Congressional Record: November 1, 2005 (Senate)
Page S12099-S12122                        


  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the minority leader 
is recognized.
  Mr. REID. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, just a couple of days ago, my son Leif called me and 
indicated that his lovely wife Amber was going to have another baby. 
That will be our 16th grandchild.
  Mr. President, I have been in public service a long time. Never have 
I been so concerned about our country. We have gas prices that are 
really unbelievable. This year, gas prices have been over $3 in the 
State of Nevada. Diesel fuel is still over $3 a gallon in Nevada.
  The majority leader of the House of Representatives is under 
indictment. The man in charge of contracting for the Federal Government 
is under indictment. We have deficits so far you can't see them. The 
deficits have been basically run up by President Bush's administration 
these last 5 years.
  We are the wealthiest nation in the world, but we are very poor as it 
relates to health care. We have an intractable war in Iraq. Is it any 
wonder that I am concerned about my family, my grandchildren?
  This past weekend, we witnessed the indictment of I. Lewis Libby, the 
Vice President's Chief of Staff, also on the President's staff, a 
senior adviser to the President.
  Mr. Libby is the first sitting White House staffer to be indicted in 

[[Page S12100]]

years. Is it any wonder that I am concerned about my grandchildren?
  This indictment raises very serious charges. It asserts this 
administration engaged in actions that both harmed our national 
security and were morally repugnant. A decision made to place U.S. 
soldiers, our military, into harm's way, I believe, is the most 
significant responsibility the Constitution invests in the Congress and 
in the President. The Libby indictment provides a window into what this 
is really all about: how this administration manufactured and 
manipulated intelligence in order to sell the war in Iraq and attempted 
to destroy those who dared to challenge its actions.
  These are not just words from Harry Reid. COL Larry Wilkerson, Colin 
Powell's former Chief of Staff--Colin Powell, of course, was Secretary 
of State--this man was Chief of Staff for 4 years. Here is what he said 
about the war in Iraq.
  In President Bush's first term some of the most important decisions 
about U.S. national security, including vital decisions about postwar 
Iraq, were made by a secretive, little known cabal, made up of a very 
small group of people led by Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. But the secret process was ultimately a 
failure. It produced a series of disastrous decisions.
  That is what I am here to talk about today. As a result of its 
improper conduct, a cloud now hangs over this administration. This 
cloud is further darkened by the administration's mistakes in prisoner 
abuse, Hurricane Katrina, and the cronyism and corruption in numerous 
agencies throughout this administration.
  Unfortunately, it must be said that a cloud also hangs over this 
Republican-controlled Congress for its unwillingness to hold this 
Republican administration accountable for its misdeeds on these issues.
  During the time we had a Democratic President--8 years--and when the 
Democrats were in charge of the committees, we were in the majority, 
oversight hearings were held covering the gambit of what went on in 
that administration. Today, there is not an oversight hearing held on 
  Let's take a look back at how we got here with respect to Iraq. The 
record will show that within hours of the terrorist acts of 9/11, 
senior officials in this administration recognized those attacks could 
be used as a pretext to invade Iraq. The record will also show that in 
the months and years after 9/11, the administration engaged in a 
pattern of manipulation of the facts and retribution against anyone who 
had gotten in its way as it made its case for attacking, for invading 
  There are numerous examples of how the administration misstated, and 
manipulated the facts as it made the case for war. The administration's 
statements on Saddam's alleged nuclear weapons capability and ties with 
al-Qaida represent the best examples of how it consistently and 
repeatedly manipulated the facts. The American people were warned time 
and time again by the President, the Vice President, the current 
Secretary of State in her other capacities, about Saddam's nuclear 
weapons capabilities. The Vice President said:

       Iraq has reconstituted its nuclear programs.

  Playing upon the fears of Americans after September 11, these 
officials and others raised the specter that if left unchecked Saddam 
could soon attack America with nuclear weapons. Obviously, we know now 
that their nuclear claims were wholly inaccurate. But more troubling is 
the fact that a lot of intelligence experts were telling the 
administration then that its claims about Saddam's nuclear capabilities 
were false--the situation very similar with respect to Saddam's links 
to al-Qaida. The Vice President told the American people:

       We know he's out trying once again to produce nuclear 
     weapons and we know he has a longstanding relationship with 
     various terrorist groups including the al-Qaida organization.

  These assertions have been totally discredited--not a little bit, 
totally discredited. But again the administration went ahead with these 
assertions in spite of the fact that the Government's top experts did 
not agree with these claims. Again, Wilkerson is a person in point.
  What has been the response of this Republican-controlled Congress to 
the administration's manipulation of intelligence that led to this 
protracted war in Iraq? Nothing.
  Did the Republican-controlled Congress carry out its constitutional 
obligations to conduct oversight? No.
  Did it support our troops and their families by providing them the 
answers to many important questions? No.
  Did it even attempt to force this administration to answer the most 
basic questions about its behavior? No.
  Unfortunately, the unwillingness of the Republican-controlled 
Congress to exercise its oversight responsibilities was not limited to 
just Iraq. We see it with respect to the prison abuse scandal. We see 
it with respect to Katrina. We see it with respect to the cronyism and 
corruption that permeates this administration. Time and time again, 
this Republican-controlled Congress has consistently chosen to put its 
political interests ahead of our national security. They have 
repeatedly chosen to protect the Republican administration rather than 
to get to the bottom of what happened and why it happened.
  There is also another disturbing pattern; namely, about how this 
administration responded to those who challenged its assertions. Often 
this administration's activity sought to attack and undercut those who 
dared to raise questions about its preferred course. For example, when 
General Shinseki indicated several hundred thousand troops would be 
needed in Iraq, his military career was ended, he was fired, relieved 
of duty, when he suggested it would take 200,000 troops. Well, it has 
taken a lot more than that.

