Congressional Record: June 21, 2005 (House)
Page H4829-H4840
PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 2475, INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION
ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006
Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I
call up House Resolution 331 and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:
H. Res. 331
Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it
shall be in order without intervention of any point of order
to consider in the House the bill (H.R. 2475) to authorize
appropriations for fiscal year 2006 for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for
other purposes. The bill shall be considered as read. The
amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence now printed in the
bill, modified by the amendment printed in part A of the
report of the Committee on Rules accompanying this
resolution, shall be considered as adopted. The previous
question shall be considered as ordered on the bill, as
amended, and on any further amendment thereto to final
passage without intervening motion except: (1) One hour of
debate on the bill, as amended, equally divided and
controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; (2) the further
amendment printed in part B of the report of the Committee on
Rules, if offered by Representative Maloney of New York or
her designee, which shall be in order without intervention of
any point of order or demand for division of the question,
shall be considered as read, and shall be separately
debatable for 30 minutes equally divided and controlled by
the proponent and an opponent; and (3) one motion to recommit
with or without instructions.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Putnam) is
recognized for 1 hour.
Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the
customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings),
pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During
consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purpose
of debate only.
(Mr. PUTNAM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks, and include extraneous material.)
Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Speaker, H. Res. 331 is a structured rule that
provides for consideration of H.R. 2475, authorizing appropriations for
fiscal year 2006 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and
the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System.
I am pleased to bring this resolution to the floor for its
consideration. The rule provides for 1 hour of general debate, equally
divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The rule waives all
points of order against consideration of the bill.
It provides that the amendment in the nature of a substitute
recommended by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence modified
by the amendment printed in part A of the Committee on Rules report
accompanying the resolution shall be considered as adopted and shall be
considered as read.
It makes in order an amendment offered by the gentlewoman from New
York (Mrs. Maloney) or her designee which shall be considered as read
and shall be debatable for 30 minutes equally divided and controlled by
the proponent and opponent, and all points of order against the
amendment are waived.
The rule provides for a motion to recommit with or without
instructions.
Mr. Speaker, I am proud to present for consideration the rule for the
Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2006. I want to commend
the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) and his hard-working ranking
member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), for their
excellent work on this legislation. More than any other committee in
the Congress, we rely on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
to do work that we have confidence in and that is accurate and honest.
The committee is the eyes and ears of this Congress in the intelligence
community. We depend on them to be aware of what the rest of the world
and our own community is up to. We put our faith in them to practice
oversight and to produce a legislative product that addresses the needs
of our intelligence community, and therefore our Nation.
The committee does an outstanding job of working on a bipartisan
basis to provide for our men and women who are fighting the war on
terror on a variety of fronts.
I want to take a moment to salute those men and women who are working
around the globe in a variety of capacities doing so much in a quiet,
discreet way for our security and liberty. Linguists, analysts, case
officers, mathematicians, and engineers, some of the brightest minds
that our Nation produces, work in the intelligence community taking, in
many cases, an option that is not as generous as the private sector may
be if they were to put that intellect and those talents and skills into
some other capacity in the private sector.
But they do it as a labor of love, as a part of public service
identical to that which calls men and women into uniform in the armed
services and which calls men and women into our firefighter and police
and other first responding capacities. No differently than those
uniformed members, the men and women in our intelligence community
throughout the world are performing a huge public service for which we
can never show enough gratitude and appreciation.
{time} 1300
The Intelligence Committee has reported out a bill that continues the
House's commitment to the global war on terrorism and to ensuring that
intelligence resources are directed in a balanced way toward threats to
our national security. This legislation authorizes more than last
year's appropriated amount and more than the President's request to
continue to fight the war on terror.
The bill does an effective job of balancing our intelligence
resources and strengthening human intelligence gathering by increasing
the number of case officers and training and support infrastructure. A
long-term counterterrorism program is established to reduce the
dependence on supplemental appropriations. Additionally, it authorizes
the full amount of funds expected for heightened operations for
counterterrorism operations and the war in Iraq.
H.R. 2475 enhances the analytic workforce by providing additional
linguists and analysts as well as improved training and tools.
Furthermore, the bill continues to invest in technical programs,
funding systems end to end, investing in R&D and increased use of
signature intelligence, and reflects the results of a comprehensive
survey to review and rationalize technical collection programs.
For the first time, the Intelligence Authorization Act funds the new
Office of the Director of National Intelligence and allows for
increased positions. The National Counterterrorism Center is enhanced
through improved information sharing activities and collaboration
provisions. The bill improves physical and technical infrastructure of
intelligence agencies with new facilities.
This authorization bill is a perfect example of how Congress can
achieve a bipartisan product that meets the needs of our Nation. Again,
I thank Chairman Hoekstra, Ranking Member Harman, and the members of
the committee for their admirable work. I urge Members to support the
rule and the underlying bill.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I
may consume. First, let me thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr.
Putnam) for yielding me the time.
[[Page H4830]]
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this rule providing for the
consideration of the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year
2006.
First, Mr. Speaker, let me remind my colleagues that Members who wish
to do so can go to the Intelligence Committee office to examine the
classified schedule of authorizations for the programs and activities
of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the national
intelligence program. This includes authorizations for the CIA as well
as the foreign intelligence and counterintelligence programs within,
among other things, the Department of Defense, the National Security
Agency, the Departments of State, Treasury and Energy, and the FBI.
Also included in the classified documents are the authorizations for
the tactical intelligence and related activities and joint military
intelligence program of the Department of Defense.
Today more than ever, we must make the creation of a strong and
flexible intelligence apparatus one of the highest priorities of this
body. The terrorist attacks of September 11, combined with the
continuing threat of further attacks, underscore the importance of this
legislation, and I am pleased that it has been brought to the floor
before the July 4 recess.
Now, Mr. Speaker, while I generally support this bill, it is not
closed to improvements. As the Democrats noted in our additional views,
this bill is the first authorization bill to be considered since the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 became law
last December. The reforms undertaken last year, in the aftermath of
two intelligence failures, created a Director of National Intelligence
and dramatically reshaped the intelligence community. This
authorization bill will therefore help define the authorities,
priorities, and direction of the Director of National Intelligence and
the entire intelligence community.
Mr. Speaker, I am pleased that the committee rejected the President's
paltry request for counterterrorism funding and, instead, fully funded
the intelligence community's needs. Fully funding counterterrorism
represents bipartisanship and good public policy. Of course, this does
not seem to be the first time that this administration does not heed
the advice of its own intelligence experts, but I digress.
Let me speak also briefly about the fact that this bill and the
report accompanying it are pretty much silent on one of the most
salient issues of the day, our military prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
The allegations of severe human rights abuses at Guantanamo Bay are at
best extremely disturbing and at worst unforgivable sins of our Nation,
which has always led the fight for human rights. I do not work there,
so I cannot speak to the veracity of every single allegation. But I do
know that Guantanamo Bay is a stealth prison, an unrecognizable blip on
the radar screen of domestic and international law. Surrounded by a
world of laws, treaties, norms and practices, Guantanamo is an
unrecognizable entity, a small space where the law simply does not
penetrate.
The prisoners are in judicial limbo, with limited access to lawyers
and no legal recourse to profess their guilt or innocence or to protect
themselves from abuse. In fact, many of them have now been jailed for
more than 3 years without even having been charged with a crime. It
sounds a bit Kafkaesque to me. Requests from objective outside
observers to examine the condition of the prisoners have been rebuffed
time and again. The Bush administration seems to trust in only itself
to determine whether the prisoners are deserving of legal protections.
I am disheartened by the intelligence authorization bill's silence on
this matter. The Members of this body should be greatly concerned with
the utter lack of respect for the law or adherence to international
agreements that characterize Guantanamo Bay. Former Supreme Court
Justice Louis Brandeis once said, ``If the government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law.''
Congress has a responsibility to prevent Guantanamo Bay from becoming
the personal prison of convenience for the Bush administration to stash
people it does not want to suffer legal rights to. This body would be
greatly remiss if we shucked that responsibility in favor of turning a
blind eye to what very well might be the biggest terrorism recruitment
tool since the attacks on September 11.
Mr. Speaker, as I have said, this bill provides authorizations and
appropriations for some of the most important national security
programs in this country. With the adoption of the manager's amendment,
which we will hear about in much greater detail presently, I look
forward to supporting the bill's ultimate passage.
Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 3 minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. McGovern), my colleague
with whom I serve on the Rules Committee.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this rule.
Mr. Speaker, on June 8, the gentleman from California (Mr. Waxman),
the ranking member on the Committee on Government Reform, came before
the Committee on Rules asking that two amendments be made in order. One
amendment calls for a select committee to be established in Congress to
investigate abuses of detainees held under U.S. military custody. The
other amendment establishes an independent commission for the same
purpose.
Mr. Speaker, these are matters that merit the attention of this House
and deserve to be debated and voted upon by the Members of this body.
But the majority party on the Rules Committee feels otherwise. The
Republican leadership believes it is better to sweep these matters
under the rug, hide them, forget about them, but certainly not
investigate them. It makes no difference whether such an inquiry takes
place inside the Congress or outside the Congress, any form of
independent investigation is out of the question.
But questions about the abuse and torture of detainees simply will
not go away, whether it is Guantanamo or Abu Ghraib or the countless
other prisons, jails and detention facilities under U.S. control in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Every week brings new revelations of abuses.
Mr. Speaker, I do not blame our soldiers for these abuses. It is
their leaders who have failed. It is the leaders up and down the chain
of command whose incompetence and arrogance have led to a systemic
breakdown of standards and codes of conduct that our military has lived
by since its creation.
Mr. Speaker, I would like to read a few lines from the June 13
edition of Newsweek. The article is entitled ``Good Intentions Gone
Bad.'' In it, Rod Nordland, Newsweek's Baghdad bureau chief, who is
departing after 2 years in Iraq, shares a few final thoughts. He
writes:
``Two years ago I went to Iraq as an unabashed believer in toppling
Saddam Hussein. I knew his regime well from previous visits. WMDs or
no, ridding the world of Saddam would surely be for the best, and
America's good intentions would carry the day. What went wrong? A lot,
but the biggest turning point was the Abu Ghraib scandal. Since April
2004, the liberation of Iraq has become a desperate exercise in damage
control. The abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib alienated a broad swath
of the Iraqi public. On top of that, it didn't work. There is no
evidence that all the mistreatment and humiliation saved a single
American life or led to the capture of any major terrorist, despite
claims by the military that the prison produced actionable
intelligence. The most shocking thing about Abu Ghraib was not the
behavior of U.S. troops but the incompetence of their leaders.''
Mr. Speaker, this is why we should be debating the Waxman amendments.
We cannot run and hide from this abuse. It haunts us, Mr. Speaker. It
haunts us. If ever a matter needed the light of day, it is this one.
Oppose this rule. Support debate on the Waxman amendments. Restore
America's credibility on human rights and military conduct.
Mr. Speaker, I submit for the Record articles from Newsweek and from
the Baltimore Sun.
[From Newsweek, Jun. 13, 2005]
Good Intentions Gone Bad
(By Rod Norland)
Two years ago I went to Iraq as an unabashed believer in
toppling Saddam Hussein. I knew his regime well from previous
visits; WMDs or no, ridding the world of Saddam would surely
be for the best, and America's good intentions would carry
the day. What went wrong? A lot, but the biggest turning
point was the Abu Ghraib scandal.
[[Page H4831]]
Since April 2004 the liberation of Iraq has become a
desperate exercise in damage control. The abuse of prisoners
at Abu Ghraib alienated a broad swath of the Iraqi public. On
top of that, it didn't work. There is no evidence that all
the mistreatment and humiliation saved a single American life
or led to the capture of any major terrorist, despite claims
by the military that the prison produced ``actionable
intelligence.''
The most shocking thing about Abu Ghraib was not the
behavior of U.S. troops, but the incompetence of their
leaders. Against the conduct of the Lynndie Englands and the
Charles Graners, I'll gladly set the honesty and courage of
Specialist Joseph Darby, the young MP who reported the abuse.
A few soldiers will always do bad things. that's why you need
competent officers, who know what the men and women under
their command are capable of--and make sure it doesn't
happen.
Living and working in Iraq, it's hard not to succumb to
despair. At last count America has pumped at least $7 billion
into reconstruction projects, with little to show for it but
the hostility of ordinary Iraqis, who still have an 18
percent unemployment rate. Most of the cash goes to U.S.
contractors who spend much of it on personal security. Basic
services like electricity, water and sewers still aren't up
to prewar levels. Electricity is especially vital in a
country where summer temperatures commonly reach 125 degrees
Fahrenheit. Yet only 15 percent of Iraqis have reliable
electrical service. In the capital, where it counts most,
it's only 4 percent.
The most powerful army in human history can't even protect
a two-mile stretch of road. The Airport Highway connects both
the international airport and Baghdad's main American
military base, Camp Victory, to the city center. At night
U.S. troops secure the road for the use of dignitaries; they
close it to traffic and shoot at any unauthorized vehicles.
More troops and more helicopters could help make the whole
country safe. Instead the Pentagon has been drawing down the
number of helicopters. And America never deployed nearly
enough soldiers. They couldn't stop the orgy of looting that
followed Saddam's fall. Now their primary mission is self-
defense at any cost--which only deepens Iraqis' resentment.
The four-square-mile Green Zone, the one place in Baghdad
where foreigners are reasonably safe, could be a showcase of
American values and abilities. Instead the American enclave
is a trash-strewn wasteland of Mad Max-style fortifications.
The traffic lights don't work because no one has bothered to
fix them. The garbage rarely gets collected. Some of the
worst ambassadors in U.S. history are the GIs at the Green
Zone's checkpoints. They've repeatedly punched Iraqi
ministers, accidentally shot at visiting dignitaries and
behave (even on good days) with all the courtesy of nightclub
bouncers--to Americans and Iraqis alike. Not that U.S.
soldiers in Iraq have much to smile about. They're
overworked, much ignored on the home front and widely
despised in Iraq, with little to look forward to but the
distant end of their tours--and in most cases, another tour
soon to follow. Many are reservists who, when they get home,
often face the wreckage of careers and family.
I can't say how it will end. Iraq now has an elected
government, popular at least among Shiites and Kurds, who
give it strong approval ratings. There's even some hope that
the Sunni minority will join the constitutional process.
Iraqi security forces continue to get better trained and
equipped. But Iraqis have such along way to go, and there are
so many ways for things to get even worse. I'm not one of
those who think America should pull out immediately. There's
no real choice but to stay, probably for many years to come.
The question isn't ``When will America pull out?''; it's
``How bad a mess can we afford to leave behind?'' All I can
say is this: last one out, please turn on the lights.
____
[From the Baltimore Sun, June 5, 2005]
Close Camp Delta
(By Michael Posner)
For many around the world, the detention facility at the
U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, has become one of
the most prominent, negative symbols of America's departure
from the rule of law since 9/11.
Camp Delta, as the prison on Guantanamo is called, holds
more than 520 men from about 40 countries. Many of these
people have been detained there for more than three years;
none has been given any indication of when, or even if, he
will be released. The U.S. government has classified all of
the detainees as ``enemy combatants.''
While the term is not recognized in international human
rights or humanitarian law, it has provided the U.S.
government with a rationale for denying detainees any rights
whatsoever, either under the Geneva Conventions (the laws of
war) or U.S. criminal law. This situation has prompted some
Bush administration officials to dub Guantanamo ``the legal
equivalent of outer space.'' This label would also apply to
the dozens of secret U.S. detention sites in Iraq,
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Jordan and aboard ships at sea.
But just as Guantanamo has become a powerful negative
symbol, it has the potential to be a positive one if the
United States is willing to take steps to recognize the
possibility. One step, and it is a bold one, would be to shut
down the Guantanamo prison--to close its doors and, in doing
so, open a public debate among members of Congress, military
officers and intelligence and law enforcement leaders on
interrogation and detention practices around the world.
Shuttering Guantanamo not only would allow the United
States to broadcast to the world its commitment to the rule
of law--by moving all security detainees into an established
legal process--it also would serve America's security
interests. Those around the world who use the symbol of
Guantanamo to fuel anti-American sentiments would lose one of
their most potent rallying cries. And autocratic governments
no longer would be able to hide behind American's example, as
they do now, in justifying their own practices of indefinite
detention and abuse.
The closing of Guantanamo would, by its very nature,
require an evaluation of all the locations where the United
States is holding security prisoners because Guantanamo
derives much of its infamy from what it has wrought:
Guantanamo was the testing ground for coercive interrogation
techniques. Torture was exported to other facilities from
there.
In the spring of 2003, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld
explicitly approved 24 interrogation techniques for
Guantanamo, including ``dietary manipulation,''
``environmental manipulation,'' ``sleep adjustment'' and
``isolation,'' all of which has been previously prohibited by
U.S. law and explicit military policy. He did so despite
strenuous objections from senior military lawyers, the FBI
and others in the government. This policy is still in place.
By mid-2003, the military extended the Guantanamo rules to
Iraq. In fact, in August 2003, the Pentagon sent the
Guantanamo commander, Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller, to Abu
Ghraib prison, reportedly with the instruction to ``Gitmo-
ize'' the Iraqi prisons. The revelation of pictures from Abu
Ghraib last spring tells part of that story.
But the story is much bigger--and more troubling--than what
those photos depict. Consider this: Since December 2002, 108
people have died in U.S. custody, according to Pentagon
figures. Of these deaths, no less than 28 were criminal
homicides, the Defense Department acknowledges. The victims
were tortured to death.
An official investigation into the cases of two young men
who were beaten to death at a U.S.-run facility in Bagram,
Afghanistan, revealed that more than two dozen soldiers were
involved in these deaths. The interrogators, believe that
they could deviate from the well-tested rules because, as one
said, ``there was the Geneva Conventions for enemy prisoners
of war, but nothing for terrorists.''
Despite its benefits, the prospect of Guantanamo being
closed any time soon is unlikely. Last week, Vice President
Dick Cheney said of the prison: ``What we're doing down there
has, I think, been done perfectly appropriately.'' And yet,
the vice president's assertion files in the face of leaked
FBI and International Red Cross reports as well as comments
by a former U.S. military translator who published his
observations of detainee mistreatment and sexual humiliation.
What can be done when there is such a discrepancy between
the facts and the official interpretation of them? In a
democracy, the best way to deal with this is openness:
Congress should authorize the creation of an independent,
bipartisan commission to conduct a thorough investigation of
U.S. detention and interrogation policies worldwide. This
would allow the United States to assess what went wrong and
why and to recommend corrective action.
Until Congress does this, Guantanamo and the other U.S.
detention centers will continue to serve as the symbol of
America's tarnished reputation.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased and privileged to
yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), the
distinguished ranking member of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence.
(Ms. HARMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend her
remarks.)
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I commend the gentleman for yielding me this
time and for his service both on the Rules Committee and on the
Intelligence Committee, and I thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr.
Putnam) as well for his comments earlier in this debate.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to oppose the previous question so
that we can have a debate on the Waxman amendment. Yesterday, we had an
open rule for the Defense Appropriations Act which funds the
intelligence community. I fail to see why we cannot have an open rule
for the authorization bill for those same intelligence programs. I also
think it is sad that the leadership scheduled consideration of this
authorization bill after our vote on the appropriations bill. This
makes little sense and erodes our ability to establish clear guidance
for how money will be spent.
Mr. Speaker, this rule should have made in order all of the
amendments
[[Page H4832]]
that were offered. Only 10 amendments were submitted to the Rules
Committee. Of those, nine were offered by Democrats, and of those nine,
only one was made in order. Each amendment was responsible. Each
deserves full consideration on the House floor. Members on both sides
of the aisle should have an opportunity to debate the important issues
raised by these amendments, but as a result of this unnecessarily
restrictive rule, neither Republicans nor Democrats will have that
opportunity.
Mr. Speaker, I want to highlight one amendment that the Rules
Committee will not let us debate, the Waxman amendment to establish an
independent commission on detainee issues. Detentions and
interrogations are vital tools. We need those tools. But they must take
place according to our laws and our values. To do anything less puts
our own troops in harm's way and erodes our moral credibility in the
world.
Today, our intelligence professionals operate in what I call a ``fog
of law,'' a confusing patchwork of laws, treaties, memos and policies.
The Intelligence Committee's oversight subcommittee is conducting a
serious bipartisan investigation into the practice of renditions and
interrogations under the able leadership of the gentleman from Texas
(Mr. Thornberry) and the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Cramer). But this
investigation is largely classified. We also need a public unclassified
investigation so that the public can have confidence that our
Constitution and our laws are respected. A public bipartisan
investigation will help us learn precisely what happened, who should be
accountable at senior as well as operational levels, and how to fix the
problems.
{time} 1315
Mr. Speaker, I will enter into the Record an op-ed from the June 7
Washington Post by civil rights attorney Floyd Abrams, former
Representative Bob Barr, and Ambassador Tom Pickering, which called for
the creation of an independent commission. They wrote: ``Only with such
a commission are we likely to enact the reforms needed to restore our
credibility among the nations of the world.''
I agree. Shutting off the lights at Guantanamo will not solve the
problem. Only Congress can solve the problem by addressing the policies
underlying Guantanamo. Article I, section 8 of the Constitution states
that it is Congress's responsibility to make rules concerning captures
on land and water, and that is why, in addition to calling for this
independent commission, I believe we need bipartisan legislation. The
safety of our troops and our moral credibility in the world are on the
line.
I urge my colleagues to oppose this restrictive rule and the previous
question.
The material previously referred to is as follows:
[From the Washington Post, June 7, 2005]
Justice Before Politics
(By Floyd Abrams, Bob Barr and Thomas Pickering)
After the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, came widespread shock
and horror--and some tough questions. Could the United States
have prevented this catastrophe? What corrective action might
we take to protect ourselves from other terrorist attacks?
After political struggles and initial resistance by many
political leaders, Congress and the president created the
Sept. 11 commission in 2002. This bipartisan group of 10
prominent Americans was charged with conducting an
independent and complete investigation of the terrorist
attacks of Sept. 11 and with providing recommendations for
preventing such disasters. In July 2004 the commission
released its report, and in December Congress passed
legislation to implement many of its recommendations.
In the spring of 2004, the scandal involving the abuse of
prisoners at Abu Ghraib became public. Additional allegations
of abuse surfaced in connection with prisoners detained by
the United States at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and elsewhere.
Many Americans asked themselves the same painful questions
about these allegations: How could such terrible actions have
taken place? Who was responsible? What reforms might we
implement to prevent such problems? Once again, a year later,
these questions remain unanswered.
