

Written Statement

Of

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Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee. It is a special pleasure for me to participate in this hearing with members and staff with whom I was privileged to work closely in the recent past, and to discuss intelligence issues, with which I have been involved for most of my professional life. The subject of this hearing, the effective use of open-source information, is a priority issue today not just for homeland security but for the whole intelligence and law-enforcement communities.

Intelligence and law-enforcement officers must do their best to present a complete picture, to integrate classified and unclassified information in the story they tell. Open-source information is today more important than ever in getting that story right. The Department of Homeland Security, in my view, should play a pivotal role in brokering open-source information and in leveraging expertise outside the IC. But, to do this effectively, it also must be a key player in the classified world. In today's intelligence business, you cannot have one without the other. Intelligence should identify and fill critical gaps that cannot be addressed by open sources.

Let me summarize the five points I will make this morning:

1. Open-source exploitation in the IC is as old as the Community itself. We have always sought open-source information and selective engagement with outside experts to deepen our analysis and to drive collection priorities. The Foreign Broadcast Information Bureau (FBIS) provided excellent coverage of foreign media during my career. For most of the Cold War period, however, much of our focus was on the closed societies of the Soviet Union, in which there was a scarcity of reliable or useful open-source material to be had. And our open-source effort was directed toward bringing unclassified information into our classified environment, which was the center of our analytic universe.
2. The open-source challenge has increased exponentially over the past twenty years for at least three key reasons. First, the revolution in information technology has transformed the world of both the intelligence analyst and consumer from an information-scarcity environment to an information-glut environment. Second, the post-Soviet geopolitical transformation and the technology revolution have opened closed societies and introduced new, complex regional and transnational issues that more often than not require—as a top priority—heavy doses of real-time open-source information. And, finally, the emergence of homeland security as a national priority has introduced new analytic issues, new collection targets, and a whole set of new intelligence consumers among state and local governments and the private sector.

By contrast with the Cold War period, the center of gravity for expertise on many of these issues is outside the IC. We need new strategies to get this information, including state-of-the-art analytic tools and far-sighted policies that encourage our analysts to get away from their desks to engage with outside experts. Today, this is all a work in progress.

3. The information revolution, paradoxically, has increased the demand for expert analysts in the IC. Technology is an indispensable enabler for the IC analyst inundated with information. But it is no substitute for human expertise. It takes IC experts to extract the best data from today's fast-moving information flow and to identify the sharpest outside experts for consultation. This is a dynamic process, which aims to get the President, his top advisers, and the Congress the best answer possible information on any national security question--by uniting technology and brainpower and by integrating classified and unclassified information.
4. I believe that the creation of new, large open-source IC structures, such as an open-source directorate at CIA or any other agency including DHS, would be a step in the wrong direction. The challenge for all our analysts today is to integrate, as never before, the classified and unclassified environments. All-source analysts and single-INT analysts (e.g., human intelligence, geospatial intelligence, signals-intelligence, measurement-and-signature intelligence analysts, etc.) all need open-source information to make their contributions to the story being told and to understand where there are collection gaps that they might be able to fill.

OPINT (open-source) analysts, who increasingly staff IC operations centers and selective substantive teams, are skilled technically to exploit open sources. They serve the cause of integration, not of division between classified and unclassified information. An open-source directorate, in my view, would likely complicate this needed integration and further strain resources already stretched by excessive structure in the IC.

5. The Information Analysis (IA) component of DHS serves a Secretary with major responsibilities for prevention of terrorism against the homeland, for protection of our critical infrastructure, and for ensuring that we are able to respond effectively if an attack should occur. The Secretary of Homeland Security, as I (and the Homeland Security Act of 2002) see him, is a key player on the President's national security team, who is uniquely positioned to be an invaluable open-source collector but still needs a fully capable intelligence unit to address his critical priorities and to levy his sensitive collection requirements on the IC. There should be, in my opinion, a direct relationship between the responsibilities assigned to the Secretary and the quality of the intelligence organization dedicated to support him.

This should not require a bureaucratic empire. Senior expertise on homeland issues is far more important than the numbers of intelligence analysts in DHS. But IA must be able to compete in hiring such senior officers. I believe that IA could be effective as a relatively small intelligence unit if it has effective outreach within the IC, across the USG, and

beyond to the first-responder community. But it must have adequate facilities and infrastructure and full connectivity with other IC agencies. IA, in short, must be a recognized and respected player in the classified domain. IA must be seen an equal partner with the other fourteen members of the IC. It must have the resources and authorities to play this role. Anything less will perpetuate the unsatisfactory situation we face today.

Critical Importance of Open Source

Open-source information today is indispensable to the production of authoritative IC analysis. It increasingly contains the best information to answer some of the most important questions posed to the IC. Media reports, once the open-source mother lode, are now just a small portion of the take, which comprises a vast array of documents and reports publicly retrievable but often difficult to find in today's high-volume, high-speed information flow. Open sources provide vital information for the policymaker, who today is much better informed than in the past because of his or her easy and timely access to information, which, in turn, strengthens a firm demand for "on-time" delivery of analysis. Accessing, collecting, and analyzing open-source information, in short, is a multifaceted challenge that can only be met with a multi-front response or strategy that engages both people and technology in innovative ways.