  When the OMB Director Larry Lindsey suggested the cost of this war 
would approach $200 billion, he was dumped, fired.
  When the U.N. chief weapons inspector Hans Blix challenged the 
conclusion about Saddam's weapons of mass destruction capabilities, the 
administration simply pulled out its inspectors.
  When Nobel Prize winner and head of the IAEA Mohamed ElBaradei raised 
questions about the administration's claims of Saddam's nuclear 
capabilities, the administration attempted to remove him from his post.
  When Ambassador Joe Wilson stated there was no attempt by Saddam to 
acquire weapons from Niger, the administration not only went after him 
to discredit him, they launched a vicious and coordinated campaign, 
going so far as to expose the fact that his wife worked as a CIA spy. 
These people now have 24-hour protection, fearing for their own safety.
  Given this administration's pattern of squashing those who challenge 
its misstatements--and I have only mentioned a few--what has been the 
response of the Republican-controlled Congress? Absolutely nothing. And 
with their inactions, they provide political cover for this 
administration at the same time they keep the truth from our troops who 
continue to make large sacrifices in Iraq.
  Everyone may think the troops in Iraq are 100-percent Republican. I 
have met a friend, a marine. He was over there when the elections were 
held 10 months ago. He said where he was, he never even went to the 
bathroom without a rifle. Wherever he was on duty, all over this area, 
he said he could not find anyone who was happy with the way the 
elections turned out. The Republicans will do anything they can to keep 
the truth from people such as my marine friend. I would give you his 
name except he is stationed right here in the Marine Corps.
  This behavior is unacceptable. The toll in Iraq is as staggering as 
it is solemn. More than 2,000--2,025 now--Americans have lost their 
lives. Over 90 Americans have paid the ultimate sacrifice in the month 
of October alone, the fourth deadliest month in this ongoing 3-year 
war. More than 15,000 have been wounded. More than 150,000 remain over 
there in harm's way. Enormous sacrifices have been made and continue to 
be made.
  We have had soldiers and marines from Nevada killed, from Ely, from 
Las Vegas, from Henderson, from Boulder City, from Tonopah. Every time 
one of these deaths occurs, it is a dagger in the heart of that 
  This behavior is unacceptable. I am a patient man, Mr. President. I 
am a legislator, and I know things don't happen

[[Page S12101]]

overnight. I am a patient man. But the call from my son has put this in 
perspective. I am worried about my family. The toll in Iraq is as 
staggering, I repeat, as it is solemn. The troops and the American 
people have a right to expect answers and accountability worthy of that 
  For example, more than 40 Democrats wrote a substantive and detailed 
letter to the President asking four basic questions about this 
administration's Iraq policy, and we received a four-sentence answer in 

       Thank you for your letter to the President expressing your 
     concerns with Iraq. I shared your letter with the appropriate 
     administration officials--

  Remember, we wrote it to the President--

     and agencies responsible for formulating policy 
     recommendations in this area. Please be assured your letter 
     is receiving close and careful attention. Thank you for your 
     comments. Candy Wolff.

  That is a letter that duly elected Senators of the United States 
Senate wrote to the President of the United States, and we get a letter 
from Candy Wolff saying: Thanks, we're working on it.
  America deserves better than this. They also deserve a searching, 
comprehensive investigation into how the Bush administration brought 
this country to war. Key questions that need to be answered include: 
How did the Bush administration assemble its case for war against Iraq? 
We heard what Colonel Wilkerson said.
  Who did the Bush administration listen to and who did they ignore?
  How did the senior administration officials manipulate or manufacture 
intelligence presented to the Congress and the American people?
  What was the role of the White House Iraq Group, or WHIG, a group of 
senior White House officials tasked with marketing the war and taking 
down its critics? We know what Colonel Wilkerson says.
  How did the administration coordinate its effort to attack 
individuals who dared challenge the administration's assertions? We 
know what happened to them. I listed a few.
  Why has this administration failed to provide Congress with the 
documents which will shed light on their misconduct and misstatements? 
Unfortunately, the Senate committee that should be taking the lead in 
providing these answers is not. Despite the fact that the chairman of 
the Senate Intelligence Committee publicly committed to examine these 
questions more than a year and a half ago, he has chosen not to keep 
that commitment. Despite the fact that he restated the commitment 
earlier this year on national television, he has still done nothing 
except to assemble a few quotes from Democratic and Republican Senators 
going back to the first Iraq war.
  We need a thorough investigation that that committee is capable and 
tasked to do. At this point, we can only conclude he will continue to 
put politics ahead of our national security.
  If he does anything at this point, I suspect it will be playing 
political games by producing an analysis that fails to answer any of 
these important questions. Instead, if history is any guide, this 
analysis will attempt to disperse and deflect blame away from this 
  Mr. BOND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. REID. Key facts about the Intelligence Committee's phase II, June 
4, 2003: Intelligence Committee commits to bipartisan review of the 
deeply flawed intelligence on Iraq WMD phase I.
  February 12, 2004, Intelligence Committee commits to phase II 
investigation looking at five areas, including whether the 
administration exaggerated and manipulated intelligence.
  July 9, 2004, committee publishes phase I report on the intelligence 
agencies' mistakes on Iraq. Senator Rockefeller says publicly that 
phase II is as yet unbegun. Republican Chairman Roberts says it is one 
of my top priorities.
  July 11 on ``Meet the Press,'' Republican Chairman Roberts says:

       Even as I'm speaking, our staff is working on phase II and 
     will get it done.

