Congressional Record: October 6, 2004 (Senate)
Page S10476-S10488
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REFORM ACT OF 2004
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will
resume consideration of S. 2845, which the clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (S. 2845) to reform the intelligence community and
the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the
United States Government, and for other purposes.
Pending:
Kyl Amendment No. 3801, to modify the privacy and civil
liberties oversight.
Stevens Amendment No. 3839, to strike section 201, relating
to public disclosure of intelligence funding.
Leahy/Grassley Amendment No. 3945, to require Congressional
oversight of translators employed and contracted for by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Reid (for Harkin) Amendment No. 3821, to modify the
functions of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.
Roberts Amendment No. 3742, to clarify the continuing
applicability of section 504 of the National Security Act of
1947 to the obligation and expenditure of funds appropriated
for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of
the United States.
Stevens Amendment No. 3827, to strike section 206, relating
to information sharing.
Stevens Amendment No. 3840, to strike the fiscal and
acquisition authorities of the National Intelligence
Authority.
Stevens Amendment No. 3882, to propose an alternative
section 141, relating to the Inspector General of the
National Intelligence Authority.
Warner Amendment No. 3876, to preserve certain authorities
and accountability in the implementation of intelligence
reform.
Levin Modified Amendment No. 3809, to exempt military
personnel from certain personnel transfer authorities.
Levin Amendment No. 3810, to clarify the definition of
National Intelligence Program.
Stevens Amendment No. 3830, to modify certain provisions
relating to the Central Intelligence Agency.
Warner Amendment No. 3875, to clarify the definition of
National Intelligence Program.
Reid (for Leahy) Amendment No. 3913, to address enforcement
of certain subpoenas.
Reid (for Leahy) Amendment No. 3916, to strengthen civil
liberties protections.
Reid (for Leahy) Amendment No. 3915, to establish criteria
for placing individuals on the consolidated screening watch
list of the Terrorist Screening Center.
Collins (for Frist) Modified Amendment No. 3895, to
establish the National Counterproliferation Center within the
National Intelligence Authority.
Collins (for Frist) Amendment No. 3896, to include certain
additional Members of Congress among the congressional
intelligence committees.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the time until 11:30
[[Page S10477]]
a.m. will be equally divided for debate between the two managers and 15
minutes of that time will be under the control of Senator Warner and
Senator Levin.
The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from
Alaska. I then hope we can proceed to four pending amendments of the
Senator from Alaska.
Mr. REID. On this time, on behalf of Senator Lieberman, I yield 10
minutes to the Senator from Illinois.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska is recognized for 10
minutes, to be followed by the Senator from Illinois for 10 minutes.
Amendments Nos. 3830, As Modified, 3840, As Modified, and 3882, As
Modified, En Bloc
Mr. STEVENS. I have sent three of the pending amendments to the desk
in an amended form. These changes have been coordinated with the
managers of the bill and I believe they are acceptable to them.
The first amendment, No. 3840, revises the acquisition authority of
the national intelligence director and that is at the desk. The second
amendment, No. 3830, modifies a certain provision related to the
Central Intelligence Agency and that amendment is at the desk.
Amendment No. 3882 revises the provisions related to the inspector
general of the National Intelligence Authority. It conforms these
provisions to those in the Inspector General Act and avoids duplication
of the inspector general efforts across the impacted agencies. That
amendment is at the desk.
I appreciate the courtesy of the managers of the bill and their
staffs, and their willingness to engage in dialog on these amendments
with me and my staff.
We are still working to resolve differences over amendment No. 3827
regarding the information-sharing network to address some of the
concerns identified by the White House and others. We hope to reach a
resolution on that language this morning, but, as I said, I thank the
managers of the bill for their help in resolving these issues. It has
been a matter of great concern to those of us who have worked with the
intelligence community for quite some time.
I now ask unanimous consent that amendments Nos. 3840, 3830, and 3882
be amended as noted in the revised amendments that I have sent to the
desk; that the amendments be considered en bloc and adopted en bloc,
and that the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is
so ordered.
The amendments, as modified, were agreed to, as follows:
amendment no. 3830
On page 28, beginning on line 16, strike ``of the National
Intelligence Director''.
On page 43, beginning on line 1, strike ``OF THE NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR''.
On page 43, beginning on line 5, strike ``of the National
Intelligence Director'' and insert ``for the National
Intelligence Director and the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency''.
On page 43, line 14, add at the end the following: ``Any
use of funds from the Reserve shall be subject to the
direction and approval of the National Intelligence Director
and in accordance with procedures issued by the Director.''.
On page 43, beginning on line 17, strike ``of the National
Intelligence Director''.
On page 141, between lines 15 and 16, insert the following:
(H) the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency or his
designee;
On page 141, line 16, strike ``(H)'' and insert ``(I)''.
On page 141, line 18, strike ``(I)'' and insert ``(J)''.
On page 141, line 21, strike ``(J)'' and insert ``(K)''.
On page 194, beginning on line 23, strike ``of the National
Intelligence Director''.
amendment no. 3840
On page 109, line 6, insert the words ``within the National
Intelligence Program'' after the words ``for each
intelligence program''.
