Congressional Record: February 2, 2004 (Senate)
Page S371-S376
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
By Mr. DASCHLE (for Mr. Lieberman (for himself, Mr. McCain, Mr.
Daschle, Mr. Dorgan, Mr. Lautenberg, Mr. Corzine, Mr. Graham of
Florida, Mr. Durbin, Mr. Dodd, Ms. Collins, Mr. Lott, Mr.
Graham of South Carolina, and Mr. Hagel)):
[[Page S372]]
S. 2040. A bill to extend the date for the submittal of the final
report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States, to provide additional funding for the Commission, and for other
purposes; to the Select Committee on Intelligence.
(At the request of Mr. Daschle, the following statement was ordered
to be printed in the Record.)
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, today Senator McCain and I are
introducing legislation to extend the life of the National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States so that it can complete its
critically important investigation into the causes of the September
11th terrorist attacks, which claimed the lives of nearly 3,000
innocent people.
Under legislation Senator McCain and I authored in December 2001 to
create the Commission, its final report was to have been completed by
May 27, 2004. The Commission itself has asked for more time. So we are
now proposing to extend that deadline until January 10, 2005 and to
provide an additional $6 million for the Commission to complete its
work. Senator McCain and I are grateful to the Minority Leader, Senator
Daschle, for joining us in this effort. We are also happy to have the
support of Senators Dorgan, Lautenberg, Corzine, Graham, Durbin, and
Dodd. In the House, Representatives Fossella, Shays, Hinchey and
Emanuel are expected to introduce companion legislation this week, and
we welcome their support as well.
We want the Commission's final report to be as searching and complete
as possible. We owe that to the memories of the 3,000 victims and their
families. And we owe it to the Nation as a whole. In fact, our future
security depends upon it.
George Washington once said we should look back ``to derive useful
lessons from past errors, and for the purpose of profiting by dear-
bought experience.'' That is the precise mission of this Commission to
better understand what went wrong so we can prevent such a catastrophic
attack from ever happening again. The Commission simply needs more time
to do that.
From the beginning, Senator McCain and I have been motivated by the
experience of the families of victims of September 11. Above and beyond
the grief of their losses, they have endured terrible pain in not
knowing the whole account of how something so horrific could have
happened to them and those they loved. It was a tribute to the power of
the families' message that our legislation creating the Commission
passed the Senate on September 24, 2002, by a resounding vote of 90-8.
And it is a tribute to the enduring power of their message that Senator
McCain and I are seeking this extension.
Last week, the Commission asked Congress for at least an additional
60 days to finalize its interviews, hearings, and report. The families,
however, expressed concern that two months may be an inadequate amount
of time to accomplish all that must be done. They have called for a
seven-and-a-half month extension so the Commission can conduct all the
public hearings it had originally intended to hold, so that it can
conduct thorough reviews of the President's daily intelligence
briefings--a process barely underway--and so that it has the time to
deal with the Administration's anticipated objections to declassifying
material in the final report. Indeed, the Commissioners I asked have
confirmed that they can benefit from more than the minimum two months
requested.
I have therefore been convinced by the families and the Commissioners
that the extra time is necessary. But I would also warn the
Administration that this extension is not an excuse to engage in
additional dilatory tactics.
I add this warning because the Bush Administration has a long record
of opposing this Commission and an equally long record of making its
work more difficult. Ever since Senator McCain and I first joined
forces on this issue, we have faced White House intransigence. The
President opposed the Commission for 10 months until the eve of a
Senate vote he knew he would lose. During final negotiations over the
details of the legislation, the White House negotiated to keep the
Commission's duration as short as possible, rather than give it ample
time to do a thorough job.
Once the Commission got underway, the Administration hampered the
Commission's progress through slow document production and other
stalling tactics, limiting the Commission's ability to proceed
expeditiously with its investigation. Even now, the Administration is
refusing to give the full Commission notes, taken by members of the
Commission, that describe key White House documents. When one considers
the obstacles generated by the White House, it is not in the least bit
surprising that the Commission now needs additional time to finish the
job.
I would note, however, that this extension does not preclude the
Commission from releasing interim reports, as the original legislation
establishing the Commission allows. Furthermore, the Commission is free
to release its final report before the deadline, if it has completed
its work. The Commission's hearings, questioning of witnesses, factual
findings, and staff report issued last week proved exceptionally
valuable in shedding light on some of the causes of the terrorist
attacks. Future hearings and staff reports, no doubt, will continue to
provide important new information about weaknesses in our defenses
against terrorism.
Therefore, we encourage the Commission to continue to release its
findings and recommendations as they become available, so that we can
learn from the mistakes of our past as quickly as possible, and work
harder to shore up existing vulnerabilities. Congress and the relevant
federal agencies have a duty to develop new strategies and capabilities
to deter and prevent future terrorist attacks, and expeditious
reporting by the Commission will help enormously.
