S. Hrg. 109-61
CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 16, 2005
__________
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas, Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Vice Chairman
ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah CARL LEVIN, Michigan
MIKE DeWINE, Ohio DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri RON WYDEN, Oregon
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi EVAN BAYH, Indiana
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
BILL FRIST, Tennessee, Ex Officio
HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio
JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Ex Officio
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Bill Duhnke, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Andrew W. Johnson, Minority Staff Director
Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk
CONTENTS
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Page
Hearing held in Washington, DC:
February 16, 2005............................................ 1
Witness Statements:
Goss, Hon. Porter J., Director of Central Intelligence....... 7
Prepared statement....................................... 14
Jacoby, Vice Admiral Lowell, USN, Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency........................................ 45
Prepared statement....................................... 46
Loy, Admiral James, Deputy Secretary, Department of Homeland
Security................................................... 36
Prepared statement....................................... 39
Mueller, Hon. Robert S. III, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation.............................................. 18
Prepared statement....................................... 23
Rodley, Carol, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for
Intelligence and Research.................................. 59
Supplemental Materials:
Prepared Statement for the Record from Hon. Thomas Fingar,
Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research. 59
Prepared Statement for the Record from Senator Olympia J.
Snowe...................................................... 69
CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES
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WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 2005
United States Senate,
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Pat
Roberts, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senators Roberts, Hatch, Bond,
Lot, Snowe, Chambliss, Warner, Rockefeller, Levin, Feinstein,
Wyden, Bayh, and Mikulski.
OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PAT ROBERTS,
CHAIRMAN
Chairman Roberts. The hearing will come to order.
Today, the Senate Committee on Intelligence meets in open
session to conduct its annual worldwide threat hearing. I would
like to inform Members that traditionally we have a closed
hearing in the afternoon, but Secretary of State Rice is coming
to the Senate to brief all Members this afternoon.
We will follow up with individuals at our weekly
intelligence hearings, and then, obviously, a hearing or
briefing at any Member's request. So we will see all of these
people back again in a classified session at another time.
The Committee traditionally begins its annual oversight of
the U.S. intelligence community with an open hearing, so that
the public will have the benefit of the intelligence
community's best assessment of the current and projected
national security threats to the United States.
Our witnesses today are Mr. Porter Goss, the Director of
Central Intelligence. Welcome back, Mr. Director.
Director Goss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Roberts. Mr. Robert Mueller, the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation; Admiral James Loy, the Deputy
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; Vice Admiral
Lowell Jacoby, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency;
and Ms. Carol Rodley, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for Intelligence and Research. The acronym for that,
by the way, is INR.
The Committee thanks all of our distinguished witnesses for
being here today. We thank you for your commitment, for your
perseverance on your job, and for helping to keep America safe.
Before we begin the testimony, I would like to take this
opportunity to discuss an issue that has concerned and
frustrated me since I joined this Committee over 8 year ago,
and all Members of this Committee from time to time.
While we meet today in open session, the Members of this
Committee and our witnesses will be limited in what they can
say because the vast majority of the information with which
this Committee and our witnesses deal is classified. The issues
which we cover are not necessarily secret, but the details that
surround them generally are.
Our goal today is to have as open a discussion as possible,
recognizing that there are simply some things that we cannot
and must not discuss publicly. The dynamics surrounding what we
can and cannot say represents one of the most frustrating
aspects of membership on this Committee, especially when secret
intelligence activities find their way into public discourse.
How do we as a Committee assure the American people that we
are even aware of something when we cannot discuss it publicly?
How, without confirming or denying a particular story, do we
explain that concerns are misplaced, on point or off point?
Where do we draw the line between the public's right to know
and our Nation's security interests in keeping something
secret? These remain very difficult questions.
In 1976, the U.S. Senate established this Committee to
conduct vigorous oversight of the intelligence activities of
the United States government. And that is exactly what we do,
day in and day out--with, I might add--what the Vice Chairman
and I consider to be an outstanding and most capable staff.
Unfortunately, but necessarily, the Members of this
Committee are rarely at liberty to respond to public stories or
to inquiries. This does not mean, however, that we are not
aware of or deeply involved in the issue that is being
discussed.
Much of this Committee's work gets done behind closed doors
with little fanfare. And open public discussion about all of
the issues on which our Committee works is just not possible.
If we were to discuss some of the ingenious ways this Nation
does collect intelligence and protects our citizens, our
adversaries would and could develop simple countermeasures that
would eliminate these advantages, which were developed at great
cost or high risk. This secrecy does protect lives and helps us
to keep safe.
The Vice Chairman and I will, however, continue to work
together to keep the American people as informed as possible.
And when we can, we will do our best to clarify any
misconceptions that may exist. With that in mind, I will now
briefly discuss some of our plans for this Committee's
oversight in the coming months.
First, we look forward to the naming of a Director of
National Intelligence. As soon as the President nominates this
individual, we will schedule a confirmation hearing as soon as
practicable.
Second, we will monitor closely the implementation of the
Intelligence reform bill. We will focus a great deal of
attention on how this Committee can support the new DNI in the
exercise of his or her authorities. And, because no legislation
is perfect, we will also look at whether any legislative fixes
are necessary.
Third, in the area of oversight, we will focus on the
intelligence community's collection and analytical
capabilities, especially in regard to our capabilities. Do we
have the adequate collection? Do we have the adequate analysis?
Do we have the information access to make a consensus threat
analysis that is both credible and helpful to the policymakers
and the Congress?
This Committee learned from our Iraq WMD inquiry that we
cannot and should not always take the intelligence community's
assessments at face value. The Vice Chairman and I have
therefore decided to change the way the Senate Intelligence
Committee does our work.
We haven't launched anything. We haven't really begun an
investigation or an inquiry. Nor have we ruled them out. We
have simply adjusted our approach based on the lessons we
learned while reviewing the assessment by the community on
Iraq's WMD programs.
Applying the methodologies that we used in that review, we
will now look deeper into the intelligence community's work on
the very critical threats that face our Nation. Instead of
examining these issues after the fact, as we did on the Iraq
WMD question and many other matters in the past, we are going
to be more proactive, to try to identify our strengths and our
weaknesses ahead of time. We have already begun to examine our
intelligence capabilities with respect to nuclear terrorism and
also the country of Iran.
In closing, I want to say something about the limitations
of intelligence. Even the best intelligence will not be
absolutely precise and tell us what to do. However,
intelligence is a necessary and crucial tool used by
policymakers to make very difficult decisions that do directly
affect those who defend our freedoms and our national security.
With that said, I look forward to the testimony of our
witnesses, and also the questions by our Members. I now turn to
the distinguished Vice Chairman for any comment he may wish to
make.
Senator Rockefeller.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV,
VICE CHAIRMAN
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It's customary at the beginning of our hearings to welcome
everybody, and I certainly do so, and very much look forward to
your testimony. I have to say, though, I think there is a
significant absence or an empty spot at the table, at the
witness table. And I want to talk about that.
There should be another chair before us. And the little
sign in front of it should read Director of National
Intelligence, DNI. Last summer, the Congress made reforming the
intelligence community its top legislative priority. We worked
through our August recess. We came back in a lame duck session
after the election.
And we eventually passed landmark legislation fundamentally
reforming the intelligence community for the first time in 50
years. The Congress made this extraordinary effort because it
believed that our Nation was at risk, and we take that
seriously.
More specifically, the Congress--eventually joined by the
President--understood that without one individual in charge of
the 15-agency intelligence community, America's war on
terrorism would continue to be hampered by bureaucratic
infighting and by budgetary tug-of-wars, that in turn inhibit
the sharing of information--or, as we like to say, the access
to information--and limit our ability to bring all of our
resources to bear on what is a fairly ghastly threat on a
worldwide basis.
When the President signed the intelligence reform bill in
December, I really expected that when this hearing came the new
Director of National Intelligence would be here to talk about
threats.
It took 3 months for the Senate and the House to pass
separate intelligence bills--that's not really very much time--
and then resolve a multitude of differences in conference and
all kinds of back-and-forth in a way which was agreeable to the
Administration.
Two months have now passed since the bill-signing ceremony.
And the position of Director of National Intelligence remains
vacant--not even a person nominated. To me, this is
unacceptable. It's unacceptable that the Administration has not
shown the same urgency in dealing with that question that the
Congress took the trouble to create. Some agree, some don't
agree with the decision, but it was not a particularly close
vote in either house.
With absolutely no disrespect--and, in fact, a great deal
of respect to Director Goss--or any of our other witnesses, it
is unacceptable that we cannot hear from and question the one
person under the new law that is supposed to be responsible for
the overall management of how the intelligence community is
responding to the national security threats that we will be
discussing this morning.
There are other troubling consequences to the
Administration's lack of action. In recent weeks, I visited
most of the principal agencies that comprise our intelligence
community. The message I heard over and over, through words or
body language, was that the senior leadership at these agencies
was--that action on how best to carry out some key provisions
on the intelligence reform bill was being held up pending the
arrival of the new Director of National Intelligence. The delay
in appointing a DNI has kept implementation of the reform bill,
therefore, in my judgment, in idle.
So, what are the practical consequences of this delay, in
the context of today's threat hearing? I'll highlight three.
The first and most obvious is that delaying the appointment
of the DNI places that individual at a growing disadvantage in
establishing his or her team--the new directorate--and
selecting his or her supporting team of deputies within the 6
months prescribed by law, 2 months already having gone by, or
more. It's prescribed by law, has to have it done.
The second consequence of delay pertains to the
intelligence community's counterterrorism program. In addition
to establishing the position of DNI, the intelligence reform
bill mandated the creation of the National Counterterrorism
Center, or NCTC. Initially created by Executive Order, the NCTC
is chartered to be the primary organization in the U.S.
Government responsible for analyzing and integrating all
intelligence pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism.
As is the case with the DNI, the head of the NCTC is a
Senate-confirmed position and the Administration has yet to
nominate a person to carry out those crucial tasks. One could
say one has to do the DNI before the NCTC, but let's get going.
One of the primary missions of the NCTC--and I'm reading
the law now--is to conduct strategic operational planning for
counterterrorism activities, integrating all instruments of
national power, including diplomatic, financial, military,
intelligence activities, as well as homeland security and law
enforcement activities, and to assign roles and
responsibilities as part of its strategic operational planning.
My understanding is that the operational planning mission
at NCTC is not being undertaken, pending confirmation of the
new DNI. We can discuss that. So when we talk about going after
terrorists, after their organizations, where they plot and
where they train and where they keep their money, the question
is, who is carrying out this strategic operational planning
mission on this day?
In the wake of our war against the al-Qa'ida terrorist
network and its operational bases in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
the fundamentalist Islamic terrorist threat has splintered and
decentralized its operations. We need a person in charge, we
need an organization in place, that can coordinate
counterterrorist operations across agencies against this
multiplying terrorist threat.
The third immediate consequence of not having a DNI in
place is the area of proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. The proliferation activity of North Korea and
Iran, along with the damage done by Pakistani scientist A.Q.
Khan, has reduced any confidence that the nuclear genie is
contained.
The combination of these two threats--a decentralized, but
determined terrorist threat and growing proliferation
activity--present the intelligence community with a sobering
challenge, now and for the foreseeable future.
The Congress recognized the importance of this challenge in
crafting the intelligence reform bill, by authorizing the
establishment of a National Counterproliferation Center. The
new intelligence center would generally follow the blueprint of
the National Counterterrorism Center. Again, I am told and
troubled by the fact that the decision on whether or not to
establish the National Counterproliferation Center and, if so,
in what form, is being held up pending the DNI's appointment.
The proliferation activities of North Korea are a threat to
our security and the security of our allies today, as well as
down the road. And the same, of course, is true with Iran, and
we discover others as we go along. Iran, as a nuclear aspirant
and supporter of terrorism, is also center stage and very much
needs to be pursued in this manner.
Policymakers and, most importantly, the President, but also
the Congress, need the best intelligence possible on North
Korea, Iran and other hotspots around the world--Africa being
one which I may ask a question about.
The faulty intelligence used by the Administration to
invade Iraq has harmed our credibility with our allies and has
given Islamic jihadists a powerful recruiting tool around the
world that is not to anybody's advantage. We must learn from
these mistakes, as the Chairman has indicated, and get better
in how we produce timely, objective and accurate intelligence
for U.S. policymakers.
The Chairman and I have directed that the Intelligence
Committee undertake review of how intelligence on Iran is
collected, analyzed and produced. The review will be similar to
what we did before with weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
But it's going to be very proactive. The same sort of rigorous
oversight ought to apply to North Korea also, and there are
some other countries that come to mind.
I am hopeful that the Committee can also focus the efforts
of its very talented staff on the growing controversy
surrounding the collection of intelligence through the
interrogation and rendition of detainees. We need to probe the
fundamental legal, jurisdictional and operational questions,
both retrospectively and prospectively, in my mind, at the
heart of how the intelligence community collects such
intelligence.
It's undeniable that the intelligence community has made
enormous strides in the past 3 years and that some reform has
occurred. The tireless efforts of hardworking men and women at
the CIA, FBI and other intelligence agencies, like the work of
those in uniform, have been a linchpin in the effort to protect
every American against the murderous intentions of terrorists.
But there is an acknowledgement among the people I have
spoken with that we can do better and that we must get better.
The intelligence reform bill addressed that issue of
authorities, resources and organization. But the promise of
reform will not be realized without strong leadership and
management acumen--the sort of skills the DNI must bring to the
table.
Challenges abound, as the Chairman knows, for the current
and future leadership of the intelligence community. There's a
lot of work to be done on how we collect intelligence,
particularly in the arena of human intelligence, analytical
workforce problems, language problems. Our intelligence
community needs to establish a global presence that is not only
capable, but lithe, for our adversaries are increasingly mobile
and use much more sophisticated technology as they do their
work.
I know we're limited as to what we can discuss in an open
hearing, but I hope to the extent possible that our witnesses
will address some of the questions that I have raised.
I thank the witnesses and I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Roberts. Before I recognize Director Goss, I would
like to speak to the Vice Chairman's comments in regard to the
appointment of a DNI. I think this is what we used to hear on
``Perry Mason,'' with extenuating circumstances.
The intelligence reform bill was passed on December 17. The
bill says that a DNI will be appointed no later than 6 months--
that is, June 17. I think, or at least it is my opinion, that
the Administration is also awaiting the report of the
independent WMD commission, part of whose job or task is to
take a look at the intelligence reform bill and make some
recommendations.
In addition, while I share the Vice Chairman's frustration
that we wish we had here the Director of National Intelligence
and that he or she was well down the road to implementing the
reform bill, it is, I think, crucially important, not only in
terms of timing, but to get the right person. And that person
should have managerial experience, obviously, expertise in
intelligence, obviously, expertise and experience perhaps in
the military. As the Vice Chairman has pointed out, we have
certainly people in the Washington area or, for that matter,
within the United States, that certainly fit that description.
So, I hope that the Administration will move in an
expeditious fashion, but in a fashion that gets the right
person for the job.
Director Goss, you may proceed, sir.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PORTER J. GOSS,
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Director Goss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good
morning, Mr. Vice Chairman and Members of the Committee, and
thank you for the hospitable welcome here.
The challenges that you've mentioned in your opening
remarks that face the United States of America and its citizens
and our interests literally do span the globe. My intention
today is to tell you what I believe are those challenges in
terms of the most threatening and identify briefly where we
think our service as intelligence professionals is needed most
on behalf of the United States taxpayers.
We need to make some tough decisions about which haystacks
deserve to be scrutinized for the needles that can hurt us
most. And we know in this information age that there are
literally endless haystacks everywhere. There's an awful lot of
material out there.
I do want to make several things clear. Our officers are
taking risks, and I will be asking them to take more risks--
justifiable risks--because I would be much happier here
explaining why we did something than why we did nothing.
I'm asking for more competitive analysis, more co-location
of analysts and collectors--in fact, that's underway--and
deeper collaboration with agencies throughout the intelligence
community.
Above all, our analysts must be objective. Our credibility
rests there, as you pointed out well in this Committee's report
to the community issued on the WMD.
We do not make policy. We do not wage war. I am emphatic
about that. I testified to that during my confirmation, and it
is still true and it will always be. We do collect and analyze
information. With respect to the CIA, I want to tell you that
my first few months as Director have served only to confirm
what I and, I think, Members of Congress have known about CIA
for years. It is a special place. It's an organization of
dedicated, patriotic people who are doing their best.
In addition to taking a thorough, hard look at our own
capabilities, we're working to define CIA's place in the
restructured intelligence community--a community that will be
led by a new DNI, as we've heard--to make the maximum possible
contribution to American security at home and abroad that
uniquely the CIA can make.
The CIA is and will remain the flagship agency, in my view,
and each of the other 14 elements of the community will
continue to make their unique contributions, as well. I say
that as the DCI, not as the Director of Central Intelligence
Agency.
I turn to threats. I will not attempt, obviously, to cover
everything that could go wrong in the year ahead. We must and
do concentrate our efforts, experience and expertise on the
challenges that are most pressing. And they are, of course,
defeating terrorism, protecting the homeland, stopping
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and drugs,
fostering stability, freedom and peace in the most troubled
regions of the world.
My comments today will focus on these duties. I know well
from my 30 years in public service that you and your colleagues
have an important responsibility with these open sessions to
get information to the American people, as the Chairman has
stated.
I also know too well, as the Chairman has stated, that as
we are broadcasting to America, enemies are also tuning in. In
open session, I feel that I will and must be very prudent in my
remarks as DCI.
Mr. Chairman, on the subject of terrorism, defeating
terrorism must remain one of our intelligence community's core
objectives, and it will, as widely dispersed terrorist networks
will present one of the most serious challenges to the U.S.
national security interests at home and abroad in the coming
year. That's not startling news, but it's important.
In the past year, aggressive measures by our intelligence,
law enforcement, defense and homeland security communities,
along with our key international partners, have, in fact, dealt
serious blows to al-Qa'ida and other terrorist organizations
and individuals.
Despite these successes, however, the terrorist threat to
the U.S. in the homeland and abroad endures. I'd make four
points.
Al-Qa'ida is intent on finding ways to circumvent U.S.
security enhancements to strike Americans in the homeland, one.
Number two, it may be only a matter of time before al-
Qa'ida or another group attempts to use chemical, biological,
radiological or nuclear weapons. We must focus on that.
Three, al-Qa'ida is only one facet of the threat from a
broader Sunni jihadist movement.
And four, the Iraq conflict, while not a cause of
extremism, has become a cause for extremists.
We know from experience that al-Qa'ida is a patient,
persistent, imaginative, adaptive and dangerous opponent. But
it is vulnerable and displaced. We and other allies have hit it
hard. Jihadist religious leaders preach millennial,
aberrational visions of some kind of a fight for Islam's
survival. Sometimes they argue that the struggle justifies the
indiscriminate killing of civilians, even with chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. And, fortunately,
they have a small audience.
Our pursuit of al-Qa'ida and its most senior leaders,
including bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, is
intense. However, their capture alone would not be enough to
eliminate the terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland or
interests overseas. Often influenced by al-Qa'ida's ideology,
members of a broader movement have an ability to plan and
conduct operations. We saw this last March in the railway
attacks in Madrid, conducted by local Sunni extremists.
Other regional groups connected to al-Qa'ida or acting on
their own also continue to pose a significant threat. In
Pakistan, terrorist elements remain committed to attacking U.S.
targets. In Saudi Arabia, remnants of the Saudi al-Qa'ida
network continue to attack U.S. interests in the region.
In Central Asia, the Islamic Jihad Group, a splinter group
of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, has become a more
virulent threat to U.S. interests and local governments there.
Last spring, the group used female operatives in a series of
bombings in Uzbekistan, as you know.
In Southeast Asia, the Jemaah Islamiyah continues to pose a
threat to U.S. and Western interests in Indonesia and the
Philippines, where JI is colluding with the Abu Sayyaf Group
and possibly the MILF group, as well.
In Europe, Islamic extremists continue to plan and cause
attacks against U.S. and local interests. Some of them may
cause significant casualties. In 2004, British authorities
dismantled an al-Qa'ida cell--much reported. And in the
Netherlands, an extremist brutally killed a prominent Dutch
citizen--not as widely reported.
Islamic extremists are exploiting the Iraqi conflict to
recruit new, anti-U.S. jihadists. Those jihadists who survive
will leave Iraq experienced and focused on acts of urban
terrorism. They represent a potential pool of contacts to build
transnational terrorist cells, groups and networks in Saudi
Arabia, Jordan and other countries.
Zarqawi has sought to bring about the final victory of
Islam over the West, in his version of it. And he hopes to
establish a safe haven in Iraq from which his group could
operate against the ``infidel Western nations, the apostate
Muslim governments.''
Other groups spanning the globe also pose persistent and
serious threats to U.S. and Western interests. Hizbollah's main
focus remains Israel. But it could conduct lethal attacks
against U.S. interests quickly upon a decision to do so. It has
that capability, we estimate.
Palestinian terrorist organizations have apparently
refrained from directly targeting U.S. or Western interests in
their opposition to Middle East peace initiatives, but they do
pose an ongoing risk to U.S. citizens that could be killed or
wounded in attacks intended to strike Israeli interests.
Extremist groups in Latin America are still concerned with
the FARC--the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia--
possessing capability and clear intent to threaten U.S.
interests in that region.
The Horn of Africa, the Sahel, the Mahgreb, the Levant and
the Gulf States are all areas where pop-up terrorist activity
can be expected and needs to be monitored and dealt with.
Afghanistan, Mr. Chairman, once the safe haven for Usama
bin Ladin, has started on the road to recovery after decades of
instability and civil war. Hamid Karzai's election to the
presidency was a major milestone. Elections for a new national
assembly and local district councils, tentatively scheduled for
this spring--though that's an ambitious schedule--will complete
the process of electing representatives this year, hopefully.
President Karzai still faces a low-level insurgency, aimed at
destabilizing his country and raising the cost of
reconstruction, and ultimately forcing coalition forces to
leave before the job is done. The development of the Afghan
national army and the national police force is going well,
although neither can yet stand on its own.
In Iraq, low voter turnout in some Sunni areas and the
post-election resumption of insurgent attacks--most against
Iraqi civilian and security forces--indicate that the
insurgency achieved at least some of its election day goals and
remains a serious threat to creating a stable, representative
government in Iraq.
Self-determination for the Iraqi people will largely depend
on the ability of the Iraq forces to provide their own
security. Iraq's most capable security units have become more
effective in recent months, contributing to several major
operations, and helping to put an Iraqi face on security
operations. Insurgents are determined and still trying to
discourage new recruits and undermine the effectiveness of
existing Iraqi security forces by grotesque intimidation
tactics.
The prolonged lack of security would hurt Iraq's
reconstruction efforts and economic development, causing
overall economic growth to proceed at a slower pace than many
analysts expected and, certainly that the Iraqi people deserve.
Alternatively, the larger, uncommitted moderate Sunni
population and the Sunni political elite may seize the post-
electoral moment to take part in creating Iraq's new political
institutions, if victorious Shia and Kurdish parties include
Sunnis in the new government and the drafting of the
constitution. That is a hopeful opportunity.
On the subject of proliferation, Mr. Chairman, I will now
turn to the worldwide challenge. Last year started with
promise, as Libya had just renounced its WMD programs, North
Korea was engaged in negotiations with regional states on its
nuclear weapons program, and Iran was showing greater signs of
openness regarding its nuclear program after concealing
activity for nearly a decade.
Let me start with Libya, which is a bit of a good news
story and one that reflects the patient perseverance with which
the intelligence community--writ large--can tackle a tough
intelligence problem.
In 2004, Tripoli followed through with a range of steps to
disarm itself of WMD and ballistic missiles. Libya gave up key
elements of its nuclear weapons program and opened itself to
the IAEA. Libya gave up some key CW assets, and opened its
former CW program to international scrutiny.
After disclosing its Scud stockpile and extensive ballistic
and cruise missile R&D efforts in 2003, Libya took the
important step to abide by its commitment to limit its missiles
to the 300-kilometer range threshold of the Missile Technology
Control Regime.
Today, the U.S. continues to work with Libya to make sure
that any discrepancies in the declarations they have made are
clarified.
In North Korea, on the other hand, on 10 February 2005--not
long ago--Pyongyang announced it was suspending participation
in 6-party talks under way since 2003, declared it had nuclear
weapons and affirmed it would seek to increase its nuclear
arsenal. The North had been pushing for a freeze on its
plutonium program in exchange for significant benefits rather
than committing to the full dismantlement that we and our
partners seek.
In 2003, the North claimed it had reprocessed the 8,000
fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor, originally stored under
the agreed framework, with the IAEA monitoring in 1994. The
North claims to have made new weapons from its reprocessing
effort.
We believe North Korea continues to pursue a uranium
enrichment capability, drawing on the assistance it received
from A.Q. Khan before his network was shut down.
North Korea continues to develop, produce, deploy and sell
ballistic missiles of increasing range and sophistication,
augmenting Pyongyang's large operational force of Scud and
Nodong-class missiles. North Korea could resume flight testing
at any time, including longer range missiles, such as the Taepo
Dong-2 system. We assess the TD-2 is capable of reaching the
United States with a nuclear weapon-size payload.
North Korea continues to market its ballistic missile
technology, trying to find new clients now that some
traditional customers--read Libya--have halted such trade.
We believe North Korea has active CW and BW programs, and
probably has chemical and possibly biological weapons ready for
use.
Iran. In early February, the spokesman of Iran's Supreme
Council for National Security publicly announced that Iran
would never scrap its nuclear program. This came in the midst
of negotiations with EU-3 members--that would be Britain,
Germany and France--seeking objective guarantees from Tehran
that it would not use nuclear technology for nuclear weapons.
Previous comments by Iranian officials, including Iran's
supreme leader and its foreign minister, indicated that Iran
would not give up its ability to enrich uranium. Certainly, it
would be right for Iran to have the capability to produce fuel
for power reactors. But, we're more concerned about the dual-
use nature of the technology that could also be used to achieve
a nuclear weapon. We do not have transparency.
In parallel, Iran continues its pursuit of long-range
ballistic missiles, such as an improved version of a 1,300-
kilometer range Shahab-3 MRBM, to add to the hundreds of short-
range Scud missiles it already has.
Even since 9/11, Tehran continues to support terrorist
groups in the region, such as Hizbollah--it is a state
sponsor--and could encourage increased attacks in Israel and
the Palestinian territories to derail progress toward peace
there. Iran reportedly is supporting some anti-coalition
activities in Iraq and seeking to influence the future
character of the Iraqi state.
Conservatives are likely to consolidate their power in
Iran's June 2005 presidential elections, further marginalizing
the reform movement of last year. Iran continues to retain, in
secret, important members of al-Qa'ida, causing further
uncertainty about Iran's commitment to bring them to justice
one way or another.
Moving to China, Beijing's military modernization and
military buildup could tilt the balance of power in the Taiwan
Strait. Improved Chinese capabilities threaten U.S. forces in
the region. In 2004, China increased its ballistic missile
forces deployed across from Taiwan and rolled out several new
submarines. China continues to develop more robust, survivable,
nuclear-armed missiles, as well as conventional capability for
use in regional conflict.
Taiwan continues to promote constitutional reform and other
attempts to strengthen local identity. Beijing judges these
moves to be a ``timeline for independence.'' If Beijing decides
that Taiwan is taking steps toward permanent separation that
exceed Beijing's tolerance, we assess China is prepared to
respond with varying levels of force.
China is increasingly confident and active on the
international stage, trying to ensure it has a voice on major
international issues, to secure access to natural resources,
and to counter what it sees as United States efforts to contain
or encircle it.
New leadership, under President Hu Jintao, is facing an
array of domestic challenges in 2005, including the potential
for a resurgence in inflation, increased dependence on exports,
growing economic inequalities in the country, increased
awareness of individual rights, and popular expectations for
his new leadership.
In Russia, the attitudes and actions of the so-called
``siloviki''--the ex-KGB men that Putin has placed in positions
of authority throughout the Russian government--may be critical
determinates of the course Putin will pursue in the year ahead.
Perceived setbacks in Ukraine are likely to lead Putin to
redouble his efforts to defend Russian interests abroad, while
balancing cooperation with the West.
Russia's most immediate security threat is terrorism. And
counterterrorism cooperation undoubtedly will continue.
Putin publicly acknowledges a role for outside powers to
play in the confederate states, but we believe he is
nevertheless concerned about further encroachment by the U.S.
and NATO into that region.
Moscow worries that separatism inside Russia and radical
Islamic movements beyond their borders might threaten stability
in southern Russia. Chechen extremists have increasingly turned
to terrorist operations in response to Moscow's successes in
Chechnya, and it's reasonable to predict they will carry out
attacks against civilian or military targets elsewhere in
Russia in 2005.
Budget increases will help Russia create a professional
military by replacing conscript with volunteer servicemen and
focus on maintaining, modernizing and extending the operational
life of strategic weapons systems, including the nuclear
missile force.
Russia remains an important source of weapons technology,
material and components for other nations. The vulnerability of
Russian WMD materials and technology to theft or diversion is a
continuing concern.
On other areas of potential instability, Mr. Chairman, I
would briefly go to the Middle East.
The election of the Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas,
marks an important step, and Abbas has made it clear that
negotiating a peace deal with Israel is a very high priority.
That's extraordinarily good news. Nevertheless, there are
hurdles ahead.
Redlines must be resolved while the Palestinian leaders try
to rebuild damaged PA infrastructure and governing
institutions, especially the security forces, the legislature
and the judiciary--those things that will help stability.
Terrorist groups, some of whom benefit from funding from
outside sources, could step up attacks to derail peace and
progress and need close monitoring.
In Africa, chronic instability will continue to hamper
counterterrorism efforts and impose heavy humanitarian and
peacekeeping burdens on us.
In Nigeria, the military is struggling to contain militia
groups in the oil-producing south and ethnic violence that
frequently erupts throughout the country. Extremist groups are
emerging from the country's Muslim population of about 65
million. Nigeria is a big oil producer for us.
In Sudan, the peace deal signed in January will result in
de facto southern autonomy and may inspire rebels in provinces
such as Darfur to press harder for a greater share of resource
and power. Opportunities exist for Islamic extremists to
reassert themselves in the north, unless the central government
stays unified.
Unresolved disputes in the Horn of Africa--Africa's gateway
to the Middle East--create vulnerability to foreign terrorists
and extremist groups. Ethiopia and Eritrea still have a
contested border. And armed factions in Somalia indicate they
will fight the authority of a new transitional government.
In Latin America, the region is entering a major electoral
cycle in 2006. Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Peru and Venezuela hold presidential elections.
Several key countries in the hemisphere are potential
flashpoints in 2005. In Venezuela, Chavez is consolidating his
power by using technically legal tactics to target his
opponents and meddling in the region, supported by Castro.
In Colombia, progress against counternarcotics and
terrorism under President Uribe's successful leadership may be
affected by an election.
The outlook is very cloudy for legitimate, timely elections
in November 2005 in Haiti, even with substantial international
support.
Campaigning for the 2006 presidential election in Mexico is
likely to stall progress on fiscal, labor and energy reform.
And in Cuba, Castro's hold on power remains firm. But a bad
fall last October has rekindled speculation about his declining
health and the succession scenarios.
In Southeast Asia, three countries bear close watching. In
Indonesia, President Yudhoyono has moved swiftly to crack down
on corruption. But reinvigorating the economy, burned by the
cost of recovery in the tsunami-damaged area, will likely be
affected by continuing, deep-seated ethnic and political
turmoil exploitable by terrorists.
In the Philippines, Manila is struggling with prolonged
Islamic and Communist rebellion. The presence of Jemaah
Islamiyah, terrorists seeking safe haven and training bases in
the south, adds volatility and capability to terrorist groups
already in place.
And finally, Mr. Chairman, Thailand is plagued with an
increasingly volatile Muslim separatist threat in the
southeastern provinces and the risk of escalation remains very
high.
I thank you very much for that opportunity to give a brief
overview.
[The prepared statement of Director Goss follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Porter Goss,
Director of Central Intelligence
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, Members of the
Committee.
It is my honor to meet with you today to discuss the challenges I
see facing America and its interests in the months ahead. These
challenges literally span the globe. My intention is to tell you what I
believe are the greatest challenges we face today and those where our
service as intelligence professionals is needed most on behalf of the
U.S. taxpayer.
We need to make tough decisions about which haystacks deserve to be
scrutinized for the needles that can hurt us most. And we know in this
information age that there are endless haystacks everywhere. I do want
to make several things clear:
Our officers are taking risks, and I will be asking them
to take more risks--justifiable risks--because I would much rather
explain why we did something than why we did nothing,
I am asking for more competitive analysis, more
collocation of analysts and collectors, and deeper collaboration with
agencies throughout the Intelligence Community. Above all, our analysis
must be objective. Our credibility rests there.
We do not make policy. We do not wage war. I am emphatic
about that and always have been. We do collect and analyze information.
With respect to the CIA, I want to tell you that my first few
months as Director have served only to confirm what I and Members of
Congress have known about CIA for years. It is a special place--an
organization of dedicated, patriotic people. In addition to taking a
thorough, hard look at our own capabilities, we are working to define
CIA's place in the restructured Intelligence Community--a community
that will be led by a new Director of National Intelligence--to make
the maximum possible contribution to American security at home and
abroad. The CIA is and will remain the flagship agency, in my view. And
each of the other 14 elements in the community will continue to make
their unique contributions as well.
Now, I turn to threats. I will not attempt to cover everything that
could go wrong in the year ahead. We must, and do, concentrate our
efforts, experience and expertise on the challenges that are most
pressing: defeating terrorism; protecting the homeland; stopping
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and drugs; and fostering
stability, freedom and peace in the most troubled regions of the world.
Accordingly, my comments today will focus on these duties. I know well
from my 30 years in public service that you and your colleagues have an
important responsibility with these open sessions to get information to
the American people. But I also know all too well that as we are
broadcasting to America, enemies are also tuning in. In open session I
feel I must be very prudent in my remarks as DCI.