On page 109, strike lines 12 and 13 and insert the
following:
(B) serve as exclusive milestone decision authority, except
that with respect to Department of Defense programs the
Director shall serve as milestone decision authority jointly
with the Secretary of Defense or the designee of the
Secretary; and
On page 110, strike lines 8 through 18 and insert the
following:
(4) If the National Intelligence Director and the Secretary
of Defense are unable to reach agreement on a milestone
decision under this subsection, the Director shall assume
milestone decision authority subject to review by the
President at the request of the Secretary.
amendment no. 3882
On page 60, strike line 5 and all that follows through page
77, line 18, and insert the following:
SEC. 141. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
AUTHORITY.
(a) Inspector General of National Intelligence Authority.--
There is an Inspector General of the National Intelligence
Authority. The Inspector General of the National Intelligence
Authority and the Office of the Inspector General of the
National Intelligence Authority shall be subject to the
provisions of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C.
App.).
(b) Amendments to Inspector General Act of 1978 Relating
to Inspector General of National Intelligence Authority.--The
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended--
(1) by redesignating section 8J as section 8K; and
(2) by inserting after section 8I the following new
section:
``special provisions concerning the national intelligence authority
``Sec. 8J. (a)(1) Notwithstanding the last 2 sentences of
section 3(a), the Inspector General of the National
Intelligence Authority (in this section referred to as the
`Inspector General') shall be under the authority, direction,
and control of the National Intelligence Director (in this
section referred to as the `Director') with respect to audits
or investigations, or the issuance of subpoenas, which
require access to information concerning intelligence or
counterintelligence matters the disclosure of which would
constitute a serious threat to national security.
``(2) With respect to information described in paragraph
(1), the Director may prohibit the Inspector General from
initiating, carrying out, or completing any investigation,
inspection, or audit, or from issuing any subpoena, if the
Director determines that such prohibition is necessary to
preserve the vital national security interests of the United
States.
``(3) If the Director exercises the authority under
paragraph (1) or (2), the Director shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees an appropriately
classified statement of the reasons for the exercise of such
authority within 7 days.
``(4) The Director shall advise the Inspector General at
the time a report under paragraph (3) is submitted, and, to
the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence
sources and methods, provide the Inspector General with a
copy of such report.
``(5) The Inspector General may submit to the congressional
intelligence committees any comments on a report of which the
Inspector General has notice under paragraph (4) that the
Inspector General considers appropriate.
``(b) In addition to the qualifications for the appointment
of the Inspector General under section 3(a), the Inspector
General shall be appointed on the basis of prior experience
in the field of intelligence or national security.
``(c)(1)(A) In addition to the duties and responsibilities
of the Inspector General specified elsewhere in this Act, the
Inspector General shall, for the purpose stated in
subparagraph (B), provide policy direction for, and conduct,
supervise, and coordinate audits and investigations relating
to--
``(i) the coordination and collaboration among elements of
the intelligence community within the National Intelligence
Program; and
``(ii) the coordination and collaboration between elements
of the intelligence community within the National
Intelligence Program and other elements of the intelligence
community.
``(B) The Inspector General shall conduct the activities
described in subparagraph (A) to ensure that the coordination
and collaboration referred to in that paragraph is conducted
efficiently and in accordance with applicable law and
regulation.
``(C) Before undertaking any investigation, inspection, or
audit under subparagraph (A), the Inspector General shall
consult with any other inspector general having
responsibilities regarding an element of the intelligence
community whose activities are involved in the investigation,
inspection, or audit for the purpose of avoiding duplication
of effort and ensuring effective coordination and
cooperation.
``(2) In addition to the matters of which the Inspector
General is required to keep the Director and Congress fully
and currently informed under section 4(a), the Inspector
General shall--
``(A) keep the Director and Congress fully and currently
informed concerning--
``(i) violations of civil liberties and privacy that may
occur in the programs and operations of the National
Intelligence Authority; and
``(ii) violations of law and regulations, violations of
civil liberties and privacy, and fraud and other serious
problems, abuses, and deficiencies that may occur in the
coordination and collaboration referred to in clauses (i) and
(ii) of paragraph (1)(A); and
``(B) report the progress made in implementing corrective
action with respect to the matters referred to in
subparagraph (A).
``(3) To enable the Inspector General to fully and
effectively carry out the duties and responsibilities
specified in this Act, the Inspector General and the
inspectors general of the other elements of the intelligence
community shall coordinate their internal audit,
[[Page S10478]]
inspection, and investigative activities to avoid duplication
and ensure effective coordination and cooperation.
``(4) The Inspector General shall take due regard for the
protection of intelligence sources and methods in the
preparation of all reports issued by the Inspector General,
and, to the extent consistent with the purpose and objective
of such reports, take such measures as may be appropriate to
minimize the disclosure of intelligence sources and methods
described in such reports.
``(d)(1) Each semiannual report prepared by the Inspector
General under section 5(a) shall--
``(A) include an assessment of the effectiveness of all
measures in place in the National Intelligence Authority for
the protection of civil liberties and privacy of United
States persons; and
``(B) be transmitted by the Director to the congressional
intelligence committees.
``(2) In addition the duties of the Inspector General and
the Director under section 5(d)--
``(A) the Inspector General shall report immediately to the
Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of
particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or
deficiencies relating to--
``(i) the coordination and collaboration among elements of
the intelligence community within the National Intelligence
Program; and
``(ii) the coordination and collaboration between elements
of the intelligence community within the National
Intelligence Program and other elements of the intelligence
community; and
``(B) the Director shall transmit to the congressional
intelligence committees each report under subparagraph (A)
within 7 calendar days of receipt of such report, together
with such comments as the Director considers appropriate.
