S. Hrg. 109-22, Pt. 5
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2006
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1042
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
__________
PART 5
EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
__________
MARCH 9; APRIL 11, 22, 2005
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona CARL LEVIN, Michigan
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine JACK REED, Rhode Island
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri BILL NELSON, Florida
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina EVAN BAYH, Indiana
JOHN CORNYN, Texas HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director
Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities
JOHN CORNYN, Texas, Chairman
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas JACK REED, Rhode Island
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri BILL NELSON, Florida
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina E. BENAJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina EVAN BAYH, Indiana
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Science and Technology Budget and Strategy
march 9, 2005
Page
Sega, Dr. Ronald M., Director, Defense Research and Engineering.. 5
Killion, Dr. Thomas H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
for Research and Technology and Chief Scientist................ 13
Cohen, RADM Jay M., USN, Chief of Naval Research................. 18
Engle, James B., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Science, Technology, and Engineering........................... 24
Tether, Dr. Anthony J., Director, Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency................................................ 33
Chemical Demilitarization Program
april 11, 2005
Wynne, Hon. Michael W., Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Accompanied by Dale E.
Klein, Ph.D., Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear
and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs................... 108
Bolton, Hon. Claude M., Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology......................... 112
Mahley, Hon. Donald A., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of Arms Control......................................... 117
Salazar, Hon. Ken, U.S. Senator from Colorado.................... 133
U.S. Special Operations Command
april 22, 2005
O'Connell, Hon. Thomas W., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict.................. 152
Brown, GEN Bryan D., USA, Commander, U.S. Special Operations
Command........................................................ 156
(iii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2006
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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 9, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats
and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY BUDGET AND STRATEGY
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m., in
room SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John
Cornyn (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Cornyn, Reed, E.
Benjamin Nelson, and Clinton.
Committee staff member present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations
and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Elaine A. McCusker,
professional staff member; Paula J. Philbin, professional staff
member; and Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Gabriella Eisen, research
assistant; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member;
and Arun A. Seraphin, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Andrew W. Florell, Nicholas W.
West, and Pendred K. Wilson.
Committee members' assistants present: James B. Kadtke,
assistant to Senator Warner; Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to
Senator Cornyn; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
William K. Sutey and Eric Pierce, assistants to Senator Bill
Nelson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN CORNYN, CHAIRMAN
Senator Cornyn. Good morning, and thanks to all of you for
joining us today.
This morning the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities meets to receive testimony on the Department of
Defense's (DOD) fiscal year 2006 budget request for defense
science and technology (S&T) programs. We will also examine the
process and guidance used to make decisions on the appropriate
level of investment for these programs.
It is critical that our S&T investments produce
capabilities which are responsive to current and emerging
needs, but they must also focus on preparing us for the battle
environments that we may face in the future.
I would like to thank each of the witnesses and those who
have provided the demonstrations in the back of the room for
being here today. The displays I think have helped show all of
us some of the real-world applications of some of the S&T that
we are exploring today and understand how important S&T is in
equipping, training, and protecting America's fighting force.
It is important to remember that the origins of these
successful capabilities were predominantly basic research
programs at laboratories and universities around the country.
Our witnesses today are the Department's S&T executives.
They will highlight for us their fiscal year 2006 initiatives
and explain some of the items on display. They will also
describe how they develop their budgets to meet national
security missions and corresponding technology strategies.
Decades of investment in basic and applied research have
led to a force that is better equipped and better protected.
Our military possesses new standoff detection, surveillance,
and when needed, lethal capabilities. We have advanced life-
saving medical technologies. New command and control systems
are coming on line. Achievements in the area of unmanned
systems continue to save lives and increase situational
awareness. Ongoing work in materials and composites provide
enhanced equipment and personnel protection systems.
Another key product of the DOD S&T program that we cannot
set on an easel or put in the space of a 6-foot display table
is the technical workforce, the creative problem solvers who
work in our defense labs and who think up new ideas and how to
respond to the needs of those on the front lines.
The committee took steps to enhance training, recruitment,
and retention of talented individuals who possess unique
national security related technical skills by establishing the
Science, Mathematics, and Research for Transformation (SMART),
scholarship for service pilot program in the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2005. I look forward
to your comments on the status of this effort.
As we listen to the witnesses today and discuss the
Department's plans and budget for S&T, we will also explore how
to maintain a robust research investment in an atmosphere of
competing priorities and immediate operational needs.
I have some questions about the long-term viability of our
current investment strategy and some concern about the
Department's apparent decision to deviate from previously set
funding targets for S&T.
I also have some questions about coordination, transition,
and the technical workforce.
I do, however, want to commend all of you on the great work
that you are doing. The budget request before us reflects tough
decisions made during a challenging time of evolving needs and
continuing operational requirements.
We look forward to hearing from each of the witnesses.
Please note that your written testimony will be made a part of
the record. To allow time for questions and answers, I ask that
you summarize your remarks perhaps in the range of 5 minutes or
so, and then we will come back and ask questions. Again, thanks
to all of you for being here this morning.
I just want to say from a personal standpoint how glad I am
to be working with Senator Reed as the ranking member of this
subcommittee. His experience on the subcommittee and on the
Armed Services Committee and his service to our Nation in the
uniformed services uniquely qualifies him to make a very
important contribution to the work of this subcommittee, as he
does to the committee as a whole.
We are delighted to have Senator Nelson here with us this
morning as well.
With that, I would like to recognize Senator Reed for any
comments he would care to make.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
first congratulate you on assuming the chairmanship of this
very important subcommittee. I very much look forward to
working with you, Mr. Chairman.
I also understand that you are working to develop an
energetic oversight agenda for the subcommittee, and I assure
you that myself and my staff will work eagerly with you and
your staff to get this very challenging agenda accomplished.
Let me thank all the witnesses, as well as everyone who
worked on putting together this very impressive display of S&T.
During times of war, clearly our thoughts and efforts are
focused on the current threats facing our troops deployed in
harm's way. However, in the process of prosecuting operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan, we must also think about the future.
The Department's S&T program attempts to walk the line between
addressing the near-term operational needs and investing in
potentially revolutionary future capabilities.
Through this hearing and the technologies we looked at this
morning, we are exploring the important role that the
Department's S&T program plays in supporting the global war on
terrorism and operations in Iraq. The advanced munitions,
sensors, and force protection systems displayed here are
excellent examples of how we can leverage years of sustained
investment in S&T into important new military capabilities for
our forces today. The revolutionary advances in engineering,
physics, and biology that are also funded by S&T offer the
possibility of currently unimaginable capabilities for future
forces.
I note with some concern that the President's 2006 budget
request cuts S&T by nearly $3 billion as compared to last
year's appropriated level. Despite the fact that the overall
DOD budget has grown, the S&T request is even below the amount
of funding called for in the 2005 budget request.
The request also does not meet the goal of investing 3
percent of the DOD budget in these innovative S&T programs, a
goal endorsed by Congress, Secretary Rumsfeld, the Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR), and the Defense Science Board. I hope the
witnesses can explain how it was decided to reduce investments
in S&T especially at a time when the benefits of those
investments are becoming so easy to see.
The reductions in these programs may severely impact our
Nation's universities and hamper their ability to train the
science and engineering (S&E) work force of the future. It may
also harm our small high-tech businesses who are the real
source of many of our most innovative defense technologies. It
will certainly enable our global competitors to challenge our
leadership in the areas of technology that will save the future
battlefield, areas such as biotechnology, nanotechnology, and
robotics. At a time when we are worried about new national
security threats and global economic challenges, we should not
be reducing support for America's innovators.
In order to help us understand these budget decisions and
develop the case for increased investment, it is critical to
better demonstrate that the S&T program truly addresses the
Department's short- and long-term challenges. I hope the
witnesses can give us a sense that these S&T programs are not
merely reacting to current needs and threats, but have been
shaped with the strategic eye to the future so that our forces
will maintain their superiority on the battlefields of both
today and tomorrow.
Once again, I welcome all of our distinguished witnesses. I
look forward to the discussion and thank the chairman for his
leadership.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Senator Reed. I share some of
your concerns. I know in the full committee we have heard from
the leadership at the DOD about the budget, and of course, we
are all concerned about living within our means, but obviously
the most important priority of our Nation is our security. I
want to make sure that our budget continues to reflect our
security needs, not just the desire to hit a particular bottom
line figure. I know the committee, under Chairman Warner's and
Ranking Member Levin's leadership, will continue to look at
those and examine ways that we can make sure that all of our
national security needs are being met.
Senator Nelson, I would be glad to recognize you for an
opening statement, if you have one.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too thank
you for the opportunity to learn more about the experimental
and developmental challenges that are being undertaken right
now during modern warfare. We appreciate the demonstrations
that we have seen. I look forward to more information. Thank
you.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Our witnesses today are Dr. Ronald Sega, Director of the
Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E). He will be followed
by Dr. Thomas Killion, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
for Research and Technology and the Army's Chief Scientist.
Rear Admiral Jay Cohen is with us, the Chief of Naval Research
(CNR). We also have Jim Engle, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force for Science, Technology, and Engineering, and Dr.
Tony Tether, Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA). Gentlemen, thanks to each of you for being here
with us.
As I said, your full statements will be made part of the
record, and I would like to start with you, Dr. Sega, and we
will go down the line perhaps with about a 5-minute opening
statement each. Then we will get into some of the questions.
Dr. Sega.
STATEMENT OF DR. RONALD M. SEGA, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND
ENGINEERING
Dr. Sega. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the
subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the
Department's fiscal year 2006 S&T program.
As the DDR&E and serving in the role of the Department's
Chief Technology Officer, I would like to highlight a few
representative S&T accomplishments within a framework of five
established priorities. They include: integrate DOD S&T and
focus on transformation; enhance technology transition; expand
outreach to the combatant commanders and the Intelligence
Community; accelerate support to the global war on terrorism;
and fifth, strengthen the national security S&E workforce.
Our fiscal year 2006 DOD S&T budget request is slightly
less than we requested last year, but significantly higher than
the request of fiscal year 2001. The fiscal year 2006 S&T
budget request supports transformation and reflects strategic
factors of increased pressures and threats from asymmetric and
terrorist activity and increased pace in globalization of
technology development.
The Department has increased investments in chem-bio
defense S&T by about $200 million; increased funding for
sensors, surveillance, radio frequency (RF), and electronic
warfare by roughly $100 million; and increased funding for
combatting terrorism technology activity, hypersonic propulsion
technologies, network-based S&T, and quick reaction special
projects.
The first priority: integrate DOD S&T and focus on
transformation. Here we have expanded our inputs to our S&T
decisionmaking process to include capturing more information
about the global S&T activity. We have enhanced the DOD Defense
Technical Information Center's role in electronic data
collection and analysis and realigned it under DDR&E.
The Department continues to reshape its strategic planning
and investment review process, and we continue to support basic
research, ongoing technology initiatives, and near-term
technology acceleration.
As a foundation for our S&T capability, the Department's
basic research program provides new knowledge and understanding
in the areas that underpin national defense.
Basic research performed in universities and Government
laboratories also is important because it is an integral part
of the education and training of S&Es for the Nation's defense
workforce. We are forwarding a legislative proposal in this
area to Congress.
We have sustained funding in the three cross-cutting
initiatives: the National Aerospace Initiative (NAI), Energy
and Power Technologies, and Surveillance and Knowledge Systems.
The NAI is composed of high-speed, hypersonic technologies,
space access, and space payloads. NAI was reviewed by the
National Research Council last year who found it to be a good
program. It supported the direction that we are going in with
the NAI. 2004 witnessed two flight tests, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA)-led/DOD-supported, of an X-43
vehicle at Mach 7 and later at Mach 10.
The second cross-cutting area is Energy and Power
Technologies. It is enabling a more electric force. Here we are
testing megawatt-sized superconducting motors and generators,
developing new hybrid fuel cell and battery systems, and making
significant progress in the area of solid state lasers.
The third cross-cutting area is Surveillance and Knowledge
Systems. It is the enabling underpinning technology for
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C\4\ISR). Here is an example
of collaboration of the Army and DARPA. You saw that in the
back with the command post of the future. It is being used in
Iraq today. It also is, in the supplemental, requesting funding
for additional command posts of the future.
The second priority area is enhancing technology
transition. There are several tools that are available and they
are important and we thank you for your support in these areas.
One is Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs). A
second is the Technology Transition Initiative. The third is
the Defense Acquisition Challenge, and the fourth is the
Defense Production Act, title III. You saw an example of the
Defense Production Act, title III with the laser eye protection
system, and that was in the back as an example. Here, through
this title III activity, a domestic manufacturer who had
experience in coatings at the laboratory level was able to
bring the process to a production state, maximizing coating
performance and minimizing the cycle time. They are now capable
of producing around 32,000 of these per year.
The third area is expanding the outreach to combatant
commands and the Intelligence Community. One example here is a
homeland security/homeland defense command and control ACTD. It
supports U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), addresses important
communications and common operational picture challenges for
Federal, State, and local communities. It includes several
partnerships across Government, including the Department of
Homeland Security.
The fourth area is the acceleration of the support of the
global war on terrorism. We are in the third phase of the
Combating Terrorism Technology Task Force (CTTTF) activity that
was initiated in September 2001. Here we are focusing on force
protection and counterinsurgency operations for the global war
on terrorism, with a particular focus on Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF). We have established a research, development,
test, and evaluation (RDT&E) site at the Yuma Proving Ground in
Yuma, Arizona, and I would encourage Members and congressional
staff to visit some of that testing at Yuma.
The fifth area is to strengthen the national security S&E
workforce. The future of the U.S. national security S&E
workforce is a growing and increasing concern. The declining
supply of U.S. citizens awarded degrees in defense-related S&E
fields, coupled with recent projections of domestic growth in
demand for S&Es by 2010, suggests that the DOD and other
Federal agencies with national security functions will face
increased competition with domestic and global commercial
interests for top-of-their-class, security clearance-eligible
S&Es.
During 2004, the Department was engaged in several
activities to help understand and characterize the national
security workforce situation both within the Department and
outside, to include interagency forums. The National Security
R&D Subcommittee, which I co-chair as part of the National
Science and Technology Council that addressed this issue,
brought together industry, the DOD, the National Defense
Industrial Association, and the Aerospace Industry Association.
Studies and workshops were conducted, as well as national
competitiveness forums such as the National Innovation
Initiative.
Last year Congress, as you pointed out, passed the SMART
legislation and authorized the Department to carry out a
scholarship program with an employment payback component. We
appreciate that, and it is ongoing. As we will talk about
later, I am sure, it is a very good program. We proposed to
expand the SMART pilot and build a permanent program presented
in the budget request as SMART-National Defense Education Act
(NDEA) Phase 1.
In conclusion, our S&T investment is focused on technology
capabilities to enable the warfighters to meet the challenges
of today, while preparing them to meet the challenges of the
future. We recognize that our future technological advantage
depends on the quality of our scientists, mathematicians, and
engineers, and we are building our workforce through our
proposed NDEA.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I sincerely thank you and the
subcommittee for the opportunity to outline our successes and
to review our plans for the future. We appreciate your strong
support for our S&T program and look forward to working with
you as we transform our plans into actions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Sega follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Ronald M. Sega
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this subcommittee, I
appreciate the opportunity to discuss the Department of Defense's (DOD)
fiscal year 2006 science and technology (S&T) program. The Secretary of
Defense remains committed to transforming the military with a robust
S&T program. Our military capabilities must become more rapidly
deployable, easily sustainable, and be able to operate across the full
spectrum of operations--from peace to war and transition back to peace
again. Our S&T efforts should support transformation by providing the
ability to strike with greater speed, agility, lethality, and precision
while maintaining increased global knowledge. We remain excited about
near-term and long-term transformational capabilities and possibilities
that continue to be made possible by Defense S&T.
As the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E),
serving in the role of the Department's Chief Technology Officer, I
want to highlight a few representative accomplishments within the S&T
program and our planned efforts for fiscal year 2006 within the
framework of my our five established priorities which are:
Integrate DOD S&T and focus on transformation;
Enhance technology transition;
Expand outreach to the combatant commands and the
Intelligence Community;
Accelerate support to the global war on terrorism; and
Strengthen the national security science and
engineering workforce.
These priorities continue to help shape the S&T program. DOD S&T is
an enabler for transformational capabilities for our future force and
is providing near-term capabilities for the global war on terrorism.
Amid the significant budget pressures from ongoing operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department has maintained its commitment to
S&T. Our fiscal year 2006 DOD S&T President's budget request of $10.52
billion is slightly less than $10.55 billion we requested last year.
However, the fiscal year 2006 President's budget request is still 28
percent higher than the fiscal year 2001 request of $7.5 billion.
PRESIDENT'S BUDGET REQUEST
[Then year--In millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year
-----------------------------------------------
2001 2005 2006
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Army............................................................ $1,294 $ 1,783 $ 1,735
Navy/Marine Corps............................................... 1,463 1,718 1,776
Air Force....................................................... 1,291 1,919 1,980
Defense-Wide.................................................... 3,494 5,130 5,031
-----------------------------------------------
Total DOD S&T................................................. $7,543 $10,550 $10,522
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The fiscal year 2006 S&T budget request supports the transformation
and reflects the strategic factors of increased pressures and threats
from asymmetric and terrorist activity and increased pace and
globalization of technology development. The Department has increased
the investment in chemical and biological defense S&T by nearly $200
million in this year's request. We have increased funding for command
and control, sensors, surveillance, radio frequency, and electronic
warfare systems by nearly $100 million. We have also increased funding
for combating terrorism technology activity, which could lead to new
capabilities for force protection, improvised explosive device (IED)
mitigation, etc. We are increasing our investment in hypersonic and
propulsion technologies, network-based S&T, and Quick Reaction Special
Projects. Some programs that reflect a decrease in funding from the
fiscal year 2005 are Ballistic Missile Defense Advanced Technology
Development (generation beyond the emerging generation), traditional
Army combat vehicles, and classified programs. Taken as a whole, the
DOD S&T program is reshaping to meet the needs of the DOD.
integrate dod s&t and focus on transformation
We have expanded the inputs to our S&T decisionmaking process to
include capturing more information about global S&T activity, increased
formal and informal inputs from the combatant commands, more
interaction with the interagency processes, and an expanded
comprehensive review process with the Services and Defense agencies.
These changes help support the Department's strategic planning process
and better integrate and align our S&T investments. Mechanisms for
assessments of the inputs are being aided by enhancing the Defense
Technical Information Center's (DTIC) role in electronic data
collection and analysis.
The rate of change and development of S&T on a global basis will
continue to increase into the 21st century. Therefore, a key component
of our strategy is to gain the best possible insight into technology
development throughout the world, and making that information available
to all DOD users. The DTIC, which has been realigned under the
direction of DDR&E, will be the single repository for global technical
information and capabilities with a searchable web portal that will be
accessible throughout the DOD.
A key element in achieving an optimal S&T investment strategy,
which responds to national security and joint warfighter needs, is a
collective understanding of the motivations, requirements, directions,
and opportunities of the DOD component S&T organizations that manage
S&T resources. Accordingly, we have modified the traditional S&T review
process to a ``Comprehensive S&T Review'' process to better rationalize
the program with strategic direction of the Department, and identify
additional gaps or emphasis areas. This new 2-year review cycle builds
on current processes (e.g. Technology Area Review Assessments, basic
research reviews, etc.) and will help guide S&T investment decisions
for budget and program planning cycles. While the Department is
reshaping its strategic planning and investment review process, we have
continued to support basic research, ongoing technology initiatives,
and near-term technology acceleration.
As a foundation for our S&T capability, the Department's basic
research program provides new knowledge and understanding in areas that
underpin national defense. Applying that knowledge and understanding
yields advanced technologies that enable us to increase military system
capabilities; makes those systems easier and less expensive to
manufacture, operate, and maintain; and improves the way we carry out
our missions.
The basic research program is focused on areas with the highest
potential for long-term military benefit. Our investment complements
other Federal programs and is the major source of funding in selected
disciplines critical to defense, such as electrical and mechanical
engineering, where DOD provides more than 70 percent of the overall
Federal investment in university basic research.
Basic research performed in universities and government
laboratories is also important because it is an integral part of the
education and training of scientists and engineers for the Nation's
defense workforce. We are bringing forward a legislative proposal in
this area to expand the technical workforce available to the
Department.
We have sustained funding for three cross-cutting initiatives: the
National Aerospace Initiative (NAI); Energy and Power Technologies; and
Surveillance and Knowledge Systems (SKS). These initiatives address the
development of critical DOD transformational technologies and continue
to make technical progress.
The NAI is an integrated roadmap for S&T efforts for in high-speed
and hypersonic systems, space access systems, and space-based payloads.
The National Research Council completed an ``Evaluation of National
Aerospace Initiative'' in 2004 which supported the direction of NAI.
Our progress in hypersonics was demonstrated in 2004 when the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) X-43A, which was supported
by DOD, completed two successful flight tests at speeds of Mach 7 and
Mach 10. In January 2005, we conducted a successful separation flight
test of HyFLY, a high speed system designed to fly above Mach 6. The
fiscal year 2006 budget request maintains support of the foundational
NAI technologies in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA). With the planned funding, three
stepping stone projects, HyFLY, Scramjet Engine Demonstrator (SED), and
Revolutionary Approach to Time-Critical Long Range Strike (RATTLRS)
will have at least one flight each by 2009. A ``Space S&T Strategy''
was developed in 2004 under sponsorship of DDR&E and the DOD Executive
Agent for Space, and was submitted to Congress. There have been several
important accomplishments recently in space access propulsion
technology under the DOD-NASA-U.S. Industry Integrated High Payoff
Rocket Propulsion Technology (IHPRPT) program. The first advanced U.S.
liquid rocket engine technology demonstrator since the Space Shuttle
Main Engine (SSME), the Integrated Powerhead Demonstrator, has begun
full-up engine testing at NASA Stennis Space Center. The successful
``hot-fire'' ignition in February 2005 is the culmination of 10 years
of joint development toward a fully reusable engine. Additionally, the
DOD is developing electronic propulsion for satellites, which could
provide a significant increase in satellite on-orbit propulsion
capability relative to today's systems.
The Energy and Power Technologies initiative continues to advance
the goal to transform the electric components of our weapons systems
and improve military logistics. The $260 million fiscal year 2006 DOD
investment addresses several topics. The demands for primary and
auxiliary power, as well as the electric power density for our air,
ground, and sea platforms are increasing; which in turn increases the
demands for thermal management also addressed in the initiative. We are
testing megawatt-size superconducting motors and generators that take a
fraction of the space of conventional machines. Rechargeable lithium-
ion batteries and state-of-charge battery life indicators for soldier
system power are in production. We are developing a new hybrid fuel
cell/battery power system for the individual soldier weighing less than
half of our current systems.
The SKS initiative comprises a broad set of command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (C\4\ISR) programs intended to give our forces dominant
battlespace awareness and understanding. The investment is about $1
billion per year, with 50 percent attributable directly to SKS
objectives and the other half leveraged from other development programs
that contribute to SKS capability. During the past year we made
considerable progress toward the objectives identified in the SKS
roadmap with a strong focus on supporting current operations in Iraq
and the technical objectives enabling ``command and control on the
move.'' During 2004 we successfully prototyped a 20 node mobile, ad hoc
network in a realistic C\4\ISR demonstration, moving us toward the
capability needed for the Department's vision of network-centric
operations. Through strong service and DARPA collaboration, we
supported operations in Iraq by transitioning acoustic sensing
technology from the laboratory to the field to counter the mortar and
sniper threats. We also provided forces in Iraq with Command Post of
the Future (CPOF) technology allowing commanders to maintain greater
command and control in all situations.
The Quick Reaction Special Projects program remains an important
tool in addressing the reality of a rapidly changing world. Under the
Quick Reaction Fund, projects must be completed in a year. Over the
past year, we have developed and proven technologies through the Quick
Reaction Fund that range from demonstrating an affordable, more capable
seeker to a novel, affordable dry lubricant that can be used on small
arms weapons, which will provide improved capability to deployed troops
with less logistics and maintenance required.
enhance technology transition
We have also enhanced technology transition from ideas to fielded
capabilities through continued collaboration with S&T, acquisition,
logistics, and user communities. In addition, we have expanded the use
of Technology Maturity Assessments to link S&T projects with
acquisition programs, ensuring an avenue for transition and support to
system development efforts.
The Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program
continues to match innovative joint and coalition technologies with
warfighter needs in operational demonstrations. Key aspects of this
program are the operational concepts developed and the residual ``leave
behind'' capabilities that are provided, allowing the warfighter to
``touch and feel'' the technology that is being considered before
expensive acquisition decisions are made. A number of products from the
ACTD program are being demonstrated and deployed in Iraq, Afghanistan,
and other operational theaters. For example, Special Operations Command
(SOCOM) was the operational sponsor of the fiscal year 2002 Pathfinder
ACTD. This ACTD provides networked communications, real-time urban
reconnaissance and targeting for precision weapons within a hostile
environment from an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). As a result of this
successful ACTD, SOCOM has fielded approximately 60 Raven UAVs into
combat theaters. The Army has also subsequently deployed several
hundred Ravens in response to an ``Urgent Needs Statement.''
Beginning in fiscal year 2006, we have proposed a Joint Capability
Technology Demonstration (JCTD), realigning a portion of the ACTD
effort into a new business process that complements the Department's
increased focus on meeting the needs of the joint and coalition forces.
The JCTD business model would continue to focus on the most critical
needs of the combatant commander but move even faster than the current
ACTD program with final demonstrations by the end of the third year.
JCTDs would provide more of the resources upfront, and would also
provide non-S&T resources at the end of a project (Budget Activity 4
and 5) to help address the transition issues. Using this approach,
military services' budget processes should be better phased with
successfully demonstrated capabilities.
The Technology Transition Initiative (TTI) program and Defense
Acquisition Challenge (DAC) program continue to expand transition
mechanisms. The TTI program jump-starts funding for critical
technologies developed in defense S&T programs. For example, the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Semantic Web Network has
transitioned to support Marine Expeditionary Forces in Iraq. The system
provides a single point of access to multiple data sources, distributed
search capability to support operational planning, and is interoperable
with other intelligence analysis system tools. The system is being used
by approximately 100 intelligence analysts in Iraq, and saves
approximately 4-5 hours of manual activity per query.
The DAC program is an ``on ramp'' for domestic companies to inject
new technologies into existing programs of record while supporting the
DOD's spiral development strategy. For instance, the DAC program funded
a project that replaces traditional fire barrier materials with a
flexible aerogel thermal insulating blanket for use on the DD(X) and
other platforms. Aerogel has demonstrated many superior characteristics
over traditional insulating materials, including lighter weight, better
blast, and heat resistance as well as lower costs.
The transition of promising technology also occurs through our
domestic production program, the Defense Production Act, Title III.
Title III authority was used to establish a production capability for
eyewear that provides protection from lasers on the battlefield. A
domestic manufacturer had extensive coatings experience in this area
but only a laboratory-scale production capability. Under the Title III
project, a production process to maximize coating performance and
minimize cycle time and cost was funded. The result was an all-new,
ISO-9000 certified production facility with a capacity of 32,000 Laser
Eye Protection (LEP) spectacle/goggle pairs per year.
Another important tool for technology transition includes
Technology Readiness Assessments (TRAs), which serve as a valuable tool
metric for assessing the maturity of critical technologies for major
acquisition systems. Some of the major TRAs completed during 2004 are
the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS); the CVN 21 Next Generation Aircraft
Carrier, the Aerial Common Sensor, the Global Command and Control
System-Joint (GCCS-J), and the Distributed Joint Command and Control
(DJC2).
We also enhanced transition of technologies initiated through the
DOD Combating Terrorism Technology Task Force (CTTTF). For instance,
post-September 11, one of the novel technologies identified and
supported by the CTTTF, thermobaric explosives, was accelerated,
tested, certified, and fielded in 90 days through a collaborative
effort that included the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Air
Force, Navy, Department of Energy, and industry. Using the fiscal year
2002 Quick Reaction Munitions Funds, the CTTTF built upon this initial
investment in thermobaric explosives in response to a requirement from
the Marine Corps for an improved Hellfire warhead.
The DTRA worked in coordination with the Army and Navy on the AGM-
114N Hellfire development effort. Several candidate thermobaric warhead
fills were tested and assessed during final development. The chemical
mix selected is substantially more effective in attacks against
enclosed structures than the current Hellfire blast and fragment
variants. The demonstration program developed weapons in approximately
1 year with an initial delivery of approximately 60 residual assets.
Multiple missiles were deployed and successfully employed in the
opening of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Since that time, the
Department has invested additional funds in the AGM-114N and will
deliver over 100 units to the Marine Corps and SOCOM by June 2005. The
AGM-114N is now transitioning to production with a significant increase
in production fielded units planned over the next 2 years.
expand outreach to the combatant commands and the intelligence
community
We have expanded outreach to the combatant commands and the
Intelligence Community. We work closely with the combatant commands
through the Joint Staff Joint Functional Capability Boards to develop
the Joint Warfighting S&T Plan (JWSTP), ensuring that our S&T plans
support operational requirements and are developed in conjunction with
our warfighters.
We continue to interact and collaborate with Federal, State, and
local governments in areas that affect both military and civilian
mission areas. One important project that the Department has funded
with other partners (e.g. Department of Homeland Security) is called
the Homeland Security/Homeland Defense Command and Control ACTD. This
ACTD links DOD capabilities (e.g. United States Northern Command) with
civilian authorities to address important communication and common
operational picture challenges for Federal, State, and local
communities.
Over the past 2 years, we have conducted net assessments to address
global progress in technology areas such as nanotechnology, energetic
materials, and directed energy. We will continue to refine the net
assessment process and expand it to other technology areas. DDR&E is a
formal member of the S&T Intelligence Committee, a National
Intelligence Council Working Group, with representation from across the
Intelligence Community.
accelerate support to the global war on terrorism
The CTTTF continues to coordinate potential solutions to new
challenges in the global war on terrorism with the technology
communities in the DOD, academia, industry, and other departments of
the Federal Government. The CTTTF is currently in its third major phase
of operation. The first phase accelerated technologies for homeland
defense and the war in Afghanistan, in late 2001. Phase II delivered
technology in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and OIF.
Technologies were accelerated to field several specialized, unique
weapons which focused on specific threats, such as the AGM-114N
Thermobaric Hellfire discussed previously and other support to our
fighting forces.
The current, third phase of the CTTTF is focusing on technology for
force protection and counterinsurgency operations in the global war on
terrorism, particularly, OIF. While many specific details on programs
are classified, actions are underway to mitigate effects stemming from
terrorist use of weapons such as IEDs, mortars, and rocket-propelled
grenades. A key focus is on detection and defeat of IEDs; predictive
analysis capabilities; ISR and countering the IED kill chain.
The CTTTF has also energized the need to rapidly evaluate
technologies within a representative environment. Consequently, the
CTTTF established a research, development, test, and evaluation site at
the Yuma Proving Grounds in Yuma, Arizona. This site consists of over
10 miles of roads, road interchanges, buildings, and other features
found within a representative rural, desert climate. The purpose of the
test site is to evaluate new technologies and provide recommendations
on the potential of the system or technologies under evaluation. The
test site has been a valuable resource for gathering data and
evaluating new prototypes developed by the scientific and engineering
community, while enabling the warfighter to assess military utility and
maturity.
Promising technologies identified are funded through the Rapid
Reaction Fund (RRF) within the Quick Reaction Special Projects Program.
The RRF continues to be a vital resource to develop and rapidly
transition many new technologies for the global war on terrorism into
the hands of warfighters, thereby saving lives. We appreciate your
continued support in providing the flexibility to fund emergent
technologies for our warfighter.
strengthen the national security science and engineering workforce
The future of the U.S. national security science and engineering
(S&E) workforce is a growing and increasing concern. Since 1999 more
than 12 major studies, including a 2002 report from the President's
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, warn of the
deteriorating situation within the U.S. S&E workforce. The warnings
cite several trends that continue to erode domestic S&E capability to a
point where the U.S. may no longer be the primary innovator in several
areas crucial to national security. One trend is the declining U.S.
citizen S&E workforce. The Partnership for Public Service recently
reported that 60 percent of Federal employees are over 45 years old
which indicate a significant number of our workforce with valuable
skills will soon be eligible for retirement, many of whom benefited
from the National Defense Education Act of 1958. The declining supply
of U.S. citizens awarded degrees in defense-related S&E fields, coupled
with recent projections of domestic growth in demand for S&Es by 2010,
suggests that the DOD and other Federal agencies with national security
functions will face increased competition with domestic and global
commercial interests for top-of-their class, security clearance
eligible S&Es. During 2004, the Department was engaged in several
activities to help understand and characterize the national security
workforce situation both within the Department and outside, to include
interagency forums (e.g. National Security Research and Development
Subcommittee of the National Science and Technology Council), industry
(e.g. National Defense Industrial Association and Aerospace Industry
Association studies and workshops), and national ``competitiveness''
forums (e.g. National Innovation Initiative).
We have enhanced efforts to address this situation and develop an
outstanding workforce with 21st century critical defense skills. These
new S&Es will be needed to meet tomorrow's S&T challenges. Last year,
Congress provided the Science, Mathematics, and Research for
Transformation (SMART) legislation that authorized the Department to
carry out a scholarship program with an employment payback component.
This fall about 25 promising students will enter the 2-year program. To
ensure we maintain an effective workforce, we propose to expand the
SMART pilot and built a permanent program presented in the budget
request as a legislative proposal titled ``SMART--National Defense
Education Act Phase 1'' (or the National Defense Education Program).
The proposal would provide additional authorities that would improve
our ability to develop, recruit, and retain individuals who will be
critical in fulfilling the Department's national security mission. We
look forward to your continued support in this critical, foundational
area for national security.
conclusion
Our S&T investment is focused on technology capabilities to enable
the warfighter to meet the challenges of today, while preparing them to
meet the challenges of the future. The budget request continues
supports the ongoing transformation of the DOD while simultaneously
ensuring we do all we can to provide potential solutions to ongoing,
world challenges.
We have successfully transitioned technologies to support the
global war on terrorism and we continue to identify opportunities to
minimize research and development cycle-time and enhance technology
transition. We are expanding our interaction with the combatant
commanders and the Intelligence Community; and expanding our global
knowledge base to invest in the right priorities and programs. We
recognize that our future technological advantage depends on the
superior quality of our scientists, mathematicians, and engineers, and
thus we are building our workforce through the proposed National
Defense Education Act.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I sincerely thank you and the
subcommittee for this opportunity to outline our successes and to
review our plans for the future. We appreciate your strong support of
our S&T program, and I look forward to working with you as we transform
our plans into actions.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Dr. Sega.
Dr. Killion, we will be glad to hear from you.
STATEMENT OF DR. THOMAS H. KILLION, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF THE ARMY FOR RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY AND CHIEF SCIENTIST
Dr. Killion. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee,
I would like to thank you for the opportunity to describe the
fiscal year 2006 Army S&T program and the significant role that
Army S&T has in creating, adapting, and maturing technologies
to enhance the current force and enable the future force.
I want to thank the members of this subcommittee for your
support of our soldiers who are now at war and for sustaining
the investments that will provide tomorrow's soldiers with the
dominant capabilities that they will need to defend America's
interests and those of our allies throughout the world. Your
continued advice and support are vital to our success.
Army S&T is currently supporting our soldiers deployed to
fight the global war on terrorism through three mechanisms.
First, our soldiers are benefitting today from technologies
that emerged from past investments. Some notable examples
include Interceptor Body Armor, cooled and uncooled infrared
sensors for soldiers and vehicles for owning the night, and
precision weapons that increase probability of kill and reduce
collateral damage.
Second, we are exploiting transition opportunities from
ongoing S&T efforts in areas such as acoustic and radar sensors
for enhanced situational awareness and for force protection.
Finally, we continue to leverage the expertise and
experience of our S&E to develop solutions for unforeseen
problems and emerging threats. Examples here include armor
survivability kits for High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
Vehicles (HMMWVs) to provide protection against small arms fire
and explosive blasts and slat armor for Strykers to counter
rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).
As reflected in these examples, foremost in all of our
minds is the need to provide the best available technologies to
protect our soldiers.
Beyond those technologies already contributing to the
current force, we continue to make significant progress in
maturing sensors and kill mechanisms to enable active
protection systems. Such systems will significantly increase
the survivability of light platforms. We are funding both
close-in and stand-off protection systems to defeat chemical
energy and kinetic energy munitions. This past year we have
successfully demonstrated the ability to defeat RPG's fired
from very close ranges. We are sustaining investments in these
technologies as well as advanced lightweight armors to provide
an integrated survivability suite for the Future Combat Systems
(FCS) and other lightweight combat systems, approaching
protection levels available today only with heavy armor.
Reflecting our commitment to the future force, our single
largest S&T investment remains the pursuit of enabling
technologies for the FCS. For 2006, we have over $426 million,
or roughly 25 percent of our budget, in technologies planned
for spiral insertion into the FCS program. FCS is in the system
development and demonstration (SDD) phase and is using a spiral
demonstration and fielding approach that leads to the first
full unit of action in 2014. The FCS has been designed so that
each part of the system is networked within the whole to
achieve an unprecedented synergy. Our technology investments
both on our own and in partnership with DARPA address a range
of challenges, including networked battle command systems,
networked lethality, enhanced survivability, semi-autonomous
and autonomous unmanned air and ground systems, and affordable
sensors across the spectrum to find, fix, and target the enemy.
Our investments in individual soldier technologies, focused
through our Future Force Warrior program, seek to provide
dismounted warriors with the connectivity and network lethality
that is available today only through platform-based
capabilities. In response to congressional direction, we have
worked with the program executive officer (PEO) soldier to more
tightly couple the Land Warrior and the Future Force Warrior
programs and have implemented a business plan that establishes
a lead technology integrator common to the S&T efforts and the
Land Warrior program. This new business approach will speed
transition of technology and promote efficiency in our efforts
to field ground soldier system capabilities that include
network connectivity for compatibility with future force
platforms.
We maintain our commitment to the fundamental research
required for new understanding to enable revolutionary advances
and paradigm shifts in operational capabilities to enable the
Army's transformational goals. Our basic research program
invests in world-class expertise in Government, academia, and
industry, and in state-of-the-art equipment to explore
fundamental phenomena and exploit scientific discovery. These
investments are key to the Army's ability to win the race for
speed and precision. Today's force has over-matching
capabilities enabled by technology developments such as the
Global Positioning System (GPS), night vision devices, and
precision-guided munitions, and these capabilities can be
traced to sustained basic research investments in decades past.
Of course, as has been mentioned here, to maintain
technological superiority now and into the future, we need to
staff our laboratories and RDT&E centers with top-quality S&Es.
We recognize this challenge. The DOD and the Army must compete
to obtain its future workforce from a declining national pool
of highly-qualified candidates.
We have already taken important steps to attract and retain
the best S&E talent available. Our laboratory personnel
demonstrations have instituted multiple initiatives to enhance
recruiting and reshaping of the workforce, such as recruiting
bonuses, pay banding flexibilities, pay-for-performance,
incentive awards, and enhanced employee education and
development programs. To reverse the trends in smaller numbers
of students pursuing science, math, and engineering, we have
established an array of outreach programs to attract more
students to those disciplines.
We have also provided recommendations based on our
experience that are being incorporated into the emerging
National Security Personnel System (NSPS).
In closing, the Army must have a diverse S&T portfolio to
be responsive to current and future warfighting needs. The S&T
community seeks technological solutions that can be
demonstrated in the near term, explores the feasibility of new
concepts for the mid term, and mines the imaginable for an
uncertain far-term future. The Army S&T community has committed
our intellectual resources, our people, our facilities, and our
funding to maintain the momentum of the Army's transformation
while the Army is at war.
I thank you for your attention and for your continued
support to our Army and our soldiers.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Killion follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Thomas H. Killion
introduction
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to describe the fiscal year 2006 Army science and
technology (S&T) program and the significant role Army S&T has in
creating, adapting, and maturing technologies to enhance the current
force and enable the future force.
We want to thank the members of this subcommittee for your support
of our soldiers who are now at war and for sustaining the investments
that will provide tomorrow's soldiers with the dominant capabilities
they will need to defend America's interests and those of our allies
throughout the world. Your continued advice and support are vital to
our success.
s&t contributions to the global war on terrorism
Army S&T supports our soldiers deployed to fight the global war on
terrorism through three mechanisms. First, we are benefiting today from
technologies that emerged from past investments. Second, we are
exploiting transition opportunities from ongoing S&T efforts. Third, we
are leveraging the expertise of our scientists and engineers to develop
solutions for unforeseen problems. The following are examples of the
three approaches:
(1) Reaping the return on past investments: Since the mid-
1980s, the Natick Soldier Center has pursued advanced fiber
technologies, in partnership with industry, to create lighter
weight ballistic protection for soldiers. This research
produced the technologies to develop the outer tactical vest
and components for the protective plate inserts (SAPI plates)
that are used by soldiers deployed worldwide today.
(2) Exploiting technologies from current investments: Radio
frequency (RF) jamming technology solutions from investments in
our electronic warfare technology program have been
incorporated into the family of WARLOCK systems being used to
defeat radio-controlled improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
(3) Leveraging S&T expertise to solve unforeseen problems:
Engineers at the Army Research Laboratory and the Tank-
Automotive Research Development Engineering Center have
extensive experience in designing armor and appliques for the
Army's combat vehicles. This team rapidly responded to a
critical need by designing and demonstrating armor
survivability kits for High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
Vehicles (HMMWVs) to provide protection against small arms fire
and explosive blasts. These kits have now been installed on
over 12,000 HMMWVs deployed for the global war on terrorism.
Collectively, these efforts are enhancing current force
capabilities for fighting the global war on terrorism by applying
relevant technologies to satisfy existing and emerging operational
needs.
force protection
Foremost in all of our minds is the need to provide the best
available technologies to protect our soldiers. The examples above--
Interceptor Body Armor, electronic countermeasures (WARLOCK), and
lightweight armor kits for our tactical vehicles--represent a few of
the ``arrows'' in our force protection ``quiver.'' Other examples
include:
Acoustic and radar sensors for detecting and locating
the source of rocket, artillery, and mortar fire;
Infrared technology for counter-sniper operations,
providing warning and locations for counter fire; and
Medical technology to protect soldiers from endemic
diseases and provide rapid treatment to save lives, such as the
Chitosan Bandage and the one-handed tourniquet.
Beyond those technologies already contributing to the current
force, we continue to make significant progress in maturing the sensor
and kill mechanism technologies to enable active protection systems
(APS). APS will significantly increase the survivability of lightweight
platforms. We are funding both close-in and standoff protection systems
to defeat chemical energy and kinetic energy munitions. This past year
we have successfully demonstrated the ability to defeat rocket-
propelled grenades (RPGs) fired from very close ranges. The
technologies successfully defeated RPG threats in two different
scenarios: defeating a single RPG fired against a moving vehicle and
defeating two RPGs fired nearly simultaneously at a stationary vehicle.
We are sustaining investments in these technologies as well as advanced
lightweight armors to provide an integrated survivability suite for
Future Combat Systems (FCS) and other lighter weight combat systems,
approaching protection levels available today only with heavy armor.
We continue to pursue multiple technology solutions to identify and
defeat IEDs from standoff ranges. Our work is synchronized across the
DOD through close coordination with the Joint IED Task Force.
future combat systems
The single largest S&T investment remains the pursuit of enabling
technologies for the FCS. For 2006, we have over $426 million or
roughly 25 percent of our budget in technologies planned for spiral
insertion into the FCS program. FCS is in the system development and
demonstration (SDD) phase of acquisition, using a spiral demonstration
and fielding approach that leads to the first full unit of action (UA)
in 2014. FCS has been designed so that each part of the system is
networked within the whole to achieve an unprecedented synergy. The S&T
community is maturing technologies for both the initial spirals and the
full UA capability.
Key FCS technology investments include:
Networked battle command systems to enable shared
situational awareness and improved decisionmaking;
Networked lethality through standoff precision
missiles and gun launched munitions;
Enhanced survivability through networked lethality,
improved sensors to locate and identify threats, signature
management, and active and passive protection systems;
Semiautonomous and autonomous unmanned air and ground
systems; and
Low-cost, multispectral sensors to find the enemy.
unmanned systems
The Army S&T program is pursuing unmanned and robotic capabilities
that include: unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), unmanned ground
vehicles, and unattended sensors. These systems' capabilities will be
modular in design for spiral technology insertion and rapid adaptation
to changes in mission needs. The unmanned systems and technology
applications provide capabilities that are not available today,
reducing risks to our soldiers while simultaneously reducing logistics
demands generated by human needs. Specific capabilities include:
Persistent surveillance and communications on the move
enabled by multi-sensor and communications mission equipment
packages for UAVs; and
Unmanned air and ground systems with lethal
capabilities for decisive operations against threats as they
are forming.
As an example, the A-160 Hummingbird UAV is being developed to
satisfy medium altitude long endurance requirements for communications
relay and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in the UA. The
A-160 is the result of a partnership with the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) and is currently undergoing flight-testing.
soldier systems technology
Our investments in individual soldier technologies seek to provide
soldiers with the connectivity and network lethality that is available
today only through platform-based capabilities. We are also pursuing
technologies to enable a lightweight, low-observable, enhanced armor
protection-fighting ensemble. Other key soldier technology investments
include lightweight, high-efficiency power sources; embedded
physiological monitoring and limited medical treatments; multi-
functional lightweight materials; embedded training; and networked
sensors to enable unparalleled situational understanding. The program
executive officer (PEO) has restructured soldier systems development
under a business plan that establishes a Lead Technology Integrator
common to the S&T efforts and the SDD program. This new business
approach will speed transition of technology and promote efficiency in
our efforts to field Ground Soldier System capabilities that include
network connectivity for compatibility with future force platforms.
network-centric technologies
The S&T investments to enable network-centric operations cover the
domains of communications, command and control, and sensors. These
efforts mature the algorithms, protocols, high data rate processor
technologies, and antennas to enable mobile, wireless, tactical
networks. The S&T program will develop and demonstrate real-time,
continuous situational understanding by integrating data from manned
and unmanned air- and ground-based sensors. Technologies include: high
performance multispectral sensors (electro-optic, infrared, radio
frequency, acoustic, seismic, chemical); fusion algorithms and
intelligent agents to integrate data from a wide variety of networked
sensors (airborne and ground). Our toughest challenge to enable
network-centric operations is to overcome the technical barriers to
demonstrate affordable high throughput (greater than 10 megabyts per
second) directional antennas. One approach that shows great promise to
overcome these barriers uses a distributed multi-element antenna arrays
to enable steerable beams.
basic research program
The Army basic research program produces new understanding to
enable revolutionary advances and paradigm shifts in operational
capabilities to enable the Army's transformation goals. This program
invests in world-class expertise (government, academia, and industry)
and state-of-the-art equipment to explore fundamental phenomena and
exploit scientific discovery. These investments are key to the Army's
ability to win the race for speed and precision. Today's force has
overmatching capabilities enabled by technology developments such as
global positioning systems, night vision devices, and precision-guided
munitions. These capabilities can be traced to sustained basic research
investments in decades past.
The Army's basic research program has five components: World class
university-led single investigator research; focused centers to enable
paradigm shifting capabilities such as nanotechnology for the soldier;
research centers of excellence that advance solutions to enduring needs
in the areas such as micro electronics and materials; industry-led
collaborative technology alliances focused on robotics, power and
energy, communications and networks, advanced sensors, and decision
aids; and Army-unique, in-house research in behavioral science,
infectious diseases and combat casualty care, environmental science,
and ballistics protection among others.
Some examples of recent progress in Army research are: ``liquid
armor'' to protect soldier's extremities; remote detection of high
explosive materials by using new ultra-sensitive polymers; the creation
of interactive computer-based avatars for soldier training;
biotechnology for improved sensors; flexible displays for soldier
applications; ultra-small and inexpensive power supplies using dime-
sized microturbines; and the development of hand-sized UAVs with a full
suite of sensors for communication and navigation.
science and engineering (s&e) workforce
To maintain technological superiority now and into the future, we
need to staff the Army Laboratories and Research, Development, and
Engineering Centers with top-quality engineers and scientists. We
recognize this challenge--the DOD and Army must compete to obtain its
future workforce from a declining national pool of highly-qualified
candidates. We have already taken important steps to attract and retain
the best S&E talent available. Our laboratory personnel demonstrations
have instituted multiple initiatives to enhance recruiting and
reshaping of the workforce such as recruiting bonuses, pay banding
flexibilities, pay-for-performance, incentive awards, and enhanced
employee education and development programs. To reverse the trends in
smaller numbers of students pursuing S&E, we have established outreach
programs to attract more students to math, science, and engineering
careers. We have also provided recommendations, based on our
experience, for the emerging National Security Personnel System.
technology transition
Successful transition of Army S&T products is central to enabling
the Army's transformation. We use Technology Readiness Level metrics to
assess and communicate the estimated maturity of a technology to our
acquisition customers, the program executive officers and program
managers, who buy the systems that are provided to our soldiers. The
S&T community's outcome-oriented approach to technology development has
yielded significant progress over the past few years. Examples of
successful S&T efforts that have transitioned to programs of record
include:
FCS to SDD;
Line-of-Sight Anti-Tank to SDD;
Objective Crew Served Weapon to SDD;
Tactical command and control protection algorithms to
PM Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T); and
Network Fires (Cooperative program with DARPA) to SDD
as Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System.
conclusion
The Army must have a diverse S&T portfolio to be responsive to
current and future warfighter needs. The S&T community seeks
technological solutions that can be demonstrated in the near-term,
explores the feasibility of new concepts for the mid-term, and explores
the imaginable for an uncertain far-term future. The Army S&T community
has committed our intellectual resources--our people--and our
facilities and funding to maintain the momentum of the Army's
transformation!
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Dr. Killion.
Admiral Cohen, we would be glad to hear from you.
STATEMENT OF RADM JAY M. COHEN, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL RESEARCH
Admiral Cohen. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed,
Senator Nelson. First let me say that I am personally honored
and humbled to appear before you, along with my colleagues. I
would like to thank you on behalf of our marines and sailors in
combat for your support in saving their lives and limbs.
I am currently in the fifth year of a nominal 3-year
assignment. Eighteen months ago, the Secretary of the Navy,
Gordon England, asked me as the CNR to help equip and protect
our naval forces who were to conduct difficult combat
operations on the ground both in Afghanistan and Iraq. On
December 12, 2003, we conducted what has become known as the
``county fair'' at the Naval Research Laboratory right here in
Washington, DC. We had multi-service, multi-agency, industry,
and academic representation, demonstrating those technologies
which we felt could be brought to bear to allow our marines and
sailors to accomplish their mission and to better defend them.
Subsequently, with the strong support of the Secretary of
the Navy in what he called Operation Respond, the Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Vern Clark, and the Commandant
of the Marine Corps, General Mike Hagee, along with the
administration and Congress, many of those capabilities have
been funded and deployed to Iraq and are in use today.
Building on that, last summer Secretary England challenged
me to initiate a ``Manhattan Project,'' as he likes to call it,
to detect, defeat, and destroy explosives at range and speed.
Gentlemen, this is a basic research challenge which I believe,
as do others, will take a few years, nay, many years to solve,
but we must get started. With your support, the S&E expertise
in America and around the world, we will demonstrate the
ability to detect, defeat, and destroy improvised explosive
devices (IEDs) and suicide bombers, and we will deter their
misguided actions. This basic research effort goes to the heart
of why Congress established the Naval Research Laboratory
following World War I and the Office of Naval Research after
World War II.
I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Cohen follows:]
Prepared Statement by RADM Jay M. Cohen, USN
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you
for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Department of
the Navy's science and technology (S&T) in support of the global war on
terrorism, transformation, and beyond.
overview
The fiscal year 2006 budget requests $1.78 billion for a S&T
portfolio designed to provide the best scientific research and
technology in the shortest time to maximize the benefit to our sailors
and marines.
We pursue an integrated and comprehensive S&T program, from basic
research through manufacturing technology. Programs emphasize
integrating basic research with applied S&T, promoting the effective
and expeditious transition of discovery and invention into real-world
applications. Moreover, ``transition'' has become of utmost importance,
as the success of S&T is not measured simply by the basic science it
supports, but also by the active and successful transition of that
science to supporting America's sailors and marines in the field:
discovery and invention as well as exploitation and deployment of
advanced technologies for the Nation's naval warfighters.
naval science and technology for the global war on terrorism
The Government should maintain a great research laboratory to
develop guns, new explosives, and all the technique of military
and naval progression without any vast expense.
Thomas Edison
You will remember that I came before this subcommittee a few years
ago and brought a prototype for demonstration of the Dragon Eye, a
small unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), for small unit tactical
reconnaissance. The Dragon Eye is small, light, easy to transport, and
easy to fly. This UAV has transitioned into the Marine Corps Force and
accompanied the First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) in deployment
to Iraq last year. I have pictures of your marines using the Dragon Eye
UAV in the battle of Fallujah.
In response to the decision to deploy I MEF to Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF) II, Secretary of the Navy Gordon England established
Operation Respond. It provided a forum and process to articulate urgent
operational needs to the senior leadership. It facilitated the
procurement of existing systems and rapid insertion of technologies to
support our marines and sailors in combat.
Rapid Response to Emergent Operational Medical Problems
The Office of Naval Research (ONR) is taking part in a series of
medical initiatives to support both OIF and Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF). One such initiative is a USB Memory device, called the ``thumb''
drive, for storing medical records. An important problem faced by
medical teams in OIF and OEF is the transportation of patients to
higher levels of care without their medical records. This means the
receiving caregivers are unaware of previous treatment, which results
in delays or sub-optimal care. Attaching a ``thumb'' drive containing
patient records to soldiers' dog tags would minimize this problem. Over
1,000 USB ``thumb'' drives have been provided to I MEF to be evaluated
in theater.
A second serious problem in OIF and OEF is that hypothermia
resulting from blood loss causes metabolic acidosis and impairs
coagulation in the wounded. Currently, casualties are transported in
poncho liners or body bags, neither of which provides heat. In a second
OIF/OEF medical initiative, ONR has acquired newly Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) approved blankets which use chemical heating packs
to prevent hypothermia. Currently, about 100 blankets are being sent to
I MEF for field evaluation.
Effectiveness and capability of current medical gear is a third
area in which ONR is pursuing medical initiatives. The Naval Combat
Trauma Registry has been implemented to capture injury data (type,
cause, severity, anatomical location, frequency, DNBI, etc.). Data is
obtained at Level II medical treatment facilities and above and will
indicate medical capability gaps and effectiveness of current gear
(e.g., eye protection).
A fourth problematic area of OIF/OEF is the recertification of
reservist and corpsmen/medics. The current tempo of operations requires
the deployment of these forces, who may or may not be fully up to speed
on combat medical procedures. The Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TC3)
Training Compact Disk (CD) has been developed to help solve this
problem. The TC3 CD provides scenario-based medical training to improve
first-responder care and encompasses Care Under Fire, Tactical Field
Care, and Casualty Evacuation Care.
Current body armor is designed to protect the torso, leaving the
arms and legs exposed to serious injury from a blast. In order to
reduce injuries to arms and legs caused by improvised explosive devices
(IEDs), another medical initiative is working to develop arm and leg
protection equipment. Review of medical data for injury trend
evaluation has been done and injury sites for which protection can be
provided have been determined. Ballistic testing of proposed material
systems has been completed and initial arm and leg protection designs
have been completed and given to warfighters. Warfighter feedback has
been incorporated and used to modify the original and second phases of
the designs. Phase three of the design is currently undergoing
evaluation to ensure the appropriate design, as well as lay-up of
materials, to ensure warfighter wearability, mobility, and protection.
Counter-IED Efforts
Under the leadership of the Secretary of the Navy, we have focused
our efforts on countering IEDs, rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), and
mortars. I believe a key S&T goal in resolving the IED threat is to
understand the basic phenomenologies involved in the ability to detect,
defeat, and destroy IEDs at range and speed. Long-term basic and
applied research must be conducted to address the foundations of
current and future IED problems. We must exploit our sensor, chemistry,
physics, material, and electronic warfare expertise by taking a systems
approach to attacking each step in the engagement sequence. When we are
successful, this ability could effectively deter this line of attack.
The first step in achieving these goals is the detection of IEDs at
standoff distance. This ability must be able to cover a wide range of
threats, from generic to specific. It must also be adaptable to
developing and changing threats. This requires significant S&T
investment, and although there is no clear ``Silver Bullet,'' testing
is underway to identify promising technologies. The second phase of
this process is the defeat of these explosives at standoff distances.
Ongoing testing and experimentation is being conducted to determine the
possibilities for future methods to defeat of such threats. The third
and final phase is IED destruction at a standoff distance. Some current
detonation and deflagration solutions require knowledge and location of
IED threats in order to have the greatest destructive impact. These
solutions have an adequate impact on the main charge of the IED, but
only limited capabilities in the destruction of other components.
Taking into consideration Secretary England's guidance and the
progress made thus far, we must continue this effort throughout the
naval research enterprise, especially the Naval Research Lab and the
University Affiliated Research Enterprise along with the other
services, defense agencies, and national science and research academies
and foundations. Though a strong cornerstone currently exists, based on
the previously outlined solutions, the focus must be shifted and an
investment must be made on both the detection of IED threats and
advanced long range destruction technologies. Concentration on
detection, defeat, and destruction of IED threats, while maintaining
the ability to adapt our technologies to developing and changing
threats, will allow us to actively and aggressively pursue these
initiatives.
Additionally, last April, a special Small Business Innovation
Research (SBIR) effort was pushed forward to address three critical
areas: technologies to defeat IEDs, anti-RPG technologies, and anti-
rocket, anti-artillery, and anti-mortar technologies. We received 259
proposals and a total of 29 SBIR efforts were selected for Phase I
funding. At this time we are evaluating promising Phase I efforts in
order to select the Phase II recipients. Next year we will be
evaluating the Phase II results.
Those are some of our highlights within this S&T budget request for
the global war on terrorism. Naval S&T is a sustained journey from
discovery to deployment in which innovation and invention leads to
experimentation and validation and transform the operating forces. This
is a continuous cycle.
I would like to discuss our transformation efforts for the ``Next
Navy and Marine Corps''--roughly the forces that will emerge over the
next 5 to 15 years, and finally the ``Navy and Marine Corps After
Next''--which we will see in 15 to 30 years.
transformation: future naval capabilities
A great deal of our transformational effort is lodged in Future
Naval Capabilities (FNCs). The objective of the FNCs is to provide
enabling capabilities to fill identified gaps in Naval Power 21
warfighting and enterprise capabilities identified by the requirements
analysis staff of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of
the Marine Corps.
We have focused a major portion of our S&T portfolio on FNCs for
the ``Next Navy and Marine Corps.'' Approximately two-thirds of our
Advanced Technology Development (6.3) funds and about 40 percent of our
late stage Exploratory Development (6.2) funds are invested in the
FNCs. The FNC process delivers maturing technology to acquisition
program managers for timely incorporation into platforms, weapons,
sensors, and process improvements. Each of the current FNC focus areas
is planned and reviewed by an integrated team with representation from
the ONR, a program executive office, the Navy and Marine Corps
requirements community, and the fleet/force user community. This gives
us constant validation of the relevance of the technologies, and strong
buy-in and commitment to transition plans.
Based on the reviews of the FNC Technical Oversight Group we have
recently strengthened the alignment of the FNC process with the naval
capabilities development process, which establishes our program
requirements and priorities in Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing, and
FORCEnet.
The FNCs, in no priority order, are:
Advanced Capability Electric Systems--The future of
naval warfare is electric. Warships will have revolutionary
power plants that permit new hull forms and propulsors, reduce
manning, streamline logistics, power advanced sensors, and
enable future high energy and speed-of-light weapons. This FNC
crosses several of the pillars, including, Sea Strike, Sea
Shield, and Sea Basing.
Autonomous Operations--This program is pursuing a
dramatic increase in the performance and affordability of naval
air, surface, ground, and underwater autonomous vehicles--
unmanned systems able to operate with a minimum of human
intervention and oversight. The Autonomous Operations FNC gives
us a great potential to operate effectively in what would
otherwise be denied areas. It is now aligned to the ForceNet
pillar.
Fleet/Force Protection--We have very capable ships,
aircraft, and ground combat vehicles. It's our business to
ensure that they don't fall to the sorts of asymmetric threats
our enemies pose. This FNC, aligned with Sea Shield, is working
to develop effective organic means of protection: weapons,
sensors, countermeasures, stealth, and damage control.
Knowledge Superiority and Assurance--Information
technology is as crucial to naval superiority as it is to any
other aspect of contemporary life. This program is developing
our ability to distribute integrated information in a dynamic
network with high connectivity and interoperability. It will
ensure knowledge superiority, common situational understanding,
and increased speed of command. This FNC is a key enabler of
FORCEnet.
Littoral Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW)--This program is
part of our shift in emphasis to littoral, expeditionary
operations. The ASW challenge in coastal waters is a tough one,
so we are focusing scientific efforts on enhancing our ability
to detect, track, classify, and engage enemy submarines by
using a layered tactical ASW approach. We do this by first
countering enemy submarines near shore, followed by addressing
threat submarines prior to their torpedo launch, and then
countering any threat torpedoes after launch. Each layer by
itself will effectively address its individual objective; and
when the layers are viewed in their entirety, it offers an
effective ``system-of-systems'' approach that we believe will
adequately address the ASW problem. Sea Shield is benefiting
from the enabling capabilities of this FNC.
Littoral Combat and Power Projection--The enabling
capabilities in this FNC are aligned to Sea Strike. This FNC
focuses on deploying uniquely capable combat and logistics
systems necessary to deploy and sustain the fleet and the force
without building up a large logistical infrastructure ashore.
Missile Defense--This program is focused on technology
enabling and supporting lethal engagements of theater missiles,
manned and unmanned aircraft at extended ranges in defense of
naval forces and assets afloat and ashore. Products being
worked will offer ways to expand the battlespace rapidly,
identify contacts accurately, and engage threats effectively
and efficiently. The Missile Defense FNC is a aligned to the
Sea Shield pillar of the Navy's Sea Power 21 operational
concept.
Organic Mine Countermeasures--Because they are cheap,
and able to seed the battle space with a menace far out of
proportion to their numbers, mines have been and will continue
to be deployed against us by terrorists and their state
sponsors. We're working to give our forces an organic--that is
to say, an inherent--and stand-off ability to detect,
characterize, and neutralize mines wherever they may be
encountered. Aligned with Sea Shield, this FNC has transitioned
several important products. One of them, the REMUS autonomous
underwater vehicle, is now in the hands of our operating forces
in Iraq where it helped clear the rivers to speed supplies to
troops. REMUS emerged from a basic oceanographic research
program--another piece of evidence that overnight successes are
long in preparation.
Time Critical Strike--We are substantially reducing
the amount of time it takes to hit critical mobile targets,
like theater ballistic missiles launchers, command centers, and
weapons of mass destruction. One of this FNC's products, the
Affordable Weapon System, a loitering cruise-missile-like
system that can carry a variety of payloads, transitioned to
the acquisition community for development. Time Critical Strike
is aligned with Sea Strike.
Total Ownership Cost--This FNC uses advanced design
and manufacturing processes to significantly decrease the cost
of buying, operating, and maintaining Navy systems while
promoting increased system readiness. We are working to reduce
total lifecycle costs during design and manufacturing as well
as increase savings realized from reduced manning and better
environmental compliance. This FNC supports efforts across all
the Sea Pillars.