  Fall of 2004, House Intelligence Committee, after no follow- through 
on the Iraq WMD investigation, the House announced on May 2003 no final 
  Republican Committee Chairman Porter Goss is selected as CIA 
Director. Regarding the question of the Valerie Plame leak, Goss 
previously said: ``Show me a blue dress and some DNA and I will give 
you an investigation.''
  November 2004, we had the Presidential election.
  March 2005, the President's hand-picked WMD Intelligence Committee 
says the intelligence agencies got the intelligence dead wrong, but 
says that under the President's terms of reference we are not 
authorized to investigate how policymakers used the intelligence 
assessments they received from the intelligence community.
  March 31, 2005, Senator Roberts says it would be a monumental waste 
of time to replow this ground any further. Replow?
  April 10, 2005, on ``Meet the Press,'' Senator Roberts commits to Tim 
Russert that the review will get done.
  September 2005, committee Democrats file additional views to their 
authorization bill blasting the committee for failing to conduct phase 
  There have been letters written to the committee. A press release was 
issued even saying they were going to go forward with this.
  Mr. President, enough time has gone by. I demand, on behalf of the 
American people, that we understand why these investigations are not 
being conducted. And in accordance with rule XXI, I now move that the 
Senate go into closed session.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I second the motion.
  Ms. STABENOW. I second the motion.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The motion has been made to go into closed 
session, and it has been seconded. The motion having been made and 
seconded, the Senate will go into closed session.
  The Chair, pursuant to rule XXI, now directs the Sergeant at Arms to 
clear all galleries, close all doors of the Senate Chamber, and exclude 
from the Chamber and its immediate corridor all employees and officials 
of the Senate who, under the rule, are not eligible to attend the 
closed session and who are not sworn to secrecy. The question is 
  (At 2:25 p.m., the doors of the Chamber were closed.)

                          Legislative Session

  (At 4:33 p.m., the doors of the Chamber were opened, and the open 
session of the Senate was resumed.)
  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that we now resume 
open session.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Martinez). Is there objection?
  Mr. REID. No objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                           Order of Procedure

  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following my 
remarks Senator Roberts be recognized to speak for up to 15 minutes, to 
be followed by Senator Rockefeller for up to 15 minutes, with the time 
yielded from the pending deficit reduction measure; further, that 
following that time Chairman Gregg or his designee be recognized.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, we are back in open session, and I believe 
shortly--in about 40 or 45 minutes--we will be back on course on a very 
important bill that our Nation cares about, which we are on track to 
complete this week; that is, the deficit reduction bill.
  Over the next about 30 or 35 minutes, however, we will be clarifying 
some of the intention, scheduling, and language with regard to the 
completion of the report on Iraq prewar intelligence which has been 
under a great deal of discussion in the past within the Intelligence 
Committee, and, indeed, a subject of discussion between the chairman 
and the vice chairman, both of whom will have the opportunity to 
express their ideas here shortly.
  Let me say that I think it is absolutely critical as we move forward 
on this important issue that we get partisanship out of these 
discussions of intelligence--important matters, important to this 
country, important to the American people--and anything and everything 
we can do to keep these discussions above partisanship is absolutely 
  We have been in a closed session, and I want all Members to 
familiarize themselves with what that actually

[[Page S12102]]