We believe that the American public deserves answers. We
are members of the bipartisan Liberty and Security Initiative
of the Constitution Project, which is based at Georgetown
University's Public Policy Institute. We have joined with
other members of the initiative--Republicans and Democrats,
liberals and conservatives--to call for the establishment of
an independent bipartisan commission to investigate the issue
of abuse of terrorist suspects. We urge Congress and the
president to immediately create such a commission and to use
the Sept. 11 commission as a model.
No investigation completed to date has included
recommendations on how mistreatment at detention facilities
might be avoided. Even the Pentagon's much-heralded report by
Vice Adm. Albert T. Church, completed in March, concluded
only that there were ``missed opportunities in the policy
development process'' and that these opportunities ``should
be considered in the development of future interrogation
policies.''
Establishing an independent, bipartisan commission would
also be beneficial for U.S. relationships abroad. The abuse
of terrorist suspects in U.S. custody has undermined the
United States' position in the world. This is a time when we
should be making extra efforts to reach out to Muslims and to
ask them to work with us in the war against terrorism.
Instead, our failure to undertake a thorough and credible
investigation has created severe resentment of the United
States.
An independent bipartisan investigation can generate
widespread acceptance and support for its findings. Only with
such a commission are we likely to enact the reforms needed
to restore our credibility among the nations of the world.
We must move beyond the partisan battles of our highly
charged political climate. To provide a credible
investigation and a plan for corrective action, and to show
the world that the United States takes seriously its
obligations to uphold the rule of law, we urge Congress and
the president to establish a commission to investigate abuse
of terrorist suspects.
Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the words of the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Harman) and the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr.
McGovern) and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings) as it relates
to these issues. It reflects a legitimate disagreement over the
direction that this investigation should take, whether it should be
based in the legislative branch or based in the executive branch or
some combination, which has been the history.
In fact, here in our own Congress, the Senate has had eight hearings
on detainee abuse, and three on Abu Ghraib specifically. General Myers,
the chairman of the Joint Chiefs; the Chief of Staff of the Army; the
Secretary of Defense; and the Acting Secretary of the Army have all
conducted independent reviews. There are 12 other Department of Defense
reviews that have occurred, and the House Committee on Armed Services
in this body has held three hearings and numerous briefings.
The legislative branch has been diligent in their oversight
responsibility. And I appreciate that there are differences on this,
but I particularly appreciate the way that my colleagues on the other
side of the aisle have handled this. Unlike in the Senate where the
detainee abuse was equated with the regime of Pol Pot and Hitler and
Stalin, there is a measured approach to disagreement in this Chamber,
and I think that that is the responsible approach, unlike the direction
that the Senate has gone. To equate Guantanamo Bay with regimes that
murdered millions of people is absurd, and it is dangerous, and it
gives aid and comfort to the enemy.
As the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services in this body
pointed out, detainees in Guantanamo are provided their own prayer
rugs. If that were done in the public school system, it would be
against the law. They are called to prayer five times a day. If that
were done on the average high school intercom system, it would be a
violation of the law. They are fed three nutritious meals per day at an
average of $12 per detainee per day. If we multiplied what we spend on
the school lunch program times three meals, they would be receiving
less than a detainee in Guantanamo Bay.
And because of the ongoing judicial review that our government is
engaged in with those detainees, at the end of that process, 234
detainees so far have been released from Guantanamo. And to show their
great gratitude, at least a dozen of them have been identified as
returning to the fight against American servicemen and -women.
I think that it is important that we keep those facts in mind, as
well, as we move through this debate.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
Before yielding to the gentleman from California (Mr. Waxman), I
would
[[Page H4833]]
just say to my friend from Florida that this judicial review that he
talks about evidently is going to take place forever.
It is not about food, Mr. Speaker. The detainees are properly fed.
But they cannot see their relatives. Most of them cannot see a lawyer,
and most of them have not been told what they are charged with. When I
say it is Kafka-esque, Franz Kafka wrote the book ``The Trial'' that
said how horrible it was to be in a situation where one does not know
their accusers, they do not know what they are charged with, and they
are convicted of something in sitting there. We cannot do that in this
country. It is not about food. It is about rights. It is about human
rights and dignity.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from
California (Mr. Waxman), ranking member of the Committee on Government
Reform.
Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Speaker, it has been over a year since we saw the
horrific photographs of the torture of the prisoners in Abu Ghraib
prison in Iraq. Yet in Congress, we have ignored our fundamental
responsibility to investigate this issue. And it is not just Abu
Ghraib, but other prison camps as well where we are hearing more and
more reports of instances of disrespect of the Koran and denial of
human rights to detainees.
Under our system of checks and balances, the House of Representatives
has a constitutional duty to ensure proper oversight of the executive
branch, and for this reason I submitted an amendment to this bill to
create either a select committee of the House of Representatives to
examine the matter or an independent commission to conduct such an
investigation. But the Republican leadership blocked both amendments.
They do not want an investigation inside the House or outside by an
independent group. The independent commission, I believe, would have
filled this huge oversight vacuum. It was denied, and that is why I am
in opposition to the previous question on the rule and the rule itself.
The reports of detainee abuse are undermining one of our Nation's
most valuable assets, our reputation and respect for human rights. And
they are endangering our Armed Forces and inciting hatred against the
United States. As Senator Biden said, Guantanamo is the ``greatest
propaganda tool for the recruitment of terrorists worldwide.''
Some of the allegations that have been replayed over and over again
around the world may not be true. President Bush calls them ``absurd.''
But we will not know what is true and what is not true unless we
investigate. And when we refuse to conduct thorough, independent
investigations, the rest of the world thinks we have something to hide.
When we ignore our constitutional obligations, we are not doing the
administration any favor. A lack of oversight leads to a lack of
accountability, and no accountability breeds arrogance and abuse of
power.
Over the past year, more and more instances of detainee abuse from a
growing number of locations around the world have come to light. In
just the past few weeks, new evidence emerged of the desecration of the
Koran at Guantanamo Bay; the involvement of Navy Seals in beating
detainees in Iraq; and the gruesome, ultimately fatal torture of
Afghans at the U.S. detention center at Bagram Airbase in Afghanistan.
It is time for this House to put aside political calculations and
fulfill our constitutional oversight responsibilities.
Let me just point out to my colleagues that we have not had an
investigation since Abu Ghraib. The House held only 5 hours of public
hearings in the Committee on Armed Services to investigate the abuses.
In contrast, the House spent 140 hours taking witness testimony to
examine whether President Clinton mishandled his Christmas card list.
What is more important for the use of oversight and investigative
powers of the House?
While the Senate review has been more extensive, it has not involved
comprehensive public review of all relevant agencies and personnel, nor
has it produced comprehensive conclusions regarding individual
accountability and necessary corrective actions.
We must do our job. We need to examine these allegations and take our
oversight responsibilities seriously. I urge a ``no'' vote on the rule.
Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Unquestionably, Congress's responsibility to properly oversee the
activities of the entire Federal Government is preeminent, and that is
why I am proud that, under the leadership of the gentleman from
California (Chairman Hunter), they have had hearings. In the Senate
they have had hearings. And today, as we speak, the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence also has an oversight subcommittee
devoted to investigating all of these issues.
Mr. Speaker, to elaborate on that, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman
from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra), the distinguished chairman of that
committee.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for yielding me this
time.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the rule. And before I move on to
address some of the discussion that has been on the floor today, let me
talk about some of the issues in the rule; and I think later on we will
have an opportunity to talk about what may be unusual in this bill.
But as my colleagues on the other side today may try to destroy, we
have developed a bill that will set a direction for the intelligence
community and we have done it in a bipartisan way. We have checked the
issues as to whether the bill is sufficient in terms of the resources
to have an effective intelligence community. We have made important
decisions as to the relative balance between HUMINT and our technical
capabilities. We have made important decisions about the direction of
our technical capabilities, and we have done it on a bipartisan basis.
This bill came out of committee with a voice vote. It shows the
continued commitment of the House to support the global war on
terrorism and our troops deployed abroad. We attempted this year to
keep ancillary issues out of the bill, to focus the full attention of
the committee on careful oversight and review of our Nation's
intelligence programs. Our goal was to properly align the resources of
those programs to counter the threats facing our Nation. I appreciate
the efforts of the Committee on Rules to keep floor debate similarly
focused on the programs that are authorized in the bill and related
issues.
Again, we are setting a strategic direction for where we think the
intelligence community needs to go. There will be some changes that
were made as a result of the rule that we will vote on in the next few
minutes, and these again were an attempt to make sure that there was
not confusion about what direction we wanted to go in, what we wanted
to get done, and make sure that the underlying direction for the reform
of the intelligence community was the bill that was signed into law by
the President last December.
I will say that I agree with some of my colleagues on the other side.
My ranking member said it is the responsibility of Congress to do its
work. Congress will do its work. We have been doing our work. We have
had a bipartisan, constructive effort, led by the gentleman from Texas
(Mr. Thornberry) and the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Cramer), to take a
look at the allegations that are out there. We have been investigating
these issues.
My colleague here says we have not been doing any work. My colleague
has not done the basics. He maybe could have asked, has the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence on the House side done anything to
take a look at the alleged allegations or the abuses at Guantanamo, the
intelligence community's relationships to Abu Ghraib? I think my
ranking member on the other side has said that we have had a
constructive, bipartisan effort to take a look at the allegations, to
take a look at the role of the intelligence community, and to take a
look at how we move forward on these types of things. But sometimes
people do not even want to raise the basic questions and get the basic
information that they need.
These are serious issues. The information that the folks may have in
Guantanamo may save American lives. It will make our war on terror more
effective.
Should these allegations be investigated? Absolutely. Are they being
investigated? Absolutely. And members
[[Page H4834]]
on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence know that that work
has been going on, and it has been going on in a very constructive and
a very effective method.
{time} 1330
I look forward to passing this bill today. I look forward to this
committee continuing the work that Congress has asked it to do, and us
going back and doing it in an effective way, to make sure that we will
have an effective intelligence community. It is time to stop bashing
our troops and our intelligence community. These people put their lives
on the line every day. It is time to show them some support.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, at this time I am pleased to
yield 2 minutes to my friend and classmate, the gentleman from New York
(Mr. Nadler).
Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I rise to oppose this restrictive rule for
not making in order the Waxman amendment to provide for an
investigation by a bipartisan, independent commission of the detainee
abuses alleged at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, and other sites.
Let me say at the outset that the men and women in our armed services
ought to be praised for their selfless sacrifices. They deserve not to
have their names and their good works associated with the torture and
abuse that has been alleged in newspapers and other reports. That is
why it is so important to have a complete and full investigation and to
receive assurances that torture and abuse are not standard operating
procedure in our armed forces, even if torture was authorized by
Secretary Rumsfeld and Attorney General Gonzales. It is not authorized
by Congress or by the American people who ultimately get to have the
final say.
It also bothers me that these detainees do not have any way of
asserting their innocence. The President says they are all terrorists,
but what if some of them were cases of mistaken identity? What if some
of them had nothing to do with terrorism? What if they have a similar
name or a similar appearance, but are indeed factually innocent of all
charges?
It seems to me that if the government is so sure that everyone we are
holding is a terrorist, there should be no trouble convincing a court,
a judge, or a military court. That would be preferable to having the
government assert that all of these people are terrorists, just trust
us. We cannot allow that type of abuse of power to continue in our
name.
This assertion of the right to hold people forever, with no specific
evidence and no due process, has not been asserted in an English-
speaking country since before Magna Carta, 800 years ago, until this
President had the nerve to besmirch the good name of the United States
by making such an assertion. This is not how America became the Shining
City on a Hill so admired by people the world over.
No executive should be permitted the power to lock people up forever
without ever having to prove their guilt. That is a power that I would
trust to no man, no king, no dictator, and no President.
Let me say one other thing. Torture and abuse of prisoners is not
just a shameful violation of human rights, it does not work. People
under torture will say anything. Intelligence professionals know better
than to believe or to rely on information extracted under torture.
Torture and abuse of detainees is wrong for so many reasons. It is a
horrendous practice, it produces nothing but shame and more enemies for
the United States, and anger from the rest of the world.
We need to aggressively investigate these abuses and put safeguards
and policies into place to prevent them from ever happening again.
Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Perhaps we should remind the gentleman of some of the 545 people who
are being detained in Guantanamo; 545, by the way, is fewer people than
are in my county's jail on a Saturday night.
But of those 545 people who killed innocent women and children, they
included a detainee named Katani who was stopped before he could board
one of the planes used to strike the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, or taking care of Osama bin Laden's body guards, other
members of al Qaeda and other terrorist networks and members of the
Taliban. These are not your average, run-of-the-mill pick-pockets and
thieves. They are hardened terrorists who have pledged everything to
destroy American service men and women, to come into our homeland and
wreak havoc and cause mayhem and cause death and destruction within
these borders of the United States of America. They are being
monitored. They are under ongoing judicial review. The eyes of the
world, as this debate has evidenced, are on Guantanamo.
These are individuals who represent the very worst in our global
society who would do anything to bring us harm. Yet we seem to lose all
of that perspective in this very dramatic, theatrical debate that began
in the Senate when there was an equation of Guantanamo with the regimes
of Stalin and Hitler and Pol Pot which resulted in the torture and
mutilation and death of millions of human beings. And for this similar
equation to be made on the House floor that we, in our activities in
Guantanamo, are even remotely close to those regimes is out of bounds.
There have been numerous Department of Defense investigations into
detainee abuse, numerous House Committee on Armed Services hearings on
detainee abuse, Senate committee hearings on detainee abuse, and
ongoing Intelligence subcommittee reviews of what is going on there.
It is important that we step back and understand that this is an
intelligence authorization bill that gives our men and women the tools
they need to fight people around the world that we would not invite
over for dinner; people who would do everything in their power to bring
down our society, our form of government, our cloak of safety. Let us
keep those things in mind when we go forward with this debate about
Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
Just one thing for my friend from Florida: Charge it and prove it.
That is all. This is a great Nation. We can charge those folks with a
crime, and we can prove that they did what the gentleman said.
Mr. Speaker, I am pleased at this point to yield 3 minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. George Miller), the
ranking member of the Committee on Education and the Workforce.
Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to
this rule.
We have been led to believe that the use of torture in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba were isolated incidents; that
murder, sexual assault, and physical abuse were the work of a few low-
ranking guards who are now being brought to justice.
The new evidence indicates we have been misled.
Recent news accounts have detailed the deaths of two detainees in
2002 at the Bagram Collection Point in Afghanistan during interrogation
by military intelligence. One man was hung by his arms in his jail cell
for days and beaten so severely in the legs that he died, even though,
as the newspapers reported, soldiers involved in the detention believed
that the man was innocent.
Despite being ruled homicide by the coroners, the deaths were
described by a military spokesman as resulting from natural causes. In
the meantime, the officer was promoted and placed in charge of
interrogations in Iraq's Abu Ghraib Prison.
But this story is not about low-ranking soldiers who independently
ran afoul of the system; it is not a matter of a few bad apples. It is
one tale in what is emerging to be a pattern of systematic abuse
carried out with the knowledge and approval of senior military and
civilian officials.
How do we know that the Defense Department and senior military
commanders knew what was going on? Because their own documents say so.
Their own documents show that the general in charge of our troops in
Afghanistan knew that unapproved techniques were being used in those
interrogatories. So what did he do? He made
[[Page H4835]]
a list of these techniques and sent them to the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
who were looking for ways to alter interrogations in Guantanamo Bay.
In fact, the only time the general in charge of U.S. forces in
Afghanistan seems to have issued any written policy is when he
recommended that the Geneva Convention techniques be removed for
everyone, regardless of whether or not they were tied to al Qaeda or
the Taliban.
So let me sum it up. Advanced torture techniques were developed and
used in Afghanistan and resulted in the deaths of multiple detainees.
The deaths were covered up and the investigations were stalled. The
techniques were shared with the interrogators at Guantanamo Bay and
then spread to Iraq where the same people responsible for the deaths in
Afghanistan were put in charge of the Abu Ghraib prison.
From Afghanistan to Guantanamo to Abu Ghraib, torture, lies, and
coverup. This is not an accident, this is a pattern of abuse.
I want to enter into the Record an editorial from my hometown paper
on this.
That is why I join my colleagues in calling for the creation of an
independent commission on detainee abuse. The leadership in the House
and, more specifically, the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services
have proven both negligent and incapable of dealing with this issue as
they have looked the other way and led the country to continue to
believe that this is only a few bad apples, a few malcontents that went
about it the wrong way when, in fact, the evidence from our own Defense
Department tells us differently and has irreparably damaged the
reputation of the United States, and has cast doubt on our foreign
policy, and it is a new recruitment tool, as so many have commented,
both in the intelligence community and in the Congress, that raises the
likelihood that U.S. troops captured by enemy combatants or terrorists
will be killed or tortured. It gives the radical opponents of the
United States and the insurgents the fuel to feed the insurgency
against U.S. soldiers and the new Iraqi Government.
The failure of this administration, which so often demands
accountability of others to deal with this issue in an honest and
forthright fashion, undermines our ability to implement the strategy
for success in Iraq and Afghanistan and tears down our forces.
Suspicious Treatment
First, there were the sickening photos smuggled out of Abu
Ghraib prison a year ago that shocked the world and fueled
anti-American sentiment throughout the Middle East. Then,
there were allegations from prisoners recently freed from
Guantanamo Bay that U.S. military guards had beaten false
confessions out of them and desecrated the Quran. Then.
earlier this month, the New York Times reported that military
interrogators at a U.S. prison in Afghanistan had killed
detainees during questioning, then tried to cover up the
cause of death. The interrogators didn't believe one of the
men was involved in terrorism, but had beaten him to death--
allegedly by accident--anyway.
Now, Amnesty International U.S.A. has released a scathing
report calling the U.S. Navy Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
``the gulag of our times.'' The report's authors accuse
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales and other top U.S. officials of being ``architects
of torture.''
The human rights watchdog organization called on foreign
governments to use international law to investigate U.S.
officials for their abuse of detainees accused of having
terrorist ties.
Meanwhile, the Associated Press has obtained 1,000 pages of
U.S. government tribunal transcripts under a Freedom of
Information Act lawsuit that offers chilling, firsthand
accounts of alleged prisoner abuse. In one case, a Guantanamo
Bay prisoner told a military panel that American soldiers had
beaten him so badly, he now wets his pants.
Vice President Dick Cheney insists that the prisoners are
``peddling lies'' and that the Guantanamo detainees have been
``well-treated, treated humanely and decently.'' President
Bush blasted the Amnesty report Tuesday, calling it
``absurd.''
Yet, It is quite unsettling that prisoners in Guantanamo,
Afghanistan and Iraq have told strikingly similar stories.
Bush administration officials' unapolog- etic defense of
military conduct at Guantanamo and other U.S. military
prisons--in the face of mounting evidence of serious
problems--is symptomatic of its increasingly familiar refusal
to acknowledge mistakes and take responsibility. This
arrogant stonewalling must not be allowed, especially when so
much is at stake.
The well-publicized mistreatment of Muslim detainees at
U.S.-run military prisons has severely damaged the United
States' reputation abroad. It is the height of hypocrisy to
talk of spreading democracy while our government tramples all
over individual civil liberties. In the United States, a
person is innocent until proven guilty, yet Muslim detainees
are essentially guilty until proven innocent. Nearly 600
people have been held without charges. Up until a year ago,
they could not even challenge their detentions in U.S.
courts. The U.S. government had argued that as foreigners on
foreign soil, they had no legal recourse, which is absurd as
well as un-American.
It is high time that President Bush and Congress appoint a
bipartisan panel to investigate the allegations of abuse of
terrorist suspects. People on both sides of the ideological
spectrum have called for such a commission, ranging from
conservative former U.S. Rep. Bob Barr, R-Ga., to the Center
for American Progress on the left.
If, as Rumsfeld claims, released detainees are a bunch of
liars, the administration has nothing to hide.
Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Perhaps the gentleman, out of his concern for torture, would read
into the Record the similar treatments, the abuse, the torture, the
behavior shown Jessica Lynch. Perhaps the gentleman would also read
into the Record the actions of the gentlemen who boarded American
airplanes and crashed them into the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon. Perhaps, out of his sense of concern about torture, he would
enter into the Record transcripts and videos of the beheadings that
have been taking place in Iraq. Perhaps the gentleman, out of his sense
of concern about torture, would cover those bad apples, those bad
actors, and the actions that are being taken against them.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr.
Mica).
Mr. MICA. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time.
I rise in opposition to any further investigation of either what is
taking place at Guantanamo Bay with our detainees or further
investigation of Abu Ghraib.
I want to speak about Guantanamo first, because I heard some of the
reports when we first brought detainees there, and I went down and
visited. I walked among the prisoners, I saw the housing, I saw how
they were treated. I was asked what I thought when I saw the whole
thing, and I want to use my quote here on the floor. I said, ``I
thought it was too good for the bastards.''
I stand here today appalled at my colleagues who, in fact, are
concerned about the rights of mass murderers. And that is exactly what
we have here. We have international mass murderers, enemy combatants.
They had no consideration, in support of a regime, the al Qaeda regime
and Osama bin Laden, who slaughtered thousands of people on our soil,
and many of whom were both Americans and internationals.
What right did they respect of Barbara Olson, who worked for our
Committee on Government Reform, whose plane crashed into the Pentagon
that morning? And I remember Barbara. What right did they respect of
Neal Levin, who I met with at the World Trade Centers, who was trapped,
along with everyone who helped me and our Subcommittee on Aviation, who
were all murdered on the morning of September 11 when they were in the
Windows on the World restaurant? What right did they defend of those
people?
How quickly we forget September 11. I am reading the book ``102
Minutes.'' I wish everyone would read it, about the thousands of people
who were left trapped in the World Trade Center. What rights did these
people who supported that activity exercise?
Abu Ghraib, if I hear one more thing about that and the actions of
our military folks; someone described ``horrific torture.'' I saw worse
things at fraternity houses in college than what our troops were
involved in. And to continue the harassment.
The gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) brought into the
Committee on International Relations two prisoners; one, I recall, was
from Abu Ghraib. I did not see anyone from the other side there, I did
not see anyone from the press there when they described their treatment
under Saddam Hussein. Do my colleagues know how he dealt with
overcrowding? He took them out and slaughtered them. I did not see
anyone from the other side concerned about the rights of those
prisoners.
[[Page H4836]]
One gentleman told us how he was taken from Abu Ghraib Prison; well,
he described not only the beheadings, but the limb amputations, the
pulling out of tongues, the electrical shocks. How dare anyone from the
House or the other body compare the treatment our troops afforded this
scum of the earth?
What about an investigation of the 300,000 mass graves that our
troops have uncovered and the treatment that those people received.