``(3) Any report required to be transmitted by the Director
to the appropriate committees or subcommittees of Congress
under section 5(d) shall also be transmitted, within the 7-
day period specified in that section, to the congressional
intelligence committees.
``(4) In the event that--
``(A) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any
differences with the Director affecting the execution of the
duties or responsibilities of the Inspector General;
``(B) an investigation, inspection, or audit carried out by
the Inspector General should focus on any current or former
National Intelligence Authority official who holds or held a
position in the Authority that is subject to appointment by
the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, including such a position held on an acting basis;
``(C) a matter requires a report by the Inspector General
to the Department of Justice on possible criminal conduct by
a current or former official described in subparagraph (B);
``(D) the Inspector General receives notice from the
Department of Justice declining or approving prosecution of
possible criminal conduct of any current or former official
described in subparagraph (B); or
``(E) the Inspector General, after exhausting all possible
alternatives, is unable to obtain significant documentary
information in the course of an investigation, inspection, or
audit,
the Inspector General shall immediately notify and submit a
report on such matter to the congressional intelligence
committees.
``(5) Pursuant to title V of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), the Director shall submit to
the congressional intelligence committees any report or
findings and recommendations of an investigation, inspection,
or audit conducted by the office which has been requested by
the Chairman or Ranking Minority Member of either committee.
``(e)(1) In addition to the other authorities of the
Inspector General under this Act, the Inspector General shall
have access to any personnel of the National Intelligence
Authority, or any employee of a contractor of the Authority,
whose testimony is needed for the performance of the duties
of the Inspector General. Whenever such access is, in the
judgment of the Inspector General, unreasonably refused or
not provided, the Inspector General shall report the
circumstances to the Director without delay.
``(2) Failure on the part of any employee or contractor of
the National Intelligence Authority to cooperate with the
Inspector General shall be grounds for appropriate
administrative actions by the Director, including loss of
employment or termination of an existing contractual
relationship.
``(3) Whenever, in the judgment of the Director, an element
of the intelligence community that is part of the National
Intelligence Program has unreasonably refused or not provided
information or assistance requested by the Inspector General
under paragraph (1) or (3) of section 6(a), the Director
shall so inform the head of the element, who shall promptly
provide such information or assistance to the Inspector
General.
``(4) The level of classification or compartmentalization
of information shall not, in and of itself, provide a
sufficient rationale for denying the Inspector General access
to any materials under section 6(a).
``(f) In addition to the authorities and requirements in
section 7 regarding the receipt of complaints by the
Inspector General--
``(1) the Inspector General is authorized to receive and
investigate complaints or information from any person
concerning the existence of an activity constituting a
violation of laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement,
gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial
and specific danger to the public health and safety; and
``(2) once such complaint or information has been received
from an employee of the Federal Government--
``(A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the identity
of the employee without the consent of the employee, unless
the Inspector General determines that such disclosure is
unavoidable during the course of the investigation or the
disclosure is made to an official of the Department of
Justice responsible for determining whether a prosecution
should be undertaken; and
``(B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of
reprisal, for making such complaint may be taken by any
employee in a position to take such actions, unless the
complaint was made or the information was disclosed with the
knowledge that it was false or with willful disregard for its
truth or falsity.
``(g) In this section, the terms `congressional
intelligence committees', `intelligence community', and
`National Intelligence Program' have the meanings given such
terms in section 2 of the National Intelligence Reform Act of
2004.''.
(c) Technical and Conforming Amendments to Inspector
General Act of 1978.--(1)(A) Section 8H(a)(1) of the
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is further
amended--
(i) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (D);
and
(ii) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following new
subparagraph (C):
``(C) An employee of the National Intelligence Authority,
of an entity other than the Authority who is assigned or
detailed to the Authority, or of a contractor of the
Authority who intends to report to Congress a complaint or
information with respect to an urgent concern may report the
complaint or information to the Inspector General of the
National Intelligence Authority.''.
(B) In support of this paragraph, Congress makes the
findings set forth in paragraphs (1) through (6) of section
701(b) of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection
Act of 1998 (title VII of Public Law 105-272; 5 U.S.C. App.
8H note).
(2) The Inspector General Act of 1978 is further amended--
(A) in section 8K, as redesignated by subsection (b)(1) of
this section, by striking ``8F or 8H'' and inserting ``8F,
8H, 8I, or 8J''; and
(B) in section 11--
(i) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``the National
Intelligence Director;'' after ``the Attorney General;''; and
(ii) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``the National
Intelligence Authority,'' after ``the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration,''.
(d) Separate Budget Account.--The National Intelligence
Director shall, in accordance with procedures to be issued by
the Director in consultation with congressional intelligence
committees, include in the National Intelligence Program
budget a separate account for the Office of Inspector General
of the National Intelligence Authority.
(e) Sense of Congress On Adoption of Standards of Review.--
It is the sense of Congress that the Inspector General of the
National Intelligence Authority, in consultation with other
Inspectors General of the intelligence community and the
President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency, should adopt
standards for review and related precedent that are generally
used by the intelligence community for reviewing
whistleblower reprisal complaints made under sections 7 and
8J(f) of the Inspector General Act of 1978.
On page 203, strike lines 9 through 22.
On page 204, line 1, strike ``312.'' and insert ``311.''.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I thank the senior Senator from Alaska
for working with Senator Lieberman and me to resolve these three
amendments. I very much appreciate the good-faith suggestions that were
made on both sides, and I am grateful to him for working with us to
address his concerns.