means as we have seen because we were in that session for a little over 
2 hours. It is very important that people do not talk about what 
happened during that session. Again, we will all have to go back 
because it is very unusual to go into these closed sessions, and, in 
fact, I think unprecedented, the way we went into this session, which 
we will probably talk about a little bit more later. I was very 
disappointed the way we entered into this session, which was a total 
surprise to me.
  Let me also say I have absolute confidence in our Intelligence 
Committee and in what they are doing in terms of this important work 
and Senator Roberts as chairman.
  The one thing that is important for us to mention, for the benefit of 
our colleagues, is an agreement between the leader and myself to the 
following three points: that the majority leader and the Democratic 
leader will appoint three members from their respective parties. This 
task force of six Senators will meet and report back to leadership no 
later than the close of business on November 14 the following: The 
Intelligence Committee's progress on the phase II review of the prewar 
intelligence and its schedule for completion.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The minority leader.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, our representatives will be Senators 
Rockefeller, Levin, and Feinstein.
  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, for the benefit of my colleagues, at this 
point we have 15 minutes set aside--for up to 15 minutes--for Senator 
Roberts, followed by Senator Rockefeller, and after that we will 
recognize Chairman Gregg or his designee. And with mutual discussion 
between the Democratic and Republican leaders, we very much, after the 
comments by the chairman and vice chairman, want to get back on the 
deficit reduction bill.
  We have a time agreement to complete discussion on that bill by 6 
o'clock tomorrow night. There are a lot of Members who want to talk 
about this very important issue.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
Kansas is recognized for 15 minutes.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Thank you, Mr. President.
  I think the best face I could put on this--after this unfortunate 
situation which was totally unexpected by myself, or my staff, or the 
Republican members on the committee, for that matter, the Republican 
leadership--is that we have agreed to do what we already agreed to do; 
that is, to complete as best we can phase II of the Intelligence 
Committee's review of prewar intelligence in reference to Iraq.
  I think it is very important to point out that the Intelligence 
Committee has had an absolutely outstanding record working with Senator 
Rockefeller and my colleagues across the aisle to produce the original 
review in regard to the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate prior to 
the military activities into Iraq, and also as to whether Saddam 
Hussein had reconstituted his weapons of mass destruction. That was a 
17-to-0 vote. We had some differences, but that report came out. It was 
a good report. It was a seminal report. As a matter of fact, I take 
pride in saying that it was a bipartisan effort that was agreed to by 
the 9/11 Commission, by the WMD Commission that was later formed, and 
made about 93 or 94 recommendations to the administration of which 
probably 93 to 94 out of 95 have already been implemented. So we worked 
in a bipartisan fashion to do that.
  We also at the same time--and I am basically quoting from the 
statement the vice chairman and I made on February 12 of 2004--agreed 
we would go to something called phase II. There has been a lot of talk 
about phase II. What is phase II? Why is it that has been delayed, if 
in fact it has been delayed?

  There was some talk on the floor that got a little personal, and I 
regret that. It seems to me it was rather convenient because it was 
only yesterday our staff was working with the staff of the minority 
indicating that not this week but next week we would spend as much time 
as possible, 5 or 6 days, to complete our work in regard to phase II. 
It isn't as though it has been delayed. As a matter of fact, it has 
been ongoing. As a matter of fact, we have been doing our work on phase 
II. It is difficult, as I will indicate in a minute, while I go through 
these provisions on what we agreed to do.
  So it seems to be a little convenient all of a sudden to go into a 
closed session of the Senate and call for a full Senate investigation 
of phase II when the committee is already doing its work. I think that 
basically is an unfortunate stunt. I would call it something else, but 
I think probably I will simply leave it at that.
  Let me tell you what phase II is all about. Again, let me point out 
that we took a look at whether Saddam Hussein did reconstitute his 
weapons of mass destruction. That took us a long time. It is a 511-page 
report. It is a seminal report. It is a good report, and it signifies 
what we can do in the committee when we at least let one another know 
what is going on and we work in a bipartisan fashion.
  This is what phase II is all about. That is what we will begin as we 
have planned to do and what our staff has indicated to the other side's 
staff in regard to what we were going to do as of next week--that we 
will start next week, and we will hope to continue that effort. We will 
cancel all other hearings until we can reach some sort of an 
accommodation. Now, if we can do this on the WMD report, certainly we 
can do it in regard to phase II.
  My good friends across the aisle are people of good faith. We had 
strong differences of opinion then. I suppose we will have it in regard 
to phase II as well. We have seen that happen time and time again. As a 
matter of fact, we brought up phase II on May 17 of this year.
  The biggest issue is as follows. There are five things in phase II: 
Whether public statements and reports and testimony regarding Iraq by 
U.S. Government officials made between the gulf war period and the 
commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom were substantiated by 
intelligence information. In other words, the public statements made in 
the administration and the public statements made by public officials, 
whether they be in Congress, whether they be in the administration, or 
whatever, Congress, because we voted for regime change and we voted to 
go to war. Obviously, the administration, because they looked at the 
intelligence and thought our national security was in danger, we went 
to war.

  Were the public statements backed up by intelligence or were they 
backed up by flawed intelligence? We have that material. We were 
supplied about 300 to 400 names by my colleagues across the aisle from 
all sorts of statements made by people in the administration. We took a 
good look at what Members of Congress have said about the same 
intelligence. I must say, at this point, some of those statements are 
even more declarative and more aggressive than those made in the 
  That is the big issue: the use of intelligence. Whether somebody in 
the administration or somebody in the Congress made a statement that 
they thought was based on intelligence that was later proved wrong and 
somehow we are suppose to get in their head and ask: Why did you make 
that statement? Is that credible?
  On May 17, in the spring, we started down the list of statements. We 
took names off of the statements because I didn't want it to be a 
situation, in terms of naming who made the statement, because I thought 
it might perjure or affect how people would vote in the committee. We 
started down that road. We didn't get very far. We had requests on the 
total progress of phase II, other portions of phase II.
  So we started again on the first statement. Does that first statement 
match up with the intelligence? We didn't get very far. We started 
phase II in May, and we went back to work to see what we could get 
done, where we would agree and come back to the ``use'' question, when 
that would be possible.
  There are five issues to phase II. Let me read them. The postwar 
findings about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and their weapons 
programs and the links to terrorism and how they compare with prewar 
assessments. That was done by Charles Duelfer and David Kay. Those two 
paragraphs are already written. You can simply say that Charles Duelfer 
and David Kay did not find WMD. That was their conclusion. They made 
some statements

