Congressional Record: April 21, 2005 (Senate)
Page S4052-S4074
EXECUTIVE SESSION
______
NOMINATION OF JOHN D. NEGROPONTE TO BE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will
proceed to executive session for the consideration of calendar No. 69,
which the clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read the nomination of John D. Negroponte, of
New York, to be Director of National Intelligence.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there will be 4
hours of debate equally divided between the two leaders or their
designees, and the Democratic time will be equally divided between the
Senator from West Virginia, Mr. Rockefeller, and the Senator from
Oregon, Mr. Wyden.
The Senator from Kansas.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I thank you.
Mr. President, as chairman of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, I rise today in strong support of the nomination of
Ambassador John D. Negroponte to serve as our Nation's first Director
of National Intelligence.
The committee held Ambassador Negroponte's confirmation hearing on
Tuesday, April 12, and voted favorably to report his nomination to the
full Senate on Thursday, April 14.
Now, the speed with which the committee acted upon this nomination
and the nomination of LTG, soon to be four-star general, Michael
Hayden, to be the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence,
really underscores the importance the committee, and I believe the
Senate, places on continuing and ensuring reform of our Nation's
intelligence community and, as a result, our national security.
While our intelligence community has a great number of successes--let
me emphasize that--of which intelligence professionals should be
justifiably proud--and the problem here is that when we have successes
in the intelligence community, many times either the community or those
of us who serve on the committee or those who are familiar with those
successes cannot say anything about them because it is classified--but
the intelligence failures associated with the attacks of 9/11 and the
intelligence community's flawed assessments of Iraq's WMD programs
underscored the need for fundamental change across the intelligence
community.
In my years on the Senate Intelligence Committee, I have met many of
these hard-working men and women of the intelligence community who work
day in and day out with one goal in mind; that is, to keep this Nation
secure and our people safe.
They are held back, however, by a flawed system that does not permit
them to work as a community to do their best work. So we need to honor
their commitment and their sacrifices by giving them an intelligence
community worthy of their efforts and capable of meeting their
aspirations and our expectations of them.
So responding to that demonstrated need for reform, Congress really
created the position of Director of National Intelligence with the
intent of giving one person the responsibility and authority to provide
the leadership that the Nation's intelligence apparatus has desperately
needed and to exercise command and control across all the elements of
the intelligence community.
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In short, through legislation, we created the DNI, the Director of
National Intelligence, to provide the intelligence community with a
clear chain of command and the accountability that comes with that.
To facilitate that chain of command, and to foster accountability,
the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 gave the DNI
significant management authorities and tools, including expanded budget
authority, acquisition, personnel, and tasking authorities.
These authorities, however, are limited in significant ways, and the
legislation leaves certain ambiguities about the DNI's authorities.
As a result, there are questions about the DNI's ability to bring
about the kind of change and true reform necessary to address the
failures highlighted by the 9/11 attacks and the assessments of Iraq's
WMD programs.
So the task of resolving these ambiguities and questions will fall to
the first Director of National Intelligence. As the WMD Commission
pointed out in its recent report, the DNI will have to be adept at
managing more through resource allocation than through command.
Moreover, the first DNI will define the power and scope of future
Directors of National Intelligence and will determine, in large
measure, the success of our efforts to truly reform the intelligence
community.
Bringing about that reform is not going to be easy. Numerous
commissions--many commissions--have identified the same failings as
those that resulted in the legislation that created the DNI. Yet
previous reform efforts have proven largely fruitless.
So immune to reform is the intelligence community that the WMD
Commission described it as a ``closed world'' with ``an almost perfect
record of resisting external recommendations.''
Allow me to relay one example to demonstrate this point.
Over 3 years have passed since the September 11 attacks, and the
elements of the community have not made the progress that we want in
sharing intelligence data amongst the community. The distinguished vice
chairman and I call that ``information access.''
Elements within the intelligence community, unfortunately, continue
to act--some elements--as though they own the intelligence data they
collect rather than treating that data as belonging to the U.S.
Government.
As a result of the community's failure to repudiate outdated
restrictions on information access, and its refusal to revisit legal
interpretations and policy decisions that predate the threats now
confronting the United States, impediments to information access are
reemerging--reemerging, even today--in the very programs designed to
address the problem.
Clearly, then, the Nation's first Director of National Intelligence
will face tremendous challenges and will require unwavering support
from both Congress and the White House.
I am pleased President Bush has made it very clear that the DNI will
have strong authority in his administration. We in Congress must do our
part, and we begin with the nomination of Ambassador Negroponte.
The President has made an excellent choice in choosing the Ambassador
to serve as the first DNI. He has dedicated more than 40 years of
service to our country. Over the course of his public service career,
the Senate has confirmed him seven times, including five times for
ambassadorial positions in Honduras, Mexico, the Philippines, the
United Nations and, of course, most recently in Iraq. Ambassador
Negroponte has also held a number of key positions within the executive
branch, including serving as Deputy National Security Advisor.
In short, his career has been dedicated to intelligence and national
security matters, and he has a great deal of experience to offer as the
new Director of National Intelligence. He is well suited for this
position. I look forward to working with him.
In my discussions with Ambassador Negroponte, I have made it clear
that Congress and the American people expect him to make a difference
in the intelligence community. I must say, on behalf of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence and on behalf of my vice chairman and
myself, we have promised to conduct aggressive, preemptive oversight in
regard to helping the DNI answer the challenges he will face with
regard to the capabilities we have or do not have with regard to the
intelligence community.
We expect him to break down those barriers to information access I
alluded to earlier. We expect him to improve the human intelligence
capabilities we need. And ultimately, we expect him to provide
leadership and accountability. In response to these questions, during
his confirmation hearing, the Ambassador simply responded ``I will''
with conviction.
Clearly Ambassador Negroponte will face significant challenges. He is
going to carry heavy burdens. I am convinced, however, he has the
character, the expertise, and the leadership skills required to
successfully meet these challenges and to shoulder these
responsibilities.
I urge my colleagues to support this nomination, and I reserve the
remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I join with the chairman of the
Intelligence Committee in what he has said. Today the Senate is
considering the nomination of Ambassador John Negroponte to become the
Nation's first Director of National Intelligence. Personally, I
strongly support this nomination, and I will discuss the reasons why in
a moment.
First, however, as the chairman did, I am going to take a few minutes
to describe how critical this new position is to our country and its
future, the magnitude of the challenges Ambassador Negroponte will
face.
In 1947, Congress created the Central Intelligence Agency and the
Director of Central Intelligence. The Cold War was upon us and the
Nation needed intelligence about our new adversary. The structure we
put in place at that time to keep tabs on the Soviet Union grew and
took on additional missions over the next 40 years. But the
intelligence community stayed primarily focused on that one target of
the Soviet Union.
Then in 1990, the Soviet Union dissolved. The world changed
dramatically, but our intelligence organizations for the most part did
not. As a consequence, we have for the past 15 years made do with an
intelligence system designed to penetrate and collect information about
a single static adversary. There was no one in charge to force change
from within, and before September 11 of 2001, there was little impetus
for change from without.
The National Security Act of 1947, the genesis of all of this,
designated the DCI to serve as the head of the Central Intelligence
Agency, also the principal adviser to the President on intelligence
matters, and the head of the U.S. intelligence community--all three of
those assignments.
The Director of Central Intelligence ran the CIA, advised the
President, but, frankly, never exercised the third responsibility,
which is probably the most important other than advising the President,
and that is managing the intelligence community itself.
Even after the events, tragic though they might have been, of 9/11,
it took 3 years, two major investigations of those events, and the
stunning intelligence failures prior to the Iraq war to break through
the entrenched interests and to achieve reform that created the
position of director of something called national intelligence, all of
it.
The difficulty involved in the birth of this new office serves as a
warning for the challenges that the Ambassador, if confirmed, as I hope
he will be, will face. Bureaucracies are amazingly slow to change. That
doesn't say anything bad about the people. That is the way the world
works, whether it is corporate, private, or whatever. The bureaucracies
are tenacious in defending their turf. Some of the stories are
remarkable within the 15 intelligence agencies the Ambassador will have
to oversee. Reform of the intelligence community will involve stepping
on the turf of some of the most powerful bureaucracies in Washington.
And first and foremost among those is the Department of Defense.
Eighty percent of our intelligence spending is in the DOD budget. The
incoming Director of National Intelligence will have to quickly
establish a close working relationship with the Secretary of Defense,
but it must be a
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relationship of equals, and Ambassador Negroponte must be willing to
exercise the authority given him by the legislation and the President
when he and the Secretary differ. In effect, the Director of National
Intelligence supersedes the head of the Department of Defense.
Ambassador Negroponte also will encounter and need to manage the CIA,
an organization accustomed to operating with tremendous autonomy, a
world unto itself. Some of these agencies, such as the National
Security Agency--they are called NSA--get acronyms, ``no such
agency''--that is part of the way their world operates. That is not to
denigrate them, their public service, their public commitment, their
willingness to offer up their lives for their country. But bureaucracy
of a huge magnitude it surely is.
Then there is the FBI, an agency which is dominated by its law
enforcement history and struggling to make itself into a full partner
in the intelligence community. Some question whether that can be done;
my mind is still open to it. They are trying. Most people say it is
working at the top but not in the middle, because if you are a lawyer,
you have a yellow pad, you go arrest somebody for breaking the law. If
you are an intelligence officer, you find somebody you are suspicious
of, and you don't arrest that person. You surveil that person, you
trail that person, maybe for weeks, months, to find out where that
person takes you and what intelligence we can learn from that.
But these are powerful organizations with very proud histories. They
are populated by dedicated and talented public servants who have
contributed to our security for decades. But our needs are now
different. All of these agencies now must change the way they do
business.
Ambassador Negroponte takes charge at a time when the intelligence
community is reeling from criticism for the lapses prior to 9/11 and
the significant failures related to prewar intelligence on Iraq.
The chairman and I worry about that because it affects morale. One
doesn't want to affect morale. But on the other hand, intelligence
agencies have to reflect the current needs of this country and act
accordingly.
The loose amalgam of 15 intelligence agencies needs a leader who can
change not simply the boxes on an organizational chart but the way we
do intelligence. The different agencies traditionally have collected
intelligence from their sources, analyzed it, put it into their
databases, and then shared it as they deemed appropriate. The chairman
and I are very fond--both of us--of saying the word ``share'' is now
outmoded. There is a need-to-know basis from time to time. But if you
share something, that means you own it and that you make the decision
you will share it with somebody. We prefer the modern word for
intelligence which is going to have to be ``access,'' that anybody in
that business has access to that intelligence automatically by
definition unless there is a particular need-to-know restriction.
The Director of National Intelligence has to create a new culture
where the process of producing intelligence is coordinated across
agencies from the beginning. The collection strategies for various
targets need to be unified, and the intelligence collected needs to be
available to everyone with the proper clearance and the need to know
that information.
That is the concept of jointness in operation that the Presiding
Officer knows well because he is on the Armed Services Committee, as is
my colleague, the chairman of the Intelligence Committee. Jointness is
a concept the military has used and made work very effectively. It goes
back to the Goldwater-Nichols Act almost 20 years ago, and it is
something the Intelligence Committee is going to have to learn how to
do. Making fundamental changes is absolutely essential in order to make
sure our intelligence is timely, objective, and independent of
political consideration.
The credibility of the intelligence community--and, by extension, the
credibility of the United States--has suffered when key intelligence
reports such as the prewar intelligence report on Iraq failed the test
of being timely, objective, and independent as required by law. It is
not something they just ought to be doing; it is required by the 1947
National Security Act.
Making major changes in the way the community operates and produces
intelligence will be the first step for Ambassador Negroponte. He also
must instill a sense of accountability. On this many of us feel
strongly. The joint inquiry conducted by the Senate and the House
Intelligence Committees into the events of 9/11 called for
accountability for the mistakes made prior to the attack where
thousands lost their lives. The WMD commission, which finished its
work, also highlighted this issue.
But despite these findings and despite what one would think the
country would assume and expect, no one has been held accountable for
the numerous failures to share critical intelligence and act on
intelligence warnings in the year and a half prior to the 9/11 attacks.
Likewise there has been a lack of accountability over the failings in
the collection, analysis, and use of intelligence prior to the Iraq war
itself.
Accountability means people get fired or people get demoted or people
get scolded or, concurrently, people are patted on the back, rewarded,
encouraged, motivated further, held up before their colleagues as
exemplary because they have done something particularly well.
So the Ambassador is not only going to have to deal with problems
from the past, but he will have to face immediately the growing scandal
surrounding the collection of intelligence through the detention,
interrogation, and rendition of suspected terrorists and insurgents. We
have been subjected to an almost daily deluge of accusations of abuse
stemming from these operations.
The intelligence we gain through these interrogations is, frankly,
too important to allow shortcomings in this program to continue, and
the Director of National Intelligence will be the official responsible
for ensuring we have a comprehensive, consistent, legal, and
operational policy on the detention and interrogation of prisoners
because there is enormous flux in that whole area right now. The lack
of clarity in these areas has led to confusion and likely contributed
to the abuse we have witnessed.
Dealing with the many challenges is a tall order. But if anybody can
succeed in the position of DNI, Director of National Intelligence, an
entirely new position in the U.S. Government, one of the three or four
toughest jobs in Washington, that person is Ambassador Negroponte. He
has a 40-year career of public service, as has been indicated, in some
of most difficult and critical posts in the Foreign Service: Vietnam,
the Paris peace talks, South and Central America, the U.N., and most
recently in Baghdad.
He has been doing this for 40 years. One of the things I have
appreciated particularly about him is that he is not a military person,
not a political person, not an intelligence person. He is a diplomat.
He is somebody who, through his entire career, has engaged in
understanding the nuances of the cultures we have to deal with in the
intelligence world and what follows intelligence across the world. But
he also knows a great deal about intelligence and the military
operations and the political aspects of life simply because you cannot
be an ambassador and avoid those things.
He is a diplomat, a manager, a negotiator, which is crucial to
bringing these agencies together and to go back and forth with the
President and the Congress. He has extensive knowledge of the workings
of the Government. That is a very prosaic statement, until one takes it
at face value. Most people don't. They have extensive knowledge about
certain parts of Government. He covers the ballfield. He has the
temperament, standing, and self-confidence, frankly, to deal with the
Washington bureaucracy. He has a great deal of confidence in himself,
and he ought to--he has the backing of somebody called the President of
the United States of America.
The Intelligence Reform Act provides the Director of National
Intelligence with considerable authority. But in Washington, DC, the
support of the President is invaluable in exercising authority. To put
it another way, a person loses their stature pretty quickly if the
President is not backing that
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person in high-profile decisions, particularly in those instances when
decisions meet resistance from the heads of other departments and other
agencies which have full call on the President and his attention. The
President's support will be absolutely critical to Ambassador
Negroponte's success--and succeed he must, Mr. President.
The United States faces a period of enormous uncertainty and threat.
The problems of international terrorism will be with us for many
decades, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction poses a
danger at this minute for the entire world and will for decades to
come.
These are difficult targets for the intelligence community, but these
are the things that threaten our security every moment. These are the
issues the intelligence community must master. They are our front line
of defense. The warfighter has not yet engaged properly until the
intelligence has been collected and disseminated and policy is made
from that. Ambassador Negroponte must lead all of us into a new era on
intelligence. I think he is very well suited for the task, and I look
forward to his swift confirmation.
In closing, I also hope the Senate moves very quickly to confirm the
President's nominee to be Principal Deputy Director of National
Intelligence, and that is LTG Michael Hayden. This is a tandem made in
Heaven. General Hayden understands the military, the lifelong service
of it. He understands intelligence. He is Director of the National
Security Agency. He has a profound, intuitive, knowledge-based
understanding of what is under the rocks and what is plainly in sight,
what is plainly good or wrong about the intelligence profession. He has
led the National Security Agency for the last 6 years. It is an
interesting fact that in the National Security Agency, under their
roof, is the largest collection of mathematicians in this world. That
may be known or not; I suspect it is. But these people do incredibly
important things. He has led them now, having been reappointed three
times. Together, Ambassador Negroponte and General Hayden make a
powerful team. I am very pleased to support them both.
I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
Mr. ROBERTS. Will the vice chairman yield?
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Of course.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for a very
comprehensive statement. I thank him for what I think is a very
accurate statement, more especially with the history he has outlined of
the intelligence community; more especially with the contributions of
the men and women within the intelligence community who have successes
that obviously you cannot talk about, but the obvious need for reform
because of what we have gone through; especially for the Senator's
comment in relationship to the new DNI in relation to the Department of
Defense. That was right on target.
There has been a great deal of comment, as the vice chairman knows,
that 80 percent of the funding of the intelligence budget goes to the
military, and in terms of being the majority user of intelligence
nobody would quarrel with that. I don't know of any Member of Congress
who would say otherwise. I think we have made great progress between
the intelligence and the military and the real-time analysis or real-
time intelligence to the warfighter, even though our challenges in
parts of the world are very great. But I point out--and I think the
vice chairman agrees--that the principal user of intelligence--not
majority but principal user of intelligence--is not the military, as
important as they are; it is the President of the United States and the
National Security Council and the Congress of the United States to
determine policy.
I thank the Senator for bringing that out and I thank him for a very
fine statement and also for being a fine vice chairman. We aggressively
tried to provide insight and advice to the new DNI.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. If my friend will yield, I further say that the
President made an enormous contribution, which was sort of generally
overlooked--not by those of us who work in this field of intelligence--
when he made it very clear and made an executive decision that 80
percent of the budget that goes to the military, minus a few very
specific tactical areas, and necessarily so, would be under the
Director of National Intelligence. That was the President declaring
that whoever is in that position will control the funding.
Complications can arise, but the President has been clear about who is
going to run this operation, and that is very important.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I could ask for unanimous consent to lock
in the order, but I think I can just make a suggestion with the few
Senators we have here. I am sure more will come. Senator Bond has a
time conflict and would like to be recognized for 10 minutes. Senator
Feinstein has been waiting, as has Senator Wyden. And then Senator
Collins will come to the floor very quickly, one of the coauthors of
the Intelligence Reform Act. If we can have an understanding that that
would be the order, I think that would be appropriate.
Also, I ask unanimous consent that the time consumed by any quorum
calls be charged equally to both sides.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I am more than happy to yield 10 minutes
to a valued member of the committee, the Senator from Missouri, Mr.
Bond.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri is recognized.
Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I thank Chairman Roberts. As we all know,
this February, President Bush nominated Ambassador John Negroponte to
serve as the Nation's first Director of National Intelligence. I rise
today in strong support of his confirmation for this demanding
position. I agree with the chairman and vice chairman; I can think of
few people as well suited by experience, intelligence, and dedication
to tackle this assignment. I heard the remarks of the vice chairman,
and I wish to associate myself with those very fine remarks--
particularly his remarks about General Hayden who is nominated to be
the Principal Deputy. We are not talking about his nomination today,
but I associate myself with the high commendation that has been made of
this gentleman, who also deserves prompt confirmation, so that we can
get about the critically important work of providing intelligence.
Ambassador Negroponte's wealth of experience and outstanding track
record should be well known to all of us. A proven leader and manager
in our national security establishment, he served five tours as chief
of mission in U.S. Embassies. He has worked closely not only with
frontline intelligence officers but himself served as Deputy National
Security Adviser. He has solid experience working with the U.S.
military, as well as representatives of Cabinet departments. Most
telling, his recent experience as U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and the
United Nations provide him with a unique view into the spectrum of
national security challenges we now face and how best to construct an
intelligence apparatus to meet those challenges. He understands that
while collecting, analyzing, and disseminating good intelligence are
not only requirements of a sound foreign policy and a secure homeland,
they are key elements. Most important, these are processes in dire need
of repair. The Ambassador is the right choice at the right time to take
on these challenges.
As we continue our war on terror against those who would do us harm,
our intelligence community must also work to stem the proliferation and
prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction, maintain a watchful eye
on global competitors and adversaries, be alert to emerging threats,
and provide guidance to policymakers on how best to positively
influence global change. Most importantly, they must be able to provide
policymakers with timely, accurate, and authoritative intelligence to
manage, instead of reacting to looming threats. In short, the
Ambassador has his work cut out for him.
He will have to invigorate human intelligence capabilities. Our spies
and agents must not only collect better intelligence, they must work to
penetrate the governments of rogue states, terrorist and insurgent
organizations, and closed societies where some of the most devious
plots to attack America and its people and interests, as well as our
allies, are hatched. We know we have fallen short in our human
intelligence--or HUMINT--capabilities leading up to the conflicts in
Afghanistan and Iraq. We are going to have to correct that and we look
for the DNI's leadership to do that.
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As DNI, the Ambassador will have to work diligently to ensure that
signals intelligence and other technical collection means are
continuously updated, expanded, and modified to not only provide
strategic intelligence but also actionable information for our war
fighters--something in which I am personally most interested.
Our intelligence community is home to some of the world's finest
minds which have averted disaster and provided the highest quality
information to consumers from the President down to the privates on the
front line. However, inferential analysis and ``group think'' are
practices against which the DNI must guard. The DNI must ensure that
rigorously competitive analysis models and improved analytics
tradecraft be implemented.
The problem of inaccurate information sharing amongst agencies has
been a recurring theme during the review of the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence of our recent intelligence failures leading to 9/11 and
U.S. assessments of Iraq WMD programs. We have seen, unfortunately,
even since 9/11, far too recent incidents where agencies working on
common problems did not share that information and those sources. In
this day, that is totally unacceptable. The DNI will not only face the
challenge of ensuring that information is passed up and down the chain
of command, but that colleagues working for different agencies within
the intelligence community can and do regularly share and exchange
information and ideas.
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, under the wise,
compassionate guidance of Chairman Roberts, has espoused the idea of
not merely information sharing but of information access. It is a
difficult task. Sensitive information must be protected from
disclosure, and too often protecting it from disclosure means not
sharing it with people who are working on the same project.
Nonetheless, the Ambassador has assured me that an analyst with a need
to know will have access to the information, regardless of who collects
it and who is working on it.
In the end, no matter what means is used to collect intelligence, it
is the fine, brave, and dedicated men and women of the intelligence
community who will make it work on any given day on the ground. It will
be not only a responsibility but a duty of the DNI to ensure that these
men and women receive the proper education and training to discharge
their duties. While substantive expertise and technical prowess are
essential, leadership and management training, along with mentorship
programs are key elements that will ensure that we attract, as well as
retain, the talented, motivated, and dedicated personnel we need.
The men and women of the intelligence community are our first
tripwire to help stave off disaster. They can advise us on prudent
courses of action to advance our national security interests. They
willingly take great risks and make great sacrifices daily.
Accordingly, it is the solemn obligation of the DNI to ensure their
ranks continue to be filled with competent visionaries, managers, and
innovators who are willing to lead and care for them.
Over the years, this body has seen and even drafted recommendations
to establish a DNI and/or a more accountable and powerful chief of our
intelligence community. While the establishment of a DNI is historic,
it was not established to the degree of budgetary and other powers that
I, along with several of my colleagues, would have liked and thought
would be very necessary. So the Ambassador will face challenges as he
asserts his authority over the 15 intelligence agencies he will
supervise. I hope he will use the implied powers of this position and
the positive enforcement and support of the President to make sure the
work that needs to be done is done and the DNI will have the power
that, unfortunately, he was not given in the legislation but we believe
he must exercise.
Reflecting on the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, and the WMD
Commission, as well as many pre-9/11 studies, and the work that has
gone on in the Select Committee on Intelligence, I fully endorse and
call on my colleagues to support Ambassador Negroponte as he
establishes these powers to make sure our homeland is protected and our
policymakers and warfighters on the ground are well informed.
Having met with Ambassador Negroponte at length and being well aware
of his qualifications, I am confident he will not only meet these high
standards but will set a fine precedent for all succeeding DNIs to
follow.
I ask my colleagues to act quickly to confirm Ambassador Negroponte
to lead our intelligence community so he may begin in earnest to make
the difficult changes we believe are sorely needed.
I thank the Chair, I thank the managers of this nomination, and I
urge prompt confirmation.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, as a member of the Intelligence
Committee, I wish to make a few comments both about Ambassador John
Negroponte and also LTG Michael Hayden. He is soon to be General
Hayden, I understand.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Will the Senator allow me to yield to her such time
as she may desire?
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I certainly will. I thank the Senator from West
Virginia.
I know General Hayden will be a four-star general very shortly. I
think that is very good news. So we will have the first Director and
Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.
I believe these are both excellent nominees. They will provide strong
new overall management and leadership to the intelligence community as
it finally adapts to post-Cold War realities.
Ambassador Negroponte has served with distinction, both in Washington
and around the globe. He served as United States Ambassador to four
nations and to the United Nations. As Deputy National Security Adviser,
Ambassador Negroponte was intimately involved in the formation and use
of intelligence. He is well suited to overseeing the collection of
vital intelligence needed for the United States to protect itself.
Ambassador Negroponte comes to this new position without strong ties or
bias to any specific intelligence agency. That is an enormous strength,
and I believe he will be an honest broker and manager for the
community. He has pledged that he will be a neutral and apolitical
provider of intelligence to Government policymakers.
Although General Hayden's nomination is not before us at this time, I
wish to say I hold him in the highest regard. He is a skilled manager
and an expert in the workings of our Nation's intelligence apparatus.
General Hayden led a remarkable turnaround of an enormously complex and
technical agency, the National Security Agency. He was first made
Director of the NSA under President Clinton and has had his tour
extended three times by President Bush. That is a true testament to his
leadership. He has proven his ability to establish a skilled and
dedicated workforce. In short, General Hayden is a strong choice to be
the day-to-day manager of the intelligence community.
Both men have the strength, the vision, and the determination that is
necessary to be successful in their new positions.
As my colleagues know, I introduced legislation to create a DNI in
the 107th Congress and again in the 108th Congress. So I was pleased to
see that with the support of the 9/11 Commission and the chairs and
ranking members of the Intelligence and Governmental Affairs
Committees, this position was finally established.
As Director and Deputy Director of National Intelligence, these
appointees face daunting challenges. The 15 intelligence agencies are a
community in name only. The fiefdoms and turf battles--the stovepipes--
between agencies may have lessened since September 11, but they
continue to hinder our intelligence operations.
Our technical means for collecting intelligence must be adapted to
this new nonstate terrorist world and its challenges. The acquisition
and development of new intelligence systems need better management.
The demands for better human intelligence are well documented by
reports, including the Congressional Joint Inquiry, our Intelligence
Committee's Iraq study, the 9/11 Commission, and the President's own
WMD Commission. Each of these reports
[[Page S4057]]
spells out, in stark terms, the organizational, the leadership, and the
capability challenges that await Director Negroponte and General
Hayden.
The U.S. intelligence estimates of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction
were, as the WMD Commission stated, ``dead wrong'' before the war.
There was a lack of solid intelligence, made worse by fundamental and
inexcusable lapses in tradecraft and judgment. The systematic failings
will take sustained leadership and vigorous oversight to correct.
Our intelligence capabilities in other crucial areas--Iran and North
Korea among them--are still inadequate and unacceptable. As the war and
postwar operations in Iraq show dramatically and tragically, we cannot
govern effectively and cannot make informed decisions without timely
and accurate intelligence. We cannot afford to fail again. The stakes
are very large, indeed.
Thankfully, the recent Commission and Senate reports have also made
important recommendations. Both Ambassador Negroponte and General
Hayden have expressed willingness to make important changes. They will
take steps to integrate and bolster intelligence collection and to end
``group think'' and untested assumptions. They will use red teams and
alternative analysis when intelligence conflicts. This was a
substantial lacking that led to the wrong judgments made in the Iraq
National Intelligence Estimate that so many of us relied upon to make
our judgment on how to vote to authorize the President with use of
force in Iraq.
The Director also has the authority to put in place a management team
and implement changes, including new mission managers and new centers,
to focus attention on the most pressing problems.
I believe strongly it is going to take a strong and authoritative
Director of National Intelligence to put our intelligence community
back on the right track. Equally important, it will take forthright and
impeccably objective leaders to restore the credibility both to the
American people and to the world that was destroyed by the assessments
of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.
The legislation that created the DNI last year, the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, spells out the framework for a
strong DNI, but it did not fill in the details. The authorities and
responsibilities that should have been made clear in law, I believe,
will have to be instead established in practice. I have discussed
privately and through the confirmation hearing process with Ambassador
Negroponte the need for him to assert authority by taking bold action
to lead and manage the intelligence community, and I will support him
in doing so.
I have confidence the new Director shares this vision and will take
the necessary steps immediately after taking office. General Hayden,
with his experience in fighting these battles as Director of NSA, will
be a key adviser and ally in fulfilling this charge.
The men and women who work for the 15 intelligence agencies are
skilled and dedicated, but they need innovative, new tools and ways of
doing business to meet our future strategic intelligence needs. I am
confident that Director Negroponte and Deputy Director Hayden will work
to provide these needs.
I thank the President for forwarding such skilled, nonpartisan
nominees, and I wholeheartedly support their confirmation.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I am delighted to yield 10 minutes to the
distinguished chairman of the Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs Committee whose unflagging, untiring, persevering efforts,
along with her coauthor, Senator Lieberman, led to passage of the
Intelligence Reform Act that has returned us to this whole process
where we have Ambassador Negroponte and General Hayden, an outstanding
team, not only to reform but to lead the intelligence community.
I thank the Senator for her leadership and her efforts. She
persevered, and she was successful.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, first, I thank the distinguished chairman
of the Senate Intelligence Committee and his extraordinary ranking
member for all their work to improve the quality of the intelligence
upon which our policymakers, our men and women who are on the front
lines, and all of us rely.
Last July, the Senate leaders assigned the Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee the task of developing legislation to
implement the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. The committee I
am privileged to chair devoted more than 5 months to this important and
complex issue that is so crucial to the safety and well-being of the
American people. We successfully accomplished our assignment with the
enactment of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004, which the President signed into law in December.
During the committee's inquiry into how to fix the flaws in our
Nation's intelligence capability that permitted so many dots to go
unconnected for so long, one remedy emerged as being among the very
highest priorities. Our intelligence community--15 disparate agencies
and entities, each with its own expertise and experience--clearly
needed one leader. The role of this leader has often been described as
that of a CEO in business, a person with the ultimate authority over
the operation and with the ultimate accountability for results. An even
more succinct description was offered by former Secretary of State
Powell at one of our committee's many hearings. He said what the
intelligence community really needed was an empowered quarterback.
The new law creates the Director of National Intelligence as that
empowered quarterback, with significant authority to manage the
intelligence community and to transform it into, to use President
Bush's term, a single unified enterprise.
I believe John Negroponte is the right person, the right leader to be
that CEO, that empowered quarterback.
Ambassador Negroponte is an accomplished diplomat, which is a vital
credential in the international war against terrorism. Having served
very recently as our Ambassador in Iraq, he knows firsthand how
important the intelligence provided is. He has been an intelligence
consumer. Throughout his distinguished and varied career in service to
our country, he has demonstrated strong, decisive leadership skills.
These skills will be invaluable in exercising the Director of National
Intelligence authorities and in carrying out the intelligence community
transformation called for in our legislation.
The Ambassador's extensive experience in national security and
foreign relations is a solid foundation for the weighty
responsibilities he will have in this critical position. As the first
DNI, Ambassador Negroponte will not only serve a critical role
immediately, he will also establish the relationships and set the
precedent for future DNIs. Thus, when I met with the Ambassador, I
encouraged him to aggressively use the authorities we worked so hard to
secure in the intelligence reform bill. One of those key authorities
concerns the DNI's responsibility for determining the budget for the
national intelligence program. He also will have significant authority
to execute that budget and to transfer funds, if needed, to meet
emerging threats and the greatest priorities.
Today, at a hearing before the Armed Services Committee on the
nomination of General Hayden to be the No. 2 person to the DNI, I
raised the issue with General Hayden about the need to aggressively
exercise that budget authority. The law is very clear on this point,
but already we have seen some signs from the Defense Department of a
potential challenge to the new DNI in exercising that authority.
I think it should be very clear, through the legislative history and
in our conversations today, that the DNI has a direct relationship to
the heads of the National Security Agency and the other intelligence
agencies that are housed within the Pentagon but serve not only the
Department of Defense but all intelligence consumers. I was pleased to
hear General Hayden's understanding of the extent of that authority.
[[Page S4058]]
Ambassador Negroponte will be the first intelligence CEO to set the
community's budget, to establish community-wide intelligence gathering
and analytical priorities, and to employ financial, technological, and
human resources where and when they are most needed, or, as Secretary
Powell might have put it, he will be calling the plays. This is an
unprecedented challenge and unprecedented authority, and I am convinced
John Negroponte will meet this challenge in an exemplary manner. I am
convinced he understands the need to exercise that authority to the
full extent of the law.
Ambassador Negroponte will provide our intelligence community with
accomplished, experienced, dedicated, and needed leadership. I
wholeheartedly urge my colleagues to approve this important nomination
without any delay. Again, I commend the chairman and the ranking member
for bringing this nominee so quickly to the Senate floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Martinez). The Senator from Oregon.
Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, it is not easy for a member of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence to oppose Ambassador Negroponte's
nomination on the floor of this Senate. I am well aware that many do
not share the concerns, and the views I will express this afternoon
have not been arrived at casually.
The Ambassador is the consummate diplomat, a dedicated public
servant, a well-liked person who is popular with Members of the Senate
of both political parties. He has been confirmed by the Senate for a
variety of posts. I have voted twice for those confirmations, but I am
not convinced that Ambassador Negroponte is the right man for this job.
I have reached this judgment based on my strong belief that a
prerequisite for this position should be a willingness to be direct and
forthcoming with policymakers even when the truth is difficult.
Unfortunately, directness was nowhere in sight in the Ambassador's
responses at his confirmation hearing last week.
At that hearing, the Ambassador was not even as direct and
forthcoming in discussing controversial matters as he has been in the
past. For example, at the hearing I discussed with the Ambassador his
service in Honduras. I made it clear at the outset that I understand it
makes no sense to relitigate a war that took place in Central America
more than 20 years ago. In spite of the lengthy news accounts printed
that morning, the morning of his confirmation hearing, providing new
information documenting the Ambassador's continued backing of the
Contras after the House had voted to halt U.S. support, I chose not to
focus on those issues. I raised the Honduras issue last week and return
to it this afternoon because I believe the record of the Ambassador's
service there is particularly telling in terms of his judgment and his
willingness to confront difficult facts, which I believe are two key
requirements for the Director of National Intelligence.
For example, I find it especially troubling that the Ambassador's
perception of the human rights situation in Honduras differs so
dramatically from that expressed by the Central Intelligence Agency,
the InterAmerican Court, the Honduras Human Rights Commission, and
others. The Central Intelligence Agency released a report entitled
``Selected Issues Relating to CIA Activities in Honduras in the 1980s''
which found:
Honduran military committed hundreds of human rights abuses
since 1980, many of which were politically motivated and
officially sanctioned.
The CIA report linked the Honduran military personnel to death squad
activities.
Mr. Negroponte, on the other hand, said in a September 12, 1982,
letter that was printed in the New York Times Magazine that:
Honduras's increasingly professional armed forces are
dedicated to defending the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the country, and they are publicly committed to
civilian constitutional rule.
The InterAmerican Court for Human Rights heard cases concerning human
rights abuses in Honduras. In 1989, the Court found:
A practice of disappearances carried out or tolerated by
Honduran officials existed between 1981 and 1984; and
The Government of Honduras failed to guarantee the human
rights affected by that practice.
In an October 23, 1982, letter printed in the Economist, Ambassador
Negroponte wrote:
Honduras's increasingly professional armed forces are fully
supportive of this country's constitutional system.
The Honduran Human Rights Commissioner released a report on forced
disappearances that occurred in Honduras during Ambassador Negroponte's
tenure. The report states:
[t]here existed within the Armed Forces a deliberate policy
of kidnapping and forcibly disappearing persons.
Yet the introductory passage of the 1983 State Department Country
Report issued while Mr. Negroponte was Ambassador stated:
The Honduran military, which ruled the country for almost
20 years before 1982, supports the present civilian
government and is publicly committed to national and local
elections, which are scheduled in 1985, as well as the
observance of human rights.
The fact is, when you read what the Ambassador has said about
Honduras, and what the CIA and others have said about the same time
period, it is as if John Negroponte was an ambassador to a different
country.
Given these sharp differences, I asked the Ambassador last week to
reconcile this very large gap between what he saw and what others
reported. I expected an answer that would have at least acknowledged
these very substantial differences and indicated that in hindsight the
Ambassador would have been more outspoken about human rights practices.