I think we have come up with very good suggestions, and I am pleased
that the amendments have been adopted.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
Mr. STEVENS. How much time do I have remaining of the 10 minutes?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 7\1/2\ minutes.
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I have heard this talk about the
inspectors and their conclusion that they have not found weapons of
mass destruction. Seventeen times the United Nations asked Saddam
Hussein to disclose where the weapons of mass destruction were. We know
he used them on the Kurds. We know he used them in Iran. We know we
have evidence he was trying to build additional weapons but the
inspectors kept asking to return. They asked again and again to return
so they could find out if there was evidence of where he had those
weapons of mass destruction.
[[Page S10479]]
Now they are before the Armed Services Committee this morning and
they are going to testify that they have found ``no evidence'' of the
weapons of mass destruction. We had the same conclusion with regard to
the Iraqi air force. We were told Saddam had destroyed a series of
airplanes. Later we found them buried in the Iraqi desert--a whole
series of airplanes--the whole airplane buried. It was capable of being
dug up, brought out of the dirt and used.
Now, we have not found the weapons of mass destruction yet. This
Senator believes he had them. We know he had them in the Kurd area. We
know he used them on Iran. This idea that somehow or another the
President or the Vice President have lied, I am tired of hearing this
disrespect for the President and Vice President of the United States
and I will be willing to debate any time what happened in Iraq.
I went to Kuwait time after time, and to Saudi Arabia, and talked to
the pilots who were flying the continuous air patrol over Iraq. Since
the gulf war, our pilots were up there every day, and every day they
were shot at by ground-to-air weapons that Saddam was not supposed to
have at all.
This idea that somehow or another the President and Vice President of
the United States lied because they believed there were weapons of mass
destruction there, I believe there are weapons of mass destruction
there and I still believe there are weapons there somewhere. Where they
have taken them, I do not know, but they have not found them. The
inspectors kept finding enough reason to go back and go back. They went
back 17 times.
To say the President lied, what about those inspectors who said, We
have to go back; we have not found them yet but we are going to find
some more? Did they lie?
I think there ought to be greater respect for the Presidency and the
Vice Presidency of this country, and in this campaign. I have never
heard such disrespect. I did not go out and campaign against President
Clinton and say he lied, and yet we know he did. He admitted he lied
about the matters that were before the grand jury. Now we did not go
out and accuse the President of lying. We had a lot of discussions on
the floor about that.
So if we want to compare Presidents and who lied and who did not, I
am ready any time the Democrats want to do it, but I am tired of this
disrespect. It is time we showed respect for the system. I do not
remember in the past when a Senator asked another Senator to yield and
if that Senator had time, it normally would happen. At the very least
the Senator would say: Let me finish my statement now and I will yield
at the end of my statement. That kind of senatorial courtesy has to
come back to the Senate.
If the Senator wants me to yield, I will yield the remainder of my
time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Has the Senator yielded the floor?
The Senator from Illinois.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, it is my understanding I have 10 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, let me say that----
Mr. STEVENS. The Senator has 10 minutes on his time on the 1 hour to
which the Senator is entitled.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, if the Senator will check the record, he
will find that without exception I have always yielded for a question
but I was in a difficult position because the Senator from Delaware
wanted to speak after me. In the entire amount of time given to me, I
would have been happy to yield.
I think, frankly, dialog between two Senators is something perilously
close to debate in the Senate, which we hardly ever have. I am sorry we
did not have that opportunity, but I think we have the opportunity at
this moment.
What I hear from the Senator from Alaska is that we should show
respect for the Office of the Presidency. I could not agree more.
Whether the President is of my party or any other party, he should be
given respect. Even if I disagree with that President, his policy or
his statements, I am hoping that I will always be viewed as a person
who has that respect for the Office of the Presidency. That is the
least that is expected of every single Member of Congress, and I hope
the people across the United States.
Having said that, I do not believe that disagreeing with the policies
of an administration is disrespectful. In fact, I think it is part of
the national debate which makes America so unique.
I do not believe it is disrespectful to say that the information
given by the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense,
and the Secretary of State was wrong and misleading. It was. I have
never used the word ``lie,'' nor would I because a lie means there was
a deliberate misrepresentation. I don't have any evidence there was a
deliberate misrepresentation. But there was a misrepresentation, at
least in four specific elements. Let me tell you what they were.
The administration misled the American people in believing there were
weapons of mass destruction--an arsenal of chemical, biological, and
nuclear weapons set to strike countries in the Middle East as well as
the United States--in Iraq before our invasion. We know now, based on
clear and convincing evidence, there is no indication that Saddam
Hussein ever had these arsenals of weapons of mass destruction. So when
the President and the administration said that to justify the invasion,
they were wrong. The American people were misled. That is a fact.
Point No. 2, this administration misled the American people about the
capacity of Iraq to build nuclear weapons. Yesterday I came to the
floor and talked about the most recent disclosure about aluminum tubes.
The American people were misled into believing Saddam Hussein was about
to become a nuclear power, threatening the region and the United
States. The administration was wrong. The American people were misled.
Point No. 3, the administration said there was linkage, and I quoted
this morning direct quotes from Vice President Cheney. They argued
there was linkage between Saddam Hussein and the 9/11 tragedy in
America; that somehow Saddam Hussein and al-Qaida were consorting to
attack the United States. We have seen repeatedly through the 9/11
Commission Report, the Senate Intelligence Committee report, as well as
clear statements now, today, by the Secretary of Defense, that was
wrong. The American people were misled. That is a fact.