[[Page S12103]]

about it. It was commensurate, exactly, with what our WMD report said. 
There shouldn't be any problem with that. That should be adopted by the 
committee with hardly any dissent or any discussion.
  The third issue is prewar intelligence about postwar Iraq. That is 
not necessarily true today. It is post-insurgency Iraq. That was my 
suggestion, saying if the intelligence community at least could figure 
out what we expected to find in Iraq postwar, post the military action. 
Where was the intelligence? That is ongoing. That is ongoing because we 
have what we think is a pretty good report, but we can make it more 
concise. I can say right off the bat that intelligence was as flawed as 
the intelligence in regard to the WMD report. We can agree with that. 
So there are two we can agree on.
  Let me go to the next one. Any intelligence activities relating to 
Iraq conducted by the policy counterterrorism evaluation group and the 
Office of Special Plans within the Office of the Undersecretary of 
Defense. This involved a question as to whether Under Secretary Douglas 
Feith had a special intelligence group that had undue influence in the 
2002 National Intelligence Estimate and whether or not that group and 
that intelligence had an undue influence on the administration's 
decision to go to war.
  We had Under Secretary Feith before the committee. Then we were going 
to have him up again. And then my good friends across the aisle wanted 
more information. In the midst of that, there was a statement made by 
the vice chairman--I will not get into that because it tends to be 
personal, and I don't want any remarks of mine to be personal, 
especially after what happened on the Senate floor in regard to this 
issue. Basically, there was a statement made that what was going on in 
the Office of Special Plans could be illegal. When that happened, 
everyone down there at the Office of Special Plans got lawyered up or 
at least thought about seeking legal representation.
  The cooperation between that particular department and our committee 
was not nearly as good as it was. We can clear that up because we have 
asked the Department of Defense inspector general to come back and tell 
us if there was anything wrong in regard to what the Office of Special 
Plans was doing. We will rely on that. We will put that in the report. 
We can believe the inspector general of the Department of Defense.
  Finally, the use of the intelligence community of information 
provided by the Iraqi National Congress. Now, remember back when the 
Congress was talking to members of the Iraqi National Congress. Mr. 
Chalabi was the head of that group. I had Senator after Senator come to 
me and ask, Why don't you have Mr. Chalabi appear before the committee? 
The people supporting him wanted to vote and eventually did vote for 
regime change.
  Then the pendulum swung the other way and people said, Wait a minute. 
We are not really sure about his position or, for that matter, what he 
has said in the past, what are you doing, and the question of the INC. 
The whole question again was, how much effect did the Iraqi National 
Congress and Mr. Chalabi have on the input to the administration as to 
whether or not they would go to war.

  We have found, basically, as far as I am concerned, there is very 
little evidence, if any, that would take place.
  I wouldn't think that would take too much time, as well.
  So those are the five things we had to do in regard to phase II.
  Let me repeat, again, yesterday our staff talked with my colleagues' 
staff across the aisle and their staff--not my colleagues across the 
aisle but their staff--and said the chairman wants to move on this next 
week. My conversation in regard to the distinguished vice chairman, I 
think it was last Wednesday, and let me say it was in the middle of a 
hearing and let me say it was not exactly clear in terms of any kind of 
a date, but I did talk to Senator Rockefeller and indicated we had to 
move, we had to get this done.
  He will doubtlessly say they have written letters and they have tried 
to get me to move and this, that or the other, but we have been doing 
this all along. Staff has been working on this very diligently. 
Consequently, I think we are very close. I am very pleased to announce, 
on schedule, exactly what we planned to do, we will start next week. We 
will start on Tuesday, and I will announce the time in the morning. 
Members of the Intelligence Committee will know Tuesday, Wednesday, 
Thursday, Friday, how long it takes, working in good faith. We will 
look into phase II and see what we can do and finish that product.
  I said a long time ago on the Intelligence Committee we had to work 
in a bipartisan fashion. I said a long time ago that whatever ended up 
on the fan, we were going to have to clean it up. I said a long time 
ago we will let the chips fall where they may, and that went for phase 
II as well as the WMD special inquiry.
  I ought to say one other thing. There was a memo that was highly 
publicized back about a year and a half ago. That memo, which was not 
provided to Republicans--obviously, it was a Democratic memo--and 
paragraph four caused a big fuss. It caused us about a month to sort of 
walk gingerly around one another and smother each other with the milk 
of kindness and say, Well, let's see if we can't work things out. And 
we did. I credit a lot of that to Senator Rockefeller. He is not a 
partisan man.
  Here is the paragraph:

       Be prepared to launch an independent investigation when it 
     becomes clear we have exhausted the opportunity to usefully 
     collaborate with the majority. We can pull the trigger on an 
     independent investigation any time, but we can only do so 
     once. The best time to do so will probably be next year.