Instead, the Ambassador tried to dismiss the issue altogether by
simply saying the differences were not so great, something I thought
was pretty hard to fathom, given the accounts I had provided to him.
The fact is, in trying to brush off this issue of Honduras, the
Ambassador actually showed less candor last week than he has in the
past. For instance, at his 2003 hearing before the Foreign Relations
Committee when he was being considered for Ambassador to the United
Nations, Mr. Negroponte stated the following about Honduran human
rights abuses:
Maybe it was a mixed picture, Senator. I am more than
willing to acknowledge that.
At the same hearing he said:
Could I have been more vocal? Well, you know, in
retrospect, perhaps I could have been.
So you have to ask, as I have done, Why would the Ambassador be less
direct last week than he had been previously? Certainly there was no
national security reason for him to duck questions about events that
are decades old. Perhaps the newspaper articles that morning made him
fear Congress would get into issues he might find uncomfortable. That
is certainly understandable, but it is absolutely unacceptable for a
nominee tapped to head our Nation's intelligence community at a time
when directness and forthrightness is more important than ever before.
Throughout his confirmation hearing, on issue after issue, the
Ambassador ducked and avoided giving anything resembling a
straightforward answer.
I asked the Ambassador whether he foresaw his office involving itself
in decisions relating to the implementation of the PATRIOT Act's
surveillance powers, and in particular whether his office might weigh
in on whether the Federal Bureau of Investigation should seek a FISC
warrant.
His answer?
Senator, I am not entirely certain what my authorities
would be under FISC.
I asked the Ambassador whether he would be willing to take a fresh
look at the United States rendition policy, possibly the most
controversial weapon being used in fighting terrorism today. Rendition
involves sending a suspected terrorist from one country to another
without court proceedings. Republican and Democratic administrations
have used renditions in the past, but their use has increased
significantly since 9/11, and the policy has certainly changed.
Previously, most suspects were rendered to the United States. Now it
works the opposite way. More and more often the United States is
rendering suspects to foreign countries. News reports indicate that
suspects are frequently being rendered to countries known to torture
suspected terrorists, such as Syria, Egypt, Uzbekistan, and Saudi
Arabia. While the United States gets assurances from foreign
governments they will not use torture, U.S.
[[Page S4059]]
officials have little control over the situation once a suspect is in
the hands of the foreign country.
Rendition is the practice used to address a very difficult dilemma.
America may lack the evidence to bring a suspected terrorist into
court; there is some proof of wrongdoing, but not enough for a court of
law. If the suspect is not an American citizen, it is possible to send
them elsewhere to be dealt with, but that can be a dicey prospect.
Renditions get suspects off the streets, something which makes
Americans safer. But the tactic has raised serious concerns for many of
our citizens and for many people in other countries as well. I have
heard those concerns, but I also recognize that renditions can serve a
legitimate and valuable purpose. It is a question of how this policy is
carried out. Our country needs to have a frank and candid and direct
discussion about this policy of rendition. But, before that can happen,
there needs to be some answers to some tough questions:
Have any suspects been rendered based on faulty intelligence and, if
so, what amount of intelligence should be necessary before a rendition
takes place?
Are there certain countries to which the United States should not
render suspects?
Are the assurances the United States gets in the rendition area
sufficient with regard to the use of torture?
Does the United States need to retain more control of suspects it
renders, especially to countries that have weak human rights records?
How good is the intelligence the United States is getting from
rendered suspects?
What is the effect of a rendition policy on America's diplomatic
relations with other countries?
These are some of the important questions that need to be answered.
So in an effort to examine Ambassador Negroponte's openness and to try
to determine his judgment in a difficult area such as this, I asked the
Ambassador whether he would be willing to take a fresh look at our
rendition policy; not a point-by-point description of what he would do,
but simply would he be willing to take a fresh look, a new inspection
of this country's approach in rendition.
The Los Angeles Times summed up the Ambassador's response to my
question about rendition with four words. They said: ``Negroponte
avoided the question.''
The Ambassador, I would point out, ducked other important questions
asked by members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. For
example, our colleague from Michigan, Senator Levin, asked the
Ambassador to explain what action he would take if the Ambassador
concluded policymakers were making public statements that differed from
the classified intelligence. There was no direct answer to that
important question asked by Senator Levin.
Senator Feinstein sought detailed information on how, with regard to
countries such as Iran and North Korea, the Ambassador intended to
assure the United States developed much needed credible intelligence.
Ambassador Negroponte responded:
Well, Senator, the law prescribes a number of approaches to
this.
Then I asked the Ambassador about the issue of overclassification of
material in the area of national security. This is an issue that has
concerned many in the Senate, of both political parties. I have been
interested in this matter for some time.
I was, frankly, flabbergasted when
9/11 Commissioner Tom Kean, who did such a superb job in his work, with
Lee Hamilton, former Member of the other body--Tom Kean said 75 percent
of everything he saw when he chaired the
9/11 Commission that was classified should not have been classified.
This is what Tom Kean said in the extraordinarily important inquiry he
conducted.
The Central Intelligence Agency initially blacked out over 50 percent
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report on Iraq's WMD
programs and links to terrorist groups.
I will tell colleagues I thought Chairman Roberts and Senator
Rockefeller did a superb job in guiding our committee to a unanimous
judgment with respect to Iraq and that important report. But if the CIA
had had its way, page after page after page would have been blacked
out.
The National Archives Information Security Office reported 14.2
million classification actions in 2003, twice the number recorded 10
years earlier. The agencies are becoming more creative in terms of how
they overclassify. In addition to the traditional ``limited official
use,'' ``secret'' and ``top secret,'' some agencies now have
``sensitive security information,'' ``sensitive Homeland Security
information,'' ``sensitive but unclassified'' and ``for official use
only'' classifications, as well.
Secrecy has become so pervasive it makes you wonder whether facts are
being classified for legitimate reasons or to protect the individuals
and agencies involved.
As I mentioned, this has been a bipartisan concern. I am particularly
grateful for the work Senator Lott has been willing to do with me. We
took some modest steps in the intelligence reform bill to open this
process and try to bring some balance back into the area of
classification. But given this history, given the huge explosion in
terms of overclassification of Government documents, I was interested
in what the Ambassador had to say with respect to this.
When I first asked, he said:
Senator, I don't know about classification or
overclassification.
But then he went on to make the mind-boggling claim that ``Certainly
the trend in my lifetime has been to reduce levels of classification
wherever possible. And I've seen that happen before my own eyes.''
Troubling as that answer was and the nonanswers that I received to
the other important questions I asked with respect to the PATRIOT Act
and relating to rendition and other topics, as troubling as what I was
told and wasn't told, is it is not only what the Director of National
Intelligence will know that is so important but what he is willing to
say that is vital.
In spite of the Ambassador's responses to these questions, I have no
question in my mind of Ambassador Negroponte's ability to master the
facts. What I am not confident of is his steadfast commitment to
speaking those facts to ears that do not want to hear them. And history
tells us the consequences of an inability or an unwillingness to speak
truth to power can be disastrous.
This country saw what happened in the Bay of Pigs, an unsuccessful
attempt by United States-backed Cuban exiles to overthrow the
Government of the Cuban dictator Fidel Castro. It is a classic example
of what can happen when America's intelligence community is unwilling
or unable to be candid. In his review of the Bay of Pigs invasion
release to the public in 1998, CIA Inspector General Lyman Kirkpatrick
identified numerous failures. These include:
[The f]ailure to subject the president, especially in its
latter frenzied stages, to a cold and objective appraisal by
the best operating talent available, particularly by those
not involved in the operation, such as the Chief of
Operations and the chiefs of the Senior Staffs;
[The f]ailure to advise the president, at an appropriate
time, that success has become dubious and to recommend the
operation be, therefore, canceled and that the problem of
unseating Castro be restudied;
The failure to maintain the covert nature of the project--
``[f]or more than three months before the invasion the
American press was reporting, often with some accuracy, on
the recruiting and training of Cubans. Such massive
preparations could only be laid to the U.S. The agency's name
was freely linked with these activities. Plausible denial was
a pathetic illusion.''
This is what the inspector general said. This is not what a partisan
said. Yet the CIA unrealistically plowed ahead, unwilling or unable to
face the reality of the situation that the operation was doomed to
fail, and as a result the CIA was humiliated, many died, our prestige
was damaged.
Throughout the entire time our country was in Vietnam the
intelligence community also failed to be forthright and was plagued by
overoptimism. One example was particularly worth noting.
In 1963, the Board of National Estimate's draft Nation Intelligence
Estimate concluded that ``The struggle in South Vietnam at best will be
protracted and costly [because] very great weaknesses remain and will
be difficult to surmount.''
Unhappy with the pessimistic conclusion, the Director of Central
Intelligence John McCone rejected the draft
[[Page S4060]]
and instructed the board to seek the views of senior policymakers in
revising the Nation's Intelligence Estimate.
So the final version of the 1963 stated:
We believe that Communist progress has been blunted and
that the situation is improving . . .
As those who put together the Pentagon papers later observed:
The intelligence and reporting problems occurring during
this period cannot be explained away . . . In retrospect [the
estimators] were not only wrong, but more importantly, they
were influential. As a result, a generation paid the price
for the unwillingness or the inability of the intelligence
community's inability to be forthright.
Now our country deals with those consequences.
Many in the Senate will remember George Tenet told the President of
the United States that the weapons of mass destruction case against
Iraq was a ``slam dunk.'' Now America knows what George Tenet knew and
what he was unwilling or unable to tell the President of the United
States, that it wasn't a slam dunk at all.
The Niger yellowcake, the high-strength aluminum, the mobile weapons
lab, the aerial vehicles, the intelligence provided by Curveball and
the Iraqi National Congress witnesses, all of this intelligence was
questionable and was being questioned by at least some members of the
intelligence community.
However, George Tenet was not direct. He was not forthcoming. He told
the President of the United States what the President wanted to hear.
Whether he was unwilling or unable to be straight with the President, I
cannot possibly determine. What I do know is that as a member of the
Select Committee on Intelligence I want to do everything I can. I know
every Member of the Senate wants to make sure these mistakes are not
repeated. The stakes are simply too high.
The Intelligence Reorganization Act gave the Director of National
Intelligence a whole lot of responsibility but very little enforcement
power. As the Director works to make 15 intelligence agencies pull
together, his credibility will be his currency. Critical to his success
will be the understanding of all concerned that this person is going to
be direct, that the person will be forthcoming, that the person will
make sure that no matter who the truth hurts, no matter what
policymakers think, they are going to get the facts.
Here is what I think the country needs. The United States needs a
Director of National Intelligence who is going to speak truth to power,
somebody who has, in Hamilton's words, the ``gumption'' to tell the
President and other senior policymakers what they don't want to hear.
The United States needs a Director of National Intelligence who has
the knowledge and the experience to step in and begin fixing the
problems facing the intelligence sector immediately.
The United States needs a Director of National Intelligence who will
break down existing walls inhibiting analysts throughout the
intelligence community and, when appropriate, officials and citizens
outside that realm from getting access to the information they need to
keep Americans safe. The United States needs a Director of National
Intelligence willing to, when necessary, go head to head with the
agencies under his control, especially the Department of Defense. If
the Director lets them push him around, he is doomed.
The United States needs a Director of National Intelligence to take
control over the intelligence budget. Before Congress created the
position, the intelligence community lacked a leader willing to make
tough budget priority and tradeoff decisions. Each agency asked for
funds. It was, in effect, a matter of passing the request along. This
has to stop. There are not limitless resources. A strategic view, not a
parochial lens, ought to be guiding budget decisions.
The United States needs a Director of National Intelligence to shape
the intelligence agencies he oversees into a true community because, at
this point, the phrase ``intelligence community'' is pretty much a
misnomer. While coordination and cooperation have improved, the
individual intelligence agencies persist in maintaining their own
culture and collection practices. As the military services have learned
to fight jointly, our intelligence collection agencies need to learn
how to act together to gather critical information our policymakers and
warfighters need to protect our country.
The United States needs a Director of National Intelligence who
recognizes he cannot do this alone. This position is new and its
authority, while substantial, is unclear. His fights with the
administration over matters of significant national policy need not,
and should not, always be kept quiet. If the Director of National
Intelligence is to succeed, he will need to look to allies in the
executive branch and here in the Congress to help.
While Ambassador Negroponte is surely a skilled diplomat and has many
allies in the Senate, Senators of both parties I admire greatly, I am
not confident the administration's nominee will meet these
expectations.
For that reason, I will be voting no on the nomination of Ambassador
John Negroponte to be Director of National Intelligence.
Mr. President, I want to wrap up with one additional point. I am
pleased to be in strong support of General Hayden, who will, when the
nominee is confirmed, be the deputy. I thought General Hayden's
directness and openness at his confirmation hearing was particularly
welcome.
For example, I asked him, on the matter of privacy rights, which is
pretty important, given his past background at the NSA, how he would
handle that issue. I think there was a sense it is possible to fight
terrorism ferociously while still protecting civil liberties. General
Hayden, in contrast to what we heard at the earlier confirmation
hearing, was refreshingly direct in his responses, where he talked
about pushing right up to the line--I believe those were his exact
words--but being sensitive to civil liberties.
So I am pleased to be able to say, on the floor of the Senate, I am
looking forward to the support General Hayden will be receiving from
the Senate shortly. I expect Ambassador Negroponte and General Hayden
to be approved. My door will be open to both of them. As a member of
the Intelligence Committee, it is my hope that both of these
individuals will not hesitate to ask me and ask colleagues for help.
The safety of our country depends on the performance of these two
individuals in this key post.
Mr. President, with that, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, how much time remains on this side of
the aisle?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia has 32 minutes.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may
consume, which will be less than that.
Mr. President, I am going to use this opportunity to speak on an
unrelated issue, not entirely but somewhat, but one that is of critical
importance to the intelligence community and the American people.
Last week, I filed an amendment to the emergency supplemental
appropriations bill. Unfortunately, I was not able to bring the
amendment before the Senate because it was not germane under
postcloture rules. This amendment is important enough, however, that I
will take just a few minutes to explain it.
My amendment was, and is, simple and straightforward. It expresses
the sense of the Senate. It is not directive. It expresses the sense of
the Senate that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence should
conduct an investigation into matters related to the collection of
intelligence through the detention, interrogation, and rendition of
prisoners. That is its purpose.
The amendment, as I indicated, does not direct the committee to
undertake this much needed and long overdue congressional review.
Rather, it is a statement by the Senate that the committee should carry
out its oversight duties and carefully, thoroughly, and constructively
evaluate the interrogation practices of the U.S. Intelligence
Community.
A year has passed since the appearance of photographs graphically
portraying the abuse of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison. Since
then, we have
[[Page S4061]]
seen a steady stream of accusations relating to the way U.S. military
and intelligence agencies treat individuals in their custody.
Allegations of mistreatment have surfaced wherever the United States
holds prisoners overseas--across Iraq, in Afghanistan, and at
Guantanamo Bay.
Troubling new revelations have become almost a daily occurrence--
literally a daily occurrence--with a disturbing number of these
incidents resulting in prisoner deaths.
At least 26 prisoners have died in American custody. The disturbing
charge has been leveled against the United States that we are exporting
torture through rendition practices that lack accountability.
Who can honestly say these events and allegations are not serious
enough to warrant an Intelligence Committee investigation?
The collection of intelligence through interrogation and rendition is
an extremely important part of our counterterrorism effort and one of
our most important intelligence tools.
But this tool, as with all others, must be applied within the bounds
of our laws and our own moral framework. It must be subject to the same
scrutiny and congressional oversight as every other aspect of
intelligence collection. This, unfortunately, has not been the case.
Despite the critical importance of interrogation-derived intelligence
and the growing controversy surrounding detention, interrogation, and
rendition practices and policies, the Congress has largely ignored the
issue, holding few hearings that have provided only limited insight.
More disturbingly, in this Senator's judgment, the Senate
Intelligence Committee--the committee charged with overseeing
intelligence programs, and the only committee with the jurisdiction to
investigate all aspects of this issue--is, in this Senator's judgment,
sitting on the sidelines and effectively abdicating its oversight
responsibility to media investigative reporters who go at it very
aggressively and on a daily basis.
As the Intelligence Committee's vice chairman, I have been pushing,
for the past 3 months, for an investigation into the legal and
operational questions at the heart of the detention and interrogation
controversy.
My requests, and those of other committee members, have been
rebuffed, based upon the argument that we have been fully informed on
the particulars of our detention and interrogation program, and the
Intelligence Committee need only monitor these operations.
The point has also been made that the Intelligence Committee should
not undertake an investigation into these issues because the CIA
Inspector General is conducting his own investigation. I reject this
notion that the Senate should cede to the executive branch its
oversight responsibilities. Carrying out oversight is why the Senate
Intelligence Committee exists.
Effective congressional oversight is not achieved passively waiting
for and accepting the parameters of internal executive branch reviews.
We are separate in our responsibilities, executive and legislative.
While it is true that the CIA inspector general is investigating
specific allegations of abuse involving intelligence personnel, those
specific cases represent a small portion of what the Intelligence
Committee should be examining. Many fundamental legal and operational
issues are outside the inspector general's very limited focus and
deserve the Intelligence Committee's immediate attention.
We have a duty to not simply monitor but to actively inquire about
the conduct of congressionally funded activities--that is our job--
especially activities such as prisoner interrogation that can have life
or death implications. Down the road, if we don't set these rules
straight, that can come back to haunt our soldiers and their safety.
Up to this point, the Intelligence Committee oversight that I am
speaking of has been, in the judgment of this Senator, abdicated to the
press over the past year. Here is a sampling, which I will go through
quickly, of headlines from articles that have been published in recent
weeks: ``Interrogator Says U.S. Approved Handling of Detainee Who
Died''; ``White House Has Tightly Restricted Oversight of CIA
Detentions''; ``FBI Report Questions Guantanamo Tactics''; ``Questions
Are Left by C.I.A. Chief on the Use of Torture''; ``CIA's Assurances on
Transferred Subjects Doubted--Prisoners Say Countries Break No-Torture
Pledges''; ``Europeans Investigate CIA Role in Abductions''; ``Army
Details Scale of Abuse of Prisoners in an Afghan Jail''; ``Prisoners at
Abu Ghraib Said to Include Children''; ``Army, CIA Agreed on `Ghost'
Prisoners''; ``Lack of Oversight Led to the Abuse of Detainees,
Investigator Says''; ``Ex-CIA Lawyer Calls for Law on Rendition'';
``CIA Avoids Scrutiny of Detainee Treatment''; ``Files Show New Abuse
Cases in Afghan and Iraqi Prisons''; ``CIA Is Seeking New Role on
Detainees''; ``FBI Agents Allege Abuse of Detainees at Guantanamo
Bay''; ``CIA Was Wary of U.S. Interrogation Methods in Iraq.''