Finally, again, that one prisoner, and no one here bothered on the
other side to even attend the meeting with the prisoners to hear how
Saddam Hussein treated them. He described how he was taken out, he and
others, and they were all shot, and the bulldozer pushed over dirt on
them; he was shot five times, and only managed to crawl away and
somehow survive to tell how the other side truly tortures.
{time} 1345
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. I am convinced of some things: some of my
colleagues just do not get it when it comes to human rights.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to my good friend, the gentleman from
Maryland (Mr. Van Hollen).
Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for yielding me
time.
Mr. Speaker, I rise to oppose the rule with a very simple question:
What is the House Republican leadership afraid of? We say we want to
promote democracy around the world. We say we want to set a good
example to others, and yet the House leadership seeks to block a vote
today. That is what this argument is about, a vote today on the Waxman
amendment, which would simply create an independent, bipartisan
commission to investigate abuses at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, and
other places around the world.
Unfortunately, the only example we seem to be setting these days is
the example of the ostrich, to bury our heads in the sand, to ignore
the facts, to ignore the truth.
The Bush administration and my colleagues on the other side of the
aisle say that the reports of human rights abuses at these facilities
have been greatly exaggerated. Then what are they afraid of? The
chairman of the Intelligence Committee just says these are serious
issues. They are serious issues.
We do not want quarter-truths; we do not want half-truths. Let us get
at the full truth, the good, the bad and the ugly. People around the
world look to the United States, not just for the statements we make,
but for the actions we take. And Americans have been shocked at the
reports of abuses because they know these actions do not reflect our
values, and that is what this is about, our values.
And they do not represent us as a people. The United States
throughout its history has been a great beacon of human rights. And
very sadly, that beacon has been dimmed by the abuses that have been
taking place. And the best way to reclaim our credibility on this issue
is to squarely face the facts and those abuses.
We must lead by our example. We must show we will not run from the
truth even when it is unpleasant. Only by confronting the truth can we
learn from our mistakes. Only by examining our own conduct can we
credibly talk about the misconduct of others. Let us show the world
that a strong, competent Nation does not run from or hide from the
truth. Let us once again lead by example.
Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield such time as he may
consume to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Thornberry), the seeker of
that truth, the chairman of the oversight subcommittee tasked with
looking into alleged abuse.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida for
yielding and commend him on the handling of this rule, but also in
helping us put this whole issue into greater context.
Because, Mr. Speaker, I think it is important for us to remind
ourselves that this bill contains a number of things which try to help
defend the country, try to help keep us all safer, try to prevent gross
inhumane acts of slaughter by the terrorists, which we know they are
intent upon committing.
And so I think it is important as we focus down on some of these
specific issues, and we should talk about them, to keep the larger
context in mind. The gentleman from Florida has helped to do that. In a
little bit, I want to talk in greater length about the oversight
subcommittee, because I think it is important to say that the chairman
of the Intelligence Committee and the ranking member of the
Intelligence Committee, at the beginning of this Congress, decided to
create a special oversight subcommittee of the House Intelligence
Committee.
And our charge is to focus at greater depth and with greater
persistency on some of the key intelligence issues which we face. And
we take that job very seriously. And I think we can do the job very
seriously, in part because we usually do not do our job in front of the
cameras. We do not do our job for partisanship.
We do not come out on the floor, in press conferences or in other
places, and try to bash the administration or to protect the
administration. We try to be tough, but fair. And that is the way that
real oversight, particularly in the area of national security, ought to
be done, rather than posturing and other things that we have seen from
time to time. The problem is the work you do in the Intelligence
Committee cannot be talked about openly. And so there is very little
one can say about the specifics.
But just because we cannot come and detail all of our activities and
some of what we found and what more we have to do, one should never
take that to mean that there is not serious oversight and investigation
ongoing, because there is.
And, in fact, Mr. Speaker, I believe that worldwide terrorism
presents a number of challenges to us. It is absolutely true, as many
of the speakers have said, that we must maintain our American values,
and at the same time try to prevent acts of terrorism.
Our problem is, when we just focus on one part of that equation, when
we forget that the purpose here is to prevent acts of terrorism, then I
think we become unbalanced, our rhetoric becomes more sensational, and
unfortunately I think the American people do not benefit from such
talk.
I can only say that with my partner, the gentleman from Alabama (Mr.
Cramer), and other members of the subcommittee, with our bipartisan
staff, we take our job very seriously. And we will pursue that
investigation very seriously. And we will try to make sure that
American values are maintained, and at the same time our troops, our
homeland security folks, our policemen and others, have the information
they need to keep us safe. We will keep both goals in mind.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 2
minutes to my good friend, the distinguished gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Lee).
Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman for his
leadership and for yielding me this time.
Mr. Speaker, I rise to engage today in a colloquy with the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), our ranking member of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. And let me first thank the
gentlewoman for her consistent leadership on so many national security
issues.
Let me just say briefly that I appreciate this opportunity to discuss
an issue very briefly that is of critical importance, that is, making
sure that the United States Government is not involved in violating the
will of any people anywhere in the world which duly elects a government
through democratic means.
In 1982, Congress passed the Boland amendment, which prohibited the
Federal Government from using taxpayer dollars for the purpose of
overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua. I offered an amendment to
this intelligence authorization bill that broadens this concept to
ensure that our Federal intelligence dollars are not used to support
groups or individuals engaged in efforts to overthrow democratically
elected governments. Unfortunately it was not made in order.
In an ideal world, we would not specifically stipulate this, but
events in Haiti and more recently in Venezuela have led me to wonder
whether we need to codify this straightforward, nonpartisan position.
So I think that we must do all we can not only to support
[[Page H4837]]
the spirit of democracy throughout the world, but also to ensure that
it is allowed to flourish and to grow.
I would like to ask the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) if
she has any thought about how we need to move forward, basically
because I believe again, as I said earlier, that such actions fly in
the face of our own democratic principles.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. LEE. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
I thank the gentlewoman for raising this issue. I want to assure her
that I understand and support the general principle she has raised, and
I believe that we should be mindful of that issue.
Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentlewoman for her
comments and her attention to this issue. I look forward to working
with her.
Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the
gentleman from California (Mr. Daniel E. Lungren.)
Mr. DANIEL E. LUNGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, one of the previous
speakers said we just do not get it. To him I would say, and to others,
yes, we do get it.
I came back to this body after 9/11 precisely because of the attack
on Americans and the loss of three people that I knew personally. I
came back here with the idea that we needed to fight for America and
defend ourselves and not tear up the Constitution in the process.
The suggestion made by some that we are engaged in wide-scale
torture, that we are somehow morally equivalent with others is
absolutely absurd. The proper way for us to respond to allegations is
to do what the Congress is supposed to do, and what the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Thornberry) said we are about, which is the proper
congressional oversight, not mock hearings like we had last week, not
setting up independent commissions, not politicizing this, but doing it
in the way the Constitution requires us to do it.
If there is any problem, it is with the Congress not doing proper
oversight. We have the commitment from the committees and the
subcommittees to do it. Let us rise above partisanship. Let us do the
right thing, and let us get rid of this nonsense of a moral equivalency
between the United States and some of those terrible regimes around the
world. It is not worthy of this body.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield such
time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from Illinois (Ms.
Schakowsky).
Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong opposition to
this restrictive rule.
The gentleman from California (Mr. Waxman) offered a reasonable
amendment, which was rejected by the Rules Committee, that would have
put the House on record in support of a bipartisan, independent
investigation into detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and the
facility at Guantanamo Bay.
Because there are known cases of abuse, and there are more questions
than answers about the extent of abuse on people held by or for the
United States, we need to shine a very bright light on detainee
treatment. Only when we know the full scale of the problem will we be
able to stop, prevent, and correct any wrongs that have been done in
our country's name.
And if it is true, as Vice President Cheney says, that the prisoners
are peddling lies, then let us investigate prisoner treatment so that
we have evidence and not just assertions. The United States should be
the standard bearer of democracy, freedom and human rights throughout
the world. However, it has been over a year since the story broke about
prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, and we have yet to conduct a through
independent investigation.
Opening the door to an independent investigation would be a major
step toward returning our country's standing as a moral leader. And to
those who would try to justify what we do by saying, well, it is not as
bad as those unspeakable beheadings or other things, well, I should
certainly hope not, because we are not like them. We are better than
them. We are the United States of America.
And now, those who call on our country to uphold the rule of law and
who reject becoming debased ourselves by conducting torture, they
become the object of relentless criticism. Those patriots who want to
stand up to our values and our belief in the rule of law, we are a
proud and a great Nation blessed with immense freedom and with military
personnel who proudly defend us. We should not fear the truth; we
should demand it with an independent investigation.
Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Speaker, the gentlewoman is absolutely right when she
says we are better than them. She is absolutely right when she says we
are not equal to them. I hope she shares that thought with the senior
Senator from Illinois.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Arizona (Mr.
Hayworth).
(Mr. HAYWORTH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. HAYWORTH. Mr. Speaker, I have listened to this debate with
interest. And I rise in support of the rule and in support of a
realistic foreign policy that some in this Chamber apparently
misunderstand.
The actions of September 11, 2001, were not criminal acts; they were
acts of war against this Nation.
{time} 1400
One of the fundamental problems when you separate all the venom and
vitriol that we have heard in this debate and certainly from someone in
the other body who compared American fighting men and women to the
Soviets with their gulags and the Third Reich and Pol Pot's regime in
Cambodia, one of the fundamental problems seems to be the willingness
of many to equate this with some sort of law enforcement problem. It is
not.
And to those who are expending such efforts and such rhetoric on
behalf of the alleged rights of enemies of this country, let me remind
you that the Constitution's first three words are ``We the people,''
not ``they the terrorists,'' or ``they the insurgents,'' or ``they the
accused.''
In wartime the Constitution is a mechanism for the survival of the
Republic. And as Mr. Justice Jackson pointed out years ago, the
Constitution is not a suicide pact. This need not be a partisan
controversy. One look only so far as the History Channel as columnist
Thomas Sowell pointed out 2 weeks ago. Do you know what happened at
World War II to unfortunate combatants; that is, those without
representing a nation state or wearing the uniform or insignia of a
military nation or state during World War II?
When those unlawful combatants were apprehended, they were lined up
and shot. The Commander in Chief at that time was Franklin Delano
Roosevelt. That was in adherence with the Geneva Convention.
We are in a war where people behead Americans. It would be nice to
see one-tenth of the passion on behalf of American citizens that we see
for the terrorists and their alleged rights. Vote in favor of the rule.
Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Speaker, how much time remains?
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Flake). The gentleman from Florida (Mr.
Putnam) has 2 minutes remaining. The gentleman from Florida (Mr.
Hastings) has 1\1/2\ minutes remaining.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my
time.
Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Georgia (Mr. Norwood).
Mr. NORWOOD. Mr. Speaker, I want to take a second to speak to my
friend from Florida (Mr. Hastings), and he is my friend, but I think he
is wrong when he says human rights issues are something that we just do
not get.
Well, that is wrong. I think we do get it. I think it is fairly clear
to the Members of this body, it is fairly clear to the people of this
country, that many of you Democrats are very interested in human rights
of the prisoners down in Guantanamo Bay, people who would kill your
children, who would kill your families and destroy your homes. And we
are interested in getting information in a reasonable manner from
prisoners or terrorists in order to save the lives of American people,
to save the lives of our military.
So it is a simple matter. It comes down to whose side are you really
on?
[[Page H4838]]
Are you on the side of the terrorists so you can be against President
Bush, or are you on the side of the American people and the American
families?
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of
my time.
Mr. Speaker, I answer the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Norwood), I am
on the side of the American people and I am on the side of the rights
that I believe are principles inherent in our United States
Constitution and throughout the United States Constitution.
I do not have time to yield to the gentleman, otherwise I would.
Make no mistake about it, most of us feel as strongly as most of you
do, and I do not think that anybody here ought question our patriotism.
This Nation is the greatest Nation on this Earth, and we do not have
to have anything to fear. We do not have to have any worry about trying
people who harm this Nation.
Mr. Speaker, I will be asking Members to oppose the previous
question. If the previous question is defeated, I will modify this rule
so we can consider the amendment by the gentleman from California (Mr.
Waxman) that was rejected in the Committee on Rules last night.
Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to insert the text of this
amendment immediately prior to the vote on the previous question.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Florida?
There was no objection.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, the Waxman amendment has been
explained. It would establish an independent commission, similar to the
9/11 Commission, to conduct an extensive, bipartisan, and thorough
investigation into the multiple accounts of prisoner abuse that have
occurred in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo.
Mr. Speaker, it has been well over a year since the shocking and
humiliating photographs of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib first became
public. I doubt there is any Member of this Chamber who was not
appalled at that disgraceful act. Yet, in spite of these events, the
House has done very little of substance.
Mr. Speaker, if you allow me to conclude by saying, a ``no'' vote
will allow Members to vote on the Waxman amendment, so we can take
immediate steps to fully investigate these very disturbing incidents of
prisoner mistreatment.
Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, this has been a vibrant, robust debate and a good solid
beginning of the undeniable debate that will follow on the underlying
bill.
In case you missed it from the debate over the rule, there is a lot
more to this rule than just Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo. This is an
important rule that allows us to consider the intelligence
authorization bill that gives our men and women around the world the
tools and skill and support they need to win the war against terrorism
on our behalf, important new assets in terms of technical capabilities,
and a tremendous investment in the most important piece that we have in
intelligence, which is those hardworking men and women who were called
to public service.
This is a fair rule. It allows for a great deal more consideration of
these issues that we have already begun to discuss in terms of
detainees and the role of American intelligence in our society and the
tools that they need around the world. I encourage everyone to support
it and to support the underlying bill.
The material previously referred to by Mr. Hastings of Florida is as
follows:
Previous Question on H. Res. 331--Rule for H.R. 2475 Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006
``In the resolution strike ``and (3)'' and insert the
following:
``(3) the amendment printed in Section 2 of this resolution
if offered by Representative Waxman of California or a
designee, which shall be in order without intervention of any
point of order or demand for division of the question, shall
not be subject to amendment, shall be considered as read, and
shall be separately debatable for 60 minutes equally divided
and controlled by the proponent and an opponent; and (4)
Sec. 2. The amendment by Representative Waxman referred to
in Section 1 is as follows:
Amendment to H.R. 2475, As Reported Offered by Mr. Waxman of California
At the end, add the following new title:
TITLE V--ESTABLISHMENT OF INDEPENDENT COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE
DETAINEE ABUSES
SEC. 501. ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMISSION.
There is established in the legislative branch the
Independent Commission on the Investigation of Detainee
Abuses (in this title referred to as the ``Commission'').
SEC. 502. DUTIES.
(a) Investigation.--The Commission shall conduct a full and
complete investigation of the abuses of detainees in
connection with intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring
Freedom, or any operation within the Global War on Terrorism,
including but not limited to the following:
(1) The extent of the abuses.
(2) Why the abuses occurred.
(3) Who is responsible for the abuses.
(4) Whether any particular Department of Defense,
Department of State, Department of Justice, Central
Intelligence Agency, National Security Council, or White
House policies, procedures, or decisions facilitated the
detainee abuses.
(5) What policies, procedures, or mechanisms failed to
prevent the abuses.
(6) What legislative or executive actions should be taken
to prevent such abuses from occurring in the future.
(7) The extent, if any, to which Guantanamo Detention
Center policies influenced policies at the Abu Ghraib prison
and other detention centers in and outside Iraq.
(b) Assessment, Analysis, and Evaluation.--During the
course of its investigation under subsection (a), the
Commission shall assess, analyze, and evaluate relevant
persons, policies, procedures, reports, and events, including
but not limited to the following:
(1) The Military Chain of Command.
(2) The National Security Council.
(3) The Department of Justice.
(4) The Department of State.
(5) The Office of the White House Counsel.
(6) The Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central
Intelligence Agency.
(7) The approval process for interrogation techniques used
at detention facilities in Iraq, Cuba, and Afghanistan.
(8) The integration of military police and military
intelligence operations to coordinate detainee interrogation.
(9) The roles and actions of private civilian contractors
in the abuses and whether they violated the Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act or any other United States
statutes and international treaties.
(10) The role of nongovernmental organizations' warnings to
United States officials about the abuses.
(11) The role of Congress and whether it was fully informed
throughout the process that uncovered these abuses.
(12) The extent to which the United States complied with
the applicable provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949,
and the extent to which the United States may have violated
international law by restricting the access of the
International Committee of the Red Cross to detainees.
SEC. 503. COMPOSITION OF COMMISSION.
(a) Members.--The Commission shall be composed of 10
members, of whom--
(1) 1 member shall be appointed by the President, who shall
serve as chairman of the Commission;
(2) 1 member shall be jointly appointed by the minority
leader of the Senate and the minority leader of the House of
Representatives, who shall serve as vice chairman of the
Commission;
(3) 2 members shall be appointed by the majority leader of
the Senate;
(4) 2 members shall be appointed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives;
(5) 2 members shall be appointed by the minority leader of
the Senate; and
(6) 2 members shall be appointed by the minority leader of
the House of Representatives.
(b) Qualifications; Initial Meeting.--
(1) Nongovernmental appointees.--An individual appointed to
the Commission may not be an officer or employee of the
Federal Government or any State or local government.
(2) Other qualifications.--Individuals that shall be
appointed to the Commission should be prominent United States
citizens, with national recognition and significant depth of
experience in such professions as governmental service, law
enforcement, the armed services, law, public administration,
intelligence gathering, human rights policy, and foreign
affairs.
(3) Deadline for appointment.--All members of the
Commission shall be appointed within 45 days following the
enactment of this Act.
(4) Meetings.--The Commission shall meet and begin the
operations of the Commission as soon as practicable. After
its initial meeting, the Commission shall meet upon the call
of the chairman or a majority of its members.
(c) Quorum; Vacancies.--Six members of the Commission shall
constitute a quorum. Any vacancy in the Commission shall not
affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same manner in
which the original appointment was made.
(d) Conflicts of Interest.--Each member appointed to the
Commission shall submit a
[[Page H4839]]
financial disclosure report pursuant to the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978, notwithstanding the minimum required
rate of compensation or time period employed.
SEC. 504. POWERS OF COMMISSION.
(a) In General.--
(1) Hearings and evidence.--The Commission or, on the
authority of the Commission, any subcommittee or member
thereof, may, for the purpose of carrying out this title--
(A) hold such hearings and sit and act at such times and
places, take such testimony, receive such evidence,
administer such oaths; and
(B) subject to paragraph (2)(A), require, by subpoena or
otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and
the production of such books, records, correspondence,
memoranda, papers, and documents,
as the Commission or such designated subcommittee or
designated member may determine advisable.
(2) Subpoenas.--
(A) Issuance.--
(i) In general.--A subpoena may be issued under this
subsection only--
(I) by the agreement of the chairman and the vice chairman;
or
(II) by the affirmative vote of 6 members of the
Commission.
(ii) Signature.--Subject to clause (i), subpoenas issued
under this subsection may be issued under the signature of
the chairman or any member designated by a majority of the
Commission, and may be served by any person designated by the
chairman or by a member designated by a majority of the
Commission.
(B) Enforcement.--
(i) In general.--In the case of contumacy or failure to
obey a subpoena issued under this subsection, the United
States district court for the judicial district in which the
subpoenaed person resides, is served, or may be found, or
where the subpoena is returnable, may issue an order
requiring such person to appear at any designated place to
testify or to produce documentary or other evidence. Any
failure to obey the order of the court may be punished by the
court as a contempt of that court.
(ii) Additional enforcement.--In the case of any failure of
any witness to comply with any subpoena or to testify when
summoned under authority of this subsection, the Commission
may, by majority vote, certify a statement of fact
constituting such failure to the appropriate United States
attorney, who may bring the matter before the grand jury for
its action, under the same statutory authority and procedures
as if the United States attorney had received a certification
under sections 102 through 104 of the Revised Statutes of the
United States (2 U.S.C. 192 through 194).
(3) Scope.--In carrying out its duties under this Act, the
Commission may examine the actions and representations of the
current Administration as well as prior Administrations.
(b) Contracting.--The Commission may, to such extent and in
such amounts as are provided in appropriation Acts, enter
into contracts to enable the Commission to discharge its
duties of this Act.
(c) Information From Federal Agencies.--
(1) In general.--The Commission may secure directly from
any executive department, bureau, agency, board, commission,
office, independent establishment, or instrumentality of the
Federal Government, information, suggestions, estimates, and
statistics for the purposes of this Act. Each department,
bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent
establishment, or instrumentality shall, to the extent
authorized by law, furnish such information, suggestions,
estimates, and statistics directly to the Commission, upon
request made by the chairman, the chairman of any
subcommittee created by a majority of the Commission, or any
member designated by a majority of the Commission.
(2) Receipt, handling, storage, and dissemination.--
Information shall only be received, handled, stored, and
disseminated by members of the Commission and its staff
consistent with all applicable statutes, regulations, and
Executive Orders.
(d) Assistance From Federal Agencies.--
(1) General services administration.--The Administrator of
General Services shall provide to the Commission on a
reimbursable basis administrative support and other services
for the performance of the Commission's functions.
(2) Other departments and agencies.--In addition to the
assistance prescribed in paragraph (1), departments and
agencies of the United States may provide to the Commission
such services, funds, facilities, staff, and other support
services as they may determine advisable and as may be
authorized by law.
(e) Gifts.--The Commission may accept, use, and dispose of
gifts or donations of services or property.
(f) Postal Services.--The Commission may use the United
States mails in the same manner and under the same conditions
as departments and agencies of the United States.
SEC. 505. NONAPPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT.
(a) In General.--The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5
U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to the Commission.
(b) Public Meetings and Release of Public Versions of
Reports.--The Commission shall--
(1) hold public hearings and meetings to the extent
appropriate; and
(2) release public versions of the reports required under
section 509.
(c) Public Hearings.--Any public hearings of the Commission
shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the protection
of information provided to or developed for or by the
Commission as required by any applicable statute, regulation,
or Executive order.
SEC. 506. STAFF OF COMMISSION.
(a) In General.--
(1) Appointment and compensation.--The chairman, in
consultation with vice chairman, in accordance with rules
agreed upon by the Commission, may appoint and fix the
compensation of a staff director and such other personnel as
may be necessary to enable the Commission to carry out its
functions, without regard to the provisions of title 5,
United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive
service, and without regard to the provisions of chapter 51
and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to
classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that no
rate of pay fixed under this subsection may exceed the
equivalent of that payable for a position at level V of the
Executive Schedule under section 5316 of title 5, United
States Code.
(2) Personnel as federal employees.--
(A) In general.--The staff director and any personnel of
the Commission who are employees shall be employees under
section 2105 of title 5, United States Code, for purposes of
chapters 63, 81, 83, 84, 85, 87, 89, and 90 of that title.