TERRORISM
Mr. Chairman, defeating terrorism must remain one of our
intelligence community's core objectives, as widely dispersed terrorist
networks will present one of the most serious challenges to U.S.
national security interests at home and abroad in the coming year. In
the past year, aggressive measures by our intelligence, law
enforcement, defense and homeland security communities, along with our
key international partners have dealt serious blows to al-Qa'ida and
others. Despite these successes, however, the terrorist threat to the
U.S. in the Homeland and abroad endures.
Al-Qa'ida is intent on finding ways to circumvent U.S.
security enhancements to strike Americans and the Homeland.
It may be only a matter of time before al-Qa'ida or
another group attempts to use chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear weapons (CBRN).
Al-Qa'ida is only one facet of the threat from a broader
Sunni jihadist movement.
The Iraq conflict, while not a cause of extremism, has
become a cause for extremists.
We know from experience that al-Qa'ida is a patient, persistent,
imaginative, adaptive and dangerous opponent. But it is vulnerable and
we and other allies have hit it hard.
Jihadist religious leaders preach millennial aberrational
visions of a fight for Islam's survival. Sometimes they argue that the
struggle justifies the indiscriminate killing of civilians, even with
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons.
Our pursuit of Al-Qa'ida and its most senior leaders, including Bin
Ladin and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri is intense. However, their
capture alone would not be enough to eliminate the terrorist threat to
the U.S. Homeland or U.S. interests overseas. Often influenced by al-
Qa'ida's ideology, members of a broader movement have an ability to
plan and conduct operations. We saw this last March in the railway
attacks in Madrid conducted by local Sunni extremists. Other regional
groups--connected to al-Qa'ida or acting on their own--also continue to
pose a significant threat.
In Pakistan, terrorist elements remain committed to
attacking U.S. targets. In Saudi Arabia, remnants of the Saudi al-
Qa'ida network continue to attack U.S. interests in the region.
In Central Asia, the Islamic Jihad Group (IJG), a splinter
group of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, has become a more virulent
threat to U.S. interests and local governments. Last spring the group
used female operatives in a series of bombings in Uzbekistan.
In Southeast Asia, the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) continues to
pose a threat to U.S. and Western interests in Indonesia and the
Philippines, where JI is colluding with the Abu Sayyaf Group and
possibly the Mff.F.
In Europe, Islamic extremists continue to plan and cause
attacks against U.S. and local interests, some that may cause
significant casualties. In 2004 British authorities dismantled an al-
Qa'ida cell and an extremist brutally killed a prominent Dutch citizen
in the Netherlands.
Islamic extremists are exploiting the Iraqi conflict to recruit new
anti-U.S. jihadists.
These jihadists who survive will leave Iraq experienced in
and focused on acts of urban terrorism. They represent a potential pool
of contacts to build transnational terrorist cells, groups, and
networks in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and other countries.
Zarqawi has sought to bring about the final victory of
Islam over the West, and he hopes to establish a safe haven in Iraq
from which his group could operate against ``infidel'' Western nations
and ``apostate'' Muslim governments.
Other terrorist groups spanning the globe also pose persistent and
serious threats to U.S. and Western interests.
Hizballah's main focus remains Israel, but it could
conduct lethal attacks against U.S. interests quickly upon a decision
to do so.
Palestinian terrorist organizations have apparently
refrained from directly targeting U.S. or Western interests in their
opposition to Middle East peace initiatives, but pose an ongoing risk
to U.S. citizens that could be killed or wounded in attacks intended to
strike Israeli interests.
Extremist groups in Latin America are still a concern,
with the FARC--the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia--possessing
the greatest capability and the clearest intent to threaten U.S.
interests in the region.
Horn of Africa, the Sahel, the Mahgreb, the Levant, and
the Gulf States are all areas where ``pop up'' terrorist activity can
be expected.
AFGHANISTAN
Mr. Chairman, Afghanistan, once the safe haven for Usama bin Ladin,
has started on the road to recovery after decades of instability and
civil war. Hamid Karzai's election to the presidency was a major
milestone. Elections for a new National Assembly and local district
councils--tentatively scheduled for this spring--will complete the
process of electing representatives.
President Karzai still faces a low-level insurgency aimed at
destabilizing the country, raising the cost of reconstruction and
ultimately forcing Coalition forces to leave.
The development of the Afghan National Army and a national
police force is going well, although neither can yet stand on its own.
IRAQ
Low voter turnout in some Sunni areas and the post-election
resumption of insurgent attacks--most against Iraqi civilian and
security forces--indicate that the insurgency achieved at least some of
its election-day goals and remains a serious threat to creating a
stable representative government in Iraq.
Self-determination for the Iraqi people will largely depend on the
ability of Iraqi forces to provide security. Iraq's most capable
security units have become more effective in recent months,
contributing to several major operations and helping to put an Iraqi
face on security operations. Insurgents are determined to discourage
new recruits and undermine the effectiveness of existing Iraqi security
forces.
The lack of security is hurting Iraq's reconstruction efforts and
economic development, causing overall economic growth to proceed at a
much slower pace than many analysts expected a year ago.
Alternatively, the larger uncommitted moderate Sunni
population and the Sunni political elite may seize the post electoral
moment to take part in creating Iraq's new political institutions if
victorious Shia and Kurdish parties include Sunnis in the new
government and the drafting of the constitution.
PROLIFERATION
Mr. Chairman, I will now turn to the worldwide challenge of
proliferation. Last year started with promise as Libya had just
renounced its WMD programs, North Korea was engaged in negotiations
with regional states on its nuclear weapons program, and Iran was
showing greater signs of openness regarding its nuclear program after
concealing activity for nearly a decade. Let me start with Libya, a
good news story, and one that reflects the patient perseverance with
which the Intelligence Community can tackle a tough intelligence
problem.
LIBYA
In 2004, Tripoli followed through with a range of steps to disarm
itself of WMD and ballistic missiles.
Libya gave up key elements of its nuclear weapons program,
opened itself to the IAEA.
Libya gave up some key CW assets and opened its former CW
program to international scrutiny.
After disclosing its SCUD stockpile and extensive
ballistic and cruise missile R&D efforts in 2003, Libya took important
steps to abide by its commitment to limit its missiles to the 300-km
range threshold of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
The U.S. continues to work with Libya to clarify some discrepancies
in the declaration.
NORTH KOREA
On 10 February 2005, Pyongyang announced it was suspending
participation in the six-party talks underway since 2003, declared it
had nuclear weapons, and affirmed it would seek to increase its nuclear
arsenal. The North had been pushing for a freeze on its plutonium
program in exchange for significant benefits, rather than committing to
the full dismantlement that we and are our partners sought.
In 2003, the North claimed it had reprocessed the 8,000
fuel rods from the Yongbyong reactor, originally stored under the
Agreed Framework, with IAEA monitoring in 1994. The North claims to
have made new weapons from its reprocessing effort.
We believe North Korea continues to pursue a uranium
enrichment capability drawing on the assistance it received from A.Q.
Khan before his network was shutdown.
North Korea continues to develop, produce, deploy, and sell
ballistic missiles of increasing range and sophistication, augmenting
Pyongyang's large operational force of Scud and No Dong class missiles.
North Korea could resume flight-testing at any time, including of
longer-range missiles, such as the Taepo Dong-2 system. We assess the
TD 2 is capable of reaching the United States with a nuclear-weapon-
sized payload.
North Korea continues to market its ballistic missile
technology, trying to find new clients now that some traditional
customers, such as Libya, have halted such trade.
We believe North Korea has active CW and BW programs and probably
has chemical and possibly biological weapons ready for use.
IRAN
In early February, the spokesman of Iran's Supreme Council for
National Security publicly announced that Iran would never scrap its
nuclear program. This came in the midst of negotiations with EU-3
members (Britain, Germany and France) seeking objective guarantees from
Tehran that it will not use nuclear technology for nuclear weapons.
Previous comments by Iranian officials, including Iran's
Supreme Leader and its Foreign Minister, indicated that Iran would not
give up its ability to enrich uranium. Certainly they can use it to
produce fuel for power reactors. We are more concerned about the dual-
use nature of the technology that could also be used to achieve a
nuclear weapon.
In parallel, Iran continues its pursuit of long-range ballistic
missiles, such as an improved version of its 1,300 km range Shahab-3
MRBM, to add to the hundreds of short-range SCUD missiles it already
has.
Even since 9/11, Tehran continues to support terrorist groups in
the region, such as Hizballah, and could encourage increased attacks in
Israel and the Palestinian Territories to derail progress toward peace.
Iran reportedly is supporting some anti-Coalition
activities in Iraq and seeking to influence the future character of the
Iraqi state.
Conservatives are likely to consolidate their power in
Iran's June 2005 presidential elections, further marginalizing the
reform movement last year.
Iran continues to retain in secret important members of
Al-Qai'ida--the Management Council--causing further uncertainty about
Iran's commitment to bring them to justice.
CHINA
Beijing's military modernization and military buildup is tilting
the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait. Improved Chinese
capabilities to threaten U.S. forces in the region.
In 2004, China increased its ballistic missile forces
deployed across from Taiwan and rolled out several new submarines.
China continues to develop more robust, survivable
nuclear-armed missiles as well as conventional capabilities for use in
a regional conflict.
Taiwan continues to promote constitutional reform and other
attempts to strengthen local identity. Beijing judges these moves to be
a ``timeline for independence''. If Beijing decides that Taiwan is
taking steps toward permanent separation that exceed Beijing's
tolerance, we believe China is prepared to respond with various levels
of force.
China is increasingly confident and active on the international
stage, trying to ensure it has a voice on major international issues,
secure access to natural resources, and counter what it sees as U.S.
efforts to contain or encircle China.
New leadership under President Hu Jintao is facing an array of
domestic challenges in 2005, such as the potential for a resurgence in
inflation, increased dependence on exports, growing economic
inequalities, increased awareness of individual rights, and popular
expectations for the new leadership.
RUSSIA
The attitudes and actions of the so-called ``siloviki''--the ex-KGB
men that Putin has placed in positions of authority throughout the
Russian government may be critical determinants of the course Putin
will pursue in the year ahead.
Perceived setbacks in Ukraine are likely to lead Putin to
redouble his efforts to defend Russian interests abroad while balancing
cooperation with the West. Russia's most immediate security threat is
terrorism, and counterterrorism cooperation undoubtedly will continue.
Putin publicly acknowledges a role for outside powers to
play in the CIS, for example, but we believe he is nevertheless
concerned about further encroachment by the U.S. and NATO into the
region.
Moscow worries that separatism inside Russia and radical
Islamic movements beyond their borders might threaten stability in
Southern Russia. Chechen extremists have increasingly turned to
terrorist operations in response to Moscow's successes in Chechnya, and
it is reasonable to predict that they will carry out attacks against
civilian or military targets elsewhere in Russia in 2005.
Budget increases will help Russia create a professional military by
replacing conscripts with volunteer servicemen and focus on
maintaining, modernizing and extending the operational life of its
strategic weapons systems, including its nuclear missile force.
Russia remains an important source of weapons technology,
materials and components for other nations. The vulnerability of
Russian WMD materials and technology to theft or diversion is a
continuing concern.
POTENTIAL AREAS FOR INSTABILITY
Mr. Chairman, in the Middle East, the election of Palestinian
President Mahmud Abbas, nevertheless, marks an important step and Abbas
has made it clear that negotiating a peace deal with Israel is a high
priority. There nevertheless are hurdles ahead.
Redlines must be resolved while Palestinian leaders try to
rebuild damaged PA infrastructure and governing institutions,
especially the security forces, the legislature, and the judiciary.
Terrorist groups, some of who benefit from funding from
outside sources, could step up attacks to derail peace and progress.
AFRICA
In Africa, chronic instability will continue to hamper counter-
terrorism efforts and pose heavy humanitarian and peacekeeping burdens.
In Nigeria, the military is struggling to contain militia
groups in the oil-producing south and ethnic violence that frequently
erupts throughout the country. Extremist groups are emerging from the
country's Muslim population of about 65 million.
In Sudan, the peace deal signed in January will result in
de facto southern autonomy and may inspire rebels in provinces such as
Darfur to press harder for a greater share of resources and power.
Opportunities exist for Islamic extremists to reassert themselves in
the North unless the central government stays unified.
Unresolved disputes in the Horn of Africa--Africa's
gateway to the Middle East--create vulnerability to foreign terrorist
and extremist groups. Ethiopia and Eritrea still have a contested
border, and armed factions in Somalia indicate they will fight the
authority of a new transitional government.
LATIN AMERICA
In Latin America, the region is entering a major electoral cycle in
2006, when Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Peru, and Venezuela hold presidential elections. Several key countries
in the hemisphere are potential flashpoints in 2005.
In Venezuela, Chavez is consolidating his power by using
technically legal tactics to target his opponents and meddling in the
region supported by Castro.
In Colombia, progress against counternarcotics and
terrorism under President Uribe's successful leadership, may be
affected by the election.
The outlook is very cloudy for legitimate, timely
elections in November 2005 in Haiti--even with substantial
international support.
Campaigning for the 2006 presidential election in Mexico
is likely to stall progress on fiscal, labor, and energy reforms.
In Cuba, Castro's hold on power remains firm, but a bad fall last
October has rekindled speculation about his declining health and
succession scenarios.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
In Southeast Asia, three countries bear close watching.
In Indonesia, President Yudhoyono has moved swiftly to
crackdown on corruption. Reinvigorating the economy, burdened by the
costs of recovery in tsunami-damaged areas, will likely be affected by
continuing deep-seated ethnic and political turmoil exploitable by
terrorists.
In the Philippines, Manila is struggling with prolonged
Islamic and Communist rebellions. The presence of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)
terrorists seeking safe haven and training basses adds volatility and
capability to terrorist groups already in place.
Thailand is plagued with an increasingly volatile Muslim.
separatist threat in its southeastern provinces, and the risk of
escalation remains high.
Chairman Roberts. We thank you, Mr. Director, for a very
comprehensive statement.
Director Mueller.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT MUELLER,
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Director Mueller. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Rockefeller and the Members
of the Committee. I appreciate this opportunity to discuss our
current view of threats to the United States and the FBI's
efforts to address these threats.
Mr. Chairman, over the past year, through unprecedented
cooperation, particularly with our other Federal agencies, but
most particularly with State and local law enforcement, and
with enhanced intelligence capabilities, we have achieved
considerable victories against national security and criminal
threats facing the United States.
However, at the same time, I must also report that these
threats continue to evolve and to pose new challenges to the
FBI and to our partners. It remains the FBI's overriding
priority to detect and prevent terrorist attacks. And the
threat posed by international terrorism, and in particular from
al-Qa'ida and from related groups, continues to be the gravest
threat that we face.
In 2004, we learned that terrorist cell members had
conducted detailed surveillance of financial targets in New
York, Washington, DC and New Jersey. In response to this threat
and in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security,
the threat level was raised. And we mobilized a substantial
contingent of agents and analysts to review the massive amount
of information connected with the attack planning and to
uncover any additional information that would give us insight
into that plot.
Later in the year, we received information suggesting that
there would be an attack. There was an attack being planned,
possibly timed to coincide with the period before the 2004
Presidential election.
To counter that threat, the FBI created a task force in May
2004, and with thousands of FBI personnel working together with
hundreds of individuals from other agencies--Federal, State and
local--we brought to bear every possible resource in an effort
to identify the operatives and to disrupt the attack plan.
As part of the initiatives of this task force, field
offices conducted a thorough canvas of all of our
counterterrorism investigations, as well as all of our
sources--not only counterterrorism sources, but other sources--
in an effort to develop any further information that could help
us find these individuals.
During the 7 months that the task force was up and running,
we also checked every substantive lead provided in the threat
intelligence. It was indeed an extraordinary effort, and while
we may never know if an operation was indeed being planned, I
am certain that our response to the threat played an integral
role in disrupting any operational plans that may have been
under way.
Mr. Chairman, since we last spoke, the FBI has identified
various extremists located throughout the United States and is
monitoring their activities. My prepared statement sets forth a
number of instances in which we have taken legal action against
individuals engaged in terrorism-related activities in
Virginia, Minneapolis and New York. Although these efforts have
made us safer, they are also a sobering reminder of the threat
we continue to face.
There are three areas that cause us the greatest concern.
First is the threat from covert al-Qa'ida operatives inside the
United States who have the intention to facilitate or to
conduct an attack. Finding them is the top priority for the
FBI, but it is also one of our most difficult challenges. The
very nature of a covert operative, trained not to raise
suspicion and to appear benign, is what makes their detection
so difficult.
Whether we are talking about a true sleeper operative who
has been in place for years, waiting to be activated to conduct
an attack, or a recently deployed operative who has entered the
United States to facilitate or to conduct an attack, we are
continuously adapting our methods to reflect newly received
intelligence and to ensure we are as proactive and as targeted
as we can be in detecting their presence.
Second, we are also extremely concerned with the growing
body of sensitive reporting that continues to show al-Qa'ida's
clear intention to obtain, and to ultimately use, some form of
chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear material in its
attacks against the United States.
While we still assess that a mass casualty attack using
relatively low-tech methods will be their most likely approach,
we are concerned that they are seeking weapons of mass
destruction, including chemical weapons, so-called dirty bombs
or some form of biological agent such as anthrax.
Third, we remain concerned about the potential for al-
Qa'ida to leverage extremist groups with peripheral or
historical connections to al-Qa'ida, and particularly its
ability to exploit radical American converts and other
indigenous extremists. While we still believe that the most
serious threat to the homeland originates from al-Qa'ida
members located overseas, the bombings in Madrid last March
have heightened our concern regarding the possible role that
indigenous Islamic extremists already in the United States may
play in future terrorist plots.
We are also concerned about the possible role that
peripheral groups with a significant presence in the United
States may play, if called upon by members of al-Qa'ida to
assist them with attack planning or logistical support. The
potential recruitment of radicalized American Muslim converts
continues to be a concern and poses an increasingly challenging
issue. The process of recruitment can be subtle, and many times
self-initiated. And radicalization tends to occur over a long
period of time and under very many different circumstances.
Efforts by extremists to obtain training inside the United
States is also an ongoing concern. Although there are multiple
reports and ongoing investigations associated with paramilitary
training activities, I would suspect that extremists
nationwide, the majority of these cases involve small groups of
like-minded individuals who are inspired by the jihadist
rhetoric found in radical mosques or in prison proselytizing or
on the Internet.
Fortunately, the recent amendment to Title 18 adding a
provision prohibiting individuals from receiving military-type
training from a designated foreign terrorist organization makes
it possible now to prosecute individuals who participate or
assist individuals in receiving this type of training.
Mr. Chairman, al-Qa'ida and the groups that support it are
still the most lethal threat we face today. However, other
terrorist groups that have a presence in the United States
require careful monitoring.
It is the FBI's assessment at this time that there is a
limited threat of a coordinated terrorist attack in the United
States from Palestinian terrorist organizations such as Hamas
and the Palestine Islamic Jihad, and the al-Aqsa Martyrs
Brigade. These groups have maintained a longstanding policy of
focusing their attacks on Israeli targets in Israel and the
Palestinian territories. We believe that the primary interest
of Palestinian terrorist groups in the United States remains
the raising of funds to support their regional goals.
We are committed to cutting off the flow of these funds
from the United States to Palestinian terrorist organizations.
As an example of this effort, the former leadership of the Holy
Land for Relief and Development, a Hamas front organization,
was indicted this past year. And in another case, the Elashi
brothers, who owned and ran InfoCom, another Hamas front
organization, were prosecuted and convicted.
Of all the Palestinian groups, Hamas has the largest
presence in the United States, with a strong infrastructure
primarily focused on fundraising, propaganda for the
Palestinian cause and proselytizing. Although it would be a
major strategic shift for Hamas, its United States network is
theoretically capable of facilitating acts of terrorism in the
United States.
And like Hamas, but on a much smaller scale, the United
States-based Palestine Islamic Jihad members and supporters are
primarily engaged in fundraising, propaganda and proselytizing
activities. In 2003, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, or PIJ,
activities and capabilities in the United States were severely
undercut by the arrests of the PIJ leader Sami al-Arian and his
lieutenants. And there have been two additional arrests of
suspected PIJ activists on charges unrelated to terrorism,
which I believe are set forth in my accompanying statement.
Currently, the most likely threat of a terrorist attack
from Palestinian groups in the United States--in the United
States homeland--is from a lone-wolf scenario. In this
scenario, a terrorist attack would be perpetrated by one or
more individuals who may embrace the ideology of a Palestinian
terrorist group, but act without assistance or approval of any
established group.
And then, the Lebanese Hizbollah retains the capability to
strike in the United States, although we have no credible
information to indicate that United States-based Hizbollah
members have plans to attack American interests within the
United States or, for that matter, abroad.
I might add in 2004 we had successes in uncovering
individuals providing material support to Hizbollah, many of
those individuals involved in various criminal schemes to
provide the monies that could be sent to Lebanon, to the
coffers of Hizbollah.
Mr. Chairman, while the national attention is focused on
the substantial threat posed by international terrorists to the
homeland, the FBI must also dedicate resources to defeating a
number of other threats, as detailed in my prepared statement--
for example, domestic terrorists, motivated by a number of
political or social agendas, including white supremacists,
black separatists, animal rights/environmental terrorists,
anarchists, anti-abortion extremists and self-styled militia
groups; foreign intelligence activity, often using non-
traditional collectors such as students and business visitors,
targeting WMD information and technology, penetration of the
United States government and compromise of critical, national
assets.
There is the cyber threat from foreign governments, from
terrorist groups and from hackers with the ability and the
desire to utilize computers for illegal and harmful purposes.
And finally, there are the continuing threats posed to the
fabric of our society by organized crime, human smuggling and
trafficking, violent gangs, public corruption, civil rights
violations, crimes against children and corporate fraud.
Mr. Chairman, in combating all these threats, from
international terrorists to child predators, the FBI must
effectively collect, analyze and share intelligence. As a
result, over the past year we have continued to strengthen the
FBI's enterprise-wide intelligence program. It began in 2001,
with a dedicated analysis section in the Counterterrorism
Division.
In 2002, we created the Office of Intelligence in the
Counterterrorism Division. That structure has enhanced our
capability significantly for purposes of our counterterrorism
operations as well as the counterterrorism operations of our
partners.
In 2003, we extended this concept across all FBI programs--
criminal, cyber, counterterrorism and counterintelligence--and
unified intelligence authorities under a new FBI Office of
Intelligence, led by an Executive Assistant Director. The
Office of Intelligence has adopted the intelligence community's
best practices to direct all of our FBI intelligence
activities. Congress and the 9/11 Commission reviewed these
efforts, and provided recommendations to strengthen our
capabilities.
In the last years, in intelligence reform legislation,
alluded to by Senator Rockefeller, Congress directed us to
create the Directorate of Intelligence--a dedicated national
intelligence workforce within the FBI--and we are doing so.
This workforce consists of intelligence analysts, language
analysts, physical surveillance specialists and special agents
who can pursue an entire career in intelligence.
This integrated intelligence service leverages the core
strengths of the law enforcement community, such as reliability
of sources and fact-based analysis, while ensuring that no
walls exist between collectors, analysts and those who must act
upon the intelligence information.
The Directorate also benefits from the strong FBI history
of joint operations by unifying FBI intelligence professionals
and integrating all partners, but most particularly, State,
local and tribal law enforcement into our intelligence
structures.
Mr. Chairman, my prepared statement provides additional
information about the Directorate of Intelligence and the many
steps that the Bureau has taken to expand and to strengthen its
intelligence capabilities.
We continue to make progress, but there is still much work
to do. We do not underestimate the challenges we face, but we
are confident in our strategy and in our plans to protect the
American people.
I again would like to thank you and the Committee for your
support, and I look forward to working with you and the staff
in the months--and hopefully the years--ahead. And I'm happy to
answer any questions that you might have.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Director Mueller follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Robert S. Mueller, III, Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Senator Rockefeller, and Members of
the Committee. I appreciate this opportunity to discuss our current
view of threats to the United States and the FBI's efforts to address
them.
Before I begin, I would like to take a moment to thank all of our
partners in the Law Enforcement and Intelligence Communities. They have
shared their information and expertise, and in many cases worked side-
by-side with us, and together we made great progress over the past year
to protect our Nation and our communities from terrorism and crime.
I would also like to thank the men and women of the FBI for
continuing to embrace our changing mission, for working to enhance our
intelligence capabilities, for adapting to new technologies and new
ways of doing things, and for doing all of this without ever pausing in
our forward push to protect this country from active threats.
Mr. Chairman, over the past year, through unprecedented
cooperation, enhanced intelligence capabilities, and continued
unwavering commitment to protect the American people, we have achieved
considerable victories against national security and criminal threats
facing the U.S. However, I must also report that these threats continue
to evolve and to pose new challenges to the FBI and our partners.
It remains the FBI's overriding priority to predict and prevent
terrorist attacks. The threat posed by international terrorism, and in
particular from al Qa'ida and related groups, continues to be the
gravest we face.
AL-QA'IDA AND RELATED TERRORIST GROUPS
In 2004, our efforts in the War on Terrorism grew more
intelligence-driven, more coordinated, and produced many tangible
results.
In 2004 we learned that operatives had conducted detailed
surveillance of financial targets in New York, Washington DC, and New
Jersey. In response to this threat, in coordination with DHS, the
threat level was raised from yellow to orange for the cities referenced
in the threat and we mobilized a large contingent of analysts and
agents to review the massive amount of information connected with the
attack planning, and to uncover any additional information that would
give us insight into the plot.
Previously, in the Spring of 2004, our allies in the United Kingdom
arrested a group of terrorists who were plotting an imminent attack
inside the UK. In response, we immediately formed a task force of
analysts and agents to determine if there was a U.S. nexus to the plot
or if any of the UK subjects had links to individuals in the U.S.
Later in the year, we received information suggesting that there
was an attack being planned--possibly timed to coincide with the 2004
Presidential Election. To counter the threat, the FBI created the 2004
Threat Task Force in May 2004. With thousands of FBI personnel,
supported by individuals from outside agencies, it was the largest task
force created since 9/11, and it brought to bear every possible
resource in an effort to identify the operatives and disrupt the attack
plan.
As part of the Task Force's initiatives, field offices conducted a
thorough canvass of all counterterrorism investigations and FBI sources
to develop any further information that could help us find these
individuals. During the 7 months the task force was up and running, we
also checked every tangible lead provided in the threat intelligence.
It was an extraordinary effort and while we may never know if an
operation was indeed being planned, I am certain that the FBI's
tremendous response to the threat played an integral role in disrupting
any operational plans that may have been underway.
Mr. Chairman, since we last spoke, the FBI has identified various
extremists located throughout the U.S. and is monitoring their
activities. Although these efforts have made us safer, they are also a
sobering reminder of the threat we continue to face.
In Virginia, Mohammed Ali al-Timimi, the spiritual leader
of the Virginia Jihad training group disrupted last year, was indicted
for his involvement in the recruitment of U.S. citizens for extremist
training and jihad preparation. Al-Timimi, the primary lecturer at a
northern Virginia Islamic center, preached jihad to a small core group
of followers, provided them paramilitary training and facilitated their
travel to Pakistan in the days after September 11th to attend Lashkar-
e-Taiba training camp in preparation to fight the United States in
Afghanistan.
In Minneapolis, we arrested Mohamad Kamal El-Zahabi, a
Lebanese citizen who admitted to serving in Afghanistan and Chechnya as
a sniper and to providing sniper training at Khalden camp in
Afghanistan and in Lebanon in the 1990s. We first learned of El-Zahabi
during our investigation of Boston-based Sunni extremists Ra'ed Hijazi,
convicted for his role in the Millennium plot in Jordan, and Bassain
Kanj, who was killed in a plot to overthrow the Lebanese government in
2000.
In New York, Yassin Muhiddin Aref was arrested on money
laundering charges connected to a possible terrorist plot to kill a
Pakistani diplomat.
Unfortunately, in spite of these accomplishments, al-Qa'ida
continues to adapt and move forward with its desire to attack the
United States using any means at its disposal. Their intent to attack
us at home remains--and their resolve to destroy America has never
faltered.
Al-Qa'ida's overall attack methodology has adapted and evolved to
address the changes to their operating environment. While we still
assess that a mass casualty attack using relatively low-tech methods
will be their most likely approach, we are concerned that they are
seeking weapons of mass destruction including chemical weapons, so-
called ``dirty bombs'' or some type of biological agent such as
anthrax.
Every day, personnel in our Counterterrorism Division and in 100
Joint Terrorism Task Forces around the country, work to determine
where, when, and how the next attack will occur. The fact remains--
America is awash in desirable targets--those that are symbolic like the
U.S. Capitol and the White House--as well as the many infrastructure
targets, like nuclear power plants, mass transit systems, bridges and
tunnels, shipping and port facilities, financial centers, and
airports--that if successfully hit, would cause both mass casualties
and a crippling effect on our economy.
We continue to be concerned that U.S. transportation systems remain
a key target. The attacks in Madrid last March show the devastation
that a simple, low-tech operation can achieve and the resulting impact
to the government and economy, which makes this type of attack in the
U.S. particularly attractive to al-Qa'ida.
Another area we consider vulnerable and target rich is the energy
sector, particularly nuclear power plants. Al-Qa'ida planner Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed had nuclear power plants as part of his target set and
we have no reason to believe that al-Qa'ida has reconsidered.
Looking ahead, there are three areas that cause us the greatest
concern.
First is the threat from covert operatives who may be inside the
U.S. who have the intention to facilitate or conduct an attack. Finding
them is a top priority for the FBI, but it is also one of the most
difficult challenges. The very nature of a covert operative--trained to
not raise suspicion and to appear benign--is what makes their detection
so difficult.
Mr. Chairman, while we are proud of our accomplishments this year
and the additional insight we have gained into al-Qa'ida's activity, I
remain very concerned about what we are not seeing.
Whether we are talking about a true sleeper operative who has been
in place for years, waiting to be activated to conduct an attack or a
recently deployed operative that has entered the U.S. to facilitate or
conduct an attack, we are continuously adapting our methods to reflect
newly-received intelligence and to ensure we are as proactive and as
targeted as we can be in detecting their presence.
Second, because of al-Qa'ida's directed efforts this year to
infiltrate covert operatives into the U.S., I am also very concerned
with the growing body of sensitive reporting that continues to show al-
Qa'ida's clear intention to obtain and ultimately use some form of
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-energy explosives
(CBRNE) material in its attacks against America.
Third, we remain concerned about the potential for al-Qa'ida to
leverage extremist groups with peripheral or historical connections to
al-Qa'ida, particularly its ability to exploit radical American
converts and other indigenous extremists. While we still believe the
most serious threat to the Homeland originates from al-Qa'ida members
located overseas, the bombings in Madrid last March have heightened our
concern regarding the possible role that indigenous Islamic extremists,
already in the U.S., may play in future terrorist plots. Also of
concern is the possible role that peripheral groups with a significant
presence in the U.S. may play if called upon by members of al-Qa'ida to
assist them with attack planning or logistical support.
The potential recruitment of radicalized American Muslim converts
continues to be a concern and poses an increasingly challenging issue
for the FBI because the process of recruitment is subtle and many
times, self initiated and radicalization tends to occur over a long
period of time and under many different circumstances.
As part of our continued efforts to identify populations that may
be a target for extremist recruitment, the FBI has been involved in a
coordinated effort between law enforcement and corrections personnel to
combat the recruitment and radicalization of prison inmates. Prisons
continue to be fertile ground for extremists who exploit both a
prisoner's conversion to Islam while still in prison, as well as their
socio-economic status and placement in the community upon their
release.
Extremist recruitment at schools and universities inside the United
States also poses a particularly difficult problem. Because the
environment on campuses is so open and isolated, schools provide a
particularly impressionable and captive audience for extremists to
target.
Additionally, keeping in mind al-Qa'ida recruitment efforts occur
primarily overseas, we are closely monitoring any possible methods for
moving individuals to extremist-linked institutions overseas,
specifically religious schools and mosques that have overt ties to al-
Qa'ida or other terrorist organizations.
We are also concerned about the possibility that individuals who
are members of groups previously considered to be peripheral to the
current threat, could be convinced by more radical, external influences
to take on a facilitation or even worse--an operational role--with
little or no warning. Individual members of legitimate organizations,
such Jama'at Tabligh, may be targeted by al-Qa'ida in an effort to
exploit their networks and contacts here in the United States.
Efforts by extremists to obtain training inside the U.S. is also an
ongoing concern. Although there are multiple reports and ongoing
investigations associated with the paramilitary training activities of
suspected extremists nationwide, the majority of these cases involve
small groups of like-minded individuals who are inspired by the
jihadist rhetoric experienced in radical mosques or prison
proselytizing.
Fortunately, the recent amendment to Title 18 adding a provision
whereby an individual knowingly receiving military-type training from a
designated foreign terrorist organization is committing an offense,
makes it possible to now prosecute individuals who participate or
assist individuals in receiving this type of training.
Another area of concern is the recent merging of Iraqi jihadist
leader Abu Mu'sab alZargawi with al-Qa'ida. Zarqawi has a demonstrated
capability of directing external operations while maintaining his focus
on Iraq as noted with the disrupted Jordan plot in April.
Another aspect of extremist activity in the U.S. is the extensive
fundraising efforts by various terrorist groups. We continue to
identify and block funding conduits, freeze assets of terrorists and
those who support them, protect legitimate charities, and disrupt the
movement of money through peripheral financial systems such as Hawalas.
As part of this effort, the FBI has engaged in extensive
coordination with authorities of numerous foreign governments in
terrorist financing matters, leading to joint investigative efforts
throughout the world. The FBI's participation in a U.S.-Saudi Arabia
Joint Terrorism Task Force, the U.S.-Swiss Terrorism Financing Task
Force and the International Working Group on Terrorist Financing has
enhanced cooperation between these agencies and the U.S. and allowed
the FBI unprecedented access that has increased our understanding of
these complex financing networks. Since 2002, we have provided
terrorism financing training and technical assistance to liaison
partners in almost 50 countries.
THE THREAT FROM OTHER INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS
Mr. Chairman, al-Qa'ida and the groups that support it are still
the most lethal threat we face today. However, other terrorist groups
that have a presence in the U.S. require careful monitoring.
