Congressional Record: November 18, 2005 (House)
Page H11029-H11031




                              ABLE DANGER

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I include material regarding
Able Danger for the Record:


                                     House of Representatives,

                                 Washington, DC, November 9, 2005.
     Hon. Donald Rumsfeld,
     Secretary, Department of Defense, The Pentagon, Washington,
         DC.
       Dear Secretary Rumsfeld: We the undersigned are formally
     requesting that you allow former participants in the
     intelligence program known as Able Danger to testify in an
     open hearing before the United States Congress. Until this
     point, congressional efforts to investigate Able Danger have
     been obstructed by Department of Defense insistence that
     certain individuals with knowledge of Able Danger be
     prevented from freely and frankly testifying in an open
     hearing. We realize that you do not question Congress's
     authority to maintain effective oversight of executive branch
     agencies, including your department. It is our understanding
     that your objection instead derives from concern that
     classified information could be improperly exposed in an open
     hearing. We of course would never support any activity that
     might compromise sensitive information involving national
     security. However, we firmly believe that testimony from the
     appropriate individuals in an open hearing on Able Danger
     would not only fail to jeopardize national security, but
     would in fact enhance it over the long term. This is due to
     our abiding belief that America can only better prepare
     itself against future attacks if it understands the full
     scope of its past failures to do so.
       On September 21, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
     conducted a hearing on Able Danger which Bill Dugan, Acting
     Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
     Oversight, certified did not reveal any classified
     information. Congressman Curt Weldon's testimony at that
     hearing was largely based on the information that has been
     given to him by Able Danger participants barred from open
     testimony by DOD. Their testimony would therefore closely
     mirror that of Congressman Weldon, who did not reveal
     classified information. Therefore we are at a loss as to how
     the testimony of Able Danger participants would jeopardize
     classified information. Much of what they would present has
     already been revealed. Further refusal to allow Able Danger
     participants to testify in an open congressional hearing can
     only lead us to conclude that the Department of Defense is
     uncomfortable with the prospect of Members of Congress
     questioning these individuals about the circumstances
     surrounding Able Danger. This would suggest not a concern for
     national security, but rather an attempt to prevent
     potentially embarrassing facts from coming to light. Such a
     consideration would of course be an unacceptable
     justification for the refusal of a congressional request.
           Sincerely,
     Curt Weldon,
     John P. Murtha.

[[Page H11030]]


                                  ____
           Why Did the 9/11 Commission Ignore `Able Danger'?

                            (By Louis Freeh)