I think the Presiding Officer gets the drift.
I ask my colleagues to consider the finding made by General Fay in
his recent report on the abuses at Abu Ghraib. General Fay found that
CIA practices ``led to a loss of accountability, abuse . . . and the
unhealthy mystique that further poisoned the atmosphere at Abu
Ghraib.''
General Fay was unable to fully investigate the CIA's role at Abu
Ghraib and other prisons. The Senate Intelligence Committee, however,
is not unable to do that. That is our job.
These and other reports highlight the need for the sort of strong
congressional oversight that in my judgment is now absent. There are
many legal and operational questions that we should be investigating to
ensure that this vitally important intelligence collection program is
not continually hampered by vague and confusing legal and operational
directives.
For example, on March 18, 2005, the Central Intelligence Agency
issued a statement that:
CIA policies on interrogation have always followed legal
guidance from the Department of Justice.
That may be so, but was that legal guidance supportable? A lengthy
legal opinion of the Department of Justice on interrogation practices,
which had been issued in secret in August 2002, was quickly repudiated
by the White House when it became public in June of 2004 and was
superseded by a public Justice Department legal opinion in December of
2004. As that episode indicates, secret law is an invitation to great
error.
The Intelligence Committee, which includes members of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, must conduct a complete examination of the legal
guidance that CIA and Defense Department interrogators have been given.
What supporting roles do the CIA and FBI play in the interrogation of
suspects at military-run institutions? And how are their activities
coordinated, if they are?
It has been publicly reported that the CIA requested that a number of
prisoners held in Iraq not be registered and be kept from international
inspection--so-called ghost detainees--and that FBI officials lodged
strenuous complaints about the mistreatment of prisoners held at
Guantanamo Bay. I cannot emphasize how strongly those FBI objections
were. These reports and others strongly suggest that different agencies
are operating by different sets of interrogation and detention rules,
which is a recipe for disaster.
The Congress should evaluate the general policy guidelines for which
it is appropriate to render a detainee to another country, and what
intelligence is gained from such practice.
More specifically, we must examine the validity of assurances that
the United States is given when detainees are rendered to other
countries that they will not be tortured. The Congress should
undertake, with the intelligence community, case studies of
interrogations, including the methods used and, importantly, the
reliability of the information obtained. As with other intelligence
tools, we should consider on the basis of facts, rather than surmise,
what works, what does not work, to obtain reliable information that
actually contributes to our national security. The Congress should
examine plans for the long-term detention or prosecution of persons
detained or rendered for interrogation purposes.
Should the United States, for example, hold detainees without trial
for years or decades to come? Is it acceptable to do that for the
reason that the
[[Page S4062]]
detainees' acknowledgment of their actions came during interrogations
that would neither meet the standards of a U.S. court or U.S. military
commission?
The reality may be that if Congress continues to default in its
oversight and legislative responsibilities, that the courts, in fact,
themselves will end up filling that vacuum. The threat of terrorism is
going to be with us for many years, if not decades. The intelligence we
gain through interrogations will be crucial in protecting Americans
themselves against future attacks. If we are to optimize those
counterterrorism efforts, we need to have a plan, not an ad hoc policy,
for how to deal with people in our custody.
America is not a nation that uses or condones torture. We are party
to international agreements that prohibit these acts, and we demand
humane treatment for our citizens when they are arrested abroad and for
our soldiers when they are captured on the battlefield. We must uphold
the same high standards for individuals in our custody or we will
rightly be branded as hypocrites, and we will put our soldiers and our
citizens in danger. I cannot emphasize that enough.
Next year will mark the 30th anniversary of the Senate Intelligence
Committee. The committee was created in the crucible of an extensive
bipartisan investigation in 1975, led by Senators Frank Church and John
Tower, into allegations of abuse by U.S. intelligence agencies. One
conclusion, as described by Howard Baker--somebody I admire
enormously--was that the congressional oversight system had provided
``infrequent and ineffectual review'' and that ``many of the abuses
revealed might have been prevented had Congress been doing its job.''
Accordingly, the resolution establishing the Intelligence Committee
charged it to ``provide vigilant legislative oversight over the
intelligence activities of the United States to assure that such
activities are in conformity with the Constitution and the laws of the
United States.''
It is time for the Senate Intelligence Committee to carry out the
vigilant legislative oversight that is our duty and which a number are
calling for us to do. We should launch a comprehensive and constructive
investigation into the detention, interrogation, and rendition
practices of the intelligence community because it is long overdue.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the
Congressional Record several editorials that have appeared around the
country calling for congressional action. They include editorials from
many newspapers, including the Washington Times and newspapers from
Tennessee, Oregon, Florida, Maryland, New York, and California.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the St. Petersburg Times, Feb. 17, 2005]
Investigate the CIA
The extensive use of ``extraordinary rendition,'' by which
the CIA moves terrorist suspects to undisclosed prisons
around the world for interrogation, has to be the agency's
worst kept secret. News reports abound of potentially dozens
of al-Qaida suspects held overseas by the CIA, incommunicado
and without charge or turned over to the security services of
other nations known for their abusive treatment of prisoners,
such as Egypt and Syria.
Congress has been inexcusably reluctant to investigate
these actions. The Republican leadership apparently has been
happy to let the CIA dirty its hands with extralegal
strategies in the nation's efforts to fight terrorism. But
thanks to some pushing by Sen. John D. Rockefeller IV, D-
W.Va., the ranking Democrat on the Senate Intelligence
Committee, Congress may begin to open its eyes. Rockefeller
has asked the committee to open a formal investigation into
the CIA's use of detention, interrogation and rendition.
Rockefeller told the New York Times that he felt the
committee would be ``derelict if we did not carry out our
oversight responsibilities.''
Until now, Congress has done little more than shrug as more
evidence has emerged of U.S. intelligence services engaging
in brutal interrogations. During the Senate confirmation
proceedings of Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, it became
clear that the CIA had solicited the Justice Department
memorandum giving legal cover to those who use aggressive
techniques against prisoners. The CIA wanted to protect its
agents from criminal liability. And the administration's view
remains that the CIA is not bound by the president's 2002
directive that prisoners in American custody be treated
humanely. Late last year, when some in Congress sought to
impose new limits on abusive interrogation tactics by the
CIA, the White House intervened and the those limits were
dropped.
Congress has willingly collaborated in this charade that
America is maintaining its moral authority in the world even
as it adopts the tactics of human rights abusers. But as
former Secretary of State Colin Powell and retired military
leaders have repeatedly warned, when America approves of the
use of torture it puts its own soldiers in danger of facing
the same brutality.
Rockefeller's call for an investigation seems to have some
momentum. Sen. Pat Roberts, R-Kan., the Intelligence
Committee's chairman, is open to the suggestion. This is
Congress' duty. The committee should demand a full accounting
of every detainee under the direct or indirect control of the
CIA, and it should demand to know precisely what techniques
have been used to elicit information. This has been allowed
to go on far too long.
____
[From the Sunday Oregonian, Mar. 6, 2005]
The Torture Business Lands In Portland
(By David Sarasohn)
It could make you wonder if congressmen are interested in
economic development.
Rep Earl Blumenauer, D-Ore., is actually asking Congress to
investigate a hometown company. Moreover, the company is in a
booming business, which will be profiled on ``60 Minutes''
tonight.
In fact, this worldwide business is so big, nobody even
knows how big it is--or how big it could get.
You'd think we'd want a piece of it.
But at the end of February, Blumenauer wrote leaders of the
International Relations Committee, ``I am simply appalled by
continued revelations in the media regarding the torture of
detainees in American custody, whether by CIA officials,
military personnel, or after being transferred to foreign
governments.
``The extensive reports of physical and mental abuse at
American detention facilities around the world, the evidence
of detainees being turned over to other countries to be
interrogated and tortured, and continued efforts by the Bush
administration to restrict legal and constitutional
protections from detainees form a compelling case that these
are not isolated incidents but administration policy.''
Moreover, Blumenauer wrote, ``I am additionally troubled by
the use of a Gulfstream V jet registered to a shadowy--and
possibly illegal--dummy front company, Bayard Foreign
Marketing LLC, in my hometown of Portland, Oregon. Press
reports have found no public record of the company's alleged
owner, nor have calls to their office been successful at
locating him. The evidence certainly points to a violation of
Oregon law in order to hide the true nature and breadth of
this extraordinary rendition program.''
Picky, picky, picky.
Here we have a Portland company involved in what is clearly
a growth industry--the United States shipping prisoners
secretly around the world to be tortured by countries that
lack the U.S. Constitution or scruples--and people insist on
looking at it as a human rights violation instead of an
economic development opportunity.
In November, the Sunday Times of London reported a flight
log for the Gulfstream showing more than 300 flights to
countries such as Libya and Uzbekistan--countries that not
only offer an expansive view of interrogation, but are
normally difficult to get to from Portland. It's not clear
if passage on the plane is ever round-trip.
At the time, the plane was owned by Premier Executive
Transport Services of Dedham, Mass., which the Boston Globe
found had the same non-existent corporate structure as Bayard
Foreign Marketing. ``Sightings of the plane,'' said the
Globe, ``. . . have been published in newspapers across the
globe and on the Internet.''
Tonight, ``60 Minutes'' profiles another plane in the same
business, a Boeing 737 that has made 600 flights since 9/11,
including 10 to Uzbekistan--where the British ambassador at
one point complained to his superiors and to U.S. authorities
about how the prisoners were being tortured, techniques
involving rape, suffocation and immersing limbs in boiling
liquid.
As one of the CIA agents who set up the program explains to
the show's reporter, ``It's finding someone else to do your
dirty work.''
Except that nobody around the world seems to be fooled.
When Blumenauer went to East Asia to inspect tsunami damage,
people everywhere--China, Thailand, Indonesia--wanted to talk
about what happened to those in U.S. custody. ``It just
happened repeatedly,'' he said Friday.
Last week, when the State Department issued its annual
report on human rights, countries from China to Turkey
responded that the United States had no standing to comment
on the issue. Noting the irony of the United States
condemning countries where it was shipping its prisoners,
William F. Schulz of Amnesty International suggested, ``The
State Department's carefully compiled record of countries'
abuses may perversely have been transformed into a Yellow
Pages for the outsourcing of torture.''
Congress, thinks Blumenauer, might at least want to ask
some questions.
[[Page S4063]]
``There is so much of what is happening that is not
accountable,'' he says. ``To suggest that there are thousands
of people caught up with this is no exaggeration.''
And Blumenauer is now even more interested, since he's
found the program is almost a constituent.
Torture, it seems, now has a Portland address.
____
[From the Times Union, Mar. 10, 2005]
Torture on the Wing
Most Americans would cringe at any suggestion that there
are parallels between the human rights abuses in Argentina
during the 1970s, and Central Intelligence Agency
interrogations of suspected terrorists today. But the
similarities are there, and that should shame the Bush
administration and Congress. An investigation is more than
warranted.
During the years when a military junta ruled Argentina,
suspected political opponents ``disappeared.'' They were
imprisoned by government forces and tortured. Many were
murdered, but some were returned to the streets to tell their
stories.
No one has suggested that the CIA interrogators have
systematically murdered captives, to be sure. Nor is there
any way to know if American citizens have been seized. But
the very secrecy of these operations, and the lack of
accountability, raise the possibility that such abuses can
occur.
What is known is distressing enough. Recent news accounts
have detailed how CIA agents or mercenaries--it's hard to
tell because the captors are masked--have been abducting
suspected terrorists, putting them aboard planes and flying
them to countries like Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and
Afghanistan, where they are interrogated and tortured.
The abductions aren't a new development, either. Indeed,
former President Clinton once advocated kidnapping Osama bin
Laden and turning him over to Saudi Arabia, where he would
face ``streamlined'' justice. But according to a New York
Times article printed in this newspaper Sunday, the
abductions have been stepped up markedly in response to the
terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. There is no requirement
that the CIA get prior approval from the Justice Department
or the White House to seize a suspect. And by sending
captives to foreign countries, there is no obligation to
afford the captives any rights under American law, including
the prohibition against torture.
Defenders of these operations claim that they are justified
because they have produced information that has saved
American lives by thwarting possible terrorist attacks.
Others argue that in a time of war, extreme measures are
often necessary. Given the urgency of breaking up terrorist
plots, they argue, there is little time to observe a long
legal process. Moreover, the suspects are most likely
foreigners or illegal immigrants, not citizens who are being
deprived of their right to due process.
The consequences of such abductions can't be so easily
dismissed, however. Without a system of checks and balances,
there is no way to know whether there was good reason to
detain someone. That point was driven home during an
interview with one detainee, who told the television news
program ``60 Minutes'' last Sunday of being abducted while on
vacation in Macedonia, shackled, put on a plane and flown to
the Middle East for interrogation. He was later released on
his own in Albania after, he claims, his captors acknowledged
they had confused his name with that of a terror suspect.
Then there's the matter of placing Americans living abroad
at risk of being abducted by terrorist organizations who hope
to use their hostages to bargain for their comrades' release.
Finaily, and hardly least, there is the damage to America's
image and values. At the least, Congress should demand some
system of accountability to prevent abuses. More than that,
it should investigate the claims that these operations have
indeed provided life-saving intelligence, or if they have
merely tarnished the image of a nation committed to the rule
of law.
____
[From the Fresno Bee, Mar. 14, 2005]
Glass Houses Human Rights Report Has One Glaring Omission--the United
States
As required by Congress, the State Department has issued
its annual report on human rights progress, or the lack of
it, in countries around the world.
Among those faulted are a number of U.S. allies, including
the provisional government in Iraq that is partly a U.S.
creature. As always, only one country was missing: the United
States.
That's not entirely self-serving. This country doesn't rate
itself because, as a State Department official put it, ``it
wouldn't have any credibility.'' Besides, he said, there's no
shortage of critics, including U.S.-based human rights
groups.
But this year's report comes at an especially awkward time.
There is continuing evidence of abuses in U.S.-run prisons in
Afghanistan, Iraq and at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba--the same kind
of abuses for which State's report rightfully faults other
governments. But there has not been the full, impartial probe
that's needed to give a fuller picture of what happened and
who, at whatever level, is responsible.
As long as the United States fails to fully investigate,
report and correct its own lapses, it allows abusive regimes
abroad to deflect criticism by asking: Who is the United
States to judge?
Indeed, Russia and China did just that following
publication of the State Department report.
It's a fair question, and part of the response should be a
thorough attempt to go beyond the focus on abuses by low-
level military and intelligence personnel. Too much is
already known to accept the facile explanation that the
accumulating scandal reflects only isolated ``rogue''
behavior.
And while there have been several investigations, and more
continue, all have been conducted by or for the Pentagon,
which is unlikely to point the finger of blame upward.
Whatever the full truth may be about where ultimate
culpability lies, an air of cover-up hovers over the process.
On Capitol Hill, Sen. Pat Roberts, the Republican chairman
of the Senate Intelligence Committee, has rejected a proposal
by the Democratic vice chairman, Sen. Jay Rockefeller, to
launch a broad probe into the role of U.S. intelligence
agencies in the detention, interrogation and ``rendition''--
transferring to the custody of foreign governments--of terror
suspects. This standoff suggests a partisan approach to a
vital national security matter.
What's at stake in the investigation of prisoner abuses is
the credibility of this country, which is likelier to be
restored through an independent, nonpartisan investigation
that lays out whatever facts it finds.
Perhaps there is no ``smoking gun'' to be found at the top.
But for as long as the process remains an essentially in-
house exercise, those annual State Department human rights
reports will continue to raise the question: Who is the
United States to judge?
____
[From the Baltimore Sun, Jan. 31, 2005]
American Scar; Permitting Torture Brands Us in the Worst Way
(By George Hunsinger)
When the Senate confirms Alberto R. Gonzales as U.S.
attorney general, the vote will be the beginning, not the
end, of public debate about our government's policy on
torture.
The Abu Ghraib scandal is only the most visible sign that
this policy is inconsistent. Officially, our government
opposes torture and advocates a universal standard for human
rights. Yet, at the same time, it has allowed ingenious new
interrogation methods to be developed that clearly violate
these standards. They include stress positions, sleep
deprivation, sexual humiliation and desecration of religious
objects. These practices, which should never be used, are no
less traumatic than the infliction of excruciating pain.
For religious people, torture is especially deplorable
because it sins against God and against humanity created in
God's image. It degrades everyone involved--planners,
perpetrators and victims.
More than 225 Christian, Jewish, Muslim and Sikh religious
leaders signed an open letter to Mr. Gonzales. They objected
to his role in developing a narrow definition of torture and
to his equally troubling assertion that some people are not
subject to the protections of international law. They
registered deep concern about our government's moral
foundations, urging support--in practice, not just in words--
for fundamental human rights.
Four steps must now be taken to clarify that our government
has truly abolished torture.
First, Congress must remove the false partition placed
between the military and intelligence services governing
extreme interrogation techniques tantamount to torture. The
Senate was right to pass, nearly unanimously, new
restrictions for the Pentagon, CIA and other intelligence
services. But congressional leaders in both houses later
buckled under White House pressure and scrapped the language
governing intelligence services.
Whether the military or intelligence services are
conducting practices tantamount to torture is of absolutely
no significance. Trying to differentiate between the two
perhaps eases the conscience of decision-makers, but it is a
distinction without a difference. It fails to insulate us
from the absolute evil that is torture.
Second, Congress must outlaw ``extraordinary rendition,'' a
euphemism for torture by proxy. It means that detainees are
secretly transferred to countries where torture is practiced
as a means of interrogation. Although made public only
through shocking cases, such as those of Maher Arar, who was
deported to Syria by the United States, and Mamdouh Habib, an
Australian citizen who was sent to Egypt before being held at
Guantanamo, it has become a mainstay counterterrorism tool.
Does it really need to be said that ``disappearing'' people
without any kind of due process is contrary to everything
America stands for, not to mention our laws and treaties? The
reasons for a detainee's arrest and his guilt or innocence
are irrelevant. No sound moral argument can be made that
enabling torture through rendition is permissible.