It is the FBI's assessment, at this time, that there is a limited
threat of a coordinated terrorist attack in the U.S. from Palestinian
terrorist organizations, such as HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic Jihad,
and the al-Agsa Martyr's Brigade. These groups have maintained a
longstanding policy of focusing their attacks on Israeli targets in
Israel and the Palestinian territories. We believe that the primary
interest of Palestinian terrorist groups in the U.S. remains the
raising of funds to support their regional goals.
The FBI is committed to staunching the flow of funds from the U.S.
to Palestinian terrorist organizations. As an example of this effort,
the former leadership of the Holy Land for Relief and Development, a
HAMAS front organization, was indicted this past year and convictions
were won against the Elashi brothers who owned and ran Infocom, another
HAMAS front organization.
Of all the Palestinian groups, HAMAS has the largest presence in
the U.S. with a robust infrastructure, primarily focused on
fundraising, propaganda for the Palestinian cause, and proselytizing.
Although it would be a major strategic shift for HAMAS, its U.S.
network is theoretically capable of facilitating acts of terrorism in
the U.S.
Like HAMAS, but on a much smaller scale, U.S.-based Palestine
Islamic Jihad members and supporters are primarily engaged in
fundraising, propaganda and proselytizing activities. In 2003, the
Palestine Islamic Jihad, or PIJ, activities and capabilities in the
U.S. were severely undercut by the arrests of the U.S. PIJ leader, Sami
al-Arian, and three of his top lieutenants. There have also been two
additional arrests of suspected PIJ activists on charges unrelated to
terrorism. There has been no indication of a new U.S. PIJ leadership
since the arrest of al-Axian.
Currently, the most likely threat of terrorist attacks from
Palestinian groups to the U.S. homeland is from a ``lone wolf
'scenario. In this scenario, a terrorist attack would be perpetrated by
one or more individuals who may embrace the ideology of a Palestinian
terrorist group, but act without assistance or approval of any
established group.
Lebanese Hizballah retains the capability to strike in the U.S.,
although we have no credible information to indicate that US-based
Hizballah members have plans to attack American interests within the
U.S. or abroad. In 2004, we had some success in uncovering individuals
providing material support to Hizballah.
In Detroit, Mahmoud Youssef Kourani was indicted in the
Eastern District of Michigan on one count of Conspiracy to Provide
Material Support to Hizballah. Kourani was already in custody for
entering the country illegally through Mexico and was involved in
fundraising activities on behalf of Hizballah.
Also in Detroit, Fawzi Assi was arrested in May of 2004
and was charged under the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act for providing material support to Hizballah. Assi was
initially arrested in 1998 after an outbound U.S. Customs search at the
Detroit Metro Airport discovered night vision goggles, one thermal
imaging scope and two Boeing Global Positioning System devices. Assi
later fled the country after being released by the court on bail, but
was later turned over to us in Lebanon to face U.S. criminal charges.
THE THREAT FROM DOMESTIC TERRORISM
While national attention is focused on the substantial threat posed
by international terrorists to the homeland, law enforcement officials
must also contend with an ongoing threat posed by domestic terrorists
based and operating strictly within the U.S. Domestic terrorists
motivated by a number of political or social agendas--including white
supremacists, black separatists, animal rights/environmental
terrorists, anarchists, anti-abortion extremists, and self-styled
militia--continue to employ violence and criminal activity in
furtherance of these agendas.
Animal rights and environmental extremists, operating under the
umbrella of the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and Earth Liberation
Front (ELF) utilize a variety of tactics against their targets,
including arson, sabotage/vandalism, theft of research animals, and the
occasional use of explosive devices.
Serious incidents of animal rights/eco-terrorism decreased in 2004,
a fact we attribute to a series of law enforcement successes that are
likely deterring large-scale arsons and property destruction. Following
a rash of serious incidents of animal rights/eco-terrorism, including a
$50 million arson in San Diego and two bombing incidents in the San
Francisco area, law enforcement authorities achieved several
significant successes which have likely deterred additional terrorist
activity. Despite these successes, we anticipate that animal rights
extremism and eco-terrorism will continue to threaten certain segments
of government and private industry, specifically in the areas of animal
research and residential/commercial development.
The potential for violence by anarchists and other emerging
revolutionary groups, such as the Anarchist Black Cross Federation
(ABCF), will continue to be an issue for law enforcement. The stated
goals of the ABCF are ``the abolishment of prisons, the system of laws,
and the Capitalist state.'' The ABCF believes in armed resistance to
achieve a stateless and classless society. ABCF has continued to
organize, recruit, and train anarchists in the tactical use of
firearms.
U.S.-based black separatist groups follow radical variants of
Islam, and in some cases express solidarity with al-Qa'ida and other
international terrorist groups.
Incidents of organized white supremacist group violence decreased
in 2004. This is due to several high profile law enforcement arrests
over the last several years, as well as the continued fragmentation of
white supremacist groups because of the deaths or the arrests of
leaders. We judge that violence on the part of white supremacists
remains an ongoing threat to government targets, Jewish individuals and
establishments, and non-white ethnic groups.
However, the right-wing Patriot movement--consisting of militias,
common law courts, tax protesters, and other anti-government
extremists--remains a continuing threat in America today. Sporadic
incidents resulting in direct clashes with law enforcement are possible
and will most likely involve State and local law enforcement personnel,
such as highway patrol officers and sheriff's deputies.
Potential violent anti-abortion extremists linked to terrorism
ideologies or groups pose a current threat. The admiration of violent
high-profile offenders by extremists highlight continued concerns
relating to potential or similar anti-abortion threat activity.
WMD PROLIFERATION AND OTHER FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE THREATS
Although the impact of terrorism is more immediate and highly
visible, espionage and foreign intelligence activity are no less a
threat to the U.S. national security. Many countries consider the U.S.
to be their primary intelligence target; so long as the U.S. maintains
its position in world affairs, it will continue to be targeted. As part
of its reinvigorated and refocused foreign counterintelligence (FCI)
program, the FBI has applied a more rigorous methodology to its efforts
to assess and articulate the current threat environment.
One of the key elements of the FBI's National Strategy for
Counterintelligence (adopted in August 2002) is the threat assessment.
Over the past 2 years, the FBI has produced comprehensive threat
assessments on several countries deemed to be of particular CI concern.
The National Strategy for Counterintelligence identified five
categories of foreign intelligence activity as being especially harmful
to the U.S. national security. These five categories of activity are
weighted in terms of importance, the in the following order:
Proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, and high-energy explosives (CBRNE) information and technology:
Penetration of the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC)
Penetration of U.S. Government entities and contractors
Compromise of Critical National Assets (CNAs), defined as
any information, policies, plans, technologies, or industries that, if
stolen, modified, or manipulated by an adversary would seriously
threaten U.S. national or economic security; and
Conduct of clandestine foreign intelligence activities in
the U.S.
Several countries have traditionally considered the U.S. to be
their primary intelligence target, as well as an adversary or threat.
This prioritization is manifested through their continued large and
active intelligence presence in the U.S. and their aggressive targeting
of U.S. persons, information and technology. Other countries, while not
necessarily viewing the U.S. as an adversary or threat, seek
information to help them compete economically, militarily, and
politically in world affairs. As the current leader in all three areas,
the U.S. becomes their primary target. For still other countries,
rather than being an intelligence target, the U.S. represents an
operating environment in which to conduct intelligence-related
activities focused on their domestic security.
Some foreign countries are becoming increasingly sophisticated in
their CI awareness, training and capabilities. Also of growing concern
is the asymmetrical threat posed by certain intelligence services that
supplement their collection capabilities in the U.S. by using non-
traditional collectors. These collectors include students, delegations,
business visitors, emigres, and retired intelligence officers who are
collecting against targets of opportunity or responding to ad hoc
requests from the intelligence services. Such non-traditional
collectors pose a potential threat across the US, requiring a
coordinated response by all FBI field offices.
The FBI does not foresee any significant changes in the official
foreign intelligence presence in the U.S. over the next two to 3 years.
However, in addition to using non-traditional collectors, several
countries appear to be exploiting their military liaison officers, who
are in the U.S. on overt, legitimate intelligence-sharing missions, to
target and collect sensitive defense information that is outside the
scope of their official access. Most difficult to identify and assess
is the intelligence collection activity being directed and/or conducted
by non-intelligence organizations, such as other foreign government
agencies and/or foreign companies. The FBI sees this type of activity
most frequently in the targeting and collection of CBRNE information
and technology.
Another challenge the FBI will face is the tendency of some foreign
intelligence services to leverage liaison relationships for
intelligence collection purposes. U.S. Government representatives
participating in international conferences and exchanges, or whose
duties include routine liaison with foreign intelligence
representatives, frequently report that their contacts engage in
elicitation, sometimes to a surprisingly aggressive level.
The FBI expects to see a continued increase in the use of
technology as an enabler for intelligence operations, such as
contacting, tasking; and debriefing sources and agents in the US.
Over the near term, the priority collection targets for these
countries will be:
The effects of the recent 2004 U.S. elections on U.S.
foreign and domestic policies;
U.S. military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan;
U.S. counterterrorism policy;
U.S. dual use technologies; and
U.S. policy vis-a-vis particular countries or regions of
the world.
The FBI expects to see continued lobbying, political influence,
and/or perception management activities by countries hoping to affect
U.S. policy.
Many foreign intelligence services will also continue to exploit
their presence in the U.S. to target and collect against third
countries. Most will also engage in defensive intelligence activities,
targeting their own expatriate and ethnic communities in the US,
especially those groups deemed to be a threat to the current regime.
The FBI's National Strategy for Counterintelligence sets forth
national priorities and strategic objectives as well as changes in
management and organizational culture intended to redirect and
significantly enhance the overall performance of the FBI's FCI program.
Program objectives and outcomes include:
Identify intelligence service objectives, officers,
assets, and operations;
Disrupt the operations of intelligence services; and
Change the behavior of exploited institutions and
individuals.
To that end, the FBI has identified five program strategies: Know
the Domain; Understand the Threat; Engage in Strategic Partnerships;
Conduct Sophisticated Operations; and Inform Policymakers.
During fiscal year 2004, the FBI FCI program accomplished the
following:
Six foreign intelligence officers and/or agents were
arrested;
67 requests for persona non grata actions and visa denials
were issued;
1,667 Intelligence Information Reports were disseminated.
In addition, the Asset Validation Review process was implemented in
July 2002, and the FBI began providing mandatory asset validation
training for Asset Coordinators in the field regarding procedures and
policies. The FBI also implemented the Agents in Laboratories
Initiative (AILI) in February 2003, through which FBI agents have been
placed in Department of Energy nuclear weapons and science
laboratories.
The FBI has also developed several strategic partnerships, to
include the Regional CI Working Group (RCIWG) Initiative, which was
established in October 2003 to implement the National Strategy for
Counterintelligence, leverage the RCIWGs in tasking our USIC partners,
address intelligence gaps, identify CI trends and priorities in the
operational arena among USIC agencies at the field level, and ensure
that all CI operational initiatives and projects across agencies are
coordinated through the FBI.
Similarly, the National CI Working Group (NCIWG) was established
and is led by the FBI and consists of other CI agency head-level
representatives. The mission is to establish ongoing interagency
planning discussions to better coordinate CI operations USIC-wide.
Domain Task Forces are CI project level task forces led by the FBI, in
vulnerabilities associated with at-risk national security projects,
i.e., sensitive technologies, information, and research and
development.
FBI field offices are developing ``business alliances'' to build
executive-level relationships and foster threat and vulnerability
information sharing, with private industries and academic institutions
located within their territories having at-risk and sensitive national
security and economic technologies, research and development projects.
Finally, the FBI has reinvigorated its CI training process. For
example, field agents are trained in the key components of basic CI
operations through an intensive 4-week Basic CI Operations course.
Other advanced, highly specialized CI courses and seminars provide
training to agents and analysts through a variety of innovative
instructional methods and include inservices and conferences, the
Interactive Multimedia Instruction and Simulation (IMIS) computer-based
training program, and the FBI Intranet.
CYBER THREATS
The cyber-threat to the U.S. is serious and continues to expand
rapidly the number of actors with both the ability and the desire to
utilize computers for illegal and harmful purposes rises.
Cyber threats stems from both State actors, including foreign
governments that use their vast resources to develop cyber technologies
with which to attack our networks, and non-state actors such as
terrorist groups and hackers that act independently of foreign
governments. The increasing number of foreign governments and non-state
actors exploiting U.S. computer networks is a major concern to the FBI
and the Intelligence Community as a whole.
State actors continue to be a threat to both our national security
as well as our economic security because they have the technical and
financial resources to support advanced network exploitation and
attack. The greatest cyber threat is posed by countries that continue
to openly conduct computer network attacks and exploitations on
American systems.
Terrorists show a growing understanding of the critical role that
information technology plays in the day-to-day operations of our
economy and national security. Their recruitment efforts have expanded
to include young people studying mathematics, computer science and
engineering in an effort to move from the limited physical attacks to
attacks against our technical systems.
Fortunately, the large majority of hackers do not have the
resources or motivation to attack the U.S. critical information
infrastructures. Most targets of the hacker are viewed as
``challenges'' to break into a system. These individuals do not
introduce malicious code to the system, but usually leave their ``cyber
signature.'' Although a nuisance, the single hacker does not pose a
great threat; however, the increasing volume of hacking activity
worldwide does inadvertently disrupt networks, including that of the
U.S. information infrastructures. Hackers that plant malicious code or
upload bots that are designed to steal information are the main threats
in this group. These individuals have the ability to take down a system
or steal trade secrets, either of which can be devastating to a company
or agency.
The growing number of hackers motivated by money is a cause for
concern. If this pool of talent is utilized by terrorists, foreign
governments or criminal organizations, the potential for a successful
cyber attack on our critical infrastructures is greatly increased.
To combat these and other cyber threats, the FBI established a
national cyber program with a Cyber Division at FBI Headquarters and
dedicated cyber squads in the field offices. The program enables us to
coordinate and facilitate investigations of those Federal criminal
violations using the Internet, computer systems, or networks. It also
helps us to build and maintain public/private alliances to maximize
counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and law enforcement cyber
response capabilities. We are also working to aggregate the
technological and investigative expertise necessary to meet the
challenges that lie ahead. We are recruiting and hiring individuals who
possess degrees and experience in computer sciences, information
systems, or related disciplines. We are looking for specialists who
possess a bedrock of experience and a profound understanding of the
cyber world.
CONVERGING CRIMINAL THREATS
It is increasingly the case that counterterrorism,
counterintelligence, cyber, and criminal investigations are
interrelated. There are rarely clear dividing lines that distinguish
terrorist, counterintelligence, and criminal activity. Recognizing this
trend toward convergence, the first priority of the FBI's Criminal
Investigative Program is to leverage criminal investigative resources
to enhance the FBI's Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence and Cyber
programs.
Terrorists use criminal enterprises and criminal activities to
support and fund terrorist organizations. The FBI's criminal
investigations of these crimes and criminal enterprises, often in task
forces in conjunction with other Federal, state, and local law
enforcement, continue to develop invaluable intelligence, as well as to
initiate investigations, which further identify the United States'
vulnerability to attack and directly support the FBI's and the
Intelligence Community's counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and
cyber crime efforts.
One of the FBI's first investigations to utilize the material
support of a terrorist organization statute evolved from a criminal
investigation of Hizballah operators utilizing credit card scams,
cigarette smuggling and loan fraud to support the purchase of dual use
equipment for Hizballah procurement leaders in Lebanon. The FBI used
the criminal RICO statute to fully neutralize this terrorist cell.
In combatting converging threats, the FBI's Criminal Program is
placing greater emphasis on the collection, analysis, dissemination and
effective use of intelligence, including intelligence derived from
criminal investigations, including intelligence derived from human
sources and the use of sophisticated investigative techniques. We are
using intelligence to identify crime problems and trends, to conduct
threat assessments, and to drive investigative efforts. Currently, we
are aggressively pursuing intelligence collection and threat
assessments on Organized Crime, Human Smuggling and Trafficking,
Violent Gangs, Public Corruption, Civil Rights, and Middle Eastern
Criminal Enterprises.
After CT, CI, and Cyber, the Criminal Investigative Program's other
priorities in descending order are Criminal Intelligence, Public
Corruption, Civil Rights, Violent Gangs, Criminal Enterprises,
Corporate and Securities Fraud, Health Care Fraud, Mortgage Fraud,
Major Financial Institution Fraud, and Crimes Against Children and
other Violent Crimes.
Public Corruption
Public Corruption continues to pose the greatest threat to the
integrity of all levels of government. Recent investigative efforts
have been intensified to identify and convict Immigration, Department
of State, and DMV officials illegally selling visas or other
citizenship documents and drivers licenses to anyone with enough money.
Their illegal activities potentially conceal the identity and purpose
of terrorists and other criminals, facilitating their entry, travel,
and operation without detection in the U.S. Other investigations have
convicted numerous law enforcement officers, including those who formed
criminal organizations involved in drug trafficking. Many major
metropolitan areas in the U.S. have witnessed the indictment and
conviction of corrupt public officials who betrayed the public trust
for profit or personal gain. Over the last 2 years alone, the FBI has
convicted more than 1050 corrupt government employees, including 177
Federal officials, 158 State officials, 360 local officials, and more
than 365 police officers. In addition to pursuing criminal
investigations against corrupt law enforcement officers, the FBI has
initiated awareness and training efforts to deter corruption, such as
``Project Integrity.''
Civil Rights
During fiscal year 2004, the FBI initiated 1,744 civil rights
investigations and obtained 154 convictions, focusing its efforts on
Hate Crimes, Color of Law, and Involuntary Servitude and Slavery
matters. The FBI and the United States depend on the support,
cooperation and assistance of the Arab, Muslim and Sikh Communities in
the United States to fight terrorism and to fight crime. These
communities are entitled to the same civil rights of every citizen and
person in the United States. The FBI has worked with these communities
to ease their fears concerning the FBI's interest in securing their
help in the fight against terrorism and to address the backlash of hate
crimes directed against them following 9/11 and the war in Iraq. Since
9/11, more than 500 hate crime investigations have been initiated,
where the victims were Arab, Muslim, Sikh, or perceived to be as such,
resulting in more than 150 Federal and local prosecutions. During 2004,
the FBI initiated 53 hate crime investigations where the victims were
of Arab, Muslim, or Sikh descent or were perceived to be such. Thirteen
of those cases resulted in criminal charges being filed by either State
or Federal law enforcement authorities. Other groups also continue to
be the victims of Hate Crimes, including African American and Jewish
communities.
Human trafficking and modern day slavery are a worldwide crime and
human rights problem, due to global, economic, and political factors.
Approximately 17,000 victims each year are lured to the United States
with false promises of good jobs and better lives and then forced to
work under brutal and inhumane conditions. Many trafficking victims,
including women and children, are forced to work in the sex industry,
prison like factories, and migrant agricultural work.
Violent Gangs
Violent gangs are more organized, larger, more violent, and more
widespread than ever before, and they pose a growing threat to the
safety and security of Americans. The Department of Justice estimates
there are approximately 30,000 gangs with more than 800,000 members in
the U.S.
Our communities continue to experience devastating incidences of
murder, drive-by shootings, and assaults by gangs mainly involved in
the sale and distribution of illicit drugs. However, gang activity
extends far beyond protection of turf. It impacts innocent citizens who
have no connection or involvement with gangs, and it increasingly
transcends municipal boundaries. Gang members travel from city to city,
between states and, on occasion, between countries to commit their
crimes.
In response, the FBI is implementing a coordinated, intelligence-
driven National Gang Strategy to disrupt and dismantle gangs that pose
the greatest threats to America's communities. In the past year, we
have increased the number of Safe Street Task Forces from 78 to 107 and
we are seeking to increase the number by an additional 10 to 20 percent
in the coming year. We are also centralizing gang investigations at FBI
Headquarters with a new $10 million National Gang Intelligence Center
(NGIC). The NGIC will collect intelligence on gangs from across the
U.S., analyze this intelligence, and disseminate it to help law
enforcement authorities throughout the country plan and execute
strategies to prevent further gang activity and violence.
The FBI has reclassified gang matters from ``violent criminal
offenders'' to ``criminal organizations and enterprises''--a higher
priority area. The new classification also allows the U.S. Department
of Justice to charge gang members under Federal racketeering statues
which can result in stiffer prison sentences for convicted subjects.
This approach is similar to the successful strategy used by the FBI to
dismantle traditional organized crime groups.
Under the National Gang Strategy, priority is given to efforts to
disrupt and dismantle gangs that are national in their scope and
exhibit significant connectivity and internal alliances. Among the
first to be targeted is Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), a violent gang which
originated in Los Angeles comprised primarily of Central American
immigrants. We have created a National Gang Task Force specifically to
address MS-13.
Criminal Enterprises
Organized criminal enterprises operating in the U.S. and throughout
the world pose increasing concerns for the international law
enforcement and intelligence communities. Their skill in using
international monetary systems to conduct and conceal their criminal
activity, their use of State of the art communications encryption to
further safeguard their illegal activity, and their transnational
mobility increases the likelihood they will escape detection or
otherwise cover their illegal activities with a cloak of legitimacy.
Although the FBI prioritizes its efforts on criminal enterprises with
possible connections to terrorist and counterintelligence activities,
public corruption, human smuggling of Special Interest Aliens and women
and children, or violent and pervasive racketeering activity, the
impact from just one criminal activity alone, theft, is staggering.
Annual property losses from cargo/high tech/retail theft is estimated
at $30 billion, from vehicle theft $8 billion, from art/cultural
heritage artifact theft $500 million, and from jewelry and gem theft
$135 million. However, theft by criminal enterprises often represents a
multifaceted threat. For example, Middle Eastern Criminal Enterprises
involved in the organized theft and resale of infant formula pose not
only an economic threat, but a public health threat to infants, and a
potential source of material support to a terrorist organization.
The FBI is increasing its intelligence collection and assessment
efforts on criminal enterprises, as well as its joint efforts with the
intelligence and law enforcement services of other nations, to combat
the criminal activities of the La Cosa Nostra, Italian, Russian,
Balkan, Albanian, Asian, African, Middle Eastern, Colombian/South
American and other criminal enterprises. The FBI/Hungarian National
Bureau of Investigation Organized Crime Task Force in Budapest,
Hungary, which is investigating a Russian Criminal Enterprise engaged
in murder, extortion, prostitution, and other significant racketeering
activity, represents an unprecedented cooperative effort between the
FBI and the Hungarians.
Although new criminal enterprises continue to emerge, the LCN
remains a formidable and ever changing criminal threat. This year, in
just one criminal scheme, identified by the Federal Trade Commission as
the largest consumer fraud investigated in the history of the United
States, members of the Gambino LCN family were convicted for using
pornographic websites and adult entertainment 1 800 numbers to defraud
thousands of individuals of $750,000,000. Asian Criminal Enterprises
also pose a continued threat, as exemplified by one which was
dismantled earlier this year during a coordinated arrest operation with
Canada, which resulted in the arrest of 36 subjects in Canada and 102
subjects in the U.S. for drug trafficking and money laundering.
Millions of dollars and 21 firearms, including an AK 47 assault rifle
and a sawed off shotgun were seized during the operation.
Corporate/Securities Fraud
Corporate fraud can cost Americans their jobs and rob them of hard-
earned savings. It shakes the public's confidence in corporate America
to its foundation. Since the initiation of the FBI Corporate Fraud Task
Force in December 2001, there have been 480 indictments and 305
convictions of corporate executives and their associates. The FBI's
efforts have also resulted in over $2 billion in restitutions,
recoveries and fines, in addition to over $30 million in seizures and
forfeitures. In the Enron, HealthSouth, Cendant Corporation, Credit
Suisse First Boston, Computer Associates International, Worldcom,
Imclone, Royal Ahold, Perigrine Systems, and America Online cases the
FBI obtained 119 indictments/informations and 79 convictions. The
former Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Worldcom is on trial in New
York and the former CEO of HealthSouth is on trial in Alabama. Several
additional high profile trials are anticipated in the near future, to
include the trial of Enron's former CEOs and Chief Accounting Officer
anticipated to be scheduled for August or September 2005.
The FBI is currently pursuing 334 Corporate Fraud cases throughout
the U.S. This is more than a 100 percent increase from fiscal year
2003. Eighteen of the pending cases involve losses to public investors
which each exceed $1 billion. Unfortunately, the volume of cases has
yet to reach a plateau, and the FBI continues to open three to six new
cases each month, each case averaging a loss exceeding $100 million.
Health Care Fraud
Americans' health care expenditures continue to climb at rates
higher than inflation and will soon consume more than 17 percent of the
Gross Domestic Product. It is estimated that health care fraud costs
consumers, Medicare, Medicaid, and private insurers tens of billions of
dollars each year in blatant fraud schemes in every sector of the
industry. The FBI recently instituted the Out Patient Surgery and
Pharmaceutical Fraud Initiatives to combat blatant fraud identified in
those health care programs. During fiscal year 2004, the FBI had 2,468
pending health care fraud investigations, obtained 693 indictments and
informations, 564 convictions or pre trial diversions, $1.05 billion in
restitution, $543 million in fines, $28.8 million in seizures, $19.05
million in forfeitures and disrupted 186 and dismantled 105 criminal
organizations.
Mortgage Fraud
The number of FBI mortgage fraud investigations, including major
undercover operations, rose from 102 in fiscal year 2001 to
approximately 550 in fiscal year 2004. This rise is expected to
continue. During FYs 2001-2004 the FBI received over 17,000 mortgage
fraud related Suspicious Activity Reports from federally insured
financial institutions alone. The FBI worked with the Mortgage Bankers'
Association (MBA), the National Notary Association (NNA), as well as
FINCEN, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and major
mortgage lending institutions, to improve the reporting and detection
of potential mortgage fraud.
Crimes Against Children/Violent Incident Crime
Of all violent crime, crimes against children and child
prostitution are of particular concern. Over 300,000 children per year
are forced into prostitution. The FBI's Lost Innocence, Child
Prostitution Initiative, has opened 13 cases in 11 field offices,
emphasizing the use of sophisticated investigative techniques, to
obtain 135 arrests/locates, 3 complaints, 13 indictments/informations,
11 convictions/pre trial diversions, and 4 child locates. Major violent
crime incidents, such as sniper murders, serial killings and child
abductions can paralyze whole communities and require the cooperative
efforts of the FBI and local, State and other Federal law enforcement
agencies. The FBI also continues to address the 6,218 bank robberies,
resulting in 153 injuries, and 15 deaths, that occurred within the
first 10 months of 2004, albeit with a greater reliance on other
agencies and a lesser use of its own resources where possible.
ENHANCING THE FBI'S CAPABILITIES
Mr. Chairman, you will notice that our accomplishments over the
past year consistently have two things in common, the effective
collection and use of intelligence and inter-agency cooperation. The
improvements that made these accomplishments possible result from the
continued efforts of the men and women of the FBI to implement a plan
that fundamentally transforms our agency and enhances our ability to
predict and prevent terrorism.
Intelligence
As set forth above, threat information crosses both internal and
external organizational boundaries. Counterterrorism efforts must draw
from, and contribute to, counterintelligence, cyber and criminal
programs. In order to most effectively address all threats, we are
continuing to strengthen the FBI's enterprise-wide intelligence
program.
We began in 2001 with a dedicated analysis section in the
Counterterrorism Division and, in 2002, we created an Office of
Intelligence in the Counterterrorism Division. The structure and
capability significantly enhanced our CT operations and those of our
partners. In 2003, we extended this concept across all FBI programs--
Criminal Cyber, Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence--and unified
intelligence authorities under a new FBI Office of Intelligence led by
an Executive Assistant Director. The Office of Intelligence adopted
Intelligence Community best practices to direct all FBI intelligence
activities. Congress and the 9/11 Commission reviewed these efforts and
provided recommendations to further strengthen the FBI's intelligence
capability.
The newly established Directorate of Intelligence is the dedicated
national security workforce that the Congress established within the
FBI. It comprises a dedicated Headquarters element and embedded
intelligence entities in each FBI field office called Field
Intelligence Groups (FIGs). The FIGs are central to the integration of
the intelligence cycle into field operations. The FIGS include Special
Agents, Intelligence Analysts, Language Specialists, and Surveillance
Specialists, as well as officers and analysts from other intelligence
and law enforcement agencies. They are responsible for coordinating,
managing, and executing all of the functions of the intelligence cycle
and have significantly improved the FBI's intelligence capability. This
integrated intelligence service leverages the core strengths of the law
enforcement culture--such as reliability of sources and fact-based
analysis--while ensuring that no walls exist between collectors,
analysts and those who must act upon intelligence information. The
Directorate also benefits from the strong FBI history of joint
operations by unifying FBI intelligence professional and integrating
all partners, particularly state, local, and tribal law enforcement,
into our intelligence structures.
The central mission of the Directorate is to optimally position the
FBI to meet current and emerging national security and criminal threats
by: (1) assuring that the FBI proactively targets threats to the US,
inhibiting them and dissuading them before they become crimes; (2)
providing useful, appropriate and timely information and analysis to
the national security, homeland security, and law enforcement
communities; and (3) building and-sustaining FBI-wide intelligence
policies and capabilities.
In 2004, we made substantial progress to expand and strengthen our
intelligence workforce. For the first time, the FBI offered recruitment
bonuses for Intelligence Analysts. As a result of these and other
efforts, the FBI received over 80,000 applications and hired over 650
Intelligence Analysts.
We built on the College of Analytic Studies, created in October
2001, with the addition of two new courses based on intelligence
community best practices: ACES 1.0, a new basis intelligence analytic
course, and ACES 1.5, a course for experienced, on-board analysts that
provides information on the latest analytic resources and techniques.
To ensure a consistent level of knowledge across the workforce on
intelligence concepts and processes, ACES Training is now mandatory for
all FBI Intelligence Analysts. We have increased our training expertise
and capacity and are on track to deliver basic training to 1,000
Intelligence Analysts by December 2005. In addition, we have
incorporated intelligence training into New Agents class, including a
joint exercise with Intelligence Analysts and joint evening seminars.
The Intelligence Analyst career path, with multiple work roles and
cross-training requirements not only provides career development
opportunities, it also creates a workforce with the agility and
flexibility needed to respond to the changing threat environment.
In addition, we implemented several initiatives to enhance the
analyst career path and improve retention. We extended the promotion
potential for analysts in the field from GS-12 to GS-14. We created an
Intelligence Analyst Advisory Board, leveraging the strong FBI culture
of creating advisory groups to provide advocacy for specific career
fields. At the same time we worked with Congress and were granted pay
flexibilities, such that FBI intelligence professionals now can be
compensated at a rate equal to that of their Intelligence Community
peers. These and other initiatives have helped us to stabilize our
attrition rate between 8 percent and 9 percent and FY05 statistics to
date look promising.
We have also taken steps to strengthen the Special Agent component
of our intelligence workforce. In March 2004 we established a new
career path for Special Agents with three objectives. First, the career
path gives all Agents experience in intelligence collection, analysis
and dissemination. Second, the career path will give Agents an
opportunity to develop specialized skills, experience and aptitudes in
one of four areas: 1) Intelligence, 2) Counterterrorism/
Counterintelligence, 3) Cyber or 4) Criminal. Third, it makes
Intelligence Officer Certification a prerequisite for advancement to
senior supervisory ranks. The Special Agent career path will produce a
cadre of Agents who are proficient in both intelligence and law
enforcement operations. This is key to achieving the full integration
of law enforcement and intelligence operations.
To improve our foreign language capabilities, we have recruited and
processed more than 50,000 translator applicants. These efforts have
resulted in the addition of 778 new Contract Linguists (net gain of 493
after attrition) and 109 new Language Analysts (net gain of 34 after
attrition). The FBI has increased its overall number of linguists by 67
percent, with the number of linguists in certain high priority
languages increasing by 200 percent or more.
We have integrated management of the FBI's Foreign Language Program
(FLP) into the Directorate of Intelligence. This integration fully
aligns F13I foreign language and intelligence management activities and
delivers a cross-cutting platform for future improvements across all
program areas, including translation quality controls.
We also established the Language Services Translation Center
(LSTC), a command and control structure at FBI Headquarters to ensure
that our finite translator resource base of over 1,300 translators,
distributed across 52 field offices, is strategically aligned with
priorities set by our operational divisions on a national level.
We have built a secure network that allows us to efficiently route
FISA audio collection to any FBI field office. This technology allows
us to more effectively utilize our national translator base.
We now possess sufficient translation capability to promptly
address all of our highest priority counterterrorism intelligence,
often within 12 hours. Of the several hundred thousand hours of audio
materials and several million pages of text collected in connection
with counterterrorism investigations over the last 2 years, a nominal
level of backlog exists only because of obscure languages or dialects.
We have instituted a national translation quality assurance
program. Countervailing operational pressures, however, limit our
ability to fully comply with instituted translation review procedures
in those languages for which demand continues to outpace supply. In
those languages for which we have already achieved excess translation
capacity, e.g., Farsi, Pashto, and Vietnamese, 100 percent quality
assurance compliance is expected by April 2005.
Translation backlogs continue to exist within our
counterintelligence program. To target these deficiencies, we have
implemented a highly successful workforce planning model which links
field-wide workload measurements, trend analysis, and geo-political
indicators to our recruitment and applicant processing efforts.
In 2005, we plan to strengthen the integration of the entire
intelligence cycle (requirements management; planning and direction;
collection; processing and exploitation of collected information;
analysis and production; and dissemination) into field office
operations.
We will incorporate the recently developed new critical element
entitled, ``Intelligence,'' into the performance plans of all Special
Agents and Supervisory Special Agents; this new element emphasizes
participation in intelligence cycle functions, in particular human
source development and contributions to intelligence production.
We will also establish ``fly teams'' of Agents with intelligence
experience, Intelligence Analysts, Language Specialists, and
Surveillance Specialists to travel to five field offices and provide
hands-on guidance and training for the full integration of the
intelligence cycle within the office.
Partnerships
Our ability to coordinate and communicate with other members of the
Intelligence Community has never been better. Our face-to-face
interaction with the National Counterterrorism Center and members of
the CIA and DHS has positively impacted our ability to come together on
a common problem and the results of the cooperation are evident. Case
in point--during the election threat, analysts were able to meet daily
to discuss assessments and develop theories that were fundamental to
understanding the threat, and from those meetings, online forums were
created to facilitate continued sharing of ideas and new intelligence
finds--all from the desktop.