During the Cold War, covering the globe for the IC was largely a Soviet-centric enterprise. The Soviet Union was the single-strategic threat we faced. Today, global coverage entails the responsibility to assess diverse, complex, and dispersed threats around the world. In addition to traditional intelligence concerns—such as the future of Russia and China; international terrorism, narcotics, and proliferation of weapons of mass effect; and political turmoil in Indonesia or civil conflicts in Africa—the new environment features many nontraditional missions. The IC now provides intelligence about peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance, sanctions monitoring, information warfare, and threats to our space systems. Many of these missions are operationally focused, requiring growing proportions of the analytic and collection work force to function in an ad hoc crisis mode.

Clandestinely derived intelligence is as valuable as ever, but, in my recent experience, open source information now dominates the universe of the intelligence analyst, a fact that is unlikely to change for the foreseeable future. The revolution in information technology and telecommunications has fundamentally transformed the globe that the IC covers, the services that it provides to consumers, and the workplace in which its people function. While it is as important as ever to protect our sensitive sources and methods, it is more important than in the past to integrate the best information from all sources—including unclassified—into IC analysis.

- *Information abounds.* Twenty years ago, current and reliable information on the Soviet Union, Central Asia, and other corners of the world was scarce, foreign newspapers took weeks to arrive at an analyst's desk, and policymakers were willing to wait days or even weeks for a paper on their issues. Today, the information is here and now in abundance, policymakers want it in real time, and intelligence requirements are much sharper and more time sensitive. The Washington-based analyst can send a message and get a response from a post in a remote country faster than it used to take to exchange notes by

pneumatic tube with counterparts in the same IC building. Technology may make our jobs easier, but it does not feel that way. We are all working much harder.

- *Governments are losing control.* Governments have less and less capacity to control information flows. International terrorists, narcotraffickers, organized crime groups, and weapons proliferators are taking advantage of the new technologies, bypassing governments or seeking to undermine them when governments try to block their illegal activities. As al Qaeda demonstrated in planning 9/11, tech-savvy terrorists are adept at exploiting our technology for their nefarious purposes. Non-state actors are likely to be using laptop computers, establishing their own Web sites, and using sophisticated encryption. In the years ahead, these enhanced capabilities will raise the profile of transnational issues that are already high on the IC agenda. In this environment, open-source information will continue to be essential to our understanding of these groups and how they operate.

Solutions

Technology is a major part of the answer to the magnitude of the open-source challenge, but it is no substitute for the other essential component: skilled people. The IC must provide the analytic tools needed to assess and exploit the vast amount of information available, and it must invest more in people, whose expertise is crucial for prioritizing, interpreting, and analyzing this information. The greater the volume of information to assess, the stronger must be the expertise to evaluate it. In this context, DHS, as a top priority, must recruit and retain the necessary in-house expertise and develop the external partnerships to speak authoritatively on threats to the homeland—as the Homeland Security Act of 2002 requires of it.

Today, cognitive analytic tools are continuously under development in both the private sector and the government to facilitate management of the information glut, enhancing the IC's ability to filter, search and prioritize potentially overwhelming volumes of information. These tools do not discriminate between classified and unclassified information. They help the analyst to draw the best information from all sources into an integrated, high-quality analytic product.

- *Clustering* lets analysts exploit the most useful data sets first, as well as to recognize meaningful patterns and relationships, thereby helping the IC perform its warning function.
- *Link Analysis* helps to establish relationships between a known problem and known actors and to detect patterns of activities that warrant particular attention.
- *Time-series analysis* can enable analysts to track actions over time so that unusual patterns of activity can be identified.
- *Visualization and Animation* allow analysts and consumers to see extensive and complex data laid out in dynamic and easily understandable formats and models.

- *Automated database population* is designed to free analysts from the tedious and time-consuming function of manually inputting information into databases, reducing the potential for errors and inconsistencies.

One of the strongest and most consistent demands from IC analysts is ability to search and exploit both classified and unclassified information from a single workstation. The Community is making progress on this. It also is developing better ways to standardize information and tag it using metadata—or reference information—to make it easier to search, structure, and enter information into data bases.

Geospatial intelligence provides an excellent example of how today's skilled analysts—the same analysts in one place or on one team—are routinely integrating both classified and unclassified information in their path-breaking work. They take high-quality orthorectified (three dimensional to scale) imagery and superimpose on it both classified intelligence and vital unclassified information, which creates a complete picture of a terrain, site, facility, or densely populated urban area. Such an integrated picture is operationally useful as well as informative for all consumers.

A good example of the all-source analytic process is the National Intelligence Council's *Global Trends 2015* project of 2001 and its follow-up this year, *Mapping the Global Future*, which resulted from months of close collaboration between IC analysts and experts from the USG, academia, and the private sector. The disposition of outside experts to collaborate with the IC has never been greater. This collaboration or integration of effort should be encouraged as a model for dealing with the complex issues on today's intelligence agenda. The goal, again, is to deliver the best product from all sources.

IA's Future

The US Intelligence Community today is much more than an espionage service. It constitutes the world's biggest and most powerful information-based business, collecting and analyzing both clandestinely derived and open-source information. To do its job well, the IC should be on the leading edge of open-source exploitation so that it will have the best information to inform its analysis and so that it can surgically target our clandestine collection systems on critical information gaps. The IC's comparative advantage over other information-based enterprises is that its clandestine collection has the potential to add significant value to all source-analysis—to the benefit of US National Security.

To function effectively as a member of today's IC, an agency must play fully in both the classified and unclassified arenas. This is not a numbers game. It is about having adequate facilities, infrastructure, analytic expertise, IC connectivity, and authority to fully support the agency's mission. The Department of Homeland Security has a vital mission to protect America. It should have its own intelligence organization capable of supporting that mission.