Third, Mr. Bush should make a clear statement that torture
is wrong in any form and under any circumstances. He should
state beyond a shadow of doubt that America will not be
complicit in its commission. Leadership from the president
would go a long way toward resolving the torture crisis.
[[Page S4064]]
Finally, America needs a special prosecutor. Our reputation
has been so badly damaged by Guantanamo, Bagram and Abu
Ghraib that no other remedy will do. The existing
investigations are not enough because they have not been
truly independent. Organizations such as the American Bar
Association, Amnesty International and the highly respected
International Commission of Jurists in Geneva have all
insisted that an independent investigation is imperative.
Nothing less is at stake in the torture crisis than the
soul of our nation. What does it profit us if we proclaim
high moral values but fail to reject torture? What does it
signify if torture is condemned in word but allowed in deed?
A nation that rewards those who permitted and promoted
torture is approaching spiritual death.
George Hunsinger is McCord professor of theology at
Princeton Theological Seminary and coordinator of Church
Folks for a Better America.
____
[From Chattanooga Times Free Press, Feb. 8, 2005]
Stories From the Inside
``During the whole time we were at Guantanamo,'' said
Shafiq Rasul, ``we were at a high level of fear. When we
first got there the level was sky-high. At the beginning we
were terrified that we might be killed at any minute. The
guards would say to us, `We could kill you at any time.' They
would say, `The world doesn't know you're here. Nobody knows
you're here. All they know is that you're missing, and we
could kill you and no one would know.' ''
The horror stories from the scandalous interrogation camp
that the United States is operating at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
are coming to light with increased frequency. At some point
the whole shameful tale of this exercise in extreme human
degradation will be told. For the time being we have to piece
together what we can from a variety of accounts that have
escaped the government's obsessively reinforced barriers of
secrecy.
We know that people were kept in cells that in some cases
were the equivalent of animal cages, and that some detainees,
disoriented and despairing, have been shackled like slaves
and left to soil themselves with their own urine and feces.
Detainees are frequently kicked, punched, beaten and sexually
humiliated. Extremely long periods of psychologically
damaging isolation are routine.
This is all being done in the name of fighting terror. But
the best evidence seems to show that many of the people
rounded up and dumped without formal charges into Guantanamo
had nothing to do with terror. They just happened to be
unfortunate enough to get caught in one of Uncle Sam's
depressingly indiscriminate sweeps. Which is what happened to
Shafiq Rasul, who was released from Guantanamo about a year
ago. His story is instructive, and has not been told widely
enough.
Rasul was one of three young men, all friends, from the
British town of Tipton who were among thousands of people
seized in Afghanistan in the aftermath of Sept. 11, 2001.
They had been there, he said, to distribute food and medical
supplies to impoverished Afghans.
The three were interviewed soon after their release by
Michael Ratner, president of the Center for Constitutional
Rights, which has been in the forefront of efforts to secure
legal representation for Guantanamo detainees.
Under extreme duress at Guantanamo, including hundreds of
hours of interrogation and long periods of isolation, the
three men confessed to having been in a terrorist training
camp in Afghanistan. They also said they were among a number
of men who could be seen in a videotape of Osama bin Laden.
The tape had been made in August 2000.
For the better part of two years, Rasul and his friends,
Asif Iqbal and Rhuhel Ahmed, had denied involvement in any
terror activity whatsoever. But Rasul said they eventually
succumbed to long months of physical and psychological abuse.
Rasul had been held in isolation for several weeks (his
second sustained period of isolation) when an interrogator
showed him the video of bin Laden. He said she told him:
``I've put detainees here in isolation for 12 months and
eventually they've broken. You might as well admit it now.''
``I could not bear another day of isolation, let alone the
prospect of another year,'' said Rasul. He confessed.
The three men, all British citizens, were saved by British
intelligence officials, who proved that they had been in
England when the video was shot, and during the time they
were supposed to have been in Qaida training camps. All three
were returned to England, where they were released from
custody.
Rasul has said many times that he and his friends were
freed only because their alibis were corroborated. But they
continue to worry about the many other Guantanamo detainees
who may be innocent but have no way of proving it.
The Bush administration has turned Guantanamo into a place
that is devoid of due process and the rule of law. It's a
place where human beings can be imprisoned for life without
being charged or tried, without ever seeing a lawyer, and
without having their cases reviewed by a court. Congress and
the courts should be uprooting this evil practice, but
freedom and justice in the United States are on a post-9/ll
downhill slide.
So we are stuck for the time being with the disgrace of
Guantanamo, which will forever be a stain on the history of
the United States, like the internment of the Japanese in
World War II.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas is recognized.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I regret that I am compelled to speak on
this subject. The topic of the day is the confirmation of Ambassador
John Negroponte to be the new National Director of Intelligence, but it
appears as if that topic has now changed, and I have no alternative but
to respond in that basically the purpose and the responsibilities of
the Intelligence Committee have been challenged by the vice chairman.
I understand that the vice chairman feels strongly about this issue.
We have discussed this at length--not as much as I had hoped and that
we had intended to--to seek common ground, but he feels so strongly
that he offered an amendment to the supplemental appropriations bill,
which he has discussed.
I feel equally as strong, so much so that I filed a second-degree
amendment in response. My second-degree amendment is in stark contrast
to the amendment offered by my colleague and my friend. My amendment
actually expresses support for our Armed Forces and intelligence
officers, rather than calling into question their actions, while they
are on the front lines in the war on terror. The amendment underscored
the Intelligence Committee's continuing aggressive oversight of all
aspects of the war on terror, including terrorist detention and
interrogation.
The Rockefeller amendment is a sense of the Senate, as he indicated,
calling for the Intelligence Committee to launch yet another formal
investigation of the men and women who are prosecuting the war against
the terrorists. The proposed Rockefeller investigation, as I read the
parameters originally proposed and then refined, I think would be
virtually boundless in its exploration of any matter even tangentially
related to the use of rendition, detention, and interrogation of
terrorists.
I want my colleagues to know that these are the very tools that are
being used by our brave men and women in the military and intelligence
agencies to combat a continuing terrorist threat against every American
and our interests. They are also critical in our efforts in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and they are saving lives as I speak.
I oppose the efforts of Senator Rockefeller to launch yet another
wide-ranging investigation because I believe, despite what he
believes--and reasonable men can certainly disagree--that it is
currently unnecessary. I believe it would be impractical and damaging
to the ongoing operations and morale of the people who are doing the
job.
We are not sitting on the sidelines. We are not being passive, we are
not rebuffing, we are not defaulting, and we sure as heck are not going
to let the media drive the agenda within the Intelligence Committee
with regard to classified information and our national security. The
Senate Intelligence Committee, in the conduct of its normal but
aggressive oversight responsibilities, is examining the broad issues of
the effectiveness of interrogation operations, the humane treatment of
detainees, the role of intelligence in tribunals and combatant status
review boards, and, yes, rendition operations.
In conducting this oversight, just this past month committee staff--
both minority and majority--once again visited the detention facility
at Guantanamo Bay for onsite inspections, briefings, and discussions.
The committee is continuing its oversight through visits, interviews of
relevant individuals and personnel, through requests of documents,
reviews of prior investigations, and briefings from intelligence
community element, using basically the same methodology we used during
the WMD review and investigation.
In other words, we are doing our job. I believe we are fulfilling our
oversight responsibilities. And there are still ongoing investigations,
including the Navy inspector general's investigation into FBI
allegations of abuse at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba and the comprehensive
efforts of the CIA inspector general of which we are fully informed to
the degree that we have never been informed before.
[[Page S4065]]
Further, I believe the Rockefeller proposal is unnecessary because
this issue has been thoroughly investigated over the past 3 years. We
have investigated and investigated and investigated. In fact, we have
investigated the investigations.
Let me give you an idea of how many times our own people have been
investigated: in January 2002, the Custer report; January 2003, the DOD
general counsel and DOD working group, with relation to the
interrogation of detainees held in the global war on terrorism;
September 2003, the Miller report; November 2003, the Ryder report; May
2004, the Navy inspector general review; June 2004, the Taguba report
in regard to the tragedy that happened in Abu Ghraib; June 2004, the
Jacoby report; July 2004, the Mikolashek report; August 2004, the Jones
and Fay investigation; mid-August 2004, the Schlesinger Commission;
August 2004, the Formica report; December 2004, the Army Reserve
Command inspector general's assessment of military intelligence and
military police training; March 2005, last month, the Church report.
This issue has been--and will continue to be--thoroughly investigated
by inspectors general and criminal investigators from the DOD, all of
the uniformed services, the CIA, and the Justice Department. It is hard
to keep track, but I count at least 15 comprehensive national level
investigations and well over 300 investigations of specific allegations
of abuse. Between these investigations and our regular and aggressive
oversight--I will emphasize, our regular, aggressive oversight--I am
comfortable as chairman that the Intelligence Committee is meeting its
responsibilities.
I want my colleagues to also think about something else. Last year,
just as we have talked about, we enacted the most comprehensive
reorganization of the intelligence community since its creation over 50
years ago. We created the position of the Director of National
Intelligence and gave him new authorities and enormous
responsibilities, further encumbered by our very high expectations. We
have all spoken to that during this confirmation process.
If the Intelligence Committee embarks on an unnecessary and boundless
what some would even call a fishing expedition that is surely to be
tainted by politics, suggested by any leak that has appeared in the
press, it will be the first thing that greets the new DNI when he takes
office. As Ambassador Negroponte begins the difficult process of fixing
what we and numerous commissions have said need fixing, he would be met
with endless requests for documents, interviews, and hearings. So
Ambassador Negroponte and General Hayden need to hit the ground
running, and that would be exceedingly hard to do if they land right in
the middle of an unnecessary congressional investigation.
I believe that would be a very serious mistake and contrary to the
intent of Congress.
Finally, I oppose Senator Rockefeller's investigation because it will
hinder ongoing intelligence collection, and I believe it would damage
morale.
My colleagues should know there is a consensus in the intelligence
community that terrorist interrogations are the single best source of
actionable intelligence against the ongoing plans and plots of our
enemy. Terrorist interrogations today are saving lives in Iraq--
American lives, Iraqi lives, Afghan lives--and are subverting plots
against our own homeland.
The information gleaned from interrogating terrorists is doing
exactly what I said in terms of the priority that we have and our
responsibilities on the Intelligence Committee in reference to our
national security. The majority of usable and actionable intelligence
against al-Qaida comes from the terrorist interrogations and
debriefings. We must preserve this irreplaceable source of information.
Do it right, yes, but we must preserve it.
There is no doubt that this is a delicate intelligence oversight
issue. The oversight of detention and interrogation does command a
large portion of the Intelligence Committee staff and time and effort.
We must continue to treat interrogation as a delicate oversight issue
or we risk losing it.
I am concerned an unnecessary informal investigation would accomplish
little beyond what we already do in the course of our normal and, yes,
aggressive oversight efforts. As I have said on other occasions, it
will likely cause risk aversion, the very thing we are trying to avoid.
The constant and repetitive investigations of our frontline personnel
will have a chilling effect, a no-confidence vote, really, on the
collection of intelligence through interrogations.
The Senate and the Intelligence Committee should be publicly
supportive of our men and women of our Armed Forces and intelligence
agencies because the overwhelming majority of these people are doing
their best to protect us all. Where there have been allegations, they
are reported and they are being investigated. And after they are
investigated, they are turned over to the Justice Department, if
warranted, and people are being charged.
Frankly, I am fast losing patience with what appears to me to be
almost a pathological obsession with calling into question the actions
of the men and women who are on the front line in the war on terror.
Some of these very courageous individuals wear uniforms and some do
not. They leave their spouses and children at home, after assuring them
that everything will be all right, with the understanding that it may
not be all right, and sometimes it is not all right. They travel to the
other side of the world in the service of their country with a
reasonable expectation that their country supports them. At times they
make mistakes, and sometimes they make serious mistakes for which they
must account, and rightfully so, and we are doing that.
But as we sit here in the relative safety and comfort of the Capitol
complex, I cannot help but think that some of us have lost our
perspective. We will and must do our duty as elected officials. As I
have indicated, we will continue aggressive oversight on this issue,
and we will reach out to our friends across the aisle to incorporate
their concerns. But, Mr. President, I say to my friends, we are at war.
Therefore, our first and foremost duty is to support our troops and
intelligence officers at home and abroad. I, for one, will not advocate
using the constitutional authorities vested in this great institution
as a blunt instrument on the very people we depend on to keep us safe
every day.
I am on their side. And make no mistake, if we sanction another
needless investigation, it will be a very public vote of no confidence
in our men and women on the front lines in the war on terror. I, for
one, have not lost confidence in our people.
The Senator from West Virginia referred to the almost daily
revelations regarding the alleged abuses. It is very clear to me what
is happening. Facts already known to us and to investigators are now
finding their way into the press through Freedom of Information Act
requests and, quite frankly, leaks. In Washington, a leak is not a leak
until somebody gets wet. I can tell you, on the Intelligence Committee,
we are right about up to here, and the same thing is true in many other
agencies.
I do not think I am being conspiratorial when I suggest this is a
deliberate effort to give the public the impression that this is an
ongoing and growing problem. It is not. I do not believe it is.
Mistakes have been made by our military and our intelligence agencies,
and the Justice Department has responded properly with investigations
of abuse and misconduct. We will oversee that. We are being told that,
and we are being kept fully informed. I will always meet our oversight
duties using facts not press reports.
I urge my colleagues to consider this, as we have two options to
take. Again, I offer the open door of suggestions just as we did with
the WMD inquiry to incorporate concerns of the minority on the
committee with responsibilities as I see them as chairman of the
Intelligence Committee and do our due diligence.
I reserve the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon.
Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining under the
agreement that was entered into earlier?
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ALEXANDER). The Senator has 29 minutes
remaining.
[[Page S4066]]
Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from West
Virginia.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I thank my colleague. Needless to
say, all of us on the Intelligence Committee do all of this for the
protection of the American people and protection of the American
troops. That goes without saying.
I have to say that all of the investigations to which my friend and
distinguished chairman of the Intelligence Committee referred in his
remarks were all about the military. None of them were authorized to
get into or had access to information about the Central Intelligence
Agency and its role. We do not investigate the military in particular;
the Armed Services Committee does. We investigate the Central
Intelligence Agency and any other intelligence efforts with respect to
detention, interrogation, and rendition.
So there are lots of studies that have been done, but there are
precious few, if any, that have been done with respect to the
intelligence community.
I have put forward this amendment because I think it must be done. I
do not consider it irrational. I do not consider it against our troops.
I think I made the point it is in part to protect our troops because we
are going to be facing these kinds of situations for years and years to
come.
I look forward to and I have some confidence that the chairman and
myself and members of the committee can come to an agreement on how we
approach this in a way which works, gives us the information we need,
and we can proceed forward to protect our soldiers.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon.
Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I will speak very briefly on this matter
because I would like to support Senator Rockefeller's call for an
inquiry into this area, particularly as it relates to rendition.
Let me begin by saying that I strongly agree with my friend and
chairman, the distinguished Senator from Kansas, with respect to how
important a time this is with our people in harm's way. Chairman
Roberts is absolutely right that the fight against terrorists certainly
is not a nice business. We understand that.
I want to take a minute and support Senator Rockefeller in the hopes
we can work this out and do it in a bipartisan way along the route we
took with respect to Iraq, where we got a unanimous agreement in our
committee and showed a difficult area could be tackled in a bipartisan
way.
The reason I support Senator Rockefeller and want this matter
addressed is I think this inquiry could especially provide another
useful tool in our fight against al-Qaida. I say that because the
longer the war against al-Qaida and its associates goes on, the more we
realize what a sophisticated enemy we are facing.
Bin Laden and his followers understand the modern media, both here
and abroad. They know that allegations of torture and mistreatment
undercut our efforts amongst our allies and influences world opinion
against the United States. It seems to me we cannot allow ourselves to
be defamed by deceitful and murderous madmen who have learned how to
manipulate public perception.
What Senator Rockefeller is talking about would provide us, through
an inquiry, the opportunity to discredit information collected from al-
Qaida and other terrorists in custody. Torture is not an effective way
of getting valuable, credible intelligence. A suspect in extreme pain
or psychological stress will lie about anything and everything
necessary to stop what that suspect is enduring, and if the possibility
of torture is removed, those analyzing the information will have
greater faith in the reporting.
If, however, an investigation proves that torture was used by anyone,
we will have an additional reason to question the information and
better ability to determine the truth from fabrication. So I come to
the floor today to say I support Senator Rockefeller in terms of his
request. I think Senator Roberts, the chairman of our committee, makes
a very valid point about the sensitivity of this time, our people being
in harm's way, terrorists will stop at nothing, and I think what
Senator Rockefeller is talking about could provide an additional tool,
an additional opportunity, to strengthen the fight against al-Qaida by
publicly correcting their lies and to give us an opportunity to expose
the al-Qaida spin machine.
I have spoken at some length on the floor this afternoon, but I want
to make clear that I hope the distinguished chairman and the ranking
member can work this out. I support Senator Rockefeller.
I yield the floor.
Mr. KOHL. Mr. President. I rise today in support of the nomination of
Ambassador John D. Negroponte to serve as our first Director of
National Intelligence, a position whose importance to our national
security cannot be stressed enough.
After 9/11 and the failure of the intelligence community to predict
the absence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, study after study
has told us that our intelligence system is broken, and desperately in
need of repair. We began the process of fixing our intelligence
community in December, when we passed the Intelligence Reform Act of
2004. Arguably the most important part of that legislation was the
creation of a new position--the Director of National Intelligence--with
appropriate budgetary and personnel authority to effectively coordinate
the fifteen different intelligence agencies. Eliminating gaps and
ensuring that our intelligence agencies are working together is vital
to winning the war against al Qaeda, as well as to our long-term
national security.
That having been said, the mere creation of this position was not a
silver bullet. Many challenges lie ahead for the new DNI. Transforming
our intelligence agencies--getting them to work together and share
information--will not be easy. According to the Robb-Silverman
Commission, turf battles are again emerging between the Central
Intelligence Agency, CIA, Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI, and
Department of Defense, DOD. These turf battles contributed to past
intelligence failures, and if we are going to truly reform the
intelligence community, we need to put an end to this. The key to a
well-functioning intelligence community is to resolve these disputes in
the best interest of the country, and not one agency or another.
Independence and strong leadership are essential to the DNI's success.