(B) Members of commission.--Subparagraph (A) shall not be
construed to apply to members of the Commission.
(b) Detailees.--Any Federal Government employee may be
detailed to the Commission without reimbursement from the
Commission, and such detailee shall retain the rights,
status, and privileges of his or her regular employment
without interruption.
(c) Consultant Services.--The Commission is authorized to
procure the services of experts and consultants in accordance
with section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, but at
rates not to exceed the daily rate paid a person occupying a
position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section
5315 of title 5, United States Code.
SEC. 507. COMPENSATION AND TRAVEL EXPENSES.
(a) Compensation.--Each member of the Commission may be
compensated at a rate not to exceed the daily equivalent of
the annual rate of basic pay in effect for a position at
level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of
title 5, United States Code, for each day during which that
member is engaged in the actual performance of the duties of
the Commission.
(b) Travel Expenses.--While away from their homes or
regular places of business in the performance of services for
the Commission, members of the Commission shall be allowed
travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence,
in the same manner as persons employed intermittently in the
Government service are allowed expenses under section 5703(b)
of title 5, United States Code.
SEC. 508. SECURITY CLEARANCES FOR COMMISSION MEMBERS AND
STAFF.
(a) In General.--Subject to subsection (b), the appropriate
Federal agencies or departments shall cooperate with the
Commission in expeditiously providing to the Commission
members and staff appropriate security clearances to the
extent possible pursuant to existing procedures and
requirements.
(b) Exception.--No person shall be provided with access to
classified information under this title without the
appropriate required security clearance access.
SEC. 509. REPORTS OF COMMISSION; TERMINATION.
(a) Interim Reports.--The Commission may submit to Congress
and the President interim reports containing such findings,
conclusions, and recommendations for corrective measures as
have been agreed to by a majority of Commission members.
(b) Final Report.--Not later than 18 months after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Commission shall submit to
Congress and the President a final report containing such
findings, conclusions, and recommendations for corrective
measures as have been agreed to by a majority of Commission
members.
(c) Form of Report.--Each report prepared under this
section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
contain a classified annex.
(d) Recommendation to Make Public Certain Classified
Information.--If the Commission determines that it is in the
public interest that some or all of the information contained
in a classified annex of a report under this section be made
available to the public, the Commission shall make a
recommendation to the congressional intelligence committees
to make such information public, and the congressional
intelligence committees shall consider the recommendation
pursuant to the procedures under subsection (e).
(e) Procedure for Declassifying Information.--
(1) The procedures referred to in subsection (d) are the
procedures described in--
(A) with respect to the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives, clause 11(g) of
Rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, One
Hundred Ninth Congress; and
(B) with respect to the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate, section 8 of
[[Page H4840]]
Senate Resolution 400, Ninety-Fourth Congress.
(2) In this section, the term ``congressional intelligence
committees'' means--
(A) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives; and
(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
SEC. 510. TERMINATION.
(a) In General.--The Commission, and all the authorities of
this Act, shall terminate 60 days after the date on which the
final report is submitted under section 509(b).
(b) Administrative Activities Before Termination.--The
Commission may use the 60-day period referred to in paragraph
(1) for the purpose of concluding its activities, including
providing testimony to committees of Congress concerning its
reports and disseminating the final report.
SEC. 511. FUNDING.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated funds not to exceed $5,000,000 for
purposes of the activities of the Commission under this Act.
(b) Duration of Availability.--Amounts made available to
the Commission under subsection (a) shall remain available
until the termination of the Commission.
Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I
move the previous question on the resolution.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on ordering the previous
question.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the
ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a
quorum is not present.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XX, the Chair will reduce to 5 minutes
the minimum time for electronic voting, if ordered, on the question of
adoption of the resolution.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 224,
nays 201, not voting 8, as follows:
[Roll No. 288]
YEAS--224
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Bass
Beauprez
Biggert
Bilirakis
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boustany
Bradley (NH)
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Camp
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Castle
Chabot
Chocola
Coble
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Cox
Crenshaw
Cubin
Culberson
Cunningham
Davis (KY)
Davis, Jo Ann
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
DeLay
Dent
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Doolittle
Drake
Dreier
Duncan
Ehlers
Emerson
English (PA)
Everett
Feeney
Ferguson
Fitzpatrick (PA)
Flake
Foley
Forbes
Fortenberry
Fossella
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gingrey
Gohmert
Goode
Goodlatte
Granger
Graves
Green (WI)
Gutknecht
Hall
Harris
Hart
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Hensarling
Herger
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hostettler
Hulshof
Hunter
Hyde
Inglis (SC)
Issa
Istook
Jenkins
Jindal
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kuhl (NY)
LaHood
Latham
LaTourette
Leach
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lucas
Lungren, Daniel E.
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
McCaul (TX)
McCotter
McCrery
McHenry
McHugh
McKeon
McMorris
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Moran (KS)
Musgrave
Myrick
Neugebauer
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nunes
Nussle
Osborne
Otter
Oxley
Paul
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Poe
Pombo
Porter
Price (GA)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Reichert
Renzi
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Saxton
Schwarz (MI)
Sensenbrenner
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shuster
Simmons
Simpson
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Sodrel
Souder
Stearns
Sullivan
Sweeney
Tancredo
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Turner
Upton
Walsh
Wamp
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Westmoreland
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Young (AK)
NAYS--201
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Andrews
Baca
Baird
Baldwin
Barrow
Bean
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Boren
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Brown (OH)
Brown, Corrine
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cardin
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carson
Case
Chandler
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Cramer
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
Davis (TN)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Doyle
Edwards
Emanuel
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Filner
Ford
Frank (MA)
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Higgins
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kilpatrick (MI)
Kind
Kucinich
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lee
Levin
Lipinski
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Lynch
Maloney
Markey
Marshall
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy
McCollum (MN)
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Melancon
Menendez
Michaud
Millender-McDonald
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mollohan
Moore (KS)
Moore (WI)
Moran (VA)
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reyes
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Sabo
Salazar
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sanders
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schwartz (PA)
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sherman
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Spratt
Stark
Strickland
Stupak
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor (MS)
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Towns
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Wexler
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
NOT VOTING--8
Carter
Herseth
Lewis (GA)
Murphy
Sessions
Walden (OR)
Whitfield
Young (FL)
{time} 1431
Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas changed his vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
Mr. GILLMOR and Mr. ISTOOK changed their vote from ``nay'' to
``yea.''
So the previous question was ordered.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hayes). The question is on the
resolution.
The resolution was agreed to.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________
Congressional Record: June 21, 2005 (House)
Page H4840-H4858
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 331, I call
up the bill (H.R. 2475) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year
2006 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United
States Government,
[[Page H4841]]
the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes and ask for
its immediate consideration.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 331, the bill
is considered read for amendment.
The text of H.R. 2475 is as follows:
H. R. 2475
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2006''.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
year 2006 for the conduct of the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the following elements of
the United States Government:
(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Department of Defense.
(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(5) The National Security Agency.
(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(7) The Department of State.
(8) The Department of the Treasury.
(9) The Department of Energy.
(10) The Department of Justice.
(11) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(12) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(13) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(14) The Coast Guard.
(15) The Department of Homeland Security.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The
amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and
the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2006,
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the elements listed in such section, are those
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
prepared to accompany the bill H.R. ____ of the One Hundred
Ninth Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of
Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate
and House of Representatives and to the President. The
President shall provide for suitable distribution of the
Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within
the executive branch.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director
of National Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian
personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year
2006 under section 102 when the Director of National
Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the
performance of important intelligence functions.
(b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of
National Intelligence shall notify promptly the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives whenever the Director exercises the authority
granted by this section.
SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal
year 2006 the sum of $_____. Within such amount, funds
identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and
development shall remain available until September 30, 2007.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of
National Intelligence are authorized __ full-time personnel
as of September 30, 2006. Personnel serving in such elements
may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community
Management Account or personnel detailed from other elements
of the United States Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence
Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are
also authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence
Community Management Account for fiscal year 2006 such
additional amounts as are specified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).
Such additional amounts for advanced research and development
shall remain available until September 30, 2007.
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the
personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the
Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30,
2006, there are also authorized such additional personnel for
such elements as of that date as are specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations.
(d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during
fiscal year 2006 any officer or employee of the United States
or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff
of the Intelligence Community Management Account from another
element of the United States Government shall be detailed on
a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee,
or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a
period of less than one year for the performance of temporary
functions as required by the Director of National
Intelligence.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal
year 2006 the sum of $_____.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be
increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may
be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not
be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by
the Constitution or the laws of the United States.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The committee amendment in the nature of a
substitute printed in the bill, modified by the amendment printed in
Part A of House Report 109-141, is adopted.
The text of the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as
modified, is as follows:
H. R. 2475
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits
authorized by law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence
activities.
Sec. 303. Authority of the Director of National
Intelligence to assign individuals to United States
missions in foreign countries to coordinate and direct
intelligence and intelligence-related activities
conducted in that country.
Sec. 304. Clarification of delegation of transfer or
reprogramming authority.
Sec. 305. Approval of personnel transfer for new national
intelligence centers.
Sec. 306. Additional duties for the Director of Science and
Technology.
Sec. 307. Comprehensive inventory of special access
programs.
Sec. 308. Sense of Congress on budget execution authority
procedures.
Sec. 309. Sense of Congress with respect to multi-level
security clearances.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Sec. 401. Clarification of role of the Director of Central
Intelligence Agency as head of human intelligence
collection.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
year 2006 for the conduct of the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the following elements of
the United States Government:
(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Department of Defense.
(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(5) The National Security Agency.
(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(7) The Department of State.
(8) The Department of the Treasury.
(9) The Department of Energy.
(10) The Department of Justice.
(11) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(12) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(13) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(14) The Coast Guard.
(15) The Department of Homeland Security.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The
amounts authorized to
[[Page H4842]]
be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized
personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2006, for the conduct
of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of
the elements listed in such section, are those specified in
the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to
accompany the bill H.R. 2475 of the One Hundred Ninth
Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of
Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate
and House of Representatives and to the President. The
President shall provide for suitable distribution of the
Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within
the executive branch.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director
of National Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian
personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year
2006 under section 102 when the Director of National
Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the
performance of important intelligence functions.
(b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of
National Intelligence shall notify promptly the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives whenever the Director exercises the authority
granted by this section.
SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal
year 2006 the sum of $446,144,000. Within such amount, funds
identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and
development shall remain available until September 30, 2007.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of
National Intelligence are authorized 817 full-time personnel
as of September 30, 2006. Personnel serving in such elements
may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community
Management Account or personnel detailed from other elements
of the United States Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence
Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are
also authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence
Community Management Account for fiscal year 2006 such
additional amounts as are specified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).
Such additional amounts for advanced research and development
shall remain available until September 30, 2007.
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the
personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the
Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30,
2006, there are also authorized such additional personnel for
such elements as of that date as are specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations.
(d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during
fiscal year 2006 any officer or employee of the United States
or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff
of the Intelligence Community Management Account from another
element of the United States Government shall be detailed on
a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee,
or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a
period of less than one year for the performance of temporary
functions as required by the Director of National
Intelligence.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal
year 2006 the sum of $244,600,000.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be
increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may
be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not
be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by
the Constitution or the laws of the United States.
SEC. 304. CLARIFICATION OF DELEGATION OF TRANSFER OR
REPROGRAMMING AUTHORITY.
Paragraph (5)(B) of section 102A(d) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(d)), as added by
section 1011(a) of the National Security Intelligence Reform
Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3643),
is amended by striking ``or agency involved'' in the second
sentence and inserting ``involved or the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency (in the case of the Central
Intelligence Agency)''.
SEC. 306. ADDITIONAL DUTIES FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY.
(a) Coordination and Prioritization of Research Conducted
by Elements of the Intelligence Community.--Subsection (d) of
section 103E of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
403-3e), as added by section 1011(a) of the National Security
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 108-
458; 118 Stat. 3643), is amended--
(1) by inserting ``and prioritize'' after ``coordinate'' in
paragraph (3)(A); and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(4) In carrying out paragraph (3)(A), the Committee shall
identify basic, advanced, and applied research programs to be
carried out by elements of the intelligence community.''.
(b) Development of Technology Goals.--Section 103E of such
Act (50 U.S.C. 403-3e), as so added, is amended--
(1) in subsection (c)--
(A) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (4);
(B) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (6); and
(C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following new
paragraph:
``(5) assist the Director in establishing goals for the
elements of the intelligence community to meet the technology
needs of the community; and''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(e) Goals for Technology Needs of the Intelligence
Community.--In carrying out subsection (c)(5), the Director
of Science and Technology shall--
``(1) perform systematic identification and assessment of
the most significant intelligence challenges that require
technical solutions; and
``(2) examine options to enhance the responsiveness of
research and design programs to meet the requirements of the
intelligence community for timely support.''.
(c) Report.--Not later than June 30, 2006, the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report
containing a strategy for the development and use of
technology in the intelligence community through 2021. Such
report may be submitted in classified form and shall
include--
(1) an assessment of the highest priority intelligence gaps
across the intelligence community that may be resolved by the
use of technology;
(2) goals for advanced research and development and a
strategy to achieve such goals;
(3) an explanation of how each advanced research and
development project funded under the National Intelligence
Program addresses an identified intelligence gap;
(4) a list of all current and projected research and
development projects by research type (basic, advanced, or
applied) with estimated funding levels, estimated initiation
dates, and estimated completion dates; and
(5) a plan to incorporate technology from research and
development projects into National Intelligence Program
acquisition programs.
SEC. 307. COMPREHENSIVE INVENTORY OF SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS.
Not later than January 15, 2006, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees (as defined in section 3(7) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(7))) a classified report
providing a comprehensive inventory of all special access
programs under the National Intelligence Program (as defined
in section 3(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 401a(6))).
SEC. 308. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON BUDGET EXECUTION AUTHORITY
PROCEDURES.
It is the sense of Congress that the Director of National
Intelligence should expeditiously establish the necessary
budgetary processes and procedures with the heads of the
departments containing agencies or organizations within the
intelligence community, and the heads of such agencies and
organizations, in order to--
(1) implement the budget execution authorities provided
under, and submit the reports to Congress required by,
subsection (c) of section 102A of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1), as amended by section 1011(a) of
the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title
I of Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3643); and
(2) carry out the duties and authorities of the Director of
National Intelligence with respect to the transfer and
reprogramming of funds under the National Intelligence
Program under subsection (d) of such section, as so amended.
SEC. 309. SENSE OF CONGRESS WITH RESPECT TO MULTI-LEVEL
SECURITY CLEARANCES.
It is the sense of Congress that the Director of National
Intelligence should promptly establish and oversee the
implementation of a multi-level security clearance system
across the intelligence community to leverage the cultural
and linguistic skills of subject matter experts and
individuals proficient in foreign languages critical to
national security.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. After 1 hour of debate on the bill, as
amended, it shall be in order to consider the further amendment printed
in the report, if offered by the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs.
Maloney), or her designee, which shall be considered read, and shall be
debatable for 30 minutes, equally divided and controlled by the
proponent and an opponent.
The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) and the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Harman) each will control 30 minutes of debate on the
bill.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra).
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 5 minutes.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2475, the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006. This is a very good bill, a
bill we can be very
[[Page H4843]]
proud of, and a bill that every Member of the House can and should
support.
Before I talk about some of the details in the bill, I would like to
recognize the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman). We have worked
hard on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to keep this
committee focused on the job that needs to be done and to do so on a
bipartisan basis, and I thank the gentlewoman for working with us in
that process and being able to maintain that spirit as we bring this
bill to the floor on a bipartisan basis. I also thank her staff and our
staff for helping us through this process in bringing this bill here
today.
Mr. Speaker, 3 years ago when he was chairman of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Porter Goss, now director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, asked me to take a strategic look at the technical
capabilities within the United States intelligence community. He wanted
me to see how the technical intelligence collection systems all work
together, evaluate their individual contributions to national security,
and see if there were redundancies to understand the affordability of
the many systems and, most importantly, understand the impacts on the
rest of the intelligence community.
What Mr. Goss really asked us to do was to go back, and we have
expanded that in the committee over the past 8 or 9 months, to take a
look at the strategic framework that we face in the world today and how
we should respond to the threats. So we spent a considerable amount of
time looking at the threats that America faces: What is the threat
environment that is out there today; what do we expect it to be in 3, 5
and 7 years, so we can shape the proper intelligence community to give
our policymakers and our military the right information to make good
decisions and keep our soldiers safe?
We have then taken that to take a look at the feedback we have gotten
from the 9/11 Commission, the feedback we have gotten from the WMD
Commission as to the particular strengths within the intelligence
community and also some of the particular weaknesses.
So as we put this bill together, we really focused on making sure
that we had a good balance between our human capabilities, the
investment we were making in our human capabilities for the long term,
and the investment we were making in our technical capabilities. This
bill does that by investing more in our human capabilities.
On the technical capabilities, it takes a very, very hard look at the
different programs that we have in place there. It makes sure that what
we do is put in place programs that will complement each other, give us
the information that we need, and hopefully put us on a framework and
on a pathway to balancing human capabilities with our technical
capabilities.
Also in that area, this bill moves forward and holds some of our
contractors accountable for their performance. This is an area where
tactically we may disagree on some of the points on how to make that
happen, but we are very much in sync on a bipartisan basis that we need
a strategic plan and we need to have our contractors perform. It will
also lay the framework for a discussion we will have throughout this
year about how to make sure that in a time where we have limited
budgets and limited programs underway, that we maintain the industrial
base here in the United States.
So there are a lot of things that we do in this bill to make sure
that we have got the balance and are moving in the right direction on
our technical capabilities.
Another key element of this bill is we have heard consistently from
our field personnel and others within the intelligence community,
especially those involved in the counterterrorism effort, that we
cannot fund counterterrorism on an ad hoc basis. So what we did in this
bill is we have authorized the majority of the dollars that we believe
will be needed to build our intelligence capability and to fund the war
on terrorism.
We think it is important to send to the intelligence community a
clear signal of how much money they are going to have so they can do
the appropriate planning and the ramping up of resources in the waging
of this global war on terrorism.
As I said at the beginning of my statement, we have done this on a
bipartisan basis. We have taken a strategic look at what the
intelligence community, where it needs to be and where it needs to go.
We are going to continue working in that effort. I think as Members see
through the debate, we have made a lot of progress and there is more
work to do.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 5 minutes.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 2475, the strongest
intelligence authorization bill to emerge from the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence in recent memory. Without the funding
authorized in this bill, the brave men and women of the intelligence
community would not be able to do their jobs which are so vital to the
defense of our country. I and many other members of the committee have
visited these intelligence professionals in some of the most austere
places of the world, and they deserve our gratitude and support.
I appreciate the comments of the gentleman from Michigan (Mr.
Hoekstra) and thank him and all of the members and staff of our
hardworking committee for their bipartisanship and patriotism. As one
of our members, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger) often
says, we put America first.
Our members have made a difference. In April 2004, all nine Democrats
on the Intelligence Committee introduced legislation that became the
basis for the
9/11 Commission's Report and the intelligence reform legislation passed
by Congress last fall. That reform dramatically reshaped our
intelligence community, unifying 15 agencies under the leadership of a
director of National Intelligence.
This year's intelligence authorization bill authorizes funds for that
new office. The DNI must succeed in his job and he deserves our
support. He is responsible for ensuring that intelligence is timely,
accurate and actionable. To do this, he needs authority to build and
execute budgets and move personnel. So I am pleased that we removed a
provision in this bill that would have severely eroded the DNI's
authority to move personnel around the intelligence community.
Mr. Speaker, in the fight against terrorists, intelligence is the tip
of the spear. Some see this fight as a traditional war, requiring
wartime emergency budgets and wartime authorities for the President.
That may have been the right approach immediately after 9/11. We fought
a war in Afghanistan and achieved an impressive victory.
But the terrorist threat has changed. Today we no longer face a
centralized top-down terrorist organization operating out of one
country. We face a network of loosely affiliated terrorist groups which
operate as franchises around the world, and that is why I believe we
are living in an era of terror.
This legislation does some good things to help us achieve victory in
an era of terror.
First, it ends our reliance on emergency supplemental budgets for
counterterrorism. The budget the President sent to Congress this year
funded less than 40 percent of the intelligence community
counterterrorism requirements, leaving the rest for emergency
supplementals. This bill changes that on a bipartisan basis, and we
fund 100 percent of CT requirements.
Second, this legislation incorporates a resolution introduced by all
nine Democrats, urging the new DNI to establish a multi-tiered security
clearance system to allow patriotic Americans with relatives in foreign
countries to obtain security clearances and serve our Nation. It is
high time we do this. This will help with field officers who can speak
the languages and blend in with terrorist groups, penetrate
proliferation networks, and recruit spies against the toughest targets.
{time} 1445
Victory in an era of terror will not be achieved by military might
alone, Mr. Speaker. Victory will require America to win the argument
for the hearts and minds of the next generation in the Arab and Muslim
world. I fear that we are presently losing that argument.
The ongoing revelations about abuses at Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere
undermine our ability to maintain the moral high ground and be seen as
a beacon of democracy and human
[[Page H4844]]
rights. I am encouraged that our committee's new oversight subcommittee
is investigating abuses that have occurred in our interrogation and
detention programs within the intelligence community. This is a serious
bipartisan investigation. But I also support a broader public
bipartisan inquiry into detention policies across the government so
that our efforts to fight the terrorists do not become a moral black
eye for America that undermines our security.
One area where this legislation can be improved, Mr. Speaker, is in
its approach to technical systems. The details of these systems are
classified and cannot be discussed openly. But I am concerned that we
have made sudden, drastic cuts to certain programs that may lead to a
gap in our intelligence capabilities and erode the industrial base
needed to develop critical capabilities in the future. I am pleased
that the chairman is committed to addressing this problem with me as
the bill moves to conference.
Overall, Mr. Speaker, this is strong legislation that puts us on the
right track to achieve victory in an era of terror. There is more, much
more, we must do and we will. The brave men and women of the
intelligence community deserve nothing less.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Arizona (Mr. Renzi), a member of the committee.
Mr. RENZI. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 2475. As a member
of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence from Arizona,
securing our borders has become one of our top priorities. Intelligence
and border security go hand in hand as America strengthens and secures
its borders, particularly in the Southwest. This bill funds activities
necessary to keep America safe and, under the gentleman from Michigan's
leadership, for the first time this bill helps to provide our Nation
with actionable intelligence when it comes to border security.