  Well, the trigger has been pulled today with an executive session of 
the Senate that is not needed, not necessary, and, in my personal 
opinion, was a stunt. I plead with my colleagues across the aisle and 
my colleagues, all Republicans on the committee, next week when we 
start this, on Tuesday--we will go through Tuesday, Wednesday, 
Thursday, Friday--I have no illusions, we will have differences, but I 
plead with you, as we have done in the past, for the good of our 
national security, and to finish the inquiry on whether or not Saddam 
Hussein had reconstituted his weapons of mass destruction, we were able 
to do that, and it became the seminal study for intelligence reform and 
where we are now with the Director of National Intelligence.
  If we can get back to that mode instead of this surprising stunt on 
the floor to go into executive session, we will be better off.
  Phase II, yes, you bet, we have been on phase II, and we will do it 
exactly as we planned to do it as of next week. I see from the 
expression of the distinguished President's face my time has expired.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time has expired.
  Mr. ROBERTS. I thank the President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
West Virginia is recognized for 15 minutes.
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I thank the Presiding Officer. For 
the past 30 years, the Senate Intelligence Committee has been 
remarkably bipartisan. It has performed a terrific oversight factor for 
the Senate. The resolution creating the committee mandates an oversight 
role. We are not there watching clouds drift by. The resolution that 
creates the committee mandates an oversight role of the U.S. 
intelligence community and a responsibility to carefully review our 
Nation's most sensitive national security programs. It is very broad 
and widespread in the handling of highly classified secrets. The 
committee is designed to be nonpartisan. That is why I am called a vice 
chairman. That is not true in any other committee. But it is meant to 
  We have reached an agreement that shows what has happened today, in a 
somewhat abrupt manner, but nevertheless we have reached an agreement 
on what we will do. That is a large step forward. I congratulate all 
involved in that.
  For the most part, the history has been a good one. Over the past 2 
years, I have to say, in all honesty, I am troubled by a concerted 
effort by this administration to use its influence to limit, to delay, 
to frustrate, to deny the Intelligence Committee's oversight work into 
the intelligence reporting and activities leading up to the invasion of 

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  In June, 2003, the Senate Intelligence Committee began a formal 
investigation into the prewar intelligence on Iraq. The primary focus 
of the investigation was to evaluate the intelligence reporting 
underlying the claims that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction 
and that Iraq had ties to terrorist groups. Although the Senate 
resolution establishing the Intelligence Committee intelligence clearly 
states in Senate resolution 400 we are to look at the ``use'' of 
intelligence, the majority on the committee initially rejected attempts 
by myself and by others to add to the investigation--that is, to add to 
phase I--how administration officials used or potentially misused 
intelligence and public statements leading up to the war which maybe 
helped lead up to the war. Only after considerable insistence by 
committee members and protracted discussions did the majority 
leadership of the committee agree to add to the scope of our 
investigation the issue of how intelligence was used prior to the Iraq 
war. It is a huge uncovered subject.

  On February 12, 2004, the Intelligence Committee unanimously agreed 
and publicly announced that five issues would be added to the 
investigation, phase II. One, whether public statements, records and 
testimony regarding Iraq by Government officials made between the gulf 
war period, end of gulf war I and the commencement of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, whether those statements by Government officials were 
substantiated by intelligence information.
  Prewar intelligence is No. 2, prewar intelligence assessment about 
postwar Iraq.
  Three, any intelligence activities related to Iraq within the Office 
of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, headed by one Douglas Feith.
  Four, the use of the intelligence community of information provided 
by the Iraqi National Congress.
  Five, the postwar findings about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction 
and weapons programs and links to terrorism.
  Remember, this was constantly being thrown at us, links to terrorism 
and how they compare to the prewar assessments.
  The committee press release explained all of that. Everyone agreed to 
it, and it added the resolution adopted unanimously today that 
illustrated the commitment to all members to a thorough review to 
learning the necessary lessons from our experience with Iraq and 
ensures that our Armed Forces and policymakers benefit from the best 
and most reliable intelligence that can be collected.
  These five areas of inquiry commonly referred to as phase II were 
authorized well over a year and a half ago, in February of 2004. It has 
been 20 months since the committee committed to all Members of the 
Senate and to the American public a thorough review.
  My colleague, the chairman of the committee, has referred to all of 
the things that have been done. In fact, we have had one hearing. And 
he referred to work that would take place next week. I didn't know 
about that. All of a sudden everyone will plow into phase II. I am not 
critical of that because I think today has helped to create that kind 
of momentum which I think is important.
  Since the committee identified these five issues as a high priority 
in February of last year, I and other Democrats on the committee have 
repeatedly urged completion of the review--we agreed to it 
unanimously--and had been assured by the chairman, time and time again, 
that the committee will fulfill this commitment.
  Yet, despite these repeated assurances, it is clear that only token 
work, at best, has been done on phase II since it was authorized. That 
is unacceptable. We have had only one business meeting on phase II, and 
no report has been written for members to review--nothing.
  The public pronouncement of Chairman Roberts earlier this year that 
phase II was ``on the back burner'' has been, unfortunately, accurate. 
Do I enjoy saying this? Not particularly, true. But let people know.
  The disturbing question is, why has the chairman relegated the phase 
II investigation to the back burner? Why did he do that?
  The fact is--and I hope folks will listen closely--that any time the 
Intelligence Committee pursued a line of inquiry that brought us closer 
to the role of the White House in all of this, in the use of 
intelligence prior to the war, our efforts have been thwarted time and 
time again.
  When it was reported that the Vice President's Chief of Staff Scooter 
Libby and the National Security Council prepared a draft speech making 
the intelligence case against Iraq and sent it to the CIA for Secretary 
of State Powell to give before the United Nations in February of 2003, 
my staff asked that the committee obtain the NSC, National Security 
Council, document as part of our ongoing review of how the Powell 
speech was formulated. Our requests were denied by the majority. Why?
  Because of this denial, I personally wrote to the Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. Tenet, requesting the Libby/NSC input 
into the Powell speech--it was important to have that information--and 
other documents in October of 2003. Director Tenet did not respond to 
my letter, nor did he respond to my two subsequent letters for the NSC 
paper in January and March of 2003. Why?
  Perhaps the answer can be found in last week's National Journal 
article, which reports that Vice President Cheney and his Chief of 
Staff Libby overruled White House lawyers and withheld this 
information--withheld these documents--from us, and other documents 
from the Senate Intelligence Committee.
  When, during the committee's Iraq investigation, my staff requested 
that the committee interview the White House speechwriter who wrote the 
President's 2003 State of the Union Address to better understand how 
the debunked claim that Iraq was seeking uranium from Niger made it 
into the President's speech--how it got in there, when the same claim 
was removed, at the CIA's insistence, a few months earlier in 
Cincinnati--our request was denied by the majority. Why?
  When we requested that the committee obtain a copy of the one-page 
summary of the Intelligence Community's National Intelligence Estimate 
on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs that was prepared for 
the President in October 2002, our request was denied by the majority. 
  And why has the committee's phase II investigation been moribund 
since February of 2004? When the committee told the American people it 
would conduct a thorough review, was the promise a hollow one? What 
other conclusion?
  Could it be that the administration has made it clear it does not 
want the Congress to examine whether intelligence was accurately 
presented to the American people in the rush to war?
  Could it be that the administration has made it clear it does not 
want Congress to examine the role that Pentagon policy officials under 
Douglas Feith played in circumventing the intelligence community and 
preparing an alternative analysis to the White House that drew a link 
between Iraq and the attacks of 9/11 that the intelligence did not 
  Could it be the administration has made it clear it does not want 
Congress to examine the claim that the Iraqi National Congress made to 
the Senate Appropriations Committee in June of 2002 that it was 
providing intelligence information directly to the Vice President's 
office--to Mr. Hadley, I believe--and the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense? Chalabi passed all intelligence agencies in our Government 
directly into the White House.
  The administration's ability to head off any line of inquiry into 
matters of appropriate congressional oversight is not limited to the 
Intelligence Committee's Iraq investigation. Despite repeated attempts 
by me and other Intelligence Committee members to initiate a detailed 
review of fundamental legal and operational questions surrounding the 
detention, interrogation, and rendition of suspected terrorists held in 
U.S. custody--important national security measures that fall squarely 
within the jurisdiction of the Intelligence Committee--the committee's 
majority has refused to conduct such an investigation. What are we to 