The FBI's Information Sharing Policy Group, chaired by the FBI's
EAD--Intelligence, brings together the FBI entities that generate and
disseminate law enforcement information and intelligence to implement
the FBI's goal of sharing as much as possible consistent with security
and privacy protections.
Within the Intelligence Community, the FBI has a two-level
approach:
1. For those agencies that operate at the Top Secret-SCI level, we
are investing in secure facilities for an FBI network (SCI On-Line, or
SCION) that is linked to the DoD-based JWICS network used by CIA, NSA,
and other national agencies.
2. For those agencies that operate at the Secret level, we have
connected the FBI's internal electronic communications system to the
DoD-based SIPRNET network that serves. As a result, all FBI Agents or
analysts who need to communicate at the Secret-level with other
agencies can do so from their desktop.
Within the law enforcement community, the FBI's National
Information Sharing Strategy (HISS) is part of the DOJ Law Enforcement
Information Sharing Program and builds upon the FBI Criminal Justice
Information (CJIS) Services program.
1. The Law Enforcement National Data Exchange (N-DEx) will provide
a nationwide capability to exchange data derived from incident and
event reports. Data from incident and arrest reports--name, address,
and non-specific crime characteristics--will be entered into a central
repository to be queried against by future data submissions. The
national scale of N-DEx will enable rapid coordination among all strata
of law enforcement.
2. The Law Enforcement Regional Data Exchange (R-DEx) will enable
the FBI to join participating Federal, state, tribal, and local law
enforcement agencies in regional fulltext information sharing systems
under standard technical procedures and policy agreements.
3. The FBI makes national intelligence more readily available to
state, tribal, and local law enforcement agencies through the Law
Enforcement Online (LEO) network.
4. The Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) also leverages the CJIS
backbone to provide realtime actionable intelligence to State and local
law enforcement.
Information Technology
Recognizing that the ability to assemble, analyze and disseminate
information both internally and with other intelligence and law
enforcement agencies is essential to our success in the war on
terrorism, the FBI has made modernization of its information technology
(IT) a priority.
Under the centralized leadership of the Chief Information Officer
(CIO), the FBI is now taking a coordinated, strategic approach to IT.
We have a Strategic IT Plan, a baseline Enterprise Architecture, and a
system for managing IT projects at each stage of their ``life cycle''
from planning and investment, through development and deployment,
operation and maintenance, and disposal. This involves regular
technical reviews to see if milestones are met.
The first two phases of the Trilogy IT modernization program have
been completed. The FBI is now modernized with:
1. Deployment of a high-speed, secure network that enables
personnel in FBI offices around the country to share data, including
audio, video and image files.
2. More than 30,000 new desktop computers with modern software
applications 3,700 printers, 1600 scanners, 465 servers and 1400
routers.
3. An IT infrastructure that provides for secure communication with
our Intelligence Community partners.
The third phase of Trilogy, which includes the Virtual Case File
(VCF) has not yet been completed. Plans for VCF have changed both in
response to identified technical problems and because the FBI's
refocused mission created requirements that did not exist when VCF was
originally envisioned, such as requirements related to information
sharing. Last June, after we determined that the product delivered did
not meet our needs, we decided to move forward with a two-track action
plan for VCF.
1. In accordance with this plan, we asked a new contractor to
examine the latest working version of the VCF as well as available off-
the-shelf software applications and those designed for other agencies,
to determine the best combination to meet the FBI's needs. In many
ways, the pace of technological innovation has overtaken our original
vision for VCF, and there are now existing products to suit our
purposes that did not exist when Trilogy began.
2. As we move forward, we will apply all that we have learned and
leverage what we have already developed, including a critical interface
to our existing data systems that will be a key component of our final
solution.
Separate from the Trilogy Program, we have successfully developed
and deployed a number of new investigative and information sharing
capabilities.
The Investigative Data Warehouse (IDW) offers Agents and analysts
alike the technology to perform link analysis, while also providing
enhanced search and analytical tools. IDW provides FBI users with a
single access point to more than 47 sources of counterterrorism data,
including information from FBI files, other government agency data, and
open source news feeds, that were previously available only through
separate, stove-piped systems. Most of these users are with the
Directorate of Intelligence, Counterterrorism or Counterintelligence
Divisions. These users provide search and analysis services using the
IDW for personnel throughout the Bureau.
The FBI Automated Messaging System (FAMS) began operations in
December and now provides more than 300 users with the capability to
send and receive critical organizational message traffic to any of the
40,000+ addresses on the Defense Messaging System (DMS). The FBI is the
first civilian agency to operate a classified DMS.
The FBI Intelligence Information Reports Dissemination System
(FIDS) is a web-based software application that allows all FBI
personnel with access to the FBI's Intranet to create and disseminate
standardized Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs) quickly and
efficiently. FIDS allows the Directorate of Intelligence to automate
and standardize IIR creation and dissemination functions.
CONCLUSION
Looking forward, we expect certain trends to continue. Our
adversaries will keep evolving, national security and criminal threats
will further converge, and old jurisdictional boundaries will become
less and less relevant. If we are to address these trends successfully,
we must be willing and able to evolve ourselves. The FBI must continue
to build our intelligence capabilities, including a strong intelligence
workforce. We must continue hiring and training personnel with
technical expertise and foreign language skills. We must continue to
seek new ways to share information and collaborate with partners in the
Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities. Above all, we must be
agile, and encourage creativity, innovation, and strategic thinking. If
we do all of these things, I am confident that we will out-network,
out-think, and ultimately defeat our adversaries.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for this opportunity. I look
forward to working with this Committee as we continue our efforts to
address threats to the U.S. I would be happy to take any questions you
might have.
Chairman Roberts. Mr. Mueller, we thank you for your
statement as well and thank you for the job you're doing, in a
very difficult challenge in changing the mission of the FBI and
still keeping the mission in regards to crime and in regards to
law enforcement.
I would say to all Members that Ms. Rodley and Admiral
Jacoby are here to answer questions. And so, Admiral Loy will
give the last prepared statement.
And I neglected to tell all of you that each and every word
of your testimony will be in the record and preserved for all
time. And so, feel free to summarize your statements.
I apologize. That's not an admonition, that's just a
statement.
Admiral Loy. And I'm not trying to pick on you.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JAMES LOY, U.S. COAST GUARD, RET., DEPUTY
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Admiral Loy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning,
Chairman Roberts and Vice Chairman Rockefeller and
distinguished Members of the Committee. I'm pleased to have the
chance to appear before you today to discuss the threats
against the U.S. homeland, as well as some of the capabilities
we've developed and must continue to develop to confront these
threats.
That important link between the intelligence we process and
the systems we develop in response cannot be understated. For
every possible action we uncover, there must be an
intentionally focused reaction designed to secure our homeland
against that threat.
In so many areas of greatest concern, vulnerabilities we've
identified, such as our transportation systems, particularly
air travel, our border functions and our critical
infrastructure, such as ports and energy facilities, we've made
very real, measurable progress that has made our Nation more
secure.
The topic of our hearing is very straightforward. What is
the nature of the worldwide threat? And from the DHS
perspective, I would make simply five, basic points.
First, the threat is unclear and complex, but enduring. The
condition is not expected to change. We continue to note
attempted entry into the U.S. by aliens who, according to
intelligence, pose a threat to our homeland.
Second, we assess that al-Qa'ida continues to be the
primary transnational threat group, although we are seeing the
emergence of other threatening groups and gangs, like MS-13,
that will also be destabilizing influences.
Third, we think we are most likely to be attacked with a
vehicle-borne improvised explosive device, because that's the
weapon of choice around the world. However, it remains very
clear that our primary adversaries continue to seek weapons of
mass effects with which they intend to strike us if they
acquire them.
Fourth, at DHS we continue to make progress in acquiring
analysts and improving our capabilities, just 2 years into our
existence. However, we have not yet fully achieved the
capability in people, facilities and technical capability we
think is necessary to protect our homeland. We can, and we are
doing the job, through extraordinary effort on the part of our
intelligence professionals and through the collegial efforts of
all of those at this table and many other agencies in the
Federal sector.
And last, the intelligence community interaction with DHS
has markedly improved over this past year and we continue to
work toward full integration and interoperability. The
aftermath of the Intelligence Reform Act is being treated as an
opportunity to complete that work, to earn the respect of our
colleagues as a full and deserving player in the intelligence
community, and to allow that respect to serve as the foundation
DHS needs to fulfill its responsibilities to secure our
homeland.
Thankfully, we have not experienced another attack on our
soil since September 11, 2001. But the rest of the world has
not been so fortunate. If you ask the residents of Madrid or
Beslan or Bali or Jakarta or many others, they will assure you
that not only the threat, but also the harsh daily reality of
terrorism is alive and well around the world.
We realize that an attack here could come in any form at
any place on any timetable. Terrorist groups--even ones whose
capabilities may have been weakened by arrests and
interdictions worldwide--are patient, strategic and methodical
in their operational planning. At home, we must prepare
ourselves for any attack, from IEDs to weapons of mass
destruction, from soft targets like malls to national icons.
Intelligence suggests that al-Qa'ida may have specific
tendencies or certain intentions, both small- and large-scale.
And our efforts must stay directed to this full range of
threats. We must assume that they are assembling, or
reassembling, the capabilities they don't currently have or
those that have been taken from them. So our plan of action,
like theirs, must be even more deliberate and even more
enduring, and it is.
We have built new tools to help in each of the five
strategic areas of operational emphasis in our department. Our
charter runs from maximum domain awareness, if you will,
through prevention and protection efforts to response and
recovery planning. We have published an all-hazards, all-
threats National Response Plan and its sister document, the
National Incident Management System.
We have dramatically improved our technical ability to
share information. Tools such as the Homeland Security
Operations Center, the Homeland Security Information Network
and the Homeland Security Advisory System are steps toward full
capacity and capability. We know the end state we want to reach
and we are methodically designing the path to get there.
We have greatly improved systems to keep track of persons
who cross the border and we have begun to apply technology to
monitor the border where there is no human presence. We're
operating the US-VISIT Program to verify the identity of
travelers and stop criminals and terrorists before they can
enter our society.
We have signed Smart Border accords with our neighbors to
the north and south, Canada and Mexico, to help the highly
trained customs officers, border agents, Coast Guardsmen and
many others who monitor and patrol our Nation's nearly 7,500
miles of land border and 95,000 miles of coastline and
waterways.
We now require unprecedented scrutiny of high-risk
travelers and flights landing in or flying over the United
States, including requiring volumetric information on visas and
passports and agreeing to share passenger data with our
European allies. These are important strides to keep the doors
of our country open to legitimate visitors, but firmly shut to
terrorists.
We know that al-Qa'ida would like to impact our economy
with attacks on our financial systems, our cyber networks and
the vital elements of our global supply chain. So we've taken
measures to secure cargo and protect the infrastructure that
supports the free and safe movement of goods and people and
money around the world.
We launched the Container Security Initiative to target and
screen high-risk cargo before it reaches our shores. And today
we operate that program alongside our allies in 34 ports around
the world in 22 different countries with a growth posture
scheduled for 2005 and on into 2006. We are in the process of
finalizing, with the input from private sector stakeholders as
well as many others, a national cargo security strategy.
We included a special section on cyber security in the
newly released National Response Plan to enhance governmentwide
collaboration and coordination to prevent an attack on the
backbone of our electronic economy.
And most important, we've been careful to consider the
economic impacts and the privacy implications of any additional
security efforts, and worked to ensure that added protections
do not detract from our competitiveness or from our way of
life.
In ways large and small, seen and unseen, with advanced
technologies and additional vigilance, with the help of
countless agencies and allies at every level of government, in
the private sector and throughout the world, we have made it
harder for terrorists to attack our country, more difficult for
them to defeat our systems and reduce large gaps they once saw
in our security posture.
As the President has said, we are safer than ever before,
but we are still not safe enough. This experiment called DHS is
astonishingly complex and some dimensions of the challenge are
further along than others. That's the nature of culture and
transformational change. I'm proud to hand over a 2-year-old
department with a solid foundation and a solid sense of
direction to our incoming leadership team.
I'm deeply appreciative of the support, constructive
criticism and the resources that have come our way over the
past 2 years from the Congress. This Committee's continued
focus and review must remain our Nation's conscience until we
get this work accomplished.
Last night, I spoke to a group of 400 young people--high
school people--in a program geared to encouraging public
service. I promised them that we would do all we could to
lighten their burden when it's their turn on watch. And we can
only meet that promise when our national intelligence
capability is sound, inclusive, whole. Anything short of that
is simply unsatisfactory.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll happily answer your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Loy follows:]
Prepared Statement of Admiral James Loy, Deputy Secretary,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Good morning Chairman Roberts, Vice Chairman Rockefeller, and
distinguished Members of the Committee. I am privileged to appear
before you today to discuss the primary threats currently facing the
United States homeland, as well as their probability, immediacy, and
severity.
Most current threats to the homeland continue to be directed by al-
Qaida and its affiliated elements within the broader Sunni extremist
movement. Despite the successes the United States and our coalition
partners have had against al-Qaida and other extremists, al-Qaida
leaders and operational planners continue to think about--if not
actively plot--the next dramatic attack in the United States. We
believe that attacking the homeland remains at the top of al-Qaida's
operational priority list, despite the fact that more than 3 years have
passed since September 11, 2001. We judge that al-Qaida continues to
view the homeland as an attractive target for a variety reasons, and
that the next dramatic attack will attempt to replicate the 9/11
``model'' of multiple attacks against geographically distant and
symbolic targets that cause unprecedented economic damage, mass
casualties, and physical destruction. While al-Qaida and its affiliated
elements currently appear more capable of attacking United States
interests outside of the homeland, we believe that their intent remains
strong for attempting another major operation here.
While there are other transnational terrorist groups that possess
noteworthy capabilities to conduct attacks against United States
interests, we currently do not believe these groups are ready for or
oriented toward conducting attacks inside the homeland. However, there
is a legitimate threat posed by groups and persons who are present in
the country today (not necessarily connected to transnational terrorist
groups), including multi-national gangs and domestic groups that engage
in violence to achieve political and economic goals. These groups range
from single-issue groups such as the Earth Liberation Front to violent
criminal gangs like MS-13 to right-wing or neo-Nazi groups to ``lone-
wolf' threats. Additionally, the threat from criminal groups and
persons who engage in criminal enterprise that supports or contributes
to terrorism and which has homeland security implications remains of
concern. Examples of such activity include narcotics trafficking, money
laundering, people smuggling, contraband smuggling, illegal arms
transfers, illegal technology transfers, currency counterfeiting,
document forgery, and false identity provision. However, none of these
threats currently rises to the level of threat posed by al-Qaida and
its affiliates.
While there is no single ``crystal ball'' that allows intelligence
analysts to perfectly determine which terrorist threats are the most
probable, we believe the al-Qaida and affiliated extremist threat
remains the most likely in the near term. The strategic intent of al-
Qaida's remaining leaders and planners to attempt another dramatic
homeland attack is clear. What is less clear are al-Qaida's current
operational capabilities to execute such an attack. Though al-Qaida's
current capabilities for dramatic attacks inside the United States
might seem reduced, we also assess, based on past activity, that a1-
Qaida is patient, deliberate, and methodical in operational planning
for major attacks. Al-Qaida operates on a very long timeline.
Thus, the probability of an attack in the United States is assessed
to be high, but very much conditional and circumstantial. We believe
that while several attacks may have been considered inside the U.S.
since 9/11, and some moved forward beyond initial planning, none of
these plots was ever successfully executed due to the attackers'
operational limitations and the heightened intelligence and security
measures employed since that time.
The cyber risk from various types of malicious actors is more
significant than previously understood, and could be used to increase
the impact of a physical attack by disrupting emergency communications.
The National Intelligence Council released last year its first
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) for worldwide cyber security since
9/11, and the DHS/National Cyber Security Division's law enforcement
and intelligence branch participated in that assessment. It assessed
the cyber threat, and the result showed a significant capability and
threat from various actors.
Adding to our concern over the possibility of the next al-Qaida
attack is the potential threat of individuals inspired by al-Qaida and
its affiliates who are not in any way directly connected to the al-
Qaida core. In early 2004, several individuals in the United Kingdom
attempted to conduct attacks there, but none of these individuals was
considered an active al-Qaida member. This and other examples of
similar activity in Europe demonstrate how individuals or small groups,
who previously had provided only financial or logistical support to
Islamic extremist activities, themselves attempted to transition into
active operational roles.
The key locales that we currently judge as being at risk for attack
by al-Qaida and affiliated terrorist organizations include key person
and large group assemblages, major events as judged by the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) and the United States Intelligence
Community, ports, depots, stations, and related infrastructure, and
stadiums, auditoriums, and large buildings. Additionally, critical
infrastructure of primary importance includes nuclear, chemical,
biological, and other hazardous material facilities, bridges, tunnels,
dams, and power generation/transfer stations, energy facilities
including petroleum refining and related industries, and iconic cities
and facilities, large buildings, and complex high-density
infrastructure.
The possible means of attacking such national interests are far
ranging. We know from operational activity around the world that al-
Qaida can execute mass-casualty attacks using improvised explosive
devices (IEDs) combined with suicide operatives. The capture of
operatives overseas this past summer led to the identification of
detailed casing reports prepared prior to 9/11. The specific tactics
recommended in these reports highlights al-Qaida's ongoing interest and
preference for using vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices
(VBIEDs) to attack high-profile or symbolic targets.
Al-Qaida has demonstrated operational proficiency in using aircraft
as weapons, in particular hijacking operations, and has explored the
idea of bringing down aircraft in flight through the use of several
different IED configurations. Al-Qaida has also demonstrated a
capability to use man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADs) in
operations against aircraft overseas, although there are no indications
that it plans to use this capability for attacks inside the United
States. .
Al-Qaida and its affiliated groups have demonstrated an operational
capability to conduct dramatic, mass-casualty attacks against both hard
and soft targets inside the United States and abroad. Within this broad
operational spectrum, the most severe threats revolve around al-Qaida
and its affiliates' long-standing intent to develop, procure, or
acquire chemical, biological, radiological, and even nuclear, weapons
for mass-casualty attacks. Al-Qaida and affiliated elements currently
have the capability to produce small amounts of crude biological toxins
and toxic chemical materials, and may have acquired small amounts of
radioactive materials. However, we currently assess that al-Qaida has
not been able to acquire or develop a functioning nuclear weapon (i.e.,
one that generates a nuclear yield).
Despite al-Qaida's intent to strike us with Weapons of Mass Effect
(WME), we assess that the United States is a ``harder target'' for the
terrorist and for the illegal migrant than it was in the past because
of improvements in information sharing and security measures since 9/
11. There remain, of course, difficulties in securing the over 95,000
miles of coastline and 7,000 miles of border shared with Canada and
Mexico. Indeed, the efforts of DHS have been successful, and the
determination of the 180,000 plus Department personnel working around
the country and around the world day in and day out is strong and
completely dedicated to securing our homeland.
There is much evidence to convince us that interdiction measures
have improved; intelligence is working, technology has helped, and far
fewer illegal immigrants are now able to enter our ports of entry or
cross our borders than in the past. However, we still see persons using
fraudulent documentation; many are already on our watch lists,
attempting to enter the United States at the borders and at ports of
entry. Thus, we assess that the threat of illegal and even covert entry
is still present and likely will be for the foreseeable future.
On land, we now have greatly improved systems to keep track of
persons who cross the border and we have begun to apply technology to
monitor the border where there is no direct border patrol presence. We
also believe that fraudulent documentation is far more likely to be
discovered than in the past--owing in part to improved technology,
better training, more comprehensive data bases, the increased use of
biometrics, and better coordination among agencies.
However, entrenched human smuggling networks and corruption in
areas beyond our borders can be exploited by terrorist organizations.
Recent information from ongoing investigations, detentions, and
emerging threat streams strongly suggests that al-Qaida has considered
using the Southwest Border to infiltrate the United States. Several al-
Qaida leaders believe operatives can pay their way into the country
through Mexico and also believe illegal entry is more advantageous than
legal entry for operational security reasons. However, there is
currently no conclusive evidence that indicates al-Qaida operatives
have made successful penetrations into the United States via this
method.
In addition to the problems posed by the southwestern border, the
long United States-Canada border, often rugged and remote, includes a
variety of terrain and waterways, some suitable for illicit border
crossings. A host of unofficial border crossings can be utilized when
employing the services of alien smugglers, especially those winding
through mountain ranges and across the vast western prairie.
In addition to the threats posed at the extensive United States
land border, we believe al-Qaida remains focused on targeting civil
aviation. Since the creation of the Department in March 2003, DHS has
led Federal Government effort to harden and protect the aviation
infrastructure. The barriers and checks put in place since 9/11 at
airports and the system of baggage and cargo checks for air transported
materials have proven very effective in identification and interdiction
of unauthorized items and in the identification of persons engaged in
air travel. However, al-Qaida operatives have received flight training,
and we believe al-Qaida continues to consider new and novel methods for
planning and conducting attacks against civil aviation in the United
States. Al-Qaida still views the hijacking of commercial passenger
aircraft inside the United States as a primary objective.
Other aviation threats include the possible use of ultra-light
aircraft or remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs), although we have no
specific or credible information suggesting that terrorists have
considered these platforms for attacks in the Homeland. Additionally,
while al-Qaida has considered conducting an attack against United
States interests overseas using helicopters packed with explosives,
there is no specific or credible evidence supporting the use of
helicopters in aerial attacks within the United States. There have been
recent media reports about lasers being visible to pilots in commercial
aircraft in the United States. Although no specific or credible
information suggests terrorists plan to use high-powered lasers in the
United States, groups overseas have expressed interest in using these
devices against human sight.
At sea, we see positive changes and advances in the control system
similar to those made in land border crossing and aviation. These
advancements include improving vessel registration documentation and
identification capabilities and better search technologies and
procedures. While the complex problem with sea-transported cargo and
the checking especially of containers and container vessels remains,
significant improvements have been made since 9/11.
Al-Qaida remains the preeminent organization with both intent and
capabilities to targets United States maritime assets. A variation of
the familiar VBIED, the small, explosiveladen boat usually piloted by a
suicide operative, remains al-Qaida's weapon of choice in the maritime
environment. In addition to threats posed by terrorist attack, the
smuggling of illegal migrants via maritime means continues to be a
major concern for homeland security. This threat is expected to grow as
organized criminal groups continue to expand their operations
throughout the world. The huge profit potential in this trade will
ensure that it will remain a lucrative venture for the foreseeable
future. The inability of Central American nations to control their
borders is also an important factor favoring the smugglers.
Additionally, a small but increasing threat to homeland security is
represented by stowaways on merchant vessels and by crewmen jumping
ship. Most of these individuals are economic migrants and account for a
small fraction of illegal migration. However, their illegal activity
highlights persistent border security vulnerabilities that may be
exploited by contraband smugglers and terrorist organizations, as well
as concerns for merchant vessel and crew safety. When acting alone,
stowaways take advantage of poor security in foreign ports to simply
walk on board vessels and attempt to stay hidden for the duration of
the voyage. However, many stowaway incidents are part of criminally
organized attempts to traffic people and require the complicity of
merchant ship crewmembers. The threat posed by merchant seamen
illegally entering the United States includes deserters who depart the
ship legally, but do not return and absconders who illegally depart the
ship once in port. The use of these methods by criminals or terrorists
to enter the United States is probable.
The bottom line is that the best efforts of the DHS, of the United
States Intelligence Community, and of the entire Federal Government are
allied against terrorist efforts to stage attacks in the homeland.
However, despite these efforts and innumerable advances in information
sharing, technology, communication, and organization, any attack of any
kind could occur at any time. While we have not seen a trend by any
terrorist group to tie an act of terrorism to a particular date or
time, or even place, beyond the obvious goal of striking a locale or
transportation mode when a larger number of people might be present, we
do not believe we can predict timing unless we are somehow inside the
decisionmaking mechanism used by the terrorists.
An attack against the homeland with the most severe ramifications
would include the use of a WME, especially nuclear. We also give due
respect to the potential for some forms of biological attack to
generate high casualty numbers. Beyond that, most attacks would be
locally severe and would have larger implications psychologically,
culturally, and economically even if their immediate destructive impact
was very limited. While we have not seen such methods employed in the
homeland to date, we do worry about the possibility of small attacks--
the grenade into the outdoor restaurant, the small bomb in the public
place, the random shooting on the street--that would ostensibly be
carried out to influence U.S. authorities to react strongly in the
context of preventing such acts from occurring.
There is a risk of cyber or combined physical-cyber attacks from
various malicious actors, though it is difficult to quantify that risk.
However, the Intelligence Community believes there is sufficient risk,
and while there is no known information that anyone is preparing a
significant cyber attack, there appears to be circumstantial evidence
that terrorists are using a variety of illegal Internet behaviors to
finance their activities.
Given the anecdotal and imprecise nature of information in this
regard, it is important to focus on the whole risk picture, including
threat, vulnerabilities, and potential consequences. Accordingly, the
government is enhancing its interagency coordination through the
National Cyber Response Coordination Group (NCRCG) formalized by the
Cyber Annex to the National Response Plan to prepare for and respond to
national level cyber attacks from any sources and in the Interagency
Security Plan (ISP) to reduce our vulnerability to attacks that might
cause a major Internet disruption.
Which is the largest of the potential threats to the homeland?
Which is the most severe? Which is the most probable? These are
questions that cannot realistically be answered beyond the information
provided here. We are hesitant to make an attempt to answer these
questions beyond stating that, conditionally and circumstantially, any
event and any terrorist action is worthy of, and will continue to
receive, our full attention and interest.
Chairman Roberts, Senator Rockefeller, and Members of the
Committee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
answer any questions you may have at this time.
Chairman Roberts. Well, we thank you, Admiral, for a very
comprehensive statement.
I would tell the witnesses that we're having a closed
hearing on the threat of nuclear terrorism as of tomorrow. It's
my personal belief that if al-Qa'ida could obtain a nuclear
weapon or any material and could get it into the U.S., that
they would use it. The question is not whether al-Qa'ida would
use a nuclear weapon, but can they get one?
Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan passed secrets and equipment
to a host of rogue nations. The Pakistani government has
cooperated in our efforts to stop this activity and Mr. Khan is
under house arrest in Pakistan.
This is for Director Goss, Admiral Loy. What is your
assessment of the current status of the Khan network? Does the
fact that he is in custody mean the network is shut down? Are
there any other non-state actors that are potential Khans?
And especially for Admiral Loy, what is the Department of
Homeland Security's assessment of that threat? You have touched
on it in your statement. And more particularly, if you could be
very succinct, what steps has your department taken to prevent
or to mitigate a terrorist attack utilizing any nuclear weapon?
Director Goss.
Director Goss. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Actually, it's timely that you ask that question, because
we are further exploring our opportunities to learn about Mr.
Khan and what he has done. I am unable to give you the details
of that. They would be suitable for a closed hearing. But I can
assure you that, virtually as we speak, efforts--active,
appropriate direct efforts--are underway on that matter.
We have found, from a variety of sources, following the
leads of what we've known already, that we've uncovered many
new things. And we have found that in uncovering those things
we have not got to the end of the trail. Getting to the end of
that trail is extremely important for us.
It is a serious proliferation question. I'm pleased you're
having a closed hearing. I'd be very happy to make available
those experts in our business who can contribute to your wisdom
in a closed session.
Chairman Roberts. What about the non-state actors that are
potential Khans?
Director Goss. The potential Khans are a very nervous worry
for us, obviously. If there were a way--and that's the big
question, how would they go about getting it--would we know and
could we stop it?
In some cases, the regimes we have are good enough to
understand most of the issue and most of the stocks and where
things are supposed to be and how they're supposed to work. But
most isn't good enough. You need 100 percent to get to the
guarantee that you want.
So, the answer for non-state actors being able to get these
kinds of materials, either nuclear, chem or bio, is a reality.
Chairman Roberts. Admiral Loy, your assessment of the
nuclear terrorism threat? You touched on it in your statement.
Admiral Loy. Briefly, sir, certainly there are three or
four that we would categorize as those concerns that keep us
awake nights the most. They certainly would include nuclear,
chemical, bio and cyber. With respect directly to nuclear,
Director Goss has the inside track. I would offer--to offering
the most insight to the worldwide nature, with respect to
proliferation--our concerns at DHS go more directly to the
ability to detect those materials as they might be coming in
our direction.
In the President's budget for 2006, there is an initiative
that we're referring to as the National Nuclear Detection
Office, to be established inside the Department of Homeland
Security--not a DHS initiative, but literally a national
initiative--wherein the offices and the good capabilities of
DoD and DOJ and DOE and all others with equities in the issue
can be pooled, such that we can make some kind of an effort
that does two things--one, optimizes the deployment of current
capability in the areas of detection and, second, fences a
significant amount of money--almost a mini-Manhattan Project,
if you will--to offer us a chance to break through toward next-
generation capability of detection.
Those are the efforts that we have underway, Mr. Chairman.
And, again, if there is a closed hearing, we'd be happy to
participate.
Chairman Roberts. I'm going to change the subject. In the
last few years we've had the Joint Inquiry, the 9/11
Commission, this Committee's review in regards to WMD in Iraq--
all of which highlighted the failure to share intelligence
information across the intelligence community.
For every intelligence failure, you hear another
recommendation for more information sharing. That's the
buzzword. For too many times, when we hear about a consensus
threat, we find out there's not a consensus. I believe,
however, that information sharing is a rather limited idea that
falsely implies that the intelligence collectors own the
information that they collect.
The Vice Chairman and I also think that information sharing
means that the collectors push information to the analysts they
believe have a need to know.
I think we need to change our thinking on this issue. It's
time to be working toward a more powerful concept. We call it
information access. No one agency of the U.S. Government owns
intelligence information and any cleared analyst with a need to
know should be able to access it.
While sensitive information must still be managed--I know
that--cleared analysts should be able to pull that information
by searching all intelligence databases without having to wait
for any one agency to push the information to them, as we do it
today.
What do you think--and I'm addressing, basically, Director
Goss here--about this idea of information access, as well as
Director Mueller. Do we need to take the classification
authority away from the collection agencies and put it in the
hands of an authority, i.e., the DNI, who is neither a
collector or an analyst, who can more honestly balance the need
to know with the need to protect the sources and methods?
Director Goss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The sources and methods question I am clear on. We do need
to protect our sources and methods. The degree that some of our
sources and methods are revealed in the media from time to
time, through leaks and other matters, does not necessarily
mean we shouldn't continue to protect them. Just because it's
reported in the paper doesn't mean we're going to confirm it.
Sometimes we are able to still get further utility out of
sources and methods, even though they have been discussed,
because not everybody may read that particular paper.
But it is harmful to us, in our efforts to broaden the
product in the community, that not everybody is playing by
exactly the same rules. We find that different people treat
classifications different ways and have different reactions to
it. So I do believe you would be right in focusing some
attention on the classification and declassification process.
It is clearly an area that needs attention, something we've
talked about in the past. And it is still somewhat of a
neglected stepchild.
In the area of getting the information to who needs to
know, that's exactly on target. The trick is, who needs to
know? It was always a question of sharing with who needs to
know. The question of who makes that decision of who needs to
know has always been the problem.
We find that the audience of who needs to know is, in fact,
larger as we bring our community and its many, many elements
together that are being asked to do things--more things--not
only overseas, but particularly now at home.
Our domestic agencies--as Admiral Loy has just testified,
and as Director Mueller has testified--clearly are doing things
in the war on terrorism that require sharing of information.
Well, the foreign intelligence program, which is where the
intelligence program has always operated, is doing new business
with domestic agencies to deal with terrorism in a domestic
way, because, as you know, the foreign intelligence program is
prohibited from spying on Americans.
So, getting that piece just right has been part of the
effort, as we have gone along since 9/11. And I am pleased to
report we are doing exceedingly well, in my view, on that. And
I would hope that my colleagues would agree. There's still room
to go, but I believe we are sharing much better. I certainly
agree analysts should be driving collection and not the other
way around.
Chairman Roberts. I ask for the patience of my colleagues.
My time is up, but I would like for Director Mueller to address
this, and also Admiral Jacoby.
If you can be short and succinct, sir.
Director Mueller. I certainly agree with the premise that
those responsible for acting should have access to the
information in whatever database it resides, in whatever
agency.
I think TTIC, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, and
the National Counterterrorism Center, when it comes to
terrorism information, has taken us well along that way to give
us access to the information, regardless of in which database
it resides. Co-location, as we've co-located out in Tyson, has
helped immeasurably to break down some of those barriers.
So, I agree with the premise. I also agree with, I think,
the second premise. And that is the importance of the analysts
having access to at least information relating to the
motivations of underlying sources, the access that the
underlying source may have to the information. Having more
clarity as to what moves the person to provide the information,
to whether it be the FBI, CIA or elsewhere. And that, I think,
is something we have to work on.
Last, in terms of moving the authority from the agency to
the DNI, I do think the agency, at the outset, needs the
authority to protect its sources and methods, but it should be
reviewed by the DNI. I don't think that moving it up to the DNI
would work all that well. But I do believe that the DNI ought
to review how we classify, how we describe our sources and
methods.
Chairman Roberts. Admiral Jacoby.
STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL LOWELL JACOBY, USN,
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Admiral Jacoby. Sir, your ownership of information
statement is just right on the mark, sir. I think that's a
desperately important area for this Committee and for our
community to continue to work hard on.
Part of it that comes along with the need to know is, the
way we do business today, the collector decides who needs to
know in many cases. We need to swap that and have the analysts
who are charged with discovering information and generating
knowledge be the driver in the process.
The other part that's desperately important to this is
putting in place the Smart Network that is talked about so
concisely in the 9/11 Commission report, because applying
modern commercial information management kinds of tools will
help us to separate the content from neglected information
while still protecting the sourcing of the information. That's
a desperately important part of this whole discussion and needs
to be pursued very aggressively.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Jacoby follows:]
Prepared Statement of Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby,
U.S. Navy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Good morning Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman and Members of the
Committee. It is my honor and privilege to represent Defense
Intelligence and present what we know and believe to be the principal
threats and issues in today's world. The dedicated men and women of
Defense Intelligence work around the clock and around the world to
protect our country. Many of these active duty, reserve and civilian
intelligence professionals are working in remote and dangerous
conditions. Our mission is simple, but rarely easy. It is to discover
information and create knowledge to provide warning, identify
opportunities and deliver overwhelming advantage to our warfighters,
defense planners and national security policymakers.
