

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

## VII. IRAQ WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTELLIGENCE IN SECRETARY POWELL'S UNITED NATIONS SPEECH

(U) On February 5, 2003, Secretary Powell delivered a speech before the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) which outlined Iraq's noncompliance with UNSC Resolutions and provided a detailed presentation of intelligence in each of the areas of Iraq's suspected weapons of mass destruction programs. Secretary Powell told the United Nations (UN) that,

. . . every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we're giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence.

(U) The speech originated in early December 2002, according to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analysts and Intelligence Community (IC) officials, when the National Security Council (NSC) tasked the CIA to prepare a presentation in response to Iraq's declaration to the UN. At the time, it was not clear exactly how the information would be used, but the CIA was aware that they were preparing the NSC to respond to the declaration in some public manner. An Iraq analyst from the Director of Central Intelligence's (DCI) Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center (WINPAC) prepared an initial presentation on Iraq's noncompliance with UN resolutions regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMD). According to the analyst, CIA analysts and officials worked on this draft for the next several weeks.

(U) On December 28, 2002, the Deputy Director for Central Intelligence (DDCI) and the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Strategic and Nuclear Programs presented the information to the NSC. The CIA told Committee staff that the NSC believed that the draft did not provide the same level of detail or evidence of Iraq's WMD programs as had been in the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's WMD programs and asked the DDCI to take the presentation and rework it to include information from the NIE and new intelligence that had been collected since the NIE. That day, the NIO took the CIA input and combined it with additional information. At this point, it had become clear that the NSC intended the information to be presented in a public speech, but it was not clear in what format or by whom the speech would be presented. The NIO wrote the draft as a speech, rather than as an intelligence report. This new draft was circulated for comment within the CIA. Near the end of January, the DDCI provided the revised input back to the NSC. The NIO told Committee staff that the DDCI had advised the NSC that the IC had done all it could do with the presentation and that the NSC speech writers would have to take the input and work it into a policy speech.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) In some cases, information in the CIA draft provided information that had not been reported in previously coordinated IC assessments. For example, the draft said that imports of “highly specialized aluminum tubes are costing Iraq between \$20 and \$35 a piece, whereas *steel* tubes sufficient for the expendable rockets cost as little as \$.50 a piece.” As previously discussed in the nuclear section of this report, Iraq had not agreed to pay such high prices and had negotiated prices as low as [REDACTED] per tube. As also noted previously, U.S. Department of Defense rocket experts said that aluminum is one of the cheapest materials from which to make rocket motor cases and said, “everything else is higher cost to manufacture, like steels.” The draft also said that the “Iraqi specifications on roundness of these high-strength aluminum tubes is such that the tubes would be rejected as defective if I rolled one under my hand on this table – because the mere pressure of my hand would deform it.” Department of Energy (DOE) engineers have told Committee staff that this statement is incorrect. The tubes, made of high-strength aluminum and 3.3 mm thick, will not defect or deform from the specified tolerances from the pressure of one’s hand. Neither of these statements about the cost or specifications of the tubes were included in Secretary Powell’s final speech.

(U) On January 24, 2003, the NSC requested additional information from the IC. The NIO told Committee staff that the NSC believed the nuclear case was weak and asked for additional information on what Iraq would need for a nuclear weapons program and also asked for additional on Iraq’s biological and chemical weapons programs. The same day, the NIO faxed additional information on Iraq’s nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programs to the NSC.

(U) The material included a short history of Iraq’s nuclear program and a section on what Iraq would need to make a nuclear weapon. This section contained text drawn from the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) which noted that Iraq would need a cadre of scientists, a weapon design, and fissile material. It included the NIE text that Iraq began “. . . vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake,” and outlined possible uranium acquisition attempts in Niger, Somalia, and possibly the Congo. The NIE text that the IC did not know the status of the Niger arrangement was included. The material also included information on “Iraq’s plans to use WMD in a conflict” noting that “Saddam has established redlines for using weapons of mass destruction in a conflict. Why would Saddam establish these redlines if he did not have such a weapon?,” and included information on Iraq’s biological weapons program, mainly sources on Iraq’s mobile biological weapons facilities and information on biological weapons accounting discrepancies documented by the UN.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) On January 28, 2003, the NIO learned that a decision had been made at the White House that the speech would be delivered by Secretary of State Powell at the UN. Secretary Powell and State Department officials met with IC officials and CIA and National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)<sup>30</sup> analysts at CIA headquarters for several days in late January and early February to work on the draft version of the speech that had been modified by NSC speech writers. In the meetings at the CIA and a meeting in New York the day before the Secretary's UN presentation, the NIO said that they worked with Secretary Powell to develop speech language with which the Secretary and the IC were comfortable.