The relatively mature technologies managed in FNCs do not spring up
overnight. In many cases they are the result of long-term investments
in research and invention programs in basic research and early applied
research funding categories. We focus our research and invention
investments on areas where the Navy is the only significant U.S.
sponsor, such as Ocean Acoustics and Underwater Weaponry, and on S&T
Grand Challenges whose solution would provide significant advances in
naval capability, such as Naval Materials by Design. A stable, long-
term discovery and invention investment is essential to keep our
pipeline full of enabling technologies and to attract the Nation's best
scientific talent to focus on naval problems.
transformation initiatives
In addition to the FNCs, there are several ongoing S&T initiatives
that may provide game-changing capabilities. They include the
hypersonics flight demonstration program (HyFly), superconducting
electric drive motors, the Virtual At-Sea Training (VAST), and the
Advance Multi-Function Radio Frequency Concept (AMRF-C).
The HyFly, a National Aerospace Initiative, will seek to
demonstrate a hypersonic vehicle with a sustainable cruise speed of
Mach 6 and a range of 600 nautical miles. To obtain this performance,
work is focusing on the Dual-Combustion Ramjet (DCR) concept invented
by the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. Unlike the
pure supersonic combustion ramjet--or ``scramjet''--which requires
highly reactive fuels unacceptable in the naval environment, the DCR
relies on conventional liquid hydrocarbon fuels.
The Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations are
committed to making the electric ship our ship of the future and we are
providing the S&T. A key requirement for installing electric propulsion
in a destroyer-sized combatant is a high-power electric motor. Although
conventional induction motors can be scaled up to that power level, and
there is similar promise in permanent-magnet synchronous motors, the
phenomenon of superconductivity offers significant potential for
smaller size, higher power density, and quieter running. At very low
temperatures, approaching absolute zero, superconducting materials lose
virtually all resistance to the flow of electric current, which means
that extremely large currents can be carried in smaller wires without
excessive heat dissipation. These large currents also generate much
more powerful magnetic fields--and hence more electromotive force--in
motor windings much smaller than their conventional counterparts. Thus,
for the same power output, a superconducting motor can be as much as 70
percent smaller than its conventional equivalent, even including the
cooling system needed to maintain sufficiently low temperatures.
The VAST system was first demonstrated in fleet exercises in
November 2002 and will be incorporated into the Battle Force Tactical
Training program. VAST superimposes a three-dimensional, virtual-
reality battlespace on an area of the open ocean and enables ships'
crews to conduct live-fire gunnery exercises against simulated land
targets at sea. A sonobuoy field planted in the target area locates the
fall of each round within the simulated battlespace, and its effect
appears on a computer-generated display that shows how a real-world
view of the area would appear to a forward observer. Simultaneously,
other computer screens show the corresponding radar or visual pictures
for fire-control plotters, gunners, and navigators. In the sense that
its simulated battlespace can be modeled on actual targets of interest
anywhere in the world, VAST provides even more realistic training than
a fixed gunnery range ashore. Soon, these same virtual-reality
techniques will be extended to support at-sea training for close air
support, long-range strike missions by naval aircraft, and undersea
warfare.
The growing number of shipboard radio frequency (RF) functions that
require topside antennas and apertures creates a serious challenge for
the Navy, particularly when own-ship radar signatures must be so
carefully controlled. The AMRF-C is focused on a proof-of-principle
demonstration of broadband RF apertures capable of performing radar,
electronic warfare, and communication functions simultaneously using
common, low signature phased arrays. AMRF-C will divide the frequency
band into an optimal number of bandwidth segments and use separate,
electronically scanned, solid-state transmit and receive apertures in
each portion. AMRF-C's initial demonstration will concentrate on the
upper band and simultaneously accommodate low-probability-of-intercept
navigation radar, satellite and data link communications, and
electronic warfare functions, including electronic attack. An AMRF-C
test bed that incorporates a prototype control and signal-processing
architecture is already in operation, and promising transition
opportunities have been identified.
transformation--innovative naval prototypes
The fiscal year 2006 budget requests funding to develop several
Innovative Naval Prototypes (INPs). These initiatives include:
An electromagnetic railgun prototype gun capable of
launching precision-guided, hypersonic projectiles at
supersonic speeds against targets with flight times measured in
seconds and minutes, not hours;
New concepts for persistent, netted, littoral ASW. Can
we integrate multiple unmanned underwater vehicles and other
sensors, an associated underwater support infrastructure, into
a comprehensive distributed surveillance system that would
consist of a substantial number of independent, but mutually
communicating, vehicles equipped with tactical or oceanographic
sensors for continually searching a shared ocean volume?
Cooperating units could dump collected data, replenish power
sources, and update mission assignments. Virtually all of the
sensor, propulsion, and docking technology needed to implement
such a scheme is already in hand, but challenges remain in
devising a reliable methodology for ``autonomous
collaboration'' among the participants;
Technologies to enable Sea Basing--for example, ONR's
longstanding investment in naval architecture and marine
engineering has supplied the technology--advanced hull types,
composite materials, and new propulsion systems--that will
enable the design and construction of 50-knot ``connector ''
ships able to deliver 5,000-ton payloads from sea bases to
objective areas some 3,000 miles away. Increasing
containerization of military cargo and supplies requires
corresponding new efficiencies in stowage and handling
procedures as well as the ability to transfer containers among
ships and to offload them onto lighters--at sea--in conditions
up to Sea State 4;
The tactical utilization of space. In direct response
to a Defense Department transformational initiative to
facilitate more timely exploitation of space by combatant
commanders, NRL will soon launch the first in a series of
experimental tactical micro-satellites denoted TACSAT-1.
TACSAT-1's concept of operations includes responsive, on-demand
space lift, near-real-time tasking by theater commanders, and
dissemination of sensor data by means of SIPRNet protocols.
TACSAT-1 will be launched into low-Earth orbit. The initial
sensor package will include both a thermal imager and a visible
light camera with modest, but tactically useful resolution. On
orbit, TACSAT-1 will be available to regional combatant
commanders for operational experiments intended both to
evaluate this initial micro-satellite system and to provide
real-world experience with the concept.
I am excited about the INPs. These are the capabilities that
promise to fundamentally change how we prepare for and fight wars. A
more tangible example of this is the Sea Fighter FSF-1, also known as
X-Craft, that we launched in February of this year. The Sea Fighter is
a high speed aluminum catamaran that will test a variety of
technologies that will allow us to improve our capabilities in
littoral, or near-shore, waters. The Sea Fighter FSF-1 will be used to
evaluate the hydrodynamic performance, structural behavior, mission
flexibility, and propulsion system efficiency of high speed vessels.
The Sea Fighter will be the first Navy purpose built ship to
demonstrate mission flexibility. Mission flexibility will be
demonstrated through interchangeable ``mission modules'' housed in the
Sea Fighter's large Mission Bay in standard 20-foot container boxes.
The Mission Bay will be capable of housing 12 containers, permitting
the vessel to be quickly reconfigured to support a variety of potential
missions, including battle force protection, mine countermeasures,
amphibious assault support, and humanitarian support. A multi-purpose
stern ramp will allow Sea Fighter to launch and recover manned and
unmanned surface and sub-surface vehicles up to the size of an 11 meter
Rigid-Hull Inflatable Boat. From its flight deck, Sea Fighter FSF-1
will be able to support 24-hour-a-day operations for up to two MH-60S
helicopters. When turned over to the fleet in May 2005, Sea Fighter,
manned by a joint Navy-Coast Guard crew of two dozen will serve as a
risk reduction ``surrogate'' for Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) concept of
operations and technical capabilities development.
and beyond--the navy and marine corps after next
At the basic research end of the spectrum, ONR-funded
investigations are administered in accordance with scientific and
technical disciplines--ocean sciences, materials, electronics,
mathematics, physics, chemistry, medicine, and others--and their focus
is on discovering and understanding new phenomena that hold promise for
future application in the Navy/Marine Corps-after-next. Our research
investment priorities focus on areas that are uniquely naval and
maritime and usually of interest primarily to the sea services and
areas where we leverage applicable naval disciplines in conjunction
with the rest of America's basic research establishment.
We integrate the Naval Research Laboratory and ONR programs to
maintain a strong corporate lab at the Naval Research Laboratory.
Thanks to Thomas Edison's vision the Naval Research Laboratory has a
long history at the forefront of basic research, including radar,
nuclear propulsion, advances in timekeeping for the Global Positioning
System, development of satellites, electronic warfare, and today's
global war on terrorism ``tools'' to name a few.
A portion of our applied research (6.2) investment plans are
targeted to the harvest of successful basic research concepts and
knowledge for use in the FNCs, the INPs, experimentation, and other
transitions. We are working to reduce the transition time of the fruits
of the discovery and invention to less than 10 years. We also work
closely with the other Services through the DOD Reliance process to
help rationalize the DOD-wide S&T portfolio.
National Naval Responsibilities shape these basic and early-applied
research portfolios, and ONR has earmarked a significant portion of its
resources to sustain a critical mass of research and development
efforts in these areas. These scientific and engineering disciplines--
ocean acoustics, underwater weapons, and naval engineering--are
critical for naval missions but are of limited interest to commercial
industry and thus unlikely to attract significant private-sector
investment. It is vital to keep such fields healthy, not only for the
sake of our own capabilities, but to avoid technological surprise as
well.
The naval S&T Grand Challenges are large, difficult, challenges
that, if met, could give us decisive capabilities 15 to 30 years in the
future. We encourage the Nation's scientific community to achieve
breakthroughs in difficult but achievable scientific challenges like
Naval Battlespace Awareness, Advanced Electrical Power Sources for the
Navy and Marine Corps, Naval Materials by Design, and Multifunctional
Electronics for Intelligent Naval Sensors.
In conclusion, the Nation's return on investment is clear. Success
in the global war on terrorism, naval transformation, and Navy and
Marine Corps-after-next, depends on a balanced, long-term, stable, and
sustained investment in S&T, validated through a cycle of ongoing
experimentation so we can transition new capability to the warfighter.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Admiral.
Mr. Engle, we would be glad to hear you next.
STATEMENT OF JAMES B. ENGLE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE
AIR FORCE FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND ENGINEERING
Mr. Engle. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee and
staff, I also very much appreciate the opportunity to provide
testimony on the fiscal year 2006 Air Force S&T program.
The United States Air Force continues to transform to a
capabilities-focused expeditionary air and space force based on
the concepts of operations (CONOPs) for each of the seven major
tasks that the Air Force must be capable of accomplishing to
support our combatant commanders. The Air Force is focused on
delivering the ability to effectively and affordably train,
organize, and equip our military forces. The Air Force
Integration Capability Review and Risk Assessment (I-CRRA)
master planning process encompasses the effects and
capabilities required by the seven CONOPs and is key to
ensuring we have a high correlation between our S&T programs
and the warfighting capabilities required by these concepts.
As a result of this capability review and risk assessment,
the Air Force realigned approximately $500 million of its S&T
funding to support higher-priority areas over the Future Years
Defense Program (FYDP). These areas included the Battlefield
Air Operations (BAO) kit, which I will discuss in more detail
in a moment; the commander's predictive environment, which
teams our human effectiveness and information technology
communities working on network-centric warfare applications;
and Air Force-unique nanotechnology efforts in the areas of
chemistry, electronics, and materials.
Fiscal constraints, operational demands, and ongoing
peacekeeping operations and conflicts in such places as
Afghanistan and Iraq continue to place a great burden on our
people, our already stressed operational systems, and our
supporting logistics. However, the Air Force is working to
increase the S&T funding to ensure we maintain our technology
options in support of future warfighting needs.
The Air Force fiscal year 2006 budget request for S&T is
$1.98 billion. This includes $1.4 billion in core S&T efforts,
which represents an increase of over $60 million, or almost 2.3
percent real growth compared to the President's budget request
for a similar core amount of S&T investment in fiscal year
2005.
Also with an eye toward maintaining our long-term superior
warfighting capability, this year's President's budget request
includes $340 million in basic research funding, or about 18
percent of the Air Force's S&T budget. Included in this amount
are university research initiatives and high-energy laser basic
research programs that were transferred to Air Force S&T by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) the year before last.
These efforts, along with additional high-energy laser programs
that also transferred to the Air Force, continue to do well and
receive oversight and policy guidance from the OSD while the
Air Force works hard to ensure these programs support the
diverse multiple military objectives inherent in joint
activity.
In addition, the seismic research program for detection of
nuclear explosions has been successfully integrated into core
Air Force S&T programs. We continue to work with the OSD, the
Air Force Technical Applications Center, the Army, and the
Department of Energy to ensure the right level of investment in
seismic research that will address the operational nuclear
explosion monitoring needs of our country.
As the Air Force continues to transform to meet current and
future security challenges, we must prepare for a broad
spectrum of capabilities that address three strategic
contributions that air and space power provide: persistent
C\4\ISR, global mobility, and rapid strike. All of this must be
done, recognizing that we will, in most situations, be
operating in a joint and often coalition environment. We work
closely with the warfighter to anticipate new operational needs
arising from changing national and world security environments
and to develop and demonstrate S&T applications to rapidly
mitigate irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive threats, as
well as traditional threats.
Our prime example is the Air Force special tactics combat
controller BAO kit that I mentioned earlier. Lighter batteries,
hearing protection, and more efficient target designation are
some of the examples of ongoing BAO kit technology
enhancements.
The Battlefield Air Targeting Camera Autonomous Micro-air
Vehicle (BATCAM), which I brought with me today--and I think
you have all had a chance to look at--replaces the current
unmanned air vehicle (UAV) system in the BAO kit with one that
is 5 times smaller and 10 times lighter. It still provides
covert reconnaissance. It is simple to operate, inexpensive
enough to be expendable, and can provide real-time battle
damage assessment. These new BAO kits provide a joint
capability that will help save American lives and the lives of
innocent civilians.
The Bombot robot, which I also brought with me today,
provides a joint service capability to aggressively destroy
explosive devices. The Air Force was selected to develop Bombot
because of our experience and expertise in ground vehicle
robotics. The effort resulted in the development of a very
small, off-road, remote-controlled, reusable robot that has
been deployed to Iraq for destruction of IEDs. The robot uses
video feedback or line-of-sight RF to find IEDs, drop the
explosive destruction charge and move to safety.
The First Response Expeditionary Fire Vehicle shown in the
poster boards behind me today provides a lightweight air-
droppable system for effective crash and rescue fire-fighting
services starting on day one of deployments. This compact,
lightweight system can be transported on military HMMWVs,
Gators, or other small vehicles and can effectively extinguish
two- and three-dimensional fires with one-fifth the
firefighting agent.
As demonstrated in the laser eye protection display today,
the Air Force continues its laser countermeasures effort
designed to protect warfighters with multiple capabilities and
approaches to address laser hazards and threats. These
capabilities and approaches include technologies for training
tactics, personnel protection, optical hardening, as well as
technical data to established DOD policies and international
treaties.
The Air Force is also developing technology to better
prosecute the offensive portion of the global war on terrorism.
The hardened surface target ordnance package (HardSTOP) is an
airdrop munitions technology development focused on multi-story
targets in urban terrain. HardSTOP is equipped with over 50
mini-penetration charges to allow it to hit targets within
multiple-story buildings and soft bunker type targets.
Additionally, HardSTOP provides low collateral damage with a
precisely selectable explosion diameter of as little as 20
feet.
We are also engaged in other areas and are working to
ensure that we transform, as we continue to integrate these
expanding capabilities with those of other services and non-
military elements of our national power. The technology
upgrades to Global Hawk propulsion and power systems are an
example of spiral development. Power extraction from the low-
pressure turbine will triple the current onboard power
capacity, which is currently 25 kilowatts to 75 kilowatts, as
an integral starter generator will provide essential in-flight
engine restart capability, and low temperature fuel additives
will decrease operations and maintenance costs associated with
the current fuel mixtures.
In the area of world-class research, Air Force technologies
continue to stand out, including directed energy activities at
Starfire Optical Range at Kirtland, New Mexico, which is
leading atmospheric compensation technology development for use
in large ground-based telescopes to image satellites and
propagate laser beams through the atmosphere.
Our Information Directorate's networked cyber operation
tools research at Rome Research Site in Rome, New York, has
also been cited with exemplar laboratory programs.
Finally, the Air Force S&E workforce, as you mentioned
earlier in your opening remarks, is another area that we are
meeting with great success. The Air Force is generating enough
S&Es at the present time to sustain Air Force needs through its
developmental education programs and various recruitment and
retention initiatives. The Air Force is attracting the best and
the brightest. We are getting graduates with 4.0 grade point
averages, and many of our recruiting initiatives are aimed at
attracting students into the Air Force S&E career field. We
also have several education programs within our core basic
research program that could enhance our S&E workforce, such as
the National Defense Science and Engineering Graduate
Fellowship program. The Air Force is committed to continuing to
shape its S&E workforce with the vision to enhance excellence
and relevance of S&E into the 21st century and appreciates the
support Congress has already provided.
In conclusion, the Air Force is fully committed to
providing this Nation with the advanced air and space
technologies required to meet America's national security
interests around the world and to ensure we remain on the
cutting edge of systems performance, flexibility, and
affordability.
The technological advantage we enjoy today is a legacy of
decades of investment in S&T. However, in this post-Cold War
world, we cannot afford to rest on our laurels. We are focusing
our S&T program to meet the challenges of a new security
environment. The global war on terrorism drives a different
construct for Air Force S&T, and we are focusing our top talent
and investing our funds on many efforts that address this war.
Air Force core competencies in S&T enable solutions to meet
these emerging threats. The Air Force S&T program continues to
provide for the discovery, development, demonstration, and
timely transition of affordable technologies that keep our Air
Force the best in the world.
As an integral part of the DOD S&T team, we look forward to
working with Congress to ensure a strong Air Force S&T program
tailored to achieve our vision of a superior air and space
force that can identify and defeat both traditional and global
war on terrorism targets.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to
present testimony and thank you for your continued support of
the Air Force S&T program.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Engle follows:]
Prepared Statement by James B. Engle
introduction
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, and staff, I very much
appreciate the opportunity to provide testimony on the fiscal year 2006
Air Force science and technology (S&T) program. The United States Air
Force continues to transform to a capabilities-focused Expeditionary
Air and Space Force based on the concepts of operations (CONOPs) for
each of the seven major tasks the Air Force must be capable of
accomplishing to support our combatant commanders. The Air Force is
focused on delivering the ability to effectively and affordably train,
organize, and equip our military forces. The Air Force Integration
Capabilities Review and Risk Assessment (I-CRRA) master planning
process encompasses the effects and capabilities required by the seven
CONOPs. This master planning process is key to ensuring we have a high
correlation between our S&T programs and the warfighting capabilities
required by these CONOPs. In fact, in the fiscal year 2006 President's
budget request, the Air Force reprioritized approximately $500 million
of its S&T program to address capability needs identified in the master
planning process.
The United States Air Force is committed to defending America by
unleashing the power of S&T. Our S&T program enables us to achieve our
vision of becoming an integrated Air and Space Force capable of rapid
and decisive global engagement. The Air Force S&T program is
aggressively pursuing high payoff technologies and is focused on
current and future warfighting capabilities to address not only
traditional threats, but also the global war on terrorism. The Air
Force is focusing on technologies to meet the capability needs of the
combatant commanders. Many of these technologies could be applicable to
a number of different joint uses and the Air Force actively pursues
joint programs and sharing of technology with the Services, Defense
Agencies, Homeland Security, and others.
A broad foundation of basic, applied, and advanced technology S&T
investment enables our scientists and engineers (S&Es) the freedom to
innovate and is the key to ensuring the Air Force will meet the
challenges of tomorrow. The output of this broad base of science
investments provides our leadership the opportunities to respond
quickly to a rapidly changing world. A key example of this flexibility
is our rapid response to the global war on terrorism with technologies
to help defend against both traditional and asymmetrical threats. We
are able to deal with the uncertainty of tomorrow because of our broad
investment in S&T today--an investment geared towards winning
decisively, protecting our forces, and minimizing collateral damage at
anytime and any place in the world.
s&t budget/senior leadership involvement
Fiscal constraints, operational demands, and ongoing peacekeeping
operations and conflicts in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq,
continue to place a great burden on our people, our already stressed
operational systems, and our supporting logistics. However, the Air
Force is working to increase S&T funding to ensure we maintain our
technology options in support of future warfighting needs. The Air
Force fiscal year 2006 budget request for S&T is $1.98 billion--this
includes $1.4 billion in ``core'' S&T efforts, which represents an
increase of over $60 million or almost 2.3 percent real growth compared
to the requested amount for similar ``core'' S&T efforts in fiscal year
2005. An additional $77.8 million in Joint Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle
funding was added to the S&T program in fiscal year 2006 only.
Of the programs that were transferred to Air Force S&T the year
before last, all continue to do well. The University Research
Initiative program plus the High Energy Laser programs, which were
devolved to the Air Force by the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD), continue to receive oversight and policy guidance from the OSD,
while the Air Force works hard to ensure these programs support the
diverse multiple military objectives inherent in joint programs. In
addition, the Seismic Research Program for detection of nuclear
explosions has been successfully integrated into the core Air Force S&T
program. We continue to work with the OSD, the Air Force Technical
Applications Center, the Army, and the Department of Energy to ensure
the right level of investment in seismic research that will address
operational nuclear explosion monitoring needs.
Warfighter and senior Air Force leadership involvement in the
planning, programming, and prioritizing of Air Force S&T continues to
be a priority. The I-CRRA master planning process, previously
mentioned, involves several levels of senior Air Force leadership,
including the Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force plus
all the four stars, and promotes a greater understanding within the Air
Force of the S&T program and its link to warfighting capabilities. The
Chief, along with the Secretary, the Air Force Service Acquisition
Executive, and the Air Force Materiel Command Commander, also
participates in a full portfolio review of the S&T program similar to
the former S&T summits. The Capabilities Program Execution Review
continues to provide a forum in which the commander of each major
command is afforded a focused look at his portfolio, an opportunity to
resolve issues at the system/program level, and insight into the S&T
program. Finally, the Applied Technology Councils continue to bring
acquisition product centers, logistics centers, major user commands,
and laboratory personnel together to review, discuss, and prioritize
S&T efforts.
transformation
The objective of Air Force S&T is to develop technologies for
lighter, leaner, and more lethal weapon systems and their support
structure through the continuing discovery, exploitation,
demonstration, and rapid transition of technology to meet users'
operational needs. All of this must be done recognizing that we will,
in a number of situations, be operating in a joint and often a
coalition environment. The S&T world is usually where new weapon
systems begin their development process. This is the ideal time to
consider the full life cycle cost savings by considering maintenance,
sustainment, and disposal costs. During a conflict, it is not unusual
for combat-identified problems or needs to be highlighted and near-term
solutions developed--the Battlefield Air Operations (BAO) kit and the
robotics improvised explosive device (IED) destruction robotic vehicle
are examples. Yet, it is imperative that the S&T process considers the
entire life cycle cost of a proposed system from development to
disposition.
As the Air Force continues to transform from a Cold War to a post-
Cold War Air and Space Force, we must prepare for both traditional and
new forms of terrorism to include attacks on our space assets, attacks
on our information networks, cruise and ballistic missile attacks on
our forces and territory, and attacks by adversaries armed with
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high explosive weapons.
To address these emerging possibilities, the Air Force has established
a process of transformation to achieve and maintain the advantage
through changes in operational concepts, organization, and/or
technologies that significantly improve its warfighting capabilities or
ability to meet the demands of a changing security environment.
When examining the concept of combat transformation, one must
remember transformation is not the result of a one-time improvement or
change, but rather a continuum of sustained and determined efforts. It
is more than new ``show stopping'' technology as it includes adapting
existing capabilities, using them in new ways, changing the
organization structure to increase effectiveness, and changing doctrine
and our CONOPs. We are also working to ensure that as we transform we
continue to integrate these expanding capabilities with those of the
other services and nonmilitary elements of national power--we must
evolve and embrace joint and coalition operations as we transform.
Finally, we do not believe that transformation should be achieved at
the expense of ongoing operations in support of the Department of
Defense (DOD) strategy of maintaining adequate readiness and
infrastructure, conducting critical recapitalization, and attracting
quality personnel--to achieve rational transformation, there must be a
careful balance between these requirements, which all compete for
limited resources.
We work closely with the warfighter to anticipate new operational
needs arising from changing national and world security environments
and to develop and demonstrate S&T applications to rapidly mitigate
traditional and global war on terrorism threats. At almost $2 billion,
the fiscal year 2006 budget request for Air Force S&T is funded at a
level to achieve the distinctive capabilities that support Air Force
warfighting needs.
workforce
The Air Force S&E workforce is another area where senior Air Force
leadership involvement has played a pivotal role; and the steps taken
to address S&E workforce issues are meeting with great success. The Air
Force is generating enough S&Es at present to sustain Air Force needs
through its developmental education programs and various recruitment
and retention initiatives. Our workforce continues to be highly
motivated and productive and the fact that approximately 20 percent of
our laboratory S&E government workforce is active duty military gives
us a direct link to the warfighter, which in turn helps us to focus
technology development on warfighting capability needs. The Air Force
is committed to continuing to shape its S&E workforce with the vision
to enhance excellence and relevance of S&T into the 21st century and
appreciates the support Congress has already provided.
technology transition
Our goal is to get technology to the warfighter. There are several
ways we measure our effectiveness in obtaining this goal. The Air Force
believes that looking at legacy systems is one of the most effective
metrics available. While not perfect, it does demonstrate the
transition of S&T products into operational warfighting capabilities.
An excellent example is the F-35. A number of Air Force S&T developed
or sponsored technologies that transitioned to the F-35 can be traced
back to S&T investments in previous years. These technologies include
efforts such as low-observable materials and airframe structures;
advanced two-dimensional, thrust vectoring nozzles; new durable turbine
engines; airframe design; and advanced radar.
In the space arena, examples of technologies that have transitioned
into space ``products'' include radiation-hardened electronics; longer
life, lighter weight lithium ion batteries; lightweight composite
materials; compact, more efficient solar cells; and Hall thrusters. In
addition, a number of information-related technologies from the Joint
Battlespace Infosphere (JBI) program have transitioned into operational
and commercial use. The JBI network centric environment provides the
framework to establish basic principles and draft standards for a
variety of different applications.
Spiral acquisition allows an opportunity for very rapid technology
transfer. A good example is our BAO kit, which Air Force ground
controllers use to call in air strikes. Changes in this system were
rapidly transitioned into use during Operation Enduring Freedom in
Afghanistan. The BAO kit is one of the Air Force's top priorities and
continues being developed in several different acquisition spirals as
the different technology areas mature. The technology upgrades to
Global Hawk's propulsion and power system are another example of spiral
acquisition. Power extraction from the low-pressure turbine will triple
the current on-board power capacity, an internal starter generator will
provide essential in-flight engine restart capability, and low-
temperature fuel additives will decrease operations and maintenance
costs associated with current fuel mixtures.
Technology transition into operational use is the ultimate metric
for assessing the value of our S&T investment and the warfighting
capabilities it provides to the Air Force. As evidenced by our high
technology legacy systems, the technology transitioned from S&T into
developmental and operational products is extensive and provides
confidence that S&T funding is being wisely invested.
world-class research
The quality of our program is assessed by the Air Force Scientific
Advisory Board (SAB) through yearly reviews. The SAB conducts an in-
depth review of half of the S&T program each year, covering the entire
program over a 2-year period. Eleven technical areas were identified as
world-class research during the last 2-year cycle of reviews.
The Directed Energy Directorate's Starfire Optical Range at
Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, is leading atmospheric
compensation technology development for use in large ground-based
telescopes to image satellites and propagate laser beams through the
atmosphere. They have just developed a sodium laser system that will
allow compensation for a significantly larger portion of the atmosphere
along the laser's path. This will enable higher-quality, ground-based
observations of space objects and enhanced propagation of laser beams
through a turbulent atmosphere. Satellite images obtained by using this
technology can provide real-time status information that cannot be
obtained in any other manner.
The SAB cited the Information Directorate's cyber operations tools
research at Rome Research Site in Rome, New York, as an exemplar
laboratory program with a strong vision, leading edge research that
anticipated operational needs, and having invented and delivered an
impressive array of offensive and defensive cyber operations tools to
the warfighter.
The SAB also cited the Information Directorate's research in
Advanced Computing Architectures, a program that includes technologies
dealing with current problems and technologies of the future.
Especially mentioned was the work with the Joint Strike Fighter,
unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), and the Joint Tactical Radio System.
Another SAB-rated world-class research program is Directed Energy
Bioeffects being worked by our Human Effectiveness Directorate at
Brooks City-Base, Texas. Specific research areas include understanding
laser effects on humans, radio frequency dosimetry, and the fundamental
bioeffects knowledge of lasers. The Materials and Manufacturing
Directorate at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, conducts world-
class research in probalistic micromechanical modeling of material
durability that is based on the physics of failure. Thermo mechanical
process modeling of metals is having a significant impact on material
standards and process control.
The SAB also rated the Automatic Target Recognition (ATR) work
performed by the Sensors Directorate at Wright-Patterson Air Force
Base, Ohio, as world-class. ATR enables faster and more accurate
detection, identification, and prosecution of time-critical targets. We
are developing ATR tools to better detect targets in urban and obscured
environments, as well as to change detection algorithms to aid in the
detection of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). By fusing detection
and cueing tools with signature databases and advanced signature
modeling we continue to shorten the ``kill chain.''
The Space Vehicles Directorate's weather research at Hanscom Air
Force Base, Massachusetts, continues to be a SAB-rated world-class
technology development program. The weather modeling and simulation
capability undergoes frequent spiral upgrades to specify and forecast
space weather from the Sun to the ionosphere.
Also, while not specifically identified by the SAB, the Air Force
has a significant investment in various aspects of nanotechnology.
Scientific breakthroughs and technology advances in the past few years
have demonstrated the large potential of nanotechnology to address a
number of different Air Force applications. Attributes, such as high
strength, could result in lighter and faster air vehicles and could
enable miniature satellites. Nanotechnology could also make a
significant contribution to advanced energy and energetic materials.
combating terrorism
The Air Force S&T program has a considerable portfolio of
technology focused on the global war on terrorism. One prime example is
the Elastomeric Coating, which the Air Force developed to protect key
buildings and installations from close proximity explosions. This easy-
to-apply spray coating is contributing to the safety and protection of
deployed troops.
As mentioned earlier, the Air Force continues to provide spiral
upgrades to the Air Force Special Tactics Combat Controllers BAO kit.
Lighter batteries, hearing protection, and more efficient target
designation are some examples of ongoing BAO kit technology
enhancements. Another enhancement example is the Battlefield Air
Targeting Camera Autonomous Micro-air Vehicle (BATCAM). BATCAM replaces
the current UAV system in the BAO kit with one that is five times
smaller and ten times lighter, yet still provides covert
reconnaissance, is simple to operate, inexpensive enough to be
expendable, and can provide real-time battle damage assessment. Still
another example is the Battlefield Renewable Integrated Tactical Energy
System (BRITES). BRITES is designed to replace the various batteries
that are currently carried with a system and is 50 percent lighter, but
still provides for the same capability. These new BAO kits provide a
joint capability that will help save American lives and the lives of
innocent civilians. BAO enhancements provide a revolutionary and highly
effective way to combat the global war on terrorism threat.
In close coordination with the other services, the Air Force is
utilizing its expertise in metal-infused ceramics to develop a more
effective, lightweight armor. This new material was being developed by
the Air Force for air vehicle applications. It turns out, however, that
the new advanced lightweight metal-infused ceramic armor has additional
applications and could be used in body protection armor and has been
shown to be effective against shrapnel and multiple small arms shots.
Additionally, the metal-infused ceramic armor is cheaper, lighter, and
easier to produce than the standard plates.
The Bombot robot provides a joint-service capability to
aggressively destroy explosive devices. The Air Force was selected to
develop Bombot because of our expertise in ground vehicle robotics. The
effort resulted in the development of a very small reusable robot that
has been deployed to Iraq for destruction of IEDs. The robot is a
small, off-road remote controlled vehicle equipped with a small
explosive charge delivery system. It is remotely controlled and uses
either video or feedback or simply line-of-sight radio frequency to
find the IED, drop the explosive destruction charge, and move to
safety. This small robot weighs 17 pounds and costs about $3,000.
The Air Force continues to leverage its success in manportable,
shoulder-fired missile (MANPADS) countermeasures with the development
of the Affordable Laser Infrared Countermeasure Survivability System
(ALISS). ALISS provides aircrew with a highly-effective, threat-
adaptable, jamming infrared countermeasure to the proliferating MANPADS
threat. Even with its emphasis on affordability, ALISS provides missile
launch detection and jamming out to beyond the maximum range of
existing MANPADS with few false alarms. Additionally, since ALISS is a
pod system, it can be retrofitted onto a variety of aircraft platforms,
including civilian aircraft.
The Air Force is also developing technology to better prosecute the
offensive portion of the global war on terrorism. The Hardened Surface
Target Ordnance Package (HardSTOP) is an airdrop munition technology
development focused on multi-story targets in urban terrain. HardSTOP
is equipped with over 50 mini-penetration charges to allow it to hit
targets within multi-story buildings and soft bunker type targets.
Additionally, HardSTOP provides low-collateral damage with a precisely
selectable explosion diameter of as little as 20 feet.
transformational technologies
There are many other Air Force technology areas that deserve
special mention. Let me highlight just a few examples. Solid state
lasers have been around for many years, but we are finally seeing them
approach weapons class power levels. These lasers offer great promise
as small, efficient, electrically powered systems that can project
effects at the speed of light with a magazine that depends only on
available power generation. The Joint High Power Solid State Laser
program is jointly funded by the Air Force, the High Energy Laser Joint
Technology Office, and the Army. In the next few months, we should see
three competing systems demonstrating close to 25 kilowatts with the
potential of good beam quality over relevant shot times. We are also
developing and tracking other promising solid state technologies. There
are many potential applications for high-powered solid state lasers
such as aircraft self-protection, anti-sensor weapons, and tactical
weapons on ground, sea, and air platforms. Following these
demonstrations, we will evaluate how to best get these transformational
technologies to the warfighter.
The Scramjet Engine Demonstrator (SED) is the culmination of our
Hypersonics Technology work at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio,
and is the cornerstone of future hypersonic capabilities, such as
destroying time-critical targets and responsive access to space. The
objective of the SED program is to demonstrate the viability of a
hydrocarbon-fueled scramjet engine through flight and ground test and,
as such, is the first-ever flight demonstration of a hydrocarbon-fueled
scramjet engine.
In fiscal year 2006, the Air Force will continue to research and
demonstrate a low collateral damage warhead, allowing a ``behind-the-
wall'' threat prosecution with a highly localized lethal footprint. The
warhead case consists of a low-density, wrapped carbon-fiber/epoxy
matrix integrated with a steel nose and base. The low-density composite
case can survive penetration into a 1-foot hardened concrete wall. Upon
detonation, the carbon-fiber warhead case disintegrates into small non-
lethal fibers with little or no metallic fragments, thus significantly
reducing collateral damage to people and structures. The warhead
explosive fill is a dense inert metal explosive containing fine
tungsten particles to provide a ballasted payload with sufficient
penetration mass. The tungsten displaces energetic material so as to
reduce the total energetic used. The net results are higher dynamic
energy impulse all within a small lethal footprint.
conclusion
In conclusion, the Air Force is fully committed to providing this
Nation with the advanced air and space technologies required to meet
America's national security interests around the world and to ensure we
remain on the cutting edge of system performance, flexibility, and
affordability. The technological advantage we enjoy today is a legacy
of decades of investment in S&T. However, in this post-Cold War world,
we cannot afford to rest on our laurels. We are focusing our S&T
program to meet the challenges of a new security environment. The
global war on terrorism drives a different construct for Air Force S&T
and we are focusing our top talent and investing our funding on the
many efforts that address global war on terrorism. Air Force Core
Competencies in S&T enable solutions to meet these emerging threats.
The Air Force S&T program continues to provide for the discovery,
development, demonstration, and timely transition of affordable
technologies that keep our Air Force the best in the world. As an
integral part of the DOD's S&T team, we look forward to working with
Congress to ensure a strong Air Force S&T program tailored to achieve
our vision of a superior Air and Space Force that can identify and
defeat both traditional and global war on terrorism targets.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again, for the opportunity to present
testimony, and thank you for your continuing support of the Air Force
S&T program.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Engle.
Dr. Tether, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF DR. ANTHONY J. TETHER, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE ADVANCED
RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY
Dr. Tether. Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, Senator Nelson,
thank you very much for inviting me here today to testify on
DARPA's decisionmaking processes for strategic directions,
priorities, and budgets.
DARPA has many efforts directed at the global war on
terrorism which have been described in both my written
testimony and in the strategic plan that we delivered with our
fiscal year 2006 budget. At the display behind me, there are
just a handful of our quick reaction efforts which are today in
Iraq helping our guys beat the stuffing out of the bad guys and
bring them home safe.
Our Boomerang program, for example, is a low-cost system to
locate people shooting at convoys.
Our Command Post of the Future (CPOF) system is a new way
to do collaborative command and control where the commanders
can stay where they are and do not have to come to a central
location. Not only that, it is allowing everyone else on the
net to see what is going on so that the fog of decisionmaking
and why something was being done is now known to people at very
low levels where it was not known before. Major General
Chiarelli, who was a commanding general of the 1st Cavalry
Division, told us and would tell you that CPOF in use today in
Iraq is doing just that, helping them defeat the insurgents,
and at the same time saving U.S. lives.
Our gun truck technology is protecting convoys today. Right
now the truck uses just steel plates. However, we have a neat,
new material technology, really very simple, that is polymer,
sort of like a steel-belted tire. It has shown great promise,
and if we can show that this has the same capability, we will
have more lightweight protection, but more importantly, we will
be able to mold it into the right form. Not only that, we also
think it might be useful for body armor.
We also have some programs displayed on language, which is
a great problem.
However, your letter requested that we spend this time
discussing how we shape our strategy and build our budgets. I
guess you want to know how the sausage is made; sometimes not a
pretty sight. Much of this was addressed in the strategic plan
and also in my written testimony. So I am going to, therefore,
use the time I have to give you examples and hopefully more
insight into what I believe is a very thorough and complete
process which has been reviewed at all levels of the Services
and the OSD.
A strategic plan has three elements: an objective, a
strategy for meeting the objective, and tactics for
implementing that strategy.
DARPA's original objective, when created by President
Eisenhower in 1958, was to prevent technological surprise such
as Sputnik. Over the years, that objective has not changed but
it has been modified to include not only preventing
technological surprise but to create technological surprise for
our enemies.
Today's potential technological surprise comes in the form
of what is sometimes termed asymmetric threats, transnational
threats, threats without a country, or just plain terrorism. We
have many efforts directed towards these threats, some of which
I will talk about.
Creating technological surprise for the enemy is a major
activity. An example of DARPA-created technological surprise is
stealth. DARPA has many programs oriented towards creating the
same degree of surprise. However, these efforts cannot be
discussed in this forum because, in order for something to be a
surprise, it should not be known until it is ready. I would be
pleased to come and brief any of you on all of these programs
at your convenience. But let me assure you that the appropriate
staff on your committee have full access and review all of
these programs.
DARPA's strategy for meeting these objectives manifests
itself in the form of thrusts that change over time, fitting
the conditions and problems of the day. Right now we have eight
thrusts that center on providing new and enhanced capability.
You have these in your plan, but they range from not allowing
sanctuary for any surface target, whether it be fixed, mobile,
or underground; developing tactical networks; space all the way
to biology. There is a ninth thrust which is centered on the
continued development of core technologies such as
microelectronics, materials, information processing computer
science in order to enhance current capability and to enable
new capability.
These thrusts have been generated directly from the 2001
QDR and from interactions with senior service and civilians
from each of the Services and defense agencies. The thrusts are
then used in our budget process to guide what specific efforts
should be funded. But we do not pick a thrust and allocate
money to it and then look for ideas. You would be very lucky to
get the right allocation. The way we work it is we go and look
for the ideas. We have the thrust, which we use to tell people
what we are interested in and we ask for ideas to come forth,
then we fund the ideas. So we build up our budget really from
the bottom up, from an idea funding as opposed to a top-down
allocating money to thrusts. It is a very different type of
process.
But where do the ideas come from? They are found in many
ways. We have program managers (PMs) who are only hired if they
are the kind of people who can generate ideas. We get ideas
from industry, obviously. We get ideas from universities. We
get ideas from other S&T organizations within the DOD, and we
get ideas from everywhere. We even get ideas from Congress. I
did not mean it quite that way. Sorry. [Laughter.]
In addition, senior managers at DARPA meet regularly with
senior civilians and military leaders throughout the DOD.
Now, to reinforce this, we have five operational liaisons
at DARPA. These are people who are from each Service. We have
one from each Service plus the National Geospatial Agency
(NGA). They are senior in all respects. They are senior because
they are a colonel or a captain in the Navy, usually at the end
of their tour, and they are also old. But they come with a
great rolodex. Their job at DARPA is take my PMs and bring them
to the warfighter and to marry them. They act as that go-
between to bring technology to a warfighter, have the PM
describe what he is doing to the warfighter. The warfighter
then learns about something new that he might not have known
about. Plus, the PM now learns about needs that he might have
known about. This program has worked extraordinarily well in
both getting ideas and transitioning technologies.
This is something new for DARPA. I put two full-time DARPA
people at U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in Tampa. We
have two DARPA people in SOCOM at Tampa acting as operational
liaisons between DARPA and SOCOM. Now, why did I do that? Well,
SOCOM is a very special place. I consider it our experimental
lab, and General Brown knows I feel this way. He agrees with
it. He tries out our stuff. We have things. We bring them down.
They actually go out and use them and come back and tell us
what they thought about it, what is to be fixed or not. In
fact, if on occasion we give them 25-30 things, we have
outfitted the full force and we all feel good about that. But
that is a great program and we have many activities going on
with SOCOM and we are in close contact. General Brown reviews
our strategic plan on a continuous basis.
We also have a chiefs program where rising star officers
from each service come to DARPA on short 2- to 3-month
assignments to learn about DARPA. These are warfighters again.
We try to get warfighters and operators, not S&T people. We
have enough contact with S&T people. But we try to get
warfighters and operators, so that when they go back out, and
hopefully they become generals and admirals, they will know
about technology. In fact, I have a group of them behind me
here today. There are three Army, one Marine Corps, and four
Air Force interns here with me today. If you all would maybe
just hop up and back down. They wanted to come and see how
sausage was made, too. [Laughter.]
But the major source of the input is from the constant
reviews of the strategic plan and its projects from the service
chiefs, the combatant commanders, intelligence officials, and
senior civilians from the OSD. In 2004 we had about 100
separate meetings involving literally hundreds of people from
across the DOD, as well as congressional members and staffers,
to review DARPA's thrusts and projects. For 2005 so far, we
will meet another 100 times.
Now, I asked my staff how on Earth could I show to people
how many people review our strategic plan, and the best they
could do was to give me this book. This book contains the
agendas. This is just the agendas. Now, those are one-page
pieces of paper for each meeting, but that is about a 2-inch
thick set of agendas at various meetings we have had to review
the strategic plan.
Let me give you some examples, however. Let me get right
down to the meat of it and give you some examples.
One of our thrusts is robust secure self-forming tactical
networks. We are heading toward a network-centric force where
the network becomes as important as the platforms. This means
that the network has to be as reliable and available as the
platforms and supports because if the network fails, the
capability of our forces would evaporate. The thrust itself was
first started when General Shinsheki asked DARPA to help
develop the architecture for tomorrow's Army. This was the FCS
which needed to be strategically mobile and have the capability
to stay within the decision loop of today's and tomorrow's
asymmetric threats which do not fight in an historical linear
fashion.
This led to substantial efforts developing networks that
are infrastructure-free, that can hold off direct and indirect
attacks on the networks as a result of the reviews that we had
with the Army. A personal review of the strategic plan and
efforts with Generals Schoomaker, Cody, and Byrne reinforced
that networks with this quality are still at the heart of our
future force, and I think with the latest mobility initiative,
that understanding is still there.
We have also reviewed our efforts with General Jumper.
General Jumper wants to provide high bandwidth, worldwide
capability with satellites whose cross-links are lasers and
whose down-links are lasers to airborne platforms. However, we
had a problem. He knew he could guarantee getting the data to
an airborne platform, but he did not know how to guarantee that
a user on the ground had connectivity because clouds get in the
way occasionally with respect to lasers.
We responded to this and created an effort called the
Optical and Radio Frequency Combined Link Experiment (ORCLE),
which would take the data on the airborne platform and down-
link it to a user on the ground, using the laser if conditions
permitted it, but also having a RF link along with that, so
that it would automatically switch from RF to laser as the
conditions permit. This way the ground user was always
guaranteed a dial tone when he picked up the phone.
I have had the ground users tell me that the only time when
communications fail is when you are calling for fire. It always
seems that you never get a dial tone when you are trying to
call for fire. These are important calls which are very low
bandwidth. It does not take much bandwidth for a call for fire
or a call for help. But having this kind of a dual mode
capability ensures the user, when he picks up the phone, that
he has a dial tone and he is going to get connectivity, and if
the lasers are there, he is going to get bandwidth and pictures
like he has never had before.
During the review of the plan with Secretary Wynne, he was
concerned that the network was now going to be so essential
that the developers of networks needed to take into account the
requirement that the network had to survive. We responded to
this by taking the initiative to create a red team capability
which would be chartered with evaluating network concepts from
their survivability ability from the concept development.
We have had several reviews of the plan in our efforts with
DDR&E Ron Sega. One particular issue he is concerned with is
that the multi-level security was not being taken into account
in designing these networks. Here the issue is that each node
in a network is also a relay for messages from which the user
at that node may not be cleared. We need to solve this issue in
order to have one network and not several which would defeat
the purpose of network centric warfare in the first place. We
have responded to this by initiating a multi-level security
effort and we are starting to come up with ideas.
Urban area operations are another example. Our newest
strategic thrust is urban area operations which further
illustrates this process. We were concerned about urban warfare
and were studying it even before the conflict in Iraq. It is
logical for adversaries to move in the city to resist us. It is
easier to hide small caches of weapons, including weapons of
mass destruction, and to hide activities in urban style areas
where there are thousands of buildings. The conflict in Iraq
has brought urban operations center stage and accelerated our
move into this area.
We reviewed our strategic plan with Commandant Mike Hagee
and General Brown, SOCOM Commander. Commandant Hagee told us
that what they needed more than anything else was situational
awareness with respect to vehicles, people, et cetera so the
troops could deploy quickly to trouble spots and basically be a
force multiplier effect. He also said that they really needed
better nonlethal weapons in order to be able to control the
situation when enemy troops were mixed in with local civilians.
We are studying ideas in this area also.
We did respond to this by creating a major effort, which
was discussed, in obtaining situational awareness for using
small UAVs, cameras, other sensors, and even using the soldier
on patrol as a sensor. Commandant Hagee spent 4 hours with us,
along with his senior staff, at a Government-only meeting
reviewing these efforts and agreed with what we were doing.
We meet with General Brown and SOCOM's front-line warriors,
and as a result, we have started a number of very classified
programs. In fact, I just met with General Brown last week to
go over some of the more classified efforts within the urban
operations section that will, undoubtedly, create surprise for
the enemy when they are ready.
Cognitive computing. The purpose of the cognitive computing
thrust is to develop computers that learn to cope with humans
as opposed to today where humans have to learn how to cope with
a computer. We believe that if we can do this, we will be able
to reduce the number of people required in places like
operations centers and so forth. We are attacking not the
tooth, but the tail. We are trying to reduce the number of
people required in the tail who can then be used for the tooth.
Last month, when we were reviewing our strategic plan with
CNO Vernon Clark, he asked us to do an effort for reducing the
number of people required to run a carrier. In other words, he
would like us to take the number of people who run a carrier
down by a factor of two, and we have just started that.
Space. The genesis of our space thrust is directly from
Secretary Rumsfeld and Under Secretary Aldridge. About 4 years
ago, I went through the interview process and finally met with
Secretary Rumsfeld, because he is the one that does pick the
DARPA Director. It was an interview that was supposed to last
for 15 minutes, but went on for 45 where he explained what he
was trying to do. But the point here is that on the way out the
door, he said to me, look, there was this commission on space
and here is a report. Space is important. Go do it. Secretary
Rumsfeld, by the way, reaffirmed that, and that really created
the thrust at DARPA.
Now, we have had several reviews of the strategic plan with
Secretary Teets, DDR&E Ron Sega, General Lance Lord, and more
importantly, General Cartwright.
Senator Cornyn. If I could ask you to sum up. I could
listen to what you are saying all day. It is very interesting
and it is very substantive, but we need to get to some
questions.
Dr. Tether. I could go on with lots of examples, as you
just said.
Senator Cornyn. Maybe at another time. I would love to do
that.
Dr. Tether. We have had sessions with everybody, and I do
look forward to your questions. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Tether follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Tony Tether
Mr. Chairman, subcommittee members and staff: I am pleased to
appear before you today to discuss the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency's (DARPA) fiscal year 2005 activities and our fiscal
year 2006 plans to continue transforming our military through
technological innovation.
DARPA's original mission was to prevent technological surprises
like the launch of Sputnik, which in 1957 signaled that the Soviets had
beaten the U.S. into space. Our mission is still to prevent
technological surprise, but also to create technological surprise for
our adversaries. Stealth is an example of how DARPA has created
technological surprise.
DARPA conducts its mission by sponsoring revolutionary, high-payoff
research that bridges the gap between fundamental discoveries and their
military use.
DARPA is the Department of Defense's (DOD) only research agency not
tied to a specific operational mission. DARPA is designed to be the
``technological engine'' for transformation, supplying advanced
capabilities, based on revolutionary technological options for the
entire Department.
This is a unique role within DOD. The Department's operational
components naturally focus on nearer-term needs because they must meet
urgent needs and requirements. Consequently, a large organization like
the DOD needs a place like DARPA whose only charter is radical
innovation.
darpa's eight strategic thrusts
DARPA's strategy for accomplishing its mission is embodied in
strategic thrusts. Over time, as national security threats and
technical opportunities change, DARPA's strategic thrusts change.
DARPA's flexibility and ability to change direction quickly allows it
to react swiftly to emerging threats.
The eight strategic research thrusts that DARPA is emphasizing
today are:
Detection, Precision ID, Tracking, and Destruction of
Elusive Surface Targets
Robust, Secure Self-Forming Tactical Networks
Networked Manned and Unmanned Systems
Urban Area Operations
Detection, Characterization, and Assessment of
Underground Structures
Assured Use of Space
Cognitive Computing
Bio-Revolution
Urban area operations is our newest thrust, driven partly by Iraq
and partly by the increasing likelihood that future conflicts will be
fought in densely populated areas. The investments in the urban area
operations thrust area are closely integrated with the investments
DARPA has in the other seven thrusts. These investments are part of our
ever-changing investment strategy for the technologies our future
generations of warfighters will need.
Let me tell you about these eight thrusts and the forces driving
them, along with some illustrative examples.
Detection, Precision ID, Tracking, and Destruction of Elusive Surface
Targets
For many years, the DOD has steadily improved its ability to
conduct precision strike against fixed and other predictable targets.
However, experience shows we still need better ways to detect,
identify, track, and defeat elusive surface targets. America's
adversaries realize they must constantly remain on the move, and hide
when not on the move, if they are to survive against the United States'
superior precision strike capabilities. For a number of reasons, it
remains difficult to strike targets that are hiding, moving, or whose
destruction requires near real-time reaction by U.S. forces. Hence, the
basic challenge behind this thrust is, ``How can we find and defeat any
target--and only that target--anywhere, anytime, and in any weather?''
DARPA is assembling the sensors, exploitation tools, and battle
management systems needed to meet this challenge by seamlessly melding
sensor tasking with strike operations. Success will blur or even erase
barriers between the intelligence and the operations functions at all
levels of command, which has large implications for U.S. military
doctrine and organization.
As an example of our vision, DARPA is working on foliage-
penetrating radar that could be used to spot potential targets hiding
under forest ``canopies'' over a large area in all weather. This
information could be used to cue laser detection and ranging (LADAR)
sensors to look more closely at those potential targets. These LADAR
sensors, which are another DARPA project, could provide exquisitely
detailed three-dimensional images of the vehicles hiding under trees,
allowing us to identify them as tanks or trucks or something else.
We are also developing software to ``stitch together'' information
from a variety of sensors (e.g., moving target indicator radar,
synthetic aperture radar, optical, video, and acoustic sensors), and
then cue the sensors to obtain more information. For example, changes
detected by radar could cue LADAR sensors to watch a new arrival.
Conversely, if a Predator operator lost track of a target because it
entered a forest, radar could be cued to search for the vehicle. All in
all, we are taking a very comprehensive approach to finding,
identifying, tracking and destroying targets.
Let me give you some specific examples of what we are doing:
DARPA's Airborne Video Surveillance program succeeded in matching
frames from unmanned air vehicle (UAV) video to geospatial reference
imagery provided by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency with
targeting accuracies of 7-10 meters. This automatic linking of UAV
video to existing maps is a dramatic and low-cost improvement that will
greatly improve the operational flexibility of coordinate-seeking
weapons such as Joint Direct Attack Munition, Joint Standoff Weapon,
and modern Army artillery. Our current Video Verification and
Identification program is building on the success of this work.
Under our Advanced Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
(ISR) Management program, DARPA developed a tool for planning,
scheduling, and tasking U.S. intelligence collection and surveillance
platforms. The tool can perform dynamic replanning as the battlespace
situation changes. Its effectiveness was verified in recent Air Force
exercises and it is now included in the Collection Management Mission
Applications--the system for collection management used by ISR planners
and managers.
DARPA's Knowledge-Aided Sensor Signal Processing and Expert
Reasoning (KASSPER) program uses topography, terrain features, road
networks, and synthetic aperture radar imagery to greatly reduce false
alarms and improve the detection of low-speed targets. With KASSPER,
false alarms have been reduced by a factor of 100 even in the presence
of highly irregular background clutter and we can detect objects moving
only half as slowly as we could before. Technologies from KASSPER will
start to transition to the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar
System (STARS) this year.
Robust, Secure Self-Forming Tactical Networks
The DOD is in the middle of a transformation to what is often
termed ``Network-Centric Operations.'' In simplest terms, the promise
of network-centric operations is to turn information superiority into
combat power so that the U.S. and its allies have better information
and can plan and conduct operations far more quickly and effectively
than any adversary.
At the core of this concept are networks--networks that must be as
reliable, available, and survivable as the weapons platforms they
connect. They must distribute huge amounts of data quickly and
precisely across a wide area. They must form themselves without using
or building a fixed infrastructure. They must withstand attempts by
adversaries to destroy, disrupt, or listen in on them. These challenges
must be met, as networks are becoming at least as important as our
weapons platforms. So, our challenge here is, ``How can we build the
robust communication networks needed for network-centric warfare?''
DARPA is working to ensure that U.S. forces will have secure,
assured, high-data-rate, multisubscriber, multipurpose (e.g., maneuver,
logistics, intelligence) networks for future forces. This means
conducting research in areas that include mobile ad hoc self-forming
networks; information assurance and security; spectrum management; and
anti-jam and low probability of detection/intercept communications.
For example, our Networking in Extreme Environments program is
working to create ultra wideband wireless networks for robust and
efficient military communications and sensing. Ultra wideband devices
should be capable of automatically forming hard-to-detect
communications and sensor networks in areas where traditional
technologies do not perform well, such as in urban or other cluttered,
harsh environments. So far, the program has gained a thorough
understanding about how ultra wideband systems interact with current
radio systems, one key to determining the ultimate value of ultra
wideband.
In the area of information assurance, the threat to military
networks from computer worms that have never been seen before, and that
exploit previously unknown network vulnerabilities (``zero-day worms'')
has exceeded current network defense capabilities to mount an adequate
defense. DARPA's Dynamic Quarantine of Worms program will develop an
integrated system of detection and response devices to quarantine zero-
day worms and stop them from spreading before other parts of the
network are protected.
Other DARPA-developed network security tools proved to be very
effective at the 2004 Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstration, a
virtual military exercise conducted each year by the Office of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These tools were able to provide
protection and help network administrators clean up the network after
an accidental security incident. Lessons from these exercises help
provide information on which network security technologies the DOD
should procure. More generally, technology from our Network Modeling
and Simulation program has been adopted by a number of other agencies
throughout the DOD, such as Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command,
Joint Forces Command, and the Defense Information Systems Agency to do
a better job of designing communication networks.
An example of what we are doing in the areas of networks for our
forces deployed in Iraq today is the Marine Airborne Retransmission
System (MARTS) program. The Marine Corps has an urgent need to securely
extend the range of tactical radios in its area of operations. MARTS
does this by using a tactically transportable aerostat system, which
retransmits through antennas aloft and uses fiberoptics to connect to
the ground station radios. An aerostat tethered at 3,000 feet altitude
can retransmit a radio signal over an area approximately 160 miles in
diameter. The aerostat underwent its first test flight the first week
in February, and the first system will be deployed with the Marine
Corps in Iraq very soon.
Networked Manned and Unmanned Systems
Fully autonomous unmanned platforms offer great promise as
warfighting platforms integrated with other elements of our Joint
Forces. DARPA is working with the Services toward a vision of filling
the battlespace with unmanned systems networked with manned systems.
The idea is not simply to replace people with machines, but to team
people with autonomous platforms to create a more capable, agile, and
cost-effective force that also lowers the risk of U.S. casualties. The
challenge here is, ``How can we combine manned and unmanned systems to
create entirely new types of capabilities?''
Over the last several years, the Services have come to appreciate
that combining unmanned with manned systems can enable new combat
capabilities or new ways to perform hazardous missions. Improved
processors and software are achieving the dramatic increases in on-
board processing needed for unmanned systems to handle ever more
complex missions in ever more complicated environments. Networking
these vehicles in combat will improve our knowledge of the battlespace,
targeting speed and accuracy, the survivability of the network of
vehicles, and mission flexibility. A network of collaborating systems
will be far more capable than the sum of its individual components.
DARPA is working on a variety of unmanned vehicles for both the air
and the ground, ones suited to a variety of missions and levels of
environmental complexity. Our A-160 program is working towards an
unmanned helicopter for ISR missions, with as much as 32 hours
endurance at 15,000 feet. So far, A-160 vehicles have made 28 flights,
carried up to 500 pounds, traveled at over 135 knots, and stayed aloft
for over 7 hours. A number of other vehicles are part of our support to
the Army's Future Combat Systems program. These include the Micro Air
Vehicle, which is a backpackable ISR system for dismounted soldiers,
the Unmanned Ground Combat Vehicle for fire support, and several other
platforms for ISR and tactical strike. Our Netfires program, a fully
networked containerized missile system, has transitioned to an Army
development program for fielding as early as 2008.
A prominent program here has been Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems
(J-UCAS), which the Office of the Secretary of Defense asked DARPA to
manage in fiscal year 2005. J-UCAS is a joint Air Force and Navy
program to accelerate the development of networked unmanned combat air
vehicles for suppressing enemy air defenses, providing precision strike
and persistent surveillance. The program builds on DARPA's earlier work
on unmanned combat air vehicles. The program will develop new air
vehicles, but the key to J-UCAS will be its Common Operating System
(COS), which will manage its network services and other system
resources (e.g., sensors, weapons, and communication links). The
combination of the air vehicles, control stations, and the COS, in
conjunction with other manned and unmanned systems, will create an
entirely new and powerful global strike capabilities.
In the last year we have made solid progress in J-UCAS, including
several ``firsts.'' A demonstrator vehicle successfully delivered an
inert Global Positioning System (GPS)-guided smart bomb from 35,000
feet at 440 miles per hour; the weapon precisely hit the target.
Control of a vehicle was handed off to a control station 900 miles
away--and back again--while the vehicle was beyond-line-of-sight.
Various features required to operate on a carrier deck were
demonstrated. Perhaps most importantly, two demonstrator vehicles flew
together as a single team controlled by only one operator on the
ground.
In fiscal year 2006, management and funding for the program will
move to the Air Force.
In another ``first,'' DARPA held its first Grand Challenge in March
2004. DARPA is using the special prize authority authorized by Congress
to recognize outstanding achievements in basic, advanced, and applied
research, technology development, and prototype development that have
the potential for application to the performance of the military
missions of the DOD. The concept is similar to the prize awarded to
Charles Lindbergh for his solo flight across the Atlantic Ocean that
then spurred Americans toward innovation and development in aviation.
DARPA's first use of the prize authority is to accelerate
technology development in autonomous ground vehicles. DARPA offered a
$1 million prize to anyone that could develop an autonomous, unmanned
ground vehicle that could travel approximately 150 miles in under 10
hours across desert roads and trails between Barstow, California, and
Primm, Nevada. The vehicles had to be truly autonomous, and only two
commands were allowed--start and stop. The teams would not know the
route beforehand--in fact, they received the route navigation points
just 2 hours before the start signal.
DARPA designed this grand challenge to spur innovation in a very
difficult technical area so as to help DOD meet the congressional goal
that one-third of the Armed Forces' operational ground combat vehicles
be unmanned by 2015. The autonomous vehicles would remove our men and
women from harm's way by letting the autonomous vehicles take over
dangerous combat support missions, such as that faced by our supply
convoys in Iraq today.
The Grand Challenge for autonomous ground vehicles serves an
important part of our overall technical strategy. For years DARPA
funded programs to develop the technologies necessary for a truly
autonomous ground vehicle, and, still today, there are programs
underway at DARPA. While there is measurable technical progress in each
of these programs, the progress has not been quick enough on the
ability to develop an autonomous vehicle that could navigate a long
route, avoid obstacles, and do it with an average speed that is
tactically useful to the Joint Forces.
This is where the Grand Challenge helps--to win the prize, teams
competing in the Grand Challenge must develop vehicles that can
successfully travel tactically relevant distances and speeds. This is a
truly daunting technical goal, but not too daunting that no one was
interested in trying to win the prize, and a place in the history
books.
One hundred and six entrants filed applications to compete, and,
through a series of selection processes, 15 teams were selected as
having vehicles safe and capable enough to attempt the route for the
prize.
Here's what Scientific American \1\ reported about the March 13
event:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Scientific American 291, 6, p. 6 (December 2004)
Of the 15 vehicles that started the Grand Challenge . . . not
one completed the 227 kilometer course. One crashed into a
fence, another went into reverse after encountering some
sagebrush, and some moved not an inch. The best performer, the
Carnegie Mellon entry, got 12 kilometers before taking a
hairpin turn a little too fast. The $1-million prize went
unclaimed. In short, the race was a resounding success. The
task that the Pentagon's most forward-thinking research branch
. . . set out was breathtakingly demanding. Most bots can
barely get across a lab floor, but DARPA wanted them to
navigate an off-road trail at high speed with complete
autonomy. The agency had expected maybe half a dozen teams, but
more than 100, ranging from high school students to veteran
roboticists, gave it a try. The race . . . has concentrated the
minds of researchers, blown open the technological envelope and
trained a whole generation of roboticists. They will be out
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
there again next October.
All across the Nation, from garages to high schools, from
universities to corporate laboratories, hundreds--perhaps thousands--of
people worked on solving a problem important to the DOD. We had hoped
that the Grand Challenge would excite many people, but it grew into
something much, much bigger than anyone had imagined. The
congressionally-authorized prize authority inspired many smart people
who would not ordinarily work on a problem important to the DOD,
dedicating long days, nights and weekends toward finding a solution.
The Grand Challenge yielded more benefit for the DOD than the
technology developed for the vehicles, or the distance the vehicles
traveled.