This is the third time I report to you that Defense Intelligence is
engaged in a war on a global scale. Most of the forces and issues
involved in this war were addressed in my testimony last year. Several
increased in severity or changed in composition. Few, unfortunately,
decreased.
The traditional Defense Intelligence focus on military capabilities
is insufficient to identify and gauge the breadth of these threats. We
are working hard to access ``all'' information to better understand and
counter these threats. Defense Intelligence is engaged with foreign and
domestic counterparts to better integrate our capabilities. We remained
focused on information sharing and creating the ``smart networks''
described in the 9/11 Commission report. I am anxious to work with the
new Director of National Intelligence, my fellow intelligence agency
heads and others to forge a more cohesive and comprehensive
Intelligence Community.
GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM
We continue to face a variety of threats from terrorist
organizations.
Al-Qaida and Sunni Extremist Groups. The primary threat for the
foreseeable future is a network of Islamic extremists hostile to the
United States and our interests. The network is transnational and has a
broad range of capabilities, to include mass-casualty attacks. The most
dangerous and immediate threat is Sunni Islamic terrorists that form
the ``al-Qaida associated movement.''
Usama bin Ladin and his senior leadership no longer exercise
centralized control and direction. We now face an ``al-Qaida associated
movement'' of like-minded groups who interact, share resources and work
to achieve shared goals. Some of the groups comprising this movement
include Jemaah Islamiyya, responsible for the 9 September bombing of
the Australian Embassy in Jakarta and Hezb-e-Islami-Gulbuddin. Some of
the groups in the movement provide safe haven and logistical support to
al-Qaida members, others operate directly with al-Qaida and still
others fight with al-Qaida in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region.
Remnants of the senior leadership still present a threat. As is
clear in their public statements, Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri remain
focused on their strategic objectives, including another major
casualty-producing attack against the Homeland.
CBRN Terrorism. We judge terrorist groups, particularly al-Qaida,
remain interested in Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
(CBRN) weapons. Al Qaida's stated intention to conduct an attack
exceeding the destruction of 9/11 raises the possibility that planned
attacks may involve unconventional weapons. There is little doubt it
has contemplated using radiological or nuclear material. The question
is whether al-Qaida has the capability. Because they are easier to
employ, we believe terrorists are more likely to use biological agents
such as ricin or botulinum toxin or toxic industrial chemicals to cause
casualties and attack the psyche of the targeted populations.
Pressures in the Islamic World. Various factors coalesce to
sustain, and even magnify the terrorist threat.
Islam is the world's second largest religion with over 1 billion
adherents, representing 22 percent of the world's population. Due to
high birth rates, it is also the world's fastest growing religion. Only
twenty percent of Muslims are ethnic Arabs. The top four nations in
terms of Muslim population, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh and India,
are non-Arab. While the vast majority of Muslims do not advocate
violence, there are deeply felt sentiments that cross Muslims sects and
ethnic and racial groups.
Our policies in the Middle East fuel Islamic resentment. Multiple
polls show favorable ratings for the United States in the Muslim world
at all-time lows. A large majority of Jordanians oppose the War on
Terrorism, and believe Iraqis will be ``worse off' in the long term. In
Pakistan, a majority of the population holds a ``favorable'' view of
Usama bin Ladin. Across the Middle East, surveys report suspicion over
U.S. motivation for the War on Terrorism. Overwhelming majorities in
Morocco, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia believe the U.S. has a negative
policy toward the Arab world.
Usama bin Ladin has relied on Muslim resentment toward U.S.
policies in his call for a defensive jihad to oppose an American
assault on the Islamic faith and culture. He contends that all faithful
Muslims are obliged to fight, or support the jihad financially if not
physically capable of fighting. Another goal is the overthrow of
``apostate'' Muslim governments, defined as governments which do not
promote Islamic values or support or are friendly to the U.S. and other
Western countries. The goals also call for withdrawal of U.S. and other
Coalition forces from Muslim countries, the destruction of Israel and
restoration of a Palestinian State and recreation of the caliphate, a
State based on Islamic fundamental tenets.
Underlying the rise of extremism are political and socio-economic
conditions that leave many, mostly young male adults, alienated. There
is a demographic explosion or youth bubble in many Muslim countries.
The portion of the population under age 15 is 40 percent in Iraq, 49
percent in the Gaza Strip and 38 percent in Saudi Arabia. Unemployment
rates in these countries are as high as 30 percent in Saudi Arabia and
about 50 percent in the Gaza Strip.
Educational systems in many nations contribute to the appeal of
Islamic extremism. Some schools, particularly the private ``madrasas,''
actively promote Islamic extremism. School textbooks in several Middle
East states reflect a narrow interpretation of the Koran and contain
anti-Western and anti-Israeli views. Many schools concentrate on
Islamic studies focused on? memorization and recitation of the Koran
and fail to prepare students for jobs in the global economy.
Groups like al-Qaida capitalize on the economic and political
disenfranchisement to attract new recruits. Even historically local
conflicts involving Muslim minorities or fundamentalist groups such as
those in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand are generating new
support for al-Qaida and present new al-Qaida-like threats.
Saudi-Arabia. Al Saud rule is under significant pressure. In 2004,
15 significant attacks occurred against the regime, U.S. and other
Western targets in the Kingdom, an increase from 7 in 2003. Attacks in
2004 included the 6 December 2004 attack on the U.S. Consulate in
Jeddah.
Attacks since May 2003 against housing compounds, an Interior
Ministry facility, a petroleum facility and individual assassinations
caused Riyadh to attempt to aggressively counter the threat. We expect
continued assassinations, infrastructure attacks and operations
directed at Westerners in the Kingdom to discredit the regime and
discourage individuals and businesses, especially those affiliated with
the Saudi military, from remaining in the Kingdom.
Last year Saudi security forces killed or captured many of their 26
most wanted militant extremists and discovered numerous arms caches.
However, we believe there may be hundreds, if not thousands of
extremists and extremist sympathizers in the Kingdom.
Pakistan. President Musharraf continues to be a key ally in the War
on Terrorism and provides critical support against Al-Qaida and Taliban
operating in Pakistan. The economy has displayed strong growth over the
past 2 years. Indigenous and international terrorist groups have
pledged to assassinate Musharraf and other senior Pakistan government
officials and remain a significant threat. Unless Musharraf is
assassinated, Pakistan will remain stable through the year; however,
further political and economic reform is needed to continue positive
trends beyond that time.
Pakistan significantly increased its military operations and
pacification efforts in tribal areas along the Afghanistan border in
2004. These operations affected al-Qaida, Taliban, and other threat
groups by disrupting safe-havens and, in some cases, forcing them back
into Afghanistan where they are vulnerable to Coalition operations.
Pakistan also secured agreements with several tribes by successfully
balancing military action with negotiations and rewards to encourage
cooperation and limit domestic backlash. Pakistan must maintain and
expand these operations in order to permanently disrupt insurgent and
terrorist activity.
We believe international and indigenous terrorist groups continue
to pose a high threat to senior Pakistani government officials,
military officers and U.S. interests. The Prime Minister and a corps
commander have been the targets of assassination attempts since last
summer. President Musharraf remains at high risk of assassination,
although no known attempts on his life have occurred since December
2003. Investigations into the two December 2003 attempts revealed
complicity among junior officers and enlisted personnel in the
Pakistani Army and Air Force.
Our assessment remains unchanged from last year. If Musharraf were
assassinated or otherwise replaced, Pakistan's new leader would be less
pro-US. We are concerned that extremist Islamic politicians would gain
greater influence.
CONFLICT IN IRAQ
The insurgency in Iraq has grown in size and complexity over the
past year. Attacks numbered approximately 25 per day 1 year ago. Today,
they average in the 60s. Insurgents have demonstrated their ability to
increase attacks around key events such as the Iraqi Interim Government
(IIG) transfer of power, Ramadan and the recent election. Attacks on
Iraq's election day reached approximately 300, double the previous 1
day high of approximately 150 reached during last year's Ramadan.
The pattern of attacks remains the same as last year. Approximately
80 percent of all attacks occur in Sunni-dominated central Iraq. The
Kurdish north and Shia south remain relatively calm. Coalition Forces
continue to be the primary targets. Iraqi Security Forces and Iraqi
Interim Government (IIG) officials are attacked to intimidate the Iraqi
people and undermine control and legitimacy. Attacks against foreign
nationals are intended to intimidate non-government organizations and
contractors and inhibit reconstruction and economic recovery. Attacks
against the country's infrastructure, especially electricity and the
oil industry, are intended to stall economic recovery, increase popular
discontent and further undermine support for the IIG and Coalition.
Recent polls show confidence in the Iraqi Interim Government
remains high in Shia and Kurdish communities and low in Sunni areas.
Large majorities across all groups opposed attacks on Iraqi Security
Forces and Iraqi and foreign civilians. Majorities of all groups placed
great importance in the election. Sunni concern over election security
likely explains the relatively poor showing by the Sunni electorate in
comparison with the Shia and Kurdish groups. Confidence in Coalition
Forces is low. Most Iraqis see them as occupiers and a major cause of
the insurgency.
We believe Sunni Arabs, dominated by Ba'athist and Former Regime
Elements (FRE), comprise the core of the insurgency. Ba'athist/FRE and
Sunni Arab networks are likely collaborating, providing funds and
guidance across family, tribal, religious and peer group lines. Some
coordination between Sunni and Shia groups is also likely.
Militant Shia elements, including those associated with Muqtada al
Sadr, have periodically fought the Coalition. Following the latest
round of fighting last August and September, we judge Sadr's forces are
re-arming, re-organizing and training. Sadr is keeping his options open
to either participate in the political process or employ his forces.
Shia militants will remain a significant threat to the political
process and fractures within the Shia community are a concern.
Jihadists, such as al-Qaida operative Abu Musab al Zarqawi, are
responsible for many high-profile attacks. While Jihadist activity
accounts for only a fraction of the overall violence, the strategic and
symbolic nature of their attacks, combined with effective Information
Operations, has a disproportionate impact.
Foreign fighters are a small component of the insurgency and
comprise a very small percentage of all detainees. Syrian, Saudi,
Egyptian, Jordanian and Iranian nationals make up the majority of
foreign fighters. Fighters, arms and other supplies continue to enter
Iraq from virtually all of its neighbors despite increased border
security.
Insurgent groups will continue to use violence to attempt to
protect Sunni Arab interests and regain dominance. Subversion and
infiltration of emerging government institutions, security and
intelligence services will be a major problem for the new government.
Jihadists will continue to attack in Iraq in pursuit of their long-term
goals. Challenges to reconstruction, economic development and
employment will continue. Keys to success remain improving security
with an Iraqi lead, rebuilding the civil infrastructure and economy and
creating a political process that all major ethnic and sectarian groups
see as legitimate.
CONFLICT IN AFGHANISTAN
The people of Afghanistan achieved a major milestone by electing
Hamid Karzai president in October 2004 election. Approximately 70
percent or just over 8 million registered Afghans disregarded scattered
attacks by the Taliban and al-Qaida and voted. Karzai garnered 55
percent of the vote in a field of 18 candidates. The election dealt a
blow to insurgents and provides new momentum for reform, such as the
demobilization of private militias and increased government
accountability.
President Karzai has since assembled a cabinet of reform minded and
competent ministers who are ethnically and politically diverse. Most
significantly, he removed Afghanistan's most powerful warlord, Marshal
Fahim Khan, as Defense Minister.
Despite the overwhelming voter turn-out, the election's results
highlighted ethnic divisions. Karzai received a majority of the Pashtun
vote, but failed to do so within any of the other ethnic groups.
Continued ethnic divisions remain a challenge to political stability.
National Assembly elections, scheduled for later this year, will
provide the opportunity for non-Pashtuns to increase their
participation in the government.
The security situation improved over the past year. Insurgent
attacks precipitously dropped after Afghanistan's presidential
election. The primary targets remain Coalition Forces and facilities in
the southern and eastern provinces. Voter registration teams and
polling sites were attacked in these areas, reflecting the Taliban's
concern over legitimate elections. Similar attacks in the same
geographic areas are expected for elections later this year, but are
unlikely to have a significant impact.
We believe many Taliban leaders and fighters were demoralized by
their inability to derail the election and have seen their base of
support among Pashtun tribes decrease. Loss of support, plus continued
Coalition and Pakistani military operations, have prompted some to
express an interest in abandoning the insurgency and pursuing political
alternatives. Nevertheless some factions will likely remain committed
to the insurgency and seek funding to continue operations.
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND MISSILE PROLIFERATION
Nuclear Weapons. Immediately behind terrorism, nuclear
proliferation remains the most significant threats to our Nation and
international stability. We anticipate increases in the nuclear weapons
inventories of a variety of countries to include China, India, Pakistan
and North Korea.
Iran is likely continuing nuclear weapon-related endeavors in an
effort to become the dominant regional power and deter what it
perceives as the potential for U.S. or Israeli attacks. We judge Iran
is devoting significant resources to its weapons of mass destruction
and ballistic missile programs. Unless constrained by a nuclear non-
proliferation agreement, Tehran probably will have the ability to
produce nuclear weapons early in the next decade.
With declining or stagnant conventional military capabilities, we
believe North Korea considers nuclear weapons critical to deterring the
U.S. and ROK. After expelling IAEA personnel in 2002, North Korea
reactivated facilities at Yongbyon and claims it extracted and
weaponized plutonium from the 8,000 spent fuel rods. Only last week,
Pyongyang publicly claimed it had manufactured nuclear weapons. Kim
Chong-il may eventually agree to negotiate away parts of his nuclear
weapon stockpile and program and agree to some type of inspection
regime, but we judge Kim is not likely to surrender all of his nuclear
weapon capabilities. We do not know under what conditions North Korea
would sell nuclear weapons or technology.
India and Pakistan continue to expand and modernize their nuclear
weapon stockpiles. We remain concerned over the potential for
extremists to gain control of Pakistani nuclear weapons. Both nations
may develop boosted nuclear weapons, with increased yield.
Chemical and Biological Weapons. Chemical and biological weapons
pose a significant threat to our deployed forces, international
interests and homeland. Numerous states have chemical and biological
warfare programs. Some have produced and weaponized agents. While we
have no intelligence suggesting these states are planning to transfer
weapons to terrorist groups, we remain concerned and alert to the
possibility.
We anticipate the threat posed by biological and chemical agents
will become more diverse and sophisticated over the next 10 years.
Major advances in the biological sciences and information technology
will enable BW agent--both anti-human and anti-agricultural--
development. The proliferation of dual use technology compounds the
problem. Many states will remain focused on ``traditional'' BW or CW
agent programs. Others are likely to develop non-traditional chemical
agents or use advanced biotechnology to create agents that are more
difficult to detect, easier to produce, and resistant to medical
countermeasures.
Ballistic Missiles. Moscow likely views its strategic forces,
especially its nuclear armed missiles, as a symbol of great power
status and a key deterrent. Nevertheless, Russia's ballistic missile
force will continue to decline in numbers. Russia is fielding the silo-
variant of the SS-27 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and is
developing a road-mobile variant and may be developing another new ICBM
and new Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM). It recently
developed and is marketing anew Short Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM).
Russia also is trying to preserve and extend the lives of Soviet-era
missile systems.
China is modernizing and expanding its ballistic missile forces to
improve their survivability and war-fighting capabilities, enhance
their coercion and deterrence value and overcome ballistic missile
defense systems. This effort is commensurate with its growing power and
more assertive policies, especially with respect to Taiwan. It
continues to develop three new solid-propellant strategic missile
systems--the DF-31 and DF-31A road-mobile ICBMs and the JL-2 SLBM. By
2015, the number of warheads capable of targeting the continental
United States will increase several fold.
China also is developing new SRBMs, Medium Range Ballistic Missile
(MRBMs), and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (ICBMs). They are a
key component of Beijing's military modernization program. Many of
these systems will be fielded in military regions nearTaiwan. In 2004,
it added numerous SRBMs to those already existing in brigades near
Taiwan. In addition to key Taiwanese military and civilian facilities,
Chinese missiles will be capable of targeting U.S. and allied military
installations in the region to either deter outside intervention in a
Taiwan crisis or attack those installations if deterrent efforts fail.
We judge Iran will have the technical capability to develop an ICBM
by 2015. It is not clear whether Iran has decided to field such a
missile. Iran continues to field 1300-km range Shahab III MRBMs capable
of reaching Tel Aviv. Iranian officials have publicly claimed they are
developing a new 2000-km-range variant of the Shahab III. Iranian
engineers are also likely working to improve the accuracy of the
country's SRBMs.
North Korea continues to invest in ballistic missiles to defend
itself against attack, achieve diplomatic advantage and provide hard
currency through foreign sales. Its Taepo Dong 2 intercontinental
ballistic missile may be ready for testing. This missile could deliver
a nuclear warhead to parts of the United States in a two stage variant
and target all of North America with a three stage variant. North
Korean also is developing new SRBM and IRBM missiles that will put U.S.
and allied forces in the region at further risk.
Pakistan and India continue to develop new ballistic missiles,
reflecting tension between those two countries and New Delhi's desire
to become a greater regional power. Pakistan flighttested its new
solid-propellant MRBM for the first time in 2004. The Indian military
is preparing to field several new or updated SRBMs and an MRBM. India
is developing a new IRBM, the Agni III.
Syria continues to improve its missile capabilities, which it
likely considers essential compensation for conventional military
weakness. Syria is fielding updated SRBMs to replace older and shorter-
range variants.
Several nations are developing technologies to penetrate ballistic
missile defenses.
Cruise Missiles. Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs) and Lethal
Unmanned Aerodynamic Vehicles (LUAVs) are expected to pose an increased
threat to deployed U.S. and allied forces in various regions. These
capabilities are already emerging in Asia.
The numbers and capabilities of cruise missiles will increase,
fueled by maturation of land-attack and Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM)
programs in Europe, Russia, and China, sales of complete systems, and
the spread of advanced dual-use technologies and materials. Countering
today's ASCMs is a challenging problem and the difficulty in countering
these systems will increase with the introduction of more advanced
guidance and propulsion technologies. Several ASCMs will have a
secondary land-attack role.
China continues developing LACMs. We judge by 2015, it will have
hundreds of highly accurate air- and ground-launched LACMs. China is
developing and purchasing ASCMs capable of being launched from
aircraft, surface ships, submarines, and land that will be more capable
of penetrating shipboard defenses. These systems will present
significant challenges in the event of a U.S. naval force response to a
Taiwan crisis.
In the next 10 years, we expect other countries to join Russia,
China, and France as major exporters of cruise missiles. Iran and
Pakistan, for instance, are expected to develop or import LACMs. India,
in partnership with Russia, will begin production of the PJ-10, an
advanced anti-ship and land attack cruise missile, this year.
Major Exporters. Russia, China and North Korea continue to sell WMD
and missile technologies for revenue and diplomatic influence. The
Russian government, or entities within Russia, continues to support
missile programs and civil nuclear projects in China, Iran, India and
Syria. Some of the civil nuclear projects can have weapons
applications. Chinese entities continue to supply key technologies to
countries with WMD and missile programs, especially Pakistan, North
Korea and Iran, although China appears to be living up to its 1997
pledge to limit nuclear cooperation with Iran. North Korea remains the
leading supplier of missiles and technologies. In recent years, some of
the states developing WMD or ballistic missile capabilities have become
producers and potential suppliers. Iran has supplied liquid-propellant
missile technology to Syria, and has marketed its new solid-propellant
SRBM.
We also are watching non-government entities and individual
entrepreneurs. The revelations regarding the A.Q. Khan nuclear
proliferation network show how a complex international network of
suppliers with the requisite expertise and access to the needed
technology, middlemen and front companies can successfully circumvent
international controls and support multiple nuclear weapons programs.
NATIONS OF INTEREST
Iran. Iran is important to the U.S. because of its size, location,
energy resources, military strength and antipathy to U.S. interests. It
will continue support for terrorism, aid insurgents in Iraq and work to
remove the U.S. from the Middle East. It will also continue its weapons
of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. Iran's drive to
acquire nuclear weapons is a key test of international resolve and the
nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
Iran's long-term goal is to see the U.S. leave Iraq and the region.
Another Iranian goal is a weakened, decentralized and Shia-dominated
Iraq that is incapable of posing a threat to Iran. These goals and
policies most likely are endorsed by senior regime figures.
Tehran has the only military in the region that can threaten its
neighbors and Gulf stability. Its expanding ballistic missile inventory
presents a potential threat to states in the region. As new longer
range MRBMs are fielded Iran will have missiles with ranges to reach
many of our European allies. Although Iran maintains a sizable
conventional force, it has made limited progress in modernizing its
conventional capabilities. Air and air defense forces rely on out-of-
date US, Russian and Chinese equipment. Ground forces suffer from
personnel and equipment shortages. Ground forces equipment is also
poorly maintained.
We judge Iran can briefly close the Strait of Hormuz, relying on a
layered strategy using predominately naval, air, and some ground
forces. Last year it purchased North Korean torpedo and missile-armed
fast attack craft and midget submarines, making marginal improvements
to this capability.
The Iranian government is stable, exercising control through its
security services. Few anti-government demonstrations occurred in 2004.
President Khatami will leave office in June 2005 and his successor will
almost certainly be more conservative. The political reform movement
has lost its momentum. Pro-reform media outlets are being closed and
leading reformists arrested.
Syria. Longstanding Syrian policies of supporting terrorism,
relying on WMD for strategic deterrence, and occupying Lebanon remain
largely unchanged. Damascus is providing intelligence on al-Qaida for
the War on Terrorism. Its response to U.S. concerns on Iraq has been
mixed. Men, material and money continue to cross the Syrian-Iraqi
border likely with help from corrupt or sympathetic local officials.
Damascus likely sees opportunities and risks with an unstable Iraq.
Syria sees the problems we face in Iraq as beneficial because our
commitments in Iraq reduce the prospects for action against Syria.
However, Damascus is probably concerned about potential spill-over of
Iraqi problems, especially Sunni extremism, into Syria. We see little
evidence of active regime support for the insurgency, but Syria offers
safe-haven to Iraqi Baathists, some of whom have ties to insurgents.
Syria continues to support Lebanese Hizballah and several
rejectionist Palestinian groups, which Damascus argues are legitimate
resistance groups.
Syria is making minor improvements to its conventional forces. It
is buying modern antitank guided missiles and overhauling some
aircraft, but cannot afford major weapon systems acquisitions.
President Bashar al-Asad is Syria's primary decisionmaker. Since
becoming President in 2000 upon the death of his father, Asad has
gradually replaced long-serving officials. Potential domestic
opposition to his rule--such as the Muslim Brotherhood--is weak and
disorganized. We judge the Syrian regime is currently stable, but
internal or external crises could rapidly threaten it.
China. We do not expect Communist Party Secretary and President Hu
Jintao's succession to chairman of the Central Military Command (CMC)
to significantly alter Beijing's strategic priorities or its approach
to military modernization. The commanders of the People's Liberation
Army (PLA) Air Force, Navy, and Second Artillery (Strategic Rocket
Forces) joined the CMC in September, demonstrating an institutional
change to make China's military more ``joint.'' The CMC traditionally
was dominated by generals from PLA ground forces.
China remains keenly interested in Coalition military operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq and is using lessons from those operations to
guide PLA modernization and strategy. We believe several years will be
needed before these lessons are incorporated into the armed forces. We
judge Beijing remains concerned over U.S. presence in Iraq, Afghanistan
and Central Asia. Beijing may also think it has an opportunity to
improve diplomatic and economic relations, to include access to energy
resources, with other countries distrustful or resentful of U.S.
policy.
China continues to develop or import modern weapons. Their
acquisition priorities appear unchanged from my testimony last year.
Priorities include submarines, surface combatants, air defense,
ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles and modern fighters. China
recently launched a new conventional submarine and acquired its first
squadron of modern Su30/FLANKER aircraft for the naval air forces from
Russia. The PLA must overcome significant integration challenges to
turn these new, advanced and disparate weapon systems into improved
capabilities. Beijing also faces technical and operational difficulties
in numerous areas. The PLA continues with its plan to cut approximately
200,000 soldiers from the Army to free resources for further
modernization, an initiative it began in 2004.
Beijing was likely heartened by President Chen Shui-bian
coalition's failure to achieve a majority in the recent Legislative
Yuan elections. We believe China has adopted a more activist strategy
to deter Taiwan moves toward independence that will stress diplomatic
and economic instruments over military pressure. We believe China's
leaders prefer to avoid military coercion, at least through the 2008
Olympics, but would initiate military action if it felt that course of
action was necessary to prevent Taiwan independence.
Beijing remains committed to improving its forces across from
Taiwan. In 2004, it added numerous SRBMs to those already existing in
brigades near Taiwan. It is improving its air, naval and ground
capabilities necessary to coerce Taiwan unification with the mainland
and deter U.S. intervention. Last fall, for instance, a Chinese nuclear
submarine conducted a deployment that took it far into the western
Pacific Ocean, including an incursion into Japanese waters.
North Korea. After more than a decade of declining or stagnant
economic growth, Pyongyang's military capability has significantly
degraded. The North's declining capabilities are even more pronounced
when viewed in light of the significant improvements over the same
period of the ROK military and the US-ROK Combined Forces Command.
Nevertheless, the North maintains a large conventional force of over
one million soldiers, the majority of which we believe are deployed
south of Pyongyang.
North Korea continues to prioritize the military at the expense of
its economy. We judge this ``Military First Policy'' has several
purposes. It serves to deter US-ROK aggression. Nationwide conscription
is a critical tool for the regime to socialize its citizens to maintain
the Kim family in power. The large military allows Pyongyang to use
threats and bravado in order to limit US-ROK policy options.
Suggestions of sanctions, or military pressure by the U.S. or ROK are
countered by the North with threats that such actions are ``an act of
war'' or that it could ``turn Seoul into a sea of fire.'' Inertia,
leadership perceptions that military power equals national power and
the inability for the regime to change without threatening its
leadership also explains the continuing large military commitment.
The North Korean People's Army remains capable of attacking South
Korea with artillery and missile forces with limited warning. Such a
provocative act, absent an immediate threat, is highly unlikely,
counter to Pyongyang's political and economic objectives and would
prompt a South Korean-CFC response it could not effectively oppose.
Intemally, the regime in Pyongyang appears stable. Tight control
over the population is maintained by a uniquely thorough
indoctrination, pervasive security services and Party organizations,
and a loyal military.
Russia. Despite an improving economy, Russia continues to face
endemic challenges related to its post-Soviet military decline. Seeking
to portray itself as a great power, Moscow has made some improvements
to its armed forces, but has not addressed difficult domestic problems
that will limit the scale and scope of military recovery.
Russian conventional forces have improved from their mid-1990s low
point. Moscow nonetheless faces challenges if it is to move beyond
these limited improvements. Significant procurement has been postponed
until after 2010 and the Kremlin is not spending enough to modernize
Russia's defense industrial base. Russia also faces increasingly
negative demographic trends and military quality of life issues that
will create military manning problems.
Moscow has been able to boost its defense spending in line with its
recovering economy. Russia's Gross National Product averaged 6.7
percent growth over the past 5 years, predominately from increased
energy prices and consumer demand. Defense should continue to receive
modest real increases in funding, unless Russia suffers an economic
setback.
Russia continues vigorous efforts to increase its sales of weapons
and military technology. Russia's annual arms exports average several
billion dollars. China and India account for the majority of Russia's
sales, with both countries buying advanced conventional weapons,
production licenses, weapon components and technical assistance to
enhance their R&D programs. Efforts to increase its customer base last
year resulted in increased sales to Southeast Asia. Russian sales are
expected to remain several billion dollars annually for the next few
years.
Russia's struggle with the Chechen insurgency continues with no end
in sight. Chechen terrorists seized a North Ossetian primary school
where over 330 people were killed and two Russian civilian airliners
were bombed in flight last summer. Rebels continue targeting Russians
in Chechnya and Chechen officials cooperating with Moscow. While Moscow
is employing more pro-Russian Chechen security forces against the
insurgents, the war taxes Russian ground forces. Although the Chechnya
situation remains a minor issue to the average Russian, concerns over
spreading violence prompted new government security initiatives and
offered cover for imposition of authoritarian political measures.
Russian leaders continue to characterize Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
and NATO enlargement as mistakes. They express concerns that U.S.
operations in Iraq are creating instability and facilitating terrorism.
Russian leaders want others to view the Chechen conflict as a struggle
with international terrorism and accuse those who maintain contact with
exiled Chechen leaders or criticize Moscow's policies toward Chechnya
as pursuing a double standard. Russian officials are wary of potential
U.S. and NATO force deployments near Russia or in the former Soviet
states. Concern that Ukraine under a President Yushchenko would draw
closer to NATO and the EU was a factor motivating Russia's involvement
in Ukraine's presidential election.
CLOSING THOUGHTS
This year my testimony focuses on what I believe to be the most
immediate threats to our Nation and challenges to our interests. The
threat from terrorism has not abated. While our strategic intelligence
on terrorist groups is generally good, information on specific plots is
vague, dated or sporadic. We can and must do better. Improved
collection and analysis capabilities can make a significant difference.
We are increasing our ability to provide that timely, relevant
intelligence.
The Intelligence Community as a whole needs to improve its
collection and focus more analytic resources on pressures in the
Islamic world so that we can better understand the drivers for
extremism. We also need greater collection and more analytic resources
devoted to certain key Islamic countries. We have taken steps to
improve our collection and analysis, hiring more individuals with
Arabic and Farsi language skills. Nevertheless, more needs to be done
across the Intelligence Community, particularly in the area of
meaningful, penetrating collection and making the content of that
collection available to all who need it.
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles is my
second priority. Collection must be improved. Additionally, improving
our analytic techniques, adoption of true ``all-source'' analysis
approaches and greater information sharing will help us avoid problems
similar to those in our pre-war analysis of Iraq's WMD program.
We also must not let our focus on numerous nations of interest
wane. Traditional military intelligence disciplines must remain robust
if we are to provide our national security policymakers, defense
planners and warfighters the information they need to successfully
execute their missions. We need improved collection so that we are
stealing our true secrets. There are significant gaps in our
understanding of several nations' leaderships' plans and intentions.
Additionally, more collection and analysis is needed to provide
adequate warning of attack and a more complete understanding of the
military capability, doctrine and war plans of numerous countries. We
are working to better target collection against these hard targets.
As I mentioned, the threats and challenges I briefed today are the
most significant and immediate. They are certainly not the only ones.
In previous years, I have spoken about the security situation in
Africa, Latin America and South and Southeast Asia. I also addressed my
concerns on information operations, international crime, problems
associated with globalization, uneven economic development and
ungoverned states. Those issues remain significant concerns and the
focus of collection and analytic resources for defense intelligence. We
will be requesting additional funding and billets to ensure we retain
coverage and reporting on global coverage. We are reallocating our
analytic capabilities, implementing the ``Master, Measure and Monitor''
concept in the Defense Intelligence Analysis Program to better address
many of these threats and disturbing trends.
Let me conclude by making two points. First, DIA is focused on
transforming its capabilities in all of its mission areas to operate in
a true ``all-source'' environment. We are committed to incorporating
all relevant information into our analyses, integrating analysts with
collectors and precisely targeting our analytic and collection
capabilities against complex threats and tough issues. More opportunity
for ``discovery,'' greater penetration of hard targets and higher
confidence in our judgments are our goals. Second, we are aggressively
reengineering our information management approach and architecture. We
are focused on harvesting non-traditional sources of data and
positioning ourselves to exploit information from new and future
sources. We are convinced commercial sector ``content management
practices'' and data standards hold the key to upgrading our
information management capability and providing the ``smart network''
we need. Much more work is required in the area if we are to realize
our potential and fundamentally improve our capabilities. These efforts
follow the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of
Defense guidance and reflect the letter and spirit of the intelligence
reform act. Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Roberts. Admiral Loy and Ms. Rodley, I apologize
for not asking for your response in the interest of time. But I
would just say, from the INR aspect, I know the Vice Chairman
and I and Members of this Committee want to thank you. You're
one agency that got it right in regards to the WMD situation.
And both of you have a very strong interest in this.
Senator Rockefeller and I apologize to my colleagues.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just second what the Chairman has indicated. I refer to
sharing and access. If you share, it's the decision to give.
It's a decision on the part of the holder. If it's access, then
it is the right of the receiver. So, sharing out/getting in.
And I think that will be worked out over the years.
Director Goss, the National Intelligence Council recently
issued its annual report to Congress on the safety and the
security of Russian nuclear facilities and military forces. The
report is both classified and unclassified. One excerpt from
the unclassified version is as follows:
``Russian officials have reported that terrorists have
targeted Russian nuclear weapons storage sites. Security was
tightened in 2001, after Russian authorities twice thwarted
terrorist efforts to reconnoiter nuclear weapon storage sites.
``We find it''--this is a continuation of the report,
unclassified--``we find it highly unlikely that Russian
authorities would have been able to recover all the material
reportedly stolen. We assess that undetected smuggling has
occurred and we are concerned about the total amount of
material that could be diverted or stolen in the last 13
years.''
Now, I'd ask you, sir, is the material missing from Russian
nuclear facilities sufficient to construct a nuclear weapon?
Director Goss. Senator, the way I would prefer to answer
that question, is there is sufficient material unaccounted for,
so that it would be possible for those with know-how to
construct a nuclear weapon. I hope that's sufficiently clear.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. We'll wait for a closed session.
On the same subject, the National Intelligence Council
assessment, can you assure the American people--and I think
this is a yes-or-no type thing--can you assure the American
people that the material missing from Russian nuclear sites has
not found its way into terrorist hands?
Director Goss. No. I can't make that assurance. I can't
account for some of the material, so I can't make the assurance
about its whereabouts.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Appreciate it, sir.
Africa. Since the 1980s, a million people have died of
starvation, enormous dislocation, poverty, hopelessness,
despair, instability, a fertile breeding ground for terrorism,
both east and west, a large Islamic population. Instability in
the African continent has allowed us to intervene episodically
back and forth.