Good intelligence is vital to our ability to protect against the
threats we face today, as well as the threats we will face in the
future. That cannot happen without better management, a DNI to
coordinate all of our intelligence efforts--to make sure everyone
involved remembers that we are all on the same team, working toward the
same goal. It is critical that he succeed in making meaningful changes
to our intelligence community. These are high hurdles, but I believe
Ambassador Negroponte is up to the job.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I want to discuss the nomination of John
Negroponte to be the first Director of National Intelligence. This is a
new position created by Congress as a key element of intelligence
reform after the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, and after the
many failures we saw concerning intelligence on Iraq and weapons of
mass destruction.
I want to discuss one particular aspect of the problems we had with
the intelligence community, and how I hope Ambassador Negroponte will
improve upon that situation.
In the course of conducting oversight of the executive branch,
Congress requires information and documents produced by the executive
branch, including from the intelligence community. This is especially
true in cases where Congress, or members of Congress, are conducting
oversight for which they are responsible.
Unfortunately, it has been disturbingly difficult to obtain
information and documents from this administration on a number of
serious issues and from a number of agencies, including from the
intelligence community, as well as from the Defense and Justice
Departments.
The only conclusion I can draw from my experience in seeking
information and documents from this administration as part of my
oversight responsibilities is that too often they have not cooperated
fully or appropriately.
[[Page S4067]]
Let me turn to some specific examples. Each year, the Armed Services
Committee holds a hearing with the senior leaders of the intelligence
community on worldwide threats. After the hearings, members write
questions for the record, and the answers are made part of the official
hearing record.
Last year, on March 9, 2004, the Armed Services Committee held its
annual worldwide threat hearing with the Director of Central
Intelligence or DCI, George Tenet, and the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, Admiral Lowell Jacoby. But the CIA did not answer
all the questions for the record until one year later, after I brought
this delay to the attention of the new DCI, Porter Goss.
In June 2003, as the ranking member of the Armed Services Committee,
I initiated a minority staff inquiry into the pre-war intelligence on
Iraq, and the use of that intelligence by the administration. In order
to conduct this inquiry, it was necessary to request many documents
from the intelligence community, as well as from the Defense
Department.
Although the intelligence community provided some documents, they
stonewalled other requests. For example, on April 9, 2004, I wrote to
Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, requesting the
declassification of three sets of briefing charts produced by the
Office of Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith concerning the Iraq-
al Qaeda relationship. The charts contained intelligence that only the
intelligence community could declassify.
I knew that one slide, which had been declassified previously at my
request, was highly critical of the intelligence community's assessment
of the Iraq-al Qaeda issue, and that it had been shown to Defense
Secretary Rumsfeld and later to the staffs of the Office of the Vice
President and the National Security Council, but that it had not been
shown to DCI Tenet when he was briefed.
On July 6th, I received a letter from Stanley Moskowitz, the Director
of Congressional Affairs at the CIA. His letter said that in response
to my April 9 request, the ``declassification review of the charts is
underway and we hope to have an answer to you shortly. We apologize for
the delay.''
However, although his staff told my staff that they were working on
the request, and later that they had completed the review, the
documents were not forthcoming, nor was an explanation for the delay. I
finally received the documents earlier this month, after the current
Director of Central Intelligence, Porter Goss, provided them.
In another example, on April 29, 2004, I requested the
declassification of specific portions of three finished intelligence
reports from the CIA concerning the relationship between Iraq and al
Qaeda. I requested that they respond by May 10th, but they did not
reply for 2 months.
In that same July 6th letter from Stanley Moskowitz, it said that, in
response to my April 29 request, ``the declassification review is
underway and we hope to have an answer to you shortly.''
However, the CIA did not provide an answer ``shortly.'' It did not
provide any answer until after Director Tenet had left the CIA, and I
had brought the situation to the attention of the new management team.
The declassified materials were finally provided on April 6, 2005,
nearly a year after the request.
I have had similar problems with obtaining documents from the
Department of Defense. I made a request for documents on November 25,
2003, and I am still awaiting documents from that request.
In that case, the Defense Department said it was withholding some of
the documents to determine whether they were covered by executive
privilege. It did so until late March, when it finally provided some of
the documents, 16 months after my original request. I would note that
it is unclear what possible executive privilege concern could exist for
these documents, some of which were unclassified talking points to be
used by Pentagon officials.
In the same case, the Defense Department originally told me they were
withholding some documents containing intelligence information that was
``Originator Controlled,'' also known as ORCON. The Department promised
me that they would provide any documents cleared for release by the
CIA. But instead of doing so, they simply swept all the CIA-cleared
documents into their executive privilege review.
The new leadership of the CIA and the Intelligence Community, Porter
Goss, is adopting a more responsive and responsible attitude toward
congressional requests for information and documents than did his
predecessor.
After I brought these delays to his attention at a hearing in March,
he said he would look into the matter and ensure that the information
was provided. And he did what he promised. On April 6th, he wrote me a
letter as a follow-up to providing me the materials that had been
delayed so long.
I would like to quote from the last paragraph of his letter:
You should have received answers to these requests months
ago. There is no excuse for such delays. I have conveyed to
my staff that this is not how the Agency will treat requests.
That is the right approach to take. After all the frustrating delays
and stonewalling, it is a welcome breath of fresh air. And I hope the
window stays open for the whole Intelligence Community.
This brings me back to the nomination of Ambassador Negroponte to be
the new leader of the Intelligence Community. At his nomination hearing
before the Intelligence Committee, I asked him about this problem of
stonewalling, ignoring, or delaying on requests for information and
documents. I asked him if he would ensure that the intelligence
community provides timely and responsive answers to such requests, and
he basically said he would look into the situation.
Frankly, I was hoping he would have a more robust and positive
answer, and that he would commit to taking steps, if confirmed, to
ensure that the intelligence community is fully responsive in a timely
manner to congressional requests for information and documents.
However, I am hopeful that when Ambassador Negroponte does look into
the matter, he will be more responsive, in light of the law we just
passed. He has a responsibility to the Nation, to the Congress, and to
the people--not just to the President.
I have some of the correspondence outlining the problems I have
described, and I would ask unanimous consent that they be printed in
the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, April 9, 2004.
Hon. George Tenet,
Director of Central Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Director: I am writing to request information and
action relative to a series of three briefings presented by
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
(OUSDP), Douglas Feith, to several audiences, entitled
``Assessing the Relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda.'' I
believe you received a copy of these briefings as attachments
to a letter written by Under Secretary Feith to me on March
25, 2004, a copy of which he sent to you.
According to Secretary Feith, the first briefing was
presented to the Secretary of Defense in August, 2002. The
second briefing was presented to you in August, 2002. The
third briefing was presented to staff of the National
Security Council (NSC) and the Office of the Vice President
(OVP) in September, 2002.
I am requesting the following:
1. As these briefings contain intelligence information, I
request that you declassify the briefings, to the greatest
possible extent. One page used in two of the briefings (to
the Secretary of Defense and to the NSC/OVP staffs) has
already been declassified at my request.
2. Did the CIA see and clear these briefings before they
were presented to the Secretary of Defense and to NSC and OVP
staffs? If so, when? Did CIA request changes to the
briefings? Given that they contain intelligence information
controlled by the originating agencies, would such clearance
requests be the normal course of action?
3. Please explain when you and when the CIA first learned
of the existence of the OUSDP briefs; when you and the CIA
first learned that this briefing was going to be (or had
been) provided to the Secretary of Defense and to NSC and OVP
staffs; and when the CIA first learned that a different
version of the briefing was going to be (or had been)
presented to NSC and OVP staffs than had been presented to
the CIA.
4. Please provide the CIA's views on two aspects of these
briefings: first, the substantive findings and conclusions
(both implied and explicit) of the briefings; and second, the
reliability of each intelligence item or report cited in the
briefings.
[[Page S4068]]
5. Please provide your views on the appropriateness of two
activities: first, the presentation by non-Intelligence
Community personnel to senior policymakers or administration
officials of any formal intelligence analysis that is not
cleared by the Intelligence Community or made known to it;
and second, the provision of comments and edits by entities
outside of the Intelligence Community on the contents of
Intelligence Community products, whether draft or final.
I appreciate your assistance in this request, and I look
forward to your response by April 23, 2004.
Sincerely,
Carl Levin,
Ranking Member.
____
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, April 29, 2004.
Hon. George Tenet,
Director of Central Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency, Washington, DC.
Dear Director Tenet: I request that you declassify the
following information:
(1) From the June 21, 2002 Counter-Terrorism Center
document relating to Iraq's relationship to al Qaeda (CTC
2002-40078CH): In the Key Findings section, p. i, third
bullet under the first paragraph; p. iii, second bullet; p. v
in its entirety (the Scope Note); In the main body of the
report, p. 6, the second section on the page (first and
second columns, one paragraph and two sub-bullets).
(2) From the October 2, 2002 National Intelligence Estimate
on Iraq and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (NIE 2002-
16HC): p. 68, the first non-bulleted full paragraph and the
two subsequent sub-bullets.
(3) From the January 29, 2003 Counter-Terrorism Center
document relating to Iraq and terrorism (CTC 2003-40004HJX):
beginning on p. 16, the section that begins with the last
paragraph on the page, all of page 17, and the first two
bullets on page 19; p. 27, second column: the section heading
and first full paragraph under the heading; and the second-
to-last full paragraph.
I would expect that expeditious declassification should be
possible, given that you have already declassified
significant portions of the October 2002 NIE, including all
the key judgments, all the text concerning uranium, and the
alternative views of the State Department's Bureau of
Intelligence and Research.
Please have a member of your staff call Richard Fieldhouse
of the Committee staff at 202-224-0750 with any questions or
requests for clarification.
I appreciate your assistance with this request and look
forward to your response by May 10, 2004.
Sincerely,
Carl Levin,
Ranking Member.
____
The Director of Central
Intelligence,
Washington, DC, April 6, 2005.
Hon. Carl Levin,
Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Levin: I have confirmed that responses to the
long outstanding requests you brought to my attention during
the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) Global
Intelligence Challenges hearing have now been provided to the
Committee. As you made me aware, these requests were from
last year's Worldwide Threat hearing, as well as from
correspondence dating back to last April. As promised, I
instructed Agency personnel to promptly complete their review
and provide appropriate and meaningful answers.
You should have received answers to these requests months
ago. There is no excuse for such delays. I have conveyed to
my staff that this is not how the Agency will treat requests.
Sincerely,
Porter J. Goss.
____
Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, DC, July 6, 2004.
Hon. Carl Levin,
Ranking Democratic Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S.
Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Levin: I am responding on behalf of the
Director of Central Intelligence to your letter of 9 April
2004 requesting information and action relative to a series
of briefings presented by the Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith, to several audiences,
entitled ``Assessing the Relationship between Iraq and al
Queda.'' Specifically, you asked five questions. The
responses to your questions are provided below.
1. As these briefings contain intelligence information, I
request that you declassify the briefings, to the greatest
possible extent. One page used in two of the briefings (to
the Secretary of Defense and to the NSC/OVP staffs) has
already been declassified at my request.
Answer: The declassification review of the charts is
underway and we hope to have an answer to you shortly. We
apologize for the delay.
2. Did the CIA see and clear these briefings before they
were presented to the Secretary of Defense and to the NSC and
OVP staffs? If so, when? Did CIA request changes to the
briefings? Given that they contain intelligence information
controlled by the originating agencies, would such clearance
requests be the normal course of action?
Answer: CIA did not see or clear these briefings before
they were given to the Secretary of Defense, NSC or OVP. The
intelligence information used in these briefings was from
products previously disseminated to IC and Executive Branch
elements, to include DoD and the White House. There was no
need for further clearance in presenting the intelligence
information to the Secretary of Defense, NSC or OVP as the
originator control clearance had been resolved at the time of
initial dissemination.
3. Please explain when you and when CIA first learned of
the existence of the OUSDP briefs; when you and the CIA first
learned that this briefing was. going to be (or had ,been)
provided to the Secretary of Defense and to NSC and OVP
staffs; and when CIA first learned that a different version
of the briefing was going to be (or had been) presented to
NSC and OVP staffs than had been presented to the CIA.
Answer: We first learned of the brief in mid-August 2002
when it was presented to the DCI. We believe it was at that
point that we learned that it had been presented to senior
levels in the Pentagon. We did not learn that it had been
presented to the NSC and OVP or that there were different
versions until earlier this year.
4. Please provide the CIA's views on two aspects of these
briefings: first, the substantive findings and conclusions
(both implied and explicit) of the briefings; and second, the
reliability of each intelligence item or report cited in the
briefings.
Answer: The CIA's January 2003 paper, Iraqi Support for
Terrorism, represents the CIA views on the issues covered in
the DoD slides. This paper has been provided to the
Committee.
5. Please provide your views on the appropriateness of two
activities: first, the presentation by non-Intelligence
Community personnel to senior policymakers or administration
officials of any formal intelligence analysis that is not
cleared by the Intelligence Community or made known to it;
and second, the provision of comments and edits by entities
outside of the Intelligence Community on the contents of the
Intelligence Community products, whether draft or final.
Answer: The DCI responded to a similar question from you at
the 9 March 2004 hearing. He said, ``My experience is that
people come in and may present those kinds of briefings on
their views of intelligence, but I have to tell you, Senator,
I'm the President's chief intelligence officer; I have the
definitive view about these subjects. From my perspective it
is my view that prevails.''
Lastly, in response to your 29 April 2004 letter requesting
the declassification of information contained in two
Counterterrorism Center publications and the October 2002
National Intelligence Estimate, the declassification review
is underway and we hope to have an answer to you shortly.
Sincerely,
Stanley M. Moskowitz,
Director of Congressional Affairs.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I would like to express my support for
John Negroponte to be the first Director of National Intelligence, DNI.
I have the utmost respect for Ambassador Negroponte and confidence that
he will excel in this position.
It is apparent that there is a need to improve our Nation's
intelligence capabilities. The passage of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act, by creating the position of Director of
National Intelligence, is an important step in achieving this goal.
Creating centralized leadership in the intelligence community will
provide better management of capabilities and produce common standards
and practices across the foreign and domestic intelligence divide. The
position of DNI will better allow the intelligence community to set
priorities and move resources where they are most needed. The position
of DNI is going to be difficult and demanding. I believe Ambassador
Negroponte's experience and character make him an excellent choice to
take on this vast responsibility.
From 1960 to 1997 Ambassador Negroponte was a member of the Career
Foreign Service, serving at eight different posts in Asia, Europe, and
Latin America. He has been Ambassador to Honduras, Mexico, and the
Philippines. Ambassador Negroponte also served as Assistant Secretary
of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
Affairs and as Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security
affairs.
More recently, Mr. Negroponte distinguished himself as ambassador to
the United Nations, during the difficult time immediately after the
terrorist attacks of September 11. Furthermore Mr. Negroponte last year
became the first American Ambassador to Iraq since the fall of Saddam
Hussein. In this role he played an important role in moving the nation
of Iraq towards a democratic and stable future.
Ambassador Negroponte has a long and distinguished career during his
more than 40 years of service to this
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country. During that time he faced many challenges and difficult
situations. I have the highest expectations that he will take on the
assignment as Director of National Intelligence with the same
dedication he has shown in the past. Under his leadership, I believe
America will have the intelligence capability it so urgently needs to
fight and win the continuing global war on terror.
Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise today in support of John Negroponte
to be confirmed as the Director of National Intelligence. These are
historic and perilous times as we continue to face enemies intent upon
attacking us and the values and freedoms upon which our Nation was
founded.
Because we still know very little about our Nation's most dangerous
adversaries, the new Director of National Intelligence will be
responsible for ensuring that this Nation's intelligence community has
the collection and analytic expertise required to confront our greatest
challenges no matter from which quarter they appear. While many are
concerned about the emergence of China as a peer competitor in the
Northern Pacific, we obviously still face the scourge of international
terrorism, international criminal organizations and other transnational
threats. And, of course, there remains the perplexing problem of
gathering intelligence against closed societies such as Iran and North
Korea so called ``hard'' targets.
Ambassador Negroponte has both the distinct privilege and solemn
obligations that come with being the first Director of National
Intelligence. How he leads, how he manages the community, how he shapes
his role, the relationships he creates with the various agencies and
their leaders will not only determine how effective he is in reforming
our intelligence community but very likely how each of his successors
will approach the oversight of our intelligence community as well. And
the transformation he is charged with overseeing carries with it the
future security of this Nation.
Our intelligence community professionals are the best in the world
and every day they toil tirelessly, often unrecognized, in the shadows
to keep this country safe. I believe they are eagerly looking for
strong leadership so they can move forward with the business of
securing the country.
It has been said that ``A leader takes people where they want to go.
A great leader takes people where they don't necessarily want to go but
ought to be.'' I believe that John Negroponte possesses the experience
and leadership necessary to take this Nation's 15 intelligence agencies
and the thousands of dedicated professionals in those agencies who toil
to protect us all to where they ought to be.
He has demonstrated a recognition of the need to refocus our
intelligence community, so that disparate intelligence agencies are
working together more cooperatively, so that information access is
improved to enable all relevant agencies to provide necessary input,
and so that the intelligence products provided to national policy
makers are not only timely but reflect the best judgment of the
entirety of the intelligence community.
Ambassador Negroponte has taken on some of the toughest and most
important jobs in our diplomatic service in his long and illustrious
career as a Foreign Service Officer. He has been nominated for and
confirmed as Chief of Mission in four embassies and as the President's
representative to the United Nations. He has served in leadership
positions within the Department of State and as a security advisor in
the White House. John Negroponte has demonstrated the resolve and
ability to take on tough management and policy positions and to perform
admirably.
In the past 3 years, there have been four major investigations that
have concluded that the time has come for significant reform in the
intelligence community. In December 2002, the primary recommendation of
the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 was
that Congress should amend the National Security Act of 1947 to create
a statutory Director of National Intelligence to be the President's
principal advisor on intelligence with the full range of management,
budgetary, and personnel responsibilities needed to make the entire
U.S. Intelligence Community operate as a coherent whole.
Last July, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence issued its
Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence
Assessments on Iraq that found that although the Director of Central
Intelligence was supposed to act as head of both the CIA and the
intelligence community, for the most part he acted only as the head of
the CIA to the detriment of the intelligence product provided to
National policymakers.
Later that month, the 9/11 Commission issued their report on the
terrorist attacks and also recommended that the current position of
Director of Central Intelligence should be replaced by a National
Intelligence Director with two main areas of responsibility: to oversee
National intelligence centers and to manage the National intelligence
program and oversee the agencies that contribute to it.