DARPA will run the Grand Challenge again on October 8, 2005. The
end goal remains the same: build an autonomous ground vehicle that can
travel the fastest across approximately 150 miles of tough desert roads
and trails in under 10 hours--but the prize will be $2 million. As of
this date, 195 teams have applied to compete in the Grand Challenge
from 37 States and three foreign countries. Thirty-five teams are
university-based, and three are from high schools. Eventually, we will
invite 40 teams to a national qualification event, from which 20 teams
will be selected to compete.
Urban Area Operations
Our newest strategic thrust, announced last March, is urban area
operations. Like many in the DOD, we have been concerned about the
challenges of urban warfare and have been studying the issue. The
conflict in Iraq precipitated this strategic thrust and continues to
shape it. We held a major solicitation on this topic last year, and the
overall thrust continues to take form. Because this is our newest
thrust and one that is directly grappling with some of the problems
uppermost on everyone's mind, it merits discussing at some length.
Each year the world's urban areas increase in population and area.
By 2025, nearly 60 percent of the world's population will live in
cities. Our adversaries know that if they present a fixed target on the
open battlefield, or even a mobile target on the open battlefield, we
will find it and destroy it. So more and more they will choose to
resist us in cities. These basic facts suggest that our forces must be
increasingly prepared to operate in urban areas.
It is worth considering what makes operating in cities distinctive.
A city's geometry and demography are very different than the
traditional battlefields of open- or semi-open terrain so effectively
dominated by U.S. forces today. Cities have buildings and tunnels and a
complex three-dimensional terrain with many places to hide and
maneuver. Think of mountain ranges or other rugged terrain, but with a
much finer structure--one scaled to cities because they are manmade
environments. Cities are densely packed with people and their property.
This has several consequences. Vehicles, weapons, and tactics that
work effectively in open--even rugged--natural terrain, often work far
less well in the confines of a city. Our current surveillance and
reconnaissance systems simply cannot provide enough information of the
type needed to understand what's really going on throughout a city. In
most cases of urban warfare, standoff attack will not be sufficient,
and close combat tends to be chaotic with many casualties.
In cities, uniformed adversaries and their equipment are mixed in
among the civilian population, equipment and infrastructure. Insurgents
are not just mixed in--they blend in. Operations in cities, perhaps
more than in other settings, will be strongly constrained by political
considerations. Achieving our political goals will usually not be a
simple matter of capturing territory or reducing something to rubble.
The fighting in Najaf last summer is a good example of this reality.
In short, the advantages U.S. forces enjoy on traditional
battlefields are drastically reduced in cities. This is why our
adversaries will be temped to fight us or resist us there; it is a
logical response on their part. By drawing us into cities, our
adversaries hope to limit our advantages, draw more of our troops into
combat, inflict greater U.S. casualties, and, perhaps equally
important, undermine our ultimate political goals by causing the U.S.
to make more mistakes that harm civilians and neutrals.
The proof of this is in Iraq: the power, pace, and precision of our
forces quickly demolished the Iraqi armed forces on the traditional
battlefield. The current insurgency is not fighting the same way.
So our challenge is this: ``How can we operate as effectively in
the cities as we do on traditional battlefields, and what are the new
tools we need?'' We chose the word ``operate'' carefully: this cannot
just be about traditional force-on-force urban combat, as important as
that problem is. We also need to improve our stability and security
operations after major combat is over. Just as the tools for combat on
the traditional battlefield may not be well-suited to urban combat, the
tools for urban combat may not necessarily be well-suited for stability
operations. We need better tools across this entire spectrum of
operations.
In general, we need far better and different information and
coverage from our surveillance systems and sensors, more precision and
options in our maneuvers and command and control, and much finer
control over the force we apply. Ideally, we would then know much more
about what's going on in a city, we could easily discern friend from
foe, we could move around quickly--even using the vertical dimension to
our advantage--and, when we needed, we could apply well-calibrated
lethal or non-lethal force with great precision.
Let me talk in a little more detail about our vision for this
thrust and describe some of the things we are working on and would like
to expand.
One critical key to improved urban operations will be persistent,
staring reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA)
systems that vastly improve what we know about what's going on
throughout a city in all three dimensions and over time. We need
persistent staring RSTA systems that are as well tailored to cities as
our current RSTA systems are to the traditional battlefield. If you are
on an open plain you can see what is going on miles away, but in a
city, you may not know what's going on a block away. We have to change
that.
We need a network, or web, of sensors to better map a city and the
activities in it, including inside buildings, to sort adversaries and
their equipment from civilians and their equipment, including in
crowds, and to spot snipers, suicide bombers, or improvised explosive
devices (IEDs). We need to watch a great variety of things, activities,
and people over a wide area and have great resolution available when we
need it. This is not just a matter of more and better sensors, but just
as important, the systems needed to make actionable intelligence out of
all the data. Closely related to this are tagging, tracking, and
locating (TT&L) systems that help us watch and track a particular
person or object of interest. These systems will also help us detect
the clandestine production or possession of weapon of mass destruction
in overseas urban areas.
There was a recent incident in Iraq where one of our UAVs spotted
some insurgents firing a mortar. Then the insurgents climbed back into
their car and drove away. The good news was that the UAV was able to
track the car so U.S. helicopters could go after it and destroy it. The
bad news was that, at one point, some of the passengers got out. Then
we had to decide whether to follow those individuals or the car because
we simply did not have enough coverage available. If we had other
sensors available, we would have had a better chance of getting all of
those insurgents.
If we could quickly track-back where a vehicle came from, it would
greatly help us deal with suicide car bombers. It is difficult, if not
impossible, to deter the bombers themselves, just as you cannot deter a
missile that has already been launched. But, one key to deterrence that
has been missing is reliable attribution, or a ``return address.'' If
we knew where the car came from, using, for example, RSTA systems that
allowed us to quickly trace the car carrying the explosives back to the
house or shop it came from, we could then attack that place and those
people.
Once people realize that whoever helps launch a suicide attack will
themselves be targeted (and since it's unlikely that everyone in a
suicide bombing organization has a suicide wish) we would start to
deter attacks. At a minimum, we would destroy more of the people and
infrastructure behind the attacks, and make subsequent attacks more
difficult. We are pursuing this sort of capability with our Combat
Zones That See program.
Now, consider a U.S. team raiding a house looking for insurgents.
This team has probably never been to the house before, and perhaps has
never even been to the immediate neighborhood. In an unfamiliar place
with many similar buildings, it's easy to become confused and break
into the wrong place, even with GPS. Breaking into the wrong building
has two effects: the enemies get away, and, at a minimum, you probably
just made some new enemies.
Instead, imagine that the team could prepare for the raid using
clear, three-dimensional images of the actual neighborhood and the
specific building that had been collected in advance. The team could
use those images to practice and ``see'' their entire trip to the
building before they actually start out on their mission so they'd be
far more likely to enter the right building. Our Urbanscape program is
working on the technologies to do this.
Another typical urban mission could require a U.S. team to pursue
adversaries inside a multistory building. Currently, the defenders
inside the building have a major advantage in knowing the interior
layout. If we had technology that would allow our team to quickly map
the inside of the building and, perhaps, even tell them where the bad
guys are, this would go a long way to improving the team's
effectiveness and safety. Our Building Structure and Activity
Assessment program is developing this capability.
Thinking more broadly than RSTA, we are also interested in how to
improve our intelligence on general social, political, and economic
conditions. In particular, it would help to have tools to predict the
onset of a rebellion or, failing that, help us understand more clearly
the likely or possible responses to our actions, i.e., tools to wargame
our stability operations.
Another major focus of the urban area operations thrust is Command
and Control for Urban Warfighting, aimed at developing command and
control systems and intelligence analysis tools specifically suited for
urban operations. The goal is collaborative systems that allow our
warfighters to see and understand what is happening throughout an urban
area and then direct their actions in real time. RSTA and TT&L will
give us much better information, but we must then use that information
to direct what we are doing in a precise way, perhaps reaching down as
far as the individual soldier.
Our Command Post of the Future (CPOF) technology, being used today
by the Army in Iraq, is an early indication of what we are striving
for. CPOF is a distributed command and control system that creates a
virtual command post. With CPOF, command and control centers could be
wherever the commanders are, without regard to a fixed geographic
location. The Army is using CPOF because it gives them more flexibility
and insight and allows them to share information and respond more
quickly. By studying the steps usually taken after specific types of
events, DARPA is working with the Army to enhance CPOF to automatically
alert people to take those steps whenever another such events happens,
which would allow our warfighters to respond faster. Major General Pete
Chiarelli, Commander of the 1st Calvary Division in Iraq, has told us,
``CPOF is saving lives.''
This thrust also embodies our work in Asymmetric Warfare
Countermeasures, including those devoted to countering the threat of
IEDs. The IED problem is very difficult, and we are actively pursuing
and continuing to search for ideas to detect or disable IEDs. In fact,
the IED problem has been central in shaping our thinking about urban
operations generally. We have seen the great difficulty we've had with
even costly partial solutions to the IED problem, ones which, in many
cases, the insurgents are able to quickly work-around. Our discussions
with Commandant Hagee of the Marine Corps reinforced our belief that
the key to limiting IEDs will be identifying their source; this is one
of the reasons for our strong emphasis on RSTA in this thrust.
Finding ``sources'' is also the key behind DARPA's low-cost
Boomerang shooter detection and location system, which we continue to
improve based on results from the 50 units deployed so far in Iraq.
When you are traveling in a convoy it's difficult to know if you are
being shot at because of road noise. With Boomerang, people in the
convoy can tell if they are being shot at and where the shots are
coming from, so they can defend themselves more effectively.
We are also exploring ways to thwart rocket-propelled grenade (RPG)
attacks. We are transitioning an advanced, lightweight bar armor to the
Marine Corps to protect High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles
(HMMWVs) and trucks. We are testing novel, high-strength nets to stop
RPGs and mortars. Our Iron Curtain project will develop and test a
system to destroy RPGs and missiles by shooting them down with bullets
before they can strike a vehicle.
Another facet of the urban operations thrust is modeling and
simulation tools, which we believe will be particularly helpful for
improving training. For example, we have leveraged multi-player
computer game technology to help train units going to Iraq on better
ways to avoid being ambushed. After a few times through the simulation,
and after having ``died'' a few times, the lessons on what to watch for
and how to react tend to stick in the warfighters' minds. We have
married speech recognition technology with video game techniques to
create a Tactical Iraqi Language Tutor that quickly teaches everyone,
not just linguists, the Arabic needed to get basic ``Who? What? and
Where?'' information, while getting along with the locals by conducting
a civil affairs mission in a PC virtual world. Our troops are even
taught the physical gestures and social conventions needed to help
establish trust.
With these and other technologies, our strategic thrust in urban
area operations promises to make major contributions to our military
capabilities.
Detection, Characterization, and Assessment of Underground Structures
Our adversaries are well aware of the U.S. military's sophisticated
ISR assets and the global reach of our strike capabilities. In
response, they have been building deeply buried underground facilities
to hide various activities and protect them from attack.
These facilities can vary from the clever use of caves to complex
and carefully engineered bunkers in both rural and urban environments.
They are used for a variety of purposes, including protecting
leadership, command and control, hiding artillery and ballistic
missiles launchers, and producing and storing weapons of mass
destruction.
Our challenge here is, ``How can we find out what is going on
inside deeply buried structures?'' To provide answers, DARPA is
developing ground and airborne sensor systems with two-orders-of-
magnitude improvement in sensor performance, combined with advanced
signal processing for clutter rejection in complex environments.
For example, our Low Altitude Airborne Sensor System (LAASS)
program should show that sensor payloads on a wide range of air
vehicles could dramatically increase search rates and our detailed
characterizations of underground facilities. LAASS will be the first
sensor system to reveal the connections among underground facilities
that were not seen during their construction, and it will be able to
distinguish active facilities from those that are abandoned. This will
allow prioritization of attacks, as well as allow us to find buried,
but inert, targets such as escape tunnels and weapons caches.
Assured Use of Space
The national security community uses space systems to provide
weather data, warning, intelligence, communications, and navigation.
These satellite systems provide our national security community with
great advantages over potential adversaries. American society as a
whole also uses space systems for many similar purposes, making them an
integral part of the U.S. economy and way of life.
These advantages--and the dependencies that come with them--have
not gone unnoticed, and there is no reason to believe they will remain
unchallenged forever.
In fiscal year 2001, DARPA began an aggressive effort to ensure
that the U.S. military retains its preeminence in space by maintaining
unhindered U.S. access to space and protecting U.S. space assets from
attack.
There are five elements in DARPA's space strategic thrust:
Access and Infrastructure: technology to provide
rapid, affordable access to space and efficient on-orbit
operations;
Situational Awareness: the means for knowing what else
is in space and what that ``something else'' is doing;
Space Mission Protection: methods for protecting U.S.
space assets from harm;
Space Mission Denial: technologies that will prevent
our adversaries from using space to harm the U.S. or its
allies; and
Space-Based Engagement: reconnaissance, surveillance,
communications, and navigation to support military operations
down on Earth--extending what the U.S. does so well today.
In our access and infrastructure activities, the Falcon program is
designed to vastly improve the U.S. capability to reach orbit or almost
anywhere on the globe promptly from bases in the continental U.S. This
will improve the military's ability to quickly position ISR payloads,
while reducing its reliance on forward and foreign basing. This year,
the Falcon program will launch the first of a series of new, low-cost,
small launch systems to deliver new hypersonic test vehicles to near-
space. By 2008, Falcon will have conducted flight tests of two
generations of hypersonic test vehicles, using them to assess designs,
components, and materials for reusable hypersonic cruise vehicles that
could revolutionize space access and near-space transportation.
The Space Surveillance Telescope program will enhance our space
situational awareness by developing a large-aperture optical telescope
with very wide field of view using curved focal plane array technology
to detect and track very faint objects in deep space. This past year
the program successfully demonstrated a subscale telescope sensor
composed of a mosaic of curved focal plane arrays, a key technology
milestone for the program.
The U.S. national security community and American society depend on
communications satellites. We must be prepared for adversaries that
might try to deny us their use by jamming them. Under Space Mission
Protection, the Novel Satellite Communications program is aimed at
keeping our communication satellite systems secure. Last year, DARPA
successfully demonstrated a new approach to dramatically improve our
satellites' protection against jamming. This year we are developing the
technology to fully exploit this new technique; a real-time
demonstration of the Novel Satellite Communications technologies is
planned for 2008.
In space-based engagement, the Innovative Space Based Radar Antenna
Technology (ISAT) program is developing large, revolutionary radar
antennas to provide continuous tactical-grade tracking of moving ground
targets or airborne targets, such as cruise missiles. These antennas
would be extremely lightweight and, when stowed for launch, would be
about the size of a sport utility vehicle. Once on-orbit, such antennas
would unfold to a structure that could be, in the fully operational
version, the length of the Empire State Building. This past year DARPA
successfully built and deployed a single section of the antenna on the
ground, and we successfully demonstrated techniques that would measure
the position and shape of the antenna to within one millimeter on-
orbit. Multiple sections of the antenna will be built this next year,
combined, and deployed and tested in a thermal vacuum chamber that
simulates the space environment. The ISAT space-based demonstration of
a one-third-scale antenna is planned for 2010.
Cognitive Computing
Many elements of the information technology revolution that have
vastly improved the effectiveness of the U.S. forces and transformed
American society (e.g., time-sharing, personal computers, and the
Internet) were given their impetus by J.C.R. Licklider, a visionary
scientist at DARPA some 40 years ago. Licklider's vision was of people
and computers working symbiotically. He envisioned computers seamlessly
adapting to people as partners that would handle routine information
processing tasks, thus freeing the people to focus on what they do
best--think analytically and creatively--and greatly extend their
cognitive powers. As we move to an increasingly network-centric
military, the vision of intelligent, cooperative computing systems
responsible for their own maintenance is more relevant than ever.
Despite the enormous progress in information technology over the
years, information technology still falls well short of Licklider's
vision. While computing systems are critical to U.S. national defense,
they remain exceedingly complex, expensive to create, insecure,
frequently incompatible, and prone to failure. They still require the
user to adapt to them, rather than the other way around. Computers have
grown ever faster, but they remain fundamentally unintelligent and
difficult to use. Something dramatically different is needed.
In response, DARPA is revisiting Licklider's vision as its
inspiration for the strategic thrust, ``Cognitive Computing.''
Cognitive computers can be thought of as systems that know what they're
doing. Cognitive computing systems ``reason'' about their environments
(including other systems), their goals, and their own capabilities.
They will ``learn'' both from experience and by being taught. They will
be capable of natural interactions with users, and will be able to
``explain'' their reasoning in natural terms. They will be robust in
the face of surprises and avoid the brittleness and fragility of expert
systems.
As an example of how we are working to get the computers to adapt
to people--instead of the other way around--our Improving Warfighter
Information Intake Under Stress program is designing next-generation
Tomahawk missile battlestations that will monitor the weapon operator's
cognitive state. The battlestation will then adapt how the battlespace
information is presented to operators so that it enhances their ability
to make critical strategic and/or tactical time-sensitive targeting
decisions.
Bio-Revolution
Over the last decade and more, the U.S. has made an enormous
investment in the life sciences. DARPA's ``Bio-Revolution'' thrust
seeks to answer the question, ``How can we use the burgeoning knowledge
from the life sciences to help the warfighter?''
DARPA's Bio-Revolution thrust has four broad elements:
Protecting Human Assets from biological warfare
includes sensors to detect an attack, technologies to protect
people in buildings, vaccines to prevent infection, therapies
to treat those exposed, and decontamination technologies to
recover the use of an area.
Enhancing System Performance refers to creating new
man-made systems with the autonomy and adaptability of living
things by developing technology inspired by living systems.
Maintaining Human Combat Performance is aimed at
improving the warfighter's ability to maintain peak physical
and cognitive performance once deployed, despite extreme
battlefield stresses such as heat and altitude, prolonged
physical exertion, sleep deprivation, and a lack of sufficient
calories and nutrients.
Tools are the variety of techniques and insights on
which the other three areas rest.
Let me give you some examples of our work.
DARPA is conducting important work in our Human Assisted Neural
Devices and Revolutionizing Prosthetics programs. Our vision is simple
but bold: to dramatically improve the quality of life for amputees by
developing limb prostheses that are fully and naturally functional and
neurologically controlled limb replacements that have normal sensory
abilities. The goal is for amputees to return to a normal life, with no
limits whatsoever, with artificial limbs that work as well as the ones
they have lost.
Our vision includes not only regaining fine motor control, such as
the ability to type on a keyboard or play a musical instrument, but
also the ability to sense an artificial limb's position without looking
at it, and to actually ``feel'' precisely what the artificial limb is
touching. To do this, DARPA's work in materials, sensors, power
systems, and actuators will be integrated to develop a highly advanced,
multiple degree-of-freedom, lightweight mechanical limb.
Our ultimate goal is to gain full, natural, neural control of this
advanced prosthetic limb--durable, lifelike, and complete with sensory
feedback. On the way towards this vision, we will create prosthetic
arms that are vast improvements over the current state-of-the-art and
technologies that will be directly applicable to advanced prosthetics
for the lower extremities. DARPA is working closely with the Department
of Veterans Affairs to make this a reality.
DARPA's Handheld Isothermal Silver Standard Sensor program is
working toward providing our warfighters with a lightweight, handheld
detector capable of sensing the full spectrum of biological threats:
bacteria, viruses, and toxins. In a laboratory test last year, this
sensor achieved nearly perfect detection performance, while minimizing
the false alarms that plague today's sensor technologies.
Our Immune Building Program is focused on protecting the occupants
of buildings from the release of chemical or biological agents directly
inside or very nearby and dealing with the consequences of the attack.
The first fully functional Immune Building is scheduled for completion
in 2006 at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. A portable version of DARPA's
chlorine dioxide gas decontamination technology is being developed for
use by the DOD, the Department of Homeland Security, and the
Environmental Protection Agency.
The Powerswim program is using the highly efficient way sea animals
swim to design a new swimming device. Ordinary swim fins push through
the water, like oars push a boat, and are about 10 percent efficient.
The Powerswim program is developing a device that uses fin lift for
propulsion--it basically ``flies'' through the water--with an
efficiency of 80 percent. This could double the speed and range of U.S.
Navy SEALs, allowing them to arrive on-shore much faster and much less
fatigued. In another maritime example of using biology, we are looking
at fuel cells that could produce electric power from plankton and ocean
bacteria to power sensors and surveillance systems on the ocean floor
for many years.
DARPA's Soldier Self-Care program is developing a highly effective
novel pain medication that neutralizes the chemical trigger for pain
before it can stimulate the nerves. Progress has been so substantial
that we have funded a clinical trial at Walter Reed Army Medical Center
in late 2005 to reduce the incredible pain of soldiers following
amputation or severe limb trauma whose pain cannot be effectively
treated with current medications. If successful, it will be a major
step towards obtaining Food and Drug Administration approval of this
medication for treating acute pain on the battlefield.
darpa's core technology foundations
While DARPA's eight strategic thrusts are strongly driven by
national security threats and opportunities, a major portion of DARPA's
research emphasizes areas largely independently of current strategic
circumstances. These core technology foundations are the investments in
fundamentally new technologies, particularly at the component level,
that historically have been the technological feedstocks enabling
quantum leaps in U.S. military capabilities. DARPA is sponsoring
research in materials, microsystems, information technology, and other
technologies that may have far-reaching military consequences.
Materials
The importance of materials technology to Defense systems is easy
to underestimate: many fundamental changes in warfighting capabilities
have sprung from new or improved materials. The breadth of this impact
is large, ranging from stealth technology to information technology.
In keeping with this kind of impact, DARPA maintains a robust and
evolving materials program to push new materials opportunities and
discoveries that might change way the military operates.
DARPA's current work in materials includes the following areas:
Structural Materials and Components--low-cost and
ultra-lightweight, designed for structures and to accomplish
multiple performance objectives in a single system;
Functional Materials--advanced materials for non-
structural applications such as electronics, photonics,
magnetics, and sensors;
Smart Materials and Structures--materials that can
sense and respond to their environment; and
Power and Water--materials for generating and storing
electric power, for purifying air or water, and harvesting
water from the environment.
We have been working on ``multifunctional materials''--materials
that combine structure with other functions, such as batteries that can
bear loads. DARPA's WASP micro air vehicle uses these structural
batteries to combine its power supply with its wings, allowing this
small (less than 200 gram, 12-inch wingspan) micro air vehicle to fly
for 1 hour with the current sensor suite, almost three times longer
than other, comparably equipped vehicles of similar size. (With a
reduced payload, WASP has flown for nearly 2 hours.) WASP is being
evaluated by the U.S. Marine Corps and the Nimitz Strike Group as a
surveillance asset.
DARPA's rapid reaction program in advanced armor materials is
developing an updated version of the Vietnam-era ``gun truck'' to
protect our convoys in Iraq. The gun trucks are a standard military 5-
ton Army or Marine truck with an armored gun box in place of the cargo
container. Thirty prototype gun box kits were recently sent to U.S.
forces in Iraq and Kuwait, and preliminary reports from the theater
indicate that the gun trucks provide our troops and convoys with
protection and comfortable and comparatively spacious operating
quarters.
We are also working to develop significantly improved armor
materials for these trucks. One DARPA program is pursuing a lightweight
composite armor that uses the same steel wire reinforcement found in
steel-belted radial tires, and embeds these wires in a polymer matrix.
If successful, this novel material could be a moldable, low-cost,
easily manufactured, lower-weight alternative to conventional steel
armor, while providing the same or greater protection to our
warfighters. Initial ballistic tests on these new materials are very
promising.
In collaboration with the Navy, we are exploring DARPA advanced
material technology to establish the feasibility of a passively cooled
jet blast deflector for CVN 21, which could also be retrofit to the
existing fleet. This system would be 50 percent lighter by eliminating
noisy and heavy hydraulics and water-cooling systems associated with
conventional jet blast deflectors, while freeing up space and power for
other equipment.
Our DARPA Titanium Initiative aims to completely revolutionize the
way titanium is extracted from the ore and fabricated into product
forms of interest to the DOD. The goal of the program is to achieve
substantially reduced cost (less than four dollars per pound) and
increased availability of large volumes of titanium. Our intention is
to achieve a revolution similar to that in aluminum, which was
transformed from a precious metal to a commodity at the turn of the
20th century. The program is on-track to develop processes that will
meet all the DOD requirements for aerospace and other applications.
Microsystems
Microelectronics, photonics, and microelectromechanical systems
(MEMS) are three key technologies for the U.S. military, enabling it to
see farther, with greater clarity, and communicate information in a
secure, reliable, and timely manner.
DARPA is shrinking ever-more-complex systems and enabling new
capabilities into chip-scale packages, integrating microelectronics,
photonics, and MEMS into ``systems-on-a-chip.'' It is at the
intersection of these three core hardware technologies of the
information age that some of the greatest challenges and opportunities
for the DOD arise.
The future lies in increasing the integration among a variety of
technologies to create still-morecomplex capabilities. DARPA envisions
intelligent microsystems for systems with enhanced radio frequency and
optical sensing, more versatile signal processors for extracting
signals in the face of noise and intense enemy jamming, high-
performance communication links with assured bandwidth, and intelligent
chips that allow a user to convert data into actionable information in
near-real-time.
Taken together, these capabilities will create information
superiority by improving how the warfighter collects, processes, and
manages information--ultimately allowing U.S. Forces to think and react
more quickly than the enemy.
An example of the move to integrated microsystems is the 3-D
Integrated Circuits program. Conventional 2-D circuits are limited in
performance by the long signal interconnects across ever larger
circuits and by existing circuit architectures. By moving to three
dimensions, we can shorten the signal paths and introduce additional
functions in each layer of three-dimensional stacked circuits that will
change the way designers can exploit circuit complexity.
Advanced materials are important drivers in developing new,
advanced microsystems. An example is the progress being made in wide
bandgap semiconductor devices for ultraviolet emitters, microwave
sensors, and high power electronics. The ultraviolet emitters are being
integrated into a compact, low-cost, biosensor based on multi-
wavelength fluorescence for a new class of early warning systems being
transitioned to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. The microwave
sensors will extend the performance of future radar, electronic
warfare, and communications systems, and the advanced power electronics
will reduce the size and weight of the power conversion station in
future aircraft carriers or enable tactical electromagnetic weapons.
In the past year, wide bandgap ultraviolet light emitters at 280
and 340 nanometers have been incorporated into a prototype biological
threat early warning system. Initial field data shows it outperforms
the Army's Biological Aerosol Warning System, with a projected 50 times
lower cost. The successful development of a low cost bio-sensor with a
low false alarm rate, a key to fielding any sensor system, will
revolutionize how biological monitoring and defense is performed.
Also over the last year, our work on wide bandgap radio frequency
devices has established new benchmarks for power density from a
microwave transistor, with close to a 30-fold increase over
conventional approaches. This work will enable high performance radio
frequency systems to be deployed on restricted-size platforms, such as
unmanned air vehicles.
Finally, our work on wide bandgap power switching devices able to
stand-off over 10,000 volts has led to the Navy considering, via a
memorandum of agreement between DARPA, the Program Executive Office for
Aircraft Carriers, and the Chief of Naval Research, the insertion of
compact, multi-level signal conversion stations based on this
technology in future aircraft carriers that will reduce the size and
weight of the power substation by a factor of two, while adding
performance.
Information Technology
The DOD is undergoing a transformation to network-centric
operations to turn information superiority into combat power.
Supporting this, DARPA's information technology programs are building
on both traditional and revolutionary computing environments to provide
the kind of secure, robust, efficient, and versatile computing
foundation that our network-centric future requires. We will also
create radical new computing capabilities to make the commander and the
warfighter more effective in the field.
An important part of our work in information technology is machine
language translation. In past years, we have reported how DARPA's one-
way Phraselator is being used in Iraq and Afghanistan. Recently, we
demonstrated the first rudimentary two-way Pashto Phraselator; we are
now working towards making a natural two-way speech translator for
Iraqi Arabic. In addition, U.S. Central Command now uses technology
from two other DARPA human language technology programs to help produce
a variety of intelligence reports. Their analysts do this using our
eTAP-Arabic system, which combines automatic transcription and
automatic translation to convert Arabic newswire and news broadcasts to
English text.
I hope my remarks today have given you a sense of our programs, as
well as a sense of our vision and ambitions, of which I am equally
proud. Thank you for this opportunity to appear today. I would be
pleased to answer any questions you have.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much. I appreciate what you
said about DARPA getting suggestions and ideas from all
sources, although I hope you are not relying on Congress to
provide you any S&T suggestions. We mostly have warriors here
and we need, obviously, those ideas to come from the S&T field.
Let me start out. Since it is just Senator Reed and I here
for right now--we may have other colleagues join us--we will
just go back and forth here. We do have a series of stacked
votes, I am informed, at 11:30. So I want to move rather
quickly to try to make sure we cover as much as possible.
But I would like to start with Dr. Sega and just have a
response from each of you, going down the line. I want to talk
about the overall strategy of our S&T budget and approach. I
would like to ask each of you to briefly identify what you see
as the Department's biggest technology challenge now and, let
us say, in the year 2020. I have heard Senator Roberts say this
before. It is one of these ``what keeps you up at night'' sort
of questions.
Dr. Sega?
Dr. Sega. It is a great question. I think what we have been
doing from a strategic point of view over the last 3\1/2\ years
or so, since I have been there, is to emphasize more in the
longer term, as well as transitioning technology in the shorter
term. The issue of force protection and counterinsurgency
efforts that the technology community can bring to bear
additional solutions is the reason why we stood up the CTTTF on
September 19, 2001. So on a near-term basis, our focus has been
significant in that area, and we have gone through three phases
of development of that activity, one focused on Afghanistan,
another one in OIF, and now force protection and
counterinsurgency.
In the longer term, the enabler for us to advance
technologies is people. So it is the technical talent that one
needs to carry on and provide the discoveries, innovation, and
delivery of technical capability to the warfighter in the out
years. It is the one that I look at being fundamental to
achieving a variety of things in areas, whether it be in chem-
bio, defense-related areas.
By the way, we have a new Director of the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency, Dr. Jim Tegnelia. I wanted you to know that.
I will have Jim raise his hand there.
That is an area that we have emphasized in this budget, for
example, but the two in the near term and the long term are the
ones I just stated.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Dr. Sega.
Dr. Killion.
Dr. Killion. I certainly have to echo in the near term the
issue of force protection as being a real challenge for all of
us in terms of finding technologies to protect our soldiers.
Clearly we are doing that today and are trying to exploit every
advantage we have from the technology base we have developed
from past investments.
For 2020, I would say because we are evolving towards a
force that is more dependent upon the network for all of its
operations, really network science and understanding of the
fundamentals of those networks and how to design them so they
have all the appropriate features that you want, scalability,
robustness, and protection, is a real challenge for us,
particularly for a tactical environment. But part of that,
again, as Ron was saying, depends upon having that workforce
that has the appropriate background, that has the science,
math, and engineering expertise, so that the U.S. maintains its
competitiveness in the S&T fields.
Senator Cornyn. Admiral Cohen.
Admiral Cohen. I will give a slightly broader answer for
today. The reality in research is that you start with 1,000
flowers that develop into 100 projects which evolve into two or
three prototypes to give you one example, the George Foreman
Grill, one profit-maker. In the Department of the Navy--and I
think it is true in the rest of the DOD and possibly in
industry--any good chief executive officer (CEO) or chief
operating officer (COO) would like one flower to result in one
project to result in one prototype and result in one George
Foreman Grill. The Services are to train, recruit, and equip.
We fight today's wars. As you look to the underlying S&T base,
the 1,000 flowers, the science projects, you do not know what
you do not know, and you have to go up a lot of alleys to
figure out which ones are blind. Einstein said, ``If you knew
the answer, it would not be research.''
So the balance between the basic research and the output
function is a very great challenge today, and you see that
reflected in the budget. That is something that I and my
colleagues I know lose sleep over.
In 2020, to continue that thought, if we are to have
sustained, unfettered research which will maintain our
technical and economic--because this is about our economic
engine in the world where ideas are perishable and go across
nations--the facts of life are to support the technological
development and the underlying research with a capable
technological workforce and research force. It is only
Congress, in my opinion--only Congress--that has the fortitude,
division, and the resources to keep these research efforts
going at critical levels.
Thank you.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you.
Mr. Engle.
Mr. Engle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Fundamentally, the warfighter does three things. They have
to find and fix something. They have to communicate what they
found and fixed to someone else, and they have to engage it. We
do a pretty good job on the finding and fixing, and we do a
pretty good job on the engaging. The command and control or the
communications aspect of that is probably the most difficult
technical challenge because the human is probably the best
communicator ever to emerge out of evolution. We like to
communicate. We like to communicate in different ways. We are
rapidly adaptable to new forms of communication, and to keep up
with a prolifery of expanding technology on ways to communicate
makes it very difficult for us to get our arms around the
concept of a global information grid, FORCEnet, or many other
characterizations of our communication and command and control
capability.
I would suggest that our biggest challenge now and over the
long term is to bring technology to bear to enable us to do
that communication more effectively, more rapidly, more
precisely with assurance, and that will continue to be a
challenge for as long as we have humans trying to figure out
new ways to communicate. We are, in fact, investing a large
amount of our resources into that particular piece of those
three fundamental things, and we will probably continue to do
that over the long term.
Thank you, sir.
Senator Cornyn. Dr. Tether.
Dr. Tether. I agree with two of the responses. I think it
is the network. The network is what really bothers me. At
DARPA, we are constantly thinking of what the force of the
future will be. We are now taking our organic capabilities on
platforms such as sensors and weapons and moving them off
board. The Air Force is counting on having situational
awareness piped into every airplane and also having weapons
that can be shot by one airplane and commanded by another. The
Army clearly wants to be strategically mobile and therefore is
fractioning its platforms in order to get them down to smaller
pieces. The Navy is into a littoral situation. We did an
architecture study for the CNO at his request, and again, the
answer is defractionate the weapons and the surveillance. The
Marines are the same way.
But the secret sauce in all of those concepts is the
network. The secret sauce that they all are assuming is going
to be there is that when they pick up that phone, they will get
a dial tone and they will get an answer. When they want to get
that superb situational awareness, it will come to them. If
they want to fire a weapon, that will happen.
These networks are not commercial networks. The problem is
that these are special networks. When these forces move into a
region, we do not have time for the infrastructure to be set
up. We do not have time for people to put up towers. The
network now will become an integral part of our warfighting
capability. It has to form itself as the forces move in. It has
to automatically create itself hands-off. We do not have to
worry about people because people will not be able to do it. It
has to take the nodes, make a network into it, so forth and so
on. It has to figure out what frequencies to go use because
Federal Communications Commissions (FCCs) in the rest of the
world are not the same as ours.
We are putting a lot of money at DARPA into that area
because of that concern. We need to be sure that we have
robust, ad hoc, self-forming networks that are also capable of
withstanding attack because the enemy is going to come after
the network. Why? Because people like me blab about this right
here and they know that the Achilles heel of our future force
is going to be the network, and if they can take the network
down, they have devastated the force. So we have lots of
efforts in trying to prevent that. These efforts, as you might
expect, are classified, but I would be happy to tell you about
them all.
We have efforts on both sides, both on defending networks
and how to take down networks because sometimes that helps you
figure out how to defend networks too. But I think the network
is it and that is the big issue for the future.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much for that.
I guess all we need to do is look back. I think back to
when my dad flew B-17s in World War II and how much our
warfighting capabilities have progressed through the Gulf War
to Operation Enduring Freedom, OIF, and we are able to do
things today that I am sure back then he could not have even
dreamed about, and at the same time, protect civilians from
collateral damage and the like and defeat the bad guys.
The things I hear a number of you mentioning in terms of
the long-term challenges are communications, networks, and a
well-trained workforce. Of course, in the last NDAA, we created
a program to try to make sure that we were able to develop that
workforce in the future by establishing a science, mathematics,
and research for transformation scholarship for service pilot
program. Is that an adequate response, Dr. Sega, Dr. Killion,
or are there other things that we need to be doing?
Dr. Sega. First, we appreciate the legislation in the SMART
program and the pilot program that it has created. We formed a
team across the DOD to set forth how to implement it. We have
sent out the announcement for potential candidates. It closed
out I think last week and there were over 600 folks that
submitted applications for the 20 to 25 slots that will be
available in the pilot program, which was very good.
What we have submitted in the budget is a more expanded
version of SMART, the SMART-NDEA. So we have extended that a
bit and we also are in the process of bringing forward some
legislation to potentially expand some of those authorities.
That should be over to Congress in the very near future.
So I would like to continue to discuss not only the needs
where we see them, but also the mechanisms. The ability to have
a payback feature is a good thing. It does a couple of things
well. One is if you know the student, say, in their
undergraduate program--currently it is 2 years. Maybe we would
like to expand it to their full undergraduate period--that
encourages the student and the scientist/engineer in the
laboratory to build a relationship. It also helps them
understand what they are studying by way of getting hands-on
work potentially through internships and so forth. If you know
you are going to work in a laboratory after graduation, you
tend to do your capstone project in that area. So you are kind
of preparing yourself in the field in which you are going to
work, at least for a while during your payback period. You hit
the ground running. When you come into the defense laboratory,
you build a relationship and some mentors in the laboratory
system and you are tending to do that work versus some other
kind of summer job that you may have during the course of your
undergraduate experience. There is the potential of also
looking at the clearance process somewhere in that time period
in which a student is getting the education.
So we would like to look at expanding upon the SMART
program, but we think it is a great start.
Senator Cornyn. Dr. Killion.
Dr. Killion. I agree with Dr. Sega about this SMART
program, the NDEA concept. We really do need to look at how we
encourage people at those levels in high school and beyond.
I also want to make sure that we remember that we need to
encourage people into the science, math, and engineering
disciplines very early on, and we have a number of programs in
the Army and in the other services where we encourage people to
get engaged very early in the process in grade school, in
middle school. Those are critically important if you are going
to then reap the benefits of that by having people in high
school and in college who are going to be interested in and
able to participate in these kinds of programs.
I really appreciate the support we have gotten,
particularly from this subcommittee, in the past for our e-
cyber mission program in the Army which involves 6th through
9th graders engaging in projects over the Web, and we have
teams that participate every year. That has been growing by
leaps and bounds over the last few years. That is the time to
get people excited.
I was happy to last week participate as a judge for a
science fair here locally, and seeing the 7th and 8th graders
who are interested in S&E, even at that level, that is where
the talent is going to come from in the future. We need to
encourage them and then provide them the opportunities when
they get older to get involved in the national defense
workforce.
Senator Cornyn. I have one other question for Dr. Sega, and
then I will turn the floor over to Senator Reed.
We see that investments made in the 1990s and in previous
decades are now paying off in numerous ways. From your position
as the Department's Chief Technology Officer, as you look
outward to 2015, are there things we should be doing
differently to better plan for the future? In other words, are
we organized to identify future threats and corresponding
capability gaps in a 10- to 20-year time frame?
For example, who was in a position to think about things
like IEDs and some of the current technology challenges we have
today 10 or 15 years in the past? Do we have people thinking
about that? Do we have an organization in place to make sure
that we are anticipating new challenges?
Dr. Sega. What we have continued to improve is the
integration among the services and agencies over the last few
years. We have just recently adjusted our review process to a
comprehensive S&T review in which we not only look at the
quality of programs, which we have done in Technology Area
Review and Assessment (TARA) processes and basic research
reviews, but also to examine those areas that we may find that
as we project forward, that there are gaps.
We also are looking more globally in terms of where S&T is
going. The creation of knowledge is expanding. We can count on
the rate of technology increasing through the 21st century.
That more global look is important in this planning process. I
think the comprehensive S&T review plan is something that we
can go into more detail about at some other time. There are
lots of arrows, but I think we have captured it and we have
done that together with the services and agencies. So that is
an important question and one that we are making some progress
toward.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me thank you
all, gentlemen, for not only your testimony but for your
valuable work for the military and for the United States.
Dr. Sega, everything that has been said today highlights
the critical importance and the critical contribution that your
programs make. Yet, the budget is not keeping up with both the
demands in the world for your products and obviously all the
projects that you are thinking about.
Do we have a plan to get to 3 percent funding in the next
several years?
Dr. Sega. Three percent remains the goal. You are looking
at the advocates of the S&T program within the DOD. As the
Department brings forward the needs and demands from various
sectors, they are weighed, and a balanced investment
recommendation goes forward and becomes, of course, part of the
President's budget request. So we are in a time with a lot of
competing demands and we advocate for a strong S&T program, and
the result is the program as we have laid it out.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
I know there are projects that have not been able to be
funded. Dr. Sega and all you gentlemen, for the record, could
you send in a list of those unfunded top priority projects that
you think are important but just did not make the cut? That
would, I think, be very helpful to us as we make our
considerations going forward.
[The information referred to follows:]
Dr. Sega. The fiscal year 2006 President's budget was developed by
balancing priorities across all functional areas. We believe the
program submitted best represents the Department's priorities based on
available funds.
Dr. Killion. The Army Science and Technology (S&T) program request
in the fiscal year 2006 President's budget is consistent with our S&T
objectives of enhancing the Current Modular Force and enabling the
Future Modular Force. We believe the program submitted best
characterizes the Army's priorities based on available funds.
Admiral Cohen. The Navy has established a mature Future Naval
Capability (FNC) program that integrates science and technology with
the Navy and Marine Corps requirements development process. The FNC
program delivers capability for transition to acquisition programs
every 3-5 years. The number of warfighting requirements gaps exceeds
the funding available to fill them. Additional funds in later 6.2 and
6.3 would be used for a combination of (1) solving additional
warfighting gaps as identified by Navy and Marine Corps requirements
processes, and (2) accelerating Innovative Naval Prototypes like
Electromagnetic Rail-gun, Persistent Littoral Undersea Surveillance and
Sea-Base enablers so that those prototype capabilities are delivered
sooner.
Additional funds in basic research (6.1) or early-applied research
(6.2) would be applied to the Secretary of the Navy's project to detect
and defeat improvised explosive devices at range and speed.
Mr. Engle. See attached.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Dr. Tether. We do not have any unfunded requirements for fiscal
year 2006.
However, Phase III of our High Productivity Computing Systems
Program (HPCS) would require $50 million more than we have programmed
in fiscal year 2007 in order to continue two teams as opposed to only
one. Fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009 have yet to be finalized,
but additional funds would be needed in both years in order to maintain
two teams.
We are soliciting the Department of Energy and the National
Security Agency to provide the additional required funding for the
program to have an additional team since they are major beneficiaries
of the technology.
Dr. Killion, we all recognize that you have done a lot of
work on the IED issue. With respect to remote control IEDs in
Iraq, they are causing a great deal of damage. We have some
jamming devices. There are several products I suspect. But the
question really comes, why are we not fielding them as quickly
as it seems that the field forces need them?
Dr. Killion. That is a question, honestly, somewhat outside
my purview since I handle the S&T piece, but not acquisition.
Senator Reed. Right.
Dr. Killion. I think the Army does have a strategy for the
fielding of such devices. We have worked hard to accelerate the
fielding of such devices. It would be useful to have the
opportunity to come in and lay out for you exactly what the
strategy is and the time lines for fielding of different types,
both the current generation of devices and what we are looking
at for the next generation of capabilities which will provide
enhanced protection.
Senator Reed. Let me just follow up. To be fair, you are
not in the acquisition business, and this is an acquisition
problem. But, I do have a few questions.
One, the technology exists. This is not a situation where
you are looking around for adequate technology. Is that a fair
estimate?
Dr. Killion. There are technologies available that address
a certain range of the control devices that are out there, yes.
Senator Reed. This has been made a high priority for you to
search for the best products and to talk to the acquisition
people and to move this forward. It is high priority?
Dr. Killion. It is a very high priority to me, and in fact,
we have made additional investments in the 2006 budget for
enhanced survivability for both ground and air vehicles.
Senator Reed. Let me raise a question for both you, Dr.
Killion, and Dr. Tether. We have talked about networks. We have
talked about being able to get that dial tone, but somebody has
to be able to say something. A lot of what we will be doing in
the next several decades is in cultures where we do not have
language skills, cultural sensitivity. We could have the best
network in the world, but if we have people who do not know how
to speak the language or do not know how to interpret the signs
and signals of the local community, then all this technology
will help but it will not be decisive.
What are we doing in the realm of DARPA and Army R&D to
accelerate linguistic training, to provide the resources we
need to be effective in these different cultures? Do you want
to go first, Dr. Tether, and then Dr. Killion?
Dr. Tether. DARPA has a major program in language because
that is a major problem. Either we are going to have to teach
our troops 16 different languages or we are going to have to
give them something that does it for them. In fact, in the back
there are a couple displays that show some of those
capabilities.
We have had a major language program for years. In fact, in
Iraq we had a program where we were creating an ``Early Bird,''
an Iraqi Early Bird, where we were taking the previous day's TV
broadcast and newspapers and creating that Early Bird that has
a summary and then the article itself. That proved to be
extraordinarily helpful. The military phase is over and now you
are told to control the country, but you do not know what is
going on around you. That was extraordinarily valuable for
them. It saved a lot of lives. It saved lives in the sense that
there would be incidents in a town 20 miles away that we would
not have heard about for days, as it went through the normal
chain, but this Early Bird allowed us to deploy and save kids'
lives.
Senator Reed. By the way, you have discontinued that I
think----
Dr. Tether. Yes. I know you were on the Internet. The
person who did it just got tired and we are trying to automate
it more and bring it back on line. Actually, it is not
discontinued. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) still has a
version of it that they are still using.
The Phrasealator is an example of a technique, a little
Phrasealator where you speak into it in English and out comes a
phrase in any of eight different languages.
We are now trying to develop a two-way. We are on the verge
of developing a two-way where a person speaks into it in
English, and it comes out in whatever language the person
speaks back, and he hears it in English. We believe that we can
get a reasonable capability up in perhaps 6 months to a year.
But we have a major program that is just starting up, and
our objective is basically to get rid of all the linguists and
analysts. I probably just made a few more enemies, but we want
to basically have a capability where the language goes in and
the output comes in so that the warfighter can get it directly.
He does not need an interpreter with him. He can understand the
person talking to him. If he gets a document, he can put it
into a computer and out it comes in English that he can
understand. It does not require somebody else to type it in. We
believe that we can get to what the Defense Language Institute
(DLI) people would call a level 3 capability in a very short
period of time. So we have a major program. It is a major
problem.
Senator Reed. Dr. Killion, any comments?
Dr. Killion. Actually we are partnered with Dr. Tether in a
number of the programs in this area. I think a good example of
this sort of additional approach the Army is taking is the
Avatar that you see over on the table from the Institute for
Creative Technologies, which is a tool that can be used. It is
artificial intelligence driven. It can be essentially
programmed to represent any culture and any language and
provide training to an individual interacting in that type of
realistic environment and faced with realistic scenarios
without necessarily having to have a cadre of people available
to you, which can be expensive and also trouble in terms of
having them available readily for anybody throughout the United
States. You can provide access to that training widely and
fairly cheaply, put it on an X-box or a game-based-type
environment and provide training to the individual so he is
better prepared for the culture he is going into.
With regard to the speech recognition. I will know that Dr.
Tether has succeeded when Toys-R-Us sells bears that will talk
to you and understand you. So that is my challenge to Tony.
Senator Reed. Which raises the question, are we working
with Toys-R-Us?
Dr. Killion. There you go. [Laughter.]
Senator Reed. Admiral Cohen.
Admiral Cohen. Senator Reed, it is not just about
understanding and being able to communicate with the enemy.
Today with coalition warfare, it is critically important that
we be able to effectively use our allies. Two years ago CENTCOM
came to me in my overseas office in London and asked for
something which we then fielded immediately. It was called
Coalition Chat Line.
What Coalition Chat Line gave us the ability to do was,
because we had the ability to do written translation at about a
90 percent accuracy rate, give command and control with our
European and other allies using existing networks at an
unclassified level. We could type in English and it would come
out in Polish. They would type in Polish; it would come out in
English, Dutch, et cetera. That is still in use today, and it
is highly effective. It is not where we want to go. Dr. Tether
and the Army are doing wonderful work in that area.
But the second thing that we did--and this comes out of the
operation Secretary England headed--when, over a year ago, we
were losing translators--now, these were for-hire and embedded
translators with our troops, our marines, as they are kicking
down the doors, et cetera--we went ahead and we established
back in the United States a call room. We did this under
contract using an iridium phone through satellites, et cetera.
This was not ideal and there was a lot of push-back, especially
when the guy is kicking in the door to hold up the iridium
phone, saying please, bad guy, talk into it. That is now how we
used it. We used it to rapidly debrief individuals that we
needed to get real-time intelligence from in the field.
What we found was--and Dr. Tether is more sensitive to this
probably than I am--a number of dialects. I mean, I come from
New York City. I have had trouble communicating my whole life.
So, I understand dialects. The chat line gave us the ability to
have an individual harm's way, who sensed what that dialect was
on the phone; to refer it to someone else in that call room so
we got accurate--and that is critically important--translation
so we had actionable intelligence in the field at the pointy
end of the spear.
So the point of those two stories is while the future is
promising and these technology developments are moving very
fast, we do what we can do today with what we have.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, will we have a second round perhaps?
Senator Cornyn. Absolutely.
Senator Reed. Okay. Thank you.
Senator Cornyn. Senator Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Sega, the Defense Experimental Program to Stimulate
Competitive Research (DEPSCoR) has been described by a lot of
folks as a very important program, and it has been particularly
important for researchers in Nebraska and a number of other
States and has developed a number of new technologies that have
enhanced the Nation's military capabilities. So I was alarmed
to note that in your 2006 budget request you have actually
reduced the investment in this program by over 30 percent
relative to the 2005 appropriated level, and even down below
the 2005 budget request.
I guess because the program is run out of your office, I
would like your opinion as to the value of the program, and if
you have some concerns about it, is there anything that can be
done to raise your confidence so that we do not see a
continuing reduction in the budget in the future?
Dr. Sega. I believe the goals in the DEPSCoR program itself
are important. The only office I established within the Office
of the DDR&E was that of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Laboratories and Basic Sciences. Within that office are
universities and workforce-related responsibilities as well.
Dr. John Hopps led that and oversaw the DEPSCoR program. He
passed away last year.
Now, I would like to take the details of your question for
the record, but suffice it to say that the ability for us to
capture ideas from all parts of the country is something that
we value.
[The information referred to follows:]
There is value in research performed under the DEPSCoR program, as
well as the larger amount of research performed under other DOD
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation programs by academic
institutions from States eligible for DEPSCoR. The fiscal year 2006
request for DEPSCoR is $8.913 million which is 9 percent less than the
fiscal year 2005 request in real terms. The reduction is a reflection
of difficult decisions made in the current budgetary environment.
Senator Ben Nelson. Well, there seems to be concern among
the academics that their role is being minimized in the
process, and I think that is why the concern has been raised.
Obviously, you want to get the best ideas. It is alarming to
see, if in fact this is the case, the academics' role reduced
unless there is a particular reason for doing it. If they are
inadequate or something like that, is there something that
could be done to re-elevate their contributions? Because it
seems that that is what may be happening here.
Dr. Sega. If I could get back with you on that to better
address it.
[The information referred to follows:]
There was no budget decision to deliberately reduce academic
institutions' participation in DOD Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation (RDT&E), and we are not aware of any evidence that shows a
reduction. There are scientific and technical opportunities to be
explored if additional resources were available for basic research, the
portion of RDT&E within which academic institutions from all States
make their greatest contributions. However, we must maintain a balance
among DOD investments in the various components of RDT&E.
Senator Ben Nelson. Sure.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
I want to reiterate a request that Senator Reed made just
so we are all clear for the record. I wanted to make sure that
we get your unfunded S&T opportunities. In other words, we
understand that you had to meet a budget goal and presumably
there are things that you would have asked for if funds had
been unlimited, which they are not. But if they were, what
things that you have not requested would you request? If you
would give that to us please in writing by the end of April, we
would appreciate that very much.
Dr. Sega, military threats have been categorized as
traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive. The QDR
will reportedly look at how to mitigate risks in each of those
four areas. How is the DOD currently working to integrate
identified capability gaps in each of these four threat areas
into its S&T investment strategy?
Dr. Sega. The details--the QDR is an internal document at
this point. But the National Defense Strategy and National
Military Strategy were released last week. In there are the
various challenges of conventional, irregular, catastrophic,
and disruptive threats. We are participating in all of the
forms that go into the QDR to assure that the importance that
we feel, in terms of S&T's impact in dealing with the
challenges of the future, is addressed. I can assure you that
we are participating in that, and that the recognition of the
irregular, the catastrophic, and the disruptive--and the
disruptive, in particular, has a heavy focus on disruptive
technology and understands the global environment and how
technology is being developed and sometimes the unintended uses
of it have to be thought through as well. We are participating
in the process and I believe the Department feels it is
important as well.
Senator Cornyn. Does that make up part of your investment
strategy, though, how to address capability gaps in each of
those areas?
Dr. Sega. Yes. As I mentioned before, the issue of the
comprehensiveness of the review is to help us identify gaps
that we believe we potentially have in certain areas and to
address those in the context of not only where the Department
is going by way of strategies that are outlined, including the
QDR, but also the context of the global environment. We have a
responsibility not only to look at the pull part, if you will,
from warfighter needs, but also have a part of our investment
portfolio looking at the technology push aspects.
Senator Cornyn. Hopefully, the money that the American
taxpayer is investing in S&T through your collective efforts
has a benefit above and beyond, not just our defense or
national security matters, but will be available across
agencies. I am thinking particularly of the Department of
Homeland Security and the Department of Justice.
A recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) study
reported a slow pace of information sharing between fingerprint
databases at the Department of Homeland Security and the
Department of Justice. The DOD is working on a number of more
advanced security access devices and personnel recognition
technologies.
What mechanisms for coordination and sharing of
technologies exist among various Departments of the United
States Government to ensure that we can both accelerate the
sharing of critical information and also update new and
available, more reliable and effective technologies? Dr.
Tether, do you have a view on that subject?
Dr. Tether. Yes, I do.
I have met with Chuck McQuery and Dave Bolka at the
Department of Homeland Security, and we have gone over what we
are doing with them in great depth, again one of these agendas.
We are very fortunate, however, in that the Department of
Homeland Security has a DARPA-like organization. Quite a few of
the people that are there are people from DARPA. People at
DARPA are only around for 4 of the 6 years. I like to say we
are all really summer hires. The deputy is Xan Alexander. She
used to be my deputy at DARPA. A few of the PMs that used to be
at DARPA are there. So, we have great relationships. In fact,
we have joint programs. We have programs in radiation
decontamination of buildings. We have joint programs in portal
security, basically how do you detect mail, people, so forth
and so on. We have a good relationship there.
We also have a relationship at the Department of Energy. We
briefed Secretary Card before he left on our plan. We actually
have a joint program with the Department of Energy at Yucca
Mountain both in our titanium initiative and in our robotic
initiative to have a robot that can scrabble over rubble and
make sure everything is okay.
We have relationships with the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), the DDR&E, joint programs again, congressional staffers,
and the National Security Agency (NSA). In the past we have had
programs with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), so forth and so
on.
My PMs are entrepreneurs. If they have an idea, they will
go anywhere to get that idea used.
Senator Cornyn. Dr. Sega, are you satisfied that we are
doing everything we can to not just develop science leads and
technology within the DOD, but that we are cross-fertilizing
with other Federal Government agencies and not just looking
inwardly, but looking outwardly to look at other ways to apply
this technology to other needs? For example, I am thinking
about the transfer of some UAVs by the Air Force to the Air
National Guard to do border security, as well as ground sensors
along the Rio Grande to deal with the border security issues.
Are you satisfied we are doing all we can and all we should be
doing in that area?
Dr. Sega. Mr. Chairman, I believe this is a goal that we
always have to work hard on moving toward. This is a work in
progress. I think we can always try to improve what we are
doing. As conditions change, we have to relook at how we are
doing things. We have, I think, improved in many aspects. Tony
has mentioned a few. The interagency forums have also brought
forward another mechanism of doing collaboration. For example,
in high-end computing, we signed a memorandum of agreement with
the Department of Energy and the NSA. So we do have mechanisms
to collaborate, but I think this is an area that we have to
continue to pay attention to and work hard on. It will be a
work in progress forever, but we have to work, spend time and
spend energy and focus on that continuously.
Senator Cornyn. This is my last question. Then I will turn
the floor over to Senator Reed.
A number of you mentioned your long-term concerns having to
do with our networking capability and perhaps a global grid.
This does not affect any of you immediately, but I worry when I
see one of our important agencies, the Federal Bureau of
Investigations (FBI), for example, give up the development of a
virtual case file program and basically more than $100 million
goes down the toilet. I wonder whether we are comprehensively--
and this is not just a DOD issue, obviously--across the
Government looking at the best strategies to develop
information technology. Obviously, a lot of the concerns are
similar with secure communications and the like. That concerns
me and it is certainly something that, as we go forward, I want
to have a continued conversation with you about.
Admiral Cohen. Mr. Chairman, sometimes programs can be too
big. One of the advantages of S&T is its agility. So I have
been investing about $1 million a year for the last 3 years
with our Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS). I do not
take credit for the TV show, but what NCIS did ask for was the
ability to better leverage their existing computer network to
put together disparate pieces of information, seemingly
unconnected, so that pattern recognition and focused
surveillance, all within the bounds of the law, could take
place. That now is being exported to other criminal agencies
within the U.S. Government.
When we talk about the relationships, we all have these
memorandums of understanding and informal and formal agreements
with different Departments and services, et cetera, but I also
look at the broader needs of our society. From precise time
measurement came the GPS. The GPS has created a multi-billion a
year industry in the United States, around the world. It
changes how we work, how we fly, our leisure time.
If you will remember about 3 years ago we were in crisis in
electrical transmission and generation in this country. The
Navy is going electric. The DD(X) and CVN-21 will effectively
be all electric ships. So we are looking at directed energy
weapons. We are looking at the electromagnetic rail gun. We are
going to launch aircraft using Paramount and Walt Disney
technology for linear accelerators for roller coasters. But we
are heavily invested in both high temperature and low
temperature superconducting both in Massachusetts and in
California, competing technologies which I believe will give
this country not only the military advantage that an all-
electric, compact, high efficiency force brings, but will
enable us to beat back the challenges in electrical
transmission, high wire, right-of-ways, et cetera and put us
back in a leading position in the world for export of that
important industrial capability.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Sega, one of the great assets that the DOD has is the
S&Es in the laboratories. I know you have been working with
respect to the new NSPS to look at or compare, at least, the
flexibilities that might be offered there to the flexibilities
in these demonstration programs. I know there is one program at
the Naval Underwater Warfare Center (NUWC), which is very much
appreciated there.
Have you done any of the detailed comparisons yet of the
NSPS and the demonstration programs? Do you have any
observations at this point?
Dr. Sega. The demonstration programs I think were very
important in actually structuring and developing aspects of the
NSPS. So the experience gained in the demonstration programs I
believe was important in development of the NSPS program.
We have had an input by way of our demonstration and
laboratory experience.
Now, the phase that we are currently in is a release of the
naval regulations in The Federal Register, and they are fairly
broad. The next phase is those that are implementing
regulations, and it will be, as those are developed and
presented, that we can have a comparison in terms of the
demonstration labs and how the flexibilities compare. So that
is down the road a little bit.
[The information referred to follows:]
We can make the analysis, comparing the relative NSPS features and
flexibilities to those of the laboratory demonstrations, available to
interested Members of Congress upon request once it is completed.
Senator Reed. When you come to that juncture, I would be
very interested in seeing the tradeoffs before any commitments
are made. We do want to maintain the flexibility in the labs
and the strength of the labs. Their strength really is
attracting the very best S&Es.
Let me turn to both Admiral Cohen and Dr. Tether. I
understand that DARPA and the Navy are making significant
investments in developing new undersea technologies, including
weapons systems, sensor devices, and new concepts of
submarines. What is the scale of your investment, if you can
sort of lay that out, and what are the major initiatives? To
what extent is the NUWC participating? Admiral Cohen or Dr.
Tether?
Admiral Cohen. Thank you for that question. Of course, the
NUWC at Newport is unique in the world and has been doing this
for some time. When I first came to the Office of Naval
Research 5 years ago, the Navy was just finishing the
transition from blue water dominance, which we still enjoy, to
a focus on the littoral, which Dr. Tether has already
addressed. What we found was that our deepwater premier
torpedo, the Mark 48 ADCAP torpedo, which the NUWC was so
critical in developing, really was not optimized for the
littoral, shallow water, background scatter, et cetera. Plus we
had the challenges of mines.
So we looked to go ahead and develop under our Swamp Works
program, which is the naval version of Skunk Works. It smells
about the same. High risk, and we chose the NUWC at that time
to do that, and within 18 months they had transformed the deep
ocean torpedo into what we call half-torp, half-length, so we
could put 52 instead of 26 in a 688 submarine, doubling its
load, and with the precision to find and destroy a 1-meter
tethered mine in the littoral with countermeasures present
because if we could find a 1-meter mine, we could find a 3-
meter or a 5-meter submarine, but the other way is not there.
So the intellectual capital and the long-term investment that
you have there paid big dividends.
We have just, at the direction of the CNO, initiated what
we call an innovative naval prototype entitled Persistent
Littoral Undersea Surveillance (PLUS). I have about $150
million invested in that over the FYDP. It does not have a
transition partner, but it is looking at distributed sensors,
weapons, taking the littoral where we deal in the non-RF, and
making by a wide variety--and I will leave it unclassified--
sensor capabilities, some of which we are working with DARPA
on, to take undersea targets and turn them into RF signals,
which can pop up and turn that target into the common operating
picture. So for our battle forces in littoral, it becomes just
one more time-critical strike target. It is exciting, and NUWC
will be a key enabler, along with academia and industry, in
achieving that over the next 4 to 8 years.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Dr. Tether, any comments?
Dr. Tether. Yes.
Four years ago, the amount of interaction DARPA had with
the Navy was very small. It was sort of cyclical. We were at
the small side.
In a meeting with the CNO, the CNO asked us to do an
architecture study on the--actually I call it the ``literal.''
In the part of New York I come from it is ``literal,'' not
littoral.
Admiral Cohen. Dialects. [Laughter.]
Senator Reed. Who is from the Bronx?
Dr. Tether. Neither of us, I do not think.
So at the end of that architecture study, we really entered
into a major program, which is joint, by the way, with Naval
Research, on persistence surveillance. That is the issue,
especially if you are talking about the Taiwanese Straits and
having to know what is going on there under the water and above
the water. Most of it is classified.
Another major program that we have that just started off is
a small submarine program that we call Tango Bravo. Now, this
resulted from an idea that somebody had that said, gee, we do
not need a shaft to push a propeller around. We could actually
put--I am sure the people will cringe at this--propulsers on
the outside of a submarine and use those to drive the
submarine.
What would be the benefit of doing that? Well, if you can
get rid of the shaft of the submarine, you have a whole bunch
of tradeoffs now that you can make. You can, for example, take
the reactor and move the reactor to the rear of the submarine
and get rid of some of the shielding.
We had studies done. This was a study that was joint
between DARPA, Naval Research, and the CNO to see what would
come out being able to get rid of the shaft in the submarine.
The study showed that we could probably reduce the size of the
submarine by a factor of two. The constraint was the same
warfighting capability. That was very interesting. A factor of
two displacement. You do buy submarines by the pound. You also
could get a decrease in the cost because it is just less touch
labor in trying to make it.
That program is just underway. We are in source selection.
The NUWC is an important player in it obviously. They will be
in it. We are just about ready to make the awards to basically
look at two of the major technologies in doing that. One
question is, can you really put these propulsers on the outside
of the submarine and get the same acoustic quality as well as
the ability to go at fast speeds? The other thing to get the
size down is you put the torpedoes outside the pressure hull.