(U) According to a State Department foreign affairs officer in the Bureau of Nonproliferation and the NIO, the general operating principle set by Secretary Powell in preparing his presentation was that any intelligence that was included had to be corroborated. The foreign affairs officer told Committee staff that "single source information did not go in the speech." CIA analysts who participated in these meetings told Committee staff that the Secretary only wanted to use solid intelligence in the speech and wanted the language carefully reviewed by the analysts. One CIA analyst and one official told the Committee they were not aware of any guidance that single source information should not be used in the speech. The NIO for Science and Technology, who also worked on Secretary Powell's speech, told Committee staff that DCI Tenet specifically told him to check the speech for classification issues and to "back [] up the material and mak[e] sure we had good solid stuff to support everything."

(U) The Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) prepared comments on the speech draft on January 31, 2003 that were forwarded to the Secretary of State. The comments outlined specific ideas for the Secretary to include in the speech and presented a "scorecard" on the draft to address the analytic merits of the arguments in the speech. Of the thirty eight items that INR considered "weak" or "unsubstantiated," twenty eight were either removed from the draft or changed to eliminate the problem INR had with the draft. (*See appendix A for INR's full comments.*) CIA analysts told Committee staff that during the coordination meetings on the speech, information was removed in some instances because Secretary Powell was not comfortable with it and because some information was based on single source raw reporting which the CIA could not corroborate.

(U) On Monday, February 3, 2003, INR prepared more comments on the latest draft of the speech. INR noted that the draft was "vastly improved over Friday's draft, and many or most

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<sup>30</sup> NIMA has recently been renamed the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA).

[REDACTED]

of the incorrect or dubious claims have been removed.” INR’s comments described seven of the “most problematic” issues from the previous draft of the speech. Of the seven, the Committee believes three were either removed or modified. INR’s remaining concerns were 1) the numerous references to human intelligence (HUMINT) reporting as fact, including use of the phrase “we know that . . .”, 2) the report that key files were being driven around in cars to avoid inspectors, which INR said was highly questionable, 3) the report that an Iraqi missile brigade was dispersing rocket launchers and biological weapons warheads, which INR also said was highly questionable, and 4) the claim that the aluminum tubes Iraq was seeking “far exceed US requirements for comparable rockets.” The INR comments said that the tube tolerances were similar to those of a U.S. rocket system. (*See appendix B for INR’s full comments.*)

(U) The NIO told Committee staff that the CIA concurred with all of the intelligence information that was included in the final draft of the speech and could not think of any intelligence that was used in the speech that the CIA had wanted removed.

(U) Because of the CIA’s central role in preparing input for and checking the accuracy of Secretary Powell’s speech and because the speech was intended as an explanation of the intelligence the IC had on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs, the Committee reviewed the language in the speech and the intelligence that supported the assessments and statements made in the speech.

(U) Almost all of the information in the speech was from intelligence that had previously been described in IC finished intelligence assessments, in particular from the 2002 NIE on *Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction*. As described previously in this report, Committee staff found that several of the IC judgments in the NIE were not substantiated by intelligence source reporting. Many of those judgments that were included in Secretary Powell’s speech, therefore, are also not substantiated by the intelligence source reporting. Those issues are outlined in detail in the sections of this report on Iraq’s suspected nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs and delivery systems. Rather than reexamine those issues, this section of the report focuses on identifying the statements in Secretary Powell’s speech which were new or differed from previous intelligence analysis.