Finally, earlier this month the President's Commission on the
Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of
Mass Destruction found the Intelligence Community is ``fragmented,
loosely managed, and poorly coordinated; the 15 intelligence
organizations are a `community' in name only and rarely act with a
unity of purpose.'' They also concluded that the Director of National
Intelligence will make our intelligence efforts better coordinated,
more efficient, and more effective.
Clearly, with this many investigations and Commissions arriving at
the same conclusions time and again, for the sake and safety of the
Nation we must begin the transformation of the fifteen agencies tasked
with collecting and analyzing intelligence into a single, coordinated
community with the agility to predict, respond to and overcome the
threats our Nation will face. The confirmation of the first Director of
National Intelligence is the first step in executing this extremely
complex undertaking and time is of the essence. Indeed, I cannot recall
a time when a nominee has come before the Senate with the entire
community they have been nominated to lead in the midst of such
sweeping transformation.
And once again, I believe the President has made an excellent choice
in John Negroponte to lead the intelligence community through such a
transformation.
I look forward to working with him in the coming years as we shape
our intelligence community into a cohesive whole and as he defines the
role of Director of National Intelligence. With a strong DNI and a
focused intelligence team, our Nation will be safer. I urge my
colleagues to join me in supporting the confirmation of John Negroponte
the first Director of National Intelligence.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, the successes of the intelligence community
are never really known to the American public. But the spectacular
failures of the last few years have been apparent to us all. Blue-
ribbon panels, presidential commissions, and common sense have all told
us that the intelligence community needs reform. In recent months, with
action by Congress and the administration, we've begun to see progress.
With the vote on John Negroponte's nomination today, we will take an
important step in giving life to the structural reforms we've debated
for so many months.
John Negroponte faces a daunting challenge as the country's first
Director of National Intelligence. It will be his responsibility to
make intelligence reform a reality, to break-down the barriers between
intelligence agencies, and to restore the credibility of the American
intelligence community. There once was a time where the word of the
President of the United States was enough to reassure world leaders.
After the intelligence failures of the last few years, that is no
longer true.
In his confirmation hearings, Mr. Negroponte identified ways to
improve the intelligence process--formalizing lessons-learned exercises
across the community; utilizing ``Team B'' analyses to avoid self-
reinforcing analysis premised on faulty assumptions; improving inter-
agency and community-wide cooperation; and removing barriers between
foreign and domestic intelligence. He must also be able to work
effectively with Secretary Rumsfeld and the Department of Defense--and
its 80 percent of the intelligence
[[Page S4070]]
budget--to really reform the community. Many of us in Congress will
support his efforts, and I urge President Bush to be steadfast in this
regard as well.
But Mr. Negroponte's most immediate and urgent task will be to speak
truth to power. When the intelligence does not support the policy goals
or ambitions of the administration, Mr. Negroponte must never flinch,
never waiver, never compromise one iota of his integrity or the
integrity of the intelligence. He must also be willing to push analysts
to challenge assumptions, consider alternatives, and follow the
evidence wherever it may lead them. And when they do, he must back them
with the full authority of his office.
Today we face many threats, the dangerous legacy of the Cold War in
vast nuclear arsenals, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the
spread of terrorism, lingering disputes in various regions of the
world, and new forces, like globalization, all crying out for
leadership by the United States. The decisions policy makers make are
influenced by many factors. But on issues of war and peace, on
protecting this country, on determining our long-term national security
needs and the direction of our foreign policy, there is no substitute
for intelligence that is accurate, timely, and trusted.
Mr. Negroponte will shape the role of Director of National
Intelligence in fundamental ways. He will be judged on whether or not
America is safer at the end of his tenure than when he starts. For the
sake of us all, I hope he succeeds.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I strongly support the nomination of
Ambassador John D. Negroponte to be the first Director of National
Intelligence.
This is not a moment without precedent in history. President
Roosevelt faced a similar situation in 1941 when he had disparate
intelligence and information gathering organizations within the
government, but did not have a single person in charge. President
Roosevelt convinced a reluctant Colonel William J., Wild Bill, Donovan
to be the first ``Coordinator of Information,'' an organization that
eventually became the Office of Strategic Services, OSS, and
ultimately, the Central Intelligence Agency.
I would like to read a quote from the book, ``Donovan of O.S.S.,'' by
Corey Ford:
The appointment of Colonel Donovan as director of COI was
formally announced by executive order on July 11, 1941, and
his duties were defined in Roosevelt's own words: `To collect
and analyze all information and data which may bear upon
national security, to correlate such information and data and
make the same available to the President and to such
departments and officials of the Government as may the
President may determine, and to carry out when request by the
President such supplementary activities as may facilitate the
securing of information important for national security not
now available to the Government.'
The directive was purposely obscure in its wording, due to
the secret and potentially offensive nature of the agency's
functions; and the other intelligence organizations, jealous
of their prerogatives, took advantage of the vague
phraesology to set loose a flock of rumors that Donovan was
to be the Heinrich Himmler of an American Gestapo, the
Goebbels of a controlled press, a super-spy over Hoover's G-
men and the Army and Navy, the head of a grand strategy board
which would dictate even to the General Staff. In vain, the
President reiterated that Donovan's work, `is not intended to
supersede or to duplicate or to involve any direction of or
interference with the activities of the General Staff, the
regular intelligence services, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, or of other existing agencies.' The
bureaucratic war was on.
It was a war all too familiar to Washington, the dog-eat-
dog struggle among government departments to preserve their
own areas of power.
Ambassador Negroponte and General Michael Hayden, USAir Force, his
deputy, face a similar situation today, and I wish them well.
Some have said the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004 uses similarly ``vague phraseology'' in describing the
authorities and responsibilities of the new Director of National
Intelligence. Some say that Roosevelt was intentionally vague to allow
the strong personality of Wild Bill Donovan to make this new
intelligence organization work.
I think we have two very strong personalities in Ambassador
Negroponte and General Hayden who are up to the task and will make this
new Office of National Intelligence work. Their work will be even more
effective as they forge strong alliances with their colleagues in other
departments of Government.
As Ambassador Negroponte begins this important effort, I know he is
mindful on the balance that must be maintained between the needs of
national policy makers, military commanders on distant battlefields,
and local and national homeland security officials, who are all charged
with the safety and security of the American homeland. The support
these elements enjoy today has not always been the case. When General
Norman Schwarzkopf testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee
in June 1991 regarding lesson learned during the first Persian Gulf
War, he told the committee that responsive national intelligence
support has been unsatisfactory from his perspective as the theater
commander in charge of combat operations. Clearly, much has changed
since 1991, but we must all remain vigilant in ensuring that
intelligence support for our men and women in uniform is maintained and
enhanced.
Ambassador Negroponte has a strong record of public service as the
U.S. Ambassador to Honduras, Mexico, the Philippines, the United
Nations, and most recently, Iraq. He has a great reputation as a
problem solver who can be counted on for the epitome of candor and
integrity.
John Negroponte has served his Nation faithfully and well. His
willingness to take on this daunting challenge is a testament to a man
who understands service to Nation and has, once again, answered the
call to serve. We are fortunate to have a citizen of such character to
undertake this important and challenging task of bringing our
Intelligence Community together as a coherent, well-coordinated entity.
I strongly support confirmation of Ambassador John D. Negroponte to
be the first Director of National Intelligence, and hope the spirit of
Wild Bill Donovan guides and inspires his efforts.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, today I rise to give my enthusiastic vote
of support for President Bush's nominee to be this Nation's first
Director of National Intelligence. I have known Ambassador Negroponte
for over 20 years, and his professional career as one of our Nation's
best diplomats began 20 years earlier. And rarely have I voted in
support of a Presidential nominee with greater confidence. I trust that
my colleagues will lend their support unanimously to the President's
selection for a position we are anxious to fill.
As he assumes the position we created last year to unify the
intelligence community's capabilities as they have never been unified
before, I offer Ambassador Negroponte my complete support, with three
points to consider.
First, as I have told the nominee, this will be the most difficult
job he will ever hold. And I say this to the man who has just returned
from serving as our first ambassador to a liberated Iraq. During
Ambassador Negroponte's nomination hearing two weeks ago, the
distinguished chairman of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, who
also has my greatest respect, while reviewing the job requirements for
the new position of DNI, candidly asked the nominee: ``Why would you
want this job?''
The answer, for those who know him, is that Ambassador Negroponte has
always responded to the call by his country to take on difficult
challenges. And we in the Senate have supported him by confirming him,
to date, seven times.
Second, as I also told the nominee, and I have said to my colleagues:
Osama bin Laden is not quaking in his hideaway because we have created
the position of Director of National Intelligence. Let us be candid to
ourselves about this. Too often in Washington, a bureaucratic response
is mistaken for a solution. I hope we all recognize, after the years of
discussing reform, that the legislation we passed last year initiates
the beginning, not the end of reform.
And this leads to my third point. Ambassador Negroponte's mission,
once we confirm him, is to take the elements of the intelligence
community and de-Balkanize them. His mission will be to create a whole
that is greater than the sum of the intelligence community parts. He
will do
[[Page S4071]]
this by achieving what we call jointness between all parts of the
community. When he does that--and this will have to do as much with
creating new doctrine, and creating community culture that integrates
this doctrine--then will our already impressive elements we have in our
community be able to advance our security. Only then will we be
creating the 21st century global intelligence capabilities that will
make bin Laden's inevitable successors and wannabees sweat and run.
In my conversations with Ambassador Negroponte about his new brief, I
have shared some of my ideas with him, and I have found him to be
welcoming of these and all ideas. He understands the problems we face,
as he has been a consumer of intelligence for most of his career, and
he has spent his last tour in Iraq confronting the challenge of
multiple armed groups dedicated to collaborating against us. I believe
he knows what we need, and I know he is determined to take the
impressive technological and human capacities already in place in our
intelligence community and take it to the level necessary to give the
American public a strategic intelligence capability we need and must
have.
I believe Ambassador Negroponte has always served this country
honorably. As we confirm him today, which I trust we will, I offer him
my support and, once again, gratitude for choosing to serve his country
in one of the most challenging positions in our history.
Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, one of my top priorities is the real
reform of our Nation's intelligence. The Intelligence Reform Act of
2004 was a first step toward transforming the U.S. intelligence
community. Information sharing will be strengthened, while diverse
opinion and independent analysis will be protected.
The single most important provision in the act was the creation of a
Director of National Intelligence, who would have authority,
responsibility, and financial control over the entire intelligence
community.
The President has nominated an experienced diplomat to be Director of
National Intelligence. Ambassador John D. Negroponte has worked hard
for his country and has made personal sacrifices. When his country
called, he has exposed himself to hardship and danger most notably in
Vietnam and in Iraq.
He has also had extensive exposure to U.S. intelligence products and
operations. He had intelligence coordination responsibilities in
Washington on the National Security Council. He recently had
responsibility for leading the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad during a time
when intelligence on the Iraqi insurgency had the highest priority.
Yet I have serious concerns with certain aspects of Ambassador
Negroponte's record--particularly his actions while he was ambassador
to Honduras. There is a serious discrepancy between his description of
the Honduran government's human rights record during those years and
that of the CIA Inspector General and nongovernmental organizations. He
has yet to show complete candor in discussing U.S. activities there
with the Congress.
I believe that Ambassador Negroponte could have been more outspoken
in reporting from his vantage point at the United Nations in the winter
of 2003--when our country was on the verge of war.
Despite these concerns, I will vote for the confirmation of
Ambassador Negroponte. I am encouraged by his responses to my questions
during hearings before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
In a very important exchange, he provided assurances that he will
``speak truth to power.'' In response to my questions, Ambassador
Negroponte said he would make sure that reliability problems with
sources are put before decisionmakers. He agreed to explore mechanisms
like the State Department's Dissent Channel to encourage those who see
yellow flashing lights to express their views to senior officials and
to protect dissenters from political retaliation. And he said that he
himself would be taking the ``unvarnished truth'' to the President. He
also said that all organizations under his purview will obey the law
and that there will be full accountability.
These assurances are critical. My vote to confirm Ambassador
Negroponte is based on them. As a member of the Senate Select
Intelligence Committee, I will be watching closely to see that they are
honored and will do what I can to contribute to Ambassador Negroponte's
success as the first Director of National Intelligence.
Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, it is my pleasure to support the nomination
of Ambassador John Negroponte to the post of Director of National
Intelligence.
Mr. Negroponte is superbly qualified for this new and challenging
position. I applaud the President on his choice of candidate. Last
week, Mr. Negroponte was approved by the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence. I expect he will be confirmed with overwhelming,
bipartisan support here on the Senate floor.
Mr. Negroponte's career in public service spans four decades and
three continents. He has served in Europe, Asia and Latin America. He
speaks five languages fluently, and has won Senate confirmation for 7
previous posts. He is widely regarded as one of our most distinguished
and respected public officials.
Among his many career highlights, Mr. Negroponte has served as
Ambassador to Honduras, Ambassador to Mexico, Ambassador to the
Philippines, and Ambassador to the United Nations. He has served under
multiple presidents, Republican and Democrat.
In 2004, President Bush nominated Mr. Negroponte to serve as our
Ambassador to the newly liberated Iraq.
As his background attests, Mr. Negroponte has tackled many difficult
and sensitive missions. He has also earned a reputation as a skilled
manager--skills he will surely need in the job ahead.
As Director of National Intelligence, Mr. Negroponte will be
responsible for overseeing the entire intelligence community. It will
be Mr. Negroponte's job to keep America safe by bridging the gaps
between our 15 intelligence agencies and improving information sharing
between agencies.
He will determine the annual budgets for all National intelligence
agencies and offices, and direct how these funds are spent. The
Director will also report directly to the President.
It is a tough job and a tremendous responsibility. But I am confident
that Mr. Negroponte will work hard to make the necessary reforms to
help keep America safe.
We learned on 9-11 that the enemy is deadly and determined. He
doesn't wear a uniform or march under a recognized flag. He hides in
the shadows where he plots his next attack.
Dangerous weapons proliferation must be stopped. Terrorist
organizations must be destroyed. And we must have an intelligence
community that works together to confront these very real dangers so
that we never suffer another 9-11 or worse.
I look forward to Mr. Negroponte's swift confirmation. He has served
our country with honor and distinction over many years. America is
fortunate to have a public servant of his caliber working hard on our
behalf.
Mr. CORZINE. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the
confirmation of John Negroponte to be our Nation's first Director of
National Intelligence. This is a historic moment, and a critical step
toward making our nation more secure. But it is also only the beginning
of what will be a long and challenging effort to reform and improve our
intelligence capabilities.
It is worth recalling how we got here. The establishment of the
Director of National Intelligence would not have happened had it not
been for the patriotism and passion of some remarkable Americans. Let
me begin with the families of the victims of 9/11 who managed to turn
their grief into real, effective action. The Family Steering Committee
and, in particular, four 9/11 widows from my State who called
themselves the ``Jersey Girls,'' fought for real answers. They pushed
for the creation of the 9/11 Commission, whose recommendations included
the position for which Mr. Negroponte is being confirmed today. They
also insisted that the administration cooperate fully with the
Commission as it sought a full accounting of the terrorist attack. They
did all this for one reason: they wanted America to be safer than it
was on the day they lost their loved ones.
[[Page S4072]]
We also owe an enormous debt to the 9/11 Commission, led by former
New Jersey Governor Tom Kean and former Congressman Lee Hamilton. The
Commission's hard work, persistence, intellectual honesty, and
political neutrality brought about something truly incredible: a
national consensus. The Commission's meticulous and thorough study of
the events leading up to and including September 11 and its wise and
succinct recommendations gave us an understanding of the past and a
path forward. And, by involving the American people in their
deliberations, they helped generate public support for much needed
reform.
It is almost impossible to overstate the challenges ahead for the new
Director of National Intelligence. The intelligence failures that led
to the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, happened in part because
of a lack of coordination among our intelligence agencies. It is the
DNI's job to resolve this problem. Mr. Negroponte will need the
President's support. He will also need Congress' support. He has mine.
The DNI will also have to correct the intelligence failures that led
to the war in Iraq. That includes ensuring that intelligence analyses
are objective and that those analyses are used appropriately by policy
makers. The DNI will need to speak truth to power, to tell policymakers
the hard truth about what we know and what we don't know. Intelligence
must guide policy, and not vice versa.
Our intelligence serves many purposes, from informing foreign policy
to supporting tactical military decisions. The new DNI will be
responsible for guiding our priorities. But this position would not
have been created had we not been attacked on our soil, on September
11, 2001. The intelligence community has new consumers: the Department
of Homeland Security, Federal, State and local government officials,
law enforcement and our Nation's first responders. It is critical that
these people have the information they need to protect us.
Mr. Negroponte is highly qualified for this position and I am proud
to support his confirmation. But he cannot do this alone. This and
future administrations and the Congress must stay engaged in and remain
committed to the hard work of intelligence reform.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for
this historic nomination of Ambassador John Negroponte to be the first
Director of National Intelligence named under the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004--the most sweeping reform of the
intelligence community in over 50 years. With this appointment, we will
finally have a single official with the authority, responsibility, and
accountability to lead a more unified and more integrated intelligence
community capable of avoiding the unacceptable intelligence failures
recounted in excruciating detail by the independent 9/11 Commission
and, more recently, by the President's WMD Commission.
I am confident Ambassador Negroponte is up to this admittedly
difficult task. With a career in public service spanning over four
decades, Ambassador Negroponte has demonstrated the commitment and
determination this post demands. His service in numerous Foreign
Service posts across Asia, Europe, and Latin America--and most recently
as the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq--has certainly provided him with the
global perspective of our intelligence needs that the position
requires. And, having served in senior positions here in Washington at
the State Department and at the National Security Council, Ambassador
Negroponte has developed the bureaucratic skills that the DNI must
exercise in order to be effective.
The most important factor in whether Ambassador Negroponte--indeed,
whether the entire intelligence reform effort--succeeds, is the degree
of support provided by President Bush and the White House in the early
but formative stages of this process. The path toward reform is always
a difficult one, particularly with the likely array of bureaucratic and
institutional obstacles the DNI is likely to confront. As the WMD
Commission candidly recognized, ``The Intelligence Community is a
closed world, and many insiders admitted to us that it has an almost
perfect record of resisting external recommendations.'' It should come
as no surprise that the array of strong statutory authorities provided
to the DNI under the legislation can, in and of itself, only accomplish
so much; implementation will now be the crucial test, and the President
must show the same level of commitment he demonstrated during the final
push to pass the intelligence reform legislation in the last Congress.