So can you take your torpedoes and put them outside the
pressure hull? If you can do that, you could have a submarine
with greatly reduced manning, and all that comes with it. So we
have a major program.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cornyn. Recently, I had a chance to go back home to
San Antonio and talk to some of the leadership at Brooke Army
Medical Center and Wolford Hall Hospital at Lackland Air Force
Base. We learned a little bit more about how dramatically the
military medicine has improved the likelihood of survival of
our troops when they, unfortunately, do receive injuries.
I am also reminded, as Senator Reed I know has done too, as
we go visit the troops wherever they may be, at Bethesda,
Walter Reed, or back home in our States, that the nature of the
injuries that our troops are receiving has changed. It used to
be that high velocity gunshot wounds were the predominant cause
of casualties. Today 38 percent of all injuries and 41 percent
of all fatalities are the results of blasts, and we have
alluded to some of these earlier in your testimony.
Research in the area of blast injury prevention,
mitigation, and treatment is increasingly critical as we look
for ways to protect and care for our men and women in uniform.
I know we have alluded to that in a number of responses here
before, but I wonder perhaps, Dr. Killion, if I can ask you to
outline for us now efforts underway in each of these three
areas? Could you especially provide us with information on
areas in which progress could be accelerated with the
application of additional resources? Are there additional
projects you would recommend for these areas if additional
funding were available?
Dr. Killion. I would be happy to do that. I think it is
probably best that I give it to you in detail separately as a
follow-up to the hearing.
I had a recent experience at Walter Reed that I thought was
sobering, enlightening, and actually encouraging for the S&T
community, probably similar to visits some of you have had. I
was visiting recently and met a female helicopter pilot who had
lost both of her legs. I was introduced to her and she said,
``Oh, good, I did not know who to thank.'' That kind of took me
aback because that was not exactly what my response would have
been necessarily. She realized my consternation and said, ``Oh,
no, you do not understand. The technology that I was given
worked perfectly. The body armor protected my torso and I am
alive today because the body armor was there to do that. The
NOMEX flight uniform protected me from burn injuries so that my
arms were not burned any more severely.'' She had very minor
burn marks on her arms. Then she said, ``The helmet work that
designed the hearing protection and the visor for face
protection saved my eyesight, saved my hearing.'' So the
technology worked. So she was happy that we had given her what
we had. Obviously, our goal is to provide even greater
protection.
Her helicopter was hit by an RPG. So both the blast and
fragmentation effects are issues. In fact, part of our problem
with our databases is distinguishing those. So, I need to get
some clarification on the numbers. Some of the trauma injury
databases when they say blast effects also include
fragmentation effects.
We do have specific ongoing efforts that are looking at
trying to counter the blast injury from things like
thermobarics that are a special case as opposed to the body
armor that we are using today, the Small Arms Protection Insert
(SAPI) plates and the protective vest, which are primarily
aimed at protecting you from fragmentation and bullets as you
suggest.
I will follow up with information on this.
[The information referred to follows:]
Blast protection from all threats, to include IEDs and mines, is a
formidable challenge. During OIF, a large number of blast injuries have
been incurred by warfighters riding in vehicles. The recent up-armoring
of tactical vehicles to include the HMMWV has provided added
protection. This effort was the result of efforts on improved armor
performed by the Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering
Center (TARDEC) and the Army Research Laboratory (ARL). Blast
protection improvements for the deployed dismounted warfighter,
however, are limited because the inherent add-on weight of current
protective materials restricts the soldier's mobility and range of
motion.
Current Army research in blast injury prevention and mitigation is
focused on enhanced lightweight protective materials for both vehicle
and personnel armor, improved materials processing techniques, and
innovative concepts and prototypes with potential to increase
protection while minimizing added weight burden. Current research
efforts include the following:
The TARDEC and ARL are investigating new composite
material concepts/designs and active protection systems in the
area of vehicle protection.
The Natick Soldier Center is researching high-strength
fibers such as M5 and Zylon, along with post-processing
treatments that could improve the fragmentation protection of
soft armor systems. In addition, new methods of production and
innovative architectures for protective materials (e.g., non-
woven, unidirectional fiber layers; novel backing materials;
and flexible resin impregnated fabrics) are being assessed for
soldier protection.
The Natick Soldier Center, in conjunction with the
Medical Research Materiel Command, began an effort in fiscal
year 2003 to develop a concept for soldier protection designed
specifically to address pressure blast effects that could be
incurred within buildings or enclosures.
ARL is exploring advanced transparent armor materials
and material processing methods such as microlamination that
are applicable for both vehicle (i.e., windshields and windows)
and individual (i.e., face) protection. ARL is also
investigating new concepts, such as shear thickening fluids
(``liquid armor,'') to assess their ability to provide
increased protection and flexibility at much reduced weights.
We recognize that blast injury treatment is critical to the care of
our men and women in uniform. The Army's medical research program
currently has investments in trauma treatment research that are
directly applicable to the types of blast injuries incurred in OIF.
These efforts are focused in the areas of neuroprotection,
physiological sensors, and resuscitation.
In addition to these ongoing efforts, Army medical research in the
area of resuscitation will begin a new phase in fiscal year 2006 that
will focus on resuscitation fluids and how the effects of blast-related
head trauma determine fluid resuscitation requirements. Standard field
treatment of injuries resulting in blood loss or extreme head trauma
involves the use of resuscitation fluids to help stabilize the patient.
However, when the brain is traumatized there is a disruption of the
blood-brain barrier that allows these normal resuscitation fluids to
leak through the blood-brain barrier, increasing the risk of brain
swelling. Research will be conducted in developing new resuscitation
fluids that would mitigate the brain swelling when the blood-brain
barrier has been disrupted. We believe that this research is important
given the number of casualties due to head and neck injury experienced
in OIF. This research will potentially lead to the optimal use of
resuscitation solutions in the field.
The current Army S&T programs in these areas represent a balanced
portfolio addressing both near-term and long-term warfighter needs to
optimally identify potential solutions. The current approaches show
promise for improving blast protection, mitigation and treatment.
Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, if I could interrupt. Dr.
Killion was talking about Major Tammy Duckworth of the Illinois
National Guard who, when I saw her, assured me she is going to
fly again in uniform in the United States Army. She will need a
little help with technology, but just a little. She will do it
on her own.
Senator Cornyn. I appreciate your sharing that story with
us. I guess the most amazing reaction we hear from our troops
when they are in the hospital is when can I get back to my
unit, even from some who have suffered, unfortunately,
significant injuries.
Let me just ask two other questions. First of all, Dr.
Killion, if you could get us that additional information in
relatively quick order. We are going to leave the record open
and submit some additional questions to each of you in writing,
which we would ask you to turn around as soon as you reasonably
can, since obviously time will not allow us to ask all of those
verbally in the hearing.
Dr. Sega, I would like to touch on advanced semiconductor
technology, and I would like for you to take this one for the
record and get back to us. If you have any comments now, of
course, I would welcome those.
Having advanced semiconductor technology is critical to
maintaining America's military advantage. Making chips has
become increasingly complex and there are many challenges that
must be overcome to continue to make them faster, denser, and
more powerful. Of course, research drives these advances. I
believe the industry spends about 17 percent of its revenue on
R&D.
Given the advantages that the military has gained through
this advanced technology, I would be interested to know what
steps the DOD is taking to ensure that we maintain our
technological edge in this area. If you have any brief comments
now, I would be glad to hear those, but if you would like to
take that for the record and get back to us, that is fine as
well.
Dr. Sega. We do work with the semiconductor industry on
individual technologies, as well as the associations that
represent the Semiconductor Industry Association. There are
activities that focus on their concerns. Focused Research
Centers is one of them. But the question is one that I think
would be best done for the record so we can lay out the
program.
[The information referred to follows:]
The national security community has a requirement for advanced
semiconductor technology. Many of our requirements are met by the
industry as a whole. However, there remain specialized requirements for
low-volume quantities and radiation hardened components. We maintain an
active program to address these concerns. Programs in rad-hard by
design, 3D microsystems, and maskless lithography are several
initiatives the DOD pursues in this area.
Over the years, the DOD has maintained a strong technology
investment in leading-edge semiconductor technology and we have worked
closely with industry. We are currently working with industry to
establish a focused basic research program. This program will not only
generate new ideas but will help grow the scientific and engineering
talent necessary for continued innovation in semiconductor technology.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you.
I have one last question and then I would be glad to see if
Senator Reed has any others before we wrap up. Unfortunately,
we have four stacked votes starting at 11:30, so we are going
to have to go do our duty there as well.
My question has to do with the industrial base. Let me
start off first by saying I understand the Department's Office
of Industrial Policy has been conducting a series of
evaluations on the capabilities of the defense industrial base.
As technology and manufacturing processes play a key role in
industrial base issues, which also have had an impact on the
availability of a well-trained technical workforce, what has
been your role in contributing to discussions on the
development of these reports? Dr. Sega, if you could comment on
that.
Here again, I hear and read concern expressed from time to
time that if we discontinue a certain kind of project, we risk
losing our base. Obviously, going to a sole-source procurement
is always of concern because we know we typically benefit from
competitive bidding on various projects. I wonder if you have
any observations to make on that issue.
Dr. Sega. Our area of responsibility is principally in the
development of the technology and the military-critical
technologies program, now under DDR&E. So that is an important
function to establish the technical base for those
technologies.
The area of industrial policy and its study is out of our
area, but we would work with that office and provide an answer
to your question.
Senator Cornyn. I would just ask you to take this and get
back to us as part of the questions. Would you describe for us
the investments that you are making to ensure we are developing
the next generation of innovative manufacturing technologies
that will enable us to have that domestic industrial base
required to support the good work that each of you are doing in
your S&T field so we will actually be able to produce those
products here in the United States?
Dr. Sega. Mr. Chairman, on the manufacturing technology, we
have again a Defense Science Board study of manufacturing
technology. It also represents one of the areas of focus in our
research and engineering goals which we recently have
distributed. We will be happy to provide that as well.
[The information referred to follows:]
Army, Navy, Air Force, Defense Logistics Agency, and Missile
Defense Agency each has Manufacturing Technology program elements to
address core service and agency manufacturing requirements. OSD,
through the Joint Defense Manufacturing Technology Panel (JDMTP), works
with the military departments and defense agencies to encourage
investment synergy and collaboration where possible. We work with
manufacturing initiatives such as Next Generation Manufacturing
Technology Initiative (NGMTI), Composites Affordability Initiative, and
Metals Affordability Initiative to identify candidate technologies that
support DOD S&T strategic plans and have the potential to the benefit
the warfighter. Most recently, we established a Defense Science Board
task force to assess the DOD Manufacturing Technology program and
provide recommendations as to how ManTech can be strengthened to
improve benefits to the DOD.
Senator Cornyn. Senator Reed, do you have any follow-up
questions?
Senator Reed. I have one question if I may, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Sega, you have been recently designed the Chief
Technology Officer to the DOD. I wonder if you need any
additional legislative authorities to flesh out this role of
Chief Technology Officer. We presume that this would be similar
to positions in the private sector that are designated Chief
Technology Officer, and I wonder if you have the same
responsibilities and authorities. So you might respond briefly
here today, but please follow up in writing if you feel you
need more responsibilities and more detailed authority.
Dr. Sega. Senator Reed, that is another area where we are
actually getting some help from the Defense Science Board as
they look at the roles and responsibilities of the DDR&E. I met
on two occasions with their task force. I will also look at
what their findings and advice are prior to formulating the
recommendation that goes forward. So I will be glad to get back
with you, but I think this is an area where we will learn more
and have another input, in this case from the Defense Science
Board, that is addressing exactly that question.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cornyn. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your
participation here today. We will leave the record open until,
let us say, 5 o'clock on Friday for any members of the
committee to submit additional questions in writing, and we
would appreciate your prompt response to those questions. It
will give us the information we need so presumably we can help
you make sure you have what you need in order to continue to do
the outstanding job that you are doing.
It is truly impressive what we have seen displayed here
today. The promise of the research and investments that you are
making now for the future are equally exciting, although we
know we have challenges that we have discussed here today, that
we have not yet met that are very real and occurring today,
particularly in the area of IED mitigation and dealing with,
obviously, that tremendous challenge in a new and different
kind of theater.
Thank you for being here. Thank you for your service to our
country.
This hearing is now adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn
science and technology budget request
1. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Sega, Dr. Killion, Admiral Cohen, Mr. Engle,
and Dr. Tether, when developing and following a carefully constructed
strategic plan, corresponding budget decisions are necessary. Programs
must sometimes be canceled, redirected, or initiated. What decisions
have been made in the fiscal year 2006 budget request--programs
cancelled and started--as a result of the science and technology (S&T)
strategy for the current and future national security environment?
Dr. Sega. The fiscal year 2006 DOD S&T budget request contains
several new or redirected S&T efforts in support of our five
priorities: integration of DOD S&T and focus on transformation;
enhanced technology transition; expanded outreach to the Combatant
Commands and the Intelligence Community; accelerated support to the
global war on terrorism; and a strengthened national security science
and engineering workforce. Within Defense-wide S&T:
Transformation:
Reduced funding for missile defense in favor of new
and transformational initiatives
Established the Trusted Foundry program to provide an
assured source of non-exploitable micro-circuit chips
Initiated a focused program to support insensitive
munitions development
Transition:
Restructured the Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration (ACTD) process--now adding Joint Capability
Technology Demonstrations (JCTDs)--and realigned funding among
RDT&E budget activities to enhance transition
Outreach:
Increased funding for the U.S. Transportation Command
for quick-turn projects to enhance distribution and
transportation systems
Realigned the Defense Technical Information Center
(DTIC) to DDR&E to increase the synergies between research and
engineering and related knowledge systems
Support to global war on terrorism:
Increased funding for novel biodefense initiatives
which take advantage of biotechnology and genetics advances
Increased funding for the Rapid Reaction/New Solutions
within the Quick Reaction Special Projects to support the
global war on terrorism
Workforce:
Funded a proposed expansion of the Science,
Mathematics, and Research for Transformation (SMART) pilot
program into a permanent program called the SMART/National
Defense Education Act (NDEA)--Phase I to maintain an effective
workforce.
Dr. Killion. Since we are an Army at war, it is extremely important
to balance the needs of the future with current needs. In the 2006
budget request, Army S&T made some difficult choices. For example,
during this preparation for overseas movement (POM) we canceled the
Army's portion of the cooperative effort with the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in the Unmanned Combat Armed
Rotorcraft (an unmanned rotorcraft designed to be the Comanche
companion), the development of mission equipment packages for Class 1
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and munitions specifically designed
for unmanned systems. We redirected ongoing efforts to focus on
affordable missile technology, technologies to enable a counter mortar
capability, and ground vehicle survivability. We initiated new efforts
in the area of aviation survivability, network mining, and network
science.
Admiral Cohen. No significant Navy S&T programs have been canceled.
However, the fiscal year 2006 President's budget request ($356.9
million) is less than the fiscal year 2005 request ($375.8 million), or
-$18.9 million. The primary area of disinvestment is the High Frequency
Active Auroral Research Program (HAARP) (fiscal year 2006 $0 million
versus fiscal year 2005 $16.0 million = -$16.0 million) which is
consistent with a Navy/DARPA memorandum of agreement. The remaining
reduction (-$2.9 million or less than 1 percent) will not cause
significant disinvestment for this line.
Future Naval Capabilities (FNCs) were aligned with Navy defined
capability gaps, and a specific focus is planned for urban operations
and asymmetric threats.
To take advantage of technology opportunities outside of
conventional requirements and acquisition processes, Navy has
introduced the Innovative Naval Prototypes (INP) initiative in the
fiscal year 2006 budget request. The fiscal year 2006 INP program
consists of the following: Electromagnetic Rail Gun; Persistent
Littoral Undersea Surveillance (PLUS); Tactical Space; and, Sea Base
Enablers. Also, the fiscal year 2006 budget request includes $4 million
basic research (6.1) funding to initiate planning and design activities
for University National Oceanographic Laboratory System (UNOLS) fleet
renewal requirements. This proposed investment is based on Navy's
``Report to Congress--Requiremnts and Plans for University National
Oceanographic Laboratory System Fleet Renewal'' dated February 2003.
Mr. Engle. The Air Force S&T investment is shaped by a master
planning process called the Capabilities Review and Risk Assessment
(CRRA), which is key to ensuring we have a high correlation between
science and industry: programs and the warfighting capabilities
required by the concepts of operations (CONOPs) for each of the seven
major tasks the Air Force must be capable of accomplishing to support
our combatant commanders. In fiscal year 2006, the Air Force
reprioritized approximately $500 million of its S&T program to address
capability needs identified in this master planning process. A few
notable examples include shifting funding from aircraft fuels,
precision-guided weapons and control, and high power gas lasers to
support higher Air Force priorities such as Battlefield Air Operations
kit efforts, the Commander's Predictive Environment, and Air Force-
unique nanotechnology efforts.
Dr. Tether. The best example of how our strategy has changed
recently in response to a threat is our new strategic thrust in urban
operations, which is increasingly coming together in fiscal year 2006.
That thrust is aimed at making our forces operate as effectively in
cities as we do on the traditional open battlefield. DARPA had a few
programs in this area before the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns, but
the thrust was brought center stage by these conflicts and some of the
difficulties our forces faced in urban areas. While the thrust
continues to be shaped by that experience, DARPA believes adversaries
will continue to try to fight U.S. forces in urban terrain, and we are
looking at future capabilities for the joint forces. I've met with U.S.
Marine Corps Commandant General Hagee and U.S. Special Operations
Command (SOCOM) Commander General Brown to discuss DARPA's research.
They've told me DARPA's emphasis on vastly improving the joint forces
situational awareness in cities is in total sync with their view. In
creating our strategic thrust in urban operations, we went from an area
we were concerned about, to immediate challenges, to program ideas, to
a better understanding of the problem, to even more ideas and a greater
focus and budget for the area.
A specific program we've canceled is Responsive Access, Small
Cargo, Affordable Launch (RASCAL), which was aimed at lowering the cost
to orbit for small payloads and making that access more responsive.
After some effort, the increasing costs to develop RASCAL exceeded what
was felt to be practical. Continuing it would not have been a prudent
investment. DARPA is collaborating with the U.S. Air Force on Falcon, a
program that is exploring other concepts for low cost access to space,
for example, launching a rocket from a C-17.
An area where we are taking a strategic pause is advanced
lithography. We have funded work there for many years, but more
recently the needs of the broader commercial sector and the Department
of Defense (DOD) have increasingly diverged. So in fiscal year 2006 we
are reassessing the opportunities to relieve the DOD's problems in
access to lower cost, very low volume, specialized electronics--a
solution that will also prove beneficial to U.S. foundries.
2. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Sega, the fiscal year 2006 request marks the
first time since passage of the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2000 that the request for S&T programs is less
than the previous year's request. The S&T budget request represents an
increase of less than 2 percent over inflation compared to the previous
budget request. Section 212 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2000 requires
the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress a certification or a
statement explaining the request's impact. The section also requires a
Defense Science Board report assessing the impact of the proposed
budget on defense technology and the national defense. What is the
status of each of these required actions?
Dr. Sega. A strong and stable science and technology program is
important to maintain our technological edge. Each year the Department
makes an effort to fund the S&T program at a level appropriate to
maintain the technological superiority we have enjoyed to date. The
fiscal year 2006 President's budget was developed by balancing
priorities across all functional areas, and we believe the S&T budget
is funded at the proper level. Using fiscal year 2000 as a baseline and
adjusting for inflation, our fiscal year 2006 request of $10.552
billion is 23 percent higher than fiscal year 2000. The Department
continues to place a high priority on ensuring adequate funding levels
for S&T.
navy basic research
3. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Cohen, the fiscal year 2006 budget
request for the Navy Basic Research (6.1) account includes funds to
design a research vessel. The request for Navy Basic Research is also
down 6 percent from the fiscal year 2005 request and is down nearly 10
percent compared to appropriated amounts. Could you explain the reason
for including design and ship funds in a Basic Research account instead
of the usual ship construction account?
Admiral Cohen. The fiscal year 2006 RDT&E,N budget request includes
$4 million Basic Research (6.1) funding to initiate planning and design
activities for University National Oceanographic Laboratory System
(UNOLS) ocean class fleet renewal requirements. This proposed
investment is based on Navy's ``Report to Congress Requirements and
Plans for University National Oceanographic Laboratory System Fleet
Renewal'' dated February 2003. The Basic Research account was selected
for the following reasons:
- Current DOD policy allows the use of RDT&E,N for this
purpose. DOD policy (DOD Financial Management Regulation Vol.
2A, Chapter 1 Section 010213.C.8.a) states, ``An experimental
test bed type of ship or an experimental ship will be financed
by RDT&E appropriations.'' The UNOLS vessels are test beds for
testing new equipment and conducting research in support of the
critical scientific disciplines in Ocean Sciences.
- Research ships construction was most recently funded using
the RDT&E,N appropriation (i.e., fiscal year 1998 $45 million
congressional add for oceanographic ship, PE 0604528N).
Previously, SCN appropriation was used to fund such costs.
- The planned research ships support ocean sciences programs
which are funded in Navy Basic Research (6.1). Therefore, Navy
and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) comptrollers
concluded that it is appropriate to include costs associated
with the construction of these ships in the Basic Research
account.
It is noted that the fiscal year 2006 $4 million budget request
involves planning and design activities for the research ships, not
actual construction activities.
4. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Cohen, what is the Navy's long-term
strategy for its Basic Research effort? What would be the impact on 6.1
programs over the next few years if this request is filled?
Admiral Cohen. Navy long-term strategy for Basic Research (6.1)
funds the preponderance of the Navy S&T Discovery and Invention (D&I)
portfolio which seeks to enable the Navy and Marine Corps to achieve
technological superiority primarily in capabilities essential to the
naval mission. Investment priorities, in decreasing order, emphasize
(1) naval unique research, where Department of the Navy (DoN) must be
the world leader; (2) strong participation in research communities
important to future naval applications, but not necessarily lead by
DoN; and, (3) harvesting and advancing research results from all
sources in areas of potential naval payoff. Basic research disciplines
include ocean sciences, underwater weapons and sound, naval
architecture, ocean engineering, and those studies which could enable
expeditionary warfare and other warfare applications made more
challenging in the naval environment. Additionally, Basic Research
contributes to funding the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) and the 6.1
component of naval warfare centers. Basic Research areas shall be
integrated among NRL and other naval research providers who are
resourced through the Office of Naval Research to avoid duplication of
effort.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Thune
extending the life of veteran aircraft
5. Senator Thune. Mr. Engle, what new technology and research and
development (R&D) efforts is the Air Force looking at that could make
significant strides to extend the life of older aircraft like the B-1
bomber and F-16, until next generation aircraft come off the assembly
line?
Mr. Engle. Overall, the Air Force has an aggressive investment in
aging aircraft R&D of over $55 million per year. A few exciting areas
of work include the development of an improved nondestructive
inspection technique that minimizes the number of aircraft fasteners
that need to be removed in order to inspect the area. The lead aircraft
for this effort is the B-1 and this improved technique enables us to
look deep, down through multiple layers of metal, to detect cracks
around the fasteners--something we haven't been able to do before. We
estimate savings/cost avoidance of $4.5 million and around 18,000
maintenance manhours at the depot. Further, we save wear and tear on
the B-1 and other applicable aircraft because we don't have thousands
of fasteners to remove and replace. Another improved nondestructive
inspection technique focuses on the B-52 and also involves multiple
layers of metal, but this technique detects corrosion. We estimate that
this one-time inspection of the B-52's splice plate located on the wing
near the fuselage will result in savings/cost avoidance of
approximately $15 million and 54,000 depot maintenance manhours, as
well as further minimizing wear and tear to the B-52. We are also doing
great work with material substitution. The F-15 is the lead aircraft
for this project, which involves replacement of the wing structures
with a corrosion-resistant aluminum alloy that will result in a
stronger, more resistant wing. Again, estimated savings/cost avoidance
are significant at $2.1 million and about 5,580 depot maintenance
manhours. Savings are expected to grow as the entire fleet goes through
programmed depot maintenance and the old wing structures are replaced
with the new alloy.
6. Senator Thune. Mr. Engle, has the Air Force looked into a
technology called friction stir welding (FSW) and assessed its utility
to overhaul veteran aircraft by reinforcing/revitalizing aircraft
structures and weld points?
Mr. Engle. Yes, the Air Force has been instrumental in maturing the
FSW process. Partnered with industry via the Metals Affordability
Initiative (MAI) consortium, the Air Force is working to develop and
apply FSW to aerospace components. The MAI team successfully
transitioned FSW technology to the C-17 Ramp Toe (installed on aircraft
beginning with plane number 136) and is currently working to adapt the
process to the C-17 cargo door torque box. Both of these applications
involve 7000 series aluminum. The MAI team is also working to apply FSW
to the Delta 4 upper stage tanks, which would involve aluminum lithium
alloys for space applications.
7. Senator Thune. Mr. Engle, the South Dakota School of Mines and
Technology (SDSM&T) is perhaps the leading developer of this
technology, which has developed to a stage that it can soon be put to
use in aircraft maintenance/overhaul facilities--both for civilian and
military aircraft. Will the Air Force be willing to take a look at the
process developed by SDSM&T to see if it may provide a benefit to
planned Air Force depot maintenance facilities?
Mr. Engle. The Air Force would be happy to review the SDSM&T's FSW
process to assess if it would provide a benefit to planned Air Force
depot maintenance facilities. We will make contact with SDSM&T and
offer them an opportunity to show us their work.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Edward M. Kennedy
innovation centers
8. Senator Kennedy. Dr. Sega, you and I have spoken about the
importance of S&T in the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process. I
am very concerned that the BRAC criteria is very quantitative and may
not fully value the unique needs of the DOD's innovation centers.
Many economic theorists, including Michael Porter of Harvard, have
highlighted the value of regional technology clusters as the best way
to stimulate innovation and establish valuable partnerships between the
Federal Government, industry, and academic researchers. The regional
proximity of these centers enhances the innovative capabilities of DOD
labs and accelerates the process of moving technologies out of the labs
and into the hands of warfighters--or into the commercial sector. This
type of innovation has been the engine of our economic growth, as well
as the source of our military superiority.
I know for example, the great synergy created by the close
proximity of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Army's
Institute for Soldier Nanotechnologies to the Natick Soldier Center and
the large defense contracting community in the area is helping the DOD
leverage millions of dollars in private sector R&D and will speed the
transition nanotechnologies to warfighter. Are you familiar with the
work of Michael Porter and others on the value of technology clusters?
Dr. Sega. We appreciate cooperating for the purpose of working
together for mutual benefit or interest. We rely on the full spectrum
of technology providers to develop the best possible capabilities for
the Department. We rely on DOD labs, working with industry,
universities, and other Federal labs to develop the capabilities.
9. Senator Kennedy. Dr. Sega, are you confident that the
Department's BRAC decisionmaking process fully values the need for the
DOD to keep its centers of innovation co-located with our academic and
industrial centers of innovation?
Dr. Sega. I am confident that the Department has considered the
impact of a large number of factors, consistent with the statutory
requirements, in evaluating facilities.
10. Senator Kennedy. Dr. Sega, are you comfortable that the DOD's
BRAC process fully appreciates that most technical people will not
relocate to a new location following a BRAC decision--therefore costing
the DOD valuable scientific and technical expertise once the relocation
is complete?
Dr. Sega. The BRAC process is thorough, and during the evaluation
period, we considered a large number of factors and possible impacts.
The DOD BRAC process accounts for personnel relocation challenges. We
are also committed to increasing the pool of scientists and engineers
available to work on national security issues and partnering with
universities, industry, and others, to meet DOD technology goals. A
national challenge is to ensure that we have a technical workforce to
meet the needs of the Department and Nation.
11. Senator Kennedy. Dr. Sega, how do you plan on reconstituting
that expertise following the BRAC round?
Dr. Sega. The availability of scientists and engineers is an
important issue facing DOD and the Nation. The Department has submitted
a legislative proposal titled ``SMART--NDEA Phase 1''. The proposal
would provide additional authorities that would improve our ability to
develop, recruit, and retain individuals who will be critical in
fulfilling the Department's national security mission. We look forward
to your continued support in this critical, foundational area for
national security.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman
laboratory workforce issues
12. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Sega, this committee has been concerned
over the failure of the DOD to utilize the personnel demonstration
authorities provided to the Secretary to ensure that our research
facilities are able to hire and retain the top quality people they
need. Last year, section 1107 of the NDAA required the Under Secretary
of Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Under Secretary of
Personnel and Readiness to work out a process for expediting and
expanding the use of the demonstration authority, since it continues to
operate outside of the National Security Personnel System (NSPS). Have
the laboratories been part of this review?
Dr. Sega. Yes, the laboratories are participating in the
development of the plan required by section 1107. Hiring and retaining
top quality people in our research facilities is of foremost importance
to the Department and to its laboratories.
13. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Sega, what specific authorities have the
laboratories requested as part of this review?
Dr. Sega. The Plan required by section 1107 will be completed and
reported to Congress by December 2005. At this time, no additional
authorities have been requested.
14. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Sega, do you feel that these requested
authorities may improve laboratory performance?
Dr. Sega. The laboratory demonstration projects have shown that
effective personnel authorities can improve laboratory performance. The
Department will consider any new and promising laboratory authorities
resulting from the plan required by section 1107. Based on progress to
date in defining NSPS, I believe that the new system should be
sufficiently flexible and adaptable to apply eventually across the
Department, including laboratories and technical centers.
dod basic research
15. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Sega, the recent National Academy of
Sciences study, chaired by General Larry Welch, on the DOD Basic
Research program made a number of recommendations for the program.
Among these are a change in the official DOD definition of basic
research, development of a cadre of experienced and empowered program
managers to run basic research programs, and an expansion of
``unfettered'' research in the account. What steps do you intend to
take to implement some of the study's recommendations?
Dr. Sega. After the National Research Council (NRC) released its
report, I asked the Defense Basic Research Advisory Group (DBRAG) to
advise me on which of the NRC recommendations they thought DOD should
implement. The DBRAG is chaired by the acting Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Laboratories and Basic Sciences and includes senior
managers from Military Department and Defense Agency offices that
oversee or carry out Basic Research. We'll be happy to keep your
committee staff informed as the DBRAG completes its assessment of the
issues raised by the NRC report and we make progress on possible
actions to resolve them.
classified research programs
16. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Sega, Dr. Killion, Admiral Cohen, Mr.
Engle, and Dr. Tether, note that since 2001, there has been significant
growth in the classified portion of our DOD S&T portfolio. Although
there is a role for classified research in our national security
technology development strategy, I am concerned that if too much of our
research portfolio is classified that traditional performers of
innovative research like small businesses and universities will have
difficulty participating in the programs. There is also a concern that
classified research limits our ability to spin off technologies into
the commercial sector--where it is often perfected and brought back
into the military at lower cost and with more capability.
Understanding the need for some of the research that is done to be
classified, how are you working to mitigate some of these negative
aspects of the increase in classified research?
Dr. Sega. I share your concern regarding an appropriate level of
funding in the classified portion of our DOD S&T portfolio. The fiscal
year 2006 request for DOD classified S&T programs is less than the
amount we requested in fiscal year 2005. As a percent of the DOD S&T
budget request, classified programs have accounted for between 1.3
percent and 2.9 percent since fiscal year 2001. The percentage for
classified programs in the fiscal year 2006 request is 1.5 percent and
I feel this is appropriate.
Dr. Killion. The Army's S&T classified budget has been relatively
small and stable over the past 5 years, averaging only a 2-percent
increase. Classified research and technology development is limited to
those activities that require a higher level of security and control.
The work done under these auspices is planned and accomplished with
full cognizance of work being done within the commercial sector. Many
classified efforts have related unclassified aspects that provide small
businesses, nontraditional suppliers, and universities ample
opportunity to participate in basic research, applied research, and
engineering activities that contribute to the classified programs. The
Army conducts its advanced technology development phase of these
efforts in collaboration with industry partners capable of
participating at the appropriate security level.
Admiral Cohen. The Office of Naval Research does not have
classified contracting authority, so the science and technology work we
fund is available to unclassified researchers at universities, non-
government labs and small, innovative businesses.
Mr. Engle. A portion of the research conducted within the Air Force
S&T program is by necessity classified. I believe we have an
appropriate mix of both classified and unclassified opportunities in
which our commercial sector partners can participate. The Air Force is
an ardent supporter of the innovative research conducted by small
businesses and universities and reaches out to them through our Small
Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program and our basic research
programs. For the most part, neither our SBIR outreach program nor our
basic research programs involve classified material. These programs
have grown substantially over the last 5 years, increasing the
opportunity for small businesses and universities to participate.
Further, our policy with respect to universities is in accordance with
the National Security Decision Directive 189, which states that, to the
maximum extent possible, the products of fundamental research remain
unrestricted.
Dr. Tether. DARPA is always interested in great new ideas, wherever
they come from. Classification typically only becomes important the
closer we get to an actual military application. If and when we must
make some information classified, we are well prepared to sponsor
willing organizations or even individuals into the National Industrial
Security Program, which is the program that gives non-government
organizations access to classified material.
It is true that there has been significant budget growth in our
most highly classified programs. However, the overwhelming majority of
our efforts, which have grown as well, remain unclassified or are not
highly classified. For example, almost all of our SBIR work, which is
devoted to small businesses, is unclassified. Our basic research, which
has more than doubled since fiscal year 1999, is all unclassified. In
short, DARPA has many opportunities for organizations with good ideas,
and those that are willing to participate in classified programs can
(provided they can be properly cleared, of course.)
Our Grand Challenge for autonomous ground vehicles highlights our
commitment to getting good ideas from anywhere. With universities, high
schools, small companies, garage mechanics, etc. that competition is
wide open. In fact, we picked our Challenge specifically to get a very
wide variety of organizations involved.
17. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Sega, Dr. Killion, Admiral Cohen, Mr.
Engle, and Dr. Tether, what should universities and small businesses do
in order to be able to participate in these classified research
programs?
Dr. Sega. They should seek sponsorship into the National Industrial
Security Program, which is a program that gives non-government
organizations access to classified material.
Dr. Killion. As with its unclassified research programs, the Army
engages with the commercial and academic communities to support the
Army's classified research programs. In those situations that a
business or university has the appropriate facilities for performing
classified research and have the personnel with the proper level of
security clearance, they may participate directly in the performance of
the classified research. Such secured facilities and personnel are more
often found in the business sector than in the academic sector. In
academia, it is more common for universities to support the classified
research programs by performing basic research that is fundamental in
nature, and as such, does not require a restricted classification.
Admiral Cohen. The Office of Naval Research does not have
classified contracting authority, so the science and technology work we
fund is available to unclassified researchers at universities, non-
government labs and small, innovative businesses.
Mr. Engle. Small businesses and universities are not excluded from
participating in classified research programs if they can demonstrate
the ability to protect sensitive national security information and get
the appropriate security clearances for their personnel. However, in a
lot of instances, it would be cost prohibitive for most small
businesses and universities to obtain these security clearances and the
infrastructure necessary to handle, store, and publish classified
reports. One approach that has worked well is teaming arrangements with
larger defense companies that can provide the infrastructure and, in
some cases, the people through contract arrangements. In the case of
universities, we have seen very little interest in participating in
classified research programs due to restrictions on publication.
Dr. Tether. In terms of small businesses, we are well prepared to
get those that need to be cleared into the National Industrial Security
Program. Moreover, in some cases, when a small business is a
subcontractor to a prime that already has access to classified
information, the prime can sponsor the small business into a program
too.
The same is true for universities. We are prepared to work with
them to set up the safeguards needed for classified programs, just like
other performers.
semiconductor industry
18. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Sega, Dr. Killion, Admiral Cohen, Mr.
Engle, and Dr. Tether, as you are aware, East Asian countries are
leveraging market forces through their national trade and industrial
policies to drive the migration of semiconductor manufacturing to that
region. If this accelerating shift in this manufacturing sector
overseas continues, the U.S. potentially could lose the ability to
reliably obtain high end semiconductor integrated circuits.
Semiconductors impact every aspect of a warfighter's mission including
secure communications, smart weapons, precision targeting, navigation,
and guidance.
Specifically, the photomask industry is of particular concern,
especially given that this is the only area in the fabrication process
where raw data is handled for laying down a complex pattern for
circuitry. This offshore shift in semiconductor manufacturing is
occurring at a time when these components are becoming an even more
crucial defense technology advantage to the United States. For example,
network-centric capability demands ever faster real time processing for
defense purposes and also because of the increasing need for such high-
end components in the Intelligence Community.
What research efforts are in place to mitigate this national
security risk, and are these efforts adequate to fully abate this
serious issue?
Dr. Sega. Photomasks are important for large volume electronics,
typical of most commercial production. The offshore migration of
portions of the semiconductor industry, including the photomask
industry, is influenced strongly by economic considerations. The
Defense Department has critical needs in the production of leading
edge, low volume integrated circuits. Mask costs are a significant
component of the cost of low volume integrated circuits. To address
future requirements in low volume electronics, DARPA has sponsored
research efforts in maskless lithography which could eliminate the
requirements for photomasks.
Dr. Killion. The OSD is in the lead on this issue and Army S&T
leadership coordinates its efforts in electronics R&D with OSD through
the office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for S&T.
Admiral Cohen. Office of Naval Research (ONR) has substantial
investments in network-centric technologies, and is keenly aware of the
need to maintain availability of secure electronics processing. In the
near term (next 5 years) this need should be met through the Trusted
Foundry agreement being negotiated between the U.S. DOD and IBM
Corporation. In addition; the DOD Advisory Group on Electron Devices
has recently completed a Special Technology Area Review on Field-
Programmable Gate Arrays which considered some of the ramifications of
increasing offshore processing of this type of high performance
electronic circuits, and the final report of this review will include
recommendations for DOD actions. ONR does not support research in
processing science for current generation silicon electronics, both
because the scale and proprietary nature of such research is best met
by other institutions. ONR does, however, support research in novel
electronics technologies that in the long term may supplant the current
technologies. This support includes our pioneering and continuing
investments in both nanoelectronics, and in multifunctional electronics
(including magnetics, optics, superconductivity, acoustic, etc.
technologies monolithically integrated with semiconductors). Securing
and maintaining U.S. leadership in processing capability for such next-
generation electronics is expected to at least partly mitigate the
increasing shift of conventional electronics processing offshore.
In summary, the currently supported efforts by ONR are largely
directed towards ``beyond silicon'' technology. ONR is increasingly
cooperating with NIST in the pursuit of flexible fabrication processes
for diverse types of electronic devices. The Naval Air Systems Command
is involved in the pursuit of an industry based Mask Initiative
Consortium (MIC) that is composed of the major U.S. companies in this
field (materials, mask makers, and tools).
Mr. Engle. The DOD has robust R&D investments in several key areas
tied to the semiconductor industrial base. This investment has several
benefits, including: maintaining a knowledge base of scientists and
engineers by supporting university and industry research; investigating
and developing technologies that are beyond the risk of industry due to
current economics, but that may have commercial value after they
mature; and, most importantly, providing technological superiority over
current and future adversaries. I defer to Dr. Sega to further address
these questions.
Dr. Tether. In fiscal year 2005 DARPA is funding research in
Advanced Lithography focused on developing Maskless Lithography for
cost-effective fabrication of low- to mid-volume, Application-Specific
Integrated Circuits (ASICs), as well as emerging MicroElectroMechanical
Systems (MEMS), and nano-photonic devices fabricated with feature sizes
of 100 nm and below. This new lithography technology will be capable of
directly patterning complex circuits down to feature sizes of 45nm and
below without use of photo masks. Currently, this program is evaluating
both optical and electron-beam based approaches to Maskless
Lithography. These tools are specifically aimed at meeting DOD needs,
and therefore address only the low- to moderate-volume production of
specialized DOD circuitry.
DARPA's Advanced Lithography program will take a strategic pause in
fiscal year 2006 to reassess opportunities. DARPA continues to evaluate
new technologies which have the potential to improve semiconductor chip
fabrication and thereby better support the warfighter. Higher volume
DOD semiconductor needs depend increasingly on commercial off-the-shelf
semiconductor devices. The DOD continues to be concerned about the
shift in semiconductor manufacturing offshore. The military departments
have recently responded to this concern by establishing a Trusted
Foundry at IBM to meet specialized DOD semiconductor needs.
manufacturing technology
19. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Sega, Dr. Killion, Admiral Cohen, Mr.
Engle, and Dr. Tether, the U.S. trade deficit in manufactured goods
increased $94.5 billion in 2004 from the $536 billion reported in 2003.
Our largest goods deficit is now with China, standing at $162 billion,
an increase of $37.9 billion from 2003. We are running major deficits
with China in defense critical manufacturing areas, such as computer
hardware ($25 billion) and electronics machinery and parts ($23
billion) as U.S. production drifts offshore. We are transferring major
portions of our circuit board, semiconductor, machine tool, and weapon
system metal casting manufacturing to China because of low wage and
production costs. Without productivity breakthroughs, the U.S. defense
manufacturing base particularly, second and third tier small
manufacturers will continue to erode. What research efforts are in
place to address the needed innovation in manufacturing and are these
efforts adequate to fully abate this serious issue?
Dr. Sega. Army, Navy, Air Force, Defense Logistics Agency, and
Missile Defense Agency each has Manufacturing Technology program
elements to address core service and agency manufacturing requirements.
OSD, through the Joint Defense Manufacturing Technology Panel (JDMTP),
works with the Military Departments and Defense Agencies to encourage
investment synergy and collaboration where possible. We work with
manufacturing initiatives such as Next Generation Manufacturing
Technology Initiative (NGMTI), Composites Affordability Initiative, and
Metals Affordability Initiative to identify candidate technologies that
support DOD S&T strategic plans and have the potential to the benefit
the warfighter. Most recently, we established a Defense Science Board
task force to assess the DOD Manufacturing Technology program and
provide recommendations as to how ManTech can be strengthened to
improve benefits to the DOD.
Dr. Killion. Within the Army, we have established an approach,
where appropriate, in which we conduct manufacturing S&T efforts that
are fully coordinated with and complementary to our most innovative and
advanced technology maturation and demonstration programs. We want to
reduce the cycle time from technology transition through development to
production while making our systems more affordable. A specific example
of this parallel development is the Flexible Display Initiative. The
Flexible Display Center, in particular, will set up the first
integrated pilot line in the world to manufacture affordable flexible
displays. This is a collaborative effort among the Army, academia and
several sector representative companies from the U.S. industrial base.
The Army Manufacturing Technology program is also investing in high
strength steel manufacturing processes to strengthen the U.S. forging
industrial base supplying material for next generation gun barrels.
Both efforts stress the development of manufacturing techniques that
enable the affordable production of this state-of-the-art technology.
In newly emerging areas of interest, specifically nanotechnology and
biotechnology, the Army has established centers of technology
excellence. Both the Institute for Soldier Nanotechnology and the
Institute for Collaborative Biotechnology have incorporated industry
partnerships to examine early the scale up of manufacturing processes
for production.
Admiral Cohen. The Navy's primary investments in production process
technology are through the Manufacturing Technology (ManTech) and the
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Programs. ManTech investments
are used to improve the productivity and responsiveness of the Navy
industrial base by developing manufacturing technologies that are
beyond the risk that industry is able to assume. The program develops
moderate to high risk process and equipment technology needed to
support emerging acquisition program requirements that address
warfighting capabilities. For example, on the next generation destroyer
class, DD(X), numerous warfighting capability requirements drove the
design of the topside structure to utilize composite materials. Given
that the hull would remain steel, industry required an effective and
efficient means of joining the different materials. To address this
issue, ManTech developed an adhesive bonded joining technology for
marine applications. It is now being incorporated into the baseline
design for DD(X) and the technology is available for other
applications.
The Navy SBIR program is one of the major sources for funding small
business in the development of new and innovative manufacturing
processes, materials and software. The Navy SBIR office continues this
focus and through Executive Order 13329, ``Encouraging Innovation in
Manufacturing'' is receiving more visibility from small business and
acquisition programs that have a desire to use the SBIR program
resources to help address American defense manufacturing needs. Through
SBIR funding, one small business has developed automated production
planning software that creates piping production plans directly from
the 3-D model of the ship and information about the pipe shop
facilities. This software, which promises significant savings in
planning time and cost, is being tested in industry for application on
the CVN-21.
Both ManTech and SBIR are focused on Navy acquisition program
requirements and, as such, are unlikely to have an impact on overall
industrial competitiveness and the balance of commercial trade. In the
case of the electronics industry, the DOD share of the overall market
is less than 1 percent. Industry investments in electronics product and
process development are based on the needs of the commercial market.
Therefore, the Navy's manufacturing research done in electronics is not
focused on productivity improvements for semi-conductors, circuit
boards and other commodity items. Instead, it focuses on military
unique items such as traveling. wave tubes and on packaging commercial
electronics to meet military requirements. The situation is similar for
machine tools and metal castings. The market in these sectors is also
heavily weighted toward commercial sales.
Mr. Engle. Maintaining a strong domestic industrial base is a key
element to ensuring the DOD with first and assured access to critical
components from trusted domestic sources. The DOD Manufacturing
Technology program aids in this quest by developing manufacturing
technologies that enable affordable production and sustainment of
current and future weapon systems. The Air Force strives to develop
resources onshore where possible, but in some cases we are forced to go
overseas for resources, materials, or technologies that do not exist
domestically.
In the case of semiconductors, current military requirements are
met predominantly by the large vertically integrated United States
defense manufacturers. Companies such as BAE Systems, Lockheed,
Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, and Honeywell have design, fabrication, and
production capabilities to ensure military unique performance and
security requirements are met. Of course, the concern is with the move
offshore of materials and components that are used in building the
devices. Over 70 percent of the manufacturers of items such as ceramic
packages, high-purity silicon wafers, die materials, quartz products,
resins, and optical equipment are foreign based or owned. These items
are not unique to military parts and their economics and technology are
driven by the commercial market.
The DOD is evaluating three alternatives to address its
requirements. The first would establish and maintain a facility
dedicated to production of components for national security
applications. Current plans call for a short-term solution that
establishes a ``trusted foundry'' to produce parts for those systems
defined as critical or requiring mission assurance. The second is to
focus investments on revolutionary technologies. Long-range planning
within DOD's S&T community is focused on enabling and emerging
technologies as they relate to defense requirements. Investment in
areas such as optoelectronics and nanotechnology may not only provide a
significant increase in military capability, but may also have domestic
commercial economic implications that surpass trying to retain current
technologies. The third alternative is to use DOD funding to strengthen
the current commercial industrial base. However, with less than 2
percent of total market sales, DOD investment may not be adequate to
overcome industry economics.
Finally, the Defense Production Act, Title III program has limited
funding to conduct a preliminary analysis of the Mask Industry
Consortium's proposal to use Title III funding to provide incentives to
the mask infrastructure (mask writing, mask inspection, and mask repair
tools) to assure the domestic availability of state-of-the-art
photomasks for military integrated circuits. However, initial estimates
indicate that this could require a DOD investment in excess of $100
million over 4 years.
Dr. Tether. One process technology which could change the trade
deficit is our Titanium Initiative to dramatically reduce the cost of
titanium and enable new types of alloys. Titanium is an incredible
material, but its use is partly limited by it cost--just like
aluminum's use was many years ago. We want to do for titanium what was
done for aluminum. Titanium costs $16 to $32 per pound now. We are
developing a process which will reduce that to at least $4 a pound, and
maybe below $2. At that point, many new uses will open up, from
replacing the pipes aboard ships to maybe even ships themselves made of
titanium.
We've also developed a technology to manufacture bulk quantities of
structural amorphous metals, sometimes called glassy metals. These
metals are extraordinarily strong, tough and corrosion resistant, but
only small quantities could be made until DARPA's recent research. Uses
might include ballistic hardening for ships or replacing the depleted
uranium in antiarmor rounds.
As I mentioned, our work in microelectronics also shows how we work
on process technologies to reach a new capability for DOD. For example,
our Focus Centers Research Program is looking at concepts for
microelectronics and computing devices beyond the current international
roadmap for semiconductors; this includes process technologies. Our
wide bandgap semiconductor programs are working on the materials and
devices needed to use wide bandgap semiconductors for high power and
high frequency applications. DARPA is funding research in Advanced
Lithography focused on developing Maskless Lithography for cost-
effective fabrication of low- to mid-volume ASICs, as well as emerging
MEMS, and nano-photonic devices fabricated with feature sizes of 100 nm
and below. This new lithography technology will be capable of directly
patterning complex circuits down to feature sizes of 45nm and below
without use of photo masks. Currently, this program is evaluating both
optical and electron-beam based approaches to Maskless Lithography.
These tools are specifically aimed at meeting DOD needs, and therefore
address only the low- to moderate-volume production of specialized DOD
circuitry.
Our Radiation Hard by Design program also illustrates DARPA's
approach. Radiation hardened electronics, which are needed for things
like spacecraft, currently require expensive specialized fabrication
facilities. As a result, they constantly lag the most advanced
generation of electronics. Instead of trying to improve the rad hard
manufacturing process, DARPA's approach is to make such a process
unnecessary by designing the chip in such a way that a rad hard chip
can be manufactured in an ordinary, and up-to-date, fab.
I am confident that as DARPA continues its historical work of
keeping our military on the technological cutting edge, we will
continue to help create the process technologies needed for those
radical new capabilities.
20. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Sega, Dr. Killion, Admiral Cohen, Mr.
Engle, and Dr. Tether, are the efforts in your areas coordinated with
the Defense Industrial Base Capability Studies (DIBCS) that are
currently underway? Are your research priorities aligned with the
priorities identified through these studies?
Dr. Sega. Yes. DOD Science and Technology (S&T) efforts and
investment strategies are driven by warfighter requirements identified
in the Joint Warfighting S&T Plan (JWSTP). The DIBCS, along with other
DOD and commercial studies, can provide valuable insight for how best
to invest scarce resources.
Dr. Killion. Army Manufacturing S&T priorities, like our overall
S&T research priorities, are aligned with the needs of the warfighter.
We do review results of studies such as the DIBCS to identify and
mitigate possible challenges to future production of technologies being
developed. In addition we have also commissioned assessments by
independent groups, such as the National Center for Advanced
Technologies, to inform us regarding manufacturing science and
technology issues that helped us prioritize.
Admiral Cohen. The Defense Industrial Base Capability Studies
(DIBCS) are being produced by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Industrial Policy). The DIBCS are based on the Joint Staff's Joint
Functional Concepts (JFCs), which are focused on defense needs in the
2015-2020 timeframe. The JFCs provide a starting point for the analysis
of Science and Technology gaps that must be filled in order to meet the
joint warfighting vision in the 10-15 year horizon. As such, the Navy's
Science and Technology (S&T) investments are loosely coordinated with
the DIBCS through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council's definition
of future warfare needs. However, the Navy's research priorities are
not aligned directly with the DICBS priorities because industrial base
issues are but one factor among many that must be considered in the
prioritization process.
Mr. Engle. The first study of the DIBCS was released in January
2004 with the final study scheduled for release in May 2005. The Air
Force S&T community is currently evaluating DIBCS findings and
recommendations in order to incorporate these into our research and
investment plans as appropriate. In some cases, DIBCS findings have
validated ongoing programs as with the Air Force Manufacturing
Technology Advance Electronically Scanned Arrays project, which is
supported by findings contained in the Battle Space Awareness DIBCS. In
other areas, DIBCS findings may stimulate new or additional investment.
Dr. Tether. As part of the DIBCS process, the Office of the Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense (Industrial Policy) (ODUSD(IP)) takes into
account the S&T community's plans, particularly since the early
capabilities for a new technology may only exist in research labs. At
the same time, myself and other members of my staff have participated
in, contributed to and reviewed some of their studies.
Our research priorities are aligned. For example, one study
identified a concern about the supply of Maser clocks for global
positioning systems (GPS). Our program for a chip scale atomic clock
might help there. Similarly, we may be able to offer solutions to other
potential problems in the areas of pulsed plasma thrusters and
hypersonics propulsion systems. There are likely to be other things we
have underway which might help.
So, as ODUSD(IP) identifies specific problems and possible
solutions, we will fold those issues into the mix we consider while
formulating DARPA's research programs.
21. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Sega, Dr. Killion, Admiral Cohen, Mr.
Engle, and Dr. Tether, what is your current role in the completion of
the DIBCS efforts and is there additional participation needed by your
teams?
Dr. Sega. We understand the final part of DIBCS, Focused Logistics,
will be published before the end of this fiscal year. The S&T community
welcomes the opportunity to participate in evaluating and understanding
the capabilities of the industrial base with regard to DOD goals and
priorities.
Dr. Killion. Army S&T does not currently participate in the DIBCS
efforts. However, as part of the Army's S&T mission to foster
innovation and develop new capabilities, we have identified technology
areas where the Army would benefit in terms of technology availability
and affordability from improved manufacturing capability and/or
strengthening of the industrial base. The Army has determined that
pursuing advanced technology in parallel with manufacturing technology
development works to accelerate an affordable capability to the
warfighter.
Admiral Cohen. The Defense Industrial Base Capability Studies
(DIBCS) are being produced by the Office Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense (Industrial Policy) (ODUSD(IP)). Four studies covering
Battlespace Awareness, Command and Control, Force Application and
Protection have already been published. The final DIBCS study, covering
Focused Logistics, is planned for publication in May. The Navy has not
had a role in developing these reports. Since the final report is
almost complete, additional involvement is not recommended at this
time. However, once ODUSD(IP) moves into the implementation phase of
DIBCS the Navy Science and Technology community will need to be
engaged.
Mr. Engle. The Air Force did not formally participate in the DIBCS
as service participation was limited to Joint Staff representation on
requirements teams. Future Service participation will depend on how the
OSD implements DIBCS recommendations.
Dr. Tether. ODUSD(IP) and DARPA are both part of Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics, so we have organizational proximity that
facilitates understanding what each other is doing. DARPA has helped
review some of their reports. So I think the current level of
interaction works quite well and suits our various roles in the
research, technology, product life cycle.
As ODUSD(IP) moves toward the implementation phase of their DIBCS
work, I fully expect them to engage us in looking for solutions when
S&T investments by DARPA would be appropriate. I will take their
assessments into consideration when formulating what research areas
DARPA might move into.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
chemical and biological defense program coordination
22. Senator Reed. Dr. Sega and Dr. Tether, I am concerned that the
Department's programs and efforts in chemical and biological defense
S&T are not adequately coordinated with other Federal agencies,
particularly the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). This includes whether there is adequate
cooperation and a system for avoiding duplication among these agencies.
I am also aware of concerns that DARPA's efforts are not sufficiently
coordinated and integrated with the Department's overall chemical and
biological defense program. Would you agree that there are both room
and need for improvement in the coordination of the DOD programs with
other Federal agency efforts, and with the DARPA program?
Dr. Sega. In any complex enterprise such as this area there is
``room for improvement,'' and we have, and will continue to stress the
importance of coordinating interagency and intradepartmental S&T.
Dr. Tether. You should have no concern as the DARPA Chemical and
Biological Warfare (CBW) Defense Program is well coordinated both
inside and outside the DOD. The DARPA CBW Defense Program is completely
integrated and synergistic with the DOD CBW Defense Program and with
other Federal programs. Coordination and integration of these DARPA
programs into the broader Federal programs are done through a variety
of mechanisms including interagency coordinating committees, community
outreach briefings, and partnerships for the transition of technologies
to the operational arena.
The DARPA CBW Defense Program coordinates its efforts with numerous
organizations, including the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense, Defense Threat Reduction
Agency (DTRA), Joint Program Executive Office, Chem-Bio Defense (JPEO-
CBD,) and the DOD Guardian Program, as well as with non-DOD entities
such as the DHS, Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DHS-HSARPA), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Through
Project Reliance, DARPA formally participates in the coordination of
the DOD Chem Bio Defense Technology Area Plan. As part of this process,
DARPA also participates in the biannual Technology Area Review and
Assessment process. In addition, a DARPA Senior Executive is a member
of the DOD Senior Advisory Group for CBW Defense. The Advanced
Diagnostics portion of the DARPA BW Defense program is closely
coordinated with the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command
and DARPA program personnel attended meetings of the Common Diagnostic
Systems interagency Scientific Steering Committee that participated in
strategic planning for Defense Technology Objective CB.26 (Common
Diagnostic Systems for BW Agents and Endemic Infectious Diseases).
Several examples of successful transition of programs from DARPA
highlight the strong coordination among the DOD's CBW programs both
within the DOD and throughout relevant Federal agencies:
1. Immune Building (IB) Program. The IB program was initiated to
develop technologies to protect military buildings from internal or
external attack with chemical or biological warfare agents. Program
objectives include protecting human occupants, quickly restoring
building to function, and preserving forensic evidence. Early on in the
program, DARPA developed a core team of military service
representatives to review the design and testing of the system and
offer recommendations to help meet operational requirements. The goal
of transitioning this DARPA program to a military customer was made a
reality when Fort Leonard Wood agreed to not only install a
demonstration system at their site, but to also assume ownership and
follow-on testing of the IB system after the demonstration.
2. Building Protection Toolkit (BPTK). DARPA met the challenge of
implementing the IB technologies in other buildings through the
development of the BPTK. The BPTK utilizes validated modeling and
simulation tools for tailoring protective designs to buildings of
various sizes, construction and uses and to enable cost/benefit
analysis. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Protective Design Center in
Omaha, Nebraska, which specializes in chemical, biological, and
radiological weapons of mass destruction building protection, recently
hired additional personnel to specifically use BPTK to develop new and
to modify existing facility designs. The BPTK software is transitioning
to the Joint Warfighting Center at Fort Monroe, Virginia, for
integration into the Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation. The
National Institute of Standards and Technology in Gaithersburg,
Maryland, will use the BPTK modifications made to CONTAM, a multizone
indoor air quality and ventilation analysis computer program, in their
future modeling and standards work to assess and validate protective
strategies.
3. C1O2 Based Building Decontamination. While
C1O2 has been in use for some years, there was a need to
extend the system functionality and to construct a portable building
decontamination system. DARPA completed both of these objectives in
fiscal year 2004 and will complete testing of the system effectiveness
against viral, toxins, CW, and select toxic industrial chemicals in
fiscal year 2005. DARPA is currently working with DHS-HSARPA, EPA, and
JPEO-CBD to jointly develop validated CONOPs and to test system
effectiveness in full building tests against anthrax stimulant. The
portable C1O2 building decontamination system is planned for
transition to both DHS and EPA in fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2006
for use in full building decontamination activities.
4. TIGER Program. The goal of the Triangulation Identification for
Genetic Evaluation of Biological Risk (TIGER) program was to develop a
universal BW sensor system that would support ``gold standard''
classification of all biological agents. This sensor has the potential
to revolutionize biomedical evaluation of natural pathogens, including
emerging infectious diseases and genetically engineered agents, while
simultaneously monitoring for biological weapons attacks. The U.S. Army
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick,
Maryland, has acquired a TIGER system for analysis of emerging
pathogens. The National Biological Forensics Analysis Center of the DHS
has procured a TIGER system to provide high-throughput rapid agent
identification and strain typing. The system will be deployed in fiscal
year 2005. The Naval Health Research Center (NHRC) in San Diego,
California, will use a TIGER system for environmental and clinical
surveillance for human pathogens. An example of specific NHRC research
utilizing the TIGER is a study which monitors Marine recruits for
respiratory illnesses.
5. Pathogen Countermeasures Program: A number of promising medical
countermeasures have been transitioned for more advanced development
within the DOD. A few examples within the last 12 months include the
following:
CPG: DARPA has supported research into the ability of
specific sequences of microbial DNA (called CPG) to activate
the innate part of the immune system. DARPA researchers
realized that CPG was essentially functioning as an immune
activator, and proved that CPG had potential as a new vaccine
adjutant. DARPA demonstrated the feasibility of this approach;
DTRA is now supporting a human clinical trial of CPG to enhance
responses to the current anthrax vaccine. We believe that the
series of six shots can be reduced to only two, or perhaps even
one, when administered with CPG. The initial human trial will
be finished later this spring.
PlyG: For several years, DARPA has supported research
investigating specific viruses (called phage) which infect and
kill harmful bacteria, such as anthrax. DARPA investigators
proved that specific enzymes from these phage not only kill,
but actually disintegrate, anthrax. DARPA demonstrated the
feasibility of this approach, and now DTRA is funding these
investigators for further development of new antibiotics.
Clinical trials are expected to begin in 2006.
Caspase Based Anti-Viral Therapeutics: DARPA has most
recently transitioned to DTRA the development of a completely
new approach to kill many classes of viruses by inducing a
suicide signal in cells which are infected with a virus. By
killing the infected cells, the virus cannot propagate and kill
the host. This is a very novel approach, but one which now
appears to be at least technically feasible.
The DARPA program is also coordinated with efforts outside the DOD.
A panel of chemical and biological defense experts is routinely
consulted by DARPA to evaluate programs and to ensure that NIH efforts
are not being duplicated. In addition, the Pathogen Countermeasures
program is fully briefed to National Institute of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases (NIAID) every 6 months, and NIAID program managers
regularly attend the principle investigator meetings. There is also a
developing close partnership between DARPA and the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). Center and office directors at FDA have been
fully briefed on DARPA initiatives, and FDA personnel are now working
cooperatively with DARPA to identify regulatory issues and provide
input as appropriate. FDA scientists now attend pertinent DARPA
principle investigator meetings.
Additionally, from October 2004 through January 2005, DARPA hosted
a series of conferences focused on DARPA programs in the chemical and
biological defense area. The goals of these events were to ensure that
the government R&D community (both DOD and non-DOD) is informed of
DARPA investments in this area, and to promote awareness of potential
upcoming product transitions. The governmental organizations that
attended are listed below and additional meetings are planned for May
2005.
DARPA CBW Defense Community Briefings--October 5, 2004, December
21, 2004, January 25, 2005 Participating Agencies
Department of Health & Human Services, Bureau of
Health
Department of Health & Human Services, FDA
Department of Health & Human Services, Office of R&D
Coordination
DHS, S&T Directorate--HSARPA
DHS, S&T Directorate--Programs, Plans, & Budget
DHS, S&T Directorate--Systems Engineering &
Development
DHS, Transportation Security Administration
EPA, Environmental Response Team
EPA, Hazardous Sites Cleanup Division
EPA, National Homeland Security Research Center
EPA, Office of Pesticide Programs
EPA, Office of Research and Development
EPA, Office of Solid Waste & Emergency Response
EPA, Office of the Administrator
EPA, Superfund Remediation & Technology Innovation
Executive Office of the President, Office of S&T
Policy
Joint Chiefs of Staff, J8
Joint Program Executive Office, Chem-Bio Defense
Joint Requirements Office, Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense
NIH, National Center for Research Resources
NIH, National Institute of Allergy & Infectious
Diseases
OSD, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology
OSD, Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center
OSD, Chem-Bio Defense
OSD, Defense Logistics Agency
OSD, DTRA
OSD, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)
Pentagon Force Protection Agency, CBRN Directorate
U.S. Air Force, 313 Human Systems Wing
U.S. Army, Army Research Laboratory
U.S. Army, Corps of Engineers
U.S. Army, Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (ECBC)
U.S. Army, Headquarters, G-8 Force Development Branch
U.S. Army, Medical Research Institute of Infectious
Diseases
U.S. Army, Research, Development, & Engineering
Command
U.S. Army, Medical Research Institute of Infectious
Diseases
U.S. Marine Corps, Systems Command
U.S. Navy, Naval Research Laboratory
U.S. Navy, Naval Surface Warfare Center
U.S. Navy, Office of Naval Research
U.S. State Department, Bureau of Diplomatic Security
U.S. State Department, Bureau of Nonproliferation
U.S. State Department, Office of Medical Services
U.S. State Department, Overseas Building Operations
I hope this information fully alleviates any concern you may have
had regarding the DARPA program's interactions with both DOD and other
Federal programs.