#### ***A. Nuclear Program***

(U) Secretary Powell’s speech included information about Iraq’s attempts to procure a magnet production plant for magnets weighing 20-30 grams. He said the magnets were, “. . . the same weight as the magnets used in Iraq’s gas centrifuge program before the Gulf War,” and that

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

“This incident along with [Iraq’s attempts to procure high-strength aluminum tubes] is another indicator of Iraq’s attempts to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program.” Previous IC products discussed Iraq’s attempts to acquire a magnet procurement plant, but did not say that the magnets were the same as those used in Iraq’s pre-Gulf War centrifuge program.

(U) According to the Department of Energy (DOE), Iraq used four magnets in different designs for the upper dampers on its pre-Gulf War carbon fiber centrifuge program. Two of the magnets weighed approximately 24 grams, one weighed 60 grams and the other 90 grams. The Intelligence Community does not know which damper design Iraq used in the two centrifuges it operated prior to the Gulf War. The 24 gram magnets used in two of the damper designs were made of samarium cobalt (SmCo), however. The magnets for which Iraq was seeking a production capability were between 20-30 grams, but were made of aluminum-nickel-cobalt (Alnico), which have a lower strength to weight ratio than SmCo magnets. The Alnico magnets used in Iraq’s pre-Gulf War centrifuge damper designs were 60 grams, not 20-30 grams as referenced in Secretary Powell’s speech. The DOE told Committee staff that there is no known centrifuge damper design with an Alnico magnet weighing less than 60 grams.

(U) Furthermore, Iraq’s pre-Gulf War centrifuge, which used 146 mm carbon fiber tubes, is not a design Iraq could have pursued using the 81 mm aluminum tubes Iraq was trying to procure. Therefore, the weight of the magnets Iraq used in its pre-Gulf War program is irrelevant. Engineers from the DOE judged that an acceptable magnet and damper design for use with the 81 mm aluminum tubes Iraq was trying to procure would have to be made from SmCo, because it has greater magnet strength for its weight than Alnico, and “would weigh much more than 30 grams.”

### ***B. Biological Weapons***

(U) Secretary Powell’s speech referenced intelligence on Iraq’s biological weapons program, some of which had been obtained after the IC published the 2002 NIE on Iraq’s WMD programs.

( [REDACTED] ) Secretary Powell said, “. . . we know from sources that a missile brigade outside Baghdad was disbursing rocket launchers and warheads containing biological warfare agents to various locations in western Iraq. Most of the launchers and warheads have been hidden in large groves of palm trees and were moved every one to four weeks to escape detection.” While the speech text referenced “sources,” the IC provided the Committee with only one CIA HUMINT report, dated January 11, 2003, to support this statement. [REDACTED] the report, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] said that an Iraqi missile brigade commander supervised the dispersal of his brigade's al Samoud and Ababil-100 missiles in order to hide them from UN inspectors. The report said that some of the missiles had warheads containing an "unknown biological agent." The report said the missiles were hidden in large palm groves and were generally kept in the same location for one to four weeks. No other sources were provided to the Committee.

(U) Secretary Powell also described an example of an Iraqi effort to conceal prohibited activity from UN inspectors. Showing a satellite image of vehicle activity at Iraq's Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute, he noted that at a "biological weapons related facility, on November 25, just two days before inspections resumed, this truck caravan appeared, something we almost never see at this facility, and we monitor it carefully and regularly."

( [REDACTED]

( [REDACTED]

( [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) The analyst told Committee staff that he informally raised his concerns about the imagery analysis to his supervisors, but said “when this first came up, it seemed to be one little difference of opinion or potential misinterpretation within a much larger context . . . .” The analyst said, however, that he was surprised when he heard Secretary Powell’s speech and that “a NIMA product had gone forward to the policymakers with incorrect information and had in fact escalated up to where it was being used in the speech.” After the speech, the analyst raised the issue within NIMA and discussed his [REDACTED] analysis with one of the other three analysts responsible for covering Amiriyah. After looking at the [REDACTED] work, the NIMA analyst responsible for covering Amiriyah performed his own historical review of the imagery and remained convinced that the November 2002 activity was unusual [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The analyst who performed the original [REDACTED] imagery review told Committee staff that he and several other analysts in his branch of NIMA believed that the activity was routine, but said when analysts cannot resolve an issue at the analytical level “. . . we

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

don't have a mechanism to have an independent review." NIMA's official assessment remains that the activity was unusual and no other position was presented outside of the agency.