This legislation addresses the critical need for enhanced
counternarcotics and counterterrorism collection and analysis
throughout Mexico and Central and South America. It provides full
funding to the director of National Intelligence to develop and
implement a comprehensive intelligence collection strategy to help stem
the illegal flow of drugs, contraband and special interest aliens. In
addition, this bill authorizes the necessary funds to provide the
intelligence community the resources required to fulfill the
intelligence operations in Iraq and other pressing intelligence
missions around the globe. The bill increases the funding over last
year that provides additional personnel billets for linguists, analysts
and human collection, invests in new facilities and training
opportunities, and develops innovative technical tools.
In line with the President's priorities, this legislation
significantly enhances our global human intelligence collection
capabilities. Human intelligence requires boots on the ground across
the globe and those boots need linguistic skills, in-depth cultural and
tradecraft training, technical tools and a dedicated support staff to
be successful. H.R. 2475 provides both the people and the
infrastructure to expand and improve U.S. human intelligence collection
in regions around the world.
Experts estimate that almost 100 foreign entities, including both
state and nonstate actors, actively engage in espionage against the
United States. H.R. 2475 significantly reduces these threats and
improves our counterintelligence activities. Intelligence is our first
line of defense. Actionable intelligence saves lives and determines
battlefield victory. I ask my colleagues to support this bipartisan
bill and help reduce the threat and make America more secure.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Boswell) who is ranking member of the
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Human Intelligence, Analysis and
Counterintelligence, a mouthful that we call HACI.
(Mr. BOSWELL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BOSWELL. Mr. Speaker, I do rise in support of H.R. 2475. It may
not be a perfect bill, but there are many, many good things in it. I am
very pleased that the bill before us today no longer includes a
provision that would have undermined the authorities of Ambassador
Negroponte, the newly appointed director of National Intelligence. My
colleagues and I put a lot of effort into passing an intelligence
reform bill last year as was just discussed. We worked hard on giving
the director of National Intelligence all the authorities he needed to
make the intelligence community function as a community, including the
authority to transfer people to new intelligence centers if and as
needed. To tie Ambassador Negroponte's hands before his organization
has been stood up, it did not seem like a smart thing to do. I would
not have supported this bill had the provision limiting the DNI's
personnel transfer authorities not been taken out of the bill.
I thank the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) and the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) for their efforts to remove
this provision and I thank 9/11 Commission chairmen, Governor Tom Kean
and Congressman Lee Hamilton, for clearly stating their opposition to
it. I look forward to us addressing the other recommendations by the
Commission. It is also my belief that the DNI has to control the money
to be able to fulfill his charge of responsibility.
I am pleased that this year's authorization bill also fixes the
number one issue my colleagues and I raised last year, full funding for
counterterrorism operations. H.R. 2475 authorizes full funding for the
intelligence community's counterterrorism operations this year. That
should remove impediments to the intelligence community's ability to
plan their operations. Maybe this will be the year we are able to hunt
down Osama bin Laden. I certainly hope so, and I know we all feel that
way. The world will be better off once he is taken care of.
Again, I thank the gentleman from Michigan and the gentlewoman from
California for leading the Intelligence Committee in a bipartisan
fashion. National security must be a bipartisan issue and that is the
direction the committee is returning to.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from
New Mexico (Mrs. Wilson), the chairwoman of the Subcommittee on
Technical and Tactical Intelligence.
Mrs. WILSON of New Mexico. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for
bringing forward this bill and I want to thank the ranking member as
well for making this a bipartisan bill and working together. I think a
lot of credit also goes to our very capable staff who have worked very
hard and very professionally to pull together a very good piece of
work.
The technical and tactical subcommittee has been very active over the
last 5 months looking at our intelligence systems as they relate to the
military and also the high-cost technical collection programs that our
Nation relies on. The members of that committee have given their
personal time and traveled in many instances across the country, and I
wanted to thank the members of the subcommittee and particularly the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Eshoo) for working very hard in this
area. We have tried to understand what works, what is not working, do a
detailed review of some of these very expensive programs, looking at
what complements each other, where the gaps are, where the overlaps
are, so that we can improve our intelligence capability and make sure
that we are using every dollar wisely.
This bill makes several very important changes in direction in our
intelligence community. We have found that research and development is
underfunded pretty much across the entire intelligence community and it
is poorly coordinated, both in pathfinding research and in incremental
research in our current capabilities.
There are several large programs that are significantly off track
which causes a draining of funds away from other intelligence
priorities. We will not give contractors blank checks to cover cost,
schedule, and performance problems that they have failed to manage. We
have to control this budget because cost overruns compromise other
intelligence programs and put us as Members of Congress in the
difficult position of managing different risks.
This bill strengthens human intelligence. It strengthens our
analytical
[[Page H4845]]
capability. It strengthens translation and language capability. And we
insist that systems have to include plans to task sensors, exploit the
bits and bytes that come out of sensors, and disseminate information to
people who need it. If you do not have that, what you really have is a
science experiment, not an intelligence capability. In short, we have
come forward with an integrated strategic approach to the purchase of
high-cost technologies.
We have much work yet to do to win the war on terrorism. When we win
it, it will be because of two things: the bravery of our soldiers and
the superiority of American intelligence. I thank the gentleman for
bringing this bill forward. I look forward to voting for it.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, the new news on our committee is that we
have stood up an oversight subcommittee. Much discussion has been made
about this already today.
It is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Alabama
(Mr. Cramer) who is ranking member of the intelligence oversight
subcommittee.
Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the ranking member, I thank the
chairman, I thank the staff of both sides of the aisle. I stand in
enthusiastic and strong support of H.R. 2475. This bill addresses
several issues of great concern to the members of the committee and, in
fact, to all Americans. These issues were first raised or detailed by
several blue ribbon commissions that reviewed the performance of the
intelligence community after 9/11 and by the Congress in the
intelligence reform bill that was passed last year.
This bill invests in an analytical initiative that draws on expertise
resident at three centers: the Missile and Space Intelligence Center in
Huntsville, Alabama; the National Air and Space Intelligence Center in
Dayton, Ohio; and at the National Ground Intelligence Center in
Charlottesville, Virginia. These centers will collaboratively assess
the vulnerabilities of aircraft to foreign missiles and other airborne
threats and will develop countermeasures to protect commercial aircraft
at home and protect military aircraft for our troops in Iraq and
Afghanistan. The bill provides for much needed upgrades to information
networks in these centers, allowing them to eliminate possible
information gaps and to integrate stovepiped information. As
recommended by the WMD Commission, this will ensure that analysts and
operators have the information they need when they need it.
Last year's intelligence legislation significantly reformed the
intelligence community. Real reform, however, requires accountability
and oversight. I want to thank the chairman and the ranking member.
This year, we have set up, and the gentleman from Texas (Mr.
Thornberry) is here and I assume is going to speak in a few minutes as
well, this oversight subcommittee. This oversight subcommittee has been
working just as it should work. I am encouraged by our efforts to date
to provide meaningful congressional oversight of the entire
intelligence community. We have initiated in-depth reviews of
intelligence community interrogation and detention operations, and we
are actively pursuing answers to tough questions. We are also
monitoring the standup of the new DNI, ensuring that the intelligence
community implements the changes specified in the legislation.
Again, I thank the chairman, I thank the ranking member. We are off
to a fine start and this is an excellent bill. The Members should
support it.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Thornberry), the chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight
who has been working very effectively with the gentleman from Alabama
(Mr. Cramer) to do the work that an oversight subcommittee is expected
to do.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me
this time, and I rise in support of this bill. I also rise in
appreciation for the work that the chairman and the ranking member have
done in this bill and in fulfilling Congress' role vis-a-vis the
intelligence agencies in general. Further, I appreciate my partner on
the oversight subcommittee, the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Cramer),
and all that he means to this joint effort.
Mr. Speaker, the members of this committee are serious, hardworking,
knowledgeable, committed members. So much of what we do on the
Intelligence Committee is done behind closed doors. That can be an
advantage and a disadvantage. It is an advantage, in a sense, not to do
work in front of the television cameras and without press releases and
without all the partisanship that sometimes attends some of what we do
in Congress. It can be a disadvantage because we cannot talk with our
constituents or even many of our colleagues about what we do. The only
reason to be on this committee is to contribute to the national
security of the country, and I believe that all members on both sides
of the aisle in fact do that.
At the beginning of this Congress, the chairman and the ranking
member decided to create an oversight subcommittee. It became clear
from the report of the 9/11 Commission, from the Rob Silverman
Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction, in fact, a host of other
studies and reports, some even before the attacks of September 11,
2001, that Congress has to do its job.
{time} 1500
It is not enough just to say that the executive branch needs to
change the way it does its work in the post-Cold War world. We have to
do our job as well, and we should expect more of ourselves.
One of the things we have done differently is to create this
oversight subcommittee to, as I mentioned a few moments ago, have
greater depth but also greater persistence in our oversight of key
intelligence issues. The rules of the full Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence give us our mandate this year, which include oversight
of the intelligence reform bill that Congress passed last fall. It
gives specific emphasis on items for oversight that include community-
wide information-sharing, leaks of classified information, analysis and
information-assuring technologies, as well as audits and investigation
and tracking congressionally directed actions.
That is our mandate and it is a full plate, but members on both sides
of the aisle are going about that agenda working in not just a
bipartisan but really nonpartisan way.
And, in addition, I think Members on both sides agree with the Robb-
Silberman panel when they suggest that we should have these oversight
subcommittees, but we should not just hop around following newspaper
articles and doing our efforts, that we ought to have strategic
oversight. In fact, they say on page 338 of their commission report:
``We suggest that . . . the oversight committees limit their activities
to 'strategic oversight,' meaning they would set an agenda at the start
of the year or session of Congress, based on top priorities, such as
information sharing, and stick to that agenda.''
That is exactly what the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Cramer) and I
are attempting to do: to be tough but fair, to not be apologists for
the administration but not to be bashers of the administration, to try
to pursue the national security interests of the country as it relates
to intelligence oversight. That is the way serious oversight is done,
and I look forward to continuing to work from that perspective.
Ms. HARMAN. Madam Speaker, my home State of California produces many
of the platforms and systems that give us the technical edge in
intelligence, and I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Eshoo), my California friend, ranking member of the
Technical and Tactical Intelligence Subcommittee of the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence.
Ms. ESHOO. Madam Speaker, first I would like to thank the gentlewoman
from California (Ms. Harman), our distinguished ranking member, for her
exceptional leadership on the committee; certainly to the gentleman
from Michigan (Chairman Hoekstra) for the tone that he has brought to
the committee. I think it is much improved, and I think it is a result
of the bipartisanship that we have enjoyed since the chairman has
arrived that we see it in this piece of legislation which I am proud to
support.
I am especially pleased to see the multilevel security clearance
legislation introduced in March by committee Democrats, my colleagues
that I am so
[[Page H4846]]
proud of, that is in this bill. This provision will help the
intelligence community leverage the cultural and linguistic skills of a
broader candidate pool, which is so important to our intelligence
community.
During the markup of this bill, I offered an amendment requiring
inspectors general at the Defense and State Departments, the CIA, and
the DNI inspector general to establish telephone hotlines for
intelligence professionals to report complaints if they believe
policymakers are attempting to unduly or improperly influence them. I
think that it is an important effort because there is a question mark
in the mind of the American people on this very subject.
As a result, the chairman agreed to include language in this bill
about the need to ensure ombudsmen in these agencies to fulfill their
role to protect analysts and other professionals within the
intelligence community. The committee made a commitment to perform
effective oversight in this matter; so I withdraw my amendment, and I
thank the chairman for that effort.
As the ranking member of the Technical and Tactical Intelligence
Subcommittee, I am concerned that this bill reduces or eliminates
funding for several key programs in the administration's request
without full justification. Missing is an in-depth consideration of the
effect that funding reductions will have on the overall intelligence
architecture, the viability of our industrial base, which is essential.
Once that disassembles, we cannot put Humpty Dumpty back together
again, as well as overarching national security requirements. I hope
the DNI and the Secretary of Defense will conduct a comprehensive
review and explain the strategic linkages between collection
requirements, capabilities, and developing programs. This review would
better support future funding deliberations and decisions by the
committee. It is very important that that be done.
In closing, I want to express one of my deep concerns, and I know
that it is the concern that many of my colleagues share, and that is
the continuing reports of torture and other abuses of detainees. From
Abu Ghraib to Guantanamo Bay, the mounting revelations have become more
than an embarrassment to our country. They are a liability to our
deployed servicemembers. If, in fact, the Congress and its committees
of jurisdiction fail to fully investigate, I support a special
commission to do so. We have to have a full accounting for the American
people and have the determination to seek that.
So, in closing, I want to thank my colleagues, the chairman,
certainly our ranking member, all of my colleagues on the committee,
and most especially a superb and dedicated staff. I salute them. I
respect them for the work that they have done certainly on both sides
of the aisle.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
New York (Mr. McHugh), a new member of the committee, a very valuable
member, and also a member of the House Committee on Armed Services.
Mr. McHUGH. Madam Speaker, I thank the chairman for yielding me this
time.
Madam Speaker, I rise in strong support of this legislation, H.R.
2475. As the distinguished chairman so graciously recognized, I am one
of the newer members of this committee; and I must say in that respect,
I am enormously impressed by the bipartisan attitude that all the
members bring to this very important issue, that of national security
and its interface with our intelligence communities. That is a tribute
to all of the members, Democrat and Republican alike, but I think it is
a particular tribute to the distinguished gentleman from Michigan
(Chairman Hoekstra) and also the gentlewoman from California (Ms.
Harman), ranking member, who have worked so well together and provided
that leadership of bipartisanship.
The chairman noted, Madam Speaker, that I am a member of the House
Committee on Armed Services, and in that capacity I have the honor of
serving as chairman of the Military Personnel Subcommittee; and as
such, I have been particularly interested in programs that aid the
warfighter, those brave men and women who are putting their lives on
the line each and every day for our freedoms and for our interests. And
I am pleased to report that this legislation contains very important
increases in funding for military intelligence programs.
In particular, H.R. 2475 includes significant increases in funding
for operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, for the global war on terrorism,
and thereby decreases the reliance on supplemental budgeting. Budgeting
by supplemental, at least in my opinion, Madam Speaker, is inefficient;
and it hinders the effective planning of our intelligence operations.
And this bill very importantly takes a major step away from reliance on
those supplementals and seeks to provide full funding to fight
terrorism and for intelligence operations in Iraq.
There is also increased funding for critical initiatives such as
foreign language training for our troops in the field and for greater
numbers of defense intelligence analysts. This intelligence
authorization bill builds upon actions already taken by the House
Committee on Armed Services dictating a career path for military
linguists, and we should be very proud of this initiative in these
regards.
The net result, Madam Speaker, is that our intelligence personnel and
our military will be better trained and equipped to perform their
invaluable missions. These are important steps, and they have been
taken with the necessary consultation with the Committee on Armed
Services. And I am happy to report that the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence has worked very closely with the gentleman from
California (Chairman Hunter), with the gentleman from Missouri (Mr.
Skelton), distinguished ranking member, with respect to our
authorizations. And I would certainly argue that they complement one
another very closely. To the extent that there are differences, and I
think differences are and will continue to be inevitable, I know all of
us on both sides of the aisle and in both committees will work to
constructively breach those differences and bring about agreements on
remaining issues as the authorization process continues.
So I urge unanimous support of this very fine piece of legislation.
Ms. HARMAN. Madam Speaker, I now yield 2 minutes to the gentleman
from New Jersey (Mr. Holt), ranking member on the Intelligence Policy
Subcommittee.
Mr. HOLT. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from California for
yielding me this time, and I also thank the chairman and the staff for
putting together in a congenial atmosphere a good bill.
There are some good features to the bill, and I am pleased that it
gives the new Director of National Intelligence the authority and
resources necessary for him to succeed, and I am also satisfied that
the bill gives the intelligence community 100 percent of the funds that
it needs for counterterrorism programs. I am encouraged by the bill's
emphasis on human intelligence and the recommendation to create a
multilevel security clearance system that will allow the intelligence
community to harness the power of America's diversity.
More must be done, however, to encourage the use of open source, or
public, information. Last year we gave the intelligence community an
urging to increase its collection, analysis, and use of open-source
information. And I look forward to working with the DNI to move these
efforts forward.
I am also pleased that the bill advances our foreign language
training efforts within the intelligence community, and I will continue
to work with my colleagues to strengthen our language capabilities
throughout the Federal Government.
I do want to express serious concern about a couple of matters.
First, the administration's recommendations to close or realign
military bases has the potential to disrupt vital intelligence
expertise. Bases like Fort Monmouth, in my home State of New Jersey,
play critical intelligence roles that have not been taken fully into
account in the process. I would like to thank the chairman and ranking
member for urging the Director of National Intelligence to evaluate the
effect of base realignment on our Nation's intelligence capabilities,
and I will include their letter at this point in the Record.
[[Page H4847]]
House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence,
Washington, DC, May 26, 2005.
Ambassador John Negroponte,
Director of National Intelligence, New Executive Office
Building, Washington, DC.
Dear Ambassador Negroponte: During the markup of the Fiscal
Year 2006 Intelligence Authorization bill, Members of the
Committee raised questions about the potential impacts that
the Defense Department's Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)
Commission recommendations could have on the nation's
intelligence capabilities. The Members believe strongly that
such impacts should be factored into the final decision
process.
Many intelligence programs, for example, are dependent on
subject matter experts made up of military personnel,
government civilians, and contractors. These people form the
analytic depth and breadth of the Intelligence Community, as
well as much of the core of its engineering, scientific and
technical expertise. Based on past BRAC experiences, we can
logically assume that many of the intelligence personnel that
would be affected by the latest recommendations could refuse
to uproot their families and relocate. The Intelligence
Community depends on this intellectual capital, and we should
well understand how the resulting loss of these people would
affect intelligence activities and, thereby, the nation's
security.
The BRAC recommendations could affect the nation's
intelligence capabilities in many other ways. Accordingly, we
want to ensure that these intelligence-related impacts be
considered in the deliberations that result in the final BRAC
decisions. We believe that your position as the Director of
National Intelligence puts you in a unique position to best
understand and, accordingly, respond to these potential
impacts.
Therefore, we ask you to evaluate the affects of base
realignment and closure on the nation's intelligence
capabilities. We further ask that you provide the Committee
with the results of your review no later than the date that
the President provides his final approval and certification
of the BRAC report to the Congress.
Sincerely,
Peter Hoekstra,
Chairman.
Jane Harman,
Ranking Member.
Madam Speaker, I also express my deep disappointment with the
decision of the Committee on Rules to disallow a moderate and
reasonable amendment by the gentleman from California (Mr. Waxman) that
would have mandated the creation of a 9/11-style commission to
investigate how the executive branch has handled detainees. We need
that investigation, and we can do some of it within the committee; but
we do need a public 9/11-style commission.
Madam Speaker, I support this bill, and I urge my colleagues to
support it as well.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. HARMAN. Madam Speaker, I served for 6 years on the Committee on
Armed Services and came to admire greatly our next speaker.
Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr.
Skelton), ranking member.
Mr. SKELTON. Madam Speaker, I certainly thank the gentlewoman for
yielding me this time. She is doing such a superb job on the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence. We thank her for her efforts, along
with the chairman as well.
Let me say I rise in support of this intelligence authorization bill.
In doing so, I want to make a few observations about the state of our
national intelligence capabilities, as well as some comments about the
bill.
Within the span of 2 years, the United States had two very obvious
and public examples of intelligence failures: the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks; and the completely incorrect conclusions reached
about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs. These and other
failures have been recognized by both the 9/11 Commission and the Robb-
Silberman Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Last year's intelligence reform bill was an important first step in
rectifying deficiencies in our intelligence capabilities. I believe
intelligence is the tip of the spear. It is the tip of the spear in
helping our warfighters. The new Director of National Intelligence
represents an important benchmark in the creation of a Goldwater-
Nichols-like structure for our intelligence community.
The Goldwater-Nichols law, as we all know, altered command
relationships among our military services in such a way that has
fostered joint operations and enabled our military to become the very
best in the world.
{time} 1515
I am optimistic that the new director of Intelligence will be able to
unify the group of disparate intelligence organizations that comprise
the intelligence community to produce better capability, communication,
and inoperability than has been the case in the past. I am also pleased
that the gentleman from California (Chairman Hunter) and the gentleman
from Michigan (Chairman Hoekstra) have been able to resolve their
differences over the transfer of personnel who perform intelligence
functions.
While the establishment of the director of National Intelligence is
an important step, I believe much more remains to be done if we are to
really improve our intelligence capability. First, I think Congress
needs to do a better job of overseeing our intelligence operations than
it has in the past. My own view is that some of our intelligence
failures could have been avoided with vigorous congressional oversight.
Second, we need to aggressively follow up on the 9/11 Commission's
recommendations.
We need to expand our efforts to secure international stores of
nuclear materials, particularly in the nations ofthe former Soviet
Union. Governor Kean, co-chair of the 9/11 Commission, recently said
there is no greater danger to our country than a terrorist group
acquiring these materials. I want to echo his concern that we must be
sensitive to the fact that intelligence activities can sometimes
intrude upon the lives of Americans. In a free society, we must have
checks and balances. I think we need to appoint a Federal civil
liberties board to prevent and redress constitutional abuses by
intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Although last year's law
created a civil liberties board, the administration has yet to name any
members to the board, something that is long overdue.
Madam Speaker, this is a good bill I believe members should support.
I commend the gentleman from Michigan, Chairman Hoekstra, and the
gentlewoman from California, Ranking Member Harman, for a job well
done.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Hunter), the chairman of the House Committee on Armed
Services, and our partner in making sure that we have a solid and
strong intelligence community as well as the best fighting forces, the
best military in the world.
Mr. HUNTER. Madam Speaker, I want to thank the chairman for his kind
words. It is appropriate that I follow the ranking member of the
Committee on Armed Services, the distinguished gentleman from Missouri
and his remarks, because he talked about Goldwater-Nichols, and
Goldwater-Nichols did drive jointness in the military.
Another thing that Goldwater-Nichols did, and it was primarily as a
result of the debacle in Lebanon with the marines, is to drive what was
known as the chain of command rule, meaning that when you had a
combatant commander, formerly known as a CINC, that combatant commander
was in charge of everything in that warfighting theater, whether it was
a rivet joint aircraft or a soldier or a marine, special operator, or a
tactical intelligence gatherer in that area. That was a major issue
that we had to work on, and we had to build a seam and a protection for
the chain of command and, at the same time, afford to the national
intelligence gatherers the resources and the opportunity to carry out
their mission.