These elements are facts that cannot be denied. To say the
administration misled the American people is there for the record. I
have not said the President lied. But I do say he gave wrong
information to the American people, and even the President has conceded
that fact. When the Secretary of Defense says there is no linkage, when
the President removes the offensive words from the State of the Union
Address, he concedes the fact that statements made before the invasion
were misleading and they were wrong.
Why in the world can't this administration accept that reality? Why
do they have to cling to the fiction that was presented to the American
people?
The Senator from Alaska said we should show respect for the
Presidency, and I agree. But more important, we need to show respect
for the American people. They are the ones we serve, the President and
every Member of Congress. We need to show them respect by giving them
the clear, unvarnished truth so they understand the facts before we
make critical decisions.
We have now lost over 1,050 of our best and brightest and bravest
American soldiers in Iraq. We lost them because we invaded that country
before we let the inspectors do their job in Iraq, before we created a
broad coalition of countries that would join us in this military
effort, and here we stand today.
Last night, Vice President Cheney said don't demean the coalition.
Other countries stand with us. I certainly respect the fact that they
would stand by the side of America. But make no mistake, when you open
the morning paper, regularly, virtually every morning you learn of the
death of another American soldier. It is American soldiers who are
fighting and dying in Iraq in much greater numbers, even, than any
other country I should say, and much greater numbers than I think
should be the case.
Had this President done the same thing his father did, gone to the
United Nations for approval of our invasion, put together a coalition
of nations
[[Page S10480]]
which included Arab nations--President Bush's father understood that,
in the Persian Gulf. He knew that to bring in Arab nations as part of
the coalition meant there would be less resentment in Arab states for
our action. This President did not wait to bring in an Arab state to
help us in this coalition of the willing. As a consequence, the
resentment against the actions of the United States in the Arab world
has been growing apace, and we have found the recruiting efforts to
find more terrorists to not only invade Iraq and kill our soldiers but
to spread around the world are mushrooming. Are we safer today because
of that invasion, because we didn't build the coalition? I think not.
I am glad Saddam Hussein is in prison. I am glad he is out of power.
But don't diminish the cost to the United States and the fact that
there is no end in sight to this war in Iraq.
There was no plan from this administration to execute this war and
protect our troops with body armor, with Humvees armored, with
protective equipment on helicopters, and certainly we understand today,
based on Ambassador Bremer's statements just 2 days ago, that we didn't
have a sufficient number of troops to bring stability to the region.
We are paying the price for those bad decisions. Statements were made
by this administration that were wrong and misleading. Decisions were
made that clearly evidence that we were not prepared, as we should have
been. We are paying that price, and there is no end in sight.
If the Senator from Alaska suggests it is disrespectful to the
President to raise these issues, I respectfully disagree with him. It
is our obligation to have an open, honest, national debate about the
foreign policy of this country, which involves families far and wide in
Illinois, Alaska, and around the United States.
I reserve the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I am delighted to have an opportunity to
debate with the Senator from Illinois because I listened to the
comments he made before, comments I violently disagree with. For
instance, in 1998, President Clinton went before the general officers
of this Nation, officers from all of our units of the military, and he
told them he believed Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction.
He laid down a just challenge to Saddam Hussein to come forward and
disclose them or he believed he might have to go into Iraq himself.
That seems to be forgotten.
Apparently, the Senator from Illinois didn't hear the Vice President
when he mentioned Mr. Zarqawi last night, a man who was in Iraq before
even the problems of Afghanistan who was operating there. He is back
there now. He had operated in Afghanistan and Pakistan, was part of the
bad guys there. Now we know he is back in Iraq again. He is mentioned
as being one of the senior contacts within the al-Qaida organization
that was there before and came back again now. The Vice President has
mentioned the contacts that existed in the al-Qaida world in Iraq.
I still believe he was right. There is no question about it. There
was a portion of the terrorist organization in Iraq before, and they
are back there now.
As far as the weapons of mass destruction, I believe at the time we
had seen the briefings--and I am one of the eight in the Congress who
received the same briefings the President of the United States got
about Iraq. We got them in confidence. As a matter of fact, even the
statement the Senator from Illinois made about Mr. Bremer, who is the
President's representative, that is from a classified report that we
should not be discussing on the floor. It ended up somehow being
leaked, that one line from the report. But the report deals with the
overall relationship of Mr. Bremer to the whole process.
The problem is this: When we look at the Bremer situation, what
Bremer did--we were there. We talked to him. He did want more forces
around Baghdad. He thought there should be more. The President relied
upon our general officers. He told me personally and he told us as we
went to Iraq and came back from Iraq, we are doing what our general
officers request, as far as the troop strength is concerned.
The general officers disagreed with Bremer as to the location of
those forces. There is no question about it. We probably should have
had more. In my opinion, we should have been able to come through Iraq
from the north, through Turkey, and come from the south from Kuwait,
and had two forces moving through Iraq and squash those people over
there.
Instead, because of developments in Turkey, we could not go through
Turkey. We flew our troops down to Kuwait, we took their supples all
the way around, and when the supplies reached them they then went in,
and instead of having forces meet in Baghdad, particularly in Saddam
Hussein's home part of Iraq, they then come back to Baghdad, and that
left them spread out. My memory is that the insurrection started in the
south because the forces had gone north and we couldn't spread them
that thin.