(U) Secretary Powell's speech also discussed intelligence regarding the suspected Iraqi mobile biological weapons (BW) production program and provided detail on the four HUMINT sources which were said to have provided the information on the program. The Committee's findings regarding this intelligence are discussed in detail in the biological weapons section of this report. In short, Committee staff found that details of the reporting and the reliability of some of the sources were not accurately described in Intelligence Community (IC) products on Iraq's suspected BW mobile labs. Because information provided to the Committee shows that some of these problems were discovered by a Department of Defense (DOD) detailee to CIA prior to Secretary Powell delivering his UN speech, the Committee provides the following additional discussion of this issue.

(U) Secretary Powell described the primary mobile BW source and three supporting sources in his speech. He said the first was "an eyewitness, an Iraqi chemical engineer who supervised one of these facilities. He was actually present during biological agent production runs. He was also at the site when an accident occurred in 1998. Twelve technicians died from exposure to biological agents."

( [REDACTED] ) This source is known to the IC by the code name CURVE BALL. CURVE BALL is an Iraqi defector who was debriefed [REDACTED]. The IC provided the Committee with 95 intelligence reports from the [REDACTED] debriefings which describe CURVE BALL as a project engineer involved [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] biological production facilities in Iraq.

( [REDACTED] ) The second source, Secretary Powell said, was "an Iraqi civil engineer in a position to know the details of the program, [who] confirmed the existence of transportable facilities moving on trailers." This source was also an Iraqi asylum seeker [REDACTED]. A June 2001 report from this source stated that there were transportable facilities for the production of biological weapons mounted on trailers [REDACTED] and that there were other Iraqi sites where biological weapons were produced.

( [REDACTED] ) The third source in the speech was said to have been in a position to know that "Iraq had manufactured mobile production systems mounted on road-trailer units and on rail cars." The IC provided the Committee with eight HUMINT reports from this source [REDACTED], which described Iraqi mobile [REDACTED] units mounted on road-trailer units and



[REDACTED]

rail cars. [REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) The fourth source was an Iraqi Major who defected and “confirmed that Iraq has mobile biological research laboratories in addition to the production facilities.” This source was an Iraqi [REDACTED] defected from Iraq in late 2001, and was brought to the attention of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) by the Iraqi National Congress (INC) in February 2002. The IC provided the Committee with one intelligence report from this source which described mobile biological research laboratories.

( [REDACTED] ) Concerns about this source had been raised in a DIA “fabrication notice” issued in May 2002. *(See the BW section of this report for an extensive discussion of this notice.)* Although a Defense Humint Service (DHS) [REDACTED] who was aware of the fabrication notice, attended two of the Powell speech coordination meetings on February 2 and 3, 2003, he told Committee staff that he was unaware that the source mentioned in the speech was the same source about whom the fabrication notice had been issued and, therefore, he did not raise any concerns about the source. He told Committee staff that he had not seen the speech until he arrived at the meeting, that the source was not specifically discussed, and that the speech did not indicate that the source was a DHS source. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) Before Secretary Powell delivered his speech to the UN, a DoD employee detailed to CIA raised concerns within the CIA about each of the BW trailers sources cited in the speech. The detailee, who provides technical advice to the CIA Directorate of Operations (DO) on BW matters, met CURVE BALL in May 2000 in order to conduct [REDACTED] and is the only American intelligence official to have met CURVE BALL before Operation Iraqi Freedom.