23. Senator Reed. Dr. Sega and Dr. Tether, how do you believe these
two concerns can best be addressed?
Dr. Sega. As regards the interagency cooperation, four senior
officials in the Department are actively engaged in various integration
and coordination forums set up by the National and Homeland Security
Councils; DDR&E, ASD(Homeland Defense), ASD(Health Affairs) and
ATSD(NCB). I believe that these forums are comprehensive in scope and
effective. As regards internal DOD cooperation and integration, Dr.
Klein (ATSD(NCB)) is the lead official for execution of RDT&E programs
in this area and he has been actively working to address this as a
response to the Major Action Item from the 2004 Chemical-Biological
Defense Technology Area Review and Assessment (TARA). It is through
mechanisms of R&E oversight such as TARA that continuing improvements
can be effected.
Dr. Tether. DARPA continues to participate in all venues for
coordination and integration while seeking additional avenues to ensure
maximum DARPA program effectiveness and to prevent duplication. We
understand this coordination is essential within DOD as well as across
all Federal agencies and private industry and academia.
As detailed in our answer to question 22, I feel that the two
concerns are bring addressed.
joint unmanned combat air systems
24. Senator Reed. Mr. Engle, the Air Force's fiscal year 2006 S&T
budget request includes $78 million for the Joint Unmanned Combat Air
System (J-UCAS). Could you please explain why this program has been
transferred to the Air Force from DARPA?
Mr. Engle. The OSD transferred program management of the J-UCAS
program to the Air Force to establish a joint program office with Navy
representation and to advance the program. The Air Force and Navy have
been tasked to restructure the J-UCAS program with emphasis on the
development of air vehicles that will contribute to future warfighting
concepts of operations.
25. Senator Reed. Mr. Engle, why will this improve the program?
Mr. Engle. Transition of the J-UCAS program to the Air Force will
allow for an early focus on joint warfighting concepts and increased
emphasis on timely fielding of J-UCAS capabilities. The development of
war fighting concepts and capabilities, and the subsequent
incorporation of these capabilities into overall joint warfighting
operations, is not an area that DARPA is structured to perform. For
this reason, as the technology matures, it is important to transfer
DARPA's ``tech push'' efforts to service leadership. With the extensive
work the Air Force has done in this area, we are well prepared to take
the lead for the J-UCAS program.
26. Senator Reed. Mr. Engle, The J-UCAS program is being partially
funded in S&T again. Is this a more accurate reflection of the state of
maturity of the system's technologies?
Mr. Engle. Yes, the $77.8 million transferred into the Air Force
S&T Program in fiscal year 2006 reflects the relative maturity of the
J-UCAS program. This S&T funding provides for completion of technology
development and facilitates transition of this technology into the
formal development program. The majority of funding for J-UCAS was
transferred into the J-UCAS Advanced Component and Prototype
Development Program Element, which better reflects the more mature
nature of this system's technology.
27. Senator Reed. Admiral Cohen, what is the Navy's role in the J-
UCAS program?
Admiral Cohen. The Navy is integral to the joint program. Navy
personnel from the Office of Naval Research, Naval Air Systems Command,
CNO staff, and other organizations comprise a substantial portion of
the J-UCAS program management, technical, engineering, and support
staff. A J-UCAS Field Office has been established at NAS Patuxent
River. Navy objectives have been set for the program, and have a major
influence on system design, development, and demonstration plans.
28. Senator Reed. Admiral Cohen, what is the fiscal year 2006 Navy
investment in the program?
Admiral Cohen. In fiscal year 2005, all Navy Unmanned Combat Air
Vehicle (UCAV-N) funds, including those that had been allocated in
future years, were included in the Defense Wide program element
supporting the J-UCAS program. Beginning in fiscal year 2006, this
funding will be transferred to an Air Force program element. The Navy
continues to support the program with personnel and material resources
as described in the response to QFR 27.
non-lethal weapons development
29. Senator Reed. Dr. Sega, a variety of Department programs are
developing non-lethal weapons capabilities that may be deployed to our
forces. I am concerned that some of these new systems may be sent
overseas as prototypes for demonstration or experimentation purposes
without proper policy oversight, testing of the technology, or training
of end users. How are you working with the Joint Non-lethal Weapons
Program to develop new non-lethal weapons capabilities and transition
them to the field, while assuring adequate policy review and testing of
these systems and adequate training for the forces who will use them?
Dr. Sega. My office, as well as several other offices within the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics (OUSD(AT&L)) interact frequently, both formally and
informally, with the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program and the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low
Intensity Conflict (OASD/SOLIC), which has policy oversight for the
development and employment of non-lethal weapons.
The DOD policy directive on non-lethal weapons, DOD Directive
3000.3, assigns responsibilities for the development and employment of
non-lethal weapons. Non-lethal weapons are developed and fielded using
the same general processes as those used for the acquisition of lethal
weapons. Non-lethal weapons policy considerations are addressed early
in concept development and encompass areas such as intended effects,
human test protocols, concept of operations and employment, and legal
and treaty compliance.
30. Senator Reed. Dr. Sega, what is the process for policy review
of these systems prior to their deployment?
Dr. Sega. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (OASD/SO-LIC) has policy
oversight for the development and employment of non-lethal weapons. The
DOD policy directive on non-lethal weapons, DOD Directive 3000.3,
assigns specific responsibilities for the development and employment of
non-lethal weapons within the Department.
darpa experimental hiring authority (section 1101)
31. Senator Reed. Dr. Tether, Congress has given DARPA a special
hiring authority which DARPA has used successfully to hire a number of
technical experts to manage research programs. Please described how
DARPA has made use of this authority to date and what plans are for its
future use.
Dr. Tether. Since March 1999, DARPA has successfully used its
Section 1101 experimental personnel authority to hire highly skilled
term employees as program managers, deputy office directors and office
directors. The authority currently has 40 billets; it was expanded from
20 billets in 2000. Section 1101 has allowed DARPA to compete for, and
expeditiously hire, highly-skilled individuals from industry and
academia that would otherwise be lost due to salary disparities and a
lengthy hiring process. The Section 1101 authority allows us to offer a
salary up to the Executive Level III cap; offer recruitment, retention,
relocation, or performance bonuses up to $25,000 per employee, per
year; and, it allows us to make on-the-spot hires with as little as 1
week for in-processing time. This is in contrast to being able to offer
only the limited top grade and step of the General Schedule. Moreover,
it also prevents DARPA from losing potential talent because of the
protracted regular hiring process, which has exceeded 6 months in some
cases. When competing for the kind of talent DARPA needs, compensation
incentives and expeditious hiring are critical to attracting highly
sought after candidates and closing the deal.
The Section 1101 authority granted to DARPA will expire September
30, 2008. However, in the spirit of embracing the NSPS, DARPA has
recently switched to using the new Highly Qualified Expert (HQE)
authority, modeled after the Section 1101 program, for all new,
eligible hires from industry. One advantage of the Section 1101
authority has been that we control and manage the entire hiring
process. As we transition to the HQE authority I hope that we'll be
able to manage our HQE hiring in the same manner as we managed Section
1101 and that everything will be running smoothly before Section 1101
expires. My goal is to be able to hire the same quality of people for
the same kinds of positions as we have under the Section 1101
authority, and just as quickly.
32. Senator Reed. Dr. Tether, I understand that DARPA is now
working to make use of authority within the NSPS that will enable it to
hire ``HQEs'' to work at the agency. Could you describe how DARPA is
making use of this new authority?
Dr. Tether. We have been delegated authority from the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to manage the HQE
program at DARPA and received a block of 60 allocations to use from
Washington Headquarters Service (WHS). We also have a Memorandum of
Understanding with WHS to assist us with the mechanics of ensuring our
HQEs are properly entered into the Civilian Personnel Data and Payroll
Systems.
Additionally, we have written an interim pay plan, which mirrors
the Personnel and Readiness implementation guidance, pending a final
internal DARPA Instruction on HQE personnel administration.
To date, we have hired two HQEs; one in the Tactical Technology
Office; one in the Information Exploitation Office. We have another
offer pending and two more in negotiation.
33. Senator Reed. Dr. Tether, how do these new authorities compare
with respect to supporting the performance of DARPA's designated
mission? Are there particular advantages to one over the other?
Dr. Tether. The most valuable aspect of the section 1101 and HQE
hiring programs is the ability to negotiate salary (and bonus) and move
quickly with an offer of employment. Since receiving the hiring
authority delegation and a block of allocations, the HQE program can
meet DARPA's technical hiring needs as well as the Section 1101 program
has done over the past 6 years. In fact, the HQE program is an enhanced
version of the Section 1101 program in that, if necessary, we are able
to offer more compensation than what is allowable under the 1101
authority (e.g., bonuses of up to 50,000, vs. 25,000 in the Section
1101 program; HQEs receive 8 hours of annual leave per pay period vs. 4
hours of annual leave for section 1101 first time appointments).
As long as DARPA is able to manage our HQE hiring in the same
manner as we have managed Section 1101, it will be a more advantageous
and flexible hiring authority.
high productivity computing system program
34. Senator Reed. Dr. Tether, how much funding is being requested
in the fiscal year 2006 budget for the High Productivity Computing
System Program (HPCS)? What do you expect this funding will achieve?
Dr. Tether. The fiscal year 2006 budget request for the HPCS
program is $70.1 million. The requested fiscal year 2006 funding will
complete the R&D phase (Phase II) of the HPCS program and start the
full-scale development phase (Phase III). Based on the same successful
rapid response model used for the transition from Phase I to II, a
Phase III solicitation will be released, proposals reviewed, and
vendor(s) selected.
At this budget level, we anticipate that one team will move forward
into the full-scale development of HPCS Phase III effort.
35. Senator Reed. Dr. Tether, how much additional funding is
necessary in order to fund additional HPCS teams for the system
development and demonstration (SDD) phase of the program?
Dr. Tether. An additional team would not require additional funding
in fiscal year 2006, but would require $50 million more in fiscal year
2007. This would result in a budget profile of $70.1 million in fiscal
year 2006 and $125 million in fiscal year 2007. Fiscal year 2008 and
fiscal year 2009 have yet to be finalized, but additional funds would
be needed in both years.
We are also soliciting the Department of Energy and the National
Security Agency to provide the additional required funding for the
program to have an additional team since they are major beneficiaries
of the technology.
36. Senator Reed. Dr. Tether, why is it advantageous to fund
multiple contractors during the SDD phase of the program?
Dr. Tether. A number of recent reports, including the High-End
Computing Revitalization Task Force report, have indicated the
importance of revitalizing high-end computing to ensure a strong United
States high performance computing (HPC) technology, development and
product base. The number of government agencies already participating
in the HPCS program (including the DOD, the National Security Agency,
the National Reconnaissance Office, the Department of Energy, the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the National Science
Foundation) attest to the importance of the program to national
security and scientific leadership.
Each of the current Phase II vendors offer a unique high-end
computing capability and commercial market emphasis. Based on the vital
role of a world-class HPC capability, multiple awards for Phase III
would greatly increase the industrial base capability to support our
national security needs, ensure continued U.S. scientific leadership,
and greatly enhance the long-term viability of high-end computing.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
nanotechnology
37. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, Dr. Killion, Admiral Cohen, Mr.
Engle, and Dr. Tether, investment in nano-related S&T research appears
to have been significant over the last few years. Nanotechnology has
tremendous intuitive appeal, generated considerable excitement, and
attracted significant investment. Despite the investment, one does not
hear much about nanotechnology moving very progressively from
conceptual potential to technical promise. One cannot survey America's
research universities these days and not find scientists with a nano-
miracle ready to solve any number of materials, electronic, chemical,
mechanical or bio-medical problem.
For example, Florida State University and Florida A&M University
are in partnership with Armor Holding, Incorporated (manufacturer of
the up-armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)) in
the development of a composite material and manufacturing technology
that will provide new lightweight body armor to protect soldiers' arms
and legs. The ultimate objective is to apply this manufacturing
technique to an exceptionally strong and lightweight nano-material,
also under development at Florida State and Florida A&M. You can
imagine that scientists at these two great universities are working
hard on this effort with a great sense of purpose and understanding of
the urgency to find an extremities protection solution.
What in your view is the potential or promise of nanotechnology
solutions to military technical challenges?
Dr. Sega. Nanotechnology will impact military capabilities across a
broad spectrum of application areas because the ability to control and
exploit material structure at the nanometer scale will permit a wide
range of new functionalities. Some specific areas for which
nanotechnology offers the greatest potential for enhancing military
capabilities include: chemical/biological defense, information
technology, energy and energetics, multifunctional materials and
devices, and health monitoring and sensing.
Dr. Killion. Nanotechnology has the greatest potential to impact
warfighter needs in the areas of chemical and biological defense,
network-centric technologies, power and energy, light combat system
survivability, soldier protection, and soldier health monitoring and
treatment.
Admiral Cohen. There is significant excitement about the promise of
nanotechnology for many applications around the world. The example
cited is one where nanomaterials and composites are being examined as
potential high strength, but lightweight, materials for body armor.
Other examples of nanoscience-driven opportunities that have
significant military application include:
1) nanoelectronics, nanophotonics, and nanomagnetics research
as potential solutions in areas of network centric warfare,
information warfare, uninhabited combat vehicles, automation
and robotics for reduced manning, effective training via
virtual reality, and rapid digital signal processing;
2) nanomaterials ``by design'' wherein today's computers are
capable of designing and testing new materials before they are
made resulting in potential, cost effective, solutions in areas
of high performance and affordable materials, multifunctional
and adaptive (i.e., smart) materials, energetic materials and
materials for power generation and storage, nanoengineered
functional materials, and materials requiring reduced
maintenance;
3) nanobiotechnology for warfighter protection research as
potential solutions for chemical and biological agent detection
and destruction, and human performance issues such as health
monitoring and prophylaxis.
The successful transition of these S&T nanoscience research efforts
into field-tested nanotechnology products will have significant impact
in the following areas:
1) information dominance wherein nanoscale phenomena foster
lower power and/or less energy dissipation per process, better
signal transduction via improved signal-to-noise, faster
processing speeds due to shorter transit times, and higher
function density;
2) enhanced platforms wherein nanoscale phenomena provide
multifunctional and/or adaptive design flexibility inhibit
conventional failure mechanisms in materials, and control the
release of energy;
3) weapons and countermeasures wherein nanoscale phenomena
provide controlled energy release fuels and explosives, new
materials for high power lasers and missile seeker domes, and
stealth;
4) detection, protection, and decontamination systems for
weapons of mass destruction wherein nanoscale phenomena provide
improved detector sensitivity, improved selectivity with
miniaturized arrays, new capability via distributed autonomous
systems, super absorbent material, and nanofibers for membranes
and clothing; and
5) warfighter enhancement and protection wherein nanoscale
phenomena provide more function per unit weight and/or volume,
improved power generation and storage and/or lower power
demand, and personal decision aids.
Mr. Engle. We believe nanotechnology is paving the way to new
materials and device architectures that could form the foundation of
future warfighting capabilities. Because nanotechnology involves
manipulation of materials at the atomic level, we see applications
across our portfolio of science. For this reason we are building
scientific expertise in each of our applicable Technical Directorates.
Some specific areas we are exploring include materials that can self-
repair for use on aircraft surfaces, energetic materials for better
control of kinetic weapons, and new materials that will allow us to
build lighter weight sensors with significantly higher resolution.
Dr. Tether. The real promise of nanotechnology occurs when working
at the scale of nanometers provides a specific set of properties that
can't be achieved any other way. There are a great number of areas in
which nanotechnology offers promise for significant improvement in
Defense capabilities. Accordingly, our budget request this year
includes about $170 million for nanotechnology, which is the highest in
the Department.
An example of fielded nanotechnology is the development of
microwave and millimeterwave transistors where the current carrying
channel is grown 10 nm thick with atomic layer precision and the
modulating gate electrode is patterned at 100 nm long to detect and
amplify signals above 20 GHz. Many of these nanoscale devices are
flying today on space platforms.
This type of nanometer control of electronic, photonic, and MEMS
components is expanding and expected to impact an increasingly large
number for DOD systems:
Ultradense giant magneto resistance memories were one
of the first examples of the promise of nanotechnology. Today,
these radiation hard, high speed, nonvolatile memories are
being evaluated for missiles and space applications.
Semiconductor optical devices require control of their
material and device structure on the order of 10 or 20 nm. This
has led to quantum cascade lasers which are useful for
detecting chemical agents and the vertical cavity lasers now
often used to move signals around inside military equipment,
which rely on nanotechnology to create their mirror stacks.
Silicon germanium electronics combined with nanoscale
Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) is
revolutionizing radio frequency (RF) electronics by allowing RF
and mixed analog-digital electronics circuits for military
systems to be fabricated at a lower cost in silicon fabs.
We can now control the flatness on films deposited on
8 to 12 inch diameter silicon wafers down to nanometers. This
allows the processing of very fast transistor circuits with
clock frequencies in excess of few gigahertz, which is
important for many signal processing functions.
The levels of investment over the last 5 years are setting the
stage for a myriad of new capabilities that are about ready to be
brought to fruition. New biological sensors, high density nano-wire
based electronics, nano-scale photonic devices, nano-scale mechanical
oscillators, and ultra-high strength fibers from carbon nanotubes to
name just a few.
38. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, Dr. Killion, Admiral Cohen, Mr.
Engle, and Dr. Tether, in what areas would you say that nanotechnology
has demonstrated promise and is very close to operationally testing a
field application? If nothing is close to operational testing, why,
given the levels of investment over the last 5 years, have we not
prototyped a useful nano-solution to a militarily-relevant technical
challenge?
Dr. Sega. Nanotechnology is still emerging and at the early stages
of development. In fact, many of the critical scientific breakthroughs
needed to realize the potential of nanotechnology for military
applications have only emerged within the past few years. Nonetheless,
significant demonstrations of the unique potential of nanotechnology
have occurred, and many of these results have been transferred to
technology development, both to industry and within DOD laboratories.
Some program accomplishments include the following:
An aerosol-based sol-gel method (Aero-sol-gel) for
preparing nanoporous iron-oxide nanoparticles with high
internal surface area has been developed; a nano-sized oxidizer
and fuel material offer the potential (high surface area) for
applications that involve rapid energy release.
A new experimental facility was developed for studying
plasma synthesis and processing of aluminum nanoparticles for
nanoenergetics applications via ARO-funded research at the
University of Minnesota. Aluminum nanoparticles were
synthesized using a plasma torch over a range of operating
conditions. Particle size distributions, elemental composition
and particle morphology were characterized.
Recombinant virus protein-directed synthesis of
semiconductor nanowires has been utilized to fabricate
functional electronic circuits.
These are just a few demonstrations of the potential of
nanotechnology for military applications that have been achieved by the
military departments and DARPA.
Dr. Killion. The U.S. Army has a broad portfolio of nanotechnology
investment exploring a wide range of near and far term warfighter
needs. Specific examples that have been fielded or are about to be
fielded include:
a. A novel sensor called Fido, which is based on a unique
nanoscale architecture developed at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, is being produced by Nomadics, Inc. Fido has
been demonstrated to detect ultra trace amounts of TNT, and
recently received excellent preliminary feedback from field
tests conducted by the Marine Corps at Yuma Proving Grounds and
during operations in Iraq. The Army has initiated actions to
mate Fido with an advanced unmanned ground vehicle capable of
carrying multiple sensors to detect an array of threats. The
plans include development of 10 systems for deployment to Iraq.
b. High surface area nanostructured materials have been
demonstrated to yield both greater capacity for chemical agent
decontamination and faster reactivity, removing over 99.6
percent of VX, GD (soman), and HD (mustard gas) from surfaces
in under 90 seconds. This technology was fielded in 2004 by
Marine Corps Air Station Supply at Cherry Point, NC, and the
Research, Development, and Engineering Command (RDECOM), and
has dual-use application for civilian first responders.
c. Nanocomposite thin film photovoltaics have been developed
with the capability to provide lightweight, conformal and
renewable power with power densities of greater than 40 W/lb.
These materials are currently in advanced development. Field
capable prototypes are expected during fiscal year 2006 and
commercialization is imminent.
d. Nanotechnology enhanced barrier materials have been
developed for CBRN applications and food and materiel
packaging. Field testing of prototype materials for enhanced
Meal Ready to Eat (MRE) packaging is expected by fiscal year
2006.
e. With joint support from the NIH and the Army,
nanometerscale materials with an optical response tunable from
viable to infrared wavelengths have been developed that enable
a noninvasive approach to destroy tumors. Initial studies with
this approach have demonstrated 100 percent success in mice.
Admiral Cohen. There are examples of nanotechnology that are
undergoing field tests or that have already been fielded. Some examples
include:
(1) Nanoelectronics - the commercial sector already
manufactures semiconductor chips that have gate lengths of 90
nanometers or less. The dimensions of components in these
devices will continue to shrink until they reach the physical
limits of our current fabrication process in approximately
2014. Current nanoscience research activities are developing
the fabrication and metrology tools needed to sustain the
current semiconductor fabrication roadmap. Current and future
nanoscience research activities are investigating/will
investigate the next generation of electronic devices and
architectures. The military also has significant investments in
gallium arsenide and other III-V semiconductor materials and
other electronic materials used for high-speed and/or low-power
electronics and infrared sensing applications. Many of these
devices also currently employ nanoscale components.
(2) Nanomaterials - the Navy is currently testing new
nanoceramic composite coatings on mine countermeasure ships to
solve a significant wear problem associated with its drive
shaft. Nano-engineered aluminum particles (nano-aluminum) are
being tested for fuel and explosives applications.
Nanostructured materials such as silica and titania aerogels
are being investigated for improved energy storage (batteries
and ultra capacitors) and photovoltaics applications.
Nanostructured materials (e.g., polymer, adsorbents, etc.,) are
being investigated for membranes, clothing, and decontamination
applications. Nanocrystalline diamond materials are being
investigated as windows for high energy lasers and for
electronics applications.
(3) Nanosensors - nanoscale components appear in a variety of
physical, chemical, and biological sensors that are under
development. These components include nanoparticles and quantum
dots, nanotubes, nanowires, nanomechanical resonators, etc.
Several small companies are beginning to introduce products in
this area.
Mr. Engle. There are nanotechnologies that are already operational.
For example, infrared cameras that are enabled by nanotechnology to
optimize the quantum efficiency of the PtSi/Si diodes have already been
fielded on Air Force U-2 and B-52 platforms, thus providing navigation
and night-time operational capabilities not previously available. Other
promising nanotechnology efforts currently funded within the Air Force
S&T program include:
Ni-Coated Nanostrands: Addition of less than 1 percent
Ni-coated nanostrands could provide electrically conductive
airframe composite structures for lightning strike protection
and protection from electrical discharge on aircraft refueling
booms.
Quantum Well Superlattice Lasers for Aircraft Self-
Protection: Could provide new missile threat countermeasure
protection against long-wavelength threats for large aircraft
at a significant savings estimated at $300,000 per aircraft
over current technology.
Quantum Well Superlattices for Infrared Space Sensor
Applications: Could provide faster and more accurate target
detection and identification at 25 percent lower launch weight
and 95 percent lower energy requirements.
Dr. Tether. DARPA has been engaged in nanotechnology for many
years, well before the national initiative began. In fact, many of the
examples used to start that initiative came from work done at DARPA,
and we are already beginning to see payoffs for DOD.
An example of fielded nanotechnology is the development of
microwave and millimeter-wave transistors where the current carrying
channel is grown 10 nm thick with atomic layer precision and the
modulating gate electrode is patterned at 100 nm long to detect and
amplify signals above 20 GHz. Many of these nanoscale devices are
flying today on space platforms.
This type of nanometer control of electronic, photonic, and MEMS
components is expanding and expected to impact an increasingly large
number for DOD systems.
Ultradense giant magneto resistance memories were one
of the first examples of the promise of nanotechnology. Today,
these radiation hard, high speed, non-volatile memories are
being evaluated for missiles and space applications.
Semiconductor optical devices require control of their
material and device structure on the order of 10 or 20 nm. This
has led to quantum cascade lasers which are useful for
detecting chemical agents and the vertical cavity lasers now
often used to move signals around inside military equipment,
which rely on nanotechnology to create their mirror stacks
Silcon germanium electronics combined with nanoscale
CMOS is revolutionizing RF electronics by allowing RF and mixed
analog-digital electronics circuits for military systems to be
fabricated at a lower cost in silicon fabs.
We can now control the flatness on films deposited on
8 to 12 inch diameter silicon wafers down to nanometers. This
allows the processing of very fast transistor circuits with
clock frequencies in excess of few gigahertz, which is
important for many signal processing functions.
The levels of investment over the last 5 years are setting the
stage for a myriad of new capabilities that are about ready to be
brought to fruition. New biological sensors, high density nano-wire
based electronics, nano-scale photonic devices, nano-scale mechanical
oscillators, and ultra-high strength fibers from carbon nanotubes to
name just a few.
39. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, Dr. Killion, Admiral Cohen, Mr.
Engle, and Dr. Tether, what are the barriers to the successful
transition of nanotechnologies into operational systems?
Dr. Sega. The primary barriers to successful transition of
nanotechnologies, similar to those for any new technology, are
manufacturing, reliability, and acceptance. Significant barriers to the
future manufacturing of nanometer-sized structures include production
quantities, quality control, and cost; as an example, carbon nanotube
manufacturing efforts remain limited by these obstacles despite several
years of commercial production. Demonstrating reliability and
durability of nanotechnologies represents another significant barrier,
particularly since the greatly enhanced feature densities
characteristic of nanotechnology are expected to render new products
and systems increasingly susceptible to degradation.
Dr. Killion. The barriers to successful transition are generally
identical to barriers encountered in transitioning any new technologies
to programs of record and program managers, including the ability to
manufacture the materials in sufficient quantities, to process them
cost-effectively and reliably, and to develop viable approaches for
repair, rework, remanufacture, and disposal. Recognizing the need for a
transition pathway, emphasis is being placed on effective coupling
between the basic research programs and the SBIR, Small Business
Technology Transfer (STTR) and Manufacturing Technology (MANTECH)
programs to establish the unique infrastructure necessary to provide
quality nanotechnology-based devices that are effective and producible
in sufficient quantities. Additionally, reliability testing must be
performed before a new material can be adopted, and additional barriers
based on public perception of the safety of nanotechnology may be
encountered and are being considered.
Admiral Cohen. One barrier is time. Despite our technological
advancements it still seems to take 15 +/-5 years to transition from
concept to initial product. Hence, although some of the initial
nanoscience research can be traced back to the early 1980s most of the
investment in nanoscience and nanotechnology is more recent. In some
respects we should not yet expect to see significant transition to
operational systems.
Another barrier is funding. This does not mean there is not a
significant investment in nanoscience, but because it takes so long to
transition from concept (science) to product (technology), a researcher
must find several different sponsors along the way to support this
effort. In addition, there is no automatic mechanism to transition
nanoscience programs from 6.1 to 6.2 to 6.3, etc. In fact, while the
majority of investment in nanoscience has been at the 6.1 basic
research level, there is currently very little investment in the 6.2 or
higher categories. .
Another barrier may be acceptance or reliability. While you may be
aware of the integration and application of MEMS in commercial products
such as sensors for automotive airbags, MEMS components existed for
over 20 years before they were accepted for high volume applications
such as airbag sensors.
Dr. Tether. Current U.S. Army nanotechnology programs represent a
balanced investment portfolio addressing both near-term and long-term
warfighter needs to optimally identify breakthrough capabilities. There
are no major unfunded requirements specific to nanotechnology.
Mr. Engle. As with any potentially revolutionary technology, it is
difficult to mature nanotechnology to the point where system design
engineers are comfortable including it in a system. Additionally, it is
difficult to incorporate new technologies into system upgrades because
of form, fit, and function requirements; often the new technologies
result in a configuration that is quite different than the existing
design. Until it can be proven that nanotechnology options are mature
and affords greater benefits (i.e., cost, weight, strength, etc.) than
existing technologies, our program offices will be cautious and
approach this technology like any other new technology.
Dr. Tether. Transitioning technology to operational use,
particularly radical new technologies, always requires a great deal of
work, but the barriers to successful transition of nanotechnology are
no greater than that for other technologies. There aren't any special
barriers for nanotechnology.
40. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, Dr. Killion, Admiral Cohen, Mr.
Engle, and Dr. Tether, what are your unfunded priority nanotechnology
projects?
Dr. Sega. The current DOD basic research investment, in view of the
total National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI), is adequate and
represents a balanced investment portfolio addressing both near-term
warfighter needs and long-term capabilities to identify breakthrough
capabilities.
Dr. Killion. Current U.S. Army nanotechnology programs represent a
balanced investment portfolio addressing both near-term and long-term
warfighter needs to optimally identify breakthrough capabilities. There
are no major unfunded requirements specific to nanotechnology.
Admiral Cohen. Priority projects are already being funded under
existing investments. The President's budget represents the best
balance of resources to requirements. Were additional resources to
become available, the Department would recommend funding higher
priority items identified on the CNO's or CMC's Unfunded Requirements
List. However, if additional funds were available, one new area with
potential impact includes nanosensors for distributed autonomous
systems.
Mr. Engle. Like many areas in the Air Force, we could wisely invest
additional funds in nanotechnology efforts if available. The following
nanotechnology efforts are included in the expanded Fiscal Year 2006
S&T Unfunded Priority List:
[In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nanotechnology Efforts PE Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nanomaterials for Structures.................. 61102F 1.0
Nanoenergetics................................ 61102F 1.0
Nanoelectronics............................... 61102F 3.0
Nanostructed Materials for Advanced Air Force 62102F 5.5
Concepts.....................................
Nanocomposite Materials....................... 62202F 3.5
Biological Interaction of Nanomaterials....... 62202F 3.2
Mobile Water Desalinization Using Carbon 62202F 2.5
Nanotube Technology..........................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. Tether. Our request this year includes about $170 million for
nanotechnology, which is the highest in the Department. We have no
unfunded nanotechnology requirements.
electric-drive
41. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Cohen, I have long believed that
the Navy's most critical and promising transformational technology is
the development of electric-drive propulsion systems for surface ships.
The transformational implications are apparent, from increased combat
capability to lower manning requirements and especially lower operating
costs. It is not apparent, however, that the R&D necessary to make
electric-drive a reality is keeping pace with plans for new classes of
ships such as DD(X) or the Littoral Combat Ship. How is Navy R&D on
electric-drive structured and resourced to ensure the availability of
this capability for integration into new ship design and construction?
Admiral Cohen. The Navy continues to support the programs that will
lead to electric drive in future warships. The T-AKE cargo ship will
have a commercial-derivative electric drive system. The DD(X) will have
an advanced electric drive and integrated power system. The Navy S&T
community continues to invest in advanced electric drive technologies
which will be available for introduction into future classes of
warships including CG(X). One of the objectives of the ONR program is
to significantly reduce the size and weight of electric propulsion, so
that electric drive will be a viable option for small fast ships.
Technologies being developed include superconducting motors that are
torque dense and quiet, advanced controller technologies, and advanced
power electronics that significantly reduce the volume, weight, and
electrical harmonics associated with current state-of-the-art main
motor controllers. The first full-scale superconducting motor is
currently scheduled to be completed in 2006. Additionally, ONR is
building an Advanced Electric Ship Demonstrator that will enable the
waterborne demonstration of advanced electric propulsion concepts at
roughly a quarter scale of a DD(X) sized platform.
42. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Cohen, what are your unfunded R&D
priorities related to electric-drive that will accelerate the
development of this technology?
Admiral Cohen. The President's Budget represents the best balance
of resources to requirements. Were additional resources to become
available, the Department would recommend funding higher priority items
identified on the CNO's or CMC's Unfunded Requirements List. Although
the ONR S&T program in electric drive is adequately funded, additional
resources could accelerate work in advanced power conversion equipment.
Assuming ONR achieves success in development of compact superconducting
motor technologies, the next target for size and weight reduction is
the motor drive, which converts power from the generator to the correct
electrical frequency and voltage to power the propulsion motor.
Additional funding could enable advanced electric systems topologies,
improved motor drive power quality, higher performing thermal
management components/systems, and increased motor drive power density.
Investments are being made in each of these areas, but at a slower pace
than the technology could support.
43. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Cohen, how are you leveraging
other departments' investments in power technologies?
Admiral Cohen. Many investments outside of the Department of the
Navy are being leveraged to accelerate the development of advanced
electric drive and electric warship technologies. For example, the
Office of the Secretary of Defense recently established a tri-service
and DARPA Energy and Power Technology Initiative (EPTI), which provided
both increased funding and additional oversight to energy and power
investments within the Department. The EPTI ``tiger team'' meets
regularly to share information and coordinate investment strategies.
Navy personnel also participate in the Interagency Advanced Power Group
(IAPG), which includes not only the military services, but also the
civilian R&D agencies. Some examples of areas in which the Navy
leverages other service and agency investments include:
- DARPA's Wide Bandgap High Power Electronics program for
advanced power switching devices.
- DOE and Air Force programs in superconducting wire and
superconducting generator technologies.
- Army investments in capacitors and pulsed alternators to
store energy for electric weapons.
- DOE investments in fuel cells.
low cost launch capabilities
44. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, Mr. Engle, and Dr. Tether, in
July, the DOD issued its space S&T strategy document. One of the goals
of the new strategy is to develop low cost launch capabilities.
Currently, there is no definition of ``low cost.'' What is ``low-cost
launch?''
Dr. Sega. The DOD Space S&T Strategy identifies near- and long-term
goals for assured access to space as follows:
Within the next 5 years,
Low-cost and reliable small payload launchers capable
of placing a 500 Kg-class payload into low-earth orbit.
In the year 2020 or beyond,
Survivable, low-cost, and reliable launch systems to
enable on-demand launch of payloads to any orbit and altitude
required.
For the near-term, we are focusing on technologies that will enable
small launch vehicles (500Kg to Low-Earth-Orbit) costing less than $10
million a piece. The far-term strategy (by 2020 or beyond) focuses on
science and technology developments that will enable low-cost launch
for larger payloads.
Mr. Engle. In the short-term, as defined in the DOD Space S&T
Strategy as the next 5 years, operational cost reductions or ``low-cost
launch'' will most likely only apply to small launch. The Air Force
goal for small launch is less than $10 million to place 1,000 pounds
into a 100 nautical mile, 28.5 degrees east low-earth orbit. This goal
excludes the cost of the launch range.
Dr. Tether. Our primary effort for low cost launch at DARPA is
Falcon, which we're executing in conjunction with the Air Force.
Falcon's goals are to provide the flexibility to launch from 100 kg to
1,000 kg into low earth orbit. Falcon will be responsive, able to
launch within 24 hours of authorization, and it will cost no more than
$5 million per launch. The important feature of Falcon is that it will
remove the launch-cost barrier for small satellites by making launch
cost comparable to satellite cost. We think Falcon will significantly
advance our capabilities in space by making small satellites an
affordable and more attractive option.
45. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, Mr. Engle, and Dr. Tether, how
will you develop the metrics to know whether the short-term (within 5
years) and long-term (2020 and beyond) goals of ``low-cost'' are
reached? For example, is the goal a certain dollar amount per pound
launched, a percentage cost of a satellite, or a percentage reduction
from today's launch costs?
Dr. Sega. For the near-term we have established a nominal cost goal
of less than $10 million per launch for small satellites (less than 500
kg) to low earth orbit. Concurrent with this cost goal, we are pursuing
increased responsiveness to enable launch of smaller satellites in a
matter of days to weeks following call up versus months to years for
some currently available small spacecraft launch vehicles.
When completed our roadmap for a next generation large launch
vehicle will identify the necessary S&T activities, demonstration
milestones, and tactical level goals, such as launch costs, that were
identified in the Space S&T Strategy. The metrics will be physics based
for each system component and provide the technical foundation to
achieve the system-level capability payoff goals. The roadmaps are not
yet complete. Thus quantifiable cost performance metrics for next
generation large launch systems are not yet available.
Mr. Engle. As previously mentioned, the short-term goal for ``low-
cost'' launch is less than $10 million for a 1,000 pound payload. For
2020 and beyond, metrics will be developed based on a percentage of
today's launch cost. The goal is to make launches three to six times
cheaper than those using current systems. This metric includes
recurring launch costs, which consist of consumables or expendable
elements and costs to refurbish reusable elements.
Dr. Tether. Considering launch cost as a percentage of satellite
cost is, in my opinion, the most productive way to look at the problem,
and it's the key to achieving low-cost access to space. When the cost
of launching a satellite is several times the cost of the satellite
itself, there's little incentive to invest in ways to reduce satellite
costs, and more importantly, little incentive to make satellites small.
On the other hand, if we can make launch costs comparable to or even
less than satellite costs then there's considerable incentive for
investment in less costly ways of doing things in space.
46. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, Mr. Engle, and Dr. Tether, what
programs are underway or planned to meet these goals?
Dr. Sega. The Department has several ongoing S&T activities that
support the Space S&T Strategy goals of low-cost launch systems. The
Force Application and Launch from the Continental United States
(FALCON) program is one specific example for small launch vehicles.
Even though we have not completely finalized our roadmap for larger
launch systems, we have verified that existing programs in propulsion,
materials, aerodynamics and associated topics must be continued to
provide the necessary foundational technologies.
Mr. Engle. In the near-term, the joint DARPA/Air Force Falcon
program will develop and demonstrate a system capable of providing low-
cost, responsive small lift of 1,000 pounds into a 100 nautical mile,
28.5 degrees east low earth orbit. For 2020, the Air Force is pursuing
the Affordable Responsive Spacelift (ARES) initiative for payloads in
the 10,000 to 40,000 pound-class. ARES is a hybrid system with a
reusable first stage and an expendable second stage. In support of this
program, the Air Force is pursuing technologies for rocket engines,
avionics, structures, vehicle subsystems, and operations. For beyond
2020, the Air Force is pursuing technologies that would enable fully
reusable systems with both rocket and/or airbreathing propulsion.
Dr. Tether. Our primary effort at DARPA is Falcon, which we're
executing in conjunction with the Air Force. Falcon's goals are to
provide the flexibility to launch from 100 kg to 1,000 kg into low
earth orbit. Falcon will be responsive, able to launch within 24 hours
of authorization, and it will cost no more than $5 million per launch.
The important feature of Falcon is that it will remove the launch-cost
barrier for small satellites by making launch cost comparable to
satellite cost. We think Falcon will significantly advance our
capabilities in space by making small satellites an affordable and more
attractive option.
space situational awareness
47. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, Mr. Engle, and Dr. Tether, one
of the short-term goals of the space S&T strategy document is to be
able to ``detect, identify, and characterize natural and man-made
objects, threats and attacks.'' What are the metrics that will be used
to measure these goals?
Dr. Sega. The Space S&T Strategy outlines an implementation process
centered around semiannual space S&T summits with participation from
the S&T, Acquisition, Intel, and Warfighter communities. The latest
summit activities have focused on developing S&T roadmaps for four
operational vectors. When complete, these roadmaps will identify the
necessary S&T activities, demonstration milestones, and tactical level
goals, such as space situational awareness. Critical to this effort is
the identification of technology metrics which will be physics based
for each system component and provide the technical baseline to achieve
the system-level capability payoff goals. It is anticipated that
typical metrics such as smallest size object that can be tracked,
ability to identify object types, determination of operational status
of manmade objects will be employed and related to current
capabilities.
Mr. Engle. Some key metrics that could be used to measure the Space
S&T Strategy document goals are probability of detection, timeliness,
accurate recognition, and knowledge integration and dissemination.
These metrics can address a range of threats including hard-to-find
objects, space weather events and their affect on space capabilities,
and information management and decision support tools related to space
situational awareness. In addition, these metrics address desired
future capabilities of predicting space events and determining intent.
Dr. Tether. DARPA currently has two ground-based space situational
awareness (SSA) programs, Space Surveillance Telescope (SST) and Deep
View. The SST program will produce a telescope capable of detecting
very faint objects in geosynchronous orbit from the ground. SST sees
all orbital objects as point sources; it doesn't image them. Its
principal metrics are minimum detectable visual magnitude (which is a
function of the objects size, shape, and reflectivity), acquisition
time, coverage rate, and revisit rate. These parameters are closely
related.
The Deep View program is principally designed to characterize space
objects in all orbits up to and including geosynchronous orbits. Deep
View is an imaging radar, and its key performance metrics are minimum
radar cross section that can be detected (a function of range), dwell
time, and minimum resolvable feature size.
The actual values of these metrics are classified, but we would be
pleased to provide them under separate cover if you wish.
48. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, Mr. Engle, and Dr. Tether, what
is the time frame that you want to achieve within which you can detect,
identify, and characterize natural and man-made objects?
Dr. Sega. To enable assured space situational awareness, as
outlined in the 2004 DOD Space S&T Strategy, it will be necessary to
develop and demonstrate enhanced capability technologies that will:
Within the next 5 years,
Detect, identify, and characterize natural and man-
made objects, threats and attacks.
In the year 2020 or beyond,
Provide our warfighters complete space situational
awareness under all possible circumstances or situations.
Mr. Engle. In the near term (i.e., approximately 5 years), the Air
Force plans to develop technologies in numerous areas of SSA that
should enable us to be able to detect and track small space objects in
near-earth and deep space orbits. Our goal is to predict, with high
precision, the location of high value assets at least 12 hours into the
future. We also want to be able to characterize on-orbit anomalies,
changes, and events within 2 days and to predict space weather events
for at least 12 hours in to the future. In addition, we want to be able
to determine key attributes of non-United States space forces within 2
weeks of deployment and to rapidly detect threats to United States
space assets.
Dr. Tether. DARPA has two programs underway to enhance SSA with
ground-based sensors. The SST program is developing new focal plane
technologies that enable very wide field-of-view, fast optical system
to detect faint objects in the geosynchronous belt. The program is
scheduled to end in 2008 with the operational testing of a fully
capable telescope at the White Sands Missile Test Facility.
The Deep View program is upgrading a current SSA asset to operate
as a high resolution, imaging radar. It will be used to characterize
and support identification of space objects with much improved
performance. It is scheduled for completion and capability with low-
earth-orbit objects in 2008 and capability with geosynchronous objects
in 2009.
49. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, Mr. Engle, and Dr. Tether, what
programs are underway or planned that will meet these goals?
Dr. Sega. The Department has several ongoing S&T activities that
support the Space S&T Strategy goals of assured space operations and
space situational awareness. Specific efforts in progress include
development and testing of onboard warning sensors for satellites and
exploratory efforts to enhance ground-based space object tracking
systems. Capability enhancements we hope to achieve from these and
other programs in this topic area cannot be discussed in a public
forum.
Mr. Engle. Air Force advanced technology development efforts, such
as high accuracy tracking/orbit prediction, space environmental sensors
and effects, and passive and active high-resolution imaging, support
Air Force SSA goals. We are exploring the potential utility of multi-
spectral and polarimetric sensing in various technology programs, and
we continue to invest in technologies for ultra lightweight optics.
These programs, including space experiments, emphasize new technologies
for capabilities that support ground- and space-based applications.
Dr. Tether. DARPA has two programs underway to enhance SSA with
ground based sensors. The SST program is developing new focal plane
technologies that enable very wide field-of-view, fast optical system
to detect faint objects in the geosynchronous belt. The program is
scheduled to end in 2008 with the operational testing of a fully
capable telescope at the White Sands Missile Test Facility.
The Deep View program is upgrading a current SSA asset to operate
as a high resolution, imaging radar. It will be used to characterize
and support identification of space objects with much improved
performance. It is scheduled for completion and capability with low-
earth-orbit objects in 2008 and capability with geosynchronous objects
in 2009.
assured space operations
50. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, Mr. Engle, and Dr. Tether, one
of the major goals in the Space S&T Strategy document is ``assured
space operations.'' In the short- and long-term, how will this goal be
implemented and what programs are underway or planned that will achieve
this technology focus?
Dr. Sega. Maintaining Assured Space Operations is a critical goal
of our Space S&T Strategy. With participation of our S&T, Acquisition,
Intel, and Warfighter communities we have focused on developing S&T
roadmaps for operational vectors that should continue to ensure our
freedom of action in space.
Some specific elements of assured space operations includes
providing a responsive launch capability, maintaining full space
situational awareness, and sustaining on-orbit operations of critical
defense satellites despite possible hostile actions by others
Specific short-term and long-term goals include:
Within the next 5 years,
Detect, identify, and characterize natural and
manmade objects, threats, and attacks
Minimize interruptions to operations
Protection and countermeasures for enhanced
survivability
In the year 2020 or beyond,
Complete space situational awareness
Uninterrupted operations
Deny adversary's use of space
Mr. Engle. Short-term activities will focus primarily on increasing
SSA capabilities (find, fix, track, identification, characterization,
and information fusion) and passive onboard threat detection and
protection. SSA technologies will enhance both ground- and space-based
data collection, integration, and fusion. Affordable threat detection,
identification, and protection solutions for various threats will be
demonstrated and integrated with Space and Missile Command program
roadmaps.
Long-term activities will focus primarily on providing a robust SSA
and Defensive Counterspace Systems (DCS) capabilities. Technologies
will focus on identification and characterization of hard-to-find
objects, as well as space event prediction and intent determination.
Space protection and countermeasures will be improved to ensure
continued space operations, and off-board, active measures, as well as
architectural system-of-system protection concepts will be assessed.
Programs already underway that focus on these technologies include
the Integrated Space Technology Demonstration or XSS-11, the Maui Space
Surveillance System, and numerous spacecraft and sensor protection
efforts.
Dr. Tether. Our approach to technologies for assured space
operations considers five basic areas: space access and infrastructure,
SSA, protection of U.S. space assets, denial of adversary use of space,
and space-based engagement (surveillance, communications, and
navigation in support of military operations on Earth).
Orbital Express will demonstrate the ability for autonomous
refueling, upgrading, and life extension of on-orbit assets--providing
greatly increased maneuverability and mission flexibility. The SST will
demonstrate the optical ability to search geosynchronous altitudes for
very faint objects and help determine their purpose and intent in a
more timely manner. The Deep View program will use stronger radar
techniques also to identify and characterize small objects at multiple
altitudes.
Other projects are more long-term. Our Space Awareness program
(SPAWN) will also investigate the ability to provide space awareness
and even anomaly diagnostics and resolution from positions on orbit
with our satellite systems. We are also pursuing a variety of
microsatellite technologies that support multiple missions in the
Microsatellite Demonstration Science and Technology Program (MiDSTEP).
______
Questions Submitted by Senator E. Benjamin Nelson
missile defense agency research and programs
51. Senator Ben Nelson. Dr. Sega, how are your S&T programs
coordinated with those of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)? What
investments are you making that will enhance our missile defense
capabilities?
Dr. Sega. The MDA is an active participant in all of our S&T review
and coordination activities for those technical areas relevant to
missile defense. This includes, for example, the S&T Comprehensive
Review process. It is through the S&T Comprehensive review process that
we ensure that investments are made to benefit all the national
security requirements of all of the DOD components. The Comprehensive
Review incorporates both an Investment Strategy Review and Assessment
(ISRA) and a Technology Area Review and Assessment (TARA). MDA also
participates, where applicable, in preparation of our Basic Research
Plan (BRP), the Defense Area Technology Plan (DTAP), and the Joint
Warfighting S&T Plan (JWSTP).
52. Senator Ben Nelson. Dr. Sega, I understand that your office
periodically evaluates the technical readiness of major defense
systems. Have you done an evaluation of any MDA programs? What were the
results of these technical evaluations?
Dr. Sega. We have conducted technical assessments for the MDA's
Ground-Based Midcourse Element and the software for the Initial
Deployment Option (IDO). The results of these technical reviews were
provided to the Component Acquisition Executive.
network-centric warfare research
53. Senator Ben Nelson. Dr. Killion and Mr. Engle, your testimony
highlights your investments in networking technology and information
systems that will support future network-centric operations. What are
the key technical barriers you think need to be addressed before we can
fully realize the vision of truly joint, network-centric operations?
Dr. Killion The key technology barriers include: making highly
efficient use of the available frequency spectrum and bandwidth;
developing highly efficient, compact broadband antennas; maintaining
cross domain information security; and interfacing with non-network-
centric software architectures and disparate data standards, formats
and protocols. The Army currently has S&T efforts working on all of
these challenges.
Mr. Engle. A major technical barrier to achieving the network-
centric operations vision is the lack of fully joint, secure, and
interoperable connectivity among people, applications, locations, and
platforms. Another major barrier to achieving joint network-centric
operations is interoperable networking across domains--air, space,
ground, and cyber. In addition, network-centric operations requires the
modernization of our legacy systems. These older systems must be
upgraded and net-enabled to ensure cost-effective satisfaction of our
continuing missions. Also, legacy system architectures should be
converted to open system architectures to allow needed access to other
systems and information assets. Developing secure links and networks
capable of supporting the vast amounts of traffic necessary for full
network-centric operations will be critical.
Another key area is the integration of network management, spectrum
management, network and system topology (planning), and performance
optimization to create a seamless information enterprise that will
operate in a global Internet Protocol Version (IPv6) environment.
Finally, an additional major hurdle is to define and achieve end-
to-end network performance, in the form of information assurance
mechanisms, at low tactical echelons, while ensuring that throughput,
network connectivity, and latency are optimized for mission
effectiveness.
54. Senator Ben Nelson. Dr. Killion and Mr. Engle, what specific
areas of research need to be invested in to develop the technologies we
need to support networked forces?
Dr. Killion The specific areas of research that are improving the
ability to operate in a network-centric force include: multiband
directional ground based and multibeam, multiband satellite antennas;
dynamic network management for multiple, mobile ad-hoc networks; cross
security domain solutions; and development of a common language
capability across Army, Navy, and Air Force with automated language
translation; and service-oriented architectures for enterprise software
and network environments.
Mr. Engle. The Air Force is already investing in various
technologies needed to support our networked forces, however, as with
many areas in the Air Force, additional funds could be wisely invested
if available. There are specific areas of research in both network-
centric operations and network-centric infrastructure where investment
is needed to support the networked forces. For network-centric
operations, we need to develop technologies that will allow networked,
executing forces at the engagement level to be fully informed of
adversary locations/movement matched by friendly capabilities to
achieve the desired effect across a spectrum of operations from urban
warfare, to major theater of war, to humanitarian relief. For network-
centric infrastructure, we need to develop technologies in two specific
areas:
(1) Communications--Further research is needed in development
of methods to improve the ability of ``wireless on the move''
communications to interface to the wired Global Information
Grid in scenarios typical of military theaters of actions; and
(2) Systems Engineering and Architectures--Investments must
be made in systems engineering to ensure that the
architectures, designs, interfaces, and applications within the
network-centric warfare concept will all work together to
produce the objective.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton
rome it research
55. Senator Clinton. Mr. Engle, your testimony highlights the work
that is done by the Air Force Research Laboratory's (AFRL) Information
Directorate in Rome, NY, on cyber operations and information systems on
major defense platforms like the Joint Strike Fighter. In this budget,
what investments are you making to continue to expand our leadership in
areas of cyber operations?
Mr. Engle. The Air Force is investing and leveraging millions of
dollars each year to provide cyber security for our operational
networks. The AFRL's Information Directorate in Rome, New York, is the
Air Force lead in cyber security technology development and
demonstration. In the fiscal year 2006 President's budget, the Air
Force focus is on investing in R&D in the area of cyber operations. The
majority of this funding is for Information Assurance and Computer
Network Defense projects. Specific areas in which we are currently
investing and expanding a leadership role include self-healing
networks, cyber forensics, wireless intrusion detection systems, cyber
situational awareness, fusion and correlation of cyber events, and
decision support. The Air Force investment in cyber operations heavily
leverages investments made by DARPA and the Intelligence Community in
these areas, maximizing efficiency and ensuring an expanded leadership
role in the area of cyber operations.
56. Senator Clinton. Mr. Engle, how do you work to ensure that
advances in cyber security made at places like Rome are transitioned to
the commercial sector, which is equally at risk from cyber attack by
terrorists?
Mr. Engle. Much of the Air Force S&T investment in efforts that
provide for cyber security for our operational networks has either a
direct path to the field by way of commercial products and
capabilities, or has immediate spin-off potential into the commercial
world. The AFRL's Information Directorate in Rome, New York, is leading
the Air Force in cyber security S&T, paving the way for a more secure
and trusted Internet. Many of the technologies that have been developed
and are planned to be developed in the future address the cyber
security needs of the commercial sector. Some examples of this
technology include secure and fault tolerant networks, cyber forensics,
secure communications, wireless information assurance, and cyber
security situational awareness.
Commercial network security companies, such as Symantec and
Cloudshield, have employees who work in-house on a daily basis with Air
Force cyber security engineers and scientists. These teams are
developing technology, filling identified technology gaps, and
providing a direct path for technology transfer to the commercial
sector. The Information Directorate is also vigorously supporting small
businesses to ensure that they have a foothold in the commercial market
place. The SBIR program not only promotes commercialization, but also
actually requires development of a commercialization plan.
In addition, there is a unique mechanism for technology transition
based on the relationship between the Information Directorate and the
National Institute of Justice's National Law Enforcement and
Corrections Technology Center--Northeast (NLECTC-NE). The NLECTC-NE has
developed a Cyber Science Laboratory (CSL) whose purpose is to take
technology and transition it to the law enforcement community. The CSL
has a solid connection with the United States Secret Service Electronic
Crimes Task Force (ECTF) system. CSL's close relationship with the
Information Directorate enables it to test, evaluate, and transition
mature Air Force technologies and move those technologies to the ECTF
and their member institutions.
darpa investment strategy
57. Senator Clinton. Dr. Tether, over the past 4 decades, DARPA has
played a major role in making America the world leader in innovation,
thorough, fundamental research investments that led to stealth, the
Internet, modern integrated circuit design, and so forth. Recently,
DARPA has characterized its mission as ``bridging the gap between the
Far Side and the Near Side,'' meaning investing in the space that lies
between fundamental research and military products. I note that your
request for basic research investment at DARPA is down $40 million with
respect to 2005 appropriations, and even down $13 million below last
year's original request, let alone down $45 million relative to the
2003 budget request. Is this trend consistent with the successful
philosophy of the past few decades, or does it represent a shift?
Dr. Tether. DARPA does not specifically invest in the space that
lies between fundamental research and military products. By ``bridging
the gap,'' we look for ideas on the Far Side (e.g. from 6.1 or basic
research) and fund them in order to accelerate them to the Near Side,
where they can become a new military capability. Of course, during the
transition, they do go through the space that lies between fundamental
research and military products.
DARPA's basic research in fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2006 is
about 4 or 5 percent of our budget, which is about the average level it
has been for the last 15 or 20 years. We use our 6.1 funding to assure
access to knowledge that comes from basic research in order to turn
that new knowledge into new military capabilities. We are more in the
business of multidisciplinary engineering, which, at the end of the
day, is what determines how fast new knowledge can be turned into new
products and our funding reflects this.
We strongly support the basic research sponsored by places like the
National Science Foundation, the Office of Naval Research and the
Department of Energy. We depend on it and value it and it is an asset
to the Nation.
If there has been any shift at all in recent years, it's been
towards more basic research at DARPA. From fiscal year 1999 to 2006 our
request for 6.1 funding has doubled and grown almost one-third faster
than DARPA's overall budget. Our proportion of the total DOD 6.1
funding has almost doubled too.
I believe that years from now, when DARPA's work in things like
nanotechnology, cognitive computing, and neutrally controlled devices
comes to fruition, it will have a huge impact, just like what we've
done in the past.
58. Senator Clinton. Dr. Tether, does this mean you will be
reducing your investments in university-based research programs that
may generate the revolutionary new technologies of tomorrow?
Dr. Tether. Our basic research funding--the portion of our research
budget that is the best fit with the university mission and the type of
funding they favor--has more than doubled since 1999. Also since 1999,
the percentage of our basic research funding going to universities
increased to about 60 percent in fiscal year 2004, which is the norm
for DOD. The bottom line is that since 1999 DARPA has increased its
commitment to basic research and universities are getting a greater
share of it.
But as I said in the answer to another question, we are more in the
business of multidisciplinary engineering, which, at the end of the
day, is what determines how fast new knowledge can be turned into new
products.
laboratory personnel issues
59. Senator Clinton. Dr. Sega, Rome Labs is part of the AFRL system
and as such is part of the laboratory personnel demonstration program.
It is important that we obtain and retain top quality people if our
laboratories are to be relevant and globally competitive. The great
strength of these demo programs is their ability to be continuously
modified so that local lab directors can experiment with new personnel
authorities--which eventually may be adopted by the rest of the
Department. Since Congress has determined that the lab demo programs
will function independently of the NSPS until 2008, is the DOD still
processing modifications and amendments to the lab demonstration
programs or has the process closed down?
Dr. Sega. No modifications or amendments to existing demonstrations
have been processed recently. However, the Department will review any
requests for demonstration project modifications or amendments
consistent with the plan required by section 1107.
60. Senator Clinton. Dr. Sega, do you feel that there is value in
allowing local laboratory directors to continue to have control over
their demonstration programs rather than being absorbed into a one-
size-fits-all Department-wide system?
Dr. Sega. The experience of the laboratory demonstration programs
have had a positive influence on the development of the NSPS. NSPS
should provide flexible and contemporary human resources with a system
that enables the Department to meet and adjust, as necessary, to its
mission requirements quickly and efficiently. When NSPS is implemented
within the Department, local laboratory directors will find that it
gives them the tools and controls they need for their personnel systems
and processes. If that is the case, the Department may submit a
legislative proposal to bring the NSPS-exempt laboratories into NSPS
earlier than October 2008.
small business innovation research funding
61. Senator Clinton. Mr. Engle, the SBIR program is an integral
part of the success we have in R&D. It has come to my attention that
the Air Force has cut SBIR funding to some current contracts for fiscal
year 2005. Can you explain why the Air Force has withheld this funding?
Mr. Engle. The Air Force put approximately 50 percent of the fiscal
year 2005 SBIR funding on withhold as we conducted a review of the
program to look for ways to improve both our current execution
performance and the transition rate of technologies developed under
SBIR Phase I and Phase II. We are continuing to analyze the results of
this review to identify potential program improvements for fiscal year
2006 and beyond. However, based on our preliminary findings, the fiscal
year 2005 SBIR funds were released for execution on March 8, 2005.
62. Senator Clinton. Mr. Engle, what are the plans to resolve this
issue and ensure the 2005 contracts get fulfilled?
Mr. Engle. The fiscal year 2005 SBIR funds were released for
execution on March 8, 2005.
63. Senator Clinton. Mr. Engle, are there systemic issues in how
SBIR contracts are handled by the Air Force's technology development,
contracting, and financial management organizations that need to be
resolved in order to ensure that small businesses will not experience
delays in receiving funding they are awarded in SBIR competitions?
Mr. Engle. The Air Force recently completed a review of its SBIR
program and is continuing to analyze the results of this review to
identify potential program improvements for fiscal year 2006 and
beyond. Given the increasing size of the SBIR program, managing the
program is becoming inherently difficult without additional authority
to use a small portion of SBIR funding for program management. However,
we are looking for ways to improve both our execution rate and
transition of technologies, while strengthening the role of innovative
small businesses and the technological capabilities of our Armed
Forces.
[Whereupon, at 11:39 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2006
MONDAY, APRIL 11, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats
and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION PROGRAM
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:03 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John
Cornyn (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Cornyn and Reed.
Other Senators present: Senators Allard and Salazar.
Committee staff member present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
director.
Majority staff members present: Elaine A. McCusker,
professional staff member; and Lynn F. Rusten, professional
staff member.
Minority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse,
professional staff member; and Arun A. Seraphin, professional
staff member.
Staff assistants present: Benjamin L. Rubin and Nicholas W.
West.
Committee members' assistants present: Russell J.
Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; and Elizabeth King,
assistant to Senator Reed.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN CORNYN, CHAIRMAN
Senator Cornyn. This Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities hearing will now come to order. Gentlemen, thank
you for being here with us today. We meet today to receive
testimony on the Department of Defense's (DOD) fiscal year 2006
budget request for the Chemical Demilitarization Program. We
welcome all of our witnesses: Michael Wynne, Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Claude
Bolton, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,
Logistics, and Technology; Dr. Dale Klein, Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological
Defense Programs; and Ambassador Donald Mahley, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control.
The DOD Chemical Demilitarization Program is responsible
for eliminating the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile, which
originally consisted of approximately 31,000 tons of lethal
chemical agents and a wide variety of munitions located at
Johnston Atoll in the Pacific and 8 sites in the continental
United States (CONUS). Destruction of the stockpile began in
1990 and is supposed to be completed by April 29, 2007, in
accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which
the United States is a party.
Even taking into account the fact that the CWC does permit
state parties to seek a 5-year extension of that deadline to
April 29, 2012, this subcommittee is very concerned that as the
Chemical Demilitarization Program is currently planned and
budgeted it appears that the United States is not on track to
complete destruction of our stockpile in accordance with our
treaty deadlines.
To date, almost 36 percent of the total stockpile of lethal
chemical agents has been destroyed, including the stockpiles at
Johnston Atoll in the Pacific and Aberdeen Proving Ground,
Maryland. The four baseline incineration sites at Tooele, Utah;
Anniston, Alabama; Umatilla, Oregon; and Pine Bluff, Arkansas--
I think this is a test to see if I can pronounce all those
names; you will correct me, I am sure, if I am wrong--are all
operational and are destroying their stocks of lethal chemical
agents and munitions. The Army has recently informed us that
within 30 days it plans to begin neutralizing the VX nerve
agent stockpile at Newport, Indiana.
In addition to schedule delays, the cost of the program
continues to increase at an alarming rate. Current worst case
estimates of destroying the stockpile range from $26.8 billion
to $37.3 billion.
The DOD has an obligation to destroy the U.S. chemical
weapons stockpile in a manner that is safe for the general
public, for the workers at the storage and demilitarization
sites, and for the environment. DOD must also destroy the
stockpile on a timetable consistent with the international
legal obligations assumed by the United States when the U.S.
Senate ratified the CWC in 1997. Finally, DOD has a
responsibility to manage the Chemical Demilitarization Program
efficiently and effectively so that the mission is accomplished
at a reasonable cost.
Although DOD should be commended for the safe manner in
which it is destroying the stockpile, DOD is not living up to
its responsibilities with regard to cost and schedule. The
subcommittee looks forward to understanding better some of the
actions taken by Secretary Wynne to address these critical
problems.
Before us today are individuals who bear great
responsibility for the stewardship of this program and for the
implementation of the CWC. We look forward to your testimony,
in particular hearing how DOD plans to improve its management
of this program and whether anything more in the way of fiscal
resources or legislative authorities is needed to help the
Department destroy the stockpile safely, on time, and at a
reasonable cost.
We look forward to also hearing from Ambassador Mahley
regarding the requirements of the CWC and the potential
diplomatic ramifications of the problems that are evident in
the U.S. Chemical Demilitarization Program.
Gentlemen, I thank each of you for your service and for
appearing here today.
I note that, in addition to the ranking member, Senator
Reed, and other members of the subcommittee, we will no doubt
be joined by the distinguished Senators from Colorado, who I
know have a chemical storage site in their State and share a
strong interest in this program.
I will now turn the floor over to Senator Reed for any
opening remarks he cares to make.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and let me
join you in welcoming our witnesses here today. The Chemical
Demilitarization Program is truly important and deserves
national priority for at least two reasons. First, there is a
vital need to eliminate the risk to the communities where our
chemical weapons and agents are stored.