I think that the bill, the 9/11 bill did a pretty good job of that,
and I want to commend the gentleman from Michigan (Chairman Hoekstra)
and the gentlewoman from California (Ranking Member Harman) for their
participation in working that. My good colleague, the gentleman from
Missouri (Mr. Skelton) and I really look forward to Mr. Negroponte
getting off to the right start. He is a guy with a lot of good
judgment, great experience in very difficult and inconvenient and
dangerous missions, in my estimation, and I think that is probably a
requisite for this job.
I want to thank the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) also,
because there were a couple of provisions in this bill that we thought
had a chain of command problem, and he looked at those and worked on
them and took them out in the rule, and I want to let
[[Page H4848]]
him know I appreciate that. That was important to us. We are working
together, and we both want to see this new apparatus, this intelligence
apparatus that has to work so well with the defense apparatus moving
off to a good new start in this war against terror.
So my thanks to the chairman and thanks to the ranking member. We
have a lot of work to do, but we have a good bill here, and I hope
every Member supports it.
Ms. HARMAN. Madam Speaker, I yield myself 15 seconds to say to the
last speaker that I applaud his comments about the need for this new
legislation to succeed. It is critical, in my view, to move from a 1947
business model, which is the one we were operating under, to this one.
I also would point out to our colleagues, as the last speaker knows,
that battlefield intelligence is not included in the DNI construct that
we built.
Madam Speaker, it is now my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger), a recent addition to our
committee, who is a very active member of our new Subcommittee on
Oversight.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Speaker, as my colleagues have pointed out,
a lot of good, hard, work has been put into this bill, which places our
committee and the intelligence community on the path of success for
achieving the goals set forth in the recommendations of the 9/11
Commission and the WMD Commissions. The turf battles are ending and we
now have a director of National Intelligence to oversee and coordinate
efforts, but we all must work together in order to make sure that the
DNI can succeed.
I thank the gentleman from Michigan (Chairman Hoekstra) and the
gentlewoman from California (Ranking Member Harman) for leading by
example and promoting bipartisan efforts in our oversight role. I also
want to thank our staff for their hard work.
Our newly established Subcommittee on Oversight has already taken the
reins of leadership and is investigating the abuses that have occurred
in our interrogation and detention programs. These abuses only serve to
embolden terrorist actions against us and it increases risk to our
military forces and American citizens abroad. These abuses also hurt
our reputation abroad and allow the insurgents to recruit people to
attack us.
I also look forward to continuing work with my colleagues on
solutions to the security clearance challenges faced by the
intelligence community and State and local governments who need to
access information to protect our homeland. This bill's endorsement of
a multilevel security clearance system will enhance flexibility in
hiring practices and access to information. Current clearance wait
times sometimes exceed a year. Terrorists will not wait a year, and
neither can we.
Let me close by praising the excellent work of the Armed Forces
Medical Intelligence Center and the National Security Agency, NSA,
based in my district. Our committee recognizes their challenges, and we
fully support their efforts in the global war on terrorism and in Iraq
and Afghanistan. I urge my Democratic colleagues to join me in
supporting this bill.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.
Madam Speaker, as we take a look at the technical programs and we
take a look at the structure of the intelligence community, at the end
of the day it is about the people in the intelligence community. As we
have conducted our oversight responsibilities in developing this bill,
we have had the opportunity to meet and work with many of the
intelligence professionals throughout the community and around the
world. I believe I can speak for the rest of my colleagues when I say
that we hold in the highest regard the work accomplished by these
dedicated U.S. intelligence community personnel.
At great sacrifice, often under extreme and intense conditions, and
at great personal risk, the men and women of the intelligence community
continue to perform their missions with great energy, professionalism,
and devotion to the national security mission. I commend these patriots
for their heroism, their integrity, and their perseverance. These
honorable people form the first line of defense for our Nation. Our
freedoms and the very security of our country rely on their successes.
Those successes are things we cannot and do not often have the
opportunity to talk about.
Unfortunately, and quite wrongly, it is the rare but overlooked
publicized failures that they are credited with. I stand here today and
say thank you to these tremendous people. They deserve our support, and
that is what we are doing with this legislation today.
Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. HARMAN. Madam Speaker, I associate myself totally with the
comments that our chairman just made.
Madam Speaker, it is now my pleasure to yield 2\1/4\ minutes to the
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Tierney), our rookie on our side.
Mr. TIERNEY. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me
this time.
I rise to discuss H.R. 2475. It is a bill that, as people have said,
takes a number of steps to strengthen our intelligence capabilities
and, for those reasons, is supportable. Nevertheless, like most bills,
it has parts that need to be moved on and worked on still.
As was mentioned, I am new to this committee, so first I want to
recognize the efforts of all of my colleagues on the committee and the
staff who did incredible work on this. I also want to acknowledge the
fact that my minority colleagues have been outspoken during the past
couple of years on a number of issues, and I want to thank them and my
majority colleagues for incorporating those issues in this bill and, of
course, the majority adding their own approval.
On the plus side, as has been mentioned, 100 percent funding for
counterterrorism in the base budget is a huge step forward. We need to
make sure we build on that. The White House proposal to fund 60 percent
of that in a supplemental budget would have undermined our plans and
operations, so 100 percent is a big step in the right direction. The
bipartisan willingness to keenly scrutinize architectural programs for
the quality, for the program management, for the budget responsibility,
for cost is also important. It is helpful to allow for investments in
human intelligence, and it can bring more public confidence to the work
we do in this area.
I think it would be well-placed to put that kind of scrutiny on the
whole budget at large, and I think we should consider making more of
the Select Committee on Intelligence budget process public, to the
extent possible, including at least the aggregate amount of money being
spent so that the public will be able to focus on that and have more
confidence.
The best intelligence oversight begins with looking at the 9/11
Commission's recommendations for reform of Congress's intelligence
committees. We still need to do a considerable amount of work there
concerning how those committees will be formulated and what budgetary
appropriation aspect will be within what body. We need renewed
oversight, and the Subcommittee on Oversight that has been formed and
mentioned earlier is an improvement. Its time would be well spent if we
ensure that the DNI and the DNI office is set up largely in line with
Commission recommendations. We do not need another sprawling
bureaucracy. It will be well-served to have a streamlined executive
staff that utilizes existing agencies and moves forward on that basis.
And it has to have the authority to ensure that the network agencies
are reformed, coordinated, and effective. It also needs the authority
to make sure that we have the appropriate budgetary and personnel
powers within the DNI to work.
The DNI should follow the recommendation of the blue ribbon
commission to establish a Civil Liberties Board and ensure that it
effectively protects the civil liberties, even as we make sure
aggressive intelligence measures are pursued. This too is essential to
maintain public trust. It is as important as it is to require that we
use taxpayer money wisely, and it is every bit as essential that our
intelligence operate within the law.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.
Madam Speaker, I would like to get to some of the specifics of the
legislation. I want to make an observation about the overall position
we have
[[Page H4849]]
taken. It is my belief, and we have seen it today, that we may be
harshly criticized by some for being too bold or aggressive with some
of our actions. Indeed, we have already been told that we were not
incremental enough. I want to take head-on those who take such
positions.
There is no question that what is being proposed today is bold and
sweeping in some areas. Without getting into the classified specifics,
based on our strategic review, we are cutting back dramatically in some
cases, on some technical programs that have had poor performance or
could be modified for better utility for the Nation's intelligence
efforts.
We are terminating some programs that we do not believe fit in the
overall architecture for the intelligence community. We have analyzed
these programs extensively, asked the tough questions, and focused on
the resulting intelligence output. To paraphrase from a Hollywood movie
line, these programs have been weighed, they have been measured, and
they have been found wanting.
We are then taking the resulting savings and applying that to
historically underfunded areas in the human intelligence and human
capital areas. Specifically, we are focusing needed emphasis on adding
human intelligence specialists, improving the training of analysts,
improving the training of case officers, and making more robust the
infrastructure necessary to gain their expertise, and then better
employ that expertise.
We have quite simply in the past paid too much lip service to those
basic needs, while continuing to fund expensive technical programs
that, although important, do not make up for the lack of analysts, lack
of worldwide coverage, lack of training, and lack of basic
infrastructure. In sum, we are doing the heavy lifting that should have
been done long ago. We are acting boldly and positively on the task our
former chairman gave us.
Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. HARMAN. Madam Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute to comment on the
remarks the chairman just made.
Madam Speaker, it is not a zero-sum game, it is not a trade-off
between what we call HUMINT, that is, human intelligence, which is
primarily the use of spies to tell us the plans and intention of the
bad guys, and technology. It is a positive-sum game, or we hope it is a
positive-sum game, that balances correctly our investments in HUMINT
and our investments in technology.
I said earlier that my home State of California makes many of the
technical platforms that we use effectively to gather intelligence. I
agree with our chairman that we should take a clear-eyed look at what
works and what does not work and what capabilities we need to defeat
present and future threats. But some of us, I would say a majority on
the minority side, believe that the weighing, measuring, and finding
wanting that has gone on in this bill needs further review, that the
balance can be better struck.
I look forward to working with the chairman on a better balance as
this bill comes to conference, keeping in mind that we want a positive-
sum outcome.
Madam Speaker, it is now my pleasure to yield 1 minute to the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Crowley), a very serious Member of this
body, not on our committee.
Mr. CROWLEY. Madam Speaker, I thank my gentle friend and colleague
from California for yielding me this time.
I rise in strong support of the national intelligence bill. I want to
thank the committee for its great work. I especially want to focus my
praise on the gentlewoman from California (Ranking Member Harman) for
her great work in leading on this issue. It was Democrats, led by the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) and the gentleman from Florida
(Mr. Hastings), that pushed the 9/11 Commission to be started last
year, as the Republicans and the White House blocked their work and
opposed their mission. I believe the Republicans fear the truth that
may come from that Commission.
Later, when the 9/11 Commission issued its recommendations and the
Speaker said he would not implement any legislative changes without a
majority of the majority, it was again Democrats and the gentlewoman
from California (Ms. Harman) who led the fight for a real intelligence
shakeup and for the creation of a director of National Intelligence.
{time} 1530
Democrats fixed those problems and fought back changes this year to
bring us back to the bad old days of intelligence turf wars.
This bill reflects the new world we live in, a dangerous world that
has gotten more dangerous since September 11; and we need to be
involved, and more heavily involved, to protect all Americans, no
matter where they are on this planet and the bill does that.
Representing one of the most diverse congressional districts in the
U.S., I interact with a number of immigrants and their families who are
from every corner of the globe. And the one thing that unifies them all
is their love of this great country. And they can and will be helpful
in helping this country infiltrate terror networks that threaten our
country.
This bill will help them do that.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to my colleague, the
gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Shays).
Mr. SHAYS. Madam Speaker, I want to just first compliment the
chairman and ranking member for their excellent work on this
legislation, their excellent work in general, and frankly the work that
they have done in helping to create such a strong structure for
intelligence.
The Cold War is over. The world is a more dangerous place. We need to
be able to not contain and react to an event; we need to be able to
detect and prevent it. It means that we need very good intelligence,
both intelligence directed with technology and intelligence that occurs
from very good human capital.
I think the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) and our incredible
ranking member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), have done
an excellent job in drafting this legislation. My compliments to both
of them. They give credit to the full Congress and the work that they
have done.
Ms. HARMAN. Madam Speaker, I thank the last speaker for his generous
words and ask how much time remains on each side.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mrs. Miller of Michigan). The gentlewoman
from California (Ms. Harman) has 8 minutes remaining. The gentleman
from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) has 8\1/2\ minutes remaining.
Ms. HARMAN. Madam Speaker, we at the moment have no other speakers on
the floor. And I reserve the right to close for our side.
Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Speaker, we have no additional speakers at this
time either, so I believe I have the right to close. The gentlewoman
will close on her side, and we will have no additional speakers. I will
close on our side.
Ms. HARMAN. Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of our time.
Madam Speaker, the last 4 years have witnessed two of the worst
intelligence failures in our Nation's history. Congress passed
intelligence reform and created the DNI position to give the brave
women and men of the intelligence community the tools they need to
collect and analyze accurate and timely intelligence.
We cannot have any more catastrophic failures where we fail to
connect the dots or believe too fervently in the claims of bogus
sources. This legislation, the authorization bill we are considering
today, is the first funding bill under our new intelligence
organization.
It is a strong bill that deserves our support. As we said earlier,
for the first time we fully funded counterterrorism in the base budget
so we can plan CT operations against our enemies. For the first time we
have urged the DNI to create multitier security clearances so we can
field a diverse group of intelligence officers who speak the languages
and understand the cultures of our adversaries.
I am proud to say these were two ideas offered by the committee
Democrats that gained bipartisan support in our committee. As I have
said, there are ways this bill can be improved further. And I look
forward to working on
[[Page H4850]]
this as we move to conference. But this is a bipartisan product that
deserves bipartisan support.
And before I close, I do want to thank again the hard-working members
on both sides of the committee who put so much effort into it day after
day, and moreover the hard-working staff on a bipartisan basis.
And let me just identify those on the minority side who are sitting
on the floor with me today: David Buckley, staff director; Chuck Gault,
deputy staff director; Jeremy Bash, general counsel; Mike DeLaney;
Larry Hanauer; John Keefe; Pam Moore; Wyndee Parker, special counsel;
and Christine York. They make us look good, and I urge passage of this
legislation before us.
Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
(Mr. HOEKSTRA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks, and include extraneous material.)
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Madam Speaker, today before closing general debate, I would like to
briefly offer congratulations and recognition to Mr. Charles G. Allen,
as many of us know him, Charlie, as he completes his tour of duty as
the assistant director of the Central Intelligence Agency for
collection.
He has served the intelligence community with great distinction, and
I will later seek consent in the House to submit a more lengthy tribute
into the Record.
But just briefly, he is a native of North Carolina. Mr. Allen has
served the Central Intelligence Agency and the Nation with distinction
since 1958, holding a variety of positions of increasing
responsibility, both in analytical and managerial capacity. He served
overseas in an intelligence liaison capacity from 1974 to 1977, and
from 1977 to 1980 he held management positions of increasing
responsibility and importance in the Directorate of Intelligence.
I think that all of the Members in the House, and all of the Members
and the staff on the committee who have gotten to know Mr. Allen over
the last number of years, number one, we are glad that he is still
working on special assignment with Mr. Goss; but we really want to
extend our congratulations to him for almost slightly over 45 years of
service to this country within the intelligence community, a real
national asset in the intelligence business.
Madam Speaker, I include for the Record a statement on Assistant
Director Allen.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Speaker, I rise today to offer congratulations
and recognition to Mr. Charles E. Allen as he completes his tour of
duty as the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Collection.
Since its creation by the Congress 7 years ago, he has served in this
position with distinction.
Mr. Allen was appointed as the first Assistant Director of Central
Intelligence for Collection. As such, he was responsible for
Intelligence Community collection management, and specifications for
our next generation of collection systems. During these past 7 years he
has come to personify the position, personalize the management of this
nation's scarce intelligence collection assets, confound his early
critics, and overall achieve positive results beyond even the
expectations of his supporters, who are legion. His service has been a
great asset, and Congress has regularly drawn upon his experience and
judgment.
A native of North Carolina, Mr. Allen has served the Central
Intelligence Agency and the Nation with distinction since 1958, holding
a variety of positions of increasing responsibility both in analytic
and managerial capacities. He served overseas in an intelligence
liaison capacity from 1974 to 1977, and from 1977 to 1980 he held
management positions of increasing responsibility and importance in the
Directorate of Intelligence.
Mr. Allen served as program manager of a major classified project,
from 1980 to 1982 in the Office of the Director of Central
Intelligence, and was subsequently detailed to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense where he held a senior position in strategic
mobilization planning.
In 1985 the Director of Central Intelligence requested Mr. Allen's
return from the Secretary of Defense's office to serve as the National
Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism, and later as Chief of
Intelligence in the CIA's newly established Counterterrorist Center.
Many of Mr. Allen's successes have and shall continue to remain secret,
but two that have become more publicly known illustrate his
contributions; he played a key role in apprehending the hijackers who
killed an American citizen on the cruise ship Achille Lauro, and he
correctly brought to the DCI's attention certain matters which served
to stimulate the Iran-Contra investigation.
Mr. Allen served as the National Intelligence Officer for Warning
from 1988 to 1994 and chaired the Intelligence Community's Warning
Committee. From these positions he issued timely warnings of events of
momentous importance, confounding most intelligence officers who did
not share his prescience.
Mr. Allen was awarded the National Intelligence Medal for Achievement
in 1983 by DCI Casey and the President's Award for Distinguished
Federal Civilian Service in 1986 by President Reagan. In 1991, he was
presented the CIA Commendation Medal for provision of warning
intelligence in Desert Shield/Desert Storm.
He and his wife, Kay, reside in Herndon, Virginia, where they raised
four children.
Madam Speaker, Mr. Allen has already enjoyed a long and luminous
career in intelligence, and as he steps down from his current position
I hope all my colleagues will recognize the extraordinary contributions
Mr. Charles E. Allen has made to our National Security as a lifelong
professional intelligence officer. I hope my colleagues will honor him
as a great American and pioneer in the management of intelligence
collection inter alia.
Finally, Madam Speaker, I ask my colleagues to join me in expressing
our confidence in his continued ability and willingness to serve the
Nation as she shall call upon him.
Ms. HARMAN. Madam Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. HOEKSTRA. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.
Ms. HARMAN. I thank the chairman for yielding to me. Charlie Allen is
as close as you can come to a legend in the intelligence community.
Before the intelligence reform bill passed last year, he was one of the
few senior intelligence officers who could get 15 disparate agencies to
function as a community. He did that mainly through sheer force of
personality.
Our Nation collects intelligence through a variety of means, from
spies on the ground to satellites overhead, and everything in between.
In his capacity as the assistant director for collection, Charlie got
the collectors to understand that they were most effective when they
worked together as a team against the hardest targets.
He got them to understand that integrated collection strategies
yielded the best outcomes. Under Charlie's leadership, the collectors
in the intelligence community have scored some truly impressive
victories, and it is unfortunate that these cannot be recounted in
public.
I will just tell you that Charlie's service to the Nation was made
clear to me the day he told the committee that he had been with the CIA
for nearly 50 years. That is an astounding record, and it is certainly
appropriate as we close debate on what I think is one of the best
authorization bills ever, that we recognize Charlie's service to our
Nation.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Speaker, in closing, again I would like to thank
my colleagues on the other side of the aisle, the staff on both sides
of the aisle who have worked to put together a very, very good bill, my
colleagues on my side of the aisle.
We have put together, I think, a very, very strong bill. I think it
deserves broad bipartisan support. It sets us in the right direction.
As my colleague has indicated, there is more work to do. We do need to
take a look at the technical programs. These are critical to the long-
term success of our intelligence community, to make sure that public
policymakers have the information that we need to make the right
decisions.
I appreciate the gentlewoman from California's (Ms. Harman) support
as we have gone through this process and recognizing that there are
issues and concerns about the performance of some of these programs and
so that we have the agreement on that.
Where we are disagreeing and having some discussions right now is
what is the most effective way to respond to those problems and issues.
We want accountability. We want performance. We want to spend the
taxpayer dollars wisely. And I am sure that as we continue to go
through this process, work with our colleagues on the other side of
this building, and work with the administration, we will come to a
conclusion, hopefully, that we can all agree to.
I applaud the committee and our work in taking some of these steps
[[Page H4851]]
that I think we all recognize needed to be taken and that we are
committed to addressing those problems.
With that, Madam Speaker, I would encourage my colleagues to support
this bill.
Ms. PELOSI. Madam Speaker, the preamble to the Constitution tells us
that one of the first responsibilities of the Federal government is to
``provide for the common defense.''
My 10 years on the House Intelligence Committee have given me an
appreciation for the vital role the men and women in our intelligence
agencies play in doing just that.
Many of them take extraordinary risks on a daily basis in an effort
to gather the information policy makers and military commanders need to
make sound decisions. They are deeply dedicated to preserving our
country's security, and each of us is grateful for their hard work and
sacrifice.
They need an intelligence system that is as strong, smart, and
competent as they are, and this bill takes several strong steps towards
making sure we have that system.
I want to commend Chairman Hoekstra and Ranking Member Harman for
their leadership and hard work in making sure that this legislation
addresses not only the immediate needs of the intelligence community,
but helps plan for the future as well.
However, it would be a mistake for us to pass this bill and declare
that our work is done and that we have fulfilled our responsibility to
the intelligence community and the American people.
It has now been more than 1,700 days since the September 11th
terrorist attacks changed our Nation, and laid bare the holes in our
intelligence gathering system.
It has been 11 months since the independent 9/11 Commission issued
its findings and made its recommendations about how to close those
gaps.
It has been nearly a year since the Senate Intelligence Committee
concluded that our intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction
capabilities was fundamentally flawed--a conclusion that was recently
confirmed by the Presidential Commission on the Intelligence
Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass
Destruction.
In part, this bill provides the resources the intelligence community
needs to prepare for the future by learning from mistakes made in the
past. However, these recent reports--notably those of the 9/11
Commission and the Robb-Silberman Commission--point to the need to do
far more than simply fund the intelligence community.
These two commissions made many recommendations for significant
change in the way the intelligence agencies operate and are overseen by
Congress, the way the intelligence community is managed, and in other
matters associated with better protecting the American people from the
threats posed by terrorists, particularly terrorists armed with weapons
of mass destruction.
It was an intelligence authorization bill that established the 9/11
Commission, and it is therefore appropriate that in the context of the
debate on this authorization measure, and with the first anniversary of
the release of the Commission's report and recommendations fast
approaching, we reflect on the recommendations that have been
implemented, and on those that have not.
The Commission concluded that more centralized management of the
intelligence community was needed, and that the manager had to have
considerable power over people and money. The first Director of
National Intelligence, Ambassador Negroponte is now in office. He faces
a daunting task. We all hope he is successful in it.
That is why it was so surprising and regrettable that the
Intelligence Committee, over the objections of Congresswoman Harman and
the other Democratic Members, chose to welcome him with an effort to
restrict his power. What a terribly negative message that provision
sent about the commitment of the majority to intelligence reform. This
bill is much improved with that provision removed, as the rule has
done.
The impetus for this ill-advised action reportedly came from
officials in the Department of Defense. We created the position of DNI
to help address the interagency squabbling that leads to intelligence
failures. This is simply no place for power grabs or bureaucratic self-
protection and preservation on the part of the Pentagon.
Just as it was an intelligence authorization bill that created the 9/
11 commission, I had hoped that this intelligence authorization would
include Mr. Waxman's proposal to create a commission to investigate the
prisoner abuses in Afghanistan, at Abu Ghraib, and at Guantanamo.