( [REDACTED] ) The chief of the DO’s Counterproliferation Division (CPD) reports office had provided the detailee with a draft of the BW section of Secretary Powell’s UN speech on February 2 or 3, 2003, according to the CIA. After reading the speech, the detailee wrote an electronic mail (e-mail) to the Deputy Chief of the [REDACTED] Iraqi Task Force to express his concerns about the use of the four HUMINT sources cited in the speech. Regarding the source CURVE BALL the detailee said, “I believe I am still the only United States Government (USG) person to

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

have had direct access to him. There are a few issues associated with that contact that warrant further explanation, in my opinion, before using him as the backbone for the Iraqi mobile program.” The detailee explained,

I do have a concern with the validity of the information based on “CURVE BALL” having a terrible hangover the morning [REDACTED] I agree, it was only a one time interaction, however, he knew he was to have [REDACTED] on that particular morning but tied one on anyway. What underlying issues could this be a problem with and how in depth has he been vetted [REDACTED]?

The detailee also expressed concern that,

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] were having major handling issues with him and were attempting to determine, if in fact, CURVE BALL was who he said he was. These issues, in my opinion, warrant further inquiry, before we use the information as the backbone of one of our major findings of the existence of a continuing Iraqi BW program!

( [REDACTED] ) The detailee also expressed concern about the second HUMINT source cited in the Powell speech, [REDACTED]. He noted that the source was [REDACTED] and said the reporting had inconsistencies that needed further checking. The detailee added, “we sure didn’t give much credence to this report when it came out. Why now?”

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]

He sure didn’t corroborate “curve ball’s” information. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) On the fourth source, the Iraqi Major, the detailee noted that “This is the *Vanity Fair* source - who was deemed a fabricator. Need I say more?”

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) The detailee's email was sent to the Deputy Chief of the CIA's Iraqi Task Force on February 4, 2003, one day before Secretary Powell delivered his speech. The detailee told Committee staff that prior to receiving a draft copy of Secretary Powell's speech he had "had many discussions with the analysts about my concerns with CURVE BALL as this whole thing was building up and taking on a life of its own. I was becoming frustrated, and when asked to go over Colin Powell's speech . . . and I went through the speech, and I thought, my gosh, we have got – I have got to go on record and make my concerns known. . . ."

( [REDACTED] ) The Deputy Chief told Committee staff that he did not believe that the detailee's e-mail contained any new information that had not already been raised previously by the detailee many times, but said he sent the detailee an e-mail inviting him to discuss his concerns. The e-mail, which was provided to the Committee, said,

Greetings. Come on over (or I'll come over there) and we can hash this out. As I said last night, let's keep in mind the fact that this war's going to happen regardless of what Curve Ball said or didn't say, and that the Powers That Be probably aren't terribly interested in whether Curve Ball knows what he's talking about. However, in the interest of Truth, we owe somebody a sentence of two of warning, if you honestly have reservations.

(U) In describing the intent of his e-mail, the Deputy Chief told Committee staff that he had the sense that war was inevitable from reading the newspaper and that he had not had any interactions with government officials in the CIA or with any policymakers that led him to this conclusion. He said,

I was reading the same newspapers you were. It was inevitable, it seemed to me at the time, and to most of us, that war was coming. I was not privy to any particular information indicating war plans or anything. My level was too low for that. . . . My source of information was the Washington Post.

( [REDACTED] ) The Deputy Chief added,

Keep in mind [detailee's name redacted] is a personal friend of mine, and what I was probably trying to do was to calm him down a little bit, say, look [detailee's name redacted,] again we all know your objections to this. The war is not going to hinge on what [detailee's name redacted] thinks about CURVE BALL. That probably would have been my intent.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) When asked by Committee staff if he was aware of any pressure on IC personnel to change their assessments on Iraq, the Deputy Chief responded “No, absolutely not. Again, I can’t speak for the analytical community. I can only speak for the collectors. We were never pressured, no. Quite the opposite, we were given as free a rein as we possibly wanted, as much money as we needed, as much resources as we could bring to bear to find out was there a WMD program and, if so, where are the facilities.” The Deputy Chief told Committee staff that there was pressure to answer questions such as “Is there a WMD program or isn’t there? Where are the facilities?” And that “underlying it all was what kinds of weapons might the Iraqis bring to bear against our troops, and there was a lot of pressure for that – a lot of it, frankly, self-imposed pressure.”