People said: Send more troops. Send more troops. We heard that on the
floor: Send more troops. The ability to maintain and supply those
troops was a real difficult situation, particularly when all the
support supplies were coming through Kuwait. We even started sending
some supplies through Jordan.
But the problem really is what happened in terms of Saddam Hussein,
in terms of the relationship to al-Qaida, and the relationship to
weapons of mass destruction. I stood here on the floor of the Senate
and called Saddam Hussein a Hitler. I did that at least 9 months before
the war started. I still believe he was a Hitler. He invaded Kuwait,
and we had to kick him out. He was rebuilding his military within that
area that he still maintained control of in Iraq. We had control of the
south and north part of his country. Yet look at it in terms of the no-
fly zone we were trying to protect.
But in terms of the part he controlled he was rebuilding his military
because of the money that came into his hands through the ``food-for-
oil'' program.
You can stand here, no matter what you say, and say we haven't found
weapons of mass destruction. That is true. We haven't found them. I
still believe there are some out there, whether they are in adjoining
nations or buried in the ground. Whatever happened to them, he had
them.
To accuse the administration of misleading the public when they
relied upon the intelligence analysts that we relied on--the same
intelligence analysts President Clinton relied on when he made his 1998
speech. Certainly those of us who were here supported the resolution
that asked the President to send troops into Iraq; we believed it. When
you look at it, if we want to get into situations when Senator Kerry
voted against the 1991 war resolution in spite of what Iraq did in
invading Kuwait, he voted against us going into Kuwait to liberate
Kuwait.
I think my friends on the other side of the aisle have been wrong for
30 years. As a matter of fact, those on the other side of the aisle
mainly opposed the Reagan buildup in the 1980s. I was chairman of the
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, and I remember those votes. Fifty
times here we voted on amendments that were offered to try to strike
weapons systems from the defense bill that I managed to bring to the
floor to rebuild the military capacity of the United States. All of
those amendments came from the other side of the aisle.
When you look at it, when you look at the trouble, why did we have a
shortage of intelligence? President Clinton started degrading human
intelligence in the CIA. He denuded the intelligence system as far as
human intelligence is concerned because he wanted to rely on the
satellites in the air and the communications systems, electrical
systems.
I cannot believe we are going to get into these one-sided statements.
I would like to have a full debate. I am sort of at a loss. I don't
have my records. The Senator from Illinois has his records, but I don't
have them.
But I have a feeling that had we not denuded the CIA in the 1990s, we
would have had better intelligence. But the information we had relied
upon, the American public relied upon, and this Senate relied upon when
we voted to give the President the right to go into Iraq.
[[Page S10481]]
To say the President was wrong because he relied on the same
intelligence we relied upon I think is a faulty argument, and it should
not happen on the floor of the Senate in a political season where we
are trying to destroy the reputation which the President deserves for
having the guts to do what Clinton didn't have the guts to do.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 3\1/2\ minutes remaining.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, let me say in response to the Senator from
Alaska before he leaves the floor--I want to let him know I want to
respond to his comments so there will be no mistake about it.
First, the statement that Ambassador Bremer's comments had something
to do with classified information, what I have said on the floor was
based upon some front pages of the newspapers. Ambassador Bremer was
reported to have said to a private organization in a speech that one of
the problems we have in Iraq today stems from the fact that we had an
inadequate number of troops in the field to bring stability, to stop
the looting and violence immediately after the deposition of Saddam
Hussein. That is not classified. It is on the front pages of the
newspapers. Ambassador Bremer has now backed away from those comments.
But the fact is he made them, and many believe the same thing--that we
had an inadequate number of troops at the right and appropriate moment
and are paying the price today because the insurgency has grown.
Second, last night Vice President Cheney, and this morning the
Senator from Alaska, make a great deal about the so-called Ayman al-
Zawahiri link, a ruthless terrorist who is affiliated with al-Qaida.
The Vice President made the statement last night that the Senator made
today--that there was a linkage between Ayman al-Zawahiri and Saddam
Hussein and, therefore, proof positive al-Qaida and Saddam Hussein were
working together justified the invasion.
I commend to my colleagues and those following the debate this
morning's report from MSNBC.com from Washington:
A CIA report has found no conclusive evidence that former
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein harbored Ayman al-Zawahiri
which the Bush administration asserted before the invasion of
Iraq.
This is a fact. It comes from the President's own CIA. They continue
to build these straw men to justify an invasion when the facts don't
back them up--no weapons of mass destruction, no nuclear arsenal, no
evidence of bringing in yellowcake from Niger, no evidence of linkage
with al-Qaida. And they cling tenaciously and stubbornly to these
assertions even though the facts defeat them.
How can you trust an administration that will not accept the facts
and reality to prepare a defense for America? Shouldn't the defense of
our Nation be based on reality rather than theory? Shouldn't it be
based on sound intelligence instead of political ideology? I would
think so.
Any President who comes to this office with a predetermined set of
ideas on what we need to do to protect America regardless of the facts
is not serving our country well. I hope both political parties would
acknowledge that.
Amendment No. 3801
Let me also say we are about to consider in the early parts of the
debate this morning an amendment by Senator Kyl to the underlying bill
on intelligence reform. I oppose this amendment. I hope my colleagues
will join me in opposing it.
We have come together with a bipartisan agreement on the civil
liberties board. It is a board which has been created by both sides of
the aisle working to implement the recommendations in the 9/11
Commission report. What Senator Kyl is trying to do is take away some
important powers and responsibilities of this board.