But the whole prospect of the concept that this is the next
great threat, and that being something called a failed
continent, General James Jones made that point to the Chairman
and me three times in a presentation in London, when he was
stationed there. He said, this is the continent that you in the
intelligence world need to be looking at--a failed continent,
because we are consumed by challenges in Iraq, necessarily,
Afghanistan and other world hotspots.
Again, Director Goss, are we facing the possibility, do you
think, of the collapse of civil society throughout much of
Africa? Shouldn't we be addressing the problems in these
countries now, rather than at a future date when our options
will be more likely to be military?
Director Goss. Senator, thank you.
As you know, I've made the statement many times that I
don't want to get into the Department of State's policy areas,
and the question you've asked me gets into actually a much
bigger question than just the intelligence community. But it's
a great question. And you are right on the mark, that this is
an over-neglected area that is under-resourced for American
interests, from my perspective.
I can tell you that I have read Kaplan's piece about the
resurgence of anarchy and I've read Friedman's pieces on this.
We have have seen all kinds of very nasty people, Foday Sankoh,
people like that in the past, who have taken advantage of
exploitation of the processes there.
We find that we are going backwards in some areas where we
should be going forwards. You heard me mention in my remarks a
whole series of bands, of arcs, as it were, of different kinds
of problems in Africa. I think it is a rich seabed for people
who have a mission on their mind to go and try and recruit
people. We have found that. And we are making efforts there.
And I would say we would be wise to solve problems sooner,
before they get more troublesome later. I do think that that is
an area that needs more attention in the intelligence community
and all other efforts that we make.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Thank you, sir.
Admiral Jacoby, I can't imagine that you wouldn't have some
comment.
Admiral Jacoby. Senator Rockefeller, you know in past
conversations we've talked about sort of the global spread of
issues. Certainly, there's a fertile ground in the Muslim
populations in Africa for recruitment to extremist causes.
Disaffected youth, the youth bulge, socioeconomic situation,
education shortfalls, unemployment and so forth make inviting
recruiting targets. And obviously, as we look at the Madrid
bombing and some of the things that have happened, particularly
the North African crescent is an area of concern.
Sir, we take the Africa situation seriously in the sense
that we have plussed up our presence in our defense attache
offices and will continue to do that with some new initiatives
that go in place here in 2005 and 2006.
We view Africa as place that needs to be monitored
carefully. Trends need to be carefully described and assessed
and that the intelligence assessments reach policymakers in
that part of the world as a sense of urgency.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. I would follow through to both
of you that I think we all know that we have an enormous
scarcity of resources, of facilities, of capabilities, simply
because of what's going on elsewhere. And I hear what you both
say. And I hear the sense of urgency behind what you say.
But I also would guess that there's some frustration on
your part that we may not have the financial capability or the
trained personnel capability to be able to get to those areas
to get that intelligence. Those are difficult languages, and it
takes, as Director Goss has often said, 5 years to train a good
agent.
Director Goss. I think you've said it well, Senator.
Admiral Jacoby. I agree completely, sir. Absolutely.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Roberts. Let me just say that, in reference to the
Vice Chairman's concern about the situation in Russia in
regards to loose nukes or loose bioweaponry or loose scientists
or loose anything in terms of security, that we should give a
lot of credit to the Armed Services Committee and its
distinguished Chairman, who is sitting over here to my left and
everybody's right--Senator Warner--for taking such a strong
interest in the CTR program, the Nunn-Lugar program.
And knowing something about that on the Emerging Threats
Subcommittee, we learned right away the most important thing is
to provide the security. We want to eliminate the stockpiles
and we want to safeguard the scientists and make sure they're
not, you know, going somewhere else. But we have made some
progress, and we have put some conditions and some of our
allies need to step up. And the Russians have stepped up. So
I'm very hopeful we'll continue to see additional funding and
really address that security issue.
Senator Bond.
Senator Bond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Mueller, you noted that the third concern was the
recruitment of radical American converts. And this is something
that I've become increasingly concerned about.
I don't know if you've seen it, but recently, the Freedom
House put out a report on Saudi publications on hate ideologies
filling American mosques. And as you read through it, you see
the hate-filled language that is officially sponsored by the
cultural offices of the embassy of Saudi Arabia.
And mosques supported by the king has admonitions: be
dissociated from the infidels; hate them for their religion;
leave them; never rely on them; do not admire them; and always
oppose them in every way, according to Islamic law.
The list of documents and the list of publications goes on.
And it appears that the bargain with the devil they made about
25 years ago, that the Saudi government would support Wahhabism
if they stayed out of Saudi Arabia, is coming back to haunt us.
I would ask the question, number one, how serious a threat
that is? And I would ask you and Admiral Loy to respond to it.
And also, it seems to me if our doctrine is that a country
that harbors terrorists is guilty, what about a country that
fosters terrorists within our own country?
Director Mueller. Well, it certainly, as I think I
indicated in my opening remarks, it is an issue--the
radicalization of individuals within the United States. And it
can be done any number of ways.
We are looking, for instance, at the prison systems, not
just the Federal system but, through our 100 joint terrorism
task forces, working with State and local law enforcement to
address the possibility that radicalization can occur
throughout our prison system, as it has in the past in a
variety of ways.
Through our joint terrorism task forces, we also understand
that persons absolutely have the right to practice religion in
whichever way they want. But by the same token----
Senator Bond. That's not the question, Mr. Director. It's
what they are----
Director Mueller. But I'm going to say, on the other hand,
we have the obligation to determine and identify those persons
who are becoming radicalized and become a threat to the United
States.
And through our working with State and local law
enforcement, building up our intelligence capacity, working
through our joint terrorism task forces, we continuously seek
sources and information and intelligence as to those
individuals who may become radicalized in a variety of ways.
The last point I would make--and I think others would agree
with me--is that there has been a shift in the attitude of
Saudi Arabia in the wake of the May 2003 bombings--a
substantial shift, and an understanding and a recognition of
the threat not only to Saudi Arabia, but to Saudi Arabia's
interests around the world from those elements who have been
radicalized.
Senator Bond. Thank you, Mr. Director. They noted that
these documents were still, as of December 2004, were still in
the King Fahd mosque. They're still being handed out.
Admiral Loy, any thoughts about how, from the homeland
security standpoint, how dangerous is Saudi Arabia's supplying
of this literature?
Admiral Loy. Indeed, Senator Bond, there are three or four
points that I would make.
Number one, regardless of the sponsorship, the notions that
you are citing in the things that you read are dramatic
evidence of the challenge in front of us here, whether it's
pure Saudi from the implication of that particular set of
materials, or what that line of logic is as a pervasive notion
throughout not only Saudi Arabia, but the rest of the world.
I sit on a couple of joint contact groups with allies--with
the Brits, with Canada. And there has been over the last year a
growth of an agenda item referring to radicalization as a
significant issue that we have to grapple with.
Senator Bond. Admiral Loy, if I may interrupt. I apologize;
the light's on--I needed to ask Director Goss, Ms. Rodley and
maybe Admiral Jacoby, I think that Southeast Asia is the second
front of the war on terrorism.
Director Goss mentioned that. I've recently come back from
there. Jemaah Islamiyah, Moro Liberation Front, others, Abu
Sayyaf, are posing significant dangers. Singapore, Malaysia and
Indonesia have been aggressive.
Number one, I'd like to know whether you think these have
become a threat to the U.S. homeland and are our restrictions
on U.S. aid--IMET aid--to Indonesian military hurting our
ability to work cooperatively with that country?
Mr. Goss.
Director Goss. On the IMET question, there is no question
that--I can't speak specific to the particulars there. Maybe
Admiral Jacoby can.
But I will tell you that, in fact, we do have liaison
relationships in the war on terror, of course, on a global
basis. And they are affected by other matters such as that that
you have specifically mentioned.
In this case I can't answer your direct question, but I can
tell you there is a relationship, and it's important that we
understand that.
The second thing I would tell you is, I think you are right
to focus on Southeast Asia. It is an escalating area. We find
that the degree of capability to deal with the problem there is
the sophistication of dealing with the problem of terrorism
there by the governments, the states that are there, is not
adequate. Consequently, I would say it is a growth industry,
regrettably.
Yes, it is a threat.
Admiral Jacoby. Senator Bond, the key countries in the area
are the ones that Director Goss identified--Indonesia,
Philippines, Thailand. Two of those countries we've had very
longstanding IMET and other interactions and it makes it far
easier to work not only with their military forces, but also
with their military intelligence, with my counterparts.
The situation in Indonesia is quite different, where the
senior officers in that country, particularly in, again, my
case, the intelligence area, have not had those kinds of
interactions with the U.S. military.
It does create barriers for close interaction and
interoperation. And Southeast Asia in general is an area that
needs that kind of attention. And I'm going back to my days in
the Pacific command as a J-2 to say authoritatively that more
needs to be done there, sir.
STATEMENT OF CAROL RODLEY, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
Ms. Rodley. We really see it the same way as my colleagues
have outlined. Indonesia as the main problem.
Chairman Roberts. Speak right in the microphone.
Ms. Rodley. Indonesia has the most serious problem with
Jemaah Islamiyah and, to a lesser extent, the Philippines,
Thailand and some of the other nations in the region.
This is of particular concern because of Jemaah Islamiyah's
affiliation with al-Qa'ida. So the question of targeting U.S.
interests is one that we are very concerned about.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Thomas Fingar, Assistant
Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Thomas Fingar,
Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research
Mister Chairman, Members of the Committee. It is an honor to be
asked to participate in this important review of threats to our Nation
and the challenges they present to the Intelligence Community. INR has
taken to heart your admonition to describe the spectrum of threats to
the United States and its interests, and to assess the probability,
immediacy, and severity of the dangers we face, but I will do so in a
way intended to complement the judgments presented by our colleagues in
other agencies by focusing on the way threats appear when viewed
through the lens of diplomacy.
The subject of this hearing is one on which there is broad
consensus in the Intelligence Community. INR concurs with the judgment
that terrorism is the single greatest threat to Americans, both at home
and abroad, and that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), missiles, and certain types of advanced conventional weapons is
a close and dangerous second. We also share most of the other threat
judgments presented by our colleagues. But rather than merely echoing
their assessments, I will approach the subject reflecting INR's unique
perspective and responsibilities as the Secretary of State's in-house
intelligence unit.
As Secretary Rice has made clear in recent statements, diplomacy is
critical to U.S. efforts to contain, counter, and diminish the threats
we face. On February 8 she told her audience in Paris, ``We agree on
the interwoven threats we face today: terrorism, and proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, and regional conflicts, and failed states,
and organized crime.'' She added that America stands ready to work with
other countries in ``building an even stronger partnership'' to address
these threats.
To combat the twin scourges of terrorism and proliferation requires
more than just the effective collection of hard to obtain intelligence.
At a minimum, it also requires deep understanding of the motivations
and objectives of those who resort to terrorism and/or pursue WMD. It
also takes sophisticated analysis of all-source information, informed
judgments about what we do not know, and detailed knowledge of other
countries, cultures, political systems, and the underlying causes of
discontent and radicalization. The prerequisites for meeting all these
requirements include global coverage, deep analytical expertise, and
Intelligence Community commitment to providing policymakers what they
need, when they need it, and in a form that they can use day in and day
out.
Why are terrorism and proliferation at the top of the threat list?
The short and conventional answer is that the normalization of
relations with China and demise of the Soviet Union dramatically
reduced the danger of nuclear war and eliminated or transformed
fundamentally a wide array of associated threats. But the end of the
cold war also brought many changes to other aspects of international
life, including the erosion of constraints on ``client'' states, the
re-emergence of long repressed political aspirations, and the rise of
ethnic and religious hatreds. Former DCI Jim Woolsey described the
change as the displacement of a few big dragons by lots of dangerous
snakes. But it was, and is, more than that. Globalization and the
information revolution have changed expectations and aspirations and
made it possible for nations and non-state actors, including
individuals, to do things that would have been unthinkable just a few
years ago.
One of the many resultant developments has been the emergence of
vast differences in coercive capabilities. This, in turn, has
exacerbated the dangers of both terrorism and proliferation. The
inability of all but a few nations to deter the most powerful countries
(including, but not limited to the United States) has reinforced the
determination of states that feel threatened (whether justifiably or
not) to seek asymmetric solutions to the disparity of power. For some,
this means pursuit of WMD and delivery capabilities because they know
they have no hope of deterring or defeating the attacks they fear with
conventional armaments. Perhaps the clearest illustration of this can
be found in DPRK public statements after Operation Iraqi Freedom
intended to reassure its public and warn potential adversaries that,
unlike Saddam, it had a (nuclear) deterrent; a claim reiterated
February 10. Pakistan pursued-and obtained nuclear weapons and delivery
systems to compensate for India's vastly superior conventional military
power and nuclear weapons.
Terrorism is at the other end of the spectrum of asymmetric
responses. State sponsors, most notably Iran, seem implicitly to warn
potential enemies that the response to any attack will include resort
to terror. They seem to be saying, in effect, ``You may be able to
defeat us militarily, but you cannot protect all your people,
everywhere, all the time.'' Such a porcupine defense/deterrent posture
is an unfortunate, but not irrational response to wide disparities of
power. The situation is somewhat analogous for non-state actors
frustrated by their inability to achieve their (however reprehensible)
goals by other means. Terror and guerrilla warfare are long-standing
measures of choice (or last resort) for weak actors confronting a much
stronger adversary. The targets vary widely, from established
democracies to authoritarian regimes. However, in some cases,
terrorists also direct their attacks against those who are seen as
responsible for-by imposition or support the actions or existence of
the regime they oppose. That appears to be one of the reasons al-Qaida
has targeted the United States in Saudi Arabia and terrorists in Iraq
have used suicide bombers and improvised explosive devices to attack
Iraqis and others supportive of the Iraqi government. The use of terror
tactics in liberal democracies is especially problematic because in
open societies, self-restraint under the rule of law and commitment to
respect human rights and dignity complicate the challenges of mounting
an effective response.
Attacking a distant country is difficult, even in the era of
globalization, and would-be assailants must choose between difficult,
high profile attacks, like those on 9/11, and easier to accomplish, but
probably lower impact incidents (like sniper attacks on random
individuals or small explosions in crowded public places). We remain
vulnerable to both types of terror attack, but arguably we are now less
vulnerable to relatively largescale, high profile attacks than we were
before 9/11. Nevertheless, it is extremely difficult to penetrate the
tight knit groups that are most capable of carrying out such attacks on
our country and our people. We have achieved great success in
disrupting alQaida, but may be witnessing a repeat of the pattern found
in the wars on illegal drugs and organized crime, namely, that we are
fighting a ``hydra'' with robust capabilities of resurgence and
replacement of lost operatives. The bottom line is that terrorism
remains the most immediate, dangerous, and difficult security challenge
facing our country and the international community and is likely to
remain so for a long time. Despite the progress we have made, it would
be imprudent to become complacent or to lower our guard.
The quest for WMD, missiles (or unmanned aerial vehicles), and
advanced conventional arms has become more attractive to, and more
feasible for, a small but significant set of State and non-state
actors. This poses major challenges to the security of the United
States and our friends and allies, but it is important to put this
threat in perspective.
Nuclear Threats. The nuclear sword of Damocles that hung over our
national existence during the cold war remains largely a concern from a
different era. Russia and China still have nuclear weapons (the number
is declining in Russia and increasing only modestly in China), but the
hostility of the past is no longer a pressing concern and neither
threatens to use them against our country. North Korea has produced
sufficient fissile material to make a small number of nuclear weapons,
but, despite its February 10 statement, there is no evidence that it
has produced such weapons and mated them to a missile capable of
delivering them to the United States. However, if it has made such
weapons, it could reach U.S. allies, our armed forces, and large
concentrations of American citizens in Northeast Asia. India and
Pakistan have nuclear weapons and the capability to deliver them to
targets in the region, but both nations are friends and neither
threatens the territory of the United States. Iran seeks, but does not
yet have nuclear weapons or missiles capable of reaching the United
States. INR's net assessment of the threat to U.S. territory posed by
nuclear weapons controlled by Nation states is that it is low and lacks
immediacy. But this should not be grounds for complacency. The
existence of such weapons and the means to deliver them constitutes a
latent, but deadly threat. Ensuring that it remains latent is a key
diplomatic priority.
The so-far theoretical possibility of nuclear weapons falling into
the hands of terrorists constitutes a very different type of threat. We
have seen no persuasive evidence that al-Qaida has obtained fissile
material or ever has had a serious and sustained program to do so. At
worst, the group possesses small amounts of radiological material that
could be used to fabricate a radiological dispersion device (``dirty
bomb''). The only practical way for non-state actors to obtain
sufficient fissile material for a nuclear weapon (as opposed to
material for a so-called dirty bomb) would be to acquire it on the
black market or to steal it from one of the current, want-to-be, or
used-to-be nuclear weapons states. The ``loose nukes'' problem in the
former Soviet Union continues to exist but is less acute than it once
was, thanks to the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction program and
diligent efforts by Russia to consolidate and protect stockpiles. North
Korea's possession of weapons-grade fissile material adds a new layer
of danger and uncertainty. There is no convincing evidence that the
DPRK has ever sold, given, or even offered to transfer such material to
any State or non-state actor, but we cannot assume that it would never
do so.
Chemical and Biological Weapons. Despite the diffusion of know-how
and dual-use capabilities to an ever-increasing number of countries,
the number of states with known or suspected CW programs remains both
small and stable. Most of those that possess such weapons or have the
capability to produce quantities sufficient to constitute a genuine
threat to the United States or Americans (civilian and military)
outside our borders are not hostile to us, appreciate the significance
of our nuclear and conventional arsenals, and are unlikely to transfer
such weapons or capabilities to terrorists. There are nations that
might use CW against invading troops, even American forces, on their
own territory, but we judge it highly unlikely that Nation states would
use CW against the American homeland or specifically target American
citizens except as an act of desperation. Terrorists, by contrast, have
or could acquire the capability to produce small quantities of chemical
agents for use against selected targets or random individuals. We judge
the chances of their doing so as moderate to high. One or a few
disgruntled individuals or a small terrorist cell could do so in a
manner analogous to the 1995 Aurn Shinrikyo sarin gas attack on a Tokyo
subway. The severity of such an attack would be small in terms of
lethality, but the psychological and political impact would be huge.
The risk posed by Nation states with biological weapons is similar
to that for CW; many nations have the capability, but few have programs
and even fewer would be tempted to use them against the United States.
The danger of acquisition and use by terrorists, however, is far
greater. Though hard to handle safely and even harder to deliver
effectively, BW agents have the potential to overwhelm response
capabilities in specific locations, induce widespread panic, and
disrupt ordinary life for a protracted period, with resulting economic
and social consequences o# uncertain magnitude.
Conventional Attack. INR considers the danger of a conventional
military attack on the United States or American military, diplomatic,
or business facilities abroad to be very low for the simple reason that
no State hostile to the United States has the military capability to
attack the U.S. with any hope of avoiding massive retaliation and
ultimate, probably rapid, annihilation. The only way to reach a
different conclusion, it seems to us, is to posit an irrational actor
model in which either all key decisionmakers in a hostile country are
irrational or there are no systemic constraints on a totally irrational
dictator. We judge that such conditions exist nowhere at present and
hence that U.S. military might is, and will be, able to deter any such
suicidal adventure for the foreseeable future. Here again, ensuring
that this situation continues is a major goal of American diplomacy.
A far more dangerous threat is the possibility, even the
likelihood, that advanced conventional weapons will be obtained--and
used--by terrorists. For example, the danger that groups or individuals
antithetical to the United States will obtain MANPADs or advanced
explosives is both high and immediate. The number of Americans likely
to be killed or maimed in such an attack would be small in comparison
with the casualties in a conventional war or nuclear attack, but would
be unacceptably large no matter how small the number of casualties and
could have a major economic and psychological impact. Attacks on
American nationals, whether they are aimed at workers in an American
city, American tourists abroad, U.S. diplomatic facilities, U.S.
businesses at home or abroad, or U.S. military facilities at home or
abroad, are possible and unacceptable. The fact that State Department
personnel, family members, and facilities have been frequent targets of
attack makes us acutely aware of this danger and determined to do
everything possible to thwart it. This determination is magnified
severalfold by the fact that it is an important part of the State
Department's mission, and the Secretary of State's responsibility, to
protect American citizens everywhere around the globe. We take this
responsibility very seriously, and an important part of INR's support
to diplomacy involves providing information and insights that
contribute directly to the success of this mission.
States of Concern. It has become something of a convention in
threat testimony to list a number of countries that, for one reason or
another, are judged to warrant special attention from the Intelligence
Community. A few countries on this list engage in activities that
directly or indirectly threaten American lives (e.g., North Korea's
deployment of massive military power close enough to Seoul to put at
risk our ally as well as American troops and tens of thousands of
American civilians). Most countries on the list do not threaten the
United States militarily, but are important to the success of policies
to protect and promote other American interests.
Rather than enumerate a long list of countries, I will simply
provide a series of generic examples to illustrate the kinds of
conditions and concerns germane to diplomatic efforts to protect and
advance American interests. The State Department needs good
intelligence on some countries primarily because their actions could
lead to internal instability that could, in turn, threaten other
American interests. Others belong on the list because they do not or
cannot prevent the growth and export of narcotics, harbor or assist
terrorist groups, have leaders who make anti-American pronouncements,
or have conditions conducive to the rise of extremist movements. Still
others illicitly traffic in persons, weapons, conflict diamonds, or
other commodities; control critical energy resources; or have fragile
political institutions, large and dynamic economies, or any of myriad
other attributes.
What states on this long and varied list have in common is the
capacity to affect American interests and the efficacy of U.S. foreign,
economic, and security policy. Most do not and will not ``threaten''
the United States in the way that we were once threatened by the Soviet
Union and the Warsaw Pact, but something, or many things, about them
pose challenges and/or opportunities for American diplomacy. The
problems of failing states and the tremendous drain on resources in
developing countries from AIDS and other pandemics, environmental
stress, and corruption affect our ability to partner with allies and
friends to meet humanitarian needs in the interest of promoting
stability and democracy. This, in turn, poses challenges and
requirements for the Intelligence Community that extend far beyond the
collection and analysis of information germane to the suppression of
terrorism and limiting the spread of WMD, delivery systems, and
advanced conventional weapons. Meeting these challenges requires global
coverage, deep expertise, extensive collaboration, and, above all,
acceptance of the idea that the mission of the Intelligence Community
demands and entails more than collecting and interpreting covertly
acquired information on a relatively small number of narrowly defined
threats. Focusing on known threats and concerns is necessary, but could
prove to be very dangerous if we are not equally vigilant in trying to
anticipate unknowns and surprises.
Intelligence is, or should be, about more than addressing
``threats.'' The Intelligence Community has been justifiably criticized
for serious failings and shortcomings, but we should not lose sight of
what we do well and must continue to do well. For example, America's
unrivaled military preeminence, demonstrated so dramatically in our
elimination of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the destruction of
Saddam's regime in Iraq, is inextricably linked to the capabilities and
accomplishments of our Intelligence Community. Intelligence collection,
analytic tradecraft, insights gained through years of experience, and
close ties among collectors, analysts, weapons designers, military
planners, and troops on the ground are all and equally critical to the
military successes we have achieved, the predominance we enjoy, and the
fact that conventional military threats to our Nation and our citizens
are low and almost certain to remain so for many years. Preserving this
State of affairs will be neither automatic nor easy, but our efforts
and the allocation of resources to do so must not foreclose equally
committed efforts to address other threats and challenges.
Terrorism and proliferation are at the top of every agency's list
of threats, and the Intelligence Community is committing substantial
effort and resources to provide the intelligence support required to
contain and reduce those dangers. In part, this requires and involves
penetration of highly restricted and suspicious organizations and
secure systems of communication, including sophisticated measures to
hide financial transactions, obscure relationships, and deceive human
and technical collectors. But collection is only one of many essential
factors in the equation. To place the intelligence we collect in
context, to distinguish between what is true and useful and what is
not, and to develop strategies to detect and disrupt activities
inimical to American interests requires expert analysts and information
on a very wide array of critical variables. Stated another way, it is
not possible to identify, anticipate, understand, and disrupt
terrorists and proliferatitios without broad and deep understanding of
the countries, cultures, contexts, social networks, economic systems,
and political arenas in which they spawn, develop, and operate. Without
broad and deep expertise and information that goes far beyond what we
can or should collect through clandestine means, we will not be able to
judge accurately the information we collect, and will ultimately be
reduced to reliance on lucky guesses and chance discoveries. That isn't
good enough. We can and must do better.
Senator Bond. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
apologize to my colleagues.
Chairman Roberts. Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me begin by thanking each of you. I think those of you
that particularly head large departments, it is a most
difficult time to give your service. And I just want you to
know how much I appreciate it. So, thank you very much.
I view a worldwide threat to be our borders. And I'd like
to explain that a little bit. Let me begin by quoting the
Homeland Security statement today, Admiral Loy. On page four of
your statement: ``Recent information from ongoing
investigations, detentions, and emerging threat streams
strongly suggest that al-Qa'ida has considered using the
southwest border to infiltrate the United States. Several al-
Qa'ida leaders believe operatives can pay their way into the
country through Mexico and also believe illegal entry is more
advantageous than legal entry for operational security
reasons.''
I think that is a very important statement, particularly
when you consider the fact that a half-a-million other-than-
Mexican intrusions have been made on our borders since 2000.
Specifically, with respect to the southwest border, in 2003
there were 30,147 other-than-Mexican intrusions. The next year,
2004, which is the latest year that we have figures for, there
were 44,617. That's a 48 percent increase.
Now, let me take you to a hearing--because I sit on the
Judiciary Immigration Subcommittee--and a response by Mr.
Hutchinson to Senator Grassley's questions in February 2004.
This was a hearing held about a year ago. And let me read an
answer.
``At present, DHS has no specific policy regarding OTMs
apprehended at the southern border. While OTMs, as well as
Mexicans, are permitted to withdraw their applications for
admission and can be returned voluntarily to their country of
nationality, as a practical matter this option is not readily
available for them, as it is for Mexicans, whose government
will accept them back into the Mexican territory. Thus, when
apprehended, OTMs are routinely placed in removal proceedings
under Immigration and Nationality Act 240. It is not practical
to detain all non-criminal OTMs during immigration proceedings.
And thus, most are released. A majority of OTMs later fail to
appear for their immigration proceedings and simply disappear
into the United States.
``DHS is reviewing the possibility of extending its
expedited removal authority and means of addressing this
problem. DHS is also considering a variety of alternatives to
detention, especially for asylum seekers.''
Now, I've looked at the statistics for each country. And
the so-called countries of concern--Syria, Iran, others--the
numbers are up of penetrations through our southwest border.
Clearly we are deficient in a mechanism to deal with these.
Could you please comment and could you please indicate what
actions are being taken? I view this as a very serious
situation.
Admiral Loy. Thank you, Senator Feinstein. And, indeed, we
view it in exactly the same way you do, as a very serious
situation.
There have been a number of initiatives over the course of
the last year, many of which I know you're familiar with. For
example, the opportunity for deep repatriation of people back
into--not just across the border where the recidivism rate is
that they'll be back, coming our direction that night or the
next night.
The whole notion of being able to take the repatriation
decision and take Mexican nationals, illegal aliens back to----
Senator Feinstein. I'm not talking about--none of these are
Mexican nationals. These are all OTMs--other-than-Mexicans--
44,000 OTMs came across the southwest border last year.
Admiral Loy. Yes, ma'am. I'm just trying to array a set of
tools that could be potentially of use, not only in Mexico, but
wherever the OTMs might be from.
The challenge here is a lengthy border, as you well know.
We are introducing technology along that border that'll
substitute for what has historically been a very human-
intensive effort along the border, to make a difference in
terms of comings and goings.
So, US-VISIT, the notion of using UAVs on the border as
plugs between those portals of entry that we have worked so
hard to harden, if you will. But the entry-exit system that has
been now deployed by the Department of Homeland Security after,
I would offer, 20 years or so of effort on the part of INS
beforehand in failed efforts to establish some kind of a
legitimate, biometrically based entry-exit system into the
country, that we have some confidence in in terms of our
abilities to say who is here and who is not, and what are we
going to do about those who we can track and find.
Senator Feinstein. Let me have a little discussion on this.
Because essentially, there is no detention for these people.
They don't show up for their hearings and they disappear. So we
really don't know who comes into this country illegally over
that southwest border.
I have two cases that the FBI was involved in, one actually
in Michigan, where the gentleman was clearly a terrorist. He
pled guilty. He got 6 months. This is a big problem in the
United States. And I really don't think that the mechanical
aspect of it is going to solve it. You're not detaining these
people. They're released, essentially.
Admiral Loy. Well, there certainly is a prioritization
process to those with any degree of a connection against the
national terrorism database that has now been forged for us to
be able to bounce names against. So, to the degree we are
releasing because of the resource implications attendant to
keeping them and bedding them and detaining them until
resolution can come of their individual cases.
Those without any apparent criminal and/or terrorist
connection are obviously those that are on the high end of the
release order and the low end of the detention order.
Senator Feinstein. Can you give us a number of how many are
being detained?
Admiral Loy. I don't have that with me at the moment, but
I'll be happy to provide it to you.
Senator Feinstein. I would appreciate it. Out of the 44,000
that came in in 2004, how many are detained. I appreciate that.
Admiral Loy. We'll provide that.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Roberts. Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Goss, because of our longstanding relationship
going back to our House days, you know how keen my interest has
been in this area of information sharing. I was very pleased to
hear you, as well as Director Mueller, say that things are
improving. But at the same time, you both recognize we still
have a long way to go.
Donnie Harrelson, the Sheriff of Criss County, Georgia,
happened to be in the back a little earlier, and I visited with
him for a minute. He was keenly interested in a number of
things that were being said. And I told him that we really
can't let this issue of information sharing rest until his
office and every other local law enforcement office has the
information in real time that they need to help us win this war
on terrorism domestically. So, I appreciate the continued
effort of everybody at the table on this issue, but obviously
especially you two.
Director Goss and Admiral Jacoby, there was a report on Fox
News this morning in which it stated that the Iranians have
alleged that an aerial vehicle of some sort fired a missile and
it did not explode, but it was fired in the area of a nuclear
facility owned by the Iranians.
Would either of you care to comment on the information that
has come out of Iran this morning relative to that issue?
Director Goss. Senator, thank you for your comments about
vertical integration of information and your patience on
letting us get the technology and our architecture, our
enterprise, together on that. There is progress since we last
talked, and that's good news.
On the subject of Iran, I know nothing in my official
position. What I do know is, I think, from press reports that
something did fall out of the sky and came down somewhat near
Bushehr, their ongoing building of their nuclear power plant in
that area.
I also heard a subsequent report--and I have no idea
whether I'm spreading a rumor or not--that it was a gas tank
that fell off an aircraft and exploded. And I have no idea
whether that's true or not. It just came into my ear.
Admiral Jacoby. Senator Chambliss, I have no knowledge of
the report or any incidents involving Iran.
Senator Chambliss. Director Mueller, I have had the
opportunity to visit with your joint terrorism task force folks
in Atlanta and intend to do so again in the very near future.
And I will tell you, I am very impressed by the work that's
ongoing with that operation.
Every time I meet with them, I am told by some of your FBI
agents in the field, as well as other local law enforcement
officers, of the importance of the PATRIOT Act, and their
ability to fight terrorism as well as fight crime with the
tools that they have under the PATRIOT Act.
Now, as you know, the PATRIOT Act, or certain provisions of
it, are going to be expiring at the end of this year. Would you
care to comment on what your thoughts are relative to the
reauthorization of those provisions that are set to expire, and
how useful the PATRIOT Act has been to your organization in
fighting crime and fighting terrorism?
Director Mueller. Let me just start off by saying that the
provisions of the PATRIOT Act are indispensable to the
protection of the American public against further terrorist
attacks.
And the heartland of the bill that is so important--and
it's not just important to the FBI, but it's important to the
CIA, the DIA and others in the intelligence community, as well
as State and local law enforcement--is the breaking down of
walls that inhibited our ability to share information across
our agencies and across our disciplines and across our
programs. And the safety of the United States depends on the
ability of all of us together to be able to accumulate the
information, share the information.
And I don't mean just in pushing, but having access, equal
access to the information, and having the opportunity to act on
that information and all the information, whether it be act
within the United States, in a city, in a town, in a State or
nationally, or overseas, by having access to information that
may have been collected within the United States or outside the
United States.
And the PATRIOT Act has been instrumental in breaking down
those walls and enabling us to do it. It has given us new
authorities. That has given us the ability to obtain
information that will allow us to identify persons who present
a threat against the United States with adequate predication of
their interest and motivation in so doing.
It has given us access to records that we previously did
not have, but often are instrumental pieces of a puzzle that'll
give us a broader vision, a broader view of the intentions of
an individual or of a group of individuals in the United
States.
And I know myself and others who live day in and day out
trying to prevent terrorist attacks will be here before
Congress on a number of occasions, asking Congress to please
continue to let us have those tools to protect the American
public.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Roberts. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Goss, we were given information on an unclassified
basis in January of 2002, as follows. This is a CIA assessment.
``We assess that North Korea has produced enough plutonium for
at least one, and possibly two, nuclear weapons.'' I'm
wondering, Director, if you could give us the current CIA
assessment.
Director Goss. I'm honestly not sure whether or not the
assessment is classified that we have. But our assessment is
that they have a greater capability than that assessment. In
other words, it has increased since then.
I would also point out there are other agencies that are
making assessments, and there is a range. And I think that the
range we're fairly comfortable on--and I know that is
classified. Be happy to share that with you in closed session.
Senator Levin. If you also could tell us for the record if
there's any unclassified numbers you can give us--for the
record, if you can do that. I'm not asking----
Director Goss. Senator, I will.
Senator Levin. If you can give us numbers the way that
number was given. And also, Director Goss, this is for you.
The 9/11 Commission included a number of recommendations
for realigning the Executive Branch, including the following.
``Lead responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary
operations, whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the
Defense Department.'' Do you agree?
Director Goss. I recall the issue very well.
Senator Levin. Just briefly, do you agree with that?