( [REDACTED] ) According to both the detailee and the Deputy Chief, the two met later that evening to discuss the detailee’s e-mail. The detailee told Committee staff that the Deputy Chief of the Iraqi Task Force told him that he understood the detailee’s concerns but said the speech was too far along to bring them up at that time.

( [REDACTED] ) The Deputy Chief said that after meeting with the detailee and hearing his concerns, he believes he did not take any further action because he thought the CIA BW analysts and his superiors were already well aware of the detailee’s concerns. He said he may have passed the detailee’s concerns on to the Chief of the Iraqi Task Force, but he could not recall doing so and did not have any e-mail or other records to indicate that he did. The Deputy Chief told Committee staff that the Chief of the Iraq WMD Task Force said he was broadly aware at the time of the detailee’s concerns about the BW HUMINT sources, but he did not recall the Deputy Chief raising the detailee’s specific concerns about the use of the BW sources in Secretary Powell’s speech.

( [REDACTED] ) The Deputy Chief said that he may have told the detailee that “it was too far along” to raise concerns about the use of the BW sources in Secretary Powell’s speech, but could not remember whether he did. He stated, however, that if he did make this comment, it was with the intention of not hurting the detailee’s feelings by telling him there was nothing new to his concerns. He said that he believed that the detailee’s warning in the e-mail that the fourth source, the Iraqi Major, “was deemed a fabricator” was hyperbole and did not believe that this indicated that a fabrication notice had actually been issued. He said if a fabrication notice had been issued “WINPAC must have been aware” of it. The Deputy Chief told Committee staff that he believed that the CIA’s BW analysts would not have gone forward with the information concerning Iraq’s mobile BW program in the Powell speech if they had not already resolved the detailee’s concerns.

[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) Committee staff asked the Deputy Chief if he was aware of any evidence or had any reason to believe that IC management would not have been interested in listening to the detailee's concerns if the Deputy Chief had judged them to be valid. The Deputy Chief said, "they would listen to valid concerns. They had heard [the detailee's] concerns, was our contention, and they had heard it and heard it and heard it and were not interested in hearing it again."

( [REDACTED] ) The Deputy Chief told Committee staff that despite not acting on his concerns, he regarded the detailee as a "useful skeptic" in that he was an independent thinker whose point of view was often different from the CIA's BW analysts. He also told Committee staff that, in retrospect, in light of the controversy over the BW HUMINT sources, he wishes that he had taken action on the detailee's concerns, for "reasons of bureaucratic self-preservation. Even today, looking at [the detailee's] e-mail, there is simply nothing new in it that would have been worth bringing to WINPAC's attention."

( [REDACTED] ) In an interview with the DCI, when asked by Committee staff whether Secretary Powell should have been made aware of the detailee's concerns, the DCI said, "If there were issues and concerns, they should have been raised through our process so that it could be presented to the Secretary, certainly. I don't know how they would have been adjudicated at the time, but it should have been up on the table. There could have been a healthy debate about it. But it did not come to the table."

### *C. Chemical Weapons*

( [REDACTED] ) Secretary Powell's speech referenced intelligence on Iraq's chemical weapons which had been obtained after the IC published the 2002 NIE on Iraq's WMD programs. Secretary Powell noted in his speech that ". . . we have sources who tell us that [Saddam Hussein] recently has authorized his field commanders to use [chemical weapons]." The IC provided three HUMINT reports which substantiated this statement. The first, dated January [REDACTED] 2003, from a CIA [REDACTED] [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] that the Iraqi government had informed [REDACTED] that it would launch missiles armed with chemical and biological agents against northern Iraq, Kuwait and Israel within the first two hours of the initiation of air strikes by U.S. and coalition forces. The [REDACTED] reported [REDACTED] [REDACTED] that the entire Army I Corps had begun to issue atropine injectors and protective masks to soldiers and informed them they were intended to protect them against a U.S. chemical and biological weapons (CBW) attack. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(1) A second CIA HUMINT report [REDACTED] [REDACTED] said that Saddam Hussein had authorized four field commanders to use “prohibited” weapons if U.S. forces crossed the “red line,” a box around Baghdad. Another report, dated September 2002, from a foreign government service, did not say that commanders had been authorized to use chemical weapons, but noted that Saddam had ordered that all resources, including chemical and biological weapons, be used to defend the regime from attack. The foreign government service report said that the SSO, under the direction of Qusay Hussein, was in charge of all of Iraq’s CBW and that it took an average of 20 minutes to move CBW munitions into place for attack and that the maximum response time was 45 minutes. Both of the reports that noted Saddam Hussein had authorized field commanders to use CBW were obtained by the IC after publication of the NIE on Iraq’s WMD programs.