I am encouraged in this regard by the President's remarks in
announcing the nomination of Ambassador Negroponte. President Bush
said:
In the war against terrorists who target innocent civilians
and continue to seek weapons of mass murder, intelligence is
our first line of defense. If we're going to stop the
terrorists before they strike, we must ensure that our
intelligence agencies work as a single, unified enterprise.
And that's why I supported, and Congress passed, reform
legislation creating the job of Director of National
Intelligence.
As DNI, John will lead a unified intelligence community,
and will serve as the principle advisor to the President on
intelligence matters. He will have the authority to order the
collection of new intelligence, to ensure the sharing of
information among agencies, and to establish common standards
for the intelligence community's personnel. It will be John's
responsibility to determine the annual budgets for all
national intelligence agencies and offices and to direct how
these funds are spent. Vesting these authorities in a single
official who reports directly to me will make our
intelligence efforts better coordinated, more efficient, and
more effective.
Unfortunately, we had no single official who effectively forged unity
of effort across the intelligence community prior to September 11. We
had no quarterback. Prior to this legislation, the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) had three jobs: No. 1. principal intelligence
advisor to the President; No. 2. head of the CIA; and No. 3. head of
the intelligence community. As the 9/11 Commission concluded: ``No
recent DCI has been able to do all three effectively. Usually what
loses out is management of the intelligence community, a difficult task
even in the best case because the DCI's current authorities are weak.
With so much to do, the DCI often has not used even the authority he
has.''
The new Director of National Intelligence has two main
responsibilities: to head the intelligence community and to serve as
principal intelligence advisor to the President. As principal advisor
to the President, the DNI is responsible--and accountable--for ensuring
that the President is properly briefed on intelligence priorities and
activities. The CIA Director will now report to the DNI, who is not
responsible for managing the day to day activities of that agency while
also heading the intelligence community. In fact, the legislation
specifies that the Office of the DNI may not even be co-located with
the CIA or any other element of the intelligence community after
October 1, 2008.
As head of the intelligence community, the DNI will have--and must
effectively use--the wide range of strong budget, personnel, tasking,
and other authorities detailed in the legislation to forge the unity of
effort needed against the threats of this new century. I am pleased
that Ambassador Negroponte, appearing before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, indicated he has heeded the advice from many
quarters, including the President's WMD Commission, to push the
envelope with respect to his new authorities.
Perhaps the most significant of these authorities is the DNI's
control over national intelligence funding, now known as the National
Intelligence Program NIP. Money equals power in Washington, or to
paraphrase one of the witnesses who testified before the Senate
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee as we drafted the
intelligence reform legislation, former DCI James Woolsey: ``The Golden
Rule in Washington is that he who has the gold, makes the rules.'' For
instance, with respect to budget development, the bill authorizes the
DNI to ``develop and determine'' the NIP budget--which means that the
DNI is the decision-maker concerning the intelligence budget and does
not share this authority with any department head.
Once Congress passes the national intelligence budget, the DNI must
``ensure the effective execution'' of the NIP appropriation across the
entire intelligence community whether the funds are for the CIA, NSA,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or any element of the intelligence
community.
[[Page S4073]]
The Director of the Office of Management and Budget must apportion
those funds at the ``exclusive direction'' of the DNI. The DNI is
further authorized to ``direct'' the allotment and allocation of those
appropriations, and department comptrollers must then carry out their
responsibilities ``in an expeditious manner.'' In sum, the DNI controls
how national intelligence funding is spent across the executive branch,
regardless of the department in which any particular intelligence
element resides.
In order to marshal the necessary resources to address higher
priority intelligence activities, the DNI has significantly enhanced
authorities to transfer funds and personnel from one element of the
intelligence community to another. And, in addition to these budget and
transfer authorities, the legislation provides the DNI with many new
and increased authorities by which to effectively manage the sprawling
intelligence community and force greater integration and cooperation
among intelligence agencies. The DNI has the power to develop personnel
policies and programs, for example, to foster increased ``jointness''
across the intelligence community--like the Goldwater-Nichols Act
accomplished in the military context. The DNI also has the authority
to exercise greater decision-making with respect to acquisitions of
major systems, such as satellites, to task intelligence collection and
analysis, and to concur in the nominations or appointments of senior
intelligence officials at the Departments of Defense, Homeland
Security, Treasury, State, and Energy, the FBI, and elsewhere across
the executive branch.
More important than any individual authority, however, is the sum
total. There is no longer any doubt as to who is in charge of, or who
is accountable for, the performance of the United States intelligence
community. It is the DNI. Until exercised in practice, however, these
authorities are simply the words of a statute. And, unless exercised,
they will atrophy. Timidity, weakness, even passivity are not an
option. History will judge harshly a DNI who squanders this opportunity
to spread meaningful and lasting reform across the intelligence
community. And our national security depends upon it.
I fully anticipate that Ambassador Negroponte will rise to the
occasion. He must, and I believe he will, hit the ground running,
boldly face the inevitable challenges and frustrations that lie ahead,
and aggressively assert the authorities with which he has been
provided. But the DNI will not be alone. With the full support of the
President, the Joint Intelligence Community Council--composed of the
Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, and
the Attorney General--will advise the DNI and make sure the DNI's
programs, policies, and directives are executed within their respective
departments in a timely manner. And, if confirmed, the President's
nominee for Principal Deputy DNI, NSA Director Lieutenant General
Michael Hayden, will be a most valuable asset in leading the reform
effort.
We have largely provided Ambassador Negroponte with the flexibility
to establish the Office of the DNI as he sees fit in order to
accomplish the goal of reform. In addition to his Principal Deputy, he
may appoint as many as four other deputies with the duties,
responsibilities, and authorities he deems appropriate. And, in
addition to the National Counterterrorism Center, which is specifically
mandated under the legislation, Ambassador Negroponte is authorized to
establish national intelligence centers, apart from any individual
intelligence agency, to drive community-wide all-source analysis and
collection on key intelligence priorities. These national intelligence
centers have significant potential to shift the center of gravity in
the intelligence community from individual stove-piped agencies toward
a mission-oriented integrated intelligence network.
In sum, we have provided Ambassador Negroponte with the tools to get
the job done. Now, with the backing of the President, he must use those
authorities to transform the intelligence community as envisioned by
the 9/11 Commission, expected by Congress, and needed for the security
of the American people. On September 11, 2001, it became painfully
evident that the threats we face as a nation had evolved, and that our
national security structure needed to evolve accordingly. Ambassador
Negroponte will now have the opportunity to help our intelligence
community meet these new security challenges. I wish him well.
Mr. BUNNING. Mr. President, I speak today on the nomination of John
Negroponte to be the first Director of National Intelligence. I want to
express my full support for his confirmation.
John Negroponte is without question one of the most qualified public
servants to fill this position. Over the past four decades he has
continually worked to advance American policy both domestically and
abroad.
He is a career diplomat and served in the United States Foreign
Service from 1960 to 1997. Among his most notable posts are Vietnam,
the Philippines, Honduras and Mexico.
After the Foreign Service, Mr. Negroponte was appointed as the U.S.
Ambassador to the United Nations from September 2001 until June 2004.
After that, he was confirmed overwhelmingly by the Senate as the first
U.S. Ambassador to the new democratic Iraq.
Throughout his ambassadorship in Iraq, he received immense praise
even from the harshest of critics for his removal of corruption in the
reconstruction effort in Iraq. He later oversaw, what many deemed
impossible--the first successful Iraqi democratic elections. As we have
seen through his leadership in Iraq, democracy has quickly taken root
in the country and I believe it will continue to grow.
While the position of the Director of National Intelligence is new to
our Government, I am confident that Mr. Negroponte will be successful
in his endeavors to create a united intelligence entity. His experience
and success in Iraq will serve him well in this new position.
Intelligence reform is an issue that we know all too well. It has
been widely addressed in a variety of government bodies since September
11 and continues to be the topic of many debates. I commend President
Bush in his efforts to directly confront this problem and to create a
more unified and efficient intelligence apparatus.
I am confident the Senate will overwhelming confirm Mr. Negroponte. I
wish him well in his new position and with the daunting task of
reforming our intelligence agencies. It is not an easy one. Despite
this challenge, I believe he will make our intelligence efforts better
coordinated, more efficient and more effective.
Mr. SALAZAR. Mr. President, I rise in support of Ambassador John
Negroponte's nomination to be the first Director of National
Intelligence.
I am pleased President Bush filled this critical position, and
pleased that the Senate Intelligence Committee moved with such dispatch
to move him through the process. The Director of National Intelligence
will be one of the most difficult jobs in Washington. The director will
have to integrate information from 15 Federal agencies involved in
gathering anti-terrorism information.
To break down the boundaries that fracture our intelligence
community, Negroponte will have to draw on more than 40 years'
experience in the Foreign Service. He served as U.S. ambassador to the
United Nations from 2001 until last June, when he became the first U.S.
ambassador to Iraq since the 1991 Gulf War. He served in the U.S.
Embassy in Vietnam from 1964 to 1968 and has been ambassador to Mexico,
the Philippines and Honduras.
Mr. Negroponte is going to have to take advantage of his closeness
with President Bush to overcome some of the institutional inertia
within the intelligence community. However, Negroponte cannot allow
that closeness to be a double-edged sword. The DNI needs to be an
independent voice. He needs to be able to withstand pressure from the
President and report threats to American security as they are, not as
others want them to be.
I hope that Ambassador Negroponte will make it a priority to improve
the flow of accurate, timely and actionable intelligence to state and
local security officials.
Right now, local officials--our front line in the battle for homeland
security--are getting intelligence from a dozen Federal terrorism watch
lists. They get conflicting or incomplete
[[Page S4074]]
data or information that has no impact on them. They don't have the
resources and expertise to process intelligence, form a complete
picture of the threats they face, and what steps they can take.
We need to move away from a ``need-to-know'' intelligence culture to
a ``need-to-share'' one. State and local emergency officials represent
more than 800,000 sworn law enforment officers and 95 percent of
America's counter-terrorism capability. They are on the front lines of
the war on terror and they need better information in order to protect
us.
I recognize that will be difficult to do, and I also recognize that
the solutions to this problem will require new thinking. But after
serving with Colorado's police officers for 6 years as Attorney
General, I also know that the current system of information and
intelligence sharing is absolutely insufficient. We can do better--and
we must do better.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I rise to express my support for the
nominations of Ambassador John Negroponte and General Michael Hayden to
be Director and Deputy Director of National Intelligence.
The Senate's swift action on these two nominations is but the latest
example of how the Senate's confirmation process should work, and, for
the vast majority of President Bush's nominees, has worked.
It is really a simple formula for success: the President puts forward
good, qualified nominees and the committee of jurisdiction and the full
Senate act expeditiously to approve the nomination.
In nominating Ambassador John Negroponte and General Michael Hayden
to be Director and Deputy Director of National Intelligence, the
President has put forward people with long years of dedicated service
to the country.
Some have concerns about Ambassador Negroponte's previous service on
Latin American issues, and these questions are certainly legitimate to
explore.
Ambassador Negroponte and General Hayden are men who have wide
support across both parties, men who have proven track records as
professional public servants.
Together, these two men are good choices for the important new
positions at the top of our intelligence community.
With Ambassador Negroponte's recent experience in Iraq, long
experience in diplomatic matters, and years of time as a ``customer''
of intelligence, I am hopeful he will focus on improving how
intelligence is used.
It is essential that he put in place the personnel and processes
necessary to help the intelligence community avoid future colossal
failures like Iraq, where in an effort to make the case for the use of
force there, the President and the intelligence community repeatedly
asserted that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction.
As has become increasingly clear over time, Saddam did not possess
stockpiles of these terrible weapons and a number of questions have
been raised about whether the administration shaped or misused the
available intelligence.
Never again should a Secretary of State be sent in front of the
United Nations to make the President's case for war based on evidence
that was so terribly flawed.
If Ambassador Negroponte can prevent such misuse of intelligence, and
speak truth to power, he will be a successful Director.
If Ambassador Negroponte is to succeed in developing the right
intelligence and ensuring that it is used properly, he will have to
dramatically transform our intelligence agencies.
In the intelligence reform bill we passed last year, we demanded that
someone take charge of improving the intelligence agencies'
performance. In that bill, we gave him the tools and the mandate
needed.
Working with his Deputy Director, General Hayden, who has nearly 3
decades of experience in transforming intelligence as a military
officer, I expect Ambassador Negroponte to transform the intelligence
community.
The first step in this critical transformation must be to
dramatically improve our intelligence collection capabilities,
especially our human intelligence efforts, against the 21st century
threats of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.
I hope these nominees will maximize their use of the strong, new
authorities Congress provided them in last year's bill. Our Nation's
security rests in large measure on their efforts. I wish them every
success in their endeavors.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, if there is no other Member on our
side who wishes to speak, I yield back the remainder of my time.
Mr. WYDEN. I may be the only one with time remaining and I yield back
the remainder of my time as well.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
Mr. ROBERTS. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I yield back all time on the pending
nomination, other than the 5 minutes that will be reserved for Senator
Stevens; provided further that the vote on the confirmation of the
nomination occur at 3:45 today. I further ask that at 3:30 today the
Senate resume consideration of the emergency supplemental bill for the
final 15 minutes of debate and that the votes scheduled on the two
amendments and final passage occur immediately following the vote on
the Negroponte nomination. I ask that all votes in the sequence after
the first be limited to 10 minutes in length and that there be 2
minutes for debate equally divided between the votes. Finally, I ask
unanimous consent that following this consent, the Senate proceed to a
period for morning business with Senators permitted to speak for up to
10 minutes each.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon.
Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed
to speak as in morning business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
____________________
Congressional Record: April 21, 2005 (Senate)
Page S4078-S4079
NOMINATION OF JOHN NEGROPONTE
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I come to the floor to talk about my good
friend, John Negroponte. I have known him and Diana and their
children--Marina, Alejandra, John, George, and Sophia--for quite some
time. I think the Nation is very lucky to have a man of the caliber of
John Negroponte on deck, so to speak, and willing to take the
assignment of being the new Director of National Intelligence. He has
had considerable experience as an ambassador.
I remember full well the first time I met him was in Honduras when he
was the Ambassador there. We had a rather severe problem, as people
will recall; we called them the Contras. But I got to know him fairly
well in the time we were down there. When he returned to Washington, I
met his wife and was with him and spent time with him on a family
basis. I have spent time with him now in his various positions he has
had since that time, at the U.N. and in Iraq.
He is a man of great talent and depth. I believe there are many of
us--and I am one of them--who had severe questions about the direction
we were taking in terms of this new Director of National Intelligence
and how it would relate to existing agencies and to the State
Department and to the Department of Defense and to the National
Security Agency and all others who are involved in intelligence and
relate to those in the Congress who have the oversight responsibility
for the intelligence function and for the classified areas of the
activities of our Nation.
John Negroponte is a man who can do this job. He is a man of great
talent. But more than that, he has demonstrated the ability to work
with people and various entities, not only here in our country but
throughout the world. This new Director of National Intelligence could
well become the most important Cabinet position we have in the years to
come. John Negroponte is the man to fashion that office, to determine
what it needs in order to function properly at the beginning, and to
set the course for this new intelligence agency.
So I am here to urge that the Senate promptly approve this nomination
and confirm John Negroponte so he can start on this very important
task.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Coleman). The Senator from Arizona is
recognized.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I associate myself with the remarks of the
senior Senator from Alaska concerning the qualifications of John
Negroponte. Both the Senator from Alaska and I have known him for many
years and his service is one of great distinction. I am confident he
will receive the endorsement of an overwhelming majority of the Senate.
[...]
Congressional Record: April 21, 2005 (Senate)
Page S4084]
EXECUTIVE SESSION
______
NOMINATION OF JOHN D. NEGROPONTE TO BE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE-- Continued
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will
resume executive session and proceed to a vote on the nomination, which
the clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read the nomination of John D. Negroponte, of
New York, to be Director of National Intelligence.
Mr. COCHRAN. I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The question is, Will the Senate advise and consent to the nomination
of John D. Negroponte, of New York, to be Director of National
Intelligence? The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call
the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
The result was announced--yeas 98, nays 2, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 107 Ex.]
YEAS--98
Akaka
Alexander
Allard
Allen
Baucus
Bayh
Bennett
Biden
Bingaman
Bond
Boxer
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Burr
Byrd
Cantwell
Carper
Chafee
Chambliss
Clinton
Coburn
Cochran
Coleman
Collins
Conrad
Cornyn
Corzine
Craig
Crapo
Dayton
DeMint
DeWine
Dodd
Dole
Domenici
Dorgan
Durbin
Ensign
Enzi
Feingold
Feinstein
Frist
Graham
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Hutchison
Inhofe
Inouye
Isakson
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerry
Kohl
Kyl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Lott
Lugar
Martinez
McCain
McConnell
Mikulski
Murkowski
Murray
Nelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)
Obama
Pryor
Reed
Reid
Roberts
Rockefeller
Salazar
Santorum
Sarbanes
Schumer
Sessions
Shelby
Smith
Snowe
Specter
Stabenow
Stevens
Sununu
Talent
Thomas
Thune
Vitter
Voinovich
Warner
NAYS--2
Harkin
Wyden
The nomination was confirmed.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the President shall
be immediately notified of the Senate's action.
____________________
Congressional Record: April 21, 2005 (Senate)
Page S4086
EXECUTIVE SESSION
______
NOMINATION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MICHAEL V. HAYDEN, UNITED STATES AIR
FORCE, TO BE GENERAL AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, a unanimous consent has been agreed to by
both sides for the Senate to immediately proceed to executive session
to consider the following nominations on today's Executive Calendar: PN
421, LTG Michael V. Hayden, to be General, reported by the Armed
Services Committee today; and No. 70, which is the confirmation of
General Hayden to be the Deputy Director of National Intelligence.
I further ask unanimous consent the nominations be confirmed en bloc,
the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, the President be
immediately notified of the Senate's action, and the Senate then return
to legislative session.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The nominations considered and confirmed are as follows:
air force
The following named officer for appointment in the United
States Air Force to the grade indicated while assigned to a
position of importance and responsibility under title 10,
U.S.C., section 601:
To be general
Lt. Gen. Michael V. Hayden.
executive office of the president
Lieutenant General Michael V. Hayden, United States Air
Force, to be Principal Deputy Director of National
Intelligence. (New Position.)
____________________