Director Goss. I do not agree with that conclusion. We have
studied it, and the Secretary of Defense and I have a memo
which I anticipate signing today.
Senator Levin. Is that going to be public?
Director Goss. Certainly the conclusion of it will be.
Senator Levin. I think as much public as you can make,
obviously.
Director Goss. It's in everybody's interest to know, I
think, how we are dividing up the responsibility.
Senator Levin. I think it is.
Director Goss. I can tell you we spent a lot of time
looking at this. And the Secretary feels that he has
capabilities that are important, and I agree. And I feel I have
capabilities that are important, and he agrees. There's not a
lot of disagreement on this. We just didn't come out the same
place the 9/11 Commission did.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Director.
I understand that your CIA's Inspector General's report on
treatment of detainees by members of the intelligence community
is somewhere in the pipeline. Can you tell us where it is?
Director Goss. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. When is it going to be available?
Director Goss. The IG, or the inspector general of the
agency, has indeed got all of the complaints and the referral
on that matter in hand. As you know, it's an independent
position. I have checked.
There is one report that was ordered by my predecessor,
which has come back, which had 10 recommendations or so in it.
About, I think, eight of those have been done.
We are now into the process of looking at some of the
specific cases that have been brought to the IG. I cannot tell
you what his timetable is, but I'm sure he would be very happy
to tell you. I am assured that the work is ongoing, as it
should be appropriately.
Senator Levin. Well, if he'd be happy to tell us, wouldn't
he be happy to tell you?
Director Goss. Sure.
Senator Levin. Well, what is the timetable? I mean, is
there a time?
Director Goss. I haven't asked him what day he's going to
finish all these cases.
Senator Levin. Or a month?
Director Goss. As soon as they are through. I know one case
has been dismissed. I know one case has been prosecuted. You've
read about it in the paper, in North Carolina. know there are
still a bunch of other cases. What I can't tell you is how many
more might come in the door.
Senator Levin. OK. Thank you.
Director Mueller, this is for you. It relates also to the
interrogation question. The FBI documents which were released
under a FOIA request include e-mails from FBI agents expressing
their deep concerns, that during late 2002 and mid-2003, overly
aggressive and coercive interrogation techniques were being
used by the Defense Department people at Guantanamo's detention
facility which ``differed drastically from the FBI's authorized
practices.''
Those memos described the Department of Defense's methods
as, quote: ``Torture techniques,'' expressed disbelief over the
military's interviews, telling their colleagues back in
Washington--this is in the FBI--that ``you won't believe it.''
The FBI agents also described heated exchanges and battles
with the commanding generals at Guantanamo over the Department
of Defense's interrogation techniques, which FBI agents ``not
only advised against, but questioned in terms of their
effectiveness.'' Incidents described included detainees being
chained hand and foot in fetal positions, no chair, food or
water for long periods, ended up defecating on themselves. One
detainee apparently had been literally pulling his own hair out
throughout the night.
Another major concern of the FBI agents present at
Guantanamo was that the Defense Department interrogators were
impersonating FBI agents in order to gain intelligence. FBI
agents were deeply worried that should detainees ever publicly
report their treatment at Guantanamo the FBI would be left
``holding the bag,'' because it would be appear falsely that
``those torture techniques were done by FBI interrogators.''
Those documents make clear that the FBI was so concerned
about the Department of Defense's interrogation techniques that
it issued guidance to FBI agents at Guantanamo to stand clear
and to keep away from those techniques when the DoD took
control of interrogation.
I assume that because of the serious and extensive
objections that were lodged by FBI agents against those
techniques, and particularly given the heated discussions at
which your personnel were present and engaged in, that you or
your senior advisers were aware of the concerns of those
members of your staff.
And I'm just wondering--this is my question--did you raise
those concerns with either senior officials at the Department
of Defense, the Attorney General or the head of the criminal
division at the Justice Department, or higher-ups in the
Administration, including the National Security Council?
Director Mueller. Senator, I know that those concerns were
raised with the Department of Defense by persons within the
FBI. At least some of those were, at least three incidents
early-on.
Certainly after the issues were raised about Abu Ghraib
there were additional memoranda that were generated as a result
of an inquiry to the field that you may have been alluding to
there. Those also have been brought to the attention of the
military.
I will also say that our inspector general is doing a
review of when the information came in and what happened to
that information once it came into the FBI.
Senator Levin. You personally did not raise those concerns
with senior officials at the Department of Defense or with the
Attorney General or the head of the criminal division?
Director Mueller. I was not aware of those concerns until
May of 2004.
Let me just be precise on that, Senator. I was not aware of
the concerns that you raised, that you allude to there, in
Guantanamo until May of 2004.
Senator Levin. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Chairman Roberts. Senator Snowe.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE OLYMPIA J. SNOWE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MAINE
Senator Snowe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome
all of our panelists here today.
Director Goss, just to follow up on one of the questions
that the Chairman raised with respect to A.Q. Khan, there's no
question that he masterminded a far-reaching, wide-ranging,
global in scope operation in dispersing nuclear information
activities and technology.
Have we pressed the Pakistani government to allow a U.S.
representative to directly have access to A.Q. Khan for
questioning to determine the extent of his network of elicit
nuclear activities?
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Olympia J. Snowe,
U.S. Senator from Maine
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for holding this vital hearing that
will give us an opportunity to examine the threats currently arrayed
against our Nation as well as a look at those threats that may endanger
our society in the future. Identifying these threats each year is
crucial to our ability to gauge our progress in defeating or mitigating
those threats and to understanding this Committee's role in providing
the oversight and resources required by the Intelligence Community to
help defeat those who wish us harm.
This hearing will also give us an opportunity to examine the
progress of the changes initiated since passing the Intelligence
Community reform in the last Congress and the confirmation of the new
Director of Central Intelligence. But, in the end, it is the current
and emerging threats to the Nation that drives our investments in, and
the development of priorities for, the Intelligence Community's
collection and analytic capabilities. I intend to look at a wide
spectrum of these threat scenarios--from the threat posed by nuclear-
capable terrorists to the future emergence of a regional peer-
competitor, as well as to our abilities to protect the homeland.
I also want to thank Mr. Goss, Director of Central Intelligence and
Mr. Mueller of the FBI for once again appearing before the Committee to
describe to us their view of the world and how their respective
agencies are facing the many challenges before them.
I especially want to acknowledge Admiral James Loy's appearance
here today. Although he has announced his departure from public life
later this spring, he remains committed to the nation's defense, as he
has been for his entire career, and has come before us today to
describe the Department of Homeland Security's efforts to counter the
threats arrayed against the homeland. On a personal note, as Chair of
the Senate's Subcommittee on Oceans, Fisheries and Coast Guard, I was
able to work closely with Admiral Loy when he was Commandant of the
Coast Guard. His charge to protect the Nation has always been a part of
his personal code of honor and he has been unwavering in accomplishing
his mission. For that and his many years of public service, I thank
him--the Nation is not only grateful, but safer, for his loyalty and
dedication.
I would be remiss if I didn't comment directly about the dedication
and professionalism of the thousands of Americans who make up our
Intelligence Community. Each day, across this country and around the
world, they labor, often without recognition, to keep this country safe
from harm. It is their vigilance upon which we rely to give us the
forewarning necessary to counter the many dangers present in our world.
Although it is impossible to directly express our deep appreciation for
their efforts, I charge our witnesses to relay our eternal gratitude to
those who serve America so well.
It has been an extremely challenging year for the Intelligence
Community; one in which we saw two major reports detailing the actions
and failures of our collective intelligence community to provide
national decisionmakers with the timely and quality intelligence they
must have to prepare America for the threats faced by the Nation and
the need to go to war. On the heels of those reports, we in Congress
undertook the largest revamping of the intelligence community since its
inception with the 1947 National Security Act. This self-examination
and correction is a hallmark of our democracy and will serve to make us
stronger. It is my fervent hope that the professionals of the community
see this reorganization as an opportunity to renew their dedication and
take on the challenges to strengthen their craft. In these perilous
times, the Nation needs them now more than ever.
We on this Committee have spent a great deal of the past 2 years
poring over the intelligence provided to decisionmakers before the
commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom and, of course, we all learned
many things and reached many conclusions. In my analysis of that
information, I became more and more convinced that while Saddam's
nuclear programs may have been defunct, our Nation continues to face
the very real threat of nuclear terrorism.
Terrorists are known to be seeking nuclear technologies and have
already displayed a proclivity for catastrophic destruction on a
massive scale. For terrorists, attacking a U.S. city with a nuclear
device would likely be their ``dream come true.'' In the February 6
Washington Post, Steve Coll, author of ``Ghost Wars,'' notes that Osama
bin Laden's inspiration, repeatedly cited in his writings and
interviews, is the American atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
which he says shocked Japan's fading imperial government into a
surrender it might not otherwise have contemplated. Bin Laden has said
several times that he is seeking to acquire and use nuclear weapons not
only because it is ``God's will,'' but because he wants to do to
American foreign policy what the United States did to Japanese imperial
surrender policy.
I intend to focus my work on the Committee on this specific threat
to the United States because I believe it is time for us to look
closely at how we can prevent and deter such a threat. I am also
acutely aware from my work on the Commerce Committee in the area of
transportation, maritime and port security that we must look to the
seas as a very likely path of introduction of such a weapon into the
United States. The 9/11 Commission found that ``Opportunities to do
harm are as great, or greater, in maritime or surface transportation
(compared to commercial aviation).''
Recognizing these vulnerabilities, I included a number of
provisions and acted as a conferee to the Maritime Transportation
Security Act signed into law in 2002. One of my provisions included a
requirement that foreign shippers send their cargo manifest before
arriving at a U.S. port so the Department of Homeland Security can more
efficiently evaluate individual container shipments for risks of
terrorism. I have also held several port security hearings at the
Subcommittee on Oceans, Fisheries and Coast Guard and will continue to
do so because I do not believe we are anywhere near finished with fully
securing our maritime borders.
That is why I was encouraged by the President's announcement in
December of his Maritime Security Policy National Security/Homeland
Security Presidential Directive, which outlined his vision for a fully
coordinated U.S. Government effort to protect U.S. interests in the
maritime domain. The directive charges the Department of Defense and
the Department of Homeland Security with the alignment of all U.S.
Government maritime security programs and initiatives into a
comprehensive and cohesive national effort involving appropriate
Federal, State, local and private sector entities.
This move comes at a critical time. As we sit here right now, the
Department of Defense is proceeding with the 2005 Base Realignment and
Closure (BRAC) process, which I continue to believe is the wrong thing
to do while we are engaged in a global war on terrorism. We must ensure
that in the DoD's drive to meet an arbitrary 25 percent reduction
figure in infrastructure, we do no harm. For example, Brunswick Naval
Air Station on the coast of my home State of Maine is home to one of
four remaining maritime patrol bases remaining in the Navy and, in
fact, possesses the only remaining fully capable active runways in the
entire Northeast.
While many say that the maritime patrol community, whose chief
mission is anti-submarine warfare, is not relevant in the post-cold war
world, the community has reinvented itself as the warfighting
commander's premiere manned, long-range intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR) platform and is performing admirably in direct
support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.
But this community also has a role in the President's maritime
security policy. We have been talking to the Coast Guard and it is
clear that if we want to be able to conduct ISR operations against
inbound maritime traffic farther than 200 miles from our shores, the
maritime patrol community offers a ready and proven capability. These
points are made eloquently in a white paper written by retired Navy
Captain Ralph Dean who concludes that optimum basing for maritime
interdiction assets is as important as the assets themselves. We must,
therefore, carefully factor in future requirements for maritime
interdiction before closing any of the maritime patrol bases, which are
located in the four corners of the continental U.S.--Maine, Florida,
Washington state, and California.
The use of conventional forces to interdict the asymmetric threats
facing the Nation leads me to my final point. The Nation cannot afford
to develop tunnel-vision when it comes to the threat we face. Just as
the U.S. failed to adequately counter the developing threat of
terrorism as we focused solely on the cold war threat, I am concerned
that we do not now focus solely on terrorism and ignore the growing
likelihood of a regional peer competitor in the Pacific region. Like
many, I am alarmed by the rapid and unprecedented buildup of naval
forces, particularly destroyers and submarines, by the Chinese People's
Liberation Army Navy.
Last month members of the House Armed Services Committee visited
China and came away deeply concerned. Representative Randy Forbes said,
``We're seeing China really make huge moves in the area of its navy. .
.There's no question our Navy is the best in the world. . .but at some
point, sheer numbers start to matter.''
So I am doubly concerned when the Navy sends Congress a budget that
radically cuts the number of next generation destroyers and submarines
to be built by the Navy. I believe that in the future we will need
conventional ``blue-water'' ships to maintain our global presence in
the Northern and Western Pacific. I look forward to hearing from VADM
Jacoby as to the Defense Intelligence Agency's assessment of the
Chinese naval threat and what we are doing now to counter that threat
before we wake up one morning to yet another ``new normalcy,'' just as
we did on September 12, 2001.
I look forward to hearing the testimony of our witnesses and
working with them as part of this Committee to ensure that our
intelligence community has the resources and structure it needs to meet
the national security challenges we face today and in the future.
Thank you.
Director Goss. Senator Snowe, I want to be very careful how
I answer your question. I think my definition of ``pressed''
and yours would be the same. And I would say yes.
I can tell you that there is continuous attention to this
matter. And I believe that is being done with the necessary
urgency and fortitude, to make sure our interests are
completely understood.
Senator Snowe. So, could you characterize the cooperation
on the part of the Pakistani government, sharing information?
Director Goss. Yes.
Senator Snowe. I think it is disconcerting. I'm sure you
saw the article in Time Magazine recently citing a source close
to the Khan research laboratories in Islamabad. And he's quoted
as saying, ``even though its head has been removed, Khan's
illicit network of supplies and middlemen is still out there.''
Director Goss. Senator, in about 2 minutes in a private
conversation, I think I could satisfy your answers to these
questions.
Let me just simply say, there is an understanding that A.Q.
Khan enjoyed a certain amount of celebrity status in his
country because he was the man who brought them the bomb, which
was very critical to that culture and their national pride and
so forth.
It has been a difficult prospect. And understanding the
problem there, have to dealing with it, is useful in
negotiating our interests, which are to get all the information
possible.
I think that those discussions are understood and
appropriate steps by the right people are taking place. I can
be more specific in private.
Senator Snowe. I appreciate that.
Admiral Loy, I'm sure you're familiar with this report from
the inspector general of the Department of Homeland Security
regarding the visa waiver program and the use of stolen
passports from the visa waiver countries.
And it's pretty troubling and disconcerting the extent to
which aliens have applied for admissions into the United States
with stolen passports from these specific countries and have
been admitted, even when information has been submitted to the
lookout system, all the more disconcerting, I think, when you
consider--and I think we all agree--the greatest threat to this
country is having terrorists have access to nuclear weapons or
the materials to manufacture them.
And this report indicates ``aliens applying for admission
to the United States using stolen passports have little reason
to fear being caught and are usually admitted. Our analysis
showed that it only made a small difference whether the stolen
passports were posted in the lookout system.''
They reviewed two groups. Of the first group, 79 of the 98
aliens attempting entry were admitted. The second group had
lookouts posted for their stolen passports prior to their
attempted entries. And from the second group, 57 out of the 78
aliens who attempted entry were admitted.
Thirty-three of these admissions occurred after September
11, 2001. And then 136 successful entries using stolen
passports were allowed.
I mean, obviously, this is significant and disturbing, to
say the least, that obviously we haven't made much headway with
respect to this issue regarding stolen passports. And when you
think that worldwide there are 10 million stolen passports, it
only takes one to gain admission into the United States.
You know, when you think about the fact on June 6, 2001,
according to this report, 708 blank passports were stolen from
the visa waiver program. The IG reported that this was
significant because the passports were stolen in a city that
also was the location of the al-Qa'ida cell that played a
significant role in providing financial and logistical support
for the September 11th terrorists.
It's interesting as well because there is little attempt by
law enforcement officials to follow up and to try to locate
these individuals, even when they have learned--even when
officials have learned--that they have come into this country
illegally.
So, one, what are we doing to investigate these activities
of these aliens that have used stolen passports? What are we
doing to determine their whereabouts? And what are we doing to
improve our ability to locate, investigate and remove these
individuals from the United States, who have stolen passports
to gain entry?
Admiral Loy. Thank you, Senator Snowe. It's a very serious
issue. The ICE agency is following up dramatically as a result
not just of the IG's investigation but, rather, of their
recognition of this, I'll call it, chink in the armor, so to
speak.
We must recall that, of course, over the course of a couple
of hundred years of our country's openness to people coming to
our borders, our exit-entry control system attendant to those
borders was, frankly, very weak.
The fact that the last year-and-a-half that we have
established US-VISIT as an entry-exit control system, that we
have engaged internationally to try to use Interpol as a
database storage for stolen passport information, so that
there's a database that can be used internationally, not just
by folks of concern coming to the United States, but crossing
any borders anywhere.
The visa waiver program in and of itself now is required--
any folks coming into our country from visa waiver countries go
through US-VISIT, and we begin to gain the biometric value of
the fingerprints and the facial imagery that we capture as they
come into our country each time they enter.
We are conducting reviews of the visa waiver countries as
we speak. There are 25 of the 27 countries being reviewed, as
the Congress biannually, with a report due back to provide you
a solid status report on the visa waiver countries as it
relates to the issue that you're describing.
Furthermore, that review process always has the opportunity
for sanctions attendant to it, as to whether or not one stays
in the visa waiver program at the other end of the day.
There have been rather dramatic, public reflections of both
Germany and France and other countries having this nightmarish
problem of not tens or twenties, but literally thousands of
their brand-new, machine-readable passport blanks finding their
way into the status that you were describing. So it is a
significant international issue that we're trying to fight on
all those fronts.
Senator Snowe. Well, it's clear that we need to do
something very expeditiously.
Admiral Loy. Including the enforcement.
Senator Snowe. I think it's a huge challenge and the
countries better be cooperating in that regard.
Admiral Loy. Exactly.
Senator Snowe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Roberts. Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen.
Sorry, we've got multiple hearings going on this morning and I
didn't get to hear all of your testimony.
But I did understand that several of you made the point
that information sharing is improving. And I will tell you that
I'm still concerned that the walls that have prevented
information sharing still have not been brought down. And to
some extent what has happened, the pre-9/11 walls that prevent
information sharing seem to have been replaced with a new set
of walls that prevent information sharing. And I want to give
you an example that revolves around the area that you all
talked about, the National Counterterrorism Center, NCTC, where
you all feel things have gotten better.
Now, our Committee has been told that, while information
can be shared among those who work at the center, an analyst
has to go out and seek approval before sharing information that
may be of value with the home agency, and the approval may or
may not be granted and it's sort of a bureaucratic shuffle to
get it done.
My question would be to you, Director Goss. Are you aware
of the problem? And if so, how do you believe it ought to be
addressed?
This is something that our Committee has heard about now
several times. And it sort of caught my attention when you all
were talking about information sharing improving.
Director Goss, your response?
Director Goss. Yes, I'd be very happy to, Senator. Thank
you.
I do believe that the across-the-board information sharing
is improved. There are still areas--and this is one of them.
Senator Wyden. I want to make sure I got that you say this
is an area that you will still be willing to work with us on.
Director Goss. Oh, absolutely. This is not finished
business yet.
We have the question of how do you protect an individual
agency's sources and methods? How do you get assurance for that
agency when they are making a contribution?
And the question of how we use either TAGINTs or tearlines,
or how we make this available, it's easier if you're just
talking about a customer. But if you're talking about an
analyst that wants to go further in and probe further and
perhaps do tasking, then you come to the questions of some of
the things we're trying to use, like co-location, getting the
analysts and the collectors to talk together, changing things
with agencies, setting up different rules.
Part of that is going to be the business of the new DNI. As
you know, the NCTC reports to the DNI. And the NCTC is now run
very, very effectively, I would say, but on an acting basis, by
John Brennan.
They have absorbed the TTIC into the NCTC. And I think
they've gone just about as far down the road as they can go
without stepping on the prerogatives of a new DNI, whose main
function, in my view, is going to have to be sorting out the
authorities and the interface between the DNI's job and
responsibilities and the individual agencies--and those
interfaces between the 15 agencies in the community.
Because until you do that and make those lines clear, the
question of sharing proprietary--and excuse me for using the
word, but it does fit--information is going to be difficult,
because everybody is charged with preserving their sources and
methods.
Senator Wyden. I think what concerns me is that there are a
finite number of people working the terrorism issue for the
entire intelligence community. They all hold security
clearances. They're all trained.
And it just seems to me that these analysts ought to have
access to all the information that can help our side. And I
would like to talk about this with you all further, talk about
it more, perhaps, in a private session.
But it seemed to me, what we ought to have is the
equivalent of a terrorism analyst program--a special terrorism
analyst program--that would allow all of these analysts access
to all the same data.
And until we get there, we're still going to be trying to
break down these walls. And time is short. We'll talk about it
some more, but I think, Mr. Director, your answer is
constructive. The acknowledgment that there is more work to do
is what I was interested in hearing.
It just seems to me there's only so many people in this
community. Let's make sure they all can get access to the same
kind of information. And there's an awful lot of shuffling
going on, just with NCTC. And I'm just not going to take this
further, but I saw Bob Mueller nod, and I consider that
constructive, as well.
The second area that I'd like to touch on involves
accountability. If there's one thing my constituents are
frustrated about as it relates to government is the absence of
accountability. And still after 9/11, I keep looking for
anybody who lost a job, was demoted, was reprimanded--any kind
of consequences--and I can't find any. I can't find any
anywhere.
And my question would be to you, Director Goss, in that you
all apparently have a report from the Inspector General, as a
result of input from this Committee, the Joint Inquiry on the
terrorist attacks, where there was clear interest in the
Inspector General conducting a review to determine if any CIA
officials ought to actually be held accountable for the
mistakes that led to the attacks. And I'm trying to figure out
where this Inspector General report is. I gather there are just
layers and layers of review.
But where are we on this Inspector General report? What can
you tell us today? When are we going to get it on this
Committee, so that we can get serious about some
accountability?
Director Goss. Senator, thank you. You will get the IG
report as soon as it is finished. I've made the same pledge
yesterday to HPSCI. It was commissioned, I think, by Congress,
and you'll get it. And the IG is independent.
Now, as for where is it right now, the IG came to me
shortly after I came in and said that this matter was under
review and he would be presenting it shortly to me, for the
next step, because there is a process, apparently, in how this
works.
And I asked him a very simple question. I said, if you are
naming names, are you giving those names the opportunity to
express their views? And it turned out that in the process he
had not taken that option. I suggested to him that in the
interest of what I would just simply call American fair play,
if you're going to start bandying people's names about, you
might let them know what it is you're saying about them. And he
agreed. I did not instruct him to do that, please understand.
We just had a discussion about how this process would unfold.
This is somewhat new.
And so I understand that he has done that. And individuals
have been advised of what this report says about them, on a
confidential basis. I also understand that some of these
individuals have hired attorneys because they wish to, for
whatever reason, have that kind of advice. When attorneys come
into the issue like this, I understand that the timing becomes
a little uncertain of when matters will be concluded.
I do not feel it appropriate for me to demand a deadline at
this point, since the process has elements of due process in
it. And I view that the IG is capable of making the decisions
of when he's ready to present that to me. That has not happened
at this point.
When he does, I have already got two staffers I've
selected, who are in the process or I suspect have probably
read the report. So we will be able, when it comes to my level,
as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to decide
whether or not it is appropriate to convene boards in the
agency, in-house, to deal with accountability or not. And that
is apparently what my responsibility will be.
Either way, this Committee and the other Oversight
Committee--the House Oversight Committee--will get the IG's
report. And it is understood, it will be classified.
Senator Wyden. Do I have time for one additional question,
Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Roberts. I think Senator Mikulski has been waiting
very patiently throughout the whole hearing. And if we have
time for a second round, I would be delighted to recognize the
Senator. And I don't mean to pick on him, in that most Senators
have gone red.
I think I'll probably leave that comment alone.
The patient, but always accommodating, Senator from
Maryland.
Senator Mikulski. Patient. Yes, a signature characteristic
of myself, well known to all.
[Laughter.]
Senator Mikulski. Good morning, and thank you really for
what you do everyday. I think all of us appreciate the fact
that the job of everybody here is to prevent predatory attacks
against the homeland, against U.S. assets abroad, against our
troops, and even to help predatory attacks against allies.
I'm going to focus on the issue of terrorism and want to
come back to this whole issue of how we have gotten better at
connecting the dots and focus really on threats to our ports.
So these are really questions for Directors Mueller, Goss,
and Admiral Loy. There's considerable concern that sea-based or
ship-borne terrorist attacks are big concerns and big
possibilities. Many analysts are concerned about the security
of U.S. ports, foreign ports, but in my case, like Baltimore
and other coastal Senators.
So my question is: Of the various scenarios, which do we
fear attacks on our ports? Do we fear nuclear weapons being
smuggled in and detonated at a U.S. port? And what are we doing
about it? And how did the three of you work together?
And Admiral Loy, of course, we know you from your Coast
Guard days, and you've adapted to a new transportation mode
pretty quick. But you see where we are. So there's Goss, you
know, looking at the world. You know, Loy's got Mr. Homeland
Security. And there's Mueller, and he's got the domestic
whatever. So where are we on the threat to the ports, and what
are we doing to prevent the threat? And how do you all
coordinate this information so that Governors, and mayors, and
the people can feel pretty good about it?
Director Goss. Thank you, Senator. I'll start.
I will tell you that my normal day starts in the company of
these two gentlemen. And matters of this urgency are discussed
between us. But, not only that, we have close working
relationships between our agencies. And it is well understood,
the danger of which you speak, properly.
In terms of our part, from the national foreign
intelligence program, obviously, leaning overseas and getting
all the information we can to stop it over there and to get
information before something's put on a ship, or to understand
a plot, is very, very important. I would point out--somebody
can correct the statistic--but it's a very high percentage of
success, perhaps 95 percent, of all drug interdictions come
from good tips from information, not from random searches.
But you have to do the gates-guns-guards approach
domestically to take care of the ports. And you have to do the
information approach. Am I satisfied they're as plugged in as
they can be? Yes, under the circumstances that we have.
Now, with the DHS and with the FBI, law enforcement people,
people with new responsibilities dealing with homeland
security, and our very clear understand that this is part of
the target for our operatives overseas, I think we have done as
good as we can do, in terms of understanding information that's
critical.
Senator Mikulski. I appreciate that the three of you meet,
but I'm talking about all the way down, are we really
communicating?
Director Goss. I think it goes pretty far down for us.
Director Mueller. For us, in every city that there's a
port, there's a Joint Terrorism Task Force with a specific
responsibility to work closely with the elements of the port to
exchange information and provide what can be done to enhance
the port security. In several of the ports around the country,
we have--particularly where there's substantial ferry traffic,
for instance--we have done intelligence analyses of
vulnerabilities of the ferry services.
Each port has a little different mixture of the type of
shipping that comes in. And consequently, the Joint Terrorism
Task Forces, working with the Coast Guard and other elements,
work closely with State and local law enforcement as well as
the other Federal components, to come up with a plan to assure
that we have the intelligence that's necessary to focus on the
threat of a potential attack. And then, if there's an attack,
how we are going to respond to it.
And perhaps I can turn that over to Admiral Loy to pick up
on.
Admiral Loy. Thank you, Senator Mikulski.
The information flow into this challenge is as was just
described by Director Goss and Director Mueller. At the other
end, I would offer that the chair I was sitting in on 9/11 was
still in uniform as the Commandant of the Coast Guard. And,
frankly, we spent the rest of the time that I was in that great
service focusing on domestic maritime strategy--domestic
maritime security strategy.
We also recognized that it was enormously important to see
that this was an international challenge immediately, because
all of those 9 million containers a year, 20,000 a day, that
find their way to Baltimore and many other ports come from
overseas. And so one of the first things we did was literally
take a delegation to the International Maritime Organization to
start a process which has become a standard-setting effort for
international commerce as it relates to facilities, crews,
ships that ply the waters of the United States, to meet those
international standards.
Second, there have been excellent resource plus-ups
attendant to the Coast Guard's capability to shift gears from
emphasizing what it has always been able to emphasize as an
array of responsibilities it has for the Nation and focus on
port security in this particular time of need.
I think one of the greatest strengths of that service is
its agility to reshape its focus on what Nation needs it to
focus on now. And it certainly has done so over the course of
these last 3 years.
We have also recognized the legitimacy through port
security grants and Operation Safe Commerce. The requirements
that we have to look down the supply chain, literally from the
point of origin to the point of destination, with a sense of
transparency all the way through that, in order to see and be
able to apply the insights we gain from the intelligence
community as to what we should be doing operationally in those
various responsibilities.
The notion of pushing our borders out so that they don't
become the first portal that we look at things under concern
about, the Container Security Initiative, as I mentioned in my
opening comments, is now alive and well in 34 different ports
where customs agents, side by each with their host nation
counterparts, are watching the stuffing of those boxes, the
sealing of those boxes, as it relates to cargo security.
One of the most dramatic initiatives that we had already
underway for what then Vern Clark and I, as the Chief of Naval
Operations, viewed as an asymmetric array of threats, which
shifted focus to the terrorism piece of that asymmetric array
after 9/11, had already been underway in Suitland with a joint
effort, with respect to intelligence reviews that the two sea-
going services of this Nation jointly conduct there day after
day after day.
That has developed into two initiatives today. One of them
attended to something I termed maritime domain awareness and
has become almost a term of art in this look that the two
services take. With NORTHCOM's responsibility reaching 500
miles out to sea on the Pacific side and literally almost 1,700
miles to sea on the Atlantic side, we have joined forces, the
Navy and the Coast Guard, to truly understand what's going on
and how do we assure that we know what's going on in the domain
we're responsible for.
Senator Mikulski. Let me come back.
First of all, this was really, I think, very helpful, and I
hope enlightening to the Committee. I know my time's up. But
number one, how real is this threat?
And number two, Admiral Loy, homeland security is the
ultimate user of the intelligence, the ultimate customer, of
course, along with the FBI. But, you know, you're Coast Guard.
You're Customs. That's the battle line.
Admiral Loy. We hold the bag. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Mikulski. Yes. One, how real is this threat? And
number two, do you really feel that what has been described is
really working well?
Admiral Loy. The gathering and the sharing of the
information, this is, I think, working extraordinarily well in
this particular domain. I think, to go back to the Chairman's
commentary about information access as opposed to information
pushing and the comments that the Vice Chairman made attendant
to that, are absolutely right on point.
We discussed, though, there just two operatives. You talked
about the analyst and you talked about the collector. And I
would offer that the operator is the other absolutely crucial
ingredient to keep in that algorithm. The requirements that the
operator can express to the collector and the analyst go a long
way to figuring out the workload of those people on any given
day, any given week, for any given purpose or project.
So I would ask you to have the operators articulate their
requirements, those things that they're going to be able to use
properly to do the work they're required to do. Let the
analysts and the collectors then get about that business to
meet those operators' requirements.
Senator Mikulski. Threat?
Admiral Loy. The threat is as real here. We have the same
kind of exercise program to think our way through the nightmare
scenarios on the maritime sector, as in any other sector. Ports
represent that place where it all comes together. Ninety-five
percent of what comes and goes to this country comes and goes
by the water. So the port complexes are clearly a targeted area
for the terrorists.
Senator Mikulski. Mr. Chairman, I presumed my time was up.
That was a lengthy conversation, but I think really is crucial,
because that's where it all comes together.
Chairman Roberts. As usual, the Senator raised an important
point. Has the Senator finished her comments?
Senator Mikulski. My time is up.
Chairman Roberts. The distinguished Chairman of the Senate
Armed Services Committee.
Senator Warner. I thank you, Mr. Chairman and the Ranking
Member. We've had a good hearing. I'm sorry I had to step out
for a moment.
Sixty years ago this month, at age 17, I started my very
modest and inauspicious military career. And I had over a half
century of the privilege of being associated with the men and
women of the United States military. And this afternoon, like
so many of our colleagues, I go to Arlington for the burial of
a brave Marine who lost his life in Iraq.
As I sit through these ceremonies quietly, the thought
always occurred to me, ``Senator, have you failed to do
anything in your official capacity either to equip or train
this individual or to provide him the intelligence, or his
superiors the intelligence, which could have prevented this
death?''
There is an issue here, I say to my distinguished Chairman
and Ranking Member and colleagues on the Committee, which I
think we've got to address, both in my Committee and in this
Committee. And that is the manner in which we gain intelligence
from those that are captured, either on the battlefield or in
other areas.
There has been a good deal written, and I draw the
attention of my colleagues to an article today in The New York
Times entitled, ``CIA is Seen as Seeking New Role on
Detainees.'' And so my question to you is as follows.
America has always been a Nation that follows the rule of
law, and we must preserve that. And the Geneva Convention, as
such, is a part of our body of law. But we recognize other
nations have other laws, traditions, whatever. And there could
well be means by which they gain intelligence which we can't,
following the rule of law. And I'm not suggesting we deviate
from the rule of law.
But when an individual is apprehended in Iraq, should we
turn him over to the Iraqis, who may have a different system,
and from that individual we gain information that not only
preserves the opportunity to protect our coalition forces, but
indeed the terrible and tragic killing of so many Iraqi
citizens and their own security forces.
I think largely this issue has to be addressed in closed
session. But I wonder, Mr. Director, to what extent you can
talk about what your hope is in this area to gain the maximum
intelligence that we need to not only bring to, hopefully, a
successful conclusion of the Iraqi campaign, but other
campaigns on other fronts and, at the same time, carefully
preserve the traditions of this country by following the rule
of law.
And most specifically, what should we do in dealing with
other countries in terms of sharing the burdens of captivity
and interrogation of a witness or a captive or whatever we may
have in our possession? And then I'll ask the Department of
State, Ms. Rodley, to give the views of State on that.
Director Goss. Thank you, Mr. Senator.
The subject is of critical importance to us. You are
correct to point out that we are dealing in a life-and-death
business, and you are correct to point out that interrogation
is a mainstream of information. Having enough professional
interrogators operating the proper way, that would be within
the rule of law, and professional interrogators will tell you
that torture is not something they would wish to have, because
it doesn't work. There are better way to deal with captives.