( [REDACTED] ) Secretary Powell’s discussion of the intelligence reporting also differed in some respects from previous IC assessments of Iraq’s chemical weapons capability in several respects. First, Secretary Powell said that the al-Musayyib site, a suspect chemical munitions storage site, had been used for “at least three years to transship chemical weapons from production facilities out to the field.” The CIA told Committee staff that State Department speech writers crafted this statement from CIA input that “evidence of movement activity at this site went back as early as 1999.” Intelligence provided to the Committee showed only that *possible* chemical transshipment activity had occurred at the facility and only in the spring of 2002. There were indicators – a [REDACTED] vehicle in 1998 and construction of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] in late 2000 – which suggested that the facility may have been involved in suspicious activity, but imagery did not show transshipment or movement activity [REDACTED] the spring of 2002.

( [REDACTED] ) Second, Secretary Powell said that a HUMINT source corroborated the movement of chemical weapons at al-Musayyib at the same time that imagery had shown the suspicious activity. Referring to the imagery of the transshipment activity, Secretary Powell said, “What makes this picture significant is that we have a human source who has corroborated that movement of chemical weapons occurred at this site at that time.” The Committee was provided with a single report from a CIA HUMINT [REDACTED] which said that in early August to early November 2002, Iraq had moved possible chemical weapons materials between the al Musayyib site and another site. The report showed that a HUMINT source confirmed the movement of possible chemical munitions at al-Musayyib, as Secretary Powell said, but the

[REDACTED]

report did not show that the movement took place at the same time as shown in the imagery reporting.

( [REDACTED] ) Finally, Secretary Powell discussed an imagery report, which said that the ground in and around the al Musayyib storage area had been graded after the transshipment activity had been completed. Secretary Powell said the grading “literally removed the crust of the earth from large portions of this site in order to conceal chemical weapons evidence that would be there from years of chemical weapons activity.” The imagery report provided to the Committee said that this type of grading is “a common fire abatement measure in ammunition depots, but could also hide evidence of [REDACTED] CW [REDACTED],” noting only the possibility that the purpose of the grading was to conceal chemical weapons activity.

*D. Delivery Systems*

(U) The information in Secretary Powell’s UN speech regarding Iraq’s delivery systems was largely consistent with intelligence that had previously been described in other classified and unclassified Intelligence Community products, in particular the classified October 2002 NIE and the unclassified White Paper.

*E. WMD Powell Conclusions*

**(U) Conclusion 72. Much of the information provided or cleared by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for inclusion in Secretary Powell’s speech was overstated, misleading, or incorrect.**

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]

**(U) Conclusion 73. Some of the information supplied by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), but not used in Secretary Powell's speech, was incorrect. This information should never have been provided for use in a public speech.**

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**(U) Conclusion 74. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) should have alerted Secretary Powell to the problems with the biological weapons-related sources cited in the speech concerning Iraq's alleged mobile biological weapons program.**

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**(U) Conclusion 75. The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)<sup>31</sup> should have alerted Secretary Powell to the fact that there was an analytical disagreement within the NIMA concerning the meaning of [REDACTED] activity observed at Iraq's Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute in November 2002. Moreover, agencies like the NIMA should have mechanisms in place for evaluating such analytical disagreements.**

**(U) [REDACTED]**

**(U) [REDACTED]**

**(U) Conclusion 76. Human intelligence (HUMINT) gathered after the production of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), did indicate that Iraqi commanders had been authorized to use chemical weapons as noted in Secretary Powell's speech.**

**(U) [REDACTED]**

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<sup>31</sup> NIMA has recently been renamed the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]