       It was interesting to hear from the 9/11 Commission again
     on Tuesday. This self-perpetuating and privately funded group
     of lobbyists and lawyers has recently opined on hurricanes,
     nuclear weapons, the Baltimore Harbor Tunnel and even the New
     York subway system. Now it offers yet another ``report card''
     on the progress of the FBI and CIA in the war against
     terrorism, along with its ``back-seat'' take and some further
     unsolicited narrative about how things ought to be on the
     ``front lines.''
       Yet this is also a good time for the country to make some
     assessments of the 9/11 Commission itself. Recent revelation
     from the military intelligence operation code-named, ``Able
     Danger'' have cast light on a missed opportunity that could
     have potentially prevented 9/11. Specifically, Able Danger
     concluded in February 2000 that military experts had
     identified Mohamed Atta by name (and maybe by photograph) as
     an al Qaeda agent operating in the U.S. Subsequently,
     military officers assigned to Able Danger were prevented from
     sharing this critical information with FBI agents, even
     though appointments had been made to do so. Why?
       There are other questions that need answers. Was Able
     Danger intelligence provided to the 9/11 Commission prior to
     the finalization of its report, and, if so, why was it not
     explored? In sum, what did the 9/11 commissioners and their
     staff know about Able Danger and when did they know it?
       The Able Danger intelligence, if confirmed, is undoubtedly
     the most relevant fact of the entire post 9/11 inquiry. Even
     the most junior investigator would immediately know that the
     name and photo ID of Atta in 2000 is precisely the kind of
     tactical intelligence the FBI has many times employed to
     prevent attacks and arrest terrorists. Yet the 9/11
     Commission inexplicably concluded that it ``was not
     historically significant.'' This astounding conclusion--in
     combination with the failure to investigate Able Danger and
     incorporate it into its findings--raises serious challenges
     to the commission's credibility and, if the facts prove out,
     might just render the commission historically insignificant
     itself.
       The facts relating to Able Danger finally started to be
     reported in mid-August. U.S. Army Col. Anthony Shaffer, a
     veteran intelligence officer, publicly revealed that the Able
     Danger team had identified Atta and three other 9/11
     hijackers by mid-2000 but were prevented by military lawyers
     from giving this information to the FBI. One week later, Navy
     Capt. Scott J. Phillpott, a U.S. Naval Academy graduate who
     managed the program for the Pentagon's Special Operations
     Command, confirmed ``Atta was iden- tified by Able Danger by
     January-February of 2000.''
       On Aug. 18, 2005, the Pentagon initially stated that ``a
     probe'' had found nothing to back up Col. Shaffer's claims.
     Two weeks later, however, Defense Department officials
     acknowledged that its ``inquiry'' had found ``three more
     people who recall seeing an intelligence briefing slide that
     identified the ringleader of the 9/11 attacks a year before
     the hijackings and terrorist strikes.'' These same officials
     also stated that ``documents and electronic files created by
     . . . Able Danger were destroyed under standing orders that
     limit the military's use of intelligence gathered about
     people in the United States.'' Then, in September 2005, the
     Pentagon doubled back and blocked several military officers
     from testifying at an open Congressional hearing about the
     Able Danger program.
       Two members of Congress, Curt Weldon and Dan Burton, have
     also publicly stated that shortly after 9/11 attacks they
     provided then-Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley
     with a ``chart'' containing preattack information collected
     by Able danger about al Qaeda. a spokesperson for the White
     House has confirmed that Mr. Hadley ``recalled seeing such a
     chart in that time period but . . . did not recall whether he
     saw it during a meeting . . . and that a search of National
     Security Council files had failed to produce such a chart.''
       Thomas Kean, the chairman of the 9/11 Commission, reacted
     to Able Danger with the standard Washington PR approach. He
     lashed out at the Bush administration and demanded that the
     Pentagon conduct an ``investigation'' to evaluate the
     ``credibility'' of Col. Shaffer and Capt. Phillpott--rather
     than demand a substantive investigation into what failed in
     the first place. This from a former New Jersey governor who,
     along with other commissioners, routinely appeared in public
     espousing his own conclusions about 9/11 long before the
     commission's inquiry was completed and long before all the
     facts were in! This while dismissing out of hand the major
     conflicts of interest on the commission itself about
     obstructions to information-sharing within the intelligence
     community.
       Nevertheless, the final 9/11 commission report, released on
     July 22, 2004, concluded that ``American intelligence
     agencies were unaware of Mr. Atta until the day of the
     attacks.'' This now looks to be embarrassingly wrong. Yet
     amazingly, commission leaders acknowledged on Aug. 12 that
     their staff in fact met with a Navy officer 10 days before
     releasing the report, who ``asserted that a highly classified
     intelligence operation, Able Danger, had identified Mohammed
     Atta to be a member of an al Qaeda cell located in
     Brooklyn.'' (Capt. Phillpott says he briefed them in July
     2004.) The commission's statement goes on to say that the
     staff determined that ``the officer's account was not
     sufficiently reliable to warrant revision of the report or
     further investigation,'' and that the intelligence
     operation ``did not turn out to be historically
     significant,'' despite substantial corroboration from
     other seasoned intelligence officers.
       This dismissive and apparently unsupported conclusion would
     have us believe that a key piece of evidence was summarily
     rejected in less than 10 days without serious investigation.
     The commission, at the very least, should have interviewed
     the 80 members of Able Danger, as the Pentagon did, five of
     whom say they saw ``the chart.'' But this would have required
     admitting that the late-breaking news was inconveniently
     raised. So it was grossly neglected and branded as
     significant. Such a half-baked conclusion, drawn in only 10
     days without any real investigation, simply ignores what
     looks like substantial direct evidence to the contrary coming
     from our own trained military intelligence officers.
       No wonder the 9/11 families were outraged by these
     revelations and called for a ``new'' commission to
     investigate. ``I'm angry that my son's death could have been
     prevented,'' seethed Diane Horning, whose son Matthew was
     killed at the World Trade Center. On Aug. 17, 2005, a
     coalition of family members known as the September 11
     Advocates rightly blasted 9/11 Commission leaders Mr. Kean
     and Lee Hamilton for pooh-poohing Able Danger's findings as
     not ``historically significant.'' Advocate Mindy Kleinberg
     aptly notes, ``They [the 9/11 Commission] somehow made a
     determination that this was not important enough. To me, that
     says somebody there is not using good judgment. And if I'm
     questioning the judgment of this one case, what other things
     might they have missed?'' This is a stinging indictment of
     the commission by the 9/11 families.
       The chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Arlen
     Specter, has led the way in cleaning up the 9/11 Commission's
     unfinished business. Amid a very full plate of
     responsibilities, he conducted a hearing after noting that
     Col. Shaffer and Capt. Phillpott ``appear to have
     credibility.'' Himself and former prosecutor, Mr. Specter
     noted: ``If M? Atta and other 9/11 terrorists were identified
     before the attacks, it would be a very serious breach not to
     have that information passed along . . . we ought to get to
     the bottom of it.'' Indeed we should. The 9/11 Commission
     gets an ``I'' grade incomplete--for its dereliction regarding
     Able Danger. The Joint Intelligence Committee should
     reconvene and, in addition to Able Danger team members, we
     should have the 9/11 commissioners appear as witnesses so the
     families can hear their explanation why this doesn't matter.
                                  ____