Second, we have an international treaty obligation under
the CWC to destroy all our chemical weapons and production
facilities. This is the law of the land. Once the United States
ratifies and enters into a treaty, we commit ourselves as a
Nation to meet all of our obligations under that treaty without
exception or excuse. That means we must make every effort
necessary to comply with the terms of the treaty. That is the
same high standard to which we hold all other parties to any
treaty.
The U.S. Chemical Demilitarization Program has made great
progress in the last decade and most of our destruction
facilities are now operating or about to do so. That is a
tribute to the hard work of the Federal, State, and local
officials and the contractor personnel who have made it
possible to get these complex systems up and running. The DOD
and the Army leadership represented here today deserve
considerable credit for the successes we have had to date.
But there is also a serious issue before us. The Department
restructured the Chemical Demilitarization Program last year,
apparently for cost reasons, and this restructuring had the
effect of jeopardizing our compliance with the CWC. By removing
the majority of planned funding for the Pueblo, Colorado, and
Blue Grass, Kentucky, sites and delaying planned construction
at these two sites until 2011, the Department virtually
guaranteed that the United States would not be able to meet the
extended destruction deadline of April 2012.
One question that arises is whether DOD put our treaty
obligations at risk in an attempt to save money. Additionally,
did the Department consult and coordinate with all other
relevant government agencies and offices before taking a step
that would put us in noncompliance with a treaty obligation?
Although the costs for the Chemical Demilitarization
Program have grown steadily, that trend is not unique to this
program. Most DOD programs experience cost growth, sometimes
dramatically so. With normal defense acquisition programs there
is sometimes an option to slow the program down or reduce the
planned procurement as a way to save money. However, that is
not an option with a treaty obligation. There is no clause in
the CWC that says if the cost of demilitarization increases by
a certain amount we are free not to meet the destruction
deadline.
We will hear today that the Department did not believe the
previous plan could meet even the extended deadline of 2012.
However, even so I fail to see how cutting funding from two of
the planned demilitarization facilities and delaying the start
of construction there until 2011 can do anything but kill our
chances of complying with the treaty.
Fortunately, the Department has recently made modifications
and is now allowing some redesign work and some neutral
construction activities to proceed with fiscal year 2005 funds
that had been previously withheld. The Department is also
conducting a review of all options to see if there are other
ways to meet the extended treaty deadline. Unfortunately, the
previous decision to cut funding for the two sites has cost us
precious time and there is no commensurate funding requested in
the fiscal year 2006 budget request to continue the effort that
is just getting started so late.
I hope there is no doubt at the end of this hearing that
the United States is committed to meeting all its obligations
under the CWC even if doing so costs more than predicted.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Senator Reed, for your opening
statement.
We will proceed to hear from the witnesses any opening
statements that you may have, within reasonable limits, and
then allow us to get to our questions. We will proceed through
those rounds until either we run out of questions or we wear
you out, whatever comes first.
The Honorable Michael W. Wynne, Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Secretary Wynne,
please proceed with any statement that you have, sir.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL W. WYNNE, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS; ACCOMPANIED BY DALE
E. KLEIN, PH.D., ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS
Mr. Wynne. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed,
Senator Salazar, distinguished members of the subcommittee: I
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss the status of the Chemical Demilitarization Program.
Today I want to make three points concerning the Chemical
Demilitarization Program:
First, if the Chemical Demilitarization Program had
continued on its prior planned path the United States would not
have met the Chemical Weapons Convention extended 100 percent
destruction deadline of April 2012 no matter how much funding
was appropriated for the U.S. Chemical Demilitarization
Program. In November 2004, I chaired a Defense Acquisition
Board to address the Chemical Demilitarization Program. At the
Defense Acquisition Board I was presented with three options.
None of the options presented allowed the United States to meet
the extended 100 percent CWC destruction deadline of April
2012. In fact, all options required more funding than was
planned and more time to complete chemical agent destruction
than the treaty extension may have allowed. As a point of fact,
the options appeared to me to endanger our opportunity to
achieve even the 45 percent milestone. I felt this was
unacceptable, given all the effort by communities and the
project management team to start destruction of almost 90
percent of the U.S. stockpile.
Second, given that no amount of money would meet the
extended treaty deadline with the complex science, engineering
and processes required by the then-current plan, I have taken
aggressive steps to manage the life cycle cost and quality
performance of the Chemical Demilitarization Program. At the
same time, we are maintaining safety, meeting the 45 percent
milestone, and holding out hope that there may be an
alternative way of meeting the 100 percent extended deadline.
In December 2004, I gave two directions to the Chemical
Demilitarization Program. First, I directed the program to
prioritize funding to operating and constructing a facility to
maximize our ability to meet the CWC extended 45 percent
destruction deadline of December 2007. With the startup of
Newport in less than 30 days, given the notification now before
you, we will have commenced the destruction of about 90 percent
of that stockpile.
Next, I directed the program manager for the assembled
chemical weapons alternatives, which includes the last 10
percent of our stockpile, and the Army to develop potential
alternatives that are safe, secure, timely, and cost effective.
This 10 percent is divided between Blue Grass, Kentucky, which
stores 2 percent of the stockpile, and Pueblo, Colorado, which
stores 8 percent. At the time of my direction, Blue Grass and
Pueblo were essentially greenfields, that is undeveloped land,
and they remain that way today.
I requested the analysis because of the unacceptably high
risk and cost of the Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives
(ACWA) program and to maximize our ability to meet the CWC
extended 100 percent destruction deadline. I expect to review
these alternatives by the end of the third quarter of fiscal
year 2005.
To highlight the importance of this issue, recent estimates
project the life cycle costs of the program at where Senator
Reed placed them, as high as $37 billion. These estimates have
been corroborated in part by the Department's Cost Analysis
Improvement Group (CAIG). While CAIG estimates do place
pessimism into their projections, unfortunately their estimates
have been a better forecast of the actual execution for this
program and may end up to be low as compared to the actual cost
to perform.
Understand, sir, that there is a high correlation between
higher costs and longer schedule because it involves the
complexity of the plants that we are talking about. I cite, for
example, the continuing Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
concern over the hydrolysate from Newport. Changing the rules
for environmental wastes is beyond our management capability
and yet may cause me to have to not certify the current Nunn-
McCurdy breach for Newport, which would then jeopardize funding
for that site by law.
This brings me to the third point I wanted to make today. I
have taken additional steps to put in place a plan of action to
manage the escalating life cycle costs and timeline for this
program. Implementing this plan will provide the United States
with a safe, secure, timely, and cost-effective program to meet
both the intent and the literal interpretation of the
international obligation under the chemical weapons program,
with some assistance from this committee, if that alternate
method is required.
On March 23, I took steps to implement a path forward for
the Pueblo and Blue Grass sites. I would note that Blue Grass
never stopped designing and Pueblo never stopped designing,
using residual funds from prior years. The question of whether
or not they could start neutral construction was above and
beyond the design capability, for which they have not yet
achieved the required critical design review (CDR), nor have
they come forward with an approved design which would allow
them to start construction.
I directed the program manager for the ACWA program to do
the following: First, identify changes to the existing design
concept so that projects can be implemented with the
recognition of cost as a major variable and set targets of an
estimated cost of $1.5 billion for Pueblo and an estimated cost
of $2 billion for Blue Grass in fiscal year 2002 constant
dollars;
Next, to develop revised project milestones, cost targets,
and appropriate incentives for cost, schedule, quality, and
safety achievements at not only these two facilities, but
perhaps back them up to the chemical destruction alternatives;
Last, provide a plan to preserve to the Government the
option of competition for future phases of the project.
These efforts are intended to ensure the best value for the
taxpayer and to meet the CWC obligations for the safe
destruction of these chemical weapons.
The fiscal year 2006 budget submittal reflects my
direction. I respectfully request your support for this program
by fully funding the Chemical Demilitarization Program in the
President's budget. The Department is fully committed to the
safe, secure, timely, and cost-effective destruction of the
chemical weapons stockpile, but we cannot start unless we know
where we are going.
I welcome your comments on all aspects of our program's
process. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, and Senator
Salazar for coming today and for the opportunity to testify. I
am happy to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wynne follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Michael Wynne
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and distinguished
subcommittee members. I am Michael Wynne, the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L), and I thank
you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
status of the Chemical Demilitarization Program. While we have made
progress in the destruction of stockpiled chemical weapons, the
Department of Defense (DOD) recognizes that even greater progress in
the very near future is required to keep the United States on track to
meet its international obligations under the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC). This is the first time I have testified before you
regarding the Chemical Demilitarization Program.
Today, I want to make three points concerning the Chemical
Demilitarization Program.
program history and status
First, if the Chemical Demilitarization Program continues on its
current path, the United States will not meet the CWC extended 100
percent destruction deadline of April 2012, no matter how much funding
is appropriated for the U.S. Chemical Demilitarization Program. In July
2002, the Under Secretary of Defense for AT&L directed that the
chemical weapon stockpile at Pueblo, Colorado, be destroyed by a
neutralization facility followed by biotreatment, and in February 2003,
the Department directed that the chemical weapon stockpile at Blue
Grass, Kentucky, be destroyed by a neutralization facility followed by
super critical water oxidation. Both directions also established the
life cycle cost. These costs were $1.5 billion for the Pueblo project
and $2.0 billion for the Blue Grass project (in fiscal year 2002
constant dollars).
In 2004, it was brought to my attention that the Pueblo project was
not within the baseline parameters and not designed according to the
Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) direction. Costs have increased to
$2.6 billion, $1 billion over the life cycle cost certified to Congress
on January 30, 2003. Based on the results of a preliminary assessment
performed on the Pueblo project in May 2004, I requested a review be
conducted regarding the Pueblo project by the DOD Inspector General
(IG). Also, in June 2004, my staff requested an independent assessment
by Mitretek Systems. The results of the DOD IG review and the Mitretek
independent assessment showed a more cost-effective and manageable
facility could be designed using the current neutralization process
followed by biotreatment technology.
As a result of the Pueblo project issue and the growing costs at
the operating and constructed chemical weapons destruction facilities,
I chaired a Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) in November 2004. At the
DAB, the Army and Program Manager (PM) for ACWA presented me with
various options to address the program's funding and schedule. I was
very concerned that none of the options presented to me resulted in the
United States meeting the CWC extended 100 percent destruction deadline
of April 2012. Further, all of the options showed significant increases
in life cycle cost.
funding priorities and alternatives development
Second, I have taken aggressive steps required for managing the
escalating life cycle cost, schedule, and performance of the Chemical
Demilitarization Program, without compromising safety. In December
2004, I prioritized the program's resources to operating and
constructed facilities to maximize our ability to meet the CWC extended
45 percent destruction deadline of December 31, 2007. The current plans
would develop and implement technically challenging designs for
neutralization-based programs at Pueblo and Blue Grass. This has
resulted in rapidly increasing cost estimates and schedules. Next, I
directed the PM ACWA and Army to develop potential alternatives that
are safe, secure, timely, and cost effective, and I expect to review
them by the end of the third quarter of fiscal year 2005. These
potential alternatives may include consolidation of chemical weapons,
redefining our requirements in terms of performance, cost, and
schedule, as well as seeking competition for future work. I must make
it very clear that I did not exclude any alternatives, and I am fully
aware that any plan to relocate chemical weapons will require statutory
authority. However, I wanted to maximize our ability to meet the CWC
extended 100 percent destruction deadline of April 2012 and reduce the
unacceptably high operational risks and the escalating cost of the
proposed designs. Through these directions, I am re-emphasizing that
the Chemical Demilitarization Program remain within fiscal resources
and that the program was never exempt from this requirement.
path forward development
Third, I have begun the implementation of a path forward for the
program to provide the United States with a safe, secure, timely, and
cost-effective program to meet its international obligation under the
CWC. As part of my renewed emphasis on controlling costs, on March 23,
2005, I directed the PM ACWA to do the following:
Identify changes to the existing design concept so the
projects can be implemented within an estimated cost of $1.5
billion for Pueblo and $2.0 billion for Blue Grass, in fiscal
year 2002 constant dollars;
Develop revised project milestones and cost targets
and incentives; and
Provide a plan for considering competition for future
phases of the project.
I approved the limited release of fiscal year 2005 research,
development, testing, and evaluation funds to accomplish this redesign
effort, and I released fiscal year 2005 Military Construction funds
($40 million for Pueblo and $30 million for Blue Grass) to begin early
construction for neutral site improvements for any alternative
ultimately selected. I also requested the PM ACWA provide a cost of the
redesign effort to right size the Pueblo and Blue Grass projects. These
steps will enhance our ability to manage cost and schedule as the
program moves forward to the goal of safely destroying our chemical
weapons and meeting our treaty obligations.
conclusion
In summary, I took steps to: 1) review the Chemical
Demilitarization Program; 2) manage life cycle cost and evaluate
alternatives; and 3) implement a path forward to manage cost and
schedule. All of these efforts are intended to ensure the best value
for the taxpayer and meet our CWC obligations. The fiscal year 2006
President's budget submittal reflects my direction, and I respectfully
request your support for this program by fully funding it. The
Department is fully committed to the safe, secure, timely, and cost-
effective destruction of the chemical weapons stockpiles. I welcome
your comments on all aspects of our program's progress, and I would be
pleased to answer your questions. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr.
Ranking Member, and the other members of the subcommittee for the
opportunity to testify today and your continued interest in and
commitment to the Chemical Demilitarization Program.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Secretary Wynne.
Dr. Klein, we would be glad to hear from you.
Dr. Klein. Since my boss in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) made his opening statement, I am here to support
and answer your questions. Thank you.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much.
Secretary Bolton.
STATEMENT OF HON. CLAUDE M. BOLTON, JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
THE ARMY FOR ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS, AND TECHNOLOGY
Mr. Bolton. Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, distinguished
members of the subcommittee: It is my pleasure to appear before
you as Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,
Logistics, and Technology and as the Army Acquisition Executive
to discuss the status of the Chemical Demilitarization Program.
I respectfully request that my written statement be entered
into the record in its entirety.
Senator Cornyn. Without objection.
Mr. Bolton. I am joined today by Mike Parker, the Director
of the Chemical Materials Agency (CMA), and on behalf of Mr.
Parker and the men and women who perform the safe and
expeditious destruction of the chemical weapons for the Army, I
want to thank the committee members and staff for your
unwavering support of this important and difficult mission.
Your candid appraisals of this endeavor guide our path and help
us to achieve the tasks you have charged us to perform.
As the Army Acquisition Executive, I am responsible to the
Secretary of the Army and to the Defense Acquisition Executive
for all aspects of the Chemical Demilitarization Program except
for the disposal efforts at Pueblo, Colorado, and Blue Grass,
Kentucky. The Army's paramount objective is to destroy the
stockpiles of chemical agent and munitions at disposal sites in
Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana, Maryland, Oregon, and Utah, as well
as the Nation's nonstockpile chemical warfare material, while
ensuring the safety and protection of the workforce, the
general public, and the environment.
I would like to outline three main points today. First, I
will illustrate the excellent progress the Army has made over
the past year. Second, I will highlight how we are conducting
this mission safely. Third, I will describe some of the issues
that affect the program's cost and schedule.
First I would like to point out that this is a remarkable
time for the Army's Chemical Demilitarization Program. I am
proud to report that over 36 percent of the total stockpile has
been destroyed using chemical neutralization and incineration
technologies. We have destroyed all of the agent drained from
ton containers at our neutralization facility in Aberdeen,
Maryland, making it the first facility within the CONUS to
completely eliminate the risk of agent exposure to nearby
communities. Our neutralization facility at Newport, Indiana,
is expected to begin agent destruction operations next month.
Our incineration facilities are also making tremendous
progress. I am pleased to report that all of our incineration
facilities are now operating. We have destroyed more than half
of the Tooele, Utah, stockpile, which originally constituted
over 40 percent of the total U.S. stockpile. Over one million
munitions have been destroyed there, including all of the
sarin-filled weapons and nearly all of the VX munitions, which
together represent a 99-percent reduction in the risk to the
community. The employees at our facility at Anniston, Alabama,
have destroyed all of their sarin-filled rockets, which
represents a 33-percent reduction in the risk to the
surrounding community.
The workers at our facility at Umatilla, Oregon, also are
doing their part to reduce the risks posed by continued
storage. Since beginning operations in September 2004, they
have safely eliminated over 10,000 sarin-filled rockets. Two
weeks ago, the workers at our facility at Pine Bluff, Arkansas,
began destroying munitions and reducing risks to their
community. They have already destroyed over 100 sarin-filled
rockets.
International treaty requires the complete destruction of
our Nation's stockpile of chemical agent and munitions, but it
also requires destruction of nonstockpile chemical warfare
materiel. I am pleased to report that over 80 percent of our
former production facilities have already been destroyed and we
are on schedule to meet the April 2007 nonstockpile treaty
deadline.
Focusing on my second point, I would like to emphasize that
we are accomplishing all of the activities safely. The Army and
its contractors have achieved exceptional safety records and by
focusing our efforts and protecting the worker turning a valve
during a plant operation we protect the general public and the
environment as well. Our facilities have achieved an annual
average reportable injury rate that, according to the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, is somewhere between those of a credit union
and a shoe store.
Our sites have logged millions and millions of hours
without a lost time incident. Our facilities at Alabama,
Arkansas, and Oregon have all recently received prestigious
safety awards from State government offices in recognition of
their extraordinary achievements. In addition, through the
Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP), the
Army works closely with the Department of Homeland Security's
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and with State and
local governments to review emergency preparedness
requirements. As individual stockpile sites reduce risks to the
communities through continued destruction, all 10 CSEPP sites
have achieved full program benchmark compliance.
My third and final point is that a number of different
issues impact the program's cost and schedule. No one
envisioned the peaceful destruction of these weapons when they
were manufactured over 50 years ago. However, achieving a
mission of this scope and magnitude, one that holds the
interests of so many important stakeholders, poses unique
challenges. These challenges can be grouped generally into
three categories: technical, external, and internal.
As an example of a new technical requirement, we recently
identified the presence of mercury in portions of the Tooele
mustard stockpile. The Tooele plant must be modified to remain
compliant with regulations and prevent the release of mercury
into the environment. We are currently investigating whether
mercury contamination exists in the mustard of our other
stockpile sites and the potential cost and schedule impact.
Challenges related to external requirements include State
regulatory requirements, emergency response requirements, and
litigations, among others. While new and changed requirements
generally contribute to the increased safety and environmental
protection, their implementation impacts cost and schedule.
With respect to internal challenges, operational events
also have caused schedule delays and cost increases. Chemical
warfare agents are by design deadly. To protect those who have
the greatest contact with these weapons, our workers, we demand
the safe operation of these plants. We work diligently to
preclude chemical events through well-designed equipment and
facilities, thoroughly vetted operational procedures, and
comprehensive operator training.
We are focused on improving safe destruction operations
through a continuous improvement approach that results from
thoroughly examining operational events. We stop, take time to
assess what went wrong, implement corrective actions, and
proceed again with caution. I would prefer to stop operations,
perhaps even for months, to ensure that we are being safe and
environmentally protective rather than have any doubt about our
ability to do the job safely.
I have visited seven sites since accepting the
responsibility of this program and I look forward to visiting
them all in due course. I am extremely impressed with the
professionalism and dedication of the workforce and by the
robustness of our facilities. I welcome and invite each of you
to visit any of our disposal facilities and see for yourselves.
I think you will be duly impressed.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I ask for your continued support
of this critical national program so that we may sustain our
commitment to the communities surrounding the storage sites,
the Nation, and to our international partners.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss this important
program with you and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bolton follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Claude M. Bolton, Jr.
Chairman Cornyn, Senator Reed, distinguished members of the
subcommittee, it is my privilege to appear before you as the Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology and as
the Army Acquisition Executive to discuss the status of the Chemical
Demilitarization Program. On behalf of the men and women who perform
the safe and expeditious destruction of aging chemical agents and
munitions for the Army, I want to thank the subcommittee members and
staff for your unwavering support of this important and difficult
mission. Your candid appraisals of this important endeavor guide our
path and help us to achieve the task you have charged us to perform.
Your dedication to this mission is recognized and appreciated.
As the Army Acquisition Executive, I am responsible to the
Secretary of the Army and to the Defense Acquisition Executive for all
aspects of the Chemical Demilitarization Program, except for the
demilitarization efforts at Pueblo, Colorado and Blue Grass, Kentucky.
The Army's paramount objective is to destroy the stockpiles of chemical
agent and munitions at the demilitarization sites in Alabama, Arkansas,
Indiana, Maryland, Oregon, and Utah, as well as the Nation's non-
stockpile chemical warfare materiel, while ensuring the safety and
protection of the workforce, the general public, and the environment.
The management attention that I personally give this program is
commensurate with its tremendous importance to the American public, in
terms of both ensuring safety and proceeding expeditiously with the
destruction of these weapons in a cost-effective manner.
This is a remarkable time for the Army's Chemical Demilitarization
Program. We are achieving a great deal and are doing so safely.
Executing the mission, however, is not without its challenges.
I am proud to report that over 35 percent of the total stockpile is
destroyed, and the bulk of the agent at our neutralization facility in
Aberdeen, Maryland, has been destroyed. Aberdeen is the first facility
within the continental United States to completely eliminate the risk
of agent exposure to nearby communities. The bulk agent neutralization
facility at Newport, Indiana is expected to begin agent destruction
operations next month.
Our incineration facilities also are making tremendous progress.
Our first incineration facility, on Johnston Atoll in the Pacific,
safely completed destruction operations many years ago. We are in the
process of closing out the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
permit for that site. We have destroyed more than half of the stockpile
stored near Tooele, Utah. This site originally stored 44 percent of the
original U.S. stockpile of chemical agents and munitions. In essence,
the Tooele facility, alone, has now destroyed nearly one quarter of the
entire U.S. stockpile, and more than is stored at any other single
location. Over one million munitions have been destroyed at Tooele,
including all of the sarin-filled weapons, and nearly all
configurations of the VX munitions, which together represent a 99-
percent reduction in risk to the surrounding communities. I am very
proud of the Tooele workforce's accomplishments. The employees at our
facility in Anniston, Alabama also have reason to be proud of their
accomplishments. They have destroyed all of the sarin-filled rockets,
which represents a 33-percent reduction in risk to their surrounding
communities, and they continue to work safely and diligently to achieve
their remaining schedule milestones. The employees at our facility at
Umatilla, Oregon also are doing their part to reduce the risk posed by
the continued storage of these aging weapons. Since beginning
operations in September 2004, they have safely eliminated over 8,000
M55 sarin-filled rockets. I am very pleased to report that last week,
the workers at our facility in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, began destroying
agent, thereby reducing risk to their surrounding communities.
The Chemical Weapons Convention not only requires the complete
destruction of our Nation's stockpile of agent and munitions, it
provides for the destruction of our non-stockpile chemical warfare
materiel as well. This component of the treaty requires the complete
destruction of all of our former chemical weapons production facilities
by April 2007, a deadline for which there is no extension provision. I
am pleased to report that over 80 percent of our former production
facilities have already been destroyed. The remaining two facilities,
at Pine Bluff Arsenal and Newport Chemical Depot, are undergoing
demolition and we are on schedule to meet our international treaty
commitments. The non-stockpile program has also developed and deployed
a number of innovative, safe, and efficient destruction technologies,
such as the Explosive Destruction System (EDS), and the Single Chemical
Agent Identification Set (CAIS) Access and Neutralization System
(SCANS). These technologies effectively destroy chemical agent
munitions and identification sets that contain agent, and they are
completely mobile and proven to be safe. The EDS has safely processed
nearly 300 rounds since entering into service in 1999, including the
World War I chemical weapons recovered in nearby Spring Valley,
Washington, DC, and we have used SCANS to destroy recovered CAIS vials
and bottles with improved safety and cost effectiveness as compared to
previous technology. The nonstockpile program also has developed useful
chemical agent assessment technologies, such as the Mobile Munitions
Assessment System, which helps operators identify the configuration and
contents of recovered munitions. This capability greatly enhances the
safety and efficiency of recovered munitions destruction operations.
In short, the Army has safely completed destruction of the
stockpile at Johnston Atoll in the Pacific and drained all of the agent
at Aberdeen, Maryland. Four sites are currently using incinerators to
safely eliminate significant stockpiles. The last of the facilities
under Army management is expected to begin destruction operations very
soon and the destruction of our former production facilities and other
non-stockpile chemical materiel is proceeding on schedule.
The most important fact is that we are accomplishing all of these
activities safely. The Army and its contractors have achieved
exceptional safety records, and by focusing our Safety Management
System on protecting the worker who is turning a valve during a plant
operation, we protect the general public and the environment as well.
Overall, our facilities have achieved an average Annual Recordable
Injury Rate of 1.39, which, according to the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, is somewhere between those of credit unions and shoe
stores. Our sites have logged millions of hours without a lost-time
incident. As of February of this year, the Anniston facility logged
more than 6.5 million man-hours, equating to 2 years, without a lost-
time injury. In recognition, the Governor of Alabama and the Alabama
Department of Industrial Relations presented our Anniston contractor
with a prestigious safety award. The Pine Bluff facility received the
Arkansas Department of Labor safety award last September in recognition
of having logged 5 million man-hours without a lost time injury; their
record continues and they have now worked more than 5.5 million man-
hours without any lost time. Last month, our Umatilla contractor
received the 2005 Oregon Governor's Occupational Safety and Health
Employer Award for its ``outstanding contributions to occupational
safety and health.''
We continue to strive for improved excellence in agent monitoring
technology and practices. In an effort to conform to industry standards
for worker and population protection, all of our facilities implemented
new Airborne Exposure Limits (AELs) promulgated by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention.
Compliance with environmental protection requirements is not
negotiable. Our incineration facilities fully comply with the
Environmental Protection Agency's Maximum Achievable Control Technology
(MACT) requirements for emissions controls. We work daily to
effectively implement the myriad requirements for the management of our
solid and hazardous wastes. In addition, we work closely with our State
and Federal environmental regulators and proactively take steps to stay
ahead of the ever-changing regulatory environment under which we must
operate.
The Army and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) work closely with affected State
and local governments to review emergency preparedness requirements as
the individual weapons storage sites reduce risk to their communities
through the destruction of their stockpiles. The Army and DHS FEMA
share responsibility for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness
Program (CSEPP), which protects public health and safety by ensuring
the emergency preparedness capabilities of Army installations and
surrounding communities are ready to respond to an off-site chemical
agent emergency. All 10 CSEPP States have achieved full program
benchmark compliance. Capability Assessment and Readiness reports
conducted by the States and annual program exercises consistently show
that CSEPP States are better prepared to meet any emergencies than
their non-CSEPP counterparts.
No one envisioned the peaceful destruction of these weapons when
they were first manufactured. I am fond of saying that these chemical
weapons are not fine wine; they do not improve with age. It is
imperative that we continue to make significant strides toward
destroying the Nation's stockpiles while still ensuring the safety of
all involved. However, achieving a mission of this scope and magnitude,
and one that holds the interest of so many important stakeholders,
poses unique challenges. While we are focused on addressing these
challenges, they will continue to cause significant growth in both cost
and schedule as they have done in the past.
Our challenges can be grouped generally into three categories:
technical, external, and internal. As examples of new technical
requirements, our plants are aging beyond their expected service life,
which will result in increased maintenance and refurbishment costs as
well as schedule increases. As another example of a technical
challenge, we recently identified the presence of mercury in portions
of the Tooele, Utah, mustard stockpile. The Tooele plant must be
modified to remain compliant with environmental regulations and prevent
the release of mercury into the environment. We are currently
investigating whether mercury contamination exists in the mustard at
our other stockpile sites and the potential cost and schedule impacts
of processing.
Challenges related to changing external requirements include the
AELs and MACT requirements that I previously mentioned as well as State
regulatory requirements, emergency response requirements, and
litigation. While new requirements generally contribute to increased
safety and environmental protection, their implementation also impacts
the program's cost and schedule. In our efforts to safely dispose of
byproducts resulting from the destruction of VX in Indiana and the
mustard in Maryland, the Army has pursued several technically and
environmentally sound offsite disposal options. Attempts to resolve
public concerns that have been expressed regarding the transport and
treatment of secondary wastes have caused us to examine alternatives
that are equally effective but potentially more expensive. Facility
startups at Tooele and Anniston were delayed in response to community
concerns, increased local emergency response requirements, and
litigation.
With respect to internal challenges, operational events also have
caused schedule delays and cost increases. Chemical warfare agents were
designed to be deadly. To protect those who have the greatest contact
with these weapons, our workers, we demand the safe operation of these
plants. We work diligently to preclude, or at least minimize, the
effect of these events through well-designed equipment and facilities,
thoroughly vetted operational procedures, and comprehensive operator
training. From this starting point, we are focused on improving safe
destruction operations through a continuous improvement approach that
results from thoroughly examining each event. We stop, take time to
assess what went wrong, implement corrective actions, and proceed again
with caution. I would prefer to stop operations--even for months--to
ensure that our operations are safe and environmentally protective than
to have any doubt about our ability to do this job safely. Our
improving record on safety, about which I spoke earlier, demonstrates
clearly that our continuous improvement program is working.
Finally, all stakeholders with an interest in this program play an
important role. We are sensitive to the concerns of communities near
the stockpile disposal facilities, and we work hard to effectively
address their concerns while ensuring that we meet our program goals.
We must be able to clearly articulate technically correct rationales
for our decisions based on sound science while acknowledging citizen
concerns in a way that recognizes personal and community perspectives
about our program.
This is indeed a remarkable time for the Army's Chemical
Demilitarization Program. As recited in my testimony here today we
continue to accomplish the mission of safely destroying the stockpile.
There have been, and will continue to be, challenges to overcome as we
move forward. We look forward to working with Congress to achieve the
mission it has laid out for us and to addressing the many challenges
that affect this program. I have been to three sites, and I look
forward to visiting them all in due course. I am extremely impressed
with the professionalism, dedication, and ingenuity of our workforce
and by the robustness of our facilities. I welcome each and every one
of you to visit any of our disposal facilities and see them for
yourselves; each is an impressive sight. I will continue to identify
our requirements and then work to effectively use the resources that
Congress provides to the program.
In closing, I ask for your continued support of this critical
national program so that we may sustain our commitment to the
communities surrounding the storage sites, to the Nation, and to our
international partners. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss this
important program with you. I look forward to answering any questions
you may have.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Secretary Bolton.
Ambassador Mahley, we would be glad to hear from you.
STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD A. MAHLEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE, BUREAU OF ARMS CONTROL
Ambassador Mahley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I
have a written statement that I would ask be entered into the
record in its entirety.
Senator Cornyn. It will be, without objection.
Ambassador Mahley. Thank you, sir.
Second, I would like to summarize from that for my oral
statement here this afternoon.
First of all, I am going to say things a little differently
than what you have been hearing because I am going to talk
about the treaty, the international obligations, and the
history of this rather than the details of exactly what we are
doing in a technical sense. One of the things I want you to
understand, and I think that you do understand, is that we
started our Chemical Demilitarization Program well before there
was a Chemical Weapons Convention. We started it back in 1985
with the current program. We did that, partly at the behest of
the United States Congress, with an estimate at that point that
said we should have been finished with it by 1994, which again
would have been before the CWC even entered into force.
The fact that we are still here having this kind of a
statement and inquiry today I think indicates that there have
been indeed a number of difficulties that have come across with
that program and a number of escalations from those initial
estimates and the initial start that we made.
I mention all of this because I believe it is important to
understand that the United States really has been committed to
this kind of a destruction program even before we had an
international treaty obligation to do so.
Now, what are we doing in the treaty itself? We heard the
year 2012 mentioned a number of times today and indeed that is
the ultimate deadline by which the treaty will require us to
have our stocks destroyed. The initial deadline that we set in
the treaty when we negotiated it was 2007, 10 years after entry
into force.
I would point out that that was done with the full
cognizance of everyone involved with giving us what we thought
was at that point a safe margin from the then estimated program
outputs that would have given us an opportunity to have
complied with our international obligations.
The 2012 deadline constitutes a 5-year extension on what is
actually written in the treaty for 10 years after entry into
force. That is the maximum extension we can get, and so
therefore there is no prospect that the treaty can be further
modified in order to change that.
Having been involved in the negotiation of the CWC, let me
make it clear. Those deadlines were inserted with the vigorous
support of the United States. With the information then
available to us and the program projections then being used,
they offered what we judged to be a very safe margin, while not
allowing other states to procrastinate indefinitely in their
own destruction programs. That is why those limits are there.
I have been asked to address for this subcommittee
specifically the implications for the United States with
respect to that convention if we do not complete 100 percent
destruction of our chemical weapons inventory by April 29,
2012. The most obvious but central point should this occur is
that we will unequivocally become non-compliant with our
international obligations. There is no automatic procedural or
substantive impact of such noncompliance on our participation
in the CWC or the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW). That is, we do not automatically lose our vote
in either the executive council or the conference of states
parties, we are not barred from selection to the executive
council, and we are not subject to any additional inspections.
However, article 12 of the treaty lists a range of measures
that can be taken by the conference in different stages of
noncompliance. It provides that, ``where a State party has been
requested by the executive council to take measures to redress
a situation raising problems with regard to its compliance and
where the State party fails to fulfill the request within the
specified time, the conference may restrict or suspend the
State party's rights and privileges under the convention until
it undertakes the necessary action to conform with its
obligations under the convention.'' So while I say there are no
automatic penalties, that does not mean that the conference of
states parties or the executive council cannot choose to impose
penalties on a noncompliant state.
It also provides that in cases where serious damage to the
object and purpose of the convention may result from activities
prohibited by the convention, the convention, ``may recommend
collective measures to States parties in conformity with
international law,'' and, ``in cases of particular gravity
bring the issue, including relevant information and
conclusions, to the attention of the United Nations General
Assembly and the United Nations Security Council.''
Further, it does not appear that article 12 of the CWC was
intended to restrict the rights of parties to the CWC to take
additional actions allowed under the international law in
response to a breach, as codified in the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties. A party specifically affected by a
material breach may invoke it as a ground for suspending the
operation of the treaty in whole or in part between itself and
the defaulting states.
In other words, should a party believe that the United
States' failure to destroy chemical weapons by 2012 constitutes
a serious security breach between the United States and itself,
it could then suspend operation of the CWC between the United
States and that party. I.e., they would then feel free that
they could then use chemical weapons if they had any on the
United States under those circumstances.
Other parties may do the same if the treaty is of such a
character that a material breach of its provisions radically
changes the position of every party with respect to further
performance of its obligations. I apologize for the relatively
legalistic nature of that, but that is how we write treaties.
Given the way the United States operates by law and under
the overall national policy objective of complying with its
international legal obligations, it is obviously a highly
undesirable circumstance if we do not adhere to those
obligations. There is also great difficulty in pressing other
countries to comply with the CWC if the United States is
noncompliant.
The particular dilemma we face here, however, is that
attempting to alter the CWC obligations in such a way as to
avoid noncompliance is also fraught with real risks. If we were
successful, we would then be establishing the very situation we
strenuously tried to avoid during the negotiation of the
convention. We would be making the destruction obligation
essentially open-ended and thus gravely undermine the incentive
for other possessors to continue to make chemical weapons
destruction a priority in their own national planning.
For the record, under the current situation the only other
possessor likely facing the situation of not being done by 2012
is Russia. Indeed, it would be a major challenge for Russia to
have even half of its declared stockpile destroyed by 2012.
If current assumptions hold and we indeed are noncompliant
for not having completed our stockpile destruction, there will
inevitably be some countries that will argue the United States
has lost its right to offer opinions on the activities of other
countries, at least with respect to chemical weapons. Frankly,
that argument is made today, even before the deadline has been
reached, on the basis that we have an inventory at all.
Responsible countries will not credit such arguments. I do
not believe we will damage our international influence fatally
if we have not completed our destruction by the deadline, so
long as we are continuing to devote obvious and extensive
effort and resources to the program and so continue to inform
other parties of the nature of our progress. The Russian
Federation could seize on any failure of the United States to
complete the destruction by 2012 as an excuse to further
submerge its own destruction program in competing budget
priorities and to justify its own failure to meet the treaty
deadline.
In response, we would of course need to emphasize that our
performance, which far outstrips theirs both in effort expended
and in results achieved, should not distract anyone from
examining Russia's performance on its own merits.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, there are absolute requirements
under the CWC for complete destruction of chemical weapons
stockpiles by a date certain. It is not possible to excuse or
alter those deadlines and the treaty was deliberately written
to make them inflexible beyond the 5-year extension allowed in
the existing text.
If the United States does not complete its destruction
program by April 29, 2012, a situation that appears
increasingly inevitable absent fundamental change, the United
States will be in noncompliance with the CWC. While clearly
undesirable, assuming continued priority is given to chemical
weapons destruction by the DOD and by this subcommittee, such
noncompliance should not be viewed by reasonable states as the
United States trying to evade its legal obligations to
eliminate chemical weapons or its commitment to the rule of
law. There can be no assurance, of course, that those with
particular political agendas might not seek to exploit the
situation by making the situation an issue in the OPCW and
elsewhere.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence in this and I
look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Mahley follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Donald A. Mahley
chemical weapons demilitarization
I am very pleased to have been invited here today to testify on the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) implications of the United States
Chemical Weapons Demilitarization Program. You have already heard from
my colleagues information on the current state of activity and the
plans for future activity and budgeting. I will try to be brief and to
outline mostly what the CWC requires, as well as my view on the
implications for the United States role under that convention of the
demilitarization activities you have had described today.
Before I do so, however, I would ask your indulgence to relate just
a bit of history. I first became involved in the United States Chemical
Weapons Demilitarization Program back in 1985 when, while serving on
Active Duty with the United States Army, my responsibilities as a
member of the National Security Council staff included chemical
weapons. I make this note to remind all of us that the United States
began destroying its chemical weapons stockpile long before there was a
CWC. When the United States began production of binary chemical
weapons--a process we terminated in 1991, again before there was a
CWC--we recognized that as a corollary to the production of binary
weapons as a newer and safer chemical deterrent, we should dispose of
our existing stocks in a safe and ecologically sound manner.
One of the aspects of our long history of chemical weapons
destruction is the gradual process of realizing just how difficult and
technologically demanding such a program is. When the U.S. Army first
started this program, it was very confident that it could be
completed--for unitary stocks--by 1994, and would cost less than a
billion dollars. The briefings you have heard from my Department of
Defense (DOD) colleagues today is stark evidence of how much more
complicated the process is than we recognized when we started down this
path.
The CWC, the international treaty banning possession and use of
chemical weapons, was negotiated over a lengthy period in the
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Realistic activity toward
completing a workable convention actually began in April of 1984, when
George H.W. Bush, then Vice President of the United States, presented
to the Conference a draft treaty that became the basis for negotiations
and ultimately the foundation of the Convention. Negotiations on the
Convention were completed by the Conference on Disarmament in September
1992, and the Convention was opened for signature in Paris on January
13, 1993. Lawrence Eagleburger, as Secretary of State, signed the
treaty in Paris on behalf of the United States. The Convention entered
into force both internationally and for the United States on April 29,
1997, following lengthy ratification proceedings in the Senate.
Article IV of the CWC requires all parties to the Convention to
destroy completely their chemical weapons stockpiles. Paragraph 6 of
Article IV states that such destruction ``. . . shall finish not later
than 10 years after entry into force of this Convention.'' Part IV(A)
of the Verification Annex of the Convention provides additional details
on the destruction of chemical weapons. Paragraph 13 of Part IV(A)
specifies that ``. . . the following processes may not be used: dumping
in any body of water, land burial, or open-pit burning.'' Paragraph 24
provides that if a country is not able to complete destruction of its
chemical weapons within 10 years of entry into force of the Convention,
it may apply for extension of the deadline. However, ``any extension
shall be the minimum necessary, but in no case shall the deadline for a
State Party to complete destruction of all chemical weapons be extended
beyond 15 years after the entry into force of this Convention.''
What all of that language combines to mean is that the United
States, in order to comply with its obligations under the CWC, must
complete destruction of its chemical weapons inventory by April 29,
2012. That date assumes the maximum possible extension under the
Convention. Obtaining the extension should be feasible, especially
considering the number of briefings we have provided to other parties
at the OPCW and the demonstration--through money and effort--of our
intentions to carry out destruction as rapidly as feasible. However,
obtaining extensions beyond that date is not an available option under
the provisions of the Convention.
Having been involved in the negotiation of the CWC, let me make it
clear that those deadlines were inserted into the text with the
vigorous support of the United States. With the information then
available to us and the program projections then being used, the
deadlines offered what we judged as a very safe margin while not
allowing other states to procrastinate indefinitely in their own
destruction programs.
I have been asked specifically to address the implications for the
United States with respect to the CWC if we do not complete 100 percent
destruction of our chemical weapons inventory by April 29, 2012. The
most obvious but most central point, should this occur, is that we will
unequivocally become noncompliant with our obligations. There is no
automatic procedural or substantive impact of such non-compliance on
our participation in the CWC and the OPCW. That is, we do not
automatically lose our vote in either the Executive Council or the
Conference of State Parties, we are not barred from selection to the
Executive Council, and we are not subject to any additional
inspections. However, Article XII lists a range of measures that can be
taken by the Conference in different stages of non-compliance. It
provides that ``where a State Party has been requested by the Executive
Council to take measures to redress a situation raising problems with
regard to its compliance, and where the State Party fails to fulfill
the request within the specified time, the Conference may . . .
restrict or suspend the State Party's rights and privileges under [the]
Convention until it undertakes the necessary action to conform with its
obligations under [the] Convention.'' It also provides that in cases
where serious damage to the object and purpose of the Convention may
result from activities prohibited under the Convention, the Conference
``may recommend collective measures to States Parties in conformity
with international law,'' and ``in cases of particular gravity, bring
the issue, including relevant information and conclusions, to the
attention of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations
Security Council.''
Further, it does not appear that Article XII was intended to
restrict the rights of Parties to the CWC to take the actions allowed
under international law in response to a breach. As codified in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a party specially affected by
a material breach may ``invoke it as a ground for suspending the
operation of the treaty in whole or in part between itself and the
defaulting State.'' Other parties may do the same if the treaty is of
such a character that a material breach of its provisions radically
changes the position of every party with respect to the further
performance of its obligations.
Given that the United States operates by rule of law and under the
overall national policy objective of complying with its international
legal obligations, it obviously is a highly undesirable circumstance if
we were not to adhere to those obligations. There is also great
difficulty in pressing other countries to comply with the CWC if the
United States is noncompliant. The particular dilemma we face here,
however, is that attempting to alter the CWC obligations in such a way
as to avoid noncompliance is fraught with real risk.
We could attempt to amend the Convention. I would strongly
recommend against any such effort for two reasons.
First, if we were successful, we would then be establishing the
very situation we strenuously tried to avoid during the negotiation of
the Convention: we would be making the destruction obligation
essentially open-ended, and thus gravely undermine the incentive for
other possessors to continue to make chemical weapons destruction a
priority in their own national planning. For the record, based on the
current situation, the only other possessor likely facing the situation
of not being done with destruction by 2012 is Russia. Indeed, it would
be a major challenge for Russia to have even half its declared
stockpile destroyed by 2012.
Second, in opening the Convention to amendment, we run the real
risk of other countries adding their own favorite subjects to the
amendment effort. Any and all such proposals would need to be taken
seriously, because the CWC amendment procedures in effect give each
State Party a veto, and thus the ability to hold any amendment hostage
to their own proposals. Seeking to amend the destruction deadline
potentially could undermine the very object and purpose of the
Convention, since there is a real desire on the part of a number of
countries to convert the document from being an arms control and
security agreement to being a technology transfer and chemical industry
assistance agreement.
If current assumptions hold and we are noncompliant for not having
completed our stockpile destruction, there inevitably will be some
countries that will argue that the United States has lost its right to
offer opinions on the activities of other countries--at least with
respect to chemical weapons. Frankly, this argument is made today even
before the deadline has been reached, on the basis that we have an
inventory at all. Responsible countries will not credit such arguments.
I do not believe that we will damage our international influence
fatally, if we have not completed our destruction by the deadline, so
long as we are continuing to devote obvious and extensive effort and
resources to the program and so inform the other parties.
The Russian Federation could seize on any failure of the United
States to complete destruction by 2012 as an excuse to further submerge
its own destruction program in competing budget priorities, and to
justify its own failure to meet the treaty deadline. In response, we
would need to emphasize that our performance which far outstrips theirs
in both effort expended and results achieved, should not distract
anyone from examining Russia's performance on its own merits.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, there are absolute requirements under the
CWC for complete destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles by a date
certain. It is not possible to excuse or alter those deadlines, and the
treaty was deliberately written to make them inflexible beyond the 5-
year extension allowed under the existing text. If the United States
does not complete its destruction program by April 29, 2012--a
situation that appears increasingly inevitable absent fundamental
change--the United States will be in noncompliance with the CWC. While
clearly undesirable, assuming continued priority is given to chemical
weapons destruction by the DOD and this subcommittee, such
noncompliance should not be viewed by reasonable people as the United
States trying to evade its legal obligations to eliminate chemical
weapons or its commitment to the rule of law. There can be no
assurance, of course, that those with a particular political agenda
might not seek to exploit the situation, by making the matter an issue
in the OPCW or elsewhere.
Thank you very much for your attention.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much, Ambassador Mahley.
That was very informative.
We will now proceed with a round of questions. Let me
start. The history of the Chemical Demilitarization Program has
been marked by numerous restructurings and shifting oversight
responsibilities between OSD, the Army, and within the Army
itself. As the Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted
last year, ``The program's complex management structure, with
multiple lines of authority within the Army and the separation
of program components between the Army and the Department of
Defense raises concerns about the roles and responsibilities of
the different parts of the program.''
Although technical surprises and new environmental
regulations, as some of you have already said, have led to cost
increases and schedule delays, I want to ensure that we have
the program structured appropriately to minimize cost and
schedule problems.
Let me just say at the outset, gentlemen, that I
congratulate you for the good work that has been done so far.
As I said in my opening statement, you have done it safely. I
am impressed that the morbidity associated with this program is
somewhere like that of a shoe store, I think you mentioned,
Secretary Bolton. That is a great accomplishment, to have done
this so safely.
But we do have a responsibility to the American people to
make sure that our treaty obligations are complied with and
also that their tax dollars are being spent as efficiently as
possible. So I do have those concerns about both the management
structure and the shifting of responsibilities, as the GAO
noted.
Let me just ask each one of you to comment, if you will,
starting with you, Secretary Wynne, and then Dr. Klein and
Secretary Bolton. In your opinion, do we currently have the
best management structure in place to run this program? If not,
what changes would you recommend to the program's structure to
make sure that we do?
Mr. Wynne. We always quest to have the best organization.
In this case what we have tried to do is to maximize the
opportunity for the construction companies to know their
counterparts and to maximize the experience base of the
management team with those contractors. I think the way that
the program is currently organized in a management structure,
though it may seem a little bit awkward, both Secretary Bolton
and myself have essentially ordained the same program manager
to manage both of the CMA and the ACWA efforts to essentially
consolidate that experience base into a single source.
The difficulty of Pueblo and Blue Grass has to do with each
of their individual sites and I think the more difficult
technologies associated with neutralization as applied to their
specific compounds and weapons. That having been said, the
same, if you will, stewards of the system are there for both.
Bechtel is the contract manager for both Blue Grass and Pueblo
right now. They have quite a bit of experience dealing with our
Army program manager and I think that does very well.
The breakout of the funding that you may have noticed
myself doing in late last year was specifically to avoid having
the Nunn-McCurdy statute force me to shut down the entirety of
this effort as a result of overruns that you have mentioned.
Breaking it down into three components, CMA, Newport, and then
the ACWA facilities, gave me more management flexibility
because I can see my way to certifying the four certification
requirements of the Nunn-McCurdy break for the underway
facilities. I have a hard time with Newport, though we have
registered her for opening, and I do believe that it is, if you
will, under control. But I do not know whether it is under
control relative to the EPA regulations. Right now, the Army
program manager has done an absolutely magnificent job of
corralling, if you will, the various Federal, State, and local
regulators on the parts of the program that are underway and in
many cases making great progress.
The third part, which was the ACWA, does not really have to
undergo a Nunn-McCurdy certification since I have asked that it
be recompeted and/or restructured. But, I think it was in fact
sailing towards that alternative and that is the reason that we
broke it out.
So there is no best case scenario here that I can tell you,
because best would probably have the program operating on
budget and on schedule. However, under the circumstances I
think this is the most effective program management alternative
we could jointly come up with.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you.
Dr. Klein.
Dr. Klein. As you had indicated, this program is
challenging. The way it is structured, OSD has the oversight
responsibility for this program from the standpoint of people's
attention to both cost and schedule. The Army is the executive
agent. I think one of the things that would help us the most,
as Mike Wynne indicated, is now to combine the ACWA and the CMA
programs so that they are in linear form.
As Mike and Claude Bolton also indicated, Mike Parker is
the head of both the CMA and the ACWA program and it would give
us some efficiencies of scale if those were now combined.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you.
Secretary Bolton.
Mr. Bolton. Yes, sir. I agree with my colleagues. I would
go on to say that I am going into my fourth year in this
position and I have been on this particular program with this
responsibility a little over 2 years, and I must tell you, Mr.
Chairman, that I resisted with some vigor being chosen to
select this for this program, the reason being that when I
judge a program I look for three things: one, do we understand
the requirement and has it been codified; two, do we have the
right processes in place to accomplish the task given; and
three, do we have the right people, both on the Government and
the contracting side.
As I stated in my opening comments, and Dale Klein also
alluded to it, the requirements have changed almost from day
one for this program, starting back in 1985, then into the
1990s, and certainly into today, for a variety of reasons.
Without control over that requirement, it is very difficult to
control costs and schedule. With the processes we have
developed, I think we have a pretty good handle on how to
destroy these agents. We have shown that successfully and
safely, and particularly with incineration, and we have learned
a lot from Aberdeen in terms of neutralization. We will learn
more when we get to start the Newport. So I think those lessons
learned will lend themselves to a very good operation once
Pueblo and Blue Grass are open.
We definitely have the right people. Mike Parker and his
staff, as well as the contracting personnel, are truly world-
class experts at what they do. They know how to get the job
done.
In terms of the management structure, it is a bit
convoluted and, as I said 2 years ago when we brought this over
and talked to a few of the staffers, for where we were at that
point in time it was the best organizational structure. We had
made some changes. We will continue to improve that and, as
Dale Klein has already indicated, from my point of view, if you
want to manage all of this better you put all of the sites
under one management structure rather than the two that we have
right now.
But back to your basic question, the management structure
is working well. There is room for improvement and we will do
that in the future.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you.
My time has expired. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you, gentlemen, for your testimony today.
Secretary Wynne, I am trying to understand the logic of the
various budget decisions that have been made. Last year you
pulled back money and I think from your testimony you suggested
that the reason was that, without regard to the money
committed, the plan would not work. Now in the supplemental
legislation you have 2005 money you are going to add back in
right now. Does that indicate that the plan is now working,
that you feel comfortable committing? If so, why do we not see
anything in the 2006 budget which would be moving forward with
a maximum and deliberate effort to meet the obligations of the
treaty?
Mr. Wynne. Thank you for the question, Senator. I did
approve the release of an appropriated $40 million for Pueblo
and $30 million for Blue Grass from the fiscal year 2005
military construction funding, basically to start site
preparation for whatever alternatives are ultimately
accomplished. The design work continues based on prior year
fundings and has never been stopped. The design work from 2004
and 2003, frankly, our roll-forward, totals over I think $250
million of available funding and they still have not achieved a
67-percent design target, which would constitute the CDR at
either site.
So there really is not a go-ahead available to me to
essentially start major bulldozer activity at either site. That
having been said, I think it is imperative if we do intend to
meet the treaty obligation, which we do, to accomplish two
things. First is we need to meet our 45-percent deadline. This
means we need to incentivize our ongoing operations to meet the
deadline. At Pine Bluff, for example, we only have one shift in
operation because we cannot recruit for Pine Bluff. Now, Pine
Bluff is not in a location where you might say that people show
up every day and are looking for work.
However, there is another side to this. We have a personnel
reliability program that we put all the workforce through at
each of these sites just as if they were guarding our nuclear
weapons on a military installation. These are not inexpensive
people and we are very selective with who we put through that
program. So the backlog is there.
We need to afford the program manager some incentive money
perhaps to pay bonuses for people to move to Pine Bluff so that
we can fill out the planned three-shift operation. Otherwise it
is going to take three times as long to essentially complete
the Pine Bluff, which would by itself begin to endanger the
2012 treaty deadline.
So giving the program manager maximum flexibility to meet
the 45 percent became an imperative. Basically, waiting for the
design to complete, with or without any addition of 2006
funding, they have sufficient money left over from prior year
funding essentially to move all the way through 2006 right now,
even if we approved it as a result of this hearing and/or
approved it as a result of the CDR.
So I do not feel bad at all about the use of the money. My
intention is to study all the alternatives, to get the maximum
capability to meet the 2012 deadline. We will be coming back to
you, of course, if it is an alternative other than destruction
onsite. But I would tell you, sir--and you probably know this
as well--that if it comes to that or if we have to move some
subset of it later in time, I think we should all hold that
alternative open and never let it go until such time as we see
that we can meet effectively, efficiently, and, as Secretary
Bolton rightly said, safely beyond site destruction that we all
are kind of questing after.
Senator Reed. Just to follow up, Mr. Secretary. The 45
percent destruction, that deadline is 2007?
Mr. Wynne. That deadline is 2007, sir.
Senator Reed. 2007. So what you have done essentially is
focus on the intermediate deadline of 2007 and try to use more
appropriately and more efficiently the facilities we already
have in place to destroy the material?
Mr. Wynne. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. That still leaves the question, and you have
just spoken about it, about the other facilities, Pueblo, et
cetera. The question I would follow up with is--it seems to me
that if we are moving forward at Pueblo other than just all
these other facilities, we would have at least an idea of how
much money we could deploy in the next budget cycle. There is
nothing in the budget. I fear that another supplemental or
another reprogramming will take place next year for funds for
these facilities. It helps us a great deal to know for
authorization purposes, not for appropriations purposes, to
know how much money you could spend next year.
You have said you think you can get by with what you have
now, but it puts us in a slight dilemma. We have to authorize
these funds. Can you comment?
Mr. Wynne. As I mentioned, Senator, I think I am given
maximum flexibility for us to meet the requirements for the 86
percent of the stockpile that is already underway or completed.
Newport accounts for 4 percent of the stockpile and we have a
request in that you might accelerate if you would like to. It
is currently costing me $400,000 a day at Newport to not work
because I already have a qualified staff there that I could
open, and this 30-day notification cycle that we are going
through really was left over from some of the early days of the
facility. If there is anything I would ask of this committee,
you might want to accelerate that approval cycle.
There is $400 million available to essentially begin both--
any of the alternatives that would be considered at Pueblo and
at Blue Grass should we ever take that alternative, and that
includes the alternative of destruction in place. This should
absolutely fill all the requirements that we can foresee for
fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2006, so I do not see anything
that I would be asking you to do at present.
That having been said, the Army has not given me the plan
as yet and that will come in I think by the end of June. We
will also be providing you the required strategic vision at
that point as to what we see. We are all hoping that the
contractors, some of whom have already been in, will in fact
give us more alternatives that will actually meet the schedule
and perhaps do it with some schedule incentives as opposed to
square foot.
Senator Reed. Just a final point. Mr. Chairman, you have
been very kind.
From your remarks, it seems that you are not confident that
you have in place yet the programs, the facilities, to begin
significant funding to try to reach the 2012 deadline. Is that
fair?
Mr. Wynne. I would say that we are examining every
alternative we can, which may by the way include onsite
destruction, but we do not yet have an approved design that we
can turn a shovel of dirt for the building. We are turning in
fact or doing major site construction to prepare for either
building a building and/or moving the stocks.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Senator Reed.
We will go from side to side. Since Senator Reed was the
last questioner, we will turn now to Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I have a prepared
statement I would like to submit in the record and I ask
unanimous consent.
Senator Cornyn. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Allard follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Wayne Allard
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for providing me the opportunity to come
and ask your witnesses a few questions. I recognize that it is highly
unusual for those who are not members of the subcommittee to appear at
a subcommittee hearing, but this matter before the subcommittee today
is of considerable importance to my State of Colorado.
Mr. Chairman, I am deeply alarmed by the DOD's management of its
Chemical Demilitarization Program. This program is significantly behind
schedule and over budget. The program was supposed to have been
completed before April 29, 2012, at a cost of approximately $2.1
billion. The program is now on a path to cost as much as $37 billion
and be completed in 2030.
The DOD has consistently failed to provide sufficient funding for
this program, forcing those who run to program to make programmatic
decisions that pit sites against each other. The DOD has failed to
provide adequate program management. It has repeatedly stopped design
work and operations and then restarted, adding enormous start-up and
stop work costs and considerable schedule delays. The Department has
failed to effectively communicate its intentions and plans to the
States in which permitting is necessary and the local communities which
must provide their support.
At the Pueblo Depot in Colorado, the Department accelerated the
program in 2002. Then, in 2004, without communicating its intentions to
Congress, the State of Colorado, or the Pueblo community, the
Department unilaterally decided to cease all design work and put the
program in care-taker status for the next 6 years. Two months ago, the
DOD ordered a study on whether the stockpile in Pueblo should be
relocated to an operational incineration site, potentially wasting tens
of millions of dollars already spent on design work. A month later, the
Department changed its mind again by ordering the preparatory
construction and the redesign of the facility. The future of the
program still remains uncertain because of the lack of funding in the
Future Years Defense Plan.
Mr. Chairman, I am frustrated and the people of Colorado are
frustrated. We cannot seem to get a straight answer from the
Department. One day I was told by Department officials that the
stockpile would not be relocated outside of Colorado. The very next
day, the Department ordered the study of transportation options. The
DOD has been inconsistent and unreliable regarding its intentions for
this program.
I am also troubled by the DOD's apparent willingness to violate the
CWC not destroying our country's chemical weapons stockpile by 2012. I
believe the United States has an obligation to comply with it. Our
Nation's reputation is at stake.
The most disappointing aspect of this matter is the fact that
Congress has been more than willing to provide the funds and political
support to get this program done on time. Last year alone, Congress
added $50 million for the project at Pueblo. I am certain that if the
DOD requested additional funding for the overall program, this Congress
would be more than willing to support this request. Even those Members
who do not have chemical weapons stockpile in their State recognize the
importance of completing this program as soon as possible.
Again, I appreciate your willingness, Mr. Chairman, to provide me
with the opportunity to question the witnesses here today.
Senator Allard. Also, my colleague Senator Mitch McConnell
has a prepared statement he would like to submit in the record.
Senator Cornyn. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator McConnell follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Mitch McConnell
Mr. Chairman, I thank the subcommittee for holding this hearing on
an issue of prime importance to my constituents in Kentucky and me--the
deadly chemical weapons that are currently stored at the Blue Grass
Army Depot. In addition, I would like to thank Senator Allard for his
leadership on this issue and for submitting this statement to the
subcommittee on my behalf. He feels as strongly as I do that the
dangerous substances located at the center of our respective states
need to be disposed of safely and quickly.
Imagine how nervous you would be if large quantities of VX gas were
stored in the committee room across the hall. Now you see how the
residents of Madison County, Kentucky, feel.
VX gas and other dangerous chemical weapons have been stored at the
Blue Grass Army Depot for years. Now it is time to destroy such
substances. The administration has asked Congress for the money to do
so, and we have more than complied. Congress has appropriated hundreds
of millions of dollars so the DOD can safely destroy these materials.
Yet the Department refuses to do so. The Department has offered all
sorts of reasons for why--some of which even contradict each other--but
the bottom line is that the Department refuses to spend the money we
appropriated to dispose of the chemical weapons.
This Congress cannot and will not let them get away with it.
The Department's foot dragging on cleaning up the ACWA program
sites is simply unacceptable. The best they claim they can do is place
the Blue Grass and Pueblo sites on ``caretaker'' status--meaning that
no cleanup action will be taken in the foreseeable future. The longer
we sit on these dangerous substances, the longer the surrounding
communities are at risk. The DOD needs to fulfill its obligations to
clean up these sites now.
The Department claims that the ACWA sites must be downgraded to
``caretaker'' status because they are over budget due to cost overruns.
Yet the Department's own schizophrenic decision making is what has led
to these high costs. At Blue Grass, they plan to stop design work and
operations and then restart them again later, adding unnecessary start-
up and stop work costs. They stingily parcel out appropriated monies in
such small quantities that it is impossible to spend funds efficiently.
Perhaps we should expect no less. Dale Klein, the Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense
Programs, admitted in congressional testimony last week that ``some of
our budgeting processes are accurate but incorrect.''
Let me repeat that. Mr. Klein, speaking on behalf of the DOD, said
on the record, ``some of our budgeting processes are accurate but
incorrect.'' I will leave it to someone else to figure out exactly what
that means, but it does not fill me with confidence in the Department's
ability to resolve this issue.
Transporting chemical weapons across state lines is illegal. Yet
the Department has ordered a study of how to do just that. Kentuckians
don't want vials of nerve gas speeding down the interstate, Mr.
Chairman. I suspect neither do the people of other States.
Most saddening of all is that by placing the ACWA sites on
caretaker status, the Department is acknowledging that the weapons will
not be disposed of until 2016 at the earliest. Yet the United States
has signed the CWC, which establishes a deadline for elimination of
these substances by 2012. The DOD should be working with all the speed
it can muster to meet this deadline, not openly thumbing its nose at
it.
In this age of terrorism, our decisionmaking processes for handling
and disposing of such horrifying weapons must be focused and clear. The
DOD's approach to the ACWA sites has been neither.
I thank this subcommittee for holding this hearing and for holding
the DOD up to the strictest standard regarding its cleanup of the ACWA
sites at the Blue Grass Army Depot and the Pueblo, Colorado Depot.
Lives may depend on it.
Thank you.
Senator Allard. I am sorry about being late. We just got
off the plane and the weather is not too favorable in Colorado
right now, but we did get off.
Mr. Wynne. Welcome, Senator Allard. I will tell you, I
lived in Colorado and I remember well the late spring snow
storms. I am glad you are here at all, sir.
Senator Allard. So you understand how you can have 70
degrees the day before and 2 feet of snow the next day.
Secretary Wynne, you had issued a memorandum to the
Secretary of the Army on March 23, 2005, regarding the
contracts for the Pueblo and then Blue Grass chemical stockpile
disposal sites. As I understand it, the memo instructs the
program manager for the ACWA program to identify changes to the
existing design concept so that costs for Pueblo do not exceed
$1.5 billion for Pueblo and then $2.0 billion for Blue Grass.
I note that the legal requirements of the certification
statute require only that certification of alternative
technologies be of comparable cost, safety, and projected
duration to baseline incineration. The public law made no
mention of certifying a life cycle cost estimate. The question
is why did the DOD certify to Congress the $1.5 billion cost
figure for Pueblo when it was not necessary to do it?
Mr. Wynne. Sir, at the time I think that we--of course, we
consulted with our legal authorities and I think at the time
they thought that met the intent of the statute if it did not
meet the letter of the statute.
Senator Allard. Would you not agree that this certification
has put the Department in a box and made it nearly impossible
for the work to be completed before the 2012 deadline?
Mr. Wynne. Sir, I think when it was originally certified it
was actually done with the idea, fully cognizant of the
contractor who gave us the estimate and fully cognizant of the
program that made the thing, that they thought they had
management margin relative to all of the technical difficulties
that the neutralization concept would have given them. So we
did not realize at the time what a bind it would have put us
in.