  The Intelligence Committee's obligation under Senate Resolution 400--
``to provide vigilant oversight of the intelligence activities of the 

[[Page S12105]]

States''--requires us to not only answer questions related to cases of 
detainee abuse, but to examine the effectiveness of the methods used in 
  But, again, it is apparent to me that the White House has sent down 
the edict to the majority--and I could say more--that the Congress is 
not to carry out its oversight responsibilities in detention, 
interrogation, and rendition matters, or some of the previous matters I 
discussed, as it would bring uncomfortable attention to the legal 
decisions and opinions coming from the White House and the Justice 
Department in the operation of various programs.
  Finally, the delay in completing the remaining portion of the 
Intelligence Committee's Iraq review is inexcusable. Sadly, the 
committee's delinquency in completing an investigation that it 
unanimously voted to undertake over 20 months ago has diminished the 
committee's credibility as an effective overseer of the intelligence 
  But what disturbs me the most is that the majority has been willing, 
in this Senator's judgment, to take orders from this administration 
when it comes to limiting the scope of appropriate, authorized, and 
necessary oversight investigations. This is a very strong statement. 
The very independence of the Congress as a separate and coequal branch 
of Government has been called into question.
  We need to not only complete the second phase of the Intelligence 
Committee's investigation, we need to reopen the first part of the Iraq 
report we released in July of last year, to find out what role the 
White House played in denying the committee documents it needed to 
carry out its investigation. That is not a part of the agreement, I 
fully and freely admit.
  It is time the Senate, as a body, own up to our oversight 
responsibilities and provide the American people the answers we 
promised we would give them over 20 months ago.
  I thank the Presiding Officer and yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, will the Senators yield for a unanimous 
consent request?
  Mr. CONRAD. I yield.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I would like to ask the Senator from West 
Virginia a question.
  Has the joint agreement of February 12, 2004, been made a part of the 
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I say to the distinguished Senator 
from Michigan, I have the same document and ask unanimous consent that 
be printed in the Record.
  Mr. President, also, there was a reference in the chairman's remarks 
as to events that went on in the Douglas Feith matter, and he referred 
to ``lawyering up.'' There is a very clear, easy, simple answer to 
that, and I ask unanimous consent that be printed in the Record, also.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

 [From the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Feb. 
                               12, 2004]

   Chairman Roberts and Vice Chairman Rockefeller Issue Statement on 
    Intelligence Committee's Review of Pre War Intelligence in Iraq

