NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD FROM

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BEFORE THE

STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTE OF THE

SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

CONCERNING

MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE

PROGRAMS AND LESSONS LEARNED

IN RECENT MILITARY OPERATIONS (U)

ON

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(U) Statement For The Record

(U) Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee for requesting Marine Corps participation in this hearing on our intelligence programs and lessons learned from recent military operations. It is an honor to be here to discuss Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) programs funded by Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) funding and the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP).

(U) During this past year, the Marine Corps, both active and reserve, engaged in operations around the globe. Our successes in executing Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW) depended on our Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) having a reach-back capability to leverage and populate theater, service and national intelligence repositories, while maintaining a tactically self-sufficient ISR network to support forward MAGTF fire and maneuver. We fund our ISR systems, generally referred to as the Marine Air Ground Intelligence System (MAGIS), in TIARA because although networked and joint enabling, they are integral to our tactical combat command elements and maneuver units.

(U) Marine Corps ISR exists to support EMW and, specifically, the commander's planning, decision-making, and execution. Our previous Marine ISR modernization efforts emphasized increased collection and analytical capability at the maneuver level of command and reach-back support from theater, service and national organizations. We have sought, and we continue to seek, to transform how we fight by providing unprecedented ISR capability and access to all of our combat echelons--from our small units such as companies all the way to the

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Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), our largest MAGTF. These efforts led to a number of successes during OIF-I that I would like to share with you.

(U) Marine commanders task organized their organic intelligence support to adapt to the speed and distance of their specific operations. We augmented our Marine Divisions with support from Pioneer Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) squadrons, topographic/imagery intelligence (IMINT) specialists and TROJAN SPIRIT-LITE intelligence communications systems to provide responsive ISR support and secure mobile connectivity. Likewise, we augmented the next lower maneuver echelon, the Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs), with a wide array of ISR enhancements such as Dragon Eye UAVs, Counterintelligence Human Intelligence Exploitation Teams (CI/HETs), and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Support Teams (SSTs) to improve their organic collection capability; TROJAN SPIRIT IIs to provide secure mobile connectivity; and data link receivers for aerial sensors such as the Pioneer UAV, the Navy's P3 and the Litening POD on the AV8-B Harrier to provide them with a "bird's eye" view of the battlefield. These enhancements provided the capability to conduct immediate and responsive ISR operations such as employing the Dragon Eye UAV to safely scout the first crossing of the Tigris River; using SSTs to identify and neutralize enemy call for fire nets during the second crossing of the Tigris River; and capitalizing on CI/HET assets embedded with Light Armored Reconnaissance units to facilitate a prisoner of war rescue north of Baghdad.

(U) The Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA), the Marine Corps' Service intelligence center, provided Federated Production support before D-Day including lines of communication (LOCs) and inundation studies. This intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) support was critical to 1st Marine Division receiving approval to bypass Al Kut and strike toward Baghdad on secondary routes. MCIA serves as the parent command for Intelligence

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Marines on joint duty and in combat support agencies. Consequently, MCIA connects Marines assigned to Defense Agencies, Regional Security Operations Centers (RSOCs), Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs), and Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers (JRICs) and enables them to work as a virtual team in support of warfighting and combat development intelligence requirements.

(U) The MEF's organic Intelligence Battalion coordinated reach-back targeting support by leveraging the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) St. Louis, and the Joint Intelligence Center Central Command (JICCENT)/Combined Forces Air Component Command (CFACC) in order to populate automated target folders for strikes conducted in theater. These target folders enabled advancing Marine Forces to rapidly strike and destroy artillery units of an Iraqi Division between Al Kut and Baghdad, thereby denying the enemy the ability to use these assets to hinder our advance.

(U) As these stories illustrate, TIARA funded MAGTF ISR assets are embedded in command elements and maneuver units. We have technical specialists in all-source fusion, SIGINT, CI/HUMINT, reconnaissance and UAV operations that can be task organized to support any given commander's situation based upon his specific requirements. Enhanced intelligence support to the Marine maneuver unit in combat enables more efficient utilization of theater, service and national collection assets while simultaneously enabling commanders to focus their organic collection assets on their immediate areas of responsibility. We believe these organic capabilities should remain in TIARA so the commander will have an ownership stake in not only making them part of his team in combat, but in preserving and enhancing these capabilities during Service planning, programming, and budgeting.

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(U) Our EMW concept continues to be used with great success today in Iraq and Afghanistan for force protection, security and stability operations, and counter-terrorist operations. Our commanders are using actionable intelligence to conduct focused raids and attacks on a daily basis in Iraq and Afghanistan. When only partial information exists, commanders are conducting patrols and "cordon and knock" operations to generate intelligence. Actionable intelligence requires not only commanders who are empowered and willing to act, but also the presentation of target development information by Marines who are viewed as part of the team. Both focused raids and patrols are examples of commanders viewing their ISR Marines as trusted members of the command element's decision making process. It is very rewarding to routinely read in commanders' Situation Reports things like "...forces throughout the AO positioned to conduct focused, intelligence driven operations against the enemy...;"

(U) I would like to thank the Subcommittee for your support of Marine Corps intelligence. I have tremendous pride in the contributions made and the hard work being done by our ISR Marines. With your continued support, intelligence will remain the indispensable precursor to and enabler of MAGTF operations. The Marine Corps remains focused on organizing, training, and equipping our forces to best support Marine commanders, combatant commanders and national decision makers throughout the spectrum of conflict. Incorporating recent experiences, increasing our forces' integration with joint capabilities, exploiting the flexibility and rapid response capabilities of our units, and preserving the adaptability of our Marines will collectively lead to more options for the Combatant Commanders. I look forward to addressing our successes in detail in closed session.

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