So I don't think there is any inconsistency with the idea
of professional interrogation of combatants, whether they're
conventional or unconventional, taken off the field of
hostility and brought into our captivity, being subject to a
professional interrogation. I do not think that's an impossible
job.
The question of who does it and under what circumstances
does get us into some legalities. I'm not a lawyer, an
attorney. And I will obviously be guided by what they say. But
that is not going to be a deterrent to a professional program.
It's just going to affect the mode a little bit.
Clearly, as Americans, we are concerned with legality, the
rule of law. We are concerned with human rights because we are
compassionate human beings, and what we stand for is what we're
fighting for. And we're not going to abrogate that.
We have an immediacy of protection of forces and protection
of innocent lives in the interrogation process. We do not want
to forego that opportunity. Nor would we ask another country to
do something that we would not do ourselves as a cute way of
end-running our commitment to the law and decency.
I believe that we have most of that in hand. There are some
parts of that that I cannot answer with you yet that are sort
of down-the-road pieces of it that I need to talk to you about
in closed session.
But if you asked me today, is interrogation vitally
important to saving lives, and disrupting terrorists, and
protecting our forces, the answer is unequivocal. Yes.
If you are asking me today if we are handling interrogation
within the proper norms and bounds, the answer is yes. If you
are asking me today if I would like to get more information
from some of our captives that I still think have information
we would like to have, the answer is yes. And if you asked me
would I like to have more captives tomorrow to interrogate, the
answer is yes.
Senator Warner. Let's take it to one last subject. When
you're given the option that you could transfer this prisoner
to another nation, recognizing that nation employs methods
different than we, how would deal with that?
Director Goss. I would require safeguards, if that captive
were going back, either as a non-interrogee or as an
interrogee. If that individual is being returned to a nation, a
judgment should be made that nothing beyond, I would say, due
process punishment, if that is deserved, would happen to that
individual, even though they may not have the same standards in
that nation.
As you know, many nations will claim their citizens back.
And we have a responsibility of trying to ensure that they are
properly treated. And we try and do the best we can to
guarantee that. But, of course, once they're out of their
control, there's only so much we can do. But we do have an
accountability program for those situations.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
Chairman Roberts. Senator Bayh.
Senator Warner. I hadn't finished.
Chairman Roberts. I beg your pardon.
Senator Warner. Could the witness from the Department of
State give their perspective from their department?
Chairman Roberts. Certainly.
Ms. Rodley. Thank you, Senator Warner.
One of our key policy goals in Iraq, obviously, has been to
build and to build up institutions in Iraq--government
institutions, government services--that will adhere to the rule
of law. This is a long-term process. Mr. Goss's agency has been
involved in this project with us in the stand-up of the new
Iraqi intelligence service.
It's a long-term process, obviously. But we are, of course,
heartened by the results of the election in Iraq. And we are
following closely the formation of the new government there.
And we are hopeful that the new government in Iraq will be a
government that respects the rule of law, and that the Iraqi
people, who suffered horribly for a long time under a brutal
dictatorship, won't be subject to the kind of abuses that
routinely went on under Saddam Hussein.
So I wouldn't automatically assume that detainees turned
over to the Iraqi services now would suffer the same fate that
has been the case very commonly in the past.
Senator Warner. But, Mr. Chairman, if I could just ask a
question for the record, such that they can, I guess, given my
time's up, have to answer for the record.
But I'm following carefully initiatives by Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld as he begins to augment his gathering of
intelligence which he deems essential. And, frankly, thus far,
in my examination, he's acting within the guidelines of the
law, including the newest law that passed the Congress, in
establishing a greater ability to collect, I think, largely
tactical intelligence.
And if the Director would provide for the record his
views--because I'm sure you're following this--as to whether or
not you're of the mind that he is acting within the bounds of
the law and not in any way conflict with the objections of the
new law in establishing these units.
The distinguished Chairman and Ranking Member have begun to
look at this. We both, our Committees, have had hearings or
briefings on this subject. And it's a matter of active
consideration here in the Senate side.
Director Goss. If I'm permitted----
Senator Warner. You'll have to take it for the record,
because I don't want to interfere.
Director Goss. I'm very happy to answer if the time is
permitted.
Chairman Roberts. Let me just say that the distinguished
Chairman has asked the question that I was going to ask in
reference to the encroachment stories that we have been seeing,
both in reference to the FBI and the Department of Defense, in
augmenting their intelligence operations in cooperation with
you. You don't look encroached upon as of this morning.
And that we have had a hearing with Admiral Jacoby and with
Dr. Cambone in the Intelligence Committee about Title 10, Title
50, and the legalities involved. They have, in fact, kept the
Committee informed through the staff and through this hearing,
but I do think that if you could submit that answer to the
record, you know, for the Chairman, I think it would be very
helpful, because I think this is a subject we're all interested
in.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Goss. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman, I am completely
comfortable with where we are in terms of forward-leaning
efforts by all of the elements in the intelligence community to
do the best they can with the missions that we have been
assigned. It is quite clear to me that there has been a lot of
speculation and RUMINT and so forth, and comment in the paper,
which is unfounded or badly founded.
The truth is that I believe that the efforts that the
Department of Defense is trying to undertake are entirely
appropriate. They are looking forward to the best ways to get
the information they need to accomplish their objectives with
the maximum protection for their warfighters. I think that is
excellent.
What it involves is some coordination overseas and some
understanding about who's doing what where. I go to the analogy
that the leader of our country team in any overseas situation
is the Ambassador, the chief of mission, that the person who is
normally in charge of intelligence, all intelligence
activities, is the representative of the Central Intelligence
Agency.
That does mean there's no other intelligence going on
except under the Central Intelligence Agency's immediate
direction. It means it's coordinated there. And I believe that
we understand that. Those details, in some cases, yet to be
worked out, because there is forward-leaning, which we have not
seen forward, which is entirely appropriate.
I can say on the domestic front exactly the same thing.
There have been a lot of stories about who is doing what. There
is no question that the intelligence community has the
experience to do--it's the National Foreign Intelligence
Program overseas. There's also no question that occasionally
agencies like the FBI need to be overseas doing things that
they do very well in pursuit of their role in counterterrorism.
We ask that it be coordinated.
Equally, I think that the FBI wants to be assured, as do I,
that we are not usurping our authorities in the domestic
homeland. We all know Americans do not spy on Americans. And
that is our absolute pledge. It is equally true, however, we
need some support. And we do have a support base that we use in
the United States. It is critical that we keep that coordinated
with Director Mueller.
These are questions of working out details. Perhaps a DNI
would have done it faster than we are doing it. But I frankly
think we're doing it quite well, considering we've got 15
agencies doing very intense things that we haven't done before.
I realize that the DCI, which is one of my titles, is an
endangered species. But I will be handing off my thoughts to
the DNI. And my thoughts are forward-leaning by all agencies is
good, and we can coordinate it and make it work.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I'm very impressed by the
responses you've given to both of my questions. I wish you
well, and we're fortunate you've taken on this task.
Director Goss. Thank you, sir.
Senator Warner. You could have been basking in that sunny
clime of Florida.
Director Goss. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Roberts. Senator Bayh.
Senator Bayh. Senator Warner, sometimes the heat in
Washington is just as warm.
Thank you very much, all of you, for your service to our
country. I really do appreciate it. These are issues of
profound importance, the resolution to which is often not
clear. I wouldn't be surprised if all of you didn't lose a
significant amount of sleep over your service to our country
and dealing with what you're dealing with, so I thank you for
that.
I also apologize, Mr. Chairman, to you and the panel for
having to shuttle back and forth. Alan Greenspan, Chairman
Greenspan, was testifying before the Banking Committee today,
so we are trying to simultaneously deal with our Nation's
economic security and prosperity and our physical security
here. So I apologize for my absence.
Let me begin by asking a question that involves
credibility. And I want to make very clear that it doesn't
involve personal credibility. No one would question any of your
personal credibility. But I think we do have a national
credibility problem.
And so what I want to ask specifically is, for the
Americans watching us today and hearing about assessments
involving Iran and North Korea and what is maybe going on there
that could be threatening our country, what has improved over
the last couple of years since the assessments about weapons of
mass destruction in Iraq that would give greater assurance to
the American people that what we're hearing today is accurate?
Without getting into obviously classified specifics, have
our collection capabilities improved significantly? Have our
analytical capabilities improved significantly? Why should
people place, you know, credibility behind what we're saying
here today, given the history with regard to WMD in Iraq?
Director Goss. That's actually the perfect question, and
that's what we do. That's, I think, why we all go to work.
How do we take what we were using and make it better and
more appropriate? And I think I can report back that we have
more collectors, better technology being properly applied and
more focused in the application, more analysts who understand
the language, who understand the pitfalls of group-think, more
systems that put this together to make the information come out
more timely, more flexibility in our systems to deal with
problems as they pop up--and the nature of our enemy is pop-up,
quite often--and a greater understanding of each other's
problems.
We have all walked a little in everybody else's shoes, and
I think we see it a little differently. And I think that that's
been a helpful exercise. We need to get on with the
architecture of what the community is going to look like, and
we need to make sure that each unique contribution of each of
the elements of the community is provided for in a way that it
is still unique and adding value to the total product.
I think that we are moving well.
Senator Bayh. Are we encouraging contrarian analysis? You
mentioned group-think.
Director Goss. Indeed, we are. And we're publishing it,
too, right on the same page.
Senator Bayh. Any of the rest of you care to comment about
capabilities having improved? If not, that's OK, too.
Admiral Jacoby. I'd like to just echo the Director's words
and talk about a couple of other things, processes, processes
that you bring, you know, the different views together,
processes that have made more sourcing of information available
as we go to community products, and in my agency, a tremendous
emphasis on training and retraining all the way through the
senior levels to make sure that we are reinforcing good
analytical, logical source utilization kinds of capabilities
that are available to us.
Senator Bayh. Thank you.
Yes, Director Mueller.
Director Mueller. I would say our capabilities have
dramatically increased. We had a little bit over 1,300
counterterrorism agents before September 11th. We now have
3,000-plus. We've established an intelligence directorate which
has a total complement of 3,787. Of those, 438 are agents, 490
translators, 2,273 analysts.
We have, in each of our field offices, a field intelligence
group that was not there before. Our ability to obtain the
intelligence, analyze the intelligence, and getting the
intelligence to the operators has improved dramatically since
September 11th.
Senator Bayh. One of the things I think we've all realized
is that in some of these areas there is just an irreducible
level of ambiguity. And we try and minimize that, but in some
of these areas it's still there. And so a certain level of
humility in reaching conclusions is, I think, in order in all
of our parts.
Let me ask you about North Korea and what you assess to be
the likely reaction to our current strategy in North Korea and
the role that China might play. But let me back up for a
second. At least in 2000, with regard to their plutonium
effort, it seemed to have been in stasis. Now they may have
been cheating on the uranium side, but cameras were in place.
Those have been removed. Inspectors were in place. Those have
been removed.
There were published reports that plutonium has been
reprocessed and possibly devices have been created. There are
even published reports that perhaps in some other areas they
may have proliferated. This is not a happy course of events
over the last several years, and at least the initial strategy,
which seemed to be threaten and ignore, does not seem to have
worked too well.
Now we currently have a strategy of engagement through the
6-party talks, trying to encourage the neighbors to take charge
of their own neighborhood. My question is: What do you assess
the North Koreans' likely response to be to our current sort of
sticks and carrots approach, number one? And number two, might
a cynic not think that China, which is in a very good position
to be helpful on this, that there might be an interest there in
not resolving this problem, because as long as North Korea is
there and of concern to us, that gives them leverage over us in
a variety of other areas.
So, my question is, what do you assess the likely response
of North Korea to our current approach? And second, how do you
assess the role that China will play in trying to reach a
positive conclusion?
Director Goss. I'm going to try and avoid a policy comment.
My view is that we are seeing what is the traditional
bluster diplomacy by North Korea, trying to threaten something
terrible and get something concrete back. They're dealing with
nothing to get something, and they do it very effectively. And
this has been their MO, in my view.
As to their response, I think that their responses are
predictable. They are going to continue to do what they want to
do. Their number-one goal is survivability of the regime. And
that is where they are going to go. And whatever it takes,
that's what they'll do. How ridiculous they look on the world
stage does not seem to bother them.
Senator Bayh. Forgive me for interrupting, Director. Is
there anything, in your estimation, or anybody else's
estimation, that could convince them that the survival of their
regime--since that's their top priority--is inconsistent with
the creation and possession of nuclear weapons? They seem to
have concluded that those two things have to go hand-in-hand.
What, in your estimation, could lead them to a different point
of view?
Director Goss. I do not know the answer to that question. I
just simply don't have that information. I could make a guess
and say for them to be relevant, they feel that they have to be
in the nuclear club.
There is another aspect that's practical. That's the way
they make their money. Their bread-and-butter money is selling
this stuff, proliferating.
The Chinese response that you ask, I think the Chinese
understand they have got a very troublesome child right there
in the nest of the family, and they can't go anywhere. The real
estate's not going to change. They've got to deal with the
problem.
They have border problems, refugee problems, all kinds of
things. I think the Chinese are genuinely interested in not
having this be a worse problem. Now, I'm not going to practice
diplomacy. I'm going to yield to the Department of State. Much
of that was my personal view, not an informed intelligence
response.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Director.
Ms. Rodley. I'm just going to pick up on that point about
the Chinese. We agree with that assessment, that the Chinese
are genuinely interested and have concluded that it is in their
interest to resolve the problem with North Korea. We don't see
any indications that they think it is somehow in their interest
in dealing with us to have North Korea continue to be a
problem.
Senator Bayh. But they seemed to be in denial for such a
long time, I'm glad they finally found religion on this issue.
Just two quick things, just very, very quickly.
Hizbollah, you report their capabilities in terms of
striking U.S. interests, if provoked. Should we assume that if
it was ever in our national--if we ever felt compelled to act
against Iran, that might be the sort of triggering event that
we would have to anticipate, Hizbollah taking some sort of
action against us?
Director Goss. I would certainly recommend that any
policymaker considering that take that calculation.
Senator Bayh. My final question is with regard to FARC,
kind of looking out beyond the horizon. Any assessment by any
of you about--obviously, they have capabilities of striking our
interests in Colombia. Are you at all concerned about their
potential for striking us here in the homeland?
Director Goss. Well, I used to represent southwest Florida.
And I have perhaps a different view than others. But I do feel
there is an immediacy to making sure we understand what is
going on there. There are, obviously, dialog and communications
going on between the countries. That means there can be between
the bad players. And I think it's very important for our law
enforcement people to be absolutely on top of that. And, as far
as I know, they are.
Senator Bayh. Director Mueller.
Director Mueller. We have not seen, I do not believe, any
indications or preparations for FARC to launch an attack in the
United States. However, there are ties between individuals
associated with FARC and persons in the United States. And
they're something we have to keep an eye on.
Senator Bayh. Thank you. Again, I appreciate your service.
Thank you all.
Chairman Roberts. Let me just say that, in reference to
Senator Bayh's comment, if Kim Jong-Il would suddenly get
religion, having been to North Korea and trying to deal with
that regime in regards to the famine--and they always have a
famine, but it was a more severe famine several years ago--he
is the religion. He is a deity in his own mind, and the people
believe that, as was his father. So it's a little difficult.
And I would agree with Director Goss. That's the only card
he has to play on the world stage, and they're going to play
it. And they're going to continue. I still think our best
opportunity is to do exactly what the Director said with China
in the 6-party talks. But I have no illusions of all of a
sudden him getting a light bulb to go off. They don't have any
light bulbs, by the way, in North Korea.
And following on your statement, I'd like to ask a question
about Iran. And by your statement, I mean Senator Bayh.
Admiral Jacoby, your written statement says that Iran is
likely continuing nuclear weapon-related endeavors, is devoting
significant resources to its WMD programs, and that, unless
constrained by a nuclear non-proliferation agreement, Tehran
will probably have the ability to produce a weapon early in the
next decade.
Director Goss, your statement notes that the CIA is
concerned about the dual-use nature of the technology that
could also be used to achieve a nuclear weapon.
Ms. Rodley, your statement notes that Iran seeks, but does
not yet have, any nuclear weapons.
It sounds like to me you all agree that, just like Iraq
before 2004, Iran has troubling dual-use nuclear capabilities.
What I'm interested in, and both the Vice Chairman and I want
to get into capabilities and whether or not we have the
capabilities to determine some intelligence analysis on intent.
As far as Iran's intent to build a nuclear weapon, it sounds
like there might be a difference of opinion between you three.
I'm not suggesting that, but at least that might be the case.
I would ask all three of you to give us your assessment of
Iran's intent, to characterize your confidence in that
judgment, and if you feel that should be better handled in a
classified section, I certainly appreciate it.
Director Goss. Mr. Chairman, I would limit my answer. I
think there is something I would say that is obvious. There are
other players in the neighborhood that are very concerned that
also have views about what Iran is up to. And it's important
that we understand what that might lead to.
I believe that, having watched the pride of some countries
in acquiring the world-stage status of having nuclear weapons
and what that has meant for nationalism and leadership, is that
it becomes almost a piece of the holy grail for a small country
that otherwise might be victimized living in a dangerous
neighborhood to have a nuclear weapon.
So, in my view, there is an inclination, a very strong
inclination, by the conservative leadership, present
conservative leadership of Iran to make sure that they can live
up to the same levels as some of their neighboring countries.
And some of those neighboring countries--indeed, Pakistan comes
to mind--have the bomb.
Chairman Roberts. Admiral Jacoby.
Admiral Jacoby. I would join Director Goss, in terms of the
intent part. We did some work recently looking at the direction
that threats were going. And they are going away from
conventional force-on-force confrontation strategy with the
United States toward terrorism on one end and nuclear weapons
and not only the status, but the perceived deterrent value,
that comes with them.
So I would join the Director, in terms of intent in Iran,
and would also say that we're engaged in a hard look at
sequentially nuclear programs or suspected nuclear programs in
various countries. Iran is next on our agenda, and I believe
that our look and the Committee's look will probably coincide.
And we look forward to working that together.
Chairman Roberts. Ms. Rodley.
Ms. Rodley. I don't disagree with anything that's been
said. I would merely add that another element that makes this
harder to get at is the advantage of ambiguity when it comes to
nuclear programs.
In a sense, the Iranians don't necessarily have to have a
successful nuclear program in order to have the deterrent
value. They merely have to convince us, others and their
neighbors that they do. This is a lesson that hasn't been lost
on them, and it merely complicates both the collection and the
analysis on this issue.
Chairman Roberts. I thank all three of you for your
comment.
I'm enjoying the red light--I'm now a member of the red
light club. Have patience, Senator Wyden.
This is a parochial question, but it's really not. It's a
national question. Tommy Thompson, the former secretary of HHS,
left and said his was worried about the Nation's food supply.
And all of us who are privileged to represent States who are
involved in agriculture were asked time and time again--I just
heard it again on the radio as of yesterday. I'm not sure why
Tommy said that.
But, at any rate, Admiral Loy, can you tell me how the
Department of Homeland Security views the threat of what we
call agroterrorism. The Emerging Threats Subcommittee of the
Armed Services Committee 4 or 5 years ago got into this subject
area, knowing how serious it could be, but not many people were
really thinking about it.
They had an exercise, or one of the many exercises that has
been held, called Crimson Sky. Six States were infected by
foot-and-mouth with an attack from Iraq. Devastating results
happened, utter chaos. We lost our markets. The herds had to be
destroyed. People panicked in urban areas. Our food supply
was--and I'm not talking about 1 year. I'm talking several
years.
So are those efforts now really being coordinated well with
other agencies, specifically the Department of Agriculture? Are
you getting the intelligence you need? What kind of a priority
are you putting on this? This is sort of the Mikulski port/
Roberts agriculture question.
Admiral Jacoby. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.
Without a doubt, the Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 7 first of all directs the Secretary of Homeland
Security to be the collaborate effort to pull together the
critical infrastructure protection of our Nation writ large.
One of the economic sectors cited in that directive is the food
sector. And so that has caused the Secretary of Homeland
Security to challenge that designated lead-sector agency in the
Department of Agriculture to develop a plan attendant to
becoming a piece of this puzzle that will be the additive piece
for food, as it relates to the whole critical infrastructure
protection of our Nation.
So there has been very good work undertaken with the
Department of Agriculture in agricultural operations, the meat-
poultry-eggs world, and in the HHS/FDA world responsible, if
you will, for the rest of the food production and distribution
chain that they're responsible for.
We're at a point where this critical national
infrastructure protection plan, the base plan, has been
completed and submitted to the White House. Each of these
sector plans, we have taken stock--we at the Department have
taken stock of how we felt their original plan submission met
the specifications that were outlined in HSPD-7 and have
offered that commentary back to, in this case, the Secretary of
Agriculture, with a bit of a challenge to go back to the
drawing boards a bit and resubmit such that the thresholds are
reached with what we think are the right concerns to allow not
only that to be a free-standing sector and plan attended to
food protection for our country.
Chairman Roberts. OK. When did you send that over?
Admiral Jacoby. That's back just before the holidays, sir.
Chairman Roberts. So that would be under the auspices of
the new Secretary of Agriculture, obviously. How many people do
you have on board in regards to homeland security that either
are on loan from, or consulting with, or are a regular employee
that are dealing with this? I know that's a tough question to
ask you right here. I think I know the answer. There's one, at
least that I know of.
Admiral Jacoby. There's one as a detailee, if you will,
into the Department in this business.
Chairman Roberts. Yes.
Admiral Jacoby. And, of course, we've got those elements
from Agriculture that came into the border portal validation
process.
Chairman Roberts. Yes.
Admiral Jacoby. But the effort is to allow the Agriculture
Secretary to take the lead with respect to developing these
plans for our country and make sure that they fit well, because
we could have 13 perfect plans, and I'm convinced that it's the
interdependencies between and among them that are the real
challenge.
Chairman Roberts. It's a very hard thing to develop a
contingency plan to try to mitigate this. Well, OK, I'll stop
at that point, because I've already gone way over my time. But
I need to visit with you and the new Director about this as we
can determine.
Chairman Roberts. Senator Rockefeller.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Director Goss, just a very
specific and one short question. Before the election, we went
up a color.
Director Goss. I'm sorry?
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. On imminent threat, we went up
from yellow to orange, and nothing happened. And there has been
no talk or consideration, at least that I'm aware of, of
similar elevations since then. I'm wondering if, to the extent
that you're involved with it, sir, to the extent that Homeland
Security, FBI is involved with it, has there been attempt to go
back and review the nature of that intelligence and whether or
not it was a psychological move or whether--I don't mean by
that political. I mean psychological simply as a warning to
others--or whether it was, in fact, justified. Has there been
an effort to go back and re-look at that intelligence?
Director Goss. Senator, in part, the answer's yes. I don't
know all of the things that have been looked at. But part of
that, and again, I'm not--that's not my decision area. We
provide the information. Part of that, I think, was an
assessment of the Usama bin Ladin statement that came out, that
there was a question, was that trying to interfere, and some of
the questions of propaganda began to really take shape. Exactly
how that figured into the decisions that were made by others on
raising the elevation, I don't know.
Have we gone back and taken a look? The answer is yes. And
I'll tell you why. One of the things that Senator Bayh was
pointing out--I should have answered and I neglected to--is
that we have learned the difference between a worst-case
scenario and a most-likely scenario. We need to be very careful
how we need to present these things so people are hearing
things not as worst-case scenarios, but as most-likely
scenarios, if that's what we believe.
We find that, when the chatter level goes up--that's an
expression we like to use because it sort of covers up what
we're really talking about--but it means there's something to
be tuned into. All of our sensors out there, the system is
blinking red, all of those kinds of statements that we've
heard. What it means is that we're getting a huge flow of
information.
The problem is, how much of that is just wishful thinking
and how much of it is real planning? That is a very hard
question to make a judgment on. We are going back, as part of
our process of how do we get our product better, how do we make
sure our customer understands what we're saying.
And that process is very clearly part of the overall
process that Senator Bayh was asking about. Are we attending to
correcting not only the collection piece, but the analytical
piece, including operators, incidentally, when they're
available?
Director Mueller. I think there has been an effort to go
back and look at the--well, we continuously review the threat
posture day in and day out. And I convinced, given the
information we had at the time, that we made the right
decision, in terms of the actions we took, given the
intelligence at the time.
Subsequent to that there has been further development in
that intelligence that may call into question at least some of
that intelligence. But you also have to reflect upon the fact
that we had al-Hindi, we had the surveillance documents, the
Prudential, the stock exchange, a number of things back in this
time prior to the election, along with intelligence that
indicated that we can expect a threat or an attack in that
period before the election.
As I indicated in my opening statement remarks, we
undertook substantial efforts to assure that such an attack did
not take place. We will never know whether those efforts, our
efforts, the efforts of the CIA, the efforts of DHS, the
efforts of our counterparts overseas, were effective in
reducing or removing that threat of an attack before the
elections.
But in reflecting upon what we knew at the time, I believe
that we took the right steps. That doesn't mean that we can't
do it better the next time, but I'm comfortable with the
decision that was made back then.
Admiral Loy. Sir, I think that's a very good capture of the
time. One thing I would offer is that, over the last 2 years
and certainly in the last year, where we are with respect to
capability, where we are with respect to stature of an
interagency security plan that we keep track of day after day
after day, I would offer that today's yellow is probably much
closer to yesterday's orange as it relates to the constancy of
capability that is there 24 by 7/365 around our country.
So we have simply grown and matured, both as a brand-new
department trying to coordinate and collaborate on many of
these things. And the absolute value of some of the
contributions that are being made by many yield an attitude, if
you will, that has the country sort of at a level significantly
stronger than it ever was before.
That offers us a chance to keep from the going up and down
road, so to speak, when the net evaluation of all the players
at a SVTC or a series of weekly and daily meetings that we
conduct, rates the flow going by as not being ``worthy'' of
adjusting the homeland security advisory system to a greater
level.
I think the country should take great assurance that the
level of capability attendant to these things is significantly
higher day after day after day. And that simply is a result of
us learning lessons going back from each of the experiences of
up-and-down that we've undertaken and then ratcheting up, as
appropriate, the prevention, the protection, and the response
capabilities of the Nation across the board.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. I thank you.
Chairman Roberts. Let me just say--and Senator Wyden, I'll
have to buy you lunch or something or, for that matter,
probably all of you, but we don't need to get in any food
depravation here. And so I'll try to make this quick. I hope
there's a look-back on this.
Admiral Loy. Indeed, there is.
Chairman Roberts. The same people, same table, same threat,
no consensus before our Committee in regards to access to
information. That was the problem. Same representatives
testifying before us that you're in charge of, that do this on
a day-to-day basis. And then, 30 days later, a lot of questions
about the credibility of the sources.
Now, if you're going to err, you're going to err on the
side of safety, for goodness sakes. I know that. And if you
take certain steps, you can't come back. We even had one
Senator leave this place as a result of this. He did come back.
But I'm saying that the leadership and this Senate and this
House were informed in such a way with a very aggressive kind
of consensus that was not shared when we had them before the
Committee.
That's not been too long ago. And then, 30 days later,
because of detainee information that's been so highlighted
here, why, then we decided, well, you know, we just didn't have
a consensus. Now, damn, that's got to quit. Now I know that you
can't have every source and have a consensus threat analysis
that's perfect. I'm not asking that.
But at the time, when you had the same people at same
table, you know, one of my questions is, do you people know
each other? And again it was information access. Now I feel
very strongly about that. And I think it was a classic example
of why you have to go back--the Vice Chairman calls it red
teaming--and take a look at this, and say, well, what in the
heck went wrong? Because we panicked, the entire Congress, not
to mention Washington, DC., so on and so forth.
Thank God it didn't happen. You know, maybe I'm wrong.
Maybe there was an element there that we missed. But it
certainly was not present in regards to the presentation that
we received.
Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you know, I
share your concerns about this whole question of how
information is shared, and that's one of the reasons I raised
the questions I did on the last round.
I'd like to go into another area, though, that goes to the
heart of what I think the challenge is in America. I believe
strongly in the proposition that our country has got to fight
terrorism relentlessly and ferociously. And it's got to be done
in a way that's consistent with protecting the privacy of law-
abiding people, innocent people.
Now it's been 2 years since the Congress closed down the
Operation Total Information Awareness program, but the Congress
is still totally in the dark with respect to what kind of
information your agencies collect on citizens and how it's
used. And I want to be very specific and talk about data
mining.
Data mining, by the way of shorthand, is essentially
technology that your agencies use to sift through the records
and information that involves millions and millions of American
citizens. I can't find any rules on data mining anywhere.
And so what I'd like to ask each of you is, what do your
agencies do with respect to data mining, A? B, are there any
rules at all? And, C, how are the rules enforced? Because I've
spent a lot of time on this. And I cannot find any rules at all
on data mining.
So maybe if we just go right down the row.
Admiral Loy.
Admiral Loy. Sir, you and I have spoken about this a lot,
as it's been perhaps 18 months or 2 years ago associated with,
at that point, the Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening
second program, then known as CAPPS II. As you know, I have
worked very, very hard to work with the privacy community and
with many others attendant to recognizing what then became a
list of eight absolutes that the GAO report initiated for CAPPS
II and is now ten items that the Congress put in the
appropriations bill last year for this department, attendant
to, ``You're not going any further with CAPPS II--and it's now
Secure Flight, the new program--until all ten of those concerns
that we have as a Congress are taken care of.''
We have very diligently gone to great lengths to explore
each and every one of the eight, each and every one of the now
ten, and are right on the cusp, I believe, of satisfying the
Congress and satisfying GAO that it is the right thing for us
to press on with that particular program, because it has come
to represent three things.
Senator Wyden. Admiral, are you saying that that's the only
program that involves data mining at your agency? I appreciate
what you've tried to do, and you've certainly been a
straightshooter on it.
What I'm concerned about is whether there are any rules
with respect to data mining generally. I do know what happens
when Congress picks up on one thing or another and suddenly the
travel records get out on somebody. You all work with us. We
try to get something to deal with that specific problem. But I
don't see any rules with respect to data mining generally. And
that's what troubles me.
Admiral Loy. I do not have a management directive in force,
if you will, in the Department that I'm aware of covering data
mining.
Senator Wyden. Are there plans to do that?
Admiral Loy. I'll be happy to take that on and work with
you, sir.
Senator Wyden. All right. Let me just go right down the
row. We've established at least one agency, other than the
computer-assisted travel records, doesn't have it.
Yours, sir?
Admiral Jacoby. Senator, we have very clear, definitive
restrictions on what the Department of Defense can do with
respect to having any information having to do with U.S.
persons in our files. And those are very conservative
interpretations and they are regularly inspected by inspectors
general at all levels inside the departments.
When we apply data mining tools against the information
that we have available, there's no U.S. person's data in there
to begin with. So it's a bit different situation than maybe
some of the other departments.
Senator Wyden. So you get no data, for example, from non-
governmental sources, sir?
Admiral Jacoby. We are not permitted to maintain
information on U.S. persons, sir.
Senator Wyden. OK.
Director Goss.
Director Goss. As you know, the National Foreign
Intelligence Program was specifically set up to make sure that
Americans do not spy on Americans and our work is done
overseas. And I think that the proposition you have given us is
one that, when I left Congress, was still red-hot after a
couple of years of debate, which I think will go on. And that
is the crossroads between privacy and protection.
As far as I know, our agency is not a relevant agency to
answer your question, because we don't do data mining on U.S.
persons unless it's under some safeguarded procedure which is
properly notified and so forth.
Senator Wyden. That's what I'm curious about. I know there
are areas where you do it, and I'm wanting to know what the
safeguards are. You're saying you don't do----
Director Goss. The safeguards are notification of this
Committee, sir.
Senator Wyden. Director Mueller.
Director Mueller. Well, we have one entity in the
counterterrorism area called the Foreign Terrorist Tracking
Task Force that, accomplishes certain data--I wouldn't call it
data mining, but requesting from sources outside the Bureau
information relating to possible locations of terrorists in the
United States. And that has been briefed to Congress on a
number of occasions. It's transparent. We're happy to have you
come over and brief on it.
Senator Wyden. That's the only set of rules you have with
respect to data mining?
Director Mueller. Well, it's not the only set of rules in
terms of data mining. You're definition of data mining----
Senator Wyden. That's what I'm asking.
Director Mueller. We have information that's brought into
the Bureau.
Senator Wyden. Right.
Director Mueller. When information is brought into the
Bureau, it's brought in on predication. We have some reason to
bring the data in. It may be telephone numbers. It may be
addresses of potential terrorists. Now, we data mine that data.
But it's data that we have a basis for bringing into our
databases, whether it comes from our cases or from the
collection of intelligence that is based on adequate
predication.
Senator Wyden. The reason I'm asking the question is that
there are a lot of people in this country who believe that a
lot of this information, you know, data mining, takes place
without predication. And that's why I'm trying to figure out
what the rules are. And I'm going to let Ms. Rodley answer the
question. Then I'm going to ask something of all of you, and
let my colleagues wrap up.
Ms. Rodley. Senator Wyden, as you know, the State
Department is not an intelligence collection agency. To my
knowledge, the only information that we collect and maintain on
American citizens is passport information. And passport
information is held very closely and has a very strict set of
rules regarding its use. I believe, but I will confirm to you
later, that that's restricted to use for notifying next-of-kin
when an American citizen is injured or dies abroad and
cooperation with law enforcement.
Senator Wyden. Thank you.
What I'd like from each of you is to confirm in writing
what policies exist with respect to the sifting of information
on Americans. And I would like it also to include how
information is used, if it's used at all--and I understood that
the Pentagon they had nothing--how it's used when it comes from
non-governmental agencies where there, I think, is really the
Wild West.
I mean, it's one thing if it comes from a Government
agency. It's quite another if it comes from a non-government
body. And having spent a fair amount of time digging into this
area, I can't find what the ground rules are for data mining.
Can I ask, then, that each one of you will get us the
ground rules you use for data mining within the next 30 days?
Director Goss. Absolutely, sir.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Roberts. We thank you for your patience, your
perseverance and your commitment to our country. Thank you very
much.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:17 p.m., the hearing adjourned.]
.