But, we were sailing right towards a Nunn-McCurdy breach
when we made those stipulations.
Senator Allard. It seems to me that if you look at what has
been happening at the other sites, this was a totally
unrealistic figure. I just have a hard time understanding why
the Department holds to this life cycle cost when you look at
some of the other costs which will--it is clear the project is
going to cost more, particularly when you compare it to
operational incineration sites, which currently have projected
life cycle cost estimates that exceed $3 to $5 billion per
site.
So this is new technology and I am trying to understand the
logic of a $1.5 billion estimate when you are looking at the
other sites and you have $3 to $5 billion to clean them up with
incineration, which is a commonly-used technology in the
cleanup.
Mr. Wynne. Sir, I have not seen the analysis of doing
incineration at Pueblo, for example, which would be the
comparative estimate, because every site is different and every
munition is different. Tooele, for example, has 50 percent of
our stockpile there that they are trying to close. Johnston
Island represents one that came open and now is shut down, so
it has the only life cycle cost that we can sort of do a
comparison to.
But the certification usually is relative to the same--a
different technology on the same site, both, if you will, for
Blue Grass and for Pueblo.
Senator Allard. But if you look at all the other sites,
they are running $3 to $5 billion. Would this not have raised
some concern when you had one that comes in half, maybe just a
third of the cost of what was happening at the other sites?
Mr. Wynne. I would have to take that one for the record,
sir, as to how the evaluation was made at the time and the
certification was made at the time. But I do know that the
estimates were sound when they went through and the changes
that have come about have been mostly technological.
[The information referred to follows:]
When the Department certified neutralization technology to Congress
it was determined that this technology would meet the cost and schedule
criteria of a conceptualized incinerator for the Pueblo and Blue Grass
stockpiles. Based on the analysis for this requirement it is also now a
fact that the incinerator concepts that would address the Pueblo and
Blue Grass stockpiles are less expensive than current Assembled
Chemical Weapons Alternatives neutralization designs.
Senator Allard. When can Congress expect to see a realistic
life cycle cost estimate for Pueblo and Blue Grass?
Mr. Wynne. I have asked the Army to complete their analysis
of alternatives. We have actually heard from some, you might
refer to them as optimistic, contractors, who say by the end of
June we ought to have the estimate underway along with a
revised design. I would say that until that occurs I cannot
offer you any earlier date.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, this is pretty important. I
hope you can tolerate my going ahead here for a few more
questions. I hope I am not duplicating anything that has been
asked previously.
Secretary Wynne, I was troubled with your memorandum on
March 23, 2005, that did not highlight the importance of
schedule. In 1997, the United States Senate ratified the CWC,
which obligates our Nation to destroy our chemical weapons
stockpile by 2012. I opposed the ratification of the CWC.
However, putting that aside, I firmly believe that our Nation
has a moral obligation to comply with its treaty obligations.
According to the schedule provided to me on January 18,
2005, by Assistant Secretary Dale Klein, six of the eight U.S.
chemical weapons sites will not make the treaty deadline. In
fact, work at Pueblo is not scheduled to be completed until at
least 2021. Why did you not highlight the importance of
schedule in your memorandum?
Mr. Wynne. When I asked for options in late 2004, none of
the options met the treaty deadline no matter how much money we
spent on the project. As an old estimator I realize that the
increase in cost is almost a surrogate for an increase in
schedule, and I recognize that we have to, therefore, put an
incentive on cost. Everyone knows that we are trying to achieve
the 2012 treaty deadline, so I did not think that it had to be
reminded. But I did worry that we did not have a cost incentive
and I correlate the two very closely.
So when the amount of money required for Pueblo went from
$1.5 to $2.6 billion, I did not think it would result in a
shorter schedule, but instead felt that actually we would have
spent more money and yet not have made the treaty deadline,
which would have meant that I would have essentially not
effectively husbanded the taxpayers' resources.
Senator Allard. It sounds as though the DOD has decided
unilaterally not to comply with the CWC. Is that true?
Mr. Wynne. Hardly, sir. In fact, if you really wanted to
comply with the CWC treaty, you would allow for some of the
alternatives that we are exploring, such as transportation,
because we can move to then incentivizing some of the sites
that are currently operating to essentially accelerate their
schedules and accommodate these extra munitions. Recall that we
have already started 86 percent of the chemical stockpile. Four
percent is underway at Newport, so the remaining stockpile that
we are talking about here is 10 percent.
Senator Allard. But transportation is excluded by law. It
says that you shall not----
Mr. Wynne. I would agree, sir, that you would play a part
in whether or not we achieve that deadline.
Senator Allard. How much of the U.S. stockpile do you
expect to destroy by the 2012 deadline?
Mr. Wynne. I would hope, sir, that with your permission and
good alternatives from the Army, we will have achieved 100
percent.
Senator Allard. Now, Ambassador Mahley, on February 17
during a hearing in the Appropriations Committee I asked
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice what the ramifications
would be if the United States did not comply with the CWC. She
unambiguously stated, ``If the United States of America is not
complying with its obligations, then it is going to be hard to
force anyone else to comply. We have been very much a country
of laws that insists on our own compliance and so we want to
keep that record.''
I could not agree more with her response. Will it be
difficult to hold other nations to the treaty if we do not
comply with the CWC?
Ambassador Mahley. Sir, the answer to that is that we will
lose some of our moral status in doing so. Number one, that
does not, in the fact that we are not complying with the
treaty, remove the obligation for other countries to be
compliant with the treaty. So the fact is that our not being in
compliance does not remove their legal obligation.
What it does do is impede our ability to call them to task
for that, because they will simply reply that we are indeed
ourselves not being compliant. I would emphasize, however, that
I do believe that reasonable states, not necessarily to include
all the states in the world, but reasonable States will take a
look at the amount of effort and the amount of progress that
the United States has made on this deadline and will not hold
that to be exactly the same kind of noncompliance as someone
who has not paid any attention to this obligation whatever.
That of course is a matter of political judgment and would have
to wait until the actual event occurs.
Thank you.
Senator Allard. It just seems to me like it is going to be
very difficult to insist that the other states comply when we
are not complying. Have you submitted any recommendation to the
President as far as complying, or has the State Department
submitted any recommendation as far as this treaty is
concerned?
Ambassador Mahley. Sir, we always submit to the President
of the United States annual recommendations that the United
States ought to be and remain in compliance with all of our
international obligations. The fact is that the question of
compliance that is in question here is not a current question
of noncompliance, at which time it would be the Department of
State's responsibility to recommend to the President of the
United States how we would like to see the United States come
back into compliance when we were not.
But looking at this as a future matter, then I think that
the answer is no, we have not submitted a recommendation to
look at this for 2012.
Senator Allard. So you have notified the President that you
do not see how we can comply with this. Have you made a
recommendation that the treaty deadline be extended or anything
like that?
Ambassador Mahley. Sir, the treaty deadline cannot be
extended because there is no flexibility in extending it, 2012
is actually an extension. The original deadline is 2007. It can
be extended to 2012, but not beyond that. The only other
alternative to extension would be something like trying to
amend the convention, which has its own dangers.
Senator Allard. So will you have to renegotiate the treaty?
Ambassador Mahley. Sir, I would not intend to try to do
that.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I have a number of other
questions. What I would like to do is submit those for the
record, unless you feel like you have enough time for me to ask
another----
Senator Cornyn. I want to make sure we accommodate Senator
Salazar. We are going to be able to do another round.
Senator Allard. That would be great.
Senator Cornyn. So at this time, I will recognize Senator
Salazar.
STATEMENT OF HON. KEN SALAZAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO
Senator Salazar. Thank you very much. Senator Cornyn and
Senator Reed, let me just first, as the chairman and ranking
member of the subcommittee, thank you for allowing both Senator
Allard and myself to ask a few questions at your hearing. My
thanks as well to Senator Warner and Senator Levin as the
chairman and ranking member of the Armed Services Committee.
Let me just say to Secretary Wynne, Dr. Klein, Secretary
Bolton, and Ambassador Mahley, this is a very important issue
that we are dealing with here today in my State. I join my
colleague Senator Allard in raising the concerns that he has
raised with respect to the timeline that we are under
concerning the Pueblo Army Depot.
Let me tell you why from my point of view it is so
important. When you look at the Pueblo Army Depot and you
realize that there are 780,000 munitions that are stored within
23,000 acres of the Pueblo Army Depot, it ought to be of great
concern to you as well as to all of us. I have flown over that
area probably 100 times during my life and you can see the
places where the munitions are stored throughout this 23,000
acre site. To realize that these 780,000 munitions are stored
within a very close proximity of the city of Pueblo and the
city of Colorado Springs and the southern edges of Colorado
Springs and Fort Carson ought to be of grave concern for all of
us.
In the last month and a half or so there was a jet that
actually crashed just on the perimeter of the Pueblo Army
Depot. Had it just gone another mile and a half or so out to
the east, it may have crashed into one of these munition
storage places.
So when we think about our concern in terms of community
safety, I have great concerns about the 100,000 inhabitants of
the city of Pueblo. I have great concerns about the security of
the half a million people who live in the Colorado Springs and
Fort Carson areas. So it is important for us that we make sure
that as we continue this dialogue, which I am sure that we are
going to continue, at least with me for the next 6 years while
I am the U.S. Senator, that we have the kind of understanding
where we have some straight talk and honest answers coming from
you as we move forward with respect to the particular
timelines.
In my mind this is important for us to do, one, because of
the community safety concerns that I outlined; second, the
importance of compliance with our international obligations,
which both Senator Reed and Senator Cornyn have so eloquently
talked about; and third, because of the potential that these
780,000 munitions themselves could become targets of terrorism.
As we deal with the war on terror, how we ultimately neutralize
these chemical weapons is something that is very important to
all of us.
I will tell you that when we got involved in our
communications with Dr. Klein and Secretary Wynne my concern
was that we were seeing a position from you that was one of
extreme waffling and indecision and lack of clarity about where
it is that we were going. For a long time there in the months
of January and February, the major issue that we were hearing
back from the community was that there was a possibility that
you were simply going to abandon all of the investment that had
gone into the research and development of the ACWA
neutralization process and instead look at transportation. So
for a while there it seemed you were simply planning on
transporting these chemical munitions to other places.
So it is in that context that I have several questions to
ask of you. The first question, Under Secretary Wynne, to you
is that as I read the letter that you sent to both Senator
Allard and me on March 25 I implicitly see that letter as
telling us that onsite water neutralization is still the
preferred technology and what you want to pursue at the Pueblo
Army Depot. It seems to say that you are not looking at other
technologies at this point in time.
I would like your clarification of what you are looking at
with respect to the technology that will be used to neutralize
the chemicals at the Pueblo Army Depot, and whether my
understanding is correct that we are still moving forward with
the water neutralization process.
Mr. Wynne. I have asked the Army, Senator, to be clear, to
examine every alternative that would make the 2012 deadline. I
have not left any alternative out. That includes some
transportation. I would think that incineration in that part of
Colorado, having lived in Colorado Springs and Denver for
several years of my life, I look upon it as incineration may
not be very good, but the scrubbers are getting better. They
are not cheap. So therefore neutralization looks like it might
be an option, but I am waiting for the alternatives to come
forward from the Army.
We have had, interestingly enough, some contractors show up
on our doorstep that have different innovative production
methods, mostly surrounding the continuation of neutralization.
They mostly want to take advantage of the research that has
gone on. That led me to try to say, okay, then let us release
the neutral funding that would in fact allow for site
preparation work for either construction if we pass the CDR for
a slightly modified design than they had before----
Senator Salazar. Let me, if I may, interrupt you for a
second, Secretary Wynne. Your response is part of what causes
me grave concern. I know these are the concerns that are shared
by my colleague from Colorado, Senator Allard. We know that you
are not going to be transporting these chemical munitions
offsite. Both Senator Allard and I would fight that. We have
legislation that we have introduced simply to affirm what is
already the state of existing law.
When we talk about limited taxpayer dollars that are
available to get this job done, which we ought to try to get
done by 2012, we ought not be studying windmills that have no
ability, ultimately, to deal with the problem that we are
facing here. These chemical munitions are not going to be
transported: one, because it is in violation of Federal law;
and two, because of community concerns with respect to public
safety.
So when we have your Department studying transportation as
one of the alternatives, it seems to me a nonsensical approach
to ultimately getting to the end result that we want.
Second, with respect to incineration, that was a bridge
that it seems to me we crossed a long time ago with respect to
the Pueblo Army Depot. That was looked at and the conclusion
that everyone came to as a group of stakeholders working
together on a common agenda was that we were not going to go
down the path of incineration, but instead we were going to
move forward with the water neutralization technology.
So I think it is that change from you and from your
Department that creates huge concerns among the people of
Colorado and Senator Allard and myself in terms of whether we
are really moving forward with a good faith effort to stay on
the agreements and the understandings that we have with the
local community with respect to a water neutralization effort.
Mr. Wynne. Well, sir, it is a fine balance between how we
go through the treaty obligations that we have and meeting the
needs of the community. The needs of the community may not
reflect national interests. In fact, I would say that I feel
like I owe you at this national level every alternative that I
bring forward to meet the treaty, and then I leave it to you,
sir, to determine whether or not that alternative is an
acceptable one for meeting the treaty or whether or not we
should just hold the treaty in abeyance and meet community
needs over and above national interests. I do not know the
answer, but I feel as a steward of the taxpayer dollars I owe
it to you.
As to whether or not this is a hazardous material, we
transport hazardous materials through our major cities all the
time. If I were to do the transportation in the winter out of
Pueblo, Colorado, it is the most stable, hardened chemical you
could transport in the winter. In the summer I might have a
different thought here.
So I feel like I need to at least look at that alternative,
so I might bring to you the range of alternatives. This may not
be the preference that I have, but in fact if it became 2008 or
2010 and I had only a small stockpile left and I could meet the
alternative, I would probably come back to you and say, we can
meet the treaty if you would allow me to do this. You may say,
as you are today--and I will adhere to the law, as you so
state--that, no, that is not going to ever change, so we will
hold the treaty in abeyance. Sir, that would be your choice.
Senator Salazar. My time has expired and I have several
other questions that I will ask you on the next round. But, let
me just punctuate this point home to you. It makes from my
point of view no sense whatsoever for you to be spending
significant sums of money in studying alternatives that we know
are now illegal under United States law. I will proceed with my
other questions when we come back around to the next round.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Senator Salazar.
Gentlemen, this is probably a good question for Secretary
Bolton, Secretary Wynne, and Dr. Klein. You alluded to,
Secretary Wynne, the requirement in the National Defense
Authorization Act of last year for the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the
Secretary of the Army, who is responsible for executing the
chemical agents and munitions destruction program, to jointly
prepare a strategic plan for future activities of the Chemical
Demilitarization Program.
My question is that when we asked about that earlier what I
heard from you, Secretary Wynne and Secretary Bolton, sounded
like a fairly coherent plan going forward, but yet you said
that you would not have that strategic plan as required by the
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) ready until, I
thought you said, June. Would you clarify that or tell me if I
misunderstood you?
Mr. Wynne. Yes, sir, I can. In asking the Army to look at
alternatives, I felt like I owed them as well, because we know
that one plant is completed, five are underway and seemingly
proceeding reasonably well, although I mentioned Pine Bluff
could use, if you will, incentives to additionally staff.
Newport, I am very worried about. I would like to see us
accelerate the opening of that. I feel like that 4 percent of
material may get underway. It looks pretty good to me right
now, and I would like to have everything I can in place by the
time, which is approximately May 6, to allow me to certify that
under the Nunn-McCurdy statute it is within our management
ability to contain the costs.
But I felt like, that having been said, the strategic
approach to the ACWA is an important part of the strategic
vision. But my strategic vision, if you will, or goal at the
end of the day is to achieve or maximize the achievement of all
chemical weapons destruction by 2012. That could be easily
submitted on the back of an envelope, but that is not what you
are looking for.
I have listened very well to what Senator Salazar has said,
as well as Senator Allard either personally in his office or
here today, and I understand the constraints which we are
operating under. I would only offer that these are the kinds of
constraints and environmental regulations that have us
essentially to where Ambassador Mahley says we thought we could
achieve this by 1994, but it is now 2005 and we have yet to
break honest ground at either Pueblo or Blue Grass on a
definable design.
Senator Cornyn. I hear what you are saying and again it
makes a lot of sense. My concern is that, given the checkered
history of this program, both in terms of costs and in terms of
who is responsible for what, much of which it sounds like you
have striven to try to remedy, I do not understand why it is
that it is going to take until June to come up with a strategic
plan that Congress said they wanted in the NDAA.
It strikes me that it is imperative to have that in writing
and produced to Congress so we can all understand. As you see,
we are struggling to understand, and we can hopefully be of
assistance to you and, if necessary, we will be actively
encouraging you to accomplish that plan. But we need to have
that in writing and, as you said, language on the back of an
envelope will not suffice. We need something that is
comprehensive, something so that everybody understands who is
responsible for what and when, particularly given the history
of this program.
Let me ask, Ambassador Mahley, in your view is there
adequate coordination between the Departments of State and
Defense to ensure that the Chemical Demilitarization Program is
in sync with the U.S. treaty obligations and diplomatic
strategy at the OPCW? Let me ask you also to consider when you
answer that, what role does the National Security Council (NSC)
play in ensuring coordination and resolution of any problems?
Finally, do you have any suggestions for improving coordination
in this area?
Ambassador Mahley. Thank you, Senator, for the question.
Let me answer the first part of it, do I believe we are in
synchronization. I think the answer to that is yes. The DOD
continues to inform the Department of State and the NSC through
the interagency process of what the state of play is with
respect to the Chemical Demilitarization Program. We coordinate
a number of briefings that we give to the OPCW on a regular
basis to update them in terms of their proposal both to meet
the 45-percent deadline and eventually to meet the 100-percent
deadline.
Now, we have not briefed the 100-percent deadline at this
point because we have just achieved the extension for the 45-
percent deadline and we are now moving to meet that. We will be
briefing on our prospects for the 100-percent deadline in 2006,
which is just next year, when we go to The Hague to do this.
The National Security Council has devoted a number of
resources to this and if I had any complaint about
synchronization it would only be in the sense that, as you see
the table in front of you here, you are probably looking at the
United States officials who are most knowledgeable about this
program. Getting the attention of some of the more senior
members of the various branches of the executive branch is
sometimes difficult. But that is our job and we undertake it on
a regular basis.
So I think that I would not say there is anything that we
would ask for intervention to try to increase that
coordination. We are working on it. We have the Office of
National Authority that works on it. So we are doing it in
pretty good order.
Thank you.
Senator Cornyn. I would say, Ambassador Mahley, if you need
any help getting the attention of the executive branch that we
have four Senators, members of the subcommittee, the members of
the full Armed Services Committee, and I think indeed the whole
Senate that would be of assistance to you, if you will let us
know whether you need that help or not. This is an important
matter for all the reasons we have already discussed and as we
all already know.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Mahley, first let me thank you for your very
lucid opening statement and your response to questions.
Specifically, DOD decisions to cease investment in some of
these facilities for the reasons that Secretary Wynne
discussed, were those decisions reviewed by the NSC and
confirmed by the National Security Council, or did DOD
essentially make the decision by itself through its budget
process?
Ambassador Mahley. Senator, I am hesitating just a little
bit because I think that gets down to a question of what did
you know and when did you know it in the classic sense of that,
and I am not----
Senator Reed. Those are the best questions.
Ambassador Mahley. I am not real sure that I can answer
that fulsomely for you. But let me express it this way. I do
not recall that the DOD specifically briefed the interagency
nor the NSC, although I am not in a position to answer that
question authoritatively since they may know things that they
do not share with me simply because of the press of business,
if not for other national security reasons.
But I do not recall that we were specifically briefed about
the acquisition memo before the acquisition memo itself was
signed. I do recall, however, that DOD had indicated both the
general state of play with respect to the Chemical
Demilitarization Program and that we had had a number of
interagency meetings, at which the NSC did indeed participate,
about the various obstacles and problems that we were running
into, both in terms of overall appropriations level and in
terms of the technological barriers that are involved in that
prior to the time that that acquisition memo was actually
issued.
Senator Reed. Thank you. Mr. Ambassador, just a final
question. We are sitting here today and I do not think anyone
is 100 percent confident that we are going to meet the deadline
of 2012. If we do not and if we are unambiguously out of
compliance with the CWC in 2012, would that be the first time
that we have been out of compliance with an arms control treaty
obligation?
Ambassador Mahley. It does not happen very often, which is
why I am reviewing in my mind to see if I can think of any
other examples in which that may have occurred. I think I would
answer your question in the following way. There have been
charges that the United States failed in compliance with arms
control treaties at other times in the past.
There was an incident in 1994 when the Cuban Government
accused us erroneously of having attacked them with biological
weapons. There are various issues that the Russian Federation
raises in almost every meeting of the implementation
commissions with respect to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in which they
allege that, for very obscure but nonetheless very elaborate
reasons, we are technically in noncompliance, all of which are
rebuttable and which we have rebutted very strongly.
In my 25 years of working with the arms control arena, I do
not recall any instance in which the United States has
unambiguously been in noncompliance with our arms control
obligations.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Secretary Wynne, we have heard about the tremendous
challenges you are facing and I think it bears repeating that
you have made substantial progress, all of you gentlemen, in
dealing with a very difficult issue. I can recall when there
was great difficulty in even thinking about starting some of
the incineration in Anniston and Pine Bluff and we moved
through that.
But I think what we have heard today is the need to develop
alternatives that are compliant with the law as it exists
today, not simply saying we can do 15 different things. We need
to know the cost of that. That I think is something that would
be very useful for us.
In that vein, though, do you think there are other issues
and items that would be appropriate to put in the authorization
bill or to consider that would give you the flexibility of
management or different tools that you could use effectively?
Mr. Wynne. Well, first of all, Senator Reed, thank you very
much for the opportunity to respond to that. Not yet have I
given up on the extension of the treaty through 2012. In fact,
what I did was I made every move to try to achieve the 45-
percent deadline so that we could reserve to ourselves the
methods and means of achieving the 2012 deadline and, if you
will, offer our colleagues in the State Department the maximum
opportunity for a positive briefing when it comes to The Hague
in 2006.
Your second point, as to whether or not I should offer
alternatives, is really very dependent upon the will of the
people and the will of the Nation to either achieve the 2012
treaty obligation and/or comply with statutes that they
themselves have put into place. Right now, as you say, we are
constrained from implementing any other alternative but onsite
destruction. I am hoping that in this go-round--as I mentioned,
the contractors have already brought forward to me some other
different innovative approaches relative to how you do things,
lessons learned that we have even gotten now from the
construction site at Newport, Indiana, from the way we did
things at Aberdeen Proving Ground, that may in fact inform this
process to allow us to do some incentivization.
I also think that the contractors need different kinds of
incentivization. As I mentioned, they may have to give bonuses
so that they achieve a full three-shift operation at Pine
Bluff, which they do not have yet the ability to do. I think we
should incentivize schedule when we finally have a decent cost.
I will note that the great struggle with every road
construction department is finding out how to best incentivize
contractors to achieve the road construction in minimum time. I
think we can find those things as well.
I am pleased to be able to say that this experience that we
have had with the contractors has already benefited us, in the
sense that when the increase came as it did at Pueblo and I
went to inform Senator Allard that, with all of the things
going on in acquisition, I had to send in the Inspector
General, I am pleased that he found that it was nothing more
than essentially an interpretation of the contract on both
sides than anything that could be ascribed any differently, and
that the costs were in fact rationalized at both the $1.5
billion level and then at the $2.6 billion level, frankly, that
we began to see the search for alternatives.
So that having been said, the experience we have gained
maintained, if you will, the cost control that we had in place
at Blue Grass and I think will ultimately reflect itself in the
new design that we are bringing forward at Pueblo. But that is
yet to be determined and I frankly have not seen the details of
that proposal.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Secretary, it seems that there is an assumption here
that this program is just too expensive even to in any way
restructure it, and either implicitly or explicitly we are
saying that we will not meet the treaty timelines because it is
just too expensive. Some of the expenses you alluded to are
because of technology, some are because of the proper
incentivization of the contract. Some are because of
constraints our law places upon the techniques that you can
use.
But, I think we need to make that decision, whether this is
too expensive. I think as a result I would urge once again that
an alternative has to be developed and costed, if that is the
right word, with the view of making the obligations by 2012 and
delivering your best advice to us about how much that will
cost. Then we can make decisions about whether or not that is
the appropriate path.
Mr. Wynne. Right, and all the options that were presented
to me basically said that no amount of cost thrown at this
problem will in fact guarantee us to meet the treaty. In fact,
the more you spend the more uncertain it becomes that you will
make the treaty obligation because you do not have enough
people, you do not have enough product, you do not have enough
outcomes.
Sir, I worry about making sure that it is a safe manner for
destruction at the same time, because when you only incentivize
schedule many times quality suffers. If quality suffers, safety
cannot be far behind. So, I do worry very dramatically about
that balance because the farthest thing from my mind would be
ever to set either a community or a worker at any risk trying
to achieve something that was nigh onto impossible, if you
will, when we set them out to do it.
So that having been said, I fully recognize that we owe you
a full set of alternatives and not just constrained
alternatives to try to figure out how to best, if you will,
manage this process that has been set in motion.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cornyn. Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
You expressed your concern about the cost of the project,
Secretary Wynne. Are you concerned that these additional
studies may do nothing more than just add to the cost of the
project?
Mr. Wynne. Actually, sir, the additional studies have in
fact informed the process much better. There has been nothing
that would stop, for example, the achievement of a CDR at Blue
Grass. There has been no challenge to the design. We have still
not had a CDR and we are still a greenfield site there.
Here at Pueblo, I think we have also been informed on the
production site. Many times, sir, having lost sight of the
objective, to redouble your efforts is just not the right
answer. Sitting back and asking hard questions many times can
save you schedule, can save you costs.
Senator Allard. You say, well, maybe because of
technological changes. I will bet you there will be new
technologies introduced in the next 10 years in this area. So
when do we say let us move ahead with the project and quit
studying new technology? It seems to me that at some point in
time we have to draw the line and move forward with what we
have in order to comply with the treaty, and I think this new
technology argument can be extended out almost in perpetuity.
We have already had three studies on the Pueblo site, and
finally the 104th Congress said no more that year, which I
think expressed the will of the people. So when is the
Department of the Army going to move forward with the will of
the people and start getting going with this project?
Mr. Wynne. I have asked the Army to come back to me within
the third fiscal quarter, which is about the middle of June,
with alternatives that are a balance of cost, schedule, and
effective safety to maximize our opportunity to meet the treaty
obligation.
Senator Allard. Now, Mr. Secretary, I understand the
program manager has most of the funding he needs to carry over
funds to conduct design and preparatory construction at Pueblo
and Blue Grass during fiscal year 2006. However, I note that
DOD's current budget for Pueblo and Blue Grass provides only
$30 million for these sites in fiscal year 2007. This number is
woefully inadequate. I do not think anybody can argue with
that.
If the Department plans to move forward on these projects,
is there going to be inadequate funding? Does DOD plan to
provide sufficient funding for construction and final design
work for the ACWA sites in its fiscal year 2007 budget?
Mr. Wynne. Sir, to Senator Reed's point, I think we owe you
the full measure of alternatives that would maximize the
opportunity to achieve the site, and I think at that point the
2007 budget would be reevaluated.
Senator Allard. Will DOD attempt to keep Pueblo and Blue
Grass in caretaker status for the next 5 years, as was briefed
to me 2 months ago?
Mr. Wynne. Sir, I think the answer is the same as I just
gave. As a result of the studies, I think I am ready to sit
down with the program manager. If he has a viable plan that
will maximize our opportunity to meet the 2012 schedule, I am
willing to support him on it.
Senator Allard. Secretary Wynne, many in Colorado believe
that the dramatic cost overruns at operational incineration
sites have led the Department to take money from Pueblo and
Blue Grass to pay for these costs. I was skeptical until I
obtained a copy of a DOD memo dated July 14, 2003, that
suggests using funding for Pueblo and Blue Grass as ``bill
payers,'' to pay for other costs in the Chemical
Demilitarization Program.
One estimate has the entire Chemical Demilitarization
Program costing over $37 billion and completed by 2030. Why is
the Department neglecting Pueblo and Blue Grass in favor of
operational incineration sites?
Mr. Wynne. Senator Allard, I probably would have allowed
the program to continue as it was until the costs went from
$1.5 billion to $2.6 billion, which is when it really hit my
radar screen and I tried to take positive action to try to
determine what alternatives were available to the Department to
make the 2012 site. Before that, I did not take much else into
account.
Senator Allard. Do you have similar concerns about the
overruns in the incineration sites?
Mr. Wynne. I do.
Senator Allard. Why are you not studying them like Pueblo
and Blue Grass?
Mr. Wynne. They are for the most part underway, operating,
have met their regulatory requirements, and are not, if you
will, greenfield sites, as are Blue Grass and Pueblo.
Senator Allard. Why has the Department refused to increase
its budget request for the Chemical Demilitarization Program to
cover the cost of the overruns both at the other sites as well
as Pueblo and Blue Grass?
Mr. Wynne. With all the roll-forward money that has gone
unspent from 2003 and 2004, there was really no need to, in the
2006 budget, take a look in that direction. There is plenty of
money available to complete the design and start the
construction well through 2006. As you point out, and I think
we have to meet the intent here, we have to take a look at what
it means for us in 2007. I think, sir, that is the time that
your question has a lot of relevance.
Senator Allard. How much money are we rolling forward? How
much is in that that is unspent?
Mr. Wynne. I think it is over $450 million right now.
Senator Allard. $450 million?
Mr. Wynne. Yes, sir.
Senator Allard. Those are funds that are sitting there that
are unobligated at this point in time, is that correct?
Mr. Wynne. Yes, sir.
Senator Allard. What share of those are for Blue Grass and
Pueblo?
Mr. Wynne. I do not have that answer, sir.
Senator Allard. I am thinking somewhere around $300
million, if that is correct. Do you have any reason to dispute
that?
Mr. Wynne. I do not know the answer.
Senator Allard. I would ask that perhaps maybe you can get
a chance to check that.
Mr. Wynne. Yes, I sure can, absolutely.
Senator Allard. I would appreciate that very much.
[The information referred to follows:]
As of February 28, 2005, $267.6 million in Assembled Chemical
Weapons Alternatives funds are available and not disbursed.
Mr. Chairman, to wrap this up, I want to thank you for your
time and consideration. You have been most tolerant while
Senator Salazar and myself pursue this. Senator Mitch McConnell
is also very interested in what is happening here. I would also
like to thank Senator Reed, who I have worked with on many
issues before in the past.
This is an important issue for our country. I think it is
an important policy issue. It is certainly not only important
to Colorado, but I think the whole country. We have new
technology here and we have to hold somebody accountable for
moving forward at some point in time. So I do have to share
with you a concern at the lack of moving forward. Frankly, when
we get negotiating with our counterparts in other countries I
do not think they can say that we are really moving ahead
expeditiously when I see how much taxpayer dollars we seem to
be spending here and do not seem to be showing much result. I
am sort of disappointed in the program as a whole.
But I would also again extend my thanks to you, Mr.
Chairman, and also the chairman of the full committee, Senator
Warner, in working with both Senator Salazar and myself, and it
has been a pleasure working with my colleague from Colorado on
this important issue.
Thank you.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Senator Allard.
Senator Salazar.
Senator Salazar. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.
Let me follow up on a question from Senator Allard if I
may, Secretary Wynne. My understanding is that for this fiscal
year what you have requested is $40 million for the water
neutralization efforts at the Pueblo chemical depot, but within
the ACWA funding stream that there are about $400 million that
have already been appropriated and are unexecuted, whether that
is $350 million or $400 million, whatever that amount may be.
My question to you is, what assurance do we have that that
money will continue to be set aside to be used for Blue Grass
and for the Pueblo Army Depot, as opposed to being filtered off
into other DOD projects under your jurisdiction?
Mr. Wynne. One of the things that I did, sir, was create
three program element codes, which between them would require
some reprogramming amongst them. We tried to split out the
funding. I will have to get you the actual look, but by doing
that it actually helps you to focus in on what is associated
with the ACWA, what is associated with Newport, and what is
associated with the CMA program. I think I will try to get you
what the laydown was, if you will, looking backwards, because
once the program element codes are struck and approved, which
they have already been submitted to you, there are some
restrictions on just blatantly transferring money.
Senator Salazar. If you can get that information to me, Mr.
Secretary, I would appreciate it very much.
Mr. Wynne. I would be happy to.
[The information referred to follows:]
For fiscal year 2006 the funding for the Chemical Materials Agency
(CMA) is $1,203.5 million, $143.0 million for CMA Newport, and $33.0
million allocated for Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives in the
President's budget.
Senator Salazar. Let me ask one more question and then I
will have one closing comment. With respect to the timeline for
completing the work at the Pueblo Army Depot we would all hope
that somehow we are going to be able to figure out a way of
getting this done by 2012 because that is what we are required
to do under our international obligations. But, based on the
information that we have gleaned from the DOD, it seems that
perhaps you are looking more like a 2020 timeline and that for
right now at least you have Pueblo and Blue Grass both in their
greenfield status. I know you are working on getting a more
established timeline back from your personnel by the end of
June.
Am I misreading the timeline here at all that there are
some people saying that it may be 2020 before we actually start
the construction effort in Pueblo?
Mr. Wynne. One of the things I am hoping to do with the
release of the site preparation funds is to actually do some
site preparation in parallel to the actual down-select and
obligation of a construction contract, to try to speed things
up. So I think actually, Senator, we should not allow, if you
will, the nay-sayers to push us so far on schedule that we even
start to accept a 2020 date.
I am hoping that by the time we get to 2010 we will know
pretty precisely what needs to be done in order to either meet
our deadline and/or take another decision. That is kind of my
goal. I spoke briefly with Ambassador Mahley and he indicated
that we need to be very close to the end to have a cogent story
for anybody relative to exceeding the treaty deadline. Sir, the
most cogent story I know of is to be completed.
Senator Salazar. I think because the timeline is so
important for us and you will have new information in June, I
would request, Secretary Wynne, a meeting with you and Dr.
Klein and whoever else needs to be a part of that meeting at
the end of June, and I would request that that meeting be with
Senator Allard and myself as well as other members of the
Colorado congressional delegation, Representative Hefly and
Representative John Salazar, who are very interested as well in
what happens with respect to the Pueblo Army Depot. So if you
will agree to have that meeting with us, I think it would be a
very important one to have. I will work on trying to get that
scheduled.
Let me just make a closing comment here. For me, as a
Senator from Colorado, when I look at these 780,000 munitions
at the Pueblo Army Depot I think it is important that we have a
definite timeline in which we are moving forward. Our questions
to you are hard questions and they have been hard questions,
and I do appreciate the work that you and your colleagues have
done in trying to clean up the chemical weapons arsenal that we
had in this country. There has been significant progress made.
There is still a lot more progress to be made.
When I see the remnants of what we have there at the Pueblo
Army Depot, essentially with nothing having happened on the
ground since we have been working on this issue, in the context
of the world that we are in today I believe that it still
presents a huge target for terrorism in our country and
therefore it is a matter of national security that we move
forward in as effective a way as we possibly can to make sure
that we are taking care of the mustard gas there at the Pueblo
Army Depot.
Second, it creates huge community and public safety
concerns for both Colorado Springs and the Pueblo communities.
You know there are huge populations there.
Third, I do think that Ambassador Mahley's comment about
the importance of us as a Nation being able to speak with a
sense of moral authority requires us to make sure that we are
doing everything to fulfill our international obligations, and
certainly the April 2012 deadline that we have under the CWC is
something that I know you are very concerned about and
something that we as a Nation are all very concerned about.
Let me thank you for your very candid responses here today,
and I very much look forward to our continuing work together.
Chairman Cornyn and Ranking Member Reed, I appreciate very
much your leadership in this subcommittee and also for
indulging both Senator Allard and myself with the opportunity
to ask questions today. Thank you very much.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you for joining us, Senator Salazar.
Secretary Wynne, before we adjourn, you have alluded to
something you think we might be able to do to be of assistance
to you at the chemical weapons destruction facility at Newport,
Indiana. I believe you indicated there is a 30-day notice
provision.
Mr. Wynne. Yes, sir.
Senator Cornyn. But you are standing by, paying the bills
for people to go to work even though they are unable to go to
work, until you receive some sort of response from Congress.
Mr. Wynne. I think a 30-day expiration, sir, or you can
tell us that the notice has been sufficient and we may go
forward.
Senator Cornyn. We will certainly work with the staff,
Chairman Warner, and Ranking Member Levin to try to give you a
quick response, because if there is some way we can expedite
that and get that facility up and running and save the
taxpayers some money in the process, I am all for it.
Mr. Wynne. We would appreciate that, sir.
Senator Cornyn. Well, thank you very much.
We will keep the record open for let us say a week. That
ought to be enough time for members if they have additional
questions they would like to submit in writing, and we would
appreciate your prompt response to those. But, we will leave
that open until, let us say, the close of business 1 week from
today to submit to you.
Thank you again for your participation and your service to
our country and for answering I know some tough questions about
a very important issue.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
chemical weapons convention compliance
1. Senator Reed. Dr. Klein, in your capacity as the Assistant to
the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological matters,
you represent the policy component of the Department of Defense (DOD).
Can you tell the committee if the DOD is committed to ensuring that the
United States meets all its obligations under the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC), including the obligation to destroy all our chemical
weapons by the deadline established in the treaty?
Dr. Klein. The Department is committed to the safe, secure, cost
effective, and timely destruction of all U.S. chemical weapons. The
Department is currently analyzing alternatives that will maximize the
opportunity to meet the extended 100 percent CWC destruction deadline.
2. Senator Reed. Dr. Klein, is that commitment dependent on a cost
limit, or is the Department committed to ensuring U.S. compliance with
the CWC's obligations even if doing so costs more than suggested by a
cost estimate from 2002?
Dr. Klein. The Department has not established an absolute cost
limit for the Chemical Demilitarization Program. However, the
Department is taking steps to make sure the program balances cost,
schedule, and performance objectives while at the same time, maximizing
the opportunity to meet the CWC extended 100-percent destruction
deadline.
cost constraints
3. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne, the decision to restructure the
chemical demilitarization program, and to move funding from the
Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternative (ACWA) program to the operating
sites, was made for cost reasons. I believe all the operating
facilities have cost more than their initial estimates. If it is not
possible to build, operate, and close the two ACWA sites for the
previously estimated cost, does that mean the United States will not
meet its treaty obligations under the CWC?
Mr. Wynne. No, the Department is currently analyzing alternatives
that are safe, secure, timely, and cost-effective, which will maximize
the opportunity to meet the extended 100-percent CWC destruction
deadline. Our objective is to select one or a combination of these
alternatives that will enable the U.S. to destroy the chemical weapons
at Pueblo, Colorado and Blue Grass, Kentucky, within the cost estimates
originally certified to Congress.
4. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne, would the Department be willing
to spend more than the previous estimate, if necessary, to ensure our
compliance with the CWC?
Mr. Wynne. The Department will provide the necessary resources to
maximize the opportunity to meet the extended 100-percent CWC
destruction deadline in a safe, secure, timely, and cost-effective
manner.
new plan for compliance
5. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne, your testimony was that
implementing your new plan ``will provide the United States with a
safe, secure, timely, and cost-effective program to meet both the
intent and the literal interpretation of its international obligation
under the Chemical Weapons Convention, with some assistance from this
committee if required.'' Exactly how would your plan permit the United
States to meet its treaty deadline, and exactly what kind of assistance
you are considering from this committee?
Mr. Wynne. The Department is currently analyzing alternatives that
will maximize the opportunity to meet the extended 100-percent CWC
destruction deadline. The Department has not yet identified specific
assistance that would be required but in general the Department will be
requesting assistance from local and state officials with application
of environmental regulations and issuing of permits. An example of this
would be off-site disposal of uncontaminated dunage and secondary
waste.
``certified'' cost estimates
6. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne, your prepared statement indicates
that the Pueblo and Blue Grass project decisions in 2002 and 2003
established life cycle costs for each site. You say the Pueblo life
cycle cost estimates were ``certified'' to Congress in January 2003.
Many DOD programs experience cost growth, and the Department often
requests increased funding to accommodate these increases. Are you
suggesting that no DOD programs are permitted to cost more than such
``certified'' estimates?
Mr. Wynne. No, the Department is not suggesting that no program can
exceed ``certified'' estimates. However, the recent estimate for the
design of the Pueblo, Colorado, project had increased by approximately
$1 billion, an unacceptably high level. Therefore, I felt it was
necessary, while the Pueblo and Blue Grass, Kentucky, programs were
still in their design phases, to determine whether there are
alternatives that will destroy these chemical weapons stockpiles in a
safe, secure, timely, and cost-effective manner.
7. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne, why are the ACWA cost estimates
being treated as a cost cap, when there is no legislative cost cap
imposed on the program?
Mr. Wynne. The ACWA Program costs estimates are not being treated
as a cost cap. However, the Department is required to manage the cost
of this program in the same manner required of managing costs of all
Major Defense Acquisition Programs.
cost estimates and acwa
8. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne, you have indicated a serious
concern with the increasing cost estimates for the chemical
demilitarization program, which could be $37 billion or higher. What
percentage and amount of that overall cost estimate is directly
attributable to the Chemical Materials Agency sites, and how much
directly to the two ACWA sites?
Mr. Wynne. On April 8, 2005, the Department submitted the December
2004 Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) to Congress for the Chemical
Demilitarization (Chem Demil)-Chemical Materials Agency (CMA) Program,
the Chem Demil-CMA Newport Program, and the Chem Demil-ACWA Program.
Based on the program funding summary for each program SAR, the total
life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) for the entire Chemical
Demilitarization Program is $32.703 billion. For the Chem Demil-CMA and
the Chem Demil-CMA Newport programs, the LCCE is $27.815 billion, which
is approximately 85 percent of the entire program LCCE. For the Chem
Demil-ACWA, the LCCE is $4.888 billion, which is approximately 15
percent of the entire program LCCE. These cost percentages are
consistent with the stockpile percentages of 90 percent and 10 percent,
respectively.
possible newport funding termination
9. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne, the DOD recently sent a
notification that it intends to begin neutralization of bulk chemical
agent at Newport, Indiana, within 30 days. Your statement included a
reference to the possibility that you would have to cease funding for
Newport, depending on the Environmental Protection Agency's concerns
about the post-neutralization waste treatment. Can you explain why this
might happen, and what steps the Department has taken to avoid a
requirement to stop the funding for Newport?
Mr. Wynne. If the Environmental Protection Agency decides the
Newport facility's waste should not be disposed at the DuPont facility
in Deepwater, New Jersey, the current cost estimate of operating the
Newport facility would require re-evaluation based on other treatment
and disposal methods. If revised estimates are determined to exceed the
approved Acquisition Program Baseline by 25 percent or more, then the
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)
will have to make certifications to Congress pursuant to Section 2433,
Title 10, U.S. Code. If the Under Secretary is unable to make timely
certifications to Congress, statutory limitations on obligating funds
for that program will be triggered.
estimate of likely cwc noncompliance
10. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne, you have stated that you were
presented with options that indicated that on the previous path we
would not be able to meet our CWC extended destruction deadline. Please
explain the basis for the analysis of each option that reached that
conclusion.
Mr. Wynne. The Department conducted a standard program review of
the Chemical Demilitarization Program. This type of review is used for
all defense acquisition programs. The results of the program review
revealed significant increases in the life cycle cost estimate. This
prompted the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) to convene a Defense Acquisition Board in
November 2004 to further analyze the program. Each mission area under
the Chemical Demilitarization Program, which includes the U.S. Army
Chemical Materials Agency and the ACWA Program, was instructed to
provide path forward options that were within fiscal guidance and
fiscally unconstrained. The Department Cost Analysis and Improvement
Group (CAIG) had conducted a risk analysis of both cost and schedule,
and had accorded high risk to all options presented with regard to
meeting the Chemical Weapons Convention extended 100 percent
destruction deadline. Consequently, the USD(AT&L) directed the program
manager to analyze all alternatives that would destroy the chemical
weapons in a safe, secure, timely, and cost-effective manner, while
maximizing the opportunity to meet the Chemical Weapons Convention
extended 100 percent destruction deadline.
11. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne, did you share those results with
the State Department, the National Security Council, the Office of
Management and Budget, or any other agencies before finalizing the
fiscal year 2006 budget request for chemical demilitarization?
Mr. Wynne. Yes. The Department of Defense briefed the Office of
Management and Budget, State Department, and National Security Council
prior to the fiscal year 2006 President's budget submission on the
current path of the Chemical Demilitarization Program and discussed the
issues related to noncompliance with our international treaty
obligations. The Office of Management and Budget staff also attended
the Department's meetings that reviewed the options presented during
the budget and program review process.
consultation prior to budget decision
12. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne, your decision to reduce funding
for Pueblo and Blue Grass, and to delay construction until 2011 at
those two sites, seems to have the effect of ensuring that the U.S.
will not meet its CWC destruction deadline. Did the Department consult
fully with all relevant agencies of the executive branch before making
such a budget decision, making clear the likely effect on our ability
to meet our treaty obligations?
Mr. Wynne. Yes. The Department's discussions with the relevant
agencies of the executive branch included the development of
alternatives to maximize our opportunity to achieve the extended 45-
percent CWC destruction milestone of December 2007, as well as the
extended 100-percent CWC destruction deadline of April 2012.
13. Senator Reed. Ambassador Mahley, was the State Department fully
consulted before a budget decision was made on reducing funding for
Pueblo and Blue Grass?
Ambassador Mahley. DOD regularly consults with us on the progress
of the chemical weapons destruction program and the implications for
U.S. ability to meet its obligations under the Chemical Weapons
Convention. In general, DOD does not consult State on specific
acquisition decisions with respect to the destruction program.
Therefore, State was not consulted about the acquisition decision on
funding for Pueblo and Blue Grass.
[Whereupon, at 3:54 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2006
----------
FRIDAY, APRIL 22, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats
and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John
Cornyn (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Cornyn and Reed.
Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
professional staff member; Elaine A. McCusker, professional
staff member; and Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Evelyn N. Farkas,
professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional
staff member; and Arun A. Seraphin, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Alison E. Brill and Nicholas W.
West.
Committee members' assistants present: Russell J.
Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Elizabeth King,
assistant to Senator Reed; and William K. Sutey, assistant to
Senator Bill Nelson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN CORNYN, CHAIRMAN
Senator Cornyn. Good morning. I am going to convene this
meeting of the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee
to receive testimony on the roles and missions of the U.S.
Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in review of President
Bush's defense budget request for fiscal year 2006 and for the
Future Years Defense Program.
Senator Reed and I would like to welcome our distinguished
witnesses: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, Thomas W. O'Connell; and
Commander of USSOCOM, General Doug Brown, U.S. Army. Welcome to
both of you. We appreciate your service.
Clearly, the events of September 11 have forever changed
our sense of security and the manner in which we organize and
equip our Armed Forces to defend our Nation and the threats of
the 21st century. Four years ago, SOCOM was principally focused
on supporting regional combatant commanders with Special
Operations Forces (SOF) and was heavily engaged in regional
security cooperation initiatives. Today SOCOM has much expanded
responsibilities and is a key player in the global war on
terror, with forces deployed on operational missions at the
four corners of the globe.
Such complex organizational changes are not accomplished
without hard work, a little trial and error, and dedicated
leaders such as those we have before us today. A principal
purpose of this hearing is to hear your reports on the progress
that you are making in reorienting SOCOM to combat terrorism
abroad and the challenges ahead in meeting the many and complex
responsibilities associated with special operations, low
intensity conflict, high tempo of operations (OPTEMPO), and
future threats.
As we meet this morning, thousands of our special operators
are engaged in military operations at home and abroad in the
ongoing global war on terror. These brave men and women and
their families deserve our continued support and they will get
it. The subcommittee's commitment is to ensure that these
troops remain the best equipped, best trained, best led, and
most capable SOF in the world. In doing so, we must understand
the challenges they face today and those they will face
tomorrow. The insights of our witnesses today are an
indispensable part of this process.
We have a number of important issues to discuss with our
witnesses this morning. Secretary O'Connell and General Brown,
SOF have been at the forefront of our military operations. The
operational demands on SOCOM have been very high. The ability
of SOCOM to sustain this high OPTEMPO is of great importance.
The subcommittee wants to ensure that you have the people, the
capabilities, and the resources to accomplish your many
missions and prepare for the future. We look forward to your
assessment.
While much attention has been focused on operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan, we cannot lose sight of other challenges
facing SOCOM. The Horn of Africa and other areas in sub-Saharan
Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia are unsettled and
potential havens for terrorists. Narcotrafficking and terrorism
in the Andean Ridge and Central Asia are on the rise. The
demand for U.S. SOF to respond to short-notice contingencies,
conduct extended combat operations, and help train the Armed
Forces of allied nations has never been higher. The
subcommittee looks forward to your views on these issues as
well.
As you prepare SOCOM to undertake expanded
responsibilities, prudent steps are required to ensure the
success of potential operations. The operational preparation of
the environment concept is one such step. While I am supportive
of the concept in principle, it has produced some concern that
we want to explore today. We would like to receive an update
from both our witnesses on the resolution of these concerns by
other agencies about the program.
SOCOM has enjoyed great success in identifying emerging
operational needs of its deployed teams and rapidly developing
and fielding new capabilities for SOF. Major acquisitions
programs, however, like the Advanced Sea/Air/Land (SEAL)
Delivery System (ASDS) have proven to be more challenging. I
had the chance, as General Brown and I discussed when he
visited with me in my office recently, to visit the operational
ASDS site last month and was much impressed by the capability
of the system and certainly the enthusiasm of the SEAL
operators. But I am concerned, as I expressed then and I will
repeat now, by the schedule slippage and the cost growth of the
program. We look forward to General Brown's assessment of this
program and the steps he has taken to improve oversight and
management of this important program.
Our witnesses today represent the men and women of SOCOM,
who quietly fight terrorism on distant battlefields, defending
our homeland from threats of the 21st century. We applaud and
honor their service and again thank our witnesses for their
service and their presence before the subcommittee today.
I will now turn the floor over to Senator Reed, the ranking
member.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and let me
join you in welcoming Assistant Secretary Tom O'Connell, who is
not only a distinguished Army veteran, but a distinguished
Rhode Islander. Thank you, Tom, and General Doug Brown, who
leads with great distinction SOCOM, and also Command Chief
Master Sergeant Bob Martens. A lot of our most capable special
operators are senior noncommissioned officers and their role is
absolutely critical to the military, and we thank you and your
colleagues for your service.
We have called this hearing so that we can become better
informed about how the SOCOM is organizing, training, and
equipping to conduct its statutory missions, as well as to
execute its new role leading the Department's global war on
terrorism efforts. I do not need to go down the list of special
operations achievements for our witnesses, my colleagues, and
our observers. It has been an extraordinarily effective force
in the last several years, as it has been throughout our
history, and we thank you for the valor, the courage, and skill
of the people that you lead, General Brown and Secretary
O'Connell.
As General Brown outlined in his prepared testimony, the
command has established a new Joint Interagency Operations and
Intelligence Center to allow it to better execute its
counterterrorism mission. The command is also increasing its
manpower in critical areas, such as civil affairs (CA) and
psychological operations (PSYOP), and it is working with the
Marine Corps to increase cooperation and perhaps paving the way
for the creation of a Marine Corps component for SOCOM.
The Major Force Program 11 (MFP-11) acquisition authority
and the rapid procurement process provided by combat mission
needs statements from the field continue to serve the immediate
needs of the special operators. Nonetheless, the OPTEMPO
remains the highest in the history of the SOF.
In addition, SOF operations are predominantly focused in
and around Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed, starting next fiscal
year, for the first time in 6 years we will not have any SOF
training the military in Colombia. So I wonder whether we are
increasing the right categories of SOF by the right amount.
Understanding that it takes time to create special operators,
the time to start is now, and the question I have for the
witnesses is whether the capacity the command has planned to
build will meet future requirements.
Also, many of the current special operations assignments
are direct action missions and they are being conducted at the
cost of the critical foreign training missions that serve the
long-term war against terrorism and other U.S. national
security objectives by providing SOF with familiarity and
access. SOCOM has had to turn down a higher percentage of State
Department requests for joint and combined training exercises
since 2003 than it had even in the 2 previous years. These
missions are critical in the long-term war against terrorism
and other U.S. national security objectives. I would like to
know what plans the Department of Defense (DOD) or command has
to ensure that the special operations involvement in such
training missions does not continue to decrease substantially.
I would also like to hear about any dedicated long-term
futures planning within the command, noting that the budget
request contains many legacy items. How do the DOD and SOCOM
see the future and how is the command posturing research and
development and procurement activities to meet future
challenges? Is there a SOCOM transformation plan, in essence?
Finally, SOCOM's execution of its war on terrorism mission
has led to concern about the nature of its operations, with
some press accounts pointing to increased clandestine efforts
that blur the lines between operational and intelligence
functions. I would like to hear more about what SOF are doing
and how these efforts differ from intelligence activities.
Let me conclude as I began, by commending you, General
Brown, Secretary O'Connell, and the extraordinary soldiers,
airmen, sailors, and marines that you lead. Thank you very
much.
General Brown. Thank you.
Senator Cornyn. Secretary O'Connell, we would be pleased to
hear your opening statement and then we will turn to General
Brown.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS W. O'CONNELL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT
Mr. O'Connell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Reed.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee
and comment on the status and progress of our Nation's SOF.
Thank you both for your opening statements and we will endeavor
to either get you the answers to your questions or provide them
for the record.
With your permission, sir, I will keep my opening statement
short. I have submitted a lengthier statement for the record.
Sir, the nature of the SOCOM is vastly different from just
a few short years ago. Not only are they at war, they are
playing a pivotal and crucial role, and in almost every aspect
of the global war on terrorism they are playing a leading role.
Whether participating in the direct action missions against the
most vicious and dangerous of our adversaries, conducting CA
missions designed to build the peace as well as infrastructure,
conducting effective PSYOP activities in support of
conventional troops, flying dangerous heliborne and fixed-wing
insertions in some of the most inhospitable terrain in the
world, attacking Taliban formations and remnants in Afghanistan
with our Ranger forces, or training foreign SOF all over the
world to build foreign capacity, and in the case of the Green
Berets of the Seventh Special Forces Group helping the
Government and Armed Forces of Colombia overcome the scourge of
narcoterrorists, the men and women of the United States SOCOM
deserve a great deal of credit and praise, none more so than
perhaps two of their leaders that have been acknowledged here
today: General Doug Brown and Chief Master Sergeant Bob
Martens.
Leadership is an intangible. Experience, integrity, vision,
and savvy are the hallmarks of great leaders. Two of them for
the SOCOM sit before you today.
A few months ago, sir, I had the opportunity to visit our
SEAL Command in Coronado, California, the Naval Special Warfare
Command. I came away both humbled and awed. Their contributions
to the global war on terrorism and our Nation's defense have
been nothing short of remarkable. That is a common thread among
our SOF. Rangers, CA, PSYOP, Green Beret, Army Special
Operations, Aviation Forces, Air Force Special Tactics Teams,
our great Air Force Special Operations Command aviators--flying
AC-130 gunships, Combat Talons, Pave Low helicopters, our
pararescue personnel, and weathermen--Navy SEALs, and Special
Boat Units, all contribute daily under the umbrella of ``quiet
professionals.''
I cannot give enough credit to General Brown. He is the
right man at the right time at the right place to lead our SOF.
Let me also recognize the great SOF wives, led by Doug's wife
Penny Brown. They have set the standard for family support and
fostering a compassionate, caring environment among the SOF
ranks.
One of the SOF truths, humans are more important than
hardware, has been particularly evident in SOCOM's efforts to
equip the man, rather than man the equipment. Their efforts to
press the envelope with systems such as the CV-22 and the ASDS,
which Senator Cornyn just mentioned, reflect this paradigm.
General Brown and his subordinate SOCOM staff and component
commanders have worked tirelessly to develop a force structure
that can optimize leading edge technology. I believe General
Brown has carefully crafted a coherent plan for future growth
of SOF. His plan is to increase SOF personnel by about 2,300
over the next 4 years, to include increases in both Special
Forces and SEALs, reflecting an understanding of current needs
as well as recruiting and training base limitations.
The support of this subcommittee, the full committee of the
whole, and the entire Congress has been essential to the
success of our SOF elements. General Brown will discuss the key
to success in four words--joint, combined, coalition, and
interagency--and I echo his evaluation.
Secretary Rumsfeld has charged his DOD leadership with
developing forces that can meet the demands of our national
military strategy as well as meeting the parameters of the
Quadrennial Defense Review and other elements of guidance. I am
confident that as these deliberations proceed we will determine
that our SOF are uniquely positioned to meet the challenges of
the global war on terrorism.
As we look forward to the future challenges we face, we
must recognize the tremendous support that members and staff of
this subcommittee have provided. We welcome your critical
inquiries. We welcome your counsel.
Sir, this position provides me with the opportunity and
deep honor to interact with America's finest. It is indeed a
humbling experience. With your support, we can do great things,
and I welcome your questions. Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. O'Connell follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Thomas W. O'Connell
Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee, I thank you for the
opportunity to testify about special operations and the global war on
terrorism, as well as those aspects of our current Special Operations
Forces (SOF) posture that contribute significantly to our national
capabilities to confront our adversaries.
I exercise civilian oversight of special operations activities of
the Department of Defense (DOD). I attempt to ensure that SOF are
appropriately employed and that senior policymakers understand their
capabilities as well as their limitations. Not only am I an advocate
and a defender of the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and SOF,
I am also dedicated to ensuring our SOF continues to be the best
trained, best equipped, most flexible, and most effective fighting
force available to our country. Representatives from the Office of
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SOLIC) spend a
significant amount of time at SOCOM headquarters to assist with
developing the SOF program and budget. I participate in the SOCOM Board
of Director's meetings, the Command's executive resource body. This
effort produces a SOF program and budget that stresses force readiness
and sustainability, provides sufficient force structure to meet the
demands of the geographic combatant commanders and the Commander,
USSOCOM in his role as a supported commander in the global war on
terrorism. I'd like to recognize my Director of Resources, Tim Morgan,
whose work on Major Force Program-11 (MFP-11) issues has been superb.
We sponsor the Combating Terror Technology Support Program, through
which I maintain executive direction and proponency along with the
Department of State for the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG),
which addresses the Nation's interagency combating terrorism
requirements. We will continue to serve the technology needs of the
warfighter in addressing the emerging threats. As Secretary Rumsfeld
stated repeatedly, to address any of a myriad of threats we shall be
facing, it will be necessary to shorten the decision cycle for force
definition, equipping, and deployment. The Quadrennial Defense Review's
recently published Terms of Reference is a reflection of that
philosophy. Through its numerous requirements-driven successes and by
continuing to reflect partnered cooperation across its subgroups and
among Federal agencies, the Combating Terror Technology Support Program
has shown it can meet that expectation. We also continue to seek
solutions from many allies and coalition partners. On that point, we
have achieved numerous successes. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has
been instrumental in leading an Improvised Explosive Device Integrated
Process Team. Under the executive leadership of the Army, we have been
able to apply SOF/SOLIC assistance to the fight against the leading
killer of U.S. forces in Iraq.
The United States is at a critical moment in the war on terrorism.
We have realized initial successes and achieved a degree of momentum
that together support a general assessment that we are making progress
in winning this war. But sustaining that momentum and continuing the
successes against terrorists and their supporters now and into the
future is just as critical. We must ride the crest of successes of the
Afghan and Iraqi elections to a new level of democratic processes in
the region.
For the past 3 years, we have examined how the attacks of September
11 have changed how we define ``defense,'' and how, as a consequence,
the war on terrorism is fundamentally a different type of war than any
we've fought before. We used to respond to the threat of global
terrorism in terms of transnational criminal activity. While SOF were
certainly a part of the equation, the SOF posture 4 years ago is one we
would hardly recognize today.
Indeed, that is true of the entire military and the entire concept
of national defense. Four years ago, we were geared to defend against a
state projecting force across great distances, and we built extensive
capabilities to provide us early warning and tools to deter aggression.
But the potential destructiveness of an attack of the type we suffered
on September 11 means that we are no longer afforded an opportunity to
determine an ``appropriate response,'' nor make a clear determination
of when decisive action is too little or too late. For reasons we all
understand, SOF have become a critical military tool in taking the war
to the terrorists before it can be fought on our own soil or that of
our allies. MFP-11 has been instrumental in allowing SOCOM to chart a
steady path toward matching changing requirements against available
resources.
I repeat my assessment of last year: SOF are uniquely qualified for
that mission. Because of those qualifications and the demands of the
war on terrorism, the SOCOM has been structuring and shaping SOF in
different ways. While SOF were originally conceived to be used as
forces for supporting or leveraging larger conventional forces in
battle, or for undertaking discrete, limited strategic missions, the
new reality has given SOF a prominent, front-line, essential role in
the defense of our Nation. This change was the impetus for the shift of
SOCOM from not only a supporting command but also a supported combatant
command in the global war on terror. Our current Unified Command Plan
reflects a paradigm shift in strategic thought.
This means SOF will continue to support regional commanders, while
also at times being supported by other combatant commands. SOF are
still the first in and last out in many contingency operations around
the globe. SOF must be ready to act at any time, in all environments,
overtly or clandestinely; alone or in concert with U.S. and foreign
forces. General Brown's creation of the Center for Special Operations
will pay significant dividends as we move forward to operating with the
new National Counterterrorism Center.
Before I discuss further what has changed and what our new national
security imperatives require of SOF, I want to note explicitly that one
of the most important factors and essential considerations for us has
not changed: the importance of the special operator. In terms of
missions performed and in the qualities of the individuals who
undertake those missions, the special operator is truly unique and
requires a different type of mindset on our end in terms of planning
and support. Our starting point has always been and must continue to be
what we call the ``SOF Truths,'' which are essentially statements of
the fundamentals: ``Quality is better than quantity. Special Operations
Forces cannot be mass produced. Competent Special Operations Forces
cannot be created after a crisis occurs. Humans are more important than
hardware.'' General Brown and his subordinate commanders have made sure
that these truths have not been eroded.
These truths have been reaffirmed by the superb performance of our
SOF in Afghanistan, Iraq, Colombia, the Philippines, and many other
countries around the world. I am keenly aware of how very much the
dedication and commitment of our special operations professionals are
appreciated by every member of the political leadership. I would like
to cite the work of Under Secretaries Dr. David Chu and Ms. Tina Jonas.
They fully supported the initiatives of SOCOM to address retention
issues by fostering bonuses that will help with retention of key
special operators at critical career decision points.
General Brown's testimony will reflect the importance we at both
the DOD and SOCOM attach to a Joint, Combined, Coalition, and
Interagency working environment. Perhaps more so than any other
combatant command, SOCOM has led the way in breaking bureaucratic
barriers and fostering interagency cooperation, particularly with the
Central Intelligence Agency. I echo his comments.
About a year ago, I had the high honor of visiting some of our SOF
in Iraq. These forces make us proud--and should cause potential
adversaries to pause before seeking to harm the United States. The
commitment of SOF to pursuing terrorists to all corners of the globe is
embedded in their mindset. The experience gained in defeating the
Taliban and disrupting al Qaeda in Afghanistan, destroying the brutal
regime in Iraq, and aiding friends and partners in other corners of the
globe, such as Colombia and the Philippines, has matured our
warfighters to a keen edge. Our challenge is to maintain that edge, and
it will require careful assistance from policymakers.