For example, he wants to eliminate the board's standard of review.
This is the standard that the board uses to take a look at proposed
expansions of the government's power and make sure they don't infringe
on rights. What Senator Kyl suggests is we take away the standard of
review from the civil liberties board. That would frankly create a ship
above water.
We need to make sure this board has a standard of review so they can
look at government actions and decide whether they go too far. That is
what the 9/11 Commission suggested and that is what we should stick to.
Senator Kyl's amendment also would remove the Board's subpoena power.
He said he would be concerned that this civil liberties board would be
subpoenaing members of our Government, agents of our Government, to
come in from all over the world and give them evidence. I hope the
Senator from Arizona will read this provision more carefully and more
closely because the subpoena authority in this bill is very narrow. It
only applies to people outside of the Government.
The Kyl amendment would also eliminate the requirement of the board
to inform the public about its activities in a manner consistent with
protecting classified information. This directly contradicts the
recommendation of the 9/11 Commission. We are talking about protecting
the American public's rights, liberties, and freedoms. It is essential
that the work of the civil liberties board be made public so the
American people can understand what they are doing and whether our
Government has gone too far. Why the Senator from Arizona would want to
keep secrecy and a veil over this activity, I don't understand.
I certainly hope we reject the Kyl amendment which would demolish the
Collins-Lieberman civil liberties board, a bipartisan creation. It
would upset the delicate balance between government powers and civil
liberties this bill strikes. I urge my colleagues to oppose the
amendment.
I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. REID. I ask unanimous consent that the time for the quorum call
be charged equally to both sides.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. REID. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. REID. Is there still time on both sides under the order that has
been entered?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 20 minutes on each side.
Mr. REID. The Senator from Delaware gets 5 minutes.
Mr. CARPER. I thank the minority leader for yielding to me.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.
Mr. CARPER. I thank the Chair.
(The remarks of Mr. CARPER pertaining to the introduction of S. 2899
are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills
and Joint Resolutions.'')
Mr. REID. I suggest the absence of a quorum and I ask the time be
charged equally.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(The remarks of Mr. REID pertaining to the submission of S. Res. 448
are printed in today's Record under ``Submitted Resolutions.'')
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont is recognized.
Mr. LEAHY. Parliamentary inquiry: Was there time reserved for the
Senator from Vermont prior to the vote?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. No.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I seek recognition in my own right.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, how much time does the Senator need? I
believe 30 minutes has been reserved for
[[Page S10482]]
Senator Warner and Senator Levin of the hour and a half of debate that
was available this morning.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, am I correct that we are planning to vote
at 11:30 on the Kyl amendment?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is the order.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I will speak for 3 to 4 minutes on the Kyl
amendment.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, if I may say to my distinguished friend, the
Senator from Vermont, time was evenly divided, and the minority's time
is gone. We were not aware of the Senator from Vermont needing time.
I ask the Senator from Maine, does she wish to make a statement? All
the time left is hers.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I do intend to speak, so we need to
reserve time. I am also concerned that the two Senators who
specifically requested time have not had an opportunity to speak.
Mr. REID. They have had an opportunity but have not taken it. We need
to get this vote off near the time. The Senator from Vermont needs 3 or
4 minutes.
I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Vermont be recognized
for 4 minutes and that time also be added to that of the majority, so
there would be an extra 8 minutes. We cannot extend it past that time
because there are things people need to do.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I have no objection.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Vermont is recognized.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Nevada and the
Senator from Maine.
Mr. President, I rise today to discuss the provisions in the Collins-
Lieberman bill establishing a privacy and civil liberties oversight
board and to respond to some of the disturbing discourse and efforts to
undermine those provisions.
It is unquestioned that one of the key recommendations of the 9/11
Commission was the creation of a civil liberties board to fill a clear
void in government structure for addressing these concerns. The
Commission discovered that there was ``no office within the government
whose job it is to look across the government at the actions we are
taking to protect ourselves to ensure that liberty concerns are
appropriately considered.'' In response to this vacuum, the Commission
explicitly recommended that ``at this time of increased and
consolidated government authority, there should be a board within the
executive branch to oversee adherence to the guidelines we recommend
and the commitment the government makes to defend our civil
liberties.'' The 9/11 Commission concluded: ``We must find ways of
reconciling security with liberty, since the success of one helps
protect the other.''
The Commission was certainly right. There is no doubt that such a
board is needed given the heightened civil liberty tensions created by
the realities of terrorism and modern warfare. The tools of the
information age include precise data-gathering, networked databases,
and tracking and sensing technologies impervious to the common eye. The
legal tools are similarly powerful, ranging from substantial
capabilities under the USA PATRIOT Act and under our immigration laws.
As the Commission noted, ``[e]ven without the changes we recommend, the
American public has vested enormous authority in the U.S. government.''
In an even more pointed and ominous assessment of these powers, Vice
Chairman Hamilton noted, in a recent Judiciary Committee hearing, these
developments are ``an astounding intrusion in the lives of ordinary
Americans that (are) routine today in government.''
One of my colleagues suggested that this bill is solely to strengthen
our intelligence tools and ``not a bill regarding our civil
liberties.'' But this is a myopic view. You cannot divorce one from the
other. Security and liberty are always in tension in a free society,
and that is readily apparent today. It is our vigilant duty to work
hard at striking the right balance. We must enhance our capabilities,
but with such powerful tools comes heightened responsibility, and the
Commission has challenged us to take up those reins: ``This shift of
power and authority to the government calls for an enhanced system of
checks and balances to protect the precious liberties that are vital to
our way of life.''