That will not occur as a result of actions taken by the Republican
majority on the Rules Committee. For our international standing, our
sense of fairness and decency, and to establish more effective means of
intelligence gathering, these abuses must be examined.
As former Ambassador Thomas Pickering, attorney Floyd Abrams, and our
former colleague Bob Barr wrote in The Washington Post on June 7:
``This is a time when we should be making extra efforts to reach out to
Muslims and to ask them to work with us in the war against terrorism.
Instead, our failure to undertake a thorough and credible investigation
has caused severe resentment of the United States.''
Some of those who opposed most strongly an independent investigation
of the 9/11 attacks also oppose an independent investigation of the
prisoner abuse scandal. That is unacceptable.
But just as the American people would not accept the initial refusal
to establish a 9/11 Commission, so too will demands continue for an
independent commission to investigate the prisoner abuses in Iraq,
Guantanamo Bay, and elsewhere.
Our country's standing in the eyes of the world depends on getting to
the bottom of the prisoner abuse matter--a fact that will ultimately
force the majority of this House to stop placing obstacles in the path
of a full and independent inquiry.
Unfortunately this is not the only initiative this Congress has
failed to act on. Despite the unanimity with which they were adopted
and the near universal acclaim they have produced, some critical
recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission have gone unfulfilled. For
example, Chairman Kean pointed earlier this month to the failure to
allocate more of the broadcast spectrum to first responder
communications as ``almost a scandal.'' Congresswoman Harman has been a
leader in trying to resolve this problem and I congratulate her for her
efforts.
Chairman Kean also emphasized what has long been known to Members of
the Intelligence Committee: the greatest danger facing the United
States is a terrorist attack involving weapons of mass destruction, and
the best way to address that is to safeguard or destroy WMD components,
especially nuclear material, at its source.
Intelligence plays a huge role in efforts to combat proliferation of
nuclear material and technology, but money is needed to better protect
or acquire these materials in the countries where they were developed.
We are simply not providing enough resources to this effort.
Finally, the 9/11 Commissioners have been clear in their assessment
that, unless Congress overhauls the procedures by which it oversees the
work of the intelligence agencies, intelligence reform will not be
successful.
The House has not undertaken the kind of comprehensive review of the
oversight process that the Commission believes to be necessary. I have
let the Speaker know, repeatedly, that Democrats are prepared to work
cooperatively on this review. It is imperative that we begin this task
soon--we have already waited far too long.
This bill enjoys broad bipartisan support from members of the
Committee, and I intend to support it. In doing so, however, I urge
that the House dedicate itself to finishing the job begun last fall
with the adoption of the 9/11 intelligence reform bill and address
completely all of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.
Mr. EVERETT. Madam Speaker, I rise today in strong support of H.R.
2475, the Intelligence Authorization Bill for fiscal year 2006.
As one of several ``cross-over'' members who serve on both the
Intelligence and Armed Services Committees, this legislation strikes a
reasonable balance between our national intelligence needs, and the
needs of our warfighters. As we know from our work on the Intelligence
Reform Act last fall, this is not an easy task.
Madam Speaker, it would be disingenuous to state that all is well
within the Intelligence Community. For a number of years, the Select
Committee on Intelligence has been systematically identifying major
shortfalls in providing for our foreign intelligence needs. These
include: funding shortfalls, major limitations in human intelligence,
limited capabilities in foreign language specialists, aging information
technology systems, and the lack of strategic planning with regard to
the Intelligence Community's overhead intelligence collection programs.
Madam Speaker, this bill represents a major step forward in
correcting many of these problems by funding programs, operations, and
personnel that are vital to the security of the United States. The
policies and programs in this bill will enable us to strengthen our
intelligence capabilities to ensure that we are providing the best
foreign intelligence efforts possible.
In particular, this bill begins to balance the resources applied to
technical collection programs with those applied to human source
collection. In years past, funding cuts greatly reduced the
Intelligence Community's ability to provide global collection and
analytic coverage. The global war on terrorism has led to increased
funding, but there is still only limited capability to focus on other
issues around the
[[Page H4852]]
world. This bill reinvigorates capabilities that have long been
ignored.
I have a personal concern about the Intelligence Community's
capabilities against foreign missile systems. Therefore, at my
direction the bill includes specific funding increases to allow for
expanded modeling and simulation of foreign systems, exploitation of
foreign missile systems, and all-source missile event analysis.
Madam Speaker, this bill puts a great deal of emphasis on getting the
Intelligence Community ``back to the basics.'' In short, this bill
continues to correct the systemic problems that left us underprepared
for warning against terrorist attacks on America, and begins the
process of returning human intelligence collection to a worldwide
endeavor.
I feel that this is a good bill that balances the increased
investment against critical priorities with procedures for effectively
monitoring the wise investment of the taxpayers' money. Madam Speaker,
I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 2475.
Mr. TIAHRT. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 2475, ``The
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006''. I thank my
friend and colleague from Michigan for yielding me this time.
For almost 4 years, the U.S. Intelligence Community has been at the
forefront of the Global War on Terror. Working long hours, under often
primitive conditions, the men and women of the Intelligence Community
have performed spectacularly under the most stressing of operational
tempos. The legislation before us today authorizes the funding
necessary to support the men and women of the Intelligence Community
and to keep our country safe. However, a sufficient balance must be
maintained between fighting terror and maintaining global awareness of
emerging threats. Therefore, the legislation before us lays the
budgetary and programmatic groundwork that will ensure that the U.S.
Intelligence Community is prepared and able to face the challenges and
national security threats of the future.
First and foremost, this legislation provides the appropriate balance
between technical, human and open source collection.
This bill provides sufficient funds to ensure that the U.S. retains
its technical collection edge for the next 20 years. It also increases
the resources necessary to provide a strong, global human and open
source intelligence collection capability. Achieving this balance
required some hard choices on several highly regarded technical
collection systems, however, the Committee was able to reach bipartisan
consensus on the need to eliminate some redundant or outdated systems.
Second, this legislation strengthens innovation across the
Intelligence Community.
The legislation includes a significant increase in the resources
devoted to advanced research and technology development including
increased funding for new sensors and platforms, data mining and
information assurance technologies. To ensure that these resources are
used wisely, this legislation also strengthens the authorities and
responsibilities of the Intelligence Community's Chief Scientist.
Third, this legislation revitalizes our intelligence analysis and
production capabilities.
Our intelligence community analysts are frequently asked to turn
fragmentary and seemingly random puzzle pieces into a coherent picture.
To help bring the picture into focus, this legislation provides for
improved training opportunities (particularly for languages), new
analytic tools, increased personnel and better tools to enable
information sharing.
Fourth and finally, this legislation continues the efforts begun in
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 to
strengthen and define the authorities and responsibilities of the
Director of National Intelligence.
The Intelligence Community is our first-line of defense against an
elusive and unstructured threat that has shown willingness to harm
America. It is vital that this community has the resources and
authorities necessary to effectively target both the terrorist threats
of today as well as new threats of tomorrow. H.R. 2475 provides those
resources.
I strongly urge my colleagues to support this legislation in the
bipartisan manner that our national security efforts demand.
Mrs. JO ANN DAVIS of Virginia. Madam Speaker, I rise in strong
support of H.R. 2475, the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2006. I
congratulate Chairman Hoekstra for presenting a strong bill that
addresses our major intelligence requirements.
Madam Speaker, as chair of the Intelligence Policy Subcommittee, I
have been tasked to look at the vast range of threats faced by the
United States, and work to ensure that the intelligence services devote
the necessary resources to respond to those threats.
As we consider this bill, we are in the midst of a war with a vicious
enemy--a war on terrorism that must be won. Our troops are also engaged
in a bloody effort to stabilize Iraq.
Our war-fighters must have timely, accurate information about the
enemy, and this bill makes every effort to guarantee that intelligence
is provided. Thus, there is an essential force protection component to
this authorization.
But we cannot focus solely on the collection of near-term, tactical
battlefield intelligence. We must also ensure that our political
leaders have good information about big picture threats to U.S.
interests globally.
The Intelligence Community must focus its resources on the nuclear
programs in Iran, North Korea, and other major proliferators of weapons
of mass destruction.
We must fully understand the ongoing military modernization of China,
and know how Beijing intends to use its emerging capabilities. Russia
remains a nuclear superpower with thousands of nuclear warheads, and
prudence dictates we have good intelligence regarding Russia's
intentions.
The behavior of these important nations can have a deep impact on our
national security, and the United States must not become the victim of
a ``strategic surprise''.
To protect our people and inform our political leaders, we must have
the capability to collect good, accurate information. It is
increasingly difficult to predict where the next crisis may erupt, but
our leaders must have the ability to anticipate significant events.
H.R. 2475 places much needed emphasis on our collection and analysis
capabilities. I am pleased that this bill increases the investment in
human intelligence and the capabilities they provide for us.
It provides additional resources for professional training and
language education for intelligence officers being deployed overseas.
The legislation also authorizes powerful new tools that will assist
our intelligence analysts to sort through and properly understand the
information that has been gathered.
At a time when the threats to u.s. national security are so great,
H.R. 2475 supports the effort to provide our leaders with focused,
timely intelligence. I urge my colleagues to support this legislation
and once again, I congratulate my chairman on his outstanding effort.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate on the bill has expired.
Amendment Offered by Mrs. Maloney
Mrs. MALONEY. Madam Speaker, I offer an amendment.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment offered by Mrs. Maloney:
At the end of title III (page 14, after line 23) insert the
following:
SEC. 310. REPORTS ON FAILURE TO TIMELY IMPLEMENT THE NATIONAL
COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER.
(a) Initial Report on Failure to Meet Deadlines Imposed
Under Law.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall provide written
notice to Congress explaining the failure of the executive
branch to implement the National Counterterrorism Center, as
established under section 119 of the National Security Act of
1947, as added by section 1021 of the National Security
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004; Public Law 108-
458), by the deadlines imposed under section 1097(a) of such
Act for the implementation of such Center, including the
failure by the President to nominate an individual to serve
as Director of the National Counterterrorism Center.
(b) Subsequent Monthly Updates.--The President shall
provide to Congress monthly updates to the initial notice to
Congress under subsection (a) until the National
Counterterrorism Center is fully implemented and operational.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 331, the
gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Maloney) and a Member opposed each will
control 15 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Maloney).
Mrs. MALONEY. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Our amendment requires the President to keep the Congress and the
American people updated monthly on the progress of the implementation
and operation of the National Counterterrorism Center until it is fully
implemented and operational.
The Congress and the President recognize the National
Counterterrorism Center as a critical office for the safety of our
country. The Congress and the President agreed that it had to be up and
running, fully operational and fully staffed, by June 17, 2005, or last
Friday.
While director Admiral John Redd was nominated on June 10, he has yet
to be confirmed by the Senate, and he
[[Page H4853]]
has many challenges before him, chief among which is to get this center
fully staffed and operational.
The Bush administration manages by goals and reports. A fully
operational and staffed NCTC is a goal that must be attained as quickly
as possible.
The National Counterterrorism Center was a core element of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. The center
must be the central organization for analyzing and integrating all
foreign and domestic intelligence on terrorism.
It also is to conduct strategic operational planning for
counterterrorism operations at home and abroad, integrating all
elements of national power. In short, the NCTC was created to bring all
of the pieces together to prevent a future attack. The Congress and the
President established June 17, last Friday, as the deadline for the
NCTC.
Unfortunately, we cannot stand here today and say that it is fully
operational and fully implemented. This is not the only deadline in
this important bill to be missed. I have a chart that I requested from
the Congressional Research Service. It is an 8-page chart of deadlines.
And what CRS found is no fewer than 22 deadlines have been missed in
the first 6 months of this bill becoming law. And many other important
deadlines are looming. Some of the deadlines we have missed include:
developing a national transportation strategy, a number of port
security strategic plans, and streamlining the security clearance
process.
We must keep the implementation of this bill on track; hence the need
for this amendment. This is not to say that there has not been
substantial progress. Prior to the NCTC being created in law, President
Bush created the NCTC last August by executive order.
This center has operated for months under the direction of an interim
director. A positive step towards the goal of implementation took place
on June 10 when Retired Vice Admiral John Redd was nominated to be the
permanent director of the NCTC.
{time} 1545
I would like to note that when we originally submitted this amendment
to the Committee on Rules on June 2, no NCTC director had been
nominated. Upon confirmation, the new director and Ambassador
Negroponte will be faced with a number of issues before full
implementation. Chief among these issues is working out the
inconsistencies between the statute and the executive order. The
existing inconsistencies which have been identified by CRS hold much
danger of creating confusion which could undermine the maximum
functioning of the NCTC.
Another example of these inconsistencies relates to the danger that
the tactic supplied to foreign intelligence collection may be applied
against U.S. citizens. Thus, the importance of a robust Civil Liberties
Board, the beginnings of which were included in the enacted statute.
This amendment will motivate all of the participants to get the job
done to protect the American people. I am confident that the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, under the leadership of the gentleman
from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) and the ranking member, the gentlewoman
from California (Ms. Harman), will relentlessly monitor the
implementation of these important deadlines. It is too important to the
safety of the American people.
Just as the Goldwater-Nichols bill unified the Army, Navy, and Air
Force into a single effective fighting force, so too does the
intelligence reform legislation draw together the isolated elements of
the intelligence community into a unified shield to protect the
American people.
The basic function of the NCTC is to prevent another 9/11. As someone
who represents a city that was attacked on 9/11, we owe it to the
victims and to all Americans to put this central defense mechanism
against future attacks in place. We must fulfill the promise of this
functional restructuring of the intelligence community for the safety
of the American people.
For me, the intelligence bill was the most important bill we passed
since I have been in this Congress, and I am deeply grateful to the
families of the victims who fought so hard for the enactment of this
bill along with the President and my colleagues in this Congress.
Our amendment is a step towards implementing this important bill.
Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Speaker, I rise to claim the time in opposition
to the amendment, but I do not object to the amendment.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mrs. Miller of Michigan). Is there objection
to the gentleman from Michigan controlling the time in opposition?
There was no objection.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Madam Speaker, I will not oppose this amendment. I believe the author
will have a perfecting amendment.
Mrs. MALONEY. Madam Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. HOEKSTRA. I yield to the gentlewoman from New York.
Mrs. MALONEY. Madam Speaker, I appreciate very much the gentleman
from Michigan (Chairman Hoekstra) not opposing my amendment and all the
hard work that he and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) did
on the intelligence bill.
I would like to note the concern that the gentleman reported to me or
gave to me about the reporting requirement.
Modification to Amendment Offered by Mrs. Maloney
Mrs. MALONEY. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the
amendment be modified to accept changing the reporting requirement in
the amendment from the President to the Director of National
Intelligence, Ambassador Negroponte.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the modification.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment as modified, offered by Mrs. Maloney:
At the end of title III (page 14, after line 23) insert the
following:
SEC. 310. REPORTS ON FAILURE TO TIMELY IMPLEMENT THE NATIONAL
COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER.
(a) Initial Report on Failure to Meet Deadlines Imposed
Under Law.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall provide written notice to Congress explaining the
failure of the executive branch to implement the National
Counterterrorism Center, as established under section 119 of
the National Security Act of 1947, as added by section 1021
of the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004
(title I of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004; Public Law 108-458), by the deadlines imposed
under section 1097(a) of such Act for the implementation of
such Center, including the failure by the President to
nominate an individual to serve as Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center.
(b) Subsequent Monthly Updates.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall provide to Congress monthly updates to the
initial notice to Congress under subsection (a) until the
National Counterterrorism Center is fully implemented and
operational.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the amendment is
modified.
There was no objection.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Reclaiming my time, I thank my colleague, the
gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Maloney) for that change.
I think the reason we are accepting the amendment is in the spirit
that it was offered by my colleague from New York and, I believe, my
colleague from Connecticut. We on the committee, the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Harman) and myself have laid down as one of the
parameters and one of the things that we expect from the oversight
subcommittee is to vigorously and aggressively track the implementation
of the intelligence reform bill.
I agree in the time that the gentlewoman and I have been in Congress
together until we pass Federal prison industries reform, this will be
one of the most significant pieces of legislation that we will have
worked on together.
There are some talking points on the technicality as to what ``fully
operational'' means, and those types of things; and whether it is fully
operational now and whether it could have been fully operational before
June 17, because that is when the law came into effect, we fully
understand and appreciate the concern that the gentlewoman has in
bringing this amendment forward, that we on the committee and that
Congress and the American people be fully informed as to the progress
we are making in implementing the intelligence reform bill.
We are committed to doing that. We are committed to staying informed
on
[[Page H4854]]
the committee, riding herd over the director of National Intelligence
to make sure that this bill is implemented to the full intent of
Congress when we passed it.
So it is in light of the spirit of that approach that we accept this
amendment.
Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mrs. MALONEY. Madam Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to
the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), the ranking member.
Ms. HARMAN. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me
time. I want to commend her and the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr.
Shays) for the enormous work they did outside the intelligence
committee. As we were considering the intelligence reform legislation
last year, the faces that I saw on a constant basis were theirs and the
families. And I often have said that the families were the wind beneath
our wings. I would add a couple of Members of Congress to that, too,
and I thank them for all they did.
I am very pleased that the majority is accepting the amendment. It is
a good idea for us to make absolutely clear that the NCTC, the National
Counter Terrorism Center, is a vital piece of the reform we enacted
last year and that it needs to be fully operational ASAP.
To explain further, one of the big mistakes we made leading up to 9/
11 is everyone now knows our failure to connect the dots. Obviously,
having a fusion center designed for this purpose is a very good way to
make sure we do not fail to connect the dots the next time.
So it took, I would say, the introduction of this amendment to cause
the President to nominate a very able fellow, Vice Admiral Redd, to be
the director of the NCTC. He did that 2 days after this amendment was
presented in the Committee on Rules. And perhaps now that we are
accepting it as part of today's debate, the NCTC will become fully
operational even before that prison reform bill is enacted.
In conclusion, Madam Speaker, I strongly support this. I support the
team that has brought this to us. And I would note to this body, that
bill last year that we worked so hard on gets its real sea legs today
as the House takes this necessary step in funding its critical parts
and in making clear that we will not accept any efforts to roll back
the jurisdiction of the DNI, who is going to be the commander of the
tip of the spear in this era of terror.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mrs. MALONEY. Madam Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to
the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Shays), and I commend his
leadership and support on this amendment and his hard work on the
intelligence reform committee. We both had many victims that were lost
from our respective districts and we worked closely throughout that
period with the families and with our colleagues on that important
bill. I thank the gentleman for his hard work.
Mr. SHAYS. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me
time. I thank her for her very hard work and the work again of the
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) and the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Harman).
I rise, obviously, in support of this amendment that we are offering,
as amended, which would require the director of National Intelligence
to provide Congress written explanation why the National Counter
Terrorism Center, NCTC, is not fully operational since the June 17
deadline set forth in Public Law 108-458.
The Joint Inquiry and the 9/11 Commission both found that the lack of
information-sharing and coordination within the intelligence community
led to numerous missed opportunities to detect and prevent September 11
terrorist attacks.
The establishment of the NCTC was a key 9/11 Commission
recommendation and an integral part of the effort to increase
information-sharing and coordination among intelligence agencies.
The director will serve a critical function in our Nation's
intelligence capability, as he will report to the President and to the
director of National Intelligence.
The NCTC, once fully operational, will be the Nation's primary agency
for now analyzing terrorist threats and planning counterterrorism
operations at home and abroad.
The deadline by which the NCTC was required by law to be fully
operational has passed, and while I am pleased the President nominated
Vice Admiral John Redd as the Center's permanent director on June 10, I
wish Congress had received this nomination sooner than a week before
the deadline so that the Center could have been operational on time.
The bottom line is it has been done. We are making progress. I thank
the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) for accepting this amendment
and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) as well. It is an
amendment that I think deserves passage and I thank them for accepting
it.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
I thank my colleagues for working through this amendment and making
the necessary changes. As I indicated earlier, we are willing to accept
this amendment.
Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mrs. MALONEY. Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
I thank the gentleman from Michigan (Chairman Hoekstra) for accepting
the amendment. Certainly certain issues are above partisan politics.
The defense, the protection of our Nation, intelligence reform, is
certainly among them.
The gentleman and the ranking member have really worked together in
the best interest of the American people on this important issue. I
thank the gentleman for his support.
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Madam Speaker, I rise to show my support
for the men and women who work in the intelligence community each day
sacrificing their lives so that we may remain safe. This measure, H.R.
2475, does authorize 100 percent of the funding requests made by the
community, which is a positive departure from the measure proposed in
2005, which funded only 26 percent of the requests. In addition, this
legislation improves upon the President's request of only 40 percent of
the community's counterterrorism funding needs. This departure is
important because this measure is the first authorization bill to come
to the floor since passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458)--the families of the victims of
9/11 as well as the entire international community still look to us for
responsible action in the area of intelligence.
I also applaud the Committee's inclusion of provisions for the
recruitment and clearing of personnel adept in language skills
necessary to truly aid our intelligence-gathering and processing
initiative.
However, I join my colleagues in disagreeing with Section 305 of the
bill as reported out of Committee. This section gives congressional
committees a ``pocket veto'' of the personnel transfers that the new
Director of National Intelligence might recommend. Absent passage of
the Manager's Amendment offered by Mr. Hoekstra, this provision will
contravene much of the authority conferred in the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act that was signed into law by the President
last year. Public Law 108-458 contains provisions that I offered that
deal with commercial alien smuggling such as penalty enhancement as
well as an outreach section that would require publication of the
enhancements by DHS to act as a deterrent.
I support the amendment that will be offered by my colleague from New
York, Mrs. Maloney that would require a report to Congress until the
Director of the National Counterterrorism Center has been confirmed and
until the Center is fully functional.
Madam Speaker, for the reasons above stated, I support the
legislation with reservations.
Mrs. MALONEY. Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 331, the
previous question is ordered on the bill and the amendment, as
modified, offered by the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Maloney).
The question is on the amendment, as modified, offered by the
gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Maloney).
The amendment, as modified, was agreed to.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.
[[Page H4855]]
Motion to Recommit Offered by Mr. Waxman
Mr. WAXMAN. Madam Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit with
instructions.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?
Mr. WAXMAN. I am, Madam Speaker, in its current form.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to
recommit.
The Clerk read as follows:
Mr. Waxman of California moves to recommit the bill H.R.
2475 to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence with
instructions to report the same back to the House forthwith
with the following amendment:
At the end, add the following new title:
TITLE V--ESTABLISHMENT OF INDEPENDENT COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE
DETAINEE ABUSES
SEC. 501. ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMISSION.
There is established in the legislative branch the
Independent Commission on the Investigation of Detainee
Abuses (in this title referred to as the ``Commission'').
SEC. 502. DUTIES.