     Sent: Friday, November 11, 2005 9:21 AM
     To: curtpa07
     Subject: USS COLE
       Our son Kenneth was the 1st killed on the USS Cole when it
     was attacked. Every since President Bush came into office
     I've been trying to get a meeting with him and the 17
     families and the White House will not even acknowledge. I've
     been saying things like you are now saying ever since the
     attacked happened and NO one in government will talk to us.
     The FBI has lied to us on several facts and my own
     Congressmen will do anything for me except a meeting with the
     President. President Clinton did nothing to go after those
     that attacked the Cole and if he had of they would have
     uncovered numerous signs out there about what was going to
     happen on 9/11. We sure would like to talk to you.
     John Clodfelter.
                                  ____

     Sent: Friday, November 11, 2005 9:21 PM
     To: curtpa07
     Subject: Able Danger--9/11 Family Member
       Dear Congressman Weldon: I write again to thank you for all
     you are doing to uncover the ``Able Danger'' story. I lost my
     brother Pete on 9/11, and over the last 4 years I have done
     what I could to educate myself on the ``how's, why's and
     who's'' of 9/11. I attended the Commission hearings both in
     Washington, D.C. and New York City, and to be frank . . . I
     thought the Commission was a farce. They may have reached
     recommendations that may prove worthy, but the agenda of some
     was all too obvious. I have felt from the beginning that
     certain Commissioners sat on the wrong side of the table, so
     to speak. Now that you have uncovered Able Danger, I want
     them all to sit as witnesses before Congress. Just who knew
     what and who decided these most important findings to be
     ``historically insignificant,'' are questions that must be
     answered.
       The loss of Pete on 9/11 is something I deal with every
     moment, of every day. Now that we are 2 weeks from what
     would've been his 47th birthday (one he shared with my
     sister, Kathy), a week away from Thanksgiving, 5 weeks from
     his favorite day of the year--Christmas . . . well, the
     heartache of his murder is felt a bit deeper.
       On a personal note, Pete's death on 9/11 was one tragedy
     from that day, but it is not the only one. What his murder
     has done to our family is quite another. There is no way to
     explain how those terrorists ruined more than one life that
     day and there is no way to express my anger at how life for
     us will never again be the same. We struggle to find joy, we
     find it difficult to accomplish what once were ordinary tasks
     . . . but we do, and thanks to our faith. I also believe we
     do because of public servants like you. Decent

[[Page H11031]]

     elected officials who actually serve the public instead of
     themselves. You have my family's backing and full support and
     we pray to GOD that more and more elected officials join you
     in your fight to expose Able Danger and in your fight to keep
     our Nation safe and secure, so no other family has to endure
     what we did on 9/11, and what we continue to endure since
     because of the acts of hate filled cowards.
       Thank you again Congressman Weldon and God bless! Please
     keep up the good fight on Able Danger!
       You remain in our thought & prayers, as does our President
     and our Brave Troops!
           Sincerely,
           A proud American,
                                                    John P. Owens,
     Loving brother of Peter J. Owens, Jr.

                          ____________________