Major systemic problems have already surfaced, for example, that can
point us in the right direction, or maybe even an entirely new
direction, to address an array of vulnerabilities, particularly in our
law enforcement and intelligence communities. Allow me to cite just a
few examples from the Commission's work thus far to illustrate how many
hands we will need, laboring in unison, to patch the breaches that
remain in America's domestic security:
1. An immigration official at Orlando International Airport, Mr.
Melendez-Perez, testified that on August 4, 2001, he turned away and
sent home a suspicious, unresponsive, and belligerent Saudi national
holding a one-way ticket with no departure plans and insufficient funds
to stay in the U.S. and purchase a ticket home. This individual claimed
that he was to meet a friend at the airport but would not name the
friend. It turned out that one of the 9/11 hijackers, Mohamed Atta, was
at the airport on that day. Amazingly, neither the FBI nor anyone else
from the intelligence community has ever debriefed Mr. Melendez-Perez,
even though the immigration inspector informed the FBI of the incident
immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
2. The excellent performance of Mr. Melendez-Perez demonstrated that
a vigilant and well-trained officer can spot suspicious behavior in the
course of a routine interview. But the Commission's hearings and
reports also revealed how infrequently that occurs. Government
officials admitted in public testimony that consular employees are not
expected to screen for possible terrorists during interviews of visa
applicants, nor are they trained to do so. The Commission discovered
that many of the hijackers had passports that were fraudulently altered
or had other suspicious indicators, but between 1992 and September 11,
2001, the federal government had not attempted to disseminate, to
border security or other relevant employees, available information
about the travel and passport practices of Al Qaeda or other terrorist
groups. All of the hijackers' visa applications were incomplete, and
several contained false statements that were easily identifiable. The
hijackers entered the United States, often more than once, without
incident, despite the fact that several of them had violated
immigration law. Hijackers referred to secondary inspections for more
detailed scrutiny were nevertheless admitted.
3. New information has been revealed about the abundant knowledge the
intelligence community had about three of the 19 hijackers, who held a
strategy session in Malaysia and were extensively tracked by U.S. and
foreign intelligence services. The story fleshed
[[Page S373]]
out by the Commission underscores the fact that not only did the
government fail to share information that might have kept the
terrorists out of the country, but they also failed to share
information that might have exposed the terrorists' September 11th
plot. That is why I have focused personal attention on the Terrorist
Threat Integration Center and the Directorate for Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection at DHS to make sure that these new
centers are receiving all intelligence information, mixing it together
with skilled and intense analysis, and warning the relevant state,
local, and federal officials of emerging terrorist plots.
4. All the evidence that consolidated watch lists might have
prevented entry to some of the terrorists notwithstanding, the watch
lists still haven't been consolidated despite numerous Administration
promises to do so. The Commission learned from the Federal Aviation
Administration that, prior to September 11th, the no-fly list created
for the airlines had only 12-20 names on it, whereas the terrorist
watch list at the State Department had tens of thousands of terrorists'
names. We also learned that the no-fly list and the larger terrorist
watch list are still not equal in numbers and that there are still
terrorists on the larger list who might be permitted to fly if they
evade other detection.
These disclosures demonstrate the Commission is accomplishing its
assignment, and so it must be allowed to complete its investigation. I
am certain the Commission will use the extra months wisely to complete
a thorough investigation, continue its public hearings, interview all
relevant government officials and complete a comprehensive final report
for release as soon as possible.
It is a basic American principle that we must learn from the past in
order to secure a better future. Our ability to counter, prevent, and
defend against the next terrorist attack on our homeland depends in no
small part on the Commission's ability to bring satisfactory closure to
its work. If we only give the Commission the time, resources, and
cooperation it deserves, the Commission's full, fair, and unflinching
assessment of what went wrong will be of immediate value to our
national security. And it will be of lasting value to the American
people, who will finally discover the unvarnished truth.
I urge the Senate to approve this legislation in a timely manner so
that the victims' families and the rest of America may have some
measure of peace.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 2040
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES.
(a) Extension.--Section 610(b) of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 6
U.S.C. 101 note; 116 Stat. 2413) is amended by striking ``18
months after the date of the enactment of this Act'' and
inserting ``January 10, 2005''.
(b) Additional Funding.--Section 611 of that Act (6 U.S.C.
101 note; 116 Stat. 2413) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c);
(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new
subsection (b):
``(b) Additional Funding From the National Foreign
Intelligence Program.--In addition to the amounts made
available to the Commission under subsection (a), of the
amounts authorized to be appropriated by the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177)
and available in the Department of Defense Appropriations
Act, 2004 (Public Law 108-87) for the National Foreign
Intelligence Program, not more than $6,000,000 shall be
available for transfer to the Commission for purposes of the
activities of the Commission under this title.''; and
(3) in subsection (c), as so redesignated, by striking
``subsection (a)'' and inserting ``this section''.
Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, the Democratic and Republican
commissioners on the blue ribbon commission investigating the September
11, 2001 terrorist attacks reached an important and bipartisan
decision. They decided they needed more time--more time to get access
to the documents and people that can help us understand what happened
on that fateful day; more time to analyze this information so they can
help us identify which corrective measures are needed to reduce the
prospects for future 9/11s; in short, more time to do what they are
required to do by law.
I come to the floor today to talk briefly about my views on this
commission and its work, and to explain why I have joined with Senators
McCain and Lieberman to offer legislation to give the commission the
time needed to complete its task and provide the families of the
victims of 9/11 and all Americans with a complete and thorough report.