(a) Investigation.--The Commission shall conduct a full,
complete, independent, and impartial investigation of
intelligence and intelligence-related activities carried out
in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and
any operation within the Global War on Terrorism in
connection with abuses of detainees, including but not
limited to the following:
(1) The extent of the abuses.
(2) Why the abuses occurred.
(3) Who is responsible for the abuses.
(4) Whether any particular Department of Defense,
Department of State, Department of Justice, Central
Intelligence Agency, National Security Council, or White
House policies, procedures, or decisions facilitated the
detainee abuses.
(5) What policies, procedures, or mechanisms failed to
prevent the abuses.
(6) What legislative or executive actions should be taken
to prevent such abuses from occurring in the future.
(7) The extent, if any, to which Guantanamo Detention
Center policies influenced policies at the Abu Ghraib prison
and other detention centers in and outside Iraq.
(b) Assessment, Analysis, and Evaluation.--During the
course of its investigation under subsection (a), the
Commission shall assess, analyze, and evaluate relevant
persons, policies, procedures, reports, and events, including
but not limited to the following:
(1) The Military Chain of Command.
(2) The National Security Council.
(3) The Department of Justice.
(4) The Department of State.
(5) The Office of the White House Counsel.
(6) The Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central
Intelligence Agency.
(7) The approval process for interrogation techniques used
at detention facilities in Iraq, Cuba, Afghanistan, and
elsewhere.
(8) The integration of military police and military
intelligence operations to coordinate detainee interrogation.
(9) The roles and actions of private civilian contractors
in the abuses and whether they violated the Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act or any other United States
statutes or international treaties to which the United States
is a party.
(10) The role of nongovernmental organizations' warnings to
United States officials about the abuses.
(11) The role of Congress and whether it was fully informed
throughout the process that uncovered these abuses.
(12) The extent to which the United States complied with
the applicable provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949,
and the extent to which the United States may have violated
international law by restricting the access of the
International Committee of the Red Cross to detainees.
(13) The extent to which the United States complied with
the applicable provisions of other human rights treaties,
including the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
SEC. 503. COMPOSITION OF COMMISSION.
(a) Members.--The Commission shall be composed of 10
members, of whom--
(1) 1 member shall be appointed by the President;
(2) 1 member shall be jointly appointed by the minority
leader of the Senate and the minority leader of the House of
Representatives;
(3) 2 members shall be appointed by the majority leader of
the Senate;
(4) 2 members shall be appointed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives;
(5) 2 members shall be appointed by the minority leader of
the Senate; and
(6) 2 members shall be appointed by the minority leader of
the House of Representatives.
(b) Qualifications; Initial Meeting.--
(1) Nongovernmental appointees.--An individual appointed to
the Commission may not be an officer or employee of the
Federal Government or any State or local government.
(2) Other qualifications.--Individuals that shall be
appointed to the Commission should be prominent United States
citizens, with national recognition and significant depth of
experience in such professions as governmental service, law
enforcement, the armed services, law, public administration,
intelligence gathering, international human rights and
humanitarian law, and foreign affairs.
(3) Deadline for appointment.--All members of the
Commission shall be appointed within 45 days following the
enactment of this Act.
(4) Chairman and vice chairman.--The chairman and vice
chairman of the Commission shall be elected by a majority
vote of the members.
(5) Meetings.--The Commission shall meet and begin the
operations of the Commission as soon as practicable. After
its initial meeting, the Commission shall meet upon the call
of the chairman or a majority of its members.
(c) Quorum; Vacancies.--Six members of the Commission shall
constitute a quorum. Any vacancy in the Commission shall not
affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same manner in
which the original appointment was made.
(d) Conflicts of Interest.--Each member appointed to the
Commission shall be independent of any agency, individual, or
institution that may be the subject of investigation by the
Commission.
SEC. 504. POWERS OF COMMISSION.
(a) In General.--
(1) Hearings and evidence.--The Commission or, on the
authority of the Commission, any subcommittee or member
thereof, may, for the purpose of carrying out this title--
(A) hold such hearings and sit and act at such times and
places, take such testimony, receive such evidence,
administer such oaths; and
(B) subject to paragraph (2)(A), require, by subpoena or
otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and
the production of such books, records, correspondence,
memoranda, papers, and documents,
as the Commission or such designated subcommittee or
designated member may determine advisable.
(2) Subpoenas.--
(A) In general.--A subpoena may be issued under this
subsection only--
(i) by the agreement of the chairman and the vice chairman;
or
(ii) by the affirmative vote of 6 members of the
Commission.
(B) Signature.--Subject to subparagraph (A), subpoenas
issued under this subsection may be issued under the
signature of the chairman or any member designated by a
majority of the Commission, and may be served by any person
designated by the chairman or by a member designated by a
majority of the Commission.
(3) Scope.--In carrying out its duties under this Act, the
Commission may examine the actions and representations of the
current Administration as well as prior Administrations.
(b) Contracting.--The Commission may, to such extent and in
such amounts as are provided in appropriation Acts, enter
into contracts to enable the Commission to discharge its
duties of this Act.
(c) Information From Federal Agencies.--
(1) In general.--The Commission may secure directly from
any executive department, bureau, agency, board, commission,
office, independent establishment, or instrumentality of the
Federal Government, information, suggestions, estimates, and
statistics for the purposes of this Act. Each department,
bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent
establishment, or instrumentality shall, to the extent
authorized by law, furnish such information, suggestions,
estimates, and statistics directly to the Commission, upon
request made by the chairman, the chairman of any
subcommittee created by a majority of the Commission, or any
member designated by a majority of the Commission.
(2) Receipt, handling, storage, and dissemination.--
Information shall only be received, handled, stored, and
disseminated by members of the Commission and its staff
consistent with all applicable statutes, regulations, and
Executive Orders.
(d) Assistance From Federal Agencies.--Departments and
agencies of the United States may provide to the Commission
such services, funds, facilities, staff, and other support
services as they may determine advisable and as may be
authorized by law.
SEC. 505. PUBLIC HEARINGS.
(a) Public Meetings and Release of Public Versions of
Reports.--The Commission shall--
(1) hold public hearings and meetings to the extent
appropriate; and
(2) release public versions of the reports required under
section 509.
(b) Public Hearings.--Any public hearings of the Commission
shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the protection
of information provided to or developed for or by the
Commission as required by any applicable statute, regulation,
or Executive order.
SEC. 506. STAFF OF COMMISSION.
(a) Appointment and Compensation.--The chairman and the
vice chairman jointly, in accordance with rules agreed upon
by the Commission, may appoint and fix the compensation of a
staff director and such other personnel as may be necessary
to enable the Commission to carry out its functions.
(b) Detailees.--Any Federal Government employee may be
detailed to the Commission.
(c) Consultant Services.--The Commission is authorized to
procure the services of experts and consultants.
[[Page H4856]]
SEC. 507. COMPENSATION AND TRAVEL EXPENSES.
(a) Compensation.--Each member of the Commission may be
compensated at a reasonable rate for each day during which
that member is engaged in the actual performance of the
duties of the Commission.
(b) Travel Expenses.--While away from their homes or
regular places of business in the performance of services for
the Commission, members of the Commission shall be allowed
travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence.
SEC. 508. SECURITY CLEARANCES FOR COMMISSION MEMBERS AND
STAFF.
(a) In General.--Subject to subsection (b), the appropriate
Federal agencies or departments shall cooperate with the
Commission in expeditiously providing to the Commission
members and staff appropriate security clearances to the
extent possible pursuant to existing procedures and
requirements.
(b) Exception.--No person shall be provided with access to
classified information under this title without the
appropriate required security clearance access.
SEC. 509. REPORTS OF COMMISSION; TERMINATION.
(a) Interim Reports.--The Commission may submit to Congress
and the President interim reports containing such findings,
conclusions, and recommendations for corrective measures as
have been agreed to by a majority of Commission members.
(b) Final Report.--Not later than 18 months after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Commission shall submit to
Congress and the President a final report containing such
findings, conclusions, and recommendations for corrective
measures as have been agreed to by a majority of Commission
members.
(c) Form of Report.--Each report prepared under this
section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
contain a classified annex.
(d) Recommendation to Make Public Certain Classified
Information.--If the Commission determines that it is in the
public interest that some or all of the information contained
in a classified annex of a report under this section be made
available to the public, the Commission shall make a
recommendation to the congressional intelligence committees
to make such information public, and the congressional
intelligence committees shall consider the recommendation
pursuant to the procedures under subsection (e).
(e) Procedure for Declassifying Information.--
(1) The procedures referred to in subsection (d) are the
procedures described in--
(A) with respect to the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives, clause 11(g) of
Rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, One
Hundred Ninth Congress; and
(B) with respect to the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate, section 8 of Senate Resolution 400, Ninety-Fourth
Congress.
(2) In this section, the term ``congressional intelligence
committees'' means--
(A) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives; and
(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
SEC. 510. TERMINATION.
(a) In General.--The Commission, and all the authorities of
this Act, shall terminate 60 days after the date on which the
final report is submitted under section 509(b).
(b) Administrative Activities Before Termination.--The
Commission may use the 60-day period referred to in paragraph
(1) for the purpose of concluding its activities, including
providing testimony to committees of Congress concerning its
reports and disseminating the final report.
SEC. 511. FUNDING.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated funds not to exceed $5,000,000 for
purposes of the activities of the Commission under this Act.
(b) Duration of Availability.--Amounts made available to
the Commission under subsection (a) shall remain available
until the termination of the Commission.
Mr. WAXMAN (during the reading). Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous
consent that the motion be considered as read and printed in the
Record.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from California?
There was no objection.
{time} 1600
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mrs. Miller of Michigan). Pursuant to the
rule, the gentleman from California (Mr. Waxman) is recognized for 5
minutes in support of his motion.
Mr. WAXMAN. Madam Speaker, this motion to recommit would amend the
bill to add language establishing an independent commission to examine
detainee abuses.
In the year since the horrific photographs of prisoner abuse at Abu
Ghraib surfaced, more and more instances of detainee abuse from a
growing number of locations around the world have come to light.
The reports of detainee abuse are undermining one of our Nation's
most valuable assets: our reputation for respect for human rights.
The Pentagon's internal investigations of the abuse allegations have
resulted in conflicting conclusions. Some of these reports have been
little more than whitewashes.
Congress has failed to conduct a comprehensive public investigation
of detainee abuse allegations at Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, Bagram and
other facilities. We have abdicated our constitutional duty to conduct
responsible oversight.
My motion to recommit would fill the huge oversight gap. A lack of
oversight leads to a lack of accountability, and no accountability
breeds arrogance and abuse of power.
It is time for this House to take our oversight responsibility
seriously, and I urge a ``yes'' vote on the motion to recommit.
Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman),
the ranking member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
my colleague.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me and
commend him for sponsoring this notion of an independent commission to
look at detainee abuses.
Mr. Speaker, though I am a strong supporter of this legislation, I
think it would be even better if it included language to establish this
commission, and so I support the motion to recommit the bill for the
purpose of adding the gentleman from California's (Mr. Waxman)
amendment.
Military historians often talk about the ``fog of war.'' I believe
our intelligence professionals operate in a fog of law, a confusing
patchwork of treaties, laws, memos and policies.
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution says that it is Congress'
responsibility to establish rules concerning captures on land and
water. I hope that we will seize this responsibility.
But as Congress studies the policy options going forward, it is vital
that we have the facts. Only a bipartisan, independent commission can
get to the bottom of what happened among administration policymakers
within the military chain of command and out in the field.
The steady stream of revelations about Guantanamo and other
facilities around the world erode our moral credibility, just as we are
trying to win the hearts and minds of the Arab and Muslim world.
It is vital to our national security, Mr. Speaker, that we fix this
problem so that our detention and interrogation policies get us
actionable intelligence without creating a whole new generation of
terrorist recruits. Pretending that there is no problem is not a
strategy for success.
So in conclusion, Mr. Speaker, our committee, on a bipartisan basis,
is looking into these issues through our Subcommittee on Oversight. I
commend our progress; but in addition, I think the public will have
more confidence in what we are doing if we also have an outside,
independent commission.
In that spirit, I support the Waxman motion to recommit.
Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Speaker, the failure to have an investigation of
detainee abuse is eroding our moral standard in the world. It is also
endangering our Armed Forces and inciting hatred against the United
States. As Senator Biden said about Guantanamo, it is the greatest
propaganda tool for the recruitment of terrorists worldwide.
Some of the allegations that have been repeated over and over again
may not be true. In fact, I hope they are not true. President Bush
calls them absurd, but we do not know what is true and what is not
unless we investigate; and when we refuse to conduct a thorough,
independent, credible investigation, the rest of the world thinks we
have something to hide.
The independent commission established by this proposal would
establish a 10-member bipartisan commission modeled on the successful
9/11 commission. I think we need this. I think we need it badly.
If the Congress had done its job of oversight, we might well say the
job is done and we do not need to do anything further; but Congress has
done relatively little on this whole matter. The reports that have been
issued by the
[[Page H4857]]
various investigative agencies have been in conflict.
This is why I ask my colleagues to support this motion to recommit.
Vote ``aye.''
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the motion to
recommit.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra)
is recognized.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I am a little confused, as I listened to
those on the other side as to whether we have or have not done
oversight. The author of the amendment says there has been no
oversight. My ranking member applauds the work that the committee has
done in its role of doing oversight on a bipartisan basis.
Mr. Speaker, we are at a time of war that was not begun by the making
of the United States. We are at war against an international terrorist
movement that has engaged our country in a clash of values driven by
those who fundamentally oppose American democracy and freedom.
The 9/11 Commission emphasized the importance of engaging the
terrorists in the ``struggle of ideas,'' noting that many views in the
Muslim world of the United States are ``at best uninformed about the
United States and, at worst, informed by cartoonish stereotypes among
intellectuals who caricature U.S. values and policies. Local newspapers
and the few influential satellite broadcasters, like al Jazeera, often
reinforce the jihadist theme that portrays the United States as anti-
Muslim.''
Mr. Speaker, comments that significantly exaggerate and overstate the
situation in Guantanamo Bay do nothing but reinforce the false
perceptions of America that have encouraged our enemies.
There is aggressive oversight under way by the executive branch and
by Congress into our detention procedures. It is only because of this
aggressive oversight and the freedoms provided by American democracy
that we are having this discussion in the first place. The system is
working properly, and we should continue to let it work; and for those
who do not know about the work that is going on, perhaps they could
ask.
So when senior Members of Congress, including a member of the
minority leadership in the Senate, exaggerate and distort these issues,
including by comparing American soldiers to Nazis, those comments do
nothing but reinforce the false prejudices abroad that have led us to
war.
As an example, I note that the al Jazeera network gave prominent
coverage to the remarks of a Member of the Senate comparing the actions
of U.S. soldiers to Nazis, Soviet gulags, and a mad regime like Pol
Pot's Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.
A columnist in the Chicago Sun Times said of those remarks: ``He
should at least be made a little uncomfortable over what he's done.''
What did he do? ``In a time of war, make an inflammatory libel against
his country's military that has no value whatsoever except to America's
enemies.''
We are better than those who oppose us. Our oversight has exposed our
weaknesses. Now is the time to move on.
To quote from President Roosevelt's ``Man in the Arena'' speech: ``It
is not the critic who counts, not the man who points out how the strong
man stumbles or where the doer of deeds could have done them better.''
I want this Congress to be seen as a doer of deeds. If we fail, we
fail while daringly great. To do anything less would be unworthy of the
House of Representatives.
Self-loathing of America on the floor of this House accomplishes
nothing but fueling the fires abroad that seek to destroy America's
democracy and our way of life. I encourage my colleagues to vote ``no''
on this motion to recommit.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is
ordered on the motion to recommit.
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.
Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a
quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not
present.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 and clause 9 of rule
XX, this 15-minute vote on the motion to recommit will be followed by
5-minute votes, if ordered, on passage of H.R. 2475 and on the motions
to suspend the rules previously postponed in the following order:
H.J. Res. 52, by the yeas and nays,
H. Con. Res. 160, by the yeas and nays,
H. Con. Res. 180, de novo.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 197,
nays 228, not voting 8, as follows:
[Roll No. 289]
YEAS--197
Ackerman
Allen
Andrews
Baca
Baird
Baldwin
Barrow
Bean
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Boren
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Brown (OH)
Brown, Corrine
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cardin
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carson
Case
Chandler
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Doyle
Edwards
Emanuel
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Filner
Ford
Frank (MA)
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Higgins
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kilpatrick (MI)
Kind
Kucinich
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Leach
Lee
Levin
Lipinski
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Lynch
Maloney
Markey
Matsui
McCarthy
McCollum (MN)
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Melancon
Menendez
Michaud
Millender-McDonald
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mollohan
Moore (KS)
Moore (WI)
Moran (VA)
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reyes
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Sabo
Salazar
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sanders
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schwartz (PA)
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sherman
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Spratt
Stark
Strickland
Stupak
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor (MS)
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Towns
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Wexler
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
NAYS--228
Abercrombie
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Bass
Beauprez
Biggert
Bilirakis
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boustany
Bradley (NH)
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Camp
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Castle
Chabot
Chocola
Coble
Cole (OK)
Cox
Cramer
Crenshaw
Cubin
Culberson
Cunningham
Davis (KY)
Davis (TN)
Davis, Jo Ann
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
DeLay
Dent
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Doolittle
Drake
Dreier
Duncan
Ehlers
Emerson
English (PA)
Everett
Feeney
Ferguson
Fitzpatrick (PA)
Flake
Foley
Forbes
Fortenberry
Fossella
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gingrey
Gohmert
Goode
Goodlatte
Granger
Graves
Green (WI)
Gutknecht
Hall
Harris
Hart
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Hensarling
Herger
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hostettler
Hulshof
Hunter
Hyde
Inglis (SC)
Issa
Istook
Jenkins
Jindal
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kuhl (NY)
LaHood
Latham
LaTourette
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lucas
Lungren, Daniel E.
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
Marshall
Matheson
McCaul (TX)
McCotter
McCrery
McHenry
McHugh
McKeon
McMorris
Mica
[[Page H4858]]
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Moran (KS)
Musgrave
Myrick
Neugebauer
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nunes
Nussle
Osborne
Otter
Oxley
Paul
Pearce
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Poe
Pombo
Porter
Price (GA)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Reichert
Renzi
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Saxton
Schwarz (MI)
Sensenbrenner
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shuster
Simmons
Simpson
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Sodrel
Souder
Stearns
Sullivan
Sweeney
Tancredo
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Turner
Upton
Walden (OR)
Walsh
Wamp
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Young (AK)
NOT VOTING--8
Carter
Conaway
Herseth
Lewis (GA)
Murphy
Pence
Sessions
Young (FL)
{time} 1639
Mrs. KELLY, Mr. BUYER, and Mr. ABERCROMBIE changed their vote from
``yea'' to ``nay.''
Messrs. GONZALEZ, ETHERIDGE and CHANDLER changed their vote from
``nay'' to ``yea.''
So the motion to recommit was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Petri). The question is on the passage
of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 409,
nays 16, not voting 8, as follows:
[Roll No. 290]
YEAS--409
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Allen
Andrews
Baca
Bachus
Baird
Baker
Baldwin
Barrett (SC)
Barrow
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Bass
Bean
Beauprez
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Biggert
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blumenauer
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boren
Boswell
Boucher
Boustany
Boyd
Bradley (NH)
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Brown (OH)
Brown (SC)
Brown, Corrine
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Butterfield
Buyer
Calvert
Camp
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Capps
Capuano
Cardin
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carson
Case
Castle
Chabot
Chandler
Chocola
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Coble
Cole (OK)
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Cox
Cramer
Crenshaw
Crowley
Cubin
Cuellar
Culberson
Cummings
Cunningham
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
Davis (KY)
Davis (TN)
Davis, Jo Ann
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
DeLay
Dent
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Doolittle
Doyle
Drake
Dreier
Edwards
Ehlers
Emanuel
Emerson
Engel
English (PA)
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Everett
Farr
Fattah
Feeney
Ferguson
Filner
Fitzpatrick (PA)
Flake
Foley
Forbes
Ford
Fortenberry
Fossella
Foxx
Frank (MA)
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gingrey
Gohmert
Gonzalez
Goode
Goodlatte
Gordon
Granger
Graves
Green (WI)
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Gutknecht
Hall
Harman
Harris
Hart
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Hensarling
Herger
Higgins
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hobson
Hoekstra
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hostettler
Hoyer
Hulshof
Hunter
Hyde
Inglis (SC)
Inslee
Israel
Issa
Istook
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Jenkins
Jindal
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kilpatrick (MI)
Kind
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kuhl (NY)
LaHood
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latham
LaTourette
Leach
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Lucas
Lungren, Daniel E.
Lynch
Mack
Maloney
Manzullo
Marchant
Markey
Marshall
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy
McCaul (TX)
McCollum (MN)
McCotter
McCrery
McGovern
McHenry
McHugh
McIntyre
McKeon
McMorris
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Melancon
Menendez
Mica
Michaud
Millender-McDonald
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Miller, Gary
Miller, George
Mollohan
Moore (KS)
Moore (WI)
Moran (KS)
Moran (VA)
Murtha
Musgrave
Myrick
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Neugebauer
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nunes
Nussle
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Osborne
Otter
Oxley
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Pearce
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Poe
Pombo
Pomeroy
Porter
Price (GA)
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Radanovich
Rahall
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Reichert
Renzi
Reyes
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Sabo
Salazar
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sanders
Saxton
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schwartz (PA)
Schwarz (MI)
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherman
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shuster
Simmons
Simpson
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Sodrel
Solis
Souder
Spratt
Stearns
Strickland
Stupak
Sullivan
Sweeney
Tancredo
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Tierney
Towns
Turner
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Upton
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walden (OR)
Walsh
Wamp
Wasserman Schultz
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Westmoreland
Wexler
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Wu
Wynn
Young (AK)
NAYS--16
Conyers
Duncan
Jackson (IL)
Kucinich
Lee
McDermott
McKinney
Oberstar
Owens
Paul
Payne
Rangel
Stark
Waters
Watson
Woolsey
NOT VOTING--8
Carter
Conaway
Herseth
Lewis (GA)
Murphy
Pence
Sessions
Young (FL)
{time} 1647
So the bill was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
Stated for:
Mr. CONAWAY. Mr. Speaker, I was detained and unable to cast a vote on
H.R. 2475, the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY06, on June 21,
2005. I was enroute to Brownwood, Texas to attend the funeral of Lance
Corporal Mario Castillo, a Marine from the 11th District of Texas.
Please let the Record reflect that had I been here, I would have voted
``yes.''
____________________