I also saw that the nature and importance of the new demands on SOF
are apparent to the operators in the field, and they are clearly doing
more with the additional manpower, funding, and materiel you've given
them to meet the new challenges to our national security. This level of
support is required to meet the challenges of the war on terrorism. The
change from a regional, reactive posture to a global, proactive posture
could not be achieved nor sustained with the levels of funding,
materiel, and forces that we had before September 11. I believe General
Brown has charted a steady course of growth for the foreseeable future.
The fiscal year 2006 President's budget submission for SOCOM is
$6.7 billion, an increase of a modest 3 percent. This funding request
will continue the modernization and transformation effort started in
fiscal year 2004. It will enable SOCOM to: 1) transform SOF
capabilities to better locate and track individual terrorists across
the globe and conduct small surgical operations with minimal risk to
the employed force; 2) maintain sustained operations in areas where
terrorist networks are operating; 3) continue to invest in critical
``low-density/high-demand'' aviation assets that provide SOF with the
mobility necessary to deploy quickly and to execute their missions
quickly; 4) continue to invest in key command, control, and
communications infrastructure; and 5) support the personnel USSOCOM has
added to continue worldwide deployments and 24-hour-a-day operations,
particularly in the Center for Special Operations and the Theater
Special Operations Commands.
This increase is essential to sustaining the necessary operations
and to ensuring we can meet the Secretary's transformation
requirements. We are grateful for Congress' continued interest and
support in sustaining the necessary funding for the mission. I would
also like to thank this committee and Congress for enacting special
authorities (section 1208 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2005) that will permit our SOF to recruit and train
surrogate forces in areas that offer exceptional opportunities for
success in the global war on terrorism. In addition, thank you for your
support on the supplemental that will go to conference shortly.
I would like to conclude by highlighting the implications the
posture, programming, and policy for SOF in the war on terrorism have
for all aspects of our Nation's defense. SOF have always been the
innovators for the larger military, and the SOF mindset has been the
incubator of innovation. That is especially true today. With the shift
from SOF being postured for reactive, regional contingencies to being a
global, proactive, and preemptive force, we are witnessing a key
process of evolution in SOF that may also signal a need for additional
necessary changes in our larger military. Our new Unified Command Plan
reflects this evolution. As a key innovative force, SOF's direction can
be a critical tool to inspire the evolution of the larger military and
support the transformation of our national defense as a whole in coming
years. As a Nation, we must identify and address those ``ungoverned
spaces'', and build capacity to deal with those who would harm our
country. Most of all, we must realize that we are not in a ``battle of
ideas,'' we are in a ``test of wills.''
Finally, a personal note: Whenever possible, I endeavor to attend
funerals of SOF personnel at Arlington National Cemetery. It is indeed
a high honor to represent the DOD. When I look into the eyes of widows,
children, parents, and other relatives of our fallen heroes, I
understand that there is no ``quit'' in their demeanor. We must honor
their service and sacrifice. They are an inspiration to all who witness
their courage and spirit. Your support is critical to the success of
our SOF. I thank you for your careful scrutiny of our program and
budget. Together, we can help move our SOF into a position of
prominence that will continue to press the fight against America's
enemies. Thank you. I welcome your questions.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much, Secretary O'Connell.
General Brown, we will be glad to hear from you.
STATEMENT OF GEN BRYAN D. BROWN, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL
OPERATIONS COMMAND
General Brown. Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed: It is an honor
to appear before the subcommittee today to report on our SOF.
It is a privilege to be here with the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. I
enjoy a tremendous working relationship with Mr. O'Connell as
we aggressively fight the global war on terrorism.
The threat we face today in the global war on terrorism is
an adversary without borders or boundaries, using asymmetrical
methods to attack our vulnerabilities. Defeating this enemy
requires the full range of our Nation's capabilities. SOF are
uniquely trained and equipped to support our Nation and our
coalition's efforts. Operating in this complex environment is
what SOF do best.
After September 11, SOCOM's role changed from being
traditionally a force provider to being the DOD lead for the
global war on terrorism. Our new mission includes planning,
synchronizing, and executing direct combat missions against
terrorist organizations around the world and executing those
missions as a supported commander when directed. Concurrently,
we continue to provide our critical role of force provider to
all our SOF and supporting commands to the geographic combatant
commanders.
In addition to being a small, flexible, joint force, SOF
have specialized skills, equipment, and tactics. We are
regionally focused, politically and culturally sensitive, and
many of us possess language skills.
We are working closely with the geographic combatant
commanders to determine in which areas SOF should focus to
achieve maximum effects. Our highly skilled direct action
capability has resulted in the capture or killing of terrorists
as we defend this Nation far forward, specifically in Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).
However, our capabilities are much more important than just
direct action. Through careful engagement, SOCOM is also
accomplishing our core task of foreign internal defense to help
countries become more capable, our CA operations to eliminate
the root causes of terrorism, and our PSYOPs to communicate the
truth to those who would be deciding whether or not to join al
Qaeda or other terrorist organizations.
As I mentioned earlier, we are a small force, but to meet
the challenges of the global war on terrorism we are increasing
our special operations manpower. We are adding force structure
in SOF, CA, PSYOPs, our Air Force and our Army Special
Operations Aviation Forces, and Navy Special Warfare. We are
also providing additional staff to our theater special
operations commands in the geographic combatant commanders'
areas of responsibility (AORs).
In the next 4 years we will increase our numbers by over
2,300 personnel. That includes two additional SEAL team
equivalents and approximately 500 Special Forces. In order to
create more special operators, we have aggressively increased
the number of training instructors and support personnel to
enable us to increase our training capacity without lowering
the standards. Additionally, with the help of the Service, the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and Congress, we have
instituted retention initiatives that include targeted bonuses
for specific operational specialties that are showing a
decrease in strength and educational benefits for members of
our command.
The key to SOCOM's success is our well-trained, well-
equipped, highly capable special operators. Our number one SOF
truth is that humans are more important than hardware. As such,
our number one resource priority is our SOF warrior. We are
emphasizing training, education, and equipment systems that
will ensure our SOF warriors have the technical and tactical
skill, regional expertise, language proficiency, and
specialized equipment necessary to win this war.
In support of our SOF warriors, our title 10 acquisition
authority is absolutely critical in enabling SOCOM to rapidly
respond to battlefield requirements. Through our Special
Operations Acquisition Executive and Acquisition Center, we are
able to quickly team operators and acquisition authorities to
evaluate requirements, procure the right equipment, and respond
rapidly across the spectrum of our operations. This is a pearl
at SOCOM and it is a key enabler to the speed required to be
capable of performing our missions.
SOCOM is the right command for the mission. However, we
understand we are only part of the equation. The nature of this
war and the challenges it poses require a robust,
interdependent working relationship with the DOD and
interagencies, to fully harness our Nation's instruments of
power in this fight.
This is a long-term conflict and it is worldwide. It does
not end with al Qaeda. There are multiple terrorist groups
operating in several countries whose leadership, membership,
and modes of operation will continue to change as the strategic
environment changes. When we eliminate a seam, they will search
for another. The enemy is patient, tenacious, and dedicated in
this fight and we must be the same. SOCOM is preparing for the
long term.
This Sunday marks the 25th anniversary of Operation Eagle
Claw, the mission that resulted in Congress creating SOCOM. I
want to thank you and the Members of Congress that created us
in 1987 and continue to give us incredible support as we work
together with our interagency and our coalition partners to
secure our Nation and our global allies. The support of this
subcommittee and the support of the Secretary of Defense help
ensure SOF will become even more capable in the future.
I am ready for your questions, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Brown follows:]
Prepared Statement by GEN Bryan D. Brown, USA
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is
an honor and privilege to report to you on the state of the United
States Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Today's United States
Special Operations Forces (SOF) are the most capable in the world. They
have performed magnificently on the battlefields of Iraq and
Afghanistan, and in their support of geographic combatant commander
activities around the world.
The Secretary of Defense expanded SOCOM's role in 2003 to include
leading the Department of Defenses' (DOD) global war on terrorism
planning effort, and commanding specifically designated global war on
terrorism operations. In this role as the lead command for the global
war on terrorism, SOCOM has matured into a warfighting command that is
leading the planning and synchronization of DOD activities in support
of the global war on terrorism. Today at SOCOM, our priorities are the
global war on terrorism, the readiness of our forces, and building
SOF's future capabilities to be even more capable to meet the demands
of the changing strategic environment.
strategic environment
Terrorist networks are globally dispersed and compartmentalized
into remote, smaller networks or groups that limit direct access to
their leadership, communications, and infrastructure. They recognize no
borders and no boundaries, use the local populace for plain-sight
concealment, and employ terror, torture, and indiscriminate killing as
standard tactics, techniques, and procedures. Without respect for
international law, they adapt their methods and conduct operations that
incorporate technology across the spectrum from low tech to high tech.
This creates a significant challenge for SOCOM and directs the Command
along three lines. First, as the supported Commander, SOCOM must
synchronize DOD efforts, coordinate and collaborate in
interdepartmental and interagency efforts, facilitate the flow of
information and intelligence, and foster cooperation with partner
nations to shape the global war on terrorism. This will require the
elimination of seams and sanctuaries. Second, SOCOM must focus SOF on
the global war on terrorism by increasing emphasis on organizing,
training, and equipping the force to accomplish our main effort of
attacking terrorist networks and enabling partner nations to do so in
concert with us. We will provide assistance to other government
agencies in our effort to persuade or coerce nation states that support
terrorist networks, diminish the underlying conditions that cause
terrorism, and counter core motivations that result in terrorist
networks. Finally, we must continue to flawlessly integrate with
conventional forces in traditional warfare.
socom center for special operations
When SOCOM was established by Congress in 1987, its primary role
was to support the geographic combatant commanders by providing them
with trained and equipped special operations personnel. Now SOCOM's
focus has been rebalanced to emphasize the global war on terrorism--we
are at war. The Center for Special Operations (CSO), a directorate
within SOCOM headquarters, was created to optimize SOCOM's warfighting
efforts, by breaking down traditional barriers that exist between
plans, operations, and intelligence functions. By consolidating these
efforts under a single director, SOCOM has improved its speed, agility,
and flexibility--keys to success in today's global environment. The CSO
has embedded interagency liaison teams that streamline interagency
coordination, communication, and processes, further enhancing
operations, intelligence and planning fusion. The CSO is in effect
SOCOM's Joint Interagency Coordination Group. Responsibilities in the
CSO include reviewing global strategies, developing courses of action,
and formulating plans and recommendations for operational force
employment by the Commander, SOCOM.
A dynamic component of the CSO is our Special Operations Joint
Interagency Collaboration Center (SOJICC). A state of the art facility
fusing operations and intelligence, the SOJICC integrates DOD and
interagency information and databases to exploit the full potential of
this information to support special operations planning and course of
action development. SOJICC was developed in response to operational
priorities and has been used extensively in supporting unique special
operations requirements in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and
Operational Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and developing short turn-around
products in support of SOF in all of the combatant commands.
global war on terrorism
Success in Operations
SOCOM's number one priority is the global war on terrorism.
Defeating the terrorist threat requires the full range of Special
Operations capabilities. SOCOM's special operators, carefully selected,
highly trained, and well equipped, continue to be ``the worst nightmare
of America's worst enemies'' as President Bush stated in June 2004.
Employing the tactics, techniques and procedures most appropriate to a
given situation, our forces act across the spectrum of operations from
Civil Affairs (CA), to Unconventional Warfare (UW), to Direct Action.
Our interagency, conventional, and coalition relationships have
never been stronger than in today's global operations. This joint,
coalition, interagency team has brought freedom to millions in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet plenty of work remains to defeat the
insurgents that continue a violent struggle against democracy. SOF,
deployed in support of the geographic combatant commanders, have been
involved in every phase of this global effort. As we transition to the
post-election environment in both Afghanistan and Iraq, joint,
combined, and interagency efforts will be more critical than ever to
win the peace, as we continue on the path to a more stable and secure
world.
Iraq
SOF operations, in support of United States Central Command
(CENTCOM), remain focused on defeating anti-coalition militia elements
and denying them freedom of movement and action throughout Central and
Northern Iraq. SOF have been very successful at finding, fixing, and
finishing the enemy, and one of the keys to our success has been the
ability to fuse intelligence with operations resulting in actions that
not only capture or kill the enemy, but also generate additional
information for further operations.
In close coordination with Iraqi and Coalition Forces, U.S. SOF
played a critical role in virtually every major operation in Iraq
during 2004, particularly the defeat of the insurgent offensives in
April and August, the liberation of Fallujah in November, and coalition
victories in Najaf, Samarra, and Ramadi. In these and other operations,
SOF conducted numerous offensive actions resulting in a significant
number of detainees. In addition to their combat effectiveness, SOF
personnel have shown extraordinary maturity, cultural awareness, and
good judgment. SOF, in coordination with conventional forces, continue
to execute an aggressive offensive strategy against terrorists, but do
so in a way to minimize the negative impact on Iraqi citizens.
A very visible and successful Special Operation Foreign Internal
Defense mission has been our work with Iraqi security forces. Trained
by Green Berets, the 36th Commando Battalion and the Iraqi
Counterterrorism Battalion are now capable of providing ongoing
security against insurgents. I have visited both units. They have
fought valiantly in such difficult cities as Fallujah, Najaf, and
Samarra alongside U.S. Special Forces. They are good, and are getting
better.
Applying lessons learned from earlier successes against the Taliban
in Afghanistan, SOF ground forces in Iraq have worked closely with
conventional airpower to eliminate terrorists. SOF aviation has also
been highly effective, destroying a large number of enemy targets with
minimal collateral damage and providing rapid responses to time-
sensitive information. SOF have rescued hostages and assisted local law
enforcement agencies in capturing terrorists who murdered western
hostages. In the waters of the Persian Gulf, SOF have conducted
maritime interdiction operations to disrupt terrorist movement and
operations. SOF are committed to helping the Iraqis, in support of
CENTCOM's strategy, to establish a secure and peaceful future. SOF have
played major roles alongside their conventional and coalition partners
in supporting the road to Iraqi self-government and lasting security.
Although much work remains, the very successful recent election is a
striking example of the success of our efforts in global war on
terrorism. The commander of the Multi-National Force in Iraq, GEN
George W. Casey, Jr, described SOF achievements in Iraq as
``Herculean.''
Afghanistan
SOF continue to make vital contributions to the war on terrorism as
well as stability operations. Major strategic events enabled by SOF
include Afghanistan's first ever national election in October and the
December inauguration of its first elected President. SOF operations
focused on supporting these two historic events and were critical to
these strategic victories. In precisely targeted offensive operations,
SOF killed and captured hundreds of terrorists and insurgents. These
operations have been crucial to securing cities near the critical area
along the border with Pakistan and in former Taliban strongholds. SOF
manned dozens of small camps in areas frequented by insurgents and
terrorists, inhibiting enemy operations and enhancing the security of
the Afghan population. The enemy has repeatedly attacked these small
camps, but SOF, conventional, and Coalition Forces have defeated all
enemy offensives and inflicted heavy enemy casualties.
Throughout Afghanistan, SOF conducted UW. A SOF core task, UW is
operations conducted by, through, and with surrogate forces. The
Services are using the term ``Unconventional Warfare'' frequently;
however, accomplishing missions in a new or unconventional manner is
not the same as UW. UW is a capability unique to SOF and will continue
to be an important skill in future operations.
As in Iraq, major coalition goals included building up Afghan
forces and having those forces conduct effective military operations,
thereby increasing the legitimacy and popular support of the
government. SOF emphasized combined operations, with the Afghan
National Army taking the lead role throughout the country to accomplish
these goals.
Coalition Forces, including SOF, assist in the counternarcotics
effort in Afghanistan by reporting, confiscating, or destroying drugs
and drug equipment encountered in the course of normal operations,
sharing intelligence, and training Afghan security forces in these
efforts. The adverse effect of the narcotics problem on Afghanistan's
security, stability and society is significant and requires a multi-
faceted and long term effort. The Afghan Government, aided by the
international community, must work to create viable economic
alternatives for growers and manufacturers.
Other Regions of the World
In addition to supporting the Commander, CENTCOM, SOF prosecuted
global war on terrorism missions around the globe. In support of
Commander, United States European Command, U.S. SOF joined our North
Atlantic Treaty Organization SOF allies to form a response force in
support of the 2004 Olympics in Athens, Greece, a high value potential
target for international terrorists. This response force was fully
integrated into the Olympic Games' security task force and helped
ensure that terrorists did not disrupt the games.
SOF also worked with security forces from several African nations
to enhance their counter-terrorist capabilities, conducting 2-month
training periods with indigenous forces focused on logistics,
communications, and weapons skills. The effort was designed to
eliminate sparsely-populated border regions as potential terrorist
safe-havens before terrorists arrived in force. In the Balkans, CA,
Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and other special operators supported
operations in Bosnia, bolstering civil institutions to help maintain
peace in that country.
In addition to short-term operations, SOF long-term activities help
develop the strategic environment by contributing directly to
deterrence efforts. U.S. SOF participated in over fifty Joint Combined
Exercise Training events globally with host-nation forces. In the
Pacific theater, SOF supported the Commander, United States Pacific
Command (USPACOM) by providing assistance to allied nations seeking to
stem narcoterrorism, as well as remove mines laid during four decades
of regional conflicts. SOF continues to support OEF-Philippines, and
during 2004, Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines deployed
teams to provide operational planning and special skills training to
Filipino Armed Forces personnel. U.S. SOF worked with Filipino military
forces and other units throughout the country to prevent the disruption
of national elections. Meanwhile, U.S. Navy SOF personnel worked with
their counterparts to conduct expanded maritime interdiction operations
around the archipelago. PSYOP soldiers sought to garner support of the
local population.
The tsunami of December 2004 brought horrific destruction around
the rim of the Indian Ocean, and SOF, in support of PACOM, responded
immediately to provide humanitarian assistance to those struck by this
devastating natural disaster. Through the use of specialized skills and
equipment, SOF supported the U.S. and international relief efforts. SOF
soldiers, airmen, and sailors provided their expertise in diverse areas
such as airfield management, airlift, and delivering and distributing
medical care and supplies in conjunction with the U.S. Air Force, Army,
Navy, Marine Corps, and civilian organizations.
In South America, SOF efforts support the Commander, United States
Southern Command through operations helping the Government of Colombia
in its fight against terrorists, narcotics trafficking groups, and
insurgents. SOF support included counter-narcoterrorist training
deployments, training assistance to Colombian SOF, help with
establishing a special operations command and control (C2)
organization, longstanding CA and PSYOP activities and assistance
fusing intelligence with operational planning. U.S. SOF also helped
with the search for American citizens held hostage by terrorists. By
the end of 2004, the Colombian military and police forces had made
notable progress in the fight against narcoterrorists.
readiness
Force readiness is a SOF priority and is crucial to mission
success. SOCOM's number one readiness issue is our people, followed
closely by our equipment and training.
People
SOCOM, while scheduled to grow in fiscal year 2005, remains less
than 2 percent of our Nation's military force. Our operators are high-
caliber professionals with intelligence, stamina, problem-solving
skills, mental toughness, flexibility, determination, integrity, and
extraordinary strength of character and will. Additionally, they are
experts with their weapons, and many are language trained. Our small
number of carefully selected, incredibly dedicated, capable, mature,
well-trained, and well-led people are key to our quality force.
However, we must have the total force--the correct mix of Active,
Reserve, and National Guard personnel to meet the challenge. Last year
I reported that SOF were deployed globally at the highest sustained
operations tempo in their history. That is still true today, with over
6,100 special operators supporting the geographic combatant commanders.
To accomplish SOF missions, highly specialized skill sets are
required, including cultural and regional awareness and expertise, and
skill in employing both low and high-tech equipment and solutions. To
achieve the required level of proficiency and guarantee SOF relevance,
recruitment, training, accession and retention, development of the
force must be closely managed. With the support of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and Congress, SOCOM was able to secure a
comprehensive SOCOM retention package aimed at specific SOF operational
specialists throughout their careers.
I believe our current operations tempo is manageable, but stressed
in certain critical specialties--namely our SEALS, Special Forces, Air
Force Special Operations Command Combat Controllers, Pararescuemen, and
Special Operations Weather personnel. CA and PSYOP forces will be
discussed shortly. SOCOM began our growth by investing in our
schoolhouses through additional instructors to increase throughput for
creating special operators while maintaining our standards. Coupled
with retaining experienced SOF personnel, this will improve our
capability to meet the demand on our force.
However, adding SOF is not a near-term fix, as SOF cannot be mass-
produced, nor created after emergencies occur. Our recruiting is good,
and our schools are full, but because of our rigorous selection and
training process for SOF operators, it takes between 12 and 24 months,
depending on specialty, to graduate an initially-qualified SOF
operator. In fiscal year 2006, SOCOM will grow by 1,405 members to an
end-strength of 52,846. We are adding personnel to our Active-Duty SEAL
teams, increasing active Special Forces Group strength, and adding
personnel at the 16th Special Operations Wing to support forward
deployed and rotational requirements. We have also added one MH-47
aviation battalion based on the west coast and oriented towards the
Pacific. With great support from the Secretary of Defense, we have
significantly increased the authorized manning levels of SOF over the
past 2 years, but areas of concern remain our PSYOP and CA forces.
Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations
CA and PSYOP were essential in facilitating the elections in both
Afghanistan and Iraq and will continue to play critical roles in the
stabilization and reconstruction of both countries. CA and PSYOP also
had a vital role in combat operations and consolidation activities in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Whether encouraging enemy fighters to surrender,
directing civilians away from battle zones, or separating terrorists
from their base of support, tactical PSYOP multiplied the effectiveness
of combat operations and saved many lives.
Dissemination of truthful information to foreign audiences in
support of U.S. policy and national objectives is a vital part of SOF's
effort to secure peace. Culturally-oriented PSYOP units with selected
language skills are supporting commanders and other U.S. Government
agencies in operations ranging from humanitarian assistance to weapons
collection. PSYOP forces have an aggressive program of providing
handbills to children explaining the threat of unexploded ordinance and
minefields. Additionally, through leaflets and broadcasts, PSYOP forces
disseminate information to raise awareness about the Rewards for
Justice Program. SOF then facilitate linking individuals possessing
information with the appropriate agencies. PSYOP forces use nonviolent
means in often violent environments to convince adversary, neutral, and
friendly nations and forces to take action favorable to the U.S. and
its allies. These forces, along with SOF CA units, are force
multipliers. Three quarters of our PSYOP personnel are in our Reserve
component.
CA forces are key to our long-term success in the global war on
terrorism. CA specialists can quickly and systematically identify
critical infrastructure requirements needed by local citizens. They can
also locate civil resources to support military operations, help
minimize civilian interference with operations, support national
assistance activities, and establish and maintain liaison dialogue with
civilian aid agencies, commercial and private organizations. CA forces
are currently working with local governments of Iraq and Afghanistan
and international humanitarian organizations to rebuild infrastructure
and restore stability. They facilitate, plan, and coordinate repairing
wells, providing food to hungry children, bringing medical care to
families, and are hard at work helping rebuild school systems to
counter radical thought through education. CA forces become advocates
for their plans to synchronize indigenous populations and aggressively
seek funding for regional projects. Over 90 percent of our CA personnel
are in our Reserve component.
This level of effort, however, doesn't come without a price. While
we believe people are more important than hardware and closely monitor
our deployment schedules, Army Reserve CA and PSYOP units have been
mobilized for up to 24 months under the partial mobilization authority.
This in turn has made us more reliant on the few Active-Duty CA and
PSYOP units to meet operational requirements. Future rotations for OIF/
OEF will be constrained by the number of personnel in these specialties
available. To improve these areas we have added four PSYOP companies
(Reserve), two PSYOP companies (Active), two CA battalions (Reserve),
and two CA companies (Active). While the use of Provisional Battalions
created for the war effort is a concept we are exploring, compressed CA
specialty training is not the best solution to this problem. We owe it
to the geographic combatant commanders to send fully qualified CA and
PSYOP personnel to the battlefield.
building future special operations forces
The command's main goal for the future is to identify and develop
the capabilities SOF will need to remain the decisive piece of a joint,
coalition, and interagency team while maintaining the readiness
required to shape and respond to the world today. SOCOM is committed to
producing next generation SOF capabilities that will provide
competitive advantages over future adversaries. Future SOF will be
positioned to respond rapidly to time sensitive targets in the global
war on terrorism, provide strategic responsiveness as an early entry
force, possess state of the art battlefield command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (C\4\ISR) and continue to increase cultural, regional,
and linguistic expertise. SOF must construct systems and capabilities
to have access around the world to locations of our choosing and have
dominant C\4\ISR.
Long-term success in the global war on terrorism depends largely
upon our ability to rapidly employ a sustainable mix of capabilities
with little warning--requiring agile, adaptive, and responsive
warriors. We are transforming our force quickly to provide better on-
the-ground capability to operate in the different ``gray areas'' around
the world where conventional forces are traditionally uncomfortable.
This will require a change in our thinking, not just our force
structure. We continue to transform our headquarters to incorporate
these changes. Our organization includes a standing Joint Task Force
(JTF), capable of providing a spectrum of command and control options
from providing a handful of liaison officers to an existing JTF to
deploying a complete JTF. Moreover, SOCOM is organized for interagency
transparency, a key element for success.
SOCOM is pursuing a holistic approach to our training, doctrine,
organizational structure, and technology. We will blend the
authorities, functions, and activities of a supported combatant command
with our current Service-like authorities, functions, and activities
necessary to develop, maintain, and enhance integrated joint SOF forces
and capabilities. SOCOM will cut across current national, regional, and
geographic boundaries by networking key counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency command and control nodes to create a Global Counter
Terrorist Network (GCTN) employing a tailored mix of assigned,
attached, and supporting joint forces and capabilities.
Budget and Acquisition
The SOCOM fiscal year 2006 President's budget request is $6.7
billion, 3 percent more than the fiscal year 2005 appropriated amounts.
This request includes military pay and allowances to ensure that now,
and in the future, the President, the Secretary of Defense, SOCOM, the
combatant commanders, and country teams have SOF capable of defeating
terrorist organizations worldwide. Our Operations and Maintenance
budget request grows $85 million, to $2.2 billion, which also includes
a $22 million increase for training, as well as funds associated with
sustaining SOF-specific weapons systems. Quick action on SOCOM's Fiscal
Year 2005 Supplemental Request is the issue on which I need immediate
support.
At the heart of SOCOM's strength is the commander's acquisition
authority, which is similar to that of the Military Departments. It is
one of the things that makes SOCOM special and makes our operators more
capable, more quickly. Among the responsibilities assigned to SOCOM
under Title 10, Section 167, is developing and acquiring ``special
operations-peculiar'' equipment. SOF-peculiar equipment is based on
technologies that enable our operators to become faster, stealthier,
more precise, lethal, survivable, and sustainable. It will also enable
PSYOPs forces to broadcast themes into denied areas, and provide CA
specialists with SOF specific training and communications equipment.
With exceptional support from Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the
Services, and our industry partners, these authorities have been
instrumental in equipping today's world-class SOF team to perform a
broad range of SOF missions. We are aggressively eliminating those
systems that do not support the global war on terrorism and directing
those resources for more appropriate programs. Our Flagship Programs,
the Advanced Seal Delivery System and the CV-22 Osprey continue to be a
very important part of SOF's future. We will add, in the near future,
two new flagship programs, our SOF Warrior Systems and our SOF training
centers.
Our research and development (R&D) activities are focusing on
discovering and exploiting technologies in the following areas:
Intelligence
SOCOM's primary concern remains actionable tactical intelligence.
The ``find'' piece of find, fix, and finish is an intelligence based
problem set. In other words, we have to find out who the bad guys are,
where they are, and have the right forces in the right place at the
right time to capture them. SOCOM is working to harness capabilities,
like signals intelligence, imagery intelligence, and unattended sensors
that channel the proper intelligence information to our analysts and
operators so we can capture terrorists regardless of where they are on
the globe. This persistent intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaisance (ISR) concept is a combination of continuous analysis,
human intelligence, and SOF focused ISR systems that will dwell on a
target for as long as the mission requires--the unblinking eye. We have
made progress aggressively pursuing unmanned aerial vehicles,
persistent intelligence systems and denied area access technology. We
must continue to improve these capabilities, especially our ability to
find and track targets in all weather conditions. SOCOM's number one
technological shortfall is in our ability to persistently and remotely
locate, track, and target a human.
A Global Network
SOF-led collaboration and synchronization across command lines will
play a dramatically larger role. SOCOM will use the GCTN to position
SOF around the world, in synchronized, simultaneous, and custom-
tailored operations against designated terrorist organizations, their
allies and sponsors. The GCTN will synchronize global ISR to gain
persistent close-in visibility, coordinate interagency and capable
partner nation efforts, and integrate command and control. These
operations will be coordinated by SOCOM and geographic combatant
commanders through their Theater Special Operations Commands which will
serve as the focal points for joint SOF missions conducted within their
regions. Key to this effort will be high bandwidth and reachback
communications.
Additionally, SOF must facilitate the development of indigenous
capabilities to fight against terrorists and rogue regimes. Robust UW
capabilities greatly expand the set of options available to policy
makers. SOF must also maintain and improve capabilities to support
conventional forces. The concept of a GCTN is designed to position SOF
in key locations to collect, fuse, analyze, and disseminate
intelligence. Developing greater situational awareness in priority
countries and regions will enhance SOF effectiveness in combating
terrorist networks.
Develop the Special Operations Warrior
SOF can anticipate continued global employment in the near future.
They will have to operate simultaneously in more than one geographic
combatant commander's area of responsibility against elements of the
same global enemy to eliminate seams and be responsive. For SOF the
challenge is immense: how to train for the enormous and demanding range
of functional skills necessary to meet SOCOM's core tasks while
adapting intellectually to the global demands of this war against an
enemy who holds no territory. SOCOM will meet these requirements
through continued adaptation and growth of our education and training
capabilities, to include advanced training systems. Additionally, in a
globally networked operating environment, SOF must be survivable,
sustainable, lethal, maneuverable, and possess superior situational
awareness. These are SOCOM's R&D focus areas to support the SOF
warrior.
conclusion
The struggle against global terrorism is different from any other
war in our history. We will not triumph solely or even primarily
through military might. We must fight terrorist networks and their
supporters using every instrument of national power of the United
States. Progress will come through the persistent accumulation of
successes--some seen, some unseen. Our goal will be reached when
Americans and other civilized people around the world can lead their
lives free of fear from terrorist attacks.
SOF will continue to play a lead role in this war by bringing
terrorists, their supporters, and their state facilitators to justice,
or by bringing justice to them. But winning this war will require new
capabilities, sustainable increases in capacity, and significant
improvements in the global reach and speed of SOF forces. To meet the
demands of the new environment, we must ensure that our capabilities
are well-tuned to meet emerging needs. U.S. special operators have been
the cornerstone of our military operations since the beginning of the
global war on terrorism. From Tampa to Tikrit to Toibalawe all of SOCOM
is in high gear, a tempo we expect to maintain for a long time.
Our efforts will remain focused on our mission. Our success will
come from the finest trained and prepared warriors in the world who are
in the right place at the right time against the right adversary. SOF
play a key role in America's and the world's defeat of terrorism. In an
environment of asymmetric threats, we are this Nation's asymmetric
force. With energy, focus, skill, and determination, we will take the
fight to the enemy and win. Your continued support of our soldiers,
sailors, airmen, marines, and DOD civilians is the foundation of our
success.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, General Brown and Secretary
O'Connell. Your written statements will be made part of the
record, without objection. We thank you for summarizing those
for us.
We are going to go to a closed session by no later than
10:45 in order to probe a little further in that classified
setting. I would just ask you as we pose questions to you in
the open setting, if there are areas that you think are
appropriately addressed or perhaps in greater detail in the
closed setting, if you will just advise us and we will follow
up later in closed setting.
Mr. O'Connell. Yes, sir.
General Brown. Yes, sir.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much.
General Brown, in 2003 the Secretary of Defense designated
you as the lead combatant commander for the global war on
terrorism and increased your responsibility to plan and conduct
operations under circumstances as a supported combatant
commander. Could you summarize what changes you have made in
SOCOM's organization to enable you to plan, conduct, and
sustain such operations?
General Brown. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. First of all, at the
staff level, we were organized into centers. We are not
organized in line and block diagrams like traditional military
organizations are. We were oriented on train, organize, and
equip, which was basically our function. We did very few other
types of missions. We reorganized the staff immediately and we
built a Center for Special Operations, and I am happy to say
that we have been approved for an additional three-star general
who is going through confirmation right now that, when
approved, will command our Center for Special Operations.
It is about a 450-man staff. We did that with very little
plus-up in our headquarters, but that is our operational center
and it combines our plans, operations, and intelligence into
one integrated operation at Tampa, Florida. They will soon, in
November of this year, move into a new building.
That was a huge reorganization challenge for us. We did it
without appreciable growth. But we also did it by adding over
100 partners from other agencies that now work down at SOCOM
headquarters to help us take on this mission. So I will still
have a deputy, who will be a three-star, and that is Admiral
Eric Olson, and then we will have another three-star that will
run simply this synchronization of the global war on terror,
and he will run the Center for Special Operations.
If you would have gone down to visit us about 3 years ago,
you would have seen a command center that basically answered
the phone and directed phone calls. Today we have a full-up
operations center. It is online 24 hours a day monitoring
situations around the world. Additionally, we have built a
Special Operations Joint Interagency Collaboration Center,
which is a very powerful capability, in our intelligence
center. So we have stood up the ability to actually command and
control.
One last thing real quick that we have done is we have
stood up a Joint Task Force (JTF). We have a deployable
capability. Should we be called on to do a major supported
commander-type mission, we can deploy this JTF. For the first
time in SOCOM's headquarters, last week it was deployed to the
field at Avon Park, Florida, set up and operated for 5 to 7
days out of tents with deployable equipment, and it did very
well on an exercise operating with two of the geographic
combatant commanders supporting our exercise.
Those are just some of the organizational changes that we
have made down there, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cornyn. General Brown, to the extent you can
discuss this in open session, under what circumstances would
this authority that has been conferred on you as a supported
combatant commander be used?
General Brown. The first circumstance is that we do have a
current requirement for synchronizing the global war on
terrorism. So we are doing that portion of the planning and
ensuring that the seams between the geographic combatant
commanders and other combatant commanders are covered, and that
we are lashing all of those plans together and making sure that
the DOD has one integrated plan to go forward. So we are
actually operating at that level right now.
Additionally, should there become a requirement for us to
be a supported commander, I believe it would be a very
specific, SOF-unique mission where we could go in and assist
the geographic combatant commander. It may be one that is at
the seam of two or three geographic commanders' areas and, just
to keep the coordination requirement to a minimum, we would
just put us in charge of it and it would be directed against
the global war on terrorism.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you.
I would like to hear both of you comment on this question,
and then I will turn the floor over to Senator Reed. The
concept of Operational Preparation of the Environment (OPE) was
developed to better enable SOCOM to be prepared to execute
operations against terrorist targets if and when actionable
intelligence becomes available. Several newspaper articles in
December 2004 and early 2005 suggested that the DOD program was
not well received by other government departments.
In general terms, please describe the purpose of the OPE
program, and please describe what steps you have taken to
reassure other government departments about the intent of this
program and to improve coordination.
Mr. O'Connell. Thank you, Senator Cornyn. OPE is a term
that evolved from two terms that were used previously, and
perhaps we or the Department did not pick the best choice of
words when it came to describing the activities of the teams,
particularly to other members of the interagency.
We have always had in special operations--and I can go back
to as early as 1980, when we had elements called regional
survey teams that were out operating in embassies, and their
attempt was to look at the types of threats that Americans
might face, let us say, in a Guatemala, to survey the embassy,
to look at routes to the airport for potential evacuation,
areas of weakness in protecting ambassadors, how to best
coordinate with the security forces and the embassy security
forces in a particular embassy. Even back then, the concept of
a regional survey team was not well understood.
When September 11 took place, the Department, I think, very
quickly assessed the fact that they did not know where the next
attack might come. As the rest of the government reacted by
standing up certain activities, the U.S. SOCOM and the
Department looked at areas where they felt that increased
military cooperation, particularly of a SOF-type nature, might
be required. I will not mention the specific areas. We can in
closed session.
But the first two names we used were ``operational
preparation of the battlefield'' and ``pre-crisis activities,''
which tried to describe what teams might do on the ground. One
of the first concerns was a head-scratch from, let us say, some
people in the State Department saying: What battlefield or what
crisis? As we were planning ahead, we did not necessarily say
that there would be a battle here in this particular place or
time.
But we have evolved, and I think both of the gentlemen
would agree that almost every embassy situation is different.
Each chief of mission and each chief of station from the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has a different perspective
and different experience and different relationship with the
military. They also see military requirements as being
different from country to country. In each case, we will try to
build that relationship between the chief of mission and the
chief of station, so that it most effectively represents the
needs of, first of all, the theater commander, the combatant
commander, and also General Brown if he were required to
conduct an operation in that area.
I would be happy to go into the specifics of some of the
activities of the teams in closed session, sir.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you.
General Brown, let me just ask you to follow up on that
question and response from Secretary O'Connell. Has SOCOM
conducted or does it intend to conduct military activities in
any country overseas without the knowledge of the chief of
mission in any instance?
General Brown. Absolutely not, Senator.
Senator Cornyn. I appreciate your clarifying that. Of
course, as we have discussed previously, there have been some
newspaper stories that have suggested otherwise.
What is your opinion on the level of coordination and
cooperation among different agencies in this initiative?
General Brown. First of all, Senator, OPE is about speed.
It is about how fast can you move into an area and perform
whatever task you have been given, and that is where OPE was
developed. We work very hard on coordinating every activity
with every one of the interagencies. I work very closely with
the CIA on coordinating anything we are doing, and we work very
closely with the State Department. Before any team of any kind,
to include joint/combined exercises for training or any other
special operations team deploys, they deploy with the full
knowledge and approval of the embassy. They get a country
clearance, just like any other deployment of a conventional
force, and they get country clearance from the geographic
combatant commanders.
So I am very comfortable we are working very hard and that
we have never ever deployed into a country, quite frankly, in
my history in special operations, without the full knowledge of
the ambassador or the country team that we are going into that
country.
I will be glad to discuss further the actual tactics,
techniques, and procedures of OPE in a closed session.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just follow
up on this line of questioning that you have raised, because it
is an important line of questioning.
These teams that will be operating, you have acknowledged,
General Brown, that they do so in your view with the full
disclosure to the ambassador and to the chief of station. If
they were to be discovered and detained, would they maintain
themselves as military personnel?
General Brown. Sir, it would probably be better if I
answered those questions in closed hearing, if that would be
okay.
Senator Reed. That would be fine, General, if that is your
judgment. I appreciate that.
There is always the question of notification of some of
these operations pursuant to the law. There is a much more
robust and historically better developed sort of policy with
respect to CIA operations. Are you developing policies or
should we think about policies to notify Congress about these
operations if they are particularly sensitive?
General Brown. Senator, we report everything that we are
doing up to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the OSD so that they
can be appropriately reported.
Senator Reed. My question then would be, at that level of
reporting to us, is there a need to look at that level of
reporting?
General Brown. I believe what I have been told is--and Mr.
O'Connell may have more detail on this--that the Secretary was
over yesterday and met with the leadership of the House and the
Senate to ensure that all of the reporting would be worked out
as appropriate.
Senator Reed. Mr. O'Connell, do you want to add a point?
Mr. O'Connell. Yes, sir. As General Brown mentioned, the
Secretary did host a meeting with congressional leadership
yesterday specifically over reporting procedures, to which
committee, and I think the discussion--and I do not want to
reveal the specific details or violate the confidence of the
Members that were present--but, led by the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence, Dr. Cambone, Secretary Rumsfeld,
Senate leadership, and House leadership looked at the types of
structures that exist within Congress today and their specific
oversight responsibilities.
Some of our activities are intelligence-related. Some of
them are title 10 versus title 50 activities, and the reporting
mechanisms are different. Sometimes they straddle both sides of
a particular operational issue. The Secretary did give several
examples yesterday, both historical and theoretical, where he
felt that there were difficulties on both the executive branch
and perhaps the legislative branch, as to how we stay in sync.
Several proposals were raised yesterday, some by the
legislative leadership, some by the Secretary, and the promise
was to continue to work these out. But the key thing is that
everyone wants to do the right thing, to do the efficient
thing, and to make sure that we are not jeopardizing speed or
secrecy. So I think there was general agreement and comity in
the room yesterday when that was discussed. But I would defer
any specifics to the Secretary.
Senator Reed. Surely. But I think what you have suggested
is this is fertile ground for further work, analysis, and
perhaps, if not legislation, then certain understandings
between the executive branch and Congress about reporting.
Mr. O'Connell. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. General Brown, your OPTEMPO is
extraordinarily high. You have suggested that you are going to
increase your forces by about 5,000 personnel. I understand
that that is going to take place over the next several years,
beginning in the 2008 budget to 2011. Could you outline those
plans? More specifically, it seems to me that the demands on
you might call for a more immediate and even more robust
increase in special operators. Also, recognizing the fact that
training special operators is something that takes years, it is
not something where in 3 or 4 weeks or 3 or 4 months you have
an accomplished special operator--the field skills, the
cultural sensitivities, just the maturity takes a while. So
again, I think that suggests to me that beginning now rather
than waiting until 2008 might be more appropriate.
Could you comment?
General Brown. Senator, you are exactly right, and we are
working real hard at that. Over the last 3 years--and I will be
glad to get the exact figures for the record--we have added,
over 1,000 CA and I believe about 300 to 400 PSYOP personnel,
and those today are two of our stress areas, specifically CA,
which is our most stressed area.
So we are already taking actions. We are about to grow two
SEAL team equivalents and that is happening in 2006 and 2007.
So we are growing some special operations. But the way we took
this on was to grow our schools, to make sure that our schools
were capable of the throughput that we needed and immediately
put the resources necessary to grow the school so we could then
start growing the force.
We cannot grow the Green Beret force until we get it full
for the first time. Last year, at the end of 2004, I believe it
ended the year about 89 percent full of Green Berets. We have a
great plan for the future. General Phil Kensinger down at the
Army Special Operations Command is doing a great job of
focusing it. We have actually started teaching the same course
in less weeks and with a higher standard requirement for
graduation in language skills than ever in the history of
special operations.
So all these things come together. We have the biggest
classes going through that we have ever had in the history of
special operations. We think we will get into the mid-1990s in
our fill rates of Green Berets this year. Hopefully we will be
on a glide slope that will allow us to continue this growth
into the future as we continue to add another 500 or more Green
Berets that will be necessary in the future.
It does take time. We started right away. We are in better
shape than we have ever been in the history of the Green
Berets. But quite frankly, we still have a lot of work to do on
it.
[The information referred to follows:]
As you correctly stated ``training special operators is something
that takes years,'' with this in mind, we began in fiscal year 2004
ramping up our production of Army Special Forces soldiers and Navy
SEALs. Special Forces throughput in fiscal year 2004 was increased from
450 to 550 at the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center and School. To
further increase the number of SOF, in fiscal year 2006 we will add
instructors and support personnel to both our Army and Navy training
centers. Currently, the SOCOM is programmed to add 1,405 spaces in
fiscal year 2006, 465 spaces in fiscal year 2007, and 1,675 spaces in
fiscal year 2008. These increases will primarily support institutional
training, operational, and support units which will improve readiness
and mission effectiveness. To relieve the stress caused by OPTEMPO in
OIF and OEF, and increase our operational capabilities, SOCOM will add
more CA, PSYOP, Special Forces, Army Rangers, Special Operations
Aviation (rotary and fixed wing), and maritime forces.
Senator Reed. Thank you, General Brown.
Let me ask one more question, then I will yield back to the
chairman, and I presume we will go back and forth until 10:45.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rumsfeld is in the process of promulgating a new
directive on post-conflict and stability operations. You will
play a key role in that. What changes do you see that you have
to make to play this role in the new emerging strategy of post-
stability operations? There are some specific issues that will
come up and I would like your comments.
First, you mentioned CA. I think it is critical to have CA.
We have discovered that shortages have plagued us over the last
several months in Iraq and Afghanistan. I think it is
important. On a recent trip to Iraq, I was struck by the
difficulty of getting State Department, U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), and other civilians who are
in the CA business in the field, which leaves military forces,
and properly so in many cases because of the security
considerations, the only show in town.
So this CA function has to be critical. There is an issue
of whether CA should be in SOCOM or should be migrated back to
the Army, Marine Corps, or Navy. That is an issue.
Then there is another issue, too, which is whether or not
we have to start training our conventional units and give them
more special operations capabilities, if you will, since the
missions are blending so significantly when you do stability
and counterinsurgency operations.
So both Mr. O'Connell and General Brown, if you would
comment on that range of issues.
Mr. O'Connell. Senator Reed, fair question and a very
complex question, as I think you understand. Subsequent to the
end of hostilities or the conventional phase, let us say, of
the Iraqi conflict, there was much attention paid by the
Department to how we were structured for post-conflict
activities, and the Defense Science Board did a summer study on
this which the Secretary chartered and received extensive
briefings on. Other studies were done by the Institute for
Defense Analysis.
They generally pointed to the same issues in terms of
transition to and from war: Were we properly structured to do
the types of planning that are required? Second, subsequent to
an event, how were we postured and resourced to handle
stability operations?
From those discussions came a series of initiatives which
are under way today. One, a Department initiative which was
adopted as a presidential initiative, the Global Peace Ops
initiative, was adopted last year at the G-8 meeting, whereby
we are going to be permitted to transfer money to the State
Department to allow them to start looking at developing a
significant peacekeeping capability, but one that does not
deteriorate, as many have historically, over time, to put in
places where we can increase partner capacity and reduce the
strain on U.S. forces.
I think during the last year there were three or four
instances--Liberia, Haiti--where we rushed conventional forces
in, far more capability than we actually needed on the ground,
and perhaps we would have been much better working with partner
nations and putting in basic infantry-trained peacekeepers.
With respect to your question of whether CA belong within
the SOCOM, my personal view is that there is room in many
forces for CA activities. The Marine Corps have some of their
own. General Schoomaker is now looking, in consultations with
the Secretary and General Brown, as to what portion of our CA
forces might be permanently assigned to new Army units of
action and which elements of CA should remain in SOCOM.
It is my personal view that CA can certainly be a combat
multiplier. They can assist both the conventional and SOF on
the ground, and the type of training that is given within the
special operations school system in many cases for our Green
Beret forces and our CA, much of the training is common. Could
it be placed elsewhere? If the Secretary decides that it would
be more effective elsewhere, that may happen.
But I would strongly urge the Department in any
reorganization to retain a substantial, particularly Active
Duty, CA capability within the SOCOM.
Senator Reed. General Brown, your comments?
General Brown. Sir, I think you are exactly right again. We
will play a big piece in the stability operation. Specifically,
that will fall on the shoulders of our CA. It is absolutely
critical that at the appropriate time in the transition of the
battle that the State Department, USAID, and all the other
government agencies that play a part arrive on the battlefield
at the right time and start carrying their portion of the
reconstruction.
Additionally, you have to accommodate those private
volunteers and nongovernmental organizations because they do
bring a great deal of capability to the battlefield. So it is a
very complex environment at that time, that transition in phase
four. But it is extremely important.
The problem with CA is very complex because, quite frankly,
we have a new appreciation for it, I think, in all of the DOD,
but we have always had 27 battalions in the Reserve component.
We have only had one battalion in the active force. So we went
through those battalions fairly quickly and, quite frankly,
that is our biggest stressed area now because we have deployed
all of them. Over 90 percent of them have already been used on
the battlefield and as we go into the next phases in rotations
it is getting more and more difficult for us to find CA forces.
We are working very closely with the Army to try and plus up
our CA strength within the next year so that we can go ahead
and get those folks now so that we can train them to standard
and get them on the battlefield for the next rotations.
There are good things happening in CA. We have now worked
with General Hagee and all the Marine Corps CA units, of which
there are two going to three. The CA groups, their small
battalions, will now go through the Army CA training at Fort
Bragg, North Carolina, where we own the school. That is a good
thing. That CA guy walking on the battlefield now will have a
standard level of training, whether he is a marine or an Army
CA soldier.
We are working closely with the Marine Corps--and, by the
way, always have in the CA arena in every area, but
specifically in CA. As we did routine deployments into Bosnia
and Kosovo with our CA forces, the Marines were often part of
that and took some of those rotations off of it.
I believe there are more tasks that the conventional forces
can do with a special operations capability, and I think you
are seeing that, especially in the Army under General Pete
Schoomaker, who has some background in special operations, is
working that pretty hard.
You will see that at our national training centers in the
Army and our centers for training as you go out and see that
they are putting a lot of energy into how military commanders
work with civilian populations on the battlefield, a
traditional CA function, but now they are more involved with
it, and bring in the CA to help with it.
So I think there are a lot of good things going on with CA.
We are into discussions of whether they should be in SOCOM or
in the Army or a mixture of both of them. It is a key part of
what we do on the battlefield in special operations, but the
preponderance of the CA force is in direct support of a
conventional military unit such as an Army division or an Army
corps or a Marine Corps division, because the Army CA also
support those divisions.
So I think the answer is--and I have met with General
Schoomaker on it several times--to make sure we are doing what
is best for CA and what is best for how we can perform the
mission. Those are the things that we are working through right
now. But I think there is a place in special operations for CA
and we need to make sure that we have at least a portion of it.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cornyn. General Brown, SOCOM has long had a
reputation for being able to rapidly respond to operational
needs of their teams by being able to quickly identify
requirements, develop the concept, find sources of supply, and
rapidly field new capabilities to teams. I would like for you
just for our edification to mention maybe a couple of successes
that you think you have had in that area. Then I would like you
to comment on the less positive story, at least from my
perspective, when it comes to the complex acquisition programs
like the ASDS. Then perhaps we can get Secretary O'Connell's
comments about how we are going to deal with those more complex
acquisition programs to make sure that they are clear in
concept and design and well managed and hopefully kept within
reasonable expense boundaries.
General Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We do have a
reputation, and I think it is more than a reputation. We
actually execute acquisition very rapidly. We are very good at
our MFP-11 for commercial off-the-shelf applications that apply
to SOF. As we go into the battlefield with our combat mission
needs statement, which you mentioned earlier, it is a very
powerful process where somebody on the battlefield from any one
of our Services that has a combat mission need can get that
immediately to my headquarters and we have to make a decision,
by our own policy, within 48 hours.
So it turns very quickly. Then we go after it if it is a
valid requirement and we have to do whatever it takes, which is
oftentimes reprogramming money or doing whatever we have to do
to make this happen, because it is a combat mission need.
We have had great successes on it and I have a long list of
them, everything from our Multiband Inter-Team Radio, which
started out as just a very small acquisition program. As soon
as the troops got on the battlefield and saw the need for the
radio we rapidly--with the help of Congress, I might add--added
a bunch of radios, and it has been one of the big success
stories even though it is just a small radio. The successes
include everything from weapons capabilities to sights to--
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are a perfect example, hand-
held UAVs, small, deployable UAVs. We basically had none when
OEF started and now all the teams out there have them, and that
is through our rapid acquisition process.
So I think that is a big success story. We have to be very
careful not to add any bureaucracy or let it grow down at our
headquarters, and we certainly want to keep that.
The ASDS has been a long process, as you got to see it out
in Hawaii. It is an extremely important capability that SOCOM
needs around the world. While I will not get into the details
of its operational capabilities, the program has been fraught
with some problems over the years. But we still think it is one
of our flagship capabilities we need.
What we have done as recently as March of this year is I
called in the contractor, had a meeting in the Pentagon with
the Navy, with the program managers, with the shipyard. We had
everybody stand up in front of the boss and tell us where we
are on this and how we are going to get this thing across the
finish line.
I sent a personal message out yesterday to the same
membership telling them we are going to do it again. Quite
frankly, we are focusing on the ASDS and we are going to try
and get this across the finish line because we really need it.
The Milestone C decision is in December of this year. By
December 5 we hope to make that. We are not allowed to have any
long lead items or purchase any long lead items until that
decision is made. With the success we are having with the
batteries and their arrival in June, that will be operating by
July and we will have a chance to test it by September. I am
starting to get cautiously optimistic that we are going to make
Milestone C on this program, and we need to.
When we have taken it out and tested it and put it through
its trials--and we are doing that right now--it has been very
successful in performing the operations we want it to perform.
We have had the battery problem. We are about to solve that.
There are a couple of other problems that we are about to
solve. But for the most part, I am cautiously optimistic that
this time we are going to get it across the finish line.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you.
Secretary O'Connell, if you have watched some of the full
committee hearings we have had recently, including Gordon
England's confirmation hearing and that of Mr. Krieg yesterday,
you can tell there is a lot of concern on the committee and in
Congress generally about our acquisition programs.
Unfortunately, the ASDS, while it is something that the SEALs
love--and I take General Brown at his word that it is an
essential component in our abilities--we are concerned about
management of those acquisitions.
Could you enlighten us or fill us in on anything General
Brown did not cover that you think might be helpful to our
understanding?
Mr. O'Connell. Just a couple points, sir, because I think
General Brown covered them very well. I was privileged to
attend his March session with the contractor. I do not think it
was a session that could be described as pleasant for the
contractor. Assistant Secretary Young from the Navy attended
and was very supportive.
I think everyone realizes that this is a case where a
unique requirement was identified. Perhaps the initial effort
and some of the early decisions made on ASDS certainly have not
been models of efficiency, but this was a really new concept.
Part of the problem is that it involves one sophisticated
platform being attached to another sophisticated platform, and
that creates new demands because stealth in one system has to
equal stealth in another.
As they worked through those issues and had some mechanical
and other problems, they started to recognize errors that were
made early on in the program. They went back and I think they
have made an excellent good faith attempt to realign their
production.
The point that I would like to make, more from a policy
standpoint--and again, I understand that this acquisition has
not been a model of efficiency. But if we can get it right, the
opportunity it gives us for numerous special missions is
particularly important as we face threats we really have not
looked at for some time. I would be happy to talk about some of
those in closed session.
But my final point is that I think the command, the DOD--
and I would like to acknowledge the presence of my resource
director here, Tim Morgan, who has worked diligently over the
years establishing and working with MFP-11. We have had long
talks about what do we do with ASDS. I still believe we are at
the point where we are on track for Milestone C and I think
General Brown has the right contractor here.
Senator Cornyn. General Brown, are you satisfied with the
attention the Navy is now providing?
General Brown. Yes, sir.
Senator Cornyn. Let me ask about one other area and then I
am going to turn the floor back over to Senator Reed. This has
to do with counterdrug, counterterrorism activities. Current
law now allows counterdrug funding to be used for
counterterrorism activities in certain countries, but otherwise
precludes the use of these funds for counterterrorism
activities elsewhere, including counterdrug activities along
our borders in the United States.
My own impression is that when you get people who are
engaged in lawless activity, whether it is smuggling human
beings or drugs or weapons or the like, they do not necessarily
discriminate other than to go for whatever generates the most
money. So I wonder whether counterdrug funding should be
available to support counterterrorism activities as an overall
policy.
Mr. O'Connell. Sir, my quick answer to that is yes. The
central transfer account and the general funding provided by
Congress for counternarcoterrorism is perhaps the most
effective and flexible moneys in the Department. It can be
rapidly shifted. It can be used for a wide variety of options.
I can tell you, in the case of the first supplemental that we
had for Afghanistan it was really the--if we had not had that
seed money, we would not have been able to lay the foundation
for a program that can be integrated by the combatant commander
and eventually put an Afghan face on it.
I believe--in fact, my Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Counternarcotics was just out and is out on the southwest
border looking at some of the tunnel technology that we have
been able to develop through other narcoterrorism funding and
see if we can apply that. We know that perhaps drugs come
through those tunnels, and perhaps people come through those
tunnels. That is an example of flexible use.
If either member has not visited the Joint Interagency Task
Force-South in Key West, I would encourage both of you to do
that, because it is a remarkable orchestra of an ongoing
battle. You have the Coast Guard, the Navy, the Air Force, the
Colombians, and our law enforcement fighting a 24-hour battle
using real live surveillance, tagging and tracking,
interdiction. It is a remarkable thing to watch. I think it is
the wave of the future, and the central transfer account gives
us extraordinary flexible capability, and so any restriction--
anything that continues towards that type of arrangement I
think is worthwhile, sir.
Senator Cornyn. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary and General Brown, our interrogation policy
for detainees has gotten us into some sordid and very
regrettable situations. I would note that recent information
from Freedom of Information Act requests suggests that some of
the individuals in the 519th Military Intelligence Group in
Iraq claim that they got some of their ideas from the
Interrogation Rules of Engagement, from some of the special
operations units, which raises the question at this moment not
only of what happened and how it happened, but within the
context of Iraq at least, where we know the Geneva Conventions
apply, what are the operative rules of interrogation for
special operators?
I say this because I find it in a way ironic. We have some
special operators who have been charged criminally and they are
at literally the point of the spear, in a hostile situation in
which they are fearful for their life, their safety, and so
many other things, which suggests to me unless the rules are
very clear and very consistent with regulations then we are not
doing them a service in putting them out there if there is any
ambiguity, because in that environment unless there is a clear
bright line there is a tendency to do things not only that we
regret, but later they might be held accountable for.
So first, General Brown, are the policies consistent with
the regulations and the law of land warfare?
General Brown. Sir, I think they are. I would tell you that
special operations has no unique interrogation policies. When
we deploy forces to a geographic combatant commander's AOR on
the battlefield, they are bound by the same policies as
everyone else in that geographic combatant commander's AOR. If
we were to be the supported commander, it would then be our
responsibility to publish those policies and rules of
engagement and interrogation.
So I am not familiar with the 519th and I will go back and
take a look at that and exactly what they said. We have had
some Special Operations allegations.
Senator Reed. Yes, sir.
General Brown. I think there are about 40 of them. I think
13 of them are still under--I should not say that. I think
about eight. I will make sure I get the record straight and I
give you the exact numbers. I think we have had 13 people
receive some sort of punishment or administrative punishment
for some sort of problem with interrogation and handling of
prisoners.
But to get to the bottom line, we operate under the same
policies as everyone else in any AOR that we go to.
[The information referred to follows:]
The SOCOM does not dictate interrogation policies or techniques in
Iraq. The Secretary of Defense transfers operational control of those
forces to the Commander, U.S. Central Command, when they deploy in
support of OIF. However, we are certainly concerned with ensuring that
our forces comply with U.S. and international law regarding armed
conflict. The overarching policies on interrogation are the same for
Special Operations Forces as they are for conventional forces, although
specifically approved techniques may vary. Subordinate units can craft
more restrictive policies, but may not expand them. The current
policies and techniques have all received legal reviews to ensure
compliance with controlling regulations and the law of armed conflict.
Senator Reed. That raises another question, which you may
want to defer. With these new concepts of operational control
elements, where just technically they would be under a
combatant commander but in reality they are not I think tied in
directly to a combatant commander, do those same rules apply? I
think it is important.
General Brown. I would be glad to talk about that in closed
hearing. I would just tell you the rules do apply.
Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
Let me just move to another topic. In 2001, Under Secretary
Doug Feith established the Office of Strategic Influence (OSI)
and that had a rocky reception and there was a perception or
fear that this might be a device to propagandize, even in a
misleading way. In 2004, SOCOM established the Joint
Psychological Operations Support Element (JPSE) and there are
some suggestions that it has a role in terms of broadcasts,
short-wave radio contacts, and Web initiatives. The question I
think is, are we once again getting into this area that found
so much resistance for the OSI. Mr. Secretary?
Mr. O'Connell. Let me start first and then I will pass to
General Brown.
Senator Reed, I was not in office during that time frame,
but I have, because the issue was so contentious, gone back and
talked to people and said, let us look at what really happened.
I think my own personal view is that there were a series of
unfortunate incidents that happened serendipitously to cast the
intentions of that office in a bad light.
Primary among them was the allegation that somehow the OSI
was designed to specifically mislead the foreign press. From
everything I have seen, I have heard from the people I have
talked to, that was never the case. But I think because the
press made the allegation, the Department reacted swiftly and
that capability went away.
Now, many can argue, did we miss an opportunity by not
having that type of capability prior to the war, during the
war, and even after the war? I will leave that for the experts.
But in terms of our role currently in information
operations, one of the five elements of information operations
is PSYOP. Unfortunately, that term has tended to pick up
unfortunate connotations over the years. Really, it should be
just the opposite, because our PSYOP have been effective, they
have been very helpful to the commanders, and they have
targeted our adversaries when necessary.
That is my little take on OSI and I will pass the PSYOP
question to General Brown.
General Brown. Senator, while the name, the ``Joint Support
Element,'' was not selected at that time, we were actually
discussing this long before the growth and the demise of the
OSI up here. It came from a frustration that I personally had
as the Army Special Operations Commander when we started OEF
originally and started putting SOF on the ground. All
psychological operations forces are resident in SOCOM and, once
again, they are mostly resident, with the exception of our
great Commando Solo aircraft up at the 193rd Pennsylvania
National Guard, everything else is in SOCOM, and all that is in
Army Special Operations Command.
But what immediately happened was that we did not have
people with the PSYOP skills and background. Psychological
operations forces are only allowed to tell the truth, and their
purpose is to support the commander on the battlefield and to
get his message out, a very powerful message and capability.
So what I envisioned was that we would stand up some teams
that I could send to other geographic combatant commanders or a
functional combatant commander, where we could send him some
expertise to help say, this is what leaflets look like, this is
how you develop them, these are the themes that are approved.
So while you always stand up a joint PSYOP task force--that
is the doctrine--it quite frankly is a little slow getting its
legs up under it when a war starts and additionally it is an ad
hoc organization.
What I thought would be helpful is if we could build an
organization that could go out and advise whoever needed that
kind of advice on how you use SOCOM PSYOP products, the best
way to get them, the best way to develop the programs, what the
themes are, what the themes should be, and these teams--and
that is basically what we are doing with this JPSE. We are
standing up some deployable teams out of my headquarters that
can go out and help anybody that needs that kind of help to do
this.
Senator Reed. They will be helping combatant commanders.
The reason I raised that question is because so much of
what you do comes very close to the roles of other agencies,
like the State Department, public diplomacy, like the U.S.
Information Agency. I am trying to get a handle on the
boundaries and the coordination between your role in this
endeavor and those other agencies. Why do you not just comment
on that?
General Brown. With the standup of what we call the JPSE,
the reality is the roles have not changed one bit. We still are
a DOD agency. We advise the DOD and all of the combatant
commanders on the best application of using, quite frankly, the
products we develop for PSYOP missions.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Gentlemen, we are going to now recess this open hearing and
then move to S-407 in the Capitol, where we can conduct the
closed hearing. But let me say here publicly again how much we
appreciate your responses to these questions. This has been
informative and very useful, and we look forward to asking some
additional questions and getting some follow-up on matters that
you indicated earlier should be more appropriately handled in
closed session.
So we will move immediately from here over to S-407 and we
will reconvene as soon as we can all gather there.
[Question for the record with answer supplied follows:]
Question Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton
manned aircraft
1. Senator Clinton. Secretary O'Connell, there has been much
discussion of military unmanned aircraft requirements. Does the special
operations community have requirements for manned clandestine
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft? What might
some of those requirements be and what sort of aircraft could meet
those needs?
Mr. O'Connell. The U.S. Special Operations Command has both
classified and unclassified requirements for intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft supported by the fiscal
year 2006 President's budget. The committee has been provided detailed
budget justification materials describing special operations ISR
programs. We will be happy to provide additional information detailing
the manned requirements at the appropriate classification level.
[Whereupon, at 10:45 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