The importance of this commission's work cannot be overstated. This
independent commission represents the last and perhaps best hope for
our Nation to understand how 19 individuals were able to execute the
most deadly terrorist attack on American soil in this Nation's long
history.
How did these terrorists get into this country? What is the source of
funding they used to carry out these activities? How did the hijackers
get themselves, and apparently knives and mace, past airport security?
How were they able to hijack four aircraft and drive them to such a
deadly end? Why could our intelligence community and policymakers not
do more to prevent these heinous acts? What can the Government and
individual citizens do in the future to prevent similar attacks?
These are but some of the difficult questions the commission has to
address. Given the importance of their task, one would think that all
parties--Democratic and Republican, Congress and the White House--would
quickly agree to provide the commission whatever it needs.
Unfortunately, in the days immediately after the commissioners made
their request, it became evident some parties may not believe the
commission should be provided the time it needs to do what is required
by law.
Quoting from the New York Times on January 28:
The White House and Republican congressional leaders have
said they see no need to extend the congressionally mandated
deadline . . . and a spokesperson for Speaker J. Dennis
Hastert said . . . Mr. Hastert would oppose any legislation
to grant the extension.
As unsettling as this position is, in hindsight, it should not be
surprising to those who have followed the history of this commission.
In the months immediately after the tragic events of September 11,
2001, President Bush and Vice President Cheney personally appealed to
me and to other Members of Congress not to establish a bipartisan blue
ribbon commission.
Vice President Cheney suggested to me that creating such an effort
could detract from administration officials' efforts to get the
terrorists responsible.
Fortunately, neither the families of the victims of 9/11 nor the
American people accepted this argument. They understood, and properly
in my view, that an independent investigation would enhance our efforts
on the war on terror.
Far from endangering national security, an inquiry could actually
help us pinpoint and correct flaws in our security and intelligence
communities and identify the necessary corrective measures.
Despite the fact that the idea of a commission enjoyed the
overwhelming support of the families of the victims and of the American
people, the administration, and the House Republican leadership
persisted in their efforts to see that this idea never took flight--in
some instances, at the same time they were publicly professing their
support for the commission.
For example, on the same day the White House spokesperson indicated
President Bush supported the idea of a commission, his negotiators were
on Capitol Hill vetoing a congressional agreement to establish one.
In October of 2002, the House and Senate Intelligence Committees
announced they had reached a deal to include language to establish the
commission in the intelligence authorization bill. The next day, the
deal collapsed and negotiators involved laid the blame at the doorstep
of the White House and the House Republican leadership.
According to the Washington Post, a senior Republican Senator said:
The House Republican leadership weighed in against [the
deal] and the deal collapsed. . . . It is no secret that the
White House works through the House Republican leadership.
[[Page S374]]
Again, the families of the victims and supporters of the commission
were not deterred. In fact, this commission would not exist were it not
for the dedicated efforts of the families of the victims. They pressed
on, and in November of 2002, they prevailed.
Congress passed the legislation creating the commission and the
President signed it into law. The commission was given until May of
2004 to do its work. We all knew at the time that this deadline was
both arbitrary and highly ambitious, given the scope of the work
involved. Subsequent actions would make meeting this deadline
impossible.
The commission was immediately embroiled in controversy over the
selection and subsequent resignation of Henry Kissinger, who the
President selected to chair its work. But the obstacles placed in front
of this commission were just the beginning. In light of the sensitive
nature of much of the information the commission would be examining,
getting the commission high-level security clearances was the first
priority.
However, for a variety of reasons, a process that could have taken
weeks stretched into months, thereby preventing the commissioners from
examining numerous important documents.
Then came open resistance from the Bush administration to commission
requests for access to documents and individuals the commissioners
deemed vital to their inquiry. The commission quickly became bogged
down in negotiations over which documents and individuals it would have
access to and under what terms and conditions.
Many agencies flat out refused to provide access. Others insisted the
administration minders be present when the commission questioned
Government employees.
The commission was forced to resort to subpoenas to obtain
information from several Federal agencies, and press reports is
actively considering issuing others.
As recently as this past week, it was reported that the
administration is still placing roadblocks in front of the commission's
vital work. Over the weekend, it was disclosed that the White House is
refusing to allow the commission access to notes its own members have
taken on briefings received by the President.
As a result of the administration's repeated failure to cooperate
fully and immediately with the commission and its important work, it
has become increasingly clear that it cannot fulfill the immense task
placed before it and comply with the deadline imposed on it.
In order to meet this deadline, commissioners tell us they would have
to cut corners. Scheduled hearings would have to be canceled.
Interviews with key officials would have to be scrapped. Time to
analyze their information and write their report would be short. All of
these reasons led the commission, wisely in my view, to request
additional time. All of these reasons led me to join the families of
the victims, as well as Senators McCain and Lieberman, to conclude we
must do everything possible to meet their requests.
I hope those who have opposed the commission and its work in the past
will step aside. I hope they will allow us to provide the commission
with the time it needs to give the families and America the report it
deserves.
______