       Washington, DC.--Senator Pat Roberts (R-KS), Chairman, and 
     Senator Jay Rockefeller IV (D-WV), Vice Chairman, of the 
     Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, today announced that 
     the Committee unanimously agreed to refine the terms of 
     reference of the Committee's ongoing inquiry into pre war 
     intelligence with regard to Iraq. The new terms are as 
       A. The matters set forth in the joint release of the 
     Chairman and Vice Chairman on June 20, 2003:
       1. The quantity and quality of U.S. intelligence on Iraqi 
     weapons of mass destruction programs, ties to terrorist 
     groups, Saddam Hussein's threat to stability and security in 
     the region, and his repression of his own people;
       2. the objectivity, reasonableness, independence, and 
     accuracy of the judgments reached by the Intelligence 
       3. whether those judgments were properly disseminated to 
     policy makers in the Executive Branch and Congress;
       4. whether any influence was brought to bear on anyone to 
     shape their analysis to support policy objectives; and
       5. other issues we mutually identify in the course of the 
     Committee's review;
       B. the collection of intelligence on Iraq from the end of 
     the Gulf War to the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom;
       C. whether public statements and reports and testimony 
     regarding Iraq by U.S. Government officials made between the 
     Gulf War period and the commencement of Operation Iraqi 
     Freedom were substantiated by intelligence information;
       D. the postwar findings about Iraq's weapons of mass 
     destruction and weapons programs and links to terrorism and 
     how they compare with prewar assessments;
       E. prewar intelligence assessments about postwar Iraq;
       F. any intelligence activities relating to Iraq conducted 
     by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG) and 
     the Office of Special Plans within the Office of the Under 
     Secretary of Defense for Policy; and
       G. the use by the Intelligence Community of information 
     provided by the Iraqi National Congress (INC).
       Sen. Roberts said, ``Today's agreement reflects a 
     refinement and to a great extent a restatement of the 
     Committee's ongoing review of pre-war intelligence. The 
     resolution adopted unanimously today illustrates the 
     commitment of all members to a thorough review, to learning 
     the necessary lessons from our experience with Iraq, and to 
     ensuring that our armed forces and policymakers benefit from 
     the best and most reliable intelligence that can be 
     collected. I believe that the report which we are currently 
     reviewing will have a profound impact on the future of our 
     Intelligence Community. My hope is that we be able to release 
     our initial report soon and then continue our review as we 
     work toward recommendations. I congratulate all members for 
     their willingness to work together toward these goals.''
       Sen. Rockefeller said, ``This agreement reflects a 
     difficult and lengthy process, but in the end, we were able 
     to reach consensus on the need to expand the investigation 
     into several key areas.''
       ``We will address the question of whether intelligence was 
     exaggerated or misused by reviewing statements by senior 
     policy makers to determine if those statements were 
     substantiated by the intelligence,'' Rockefeller said. ``We 
     will take a closer look at the shortfalls in our intelligence 
     collection. We will compare pre-war estimates to the 
     situation in postwar Iraq, and we will pursue a better 
     understanding of what role the Policy Counterterrorism 
     Evaluation Group and the Office of Special Plans played in 
     pre-war intelligence. There are definitely a few outstanding 
     issues, but we've made a lot of progress, and it's clear that 
     we're moving in the right direction.''

      Response to Department of Defense Letter Regarding Senator 
            Rockefeller's Statement on Under Secretary Feith

       In July 2004, officials at the Department of Defense took 
     exception to my characterization of the activities of the 
     office of Under Secretary of Defense Doug Feith. The Senate 
     Intelligence Committee has been investigating these 
     activities as part of its ongoing review of prewar 
     intelligence related to Iraq. After much delay, we received 
     thousands of pages of documents from the Defense Department 
     and conducted several interviews as we have sought to 
     determine the nature and extent of the intelligence 
     activities of this office. At the time of my public 
     statements, our review of these activities was still ongoing 
     and as part of the second phase of the Committee's work on 
     prewar intelligence.
       In describing that part of our review I stated that we were 
     seeking to determine if Under Secretary Feith was running a 
     private intelligence operation not authorized in law. For 
     example, Section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947 
     requires the heads of all departments and agencies of the 
     U.S. government involved in intelligence activities ``to keep 
     the congressional oversight committees informed.'' This 
     requirement relates to the activities of any part of the 
     government not just intelligence agencies. The Committee 
     review is intended to determine if the activities within 
     Under Secretary Feith's office were unauthorized intelligence 
     activities in contravention of this and perhaps other legal 
     requirements. The Committee unanimously agreed to review 
     ``any intelligence activities relating to Iraq conducted by 
     the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG) and the 
     Office of Special Plans within the Office of the Under 
     Secretary of Defense for Policy.'' Implicit in that statement 
     is the possibility that unauthorized intelligence activities 
     may have taken place.
       A letter from Assistant Secretary of Defense Powell Moore 
     in July 2004 expressed surprise at my description and asked 
     for an apology. I did not suggest that Mr. Feith has broken a 
     criminal statute. My concern, and that expressed in the 
     Committee's resolution authorizing its investigation, is that 
     some activities of his office may have been unauthorized. The 
     Committee has not reached a conclusion. And cannot reach a 
     conclusion without further investigation.

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, one additional unanimous consent request. I 
ask unanimous consent that it be noted in the Record that items C 
through G in the February 12, 2004, press release setting forth the 
agreement be noted as being phase II of the agreement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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