We have an obligation to ensure that there are mechanisms in place
that will see to it that this power is subject to appropriate checks
and balances and congressional oversight. An effective civil liberties
board can help provide those checks and contribute to preserving both
liberty and security.
We need a civil liberties board whose members collectively can think
critically and independently about the policies we implement as a
nation and about how they affect our fundamental rights. The board must
be able to participate in the policymaking process, review technology
choices and options, peer into various agencies and assess actions,
review classified materials and investigate concerns. This board must
have the versatility to work closely with government officials, but at
the same time it must be sufficiently independent to assess those
government policies without fear, favor or compromise. Given these
significant responsibilities, it is equally important that the board be
accountable to Congress and the American people.
The civil liberties board outlined in the Collins-Lieberman bill
makes great strides toward meeting these goals. It represents a true
bipartisan effort from conception to introduction. I was pleased to
work with these Senators along with Senator Durbin to make this civil
liberties board the kind of board that would honor the 9/11
Commission's intent. It should not go without notice that Commissioners
Slade Gorton and Richard Ben-Veniste issued a bipartisan statement
that, ``A civil liberties board of the kind we recommend can be found
in the Collins-Lieberman bill in the Senate.''
This legislation establishes a bipartisan board that would have
access to the documents and information needed to assess our
counterterrorism policies that affect the vital civil liberties of the
American people. It provides a mechanism for them to work closely with
administration officials, including working with a network of newly
created department-level privacy and civil liberty officers, whose
proximity to decision makers will ensure that these concerns are
considered from the earliest stages of policy formation. It requires
the board to report to Congress on a regular basis, and--without
compromising classified information--to inform the public about
policies that affect their vital liberties.
Unfortunately, Senator Kyl's amendment 3801 attempts to gut the
carefully crafted, bipartisan civil liberty and privacy provisions that
are the hallmark of the Collins-Lieberman bill. It is inconsistent with
the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and would undermine the
civil liberties that we cherish.
First, Senator Kyl's amendment attempts to cut off the information
flow that would ensure that the board could accurately, reliably and
effectively advise on the impact of policies on privacy and civil
liberties. It would also eliminate the board's ability to subpoena
people outside of the government who may have important information,
such as private sector data collectors working on behalf of the
government. It would also eliminate the privacy officers, as well as
public hearings and reports to the public.
It is clear that the Commission intended for the board to have access
to the information that it needed in order to effectively assess
policy. In a recent House Judiciary Committee hearing, Vice Chairman
Hamilton said, ``The key requirement is that government agencies must
be required to respond to the board.'' He went on to note that the
Commission itself had subpoena power, and ``if we had not had it, our
job would have been much, much more difficult.'' I would note that the
Collins-Lieberman bill does not go as far as to mandate subpoena power
over government officials, but rather only over relevant non-government
persons.
Given the secrecy and civil liberty concerns that have been pervasive
in this administration, we should be enhancing information flow and
dialogue, not eliminating it. It is ironic that at the same time that
the administration has been making it more difficult for the public to
learn what government agencies are up to, the government and its
private sector partners have been
[[Page S10483]]
quietly building more and more databases to learn and store more
information about the American people themselves.
Second, Senator Kyl's amendment would eliminate a provision that
gives the board important guidance on how to review requests by the
government for new and enhanced powers. This is a critical omission. In
order to balance liberty and security, we need to ensure that the board
will be looking at policies through a prism that would allow for
heightened security protection, while also ensuring that intrusions are
not disproportionate to benefits, or that they would unduly undermine
privacy and civil liberties. This guidance would also keep the board
focused on the right priorities and prevent the mission creep that some
fear.
Contrary to assertions that this would be a ``citizen board'' gone
wild that would ``haul any agent in anywhere in the world and grill
him,'' this board would consist of highly accomplished members who have
the appropriate clearance to access classified information, who have
extensive professional expertise on civil liberty and privacy issues,
and who have the knowledge of how to view these concerns in the context
of important anti-terrorism objectives. Again, its subpoena power would
be limited to non-government persons, and so could not used willy-nilly
to drag in agents from the field.
It simply cannot be that the government can create and implement
policies that impinge on our liberties without having to account to
anyone. While that may make things convenient or easy, it certainly
does not preserve the ideals of the country we are fighting to protect.
As the Commission reminded us, ``if our liberties are curtailed, we
lose the values that we are struggling to defend.''
Some have suggested that we leave this responsibility to ``federal
agencies that are already equipped and designed for that function.''
But this misses precisely the point raised in the report. There is
currently no such suitable entity that can look across government and
offer an independent, uncompromised assessment of the impact of
government powers on civil liberties. And I emphasize look, because
some would suggest that we do not need a board with an affirmative
obligation to go out and review policy. To the contrary, what we do not
need is passivity. We need to be as vigilant about protecting our
fundamental rights as we are in hunting down and capturing terrorists.
It is what Commissioner Gorton, a former Republican Senator from
Washington, described as a ``watchdog to assure maximum protection of
individual rights and liberties in those programs.'' Similarly,
Commissioner Hamilton has said that ``it ought to have a very tough
investigative staff and it ought to be a very active board and
agency.''
Others have suggested that the administration's recent efforts are a
suitable substitute. I strongly disagree. Rather, the Executive Order
attempted to foist upon us an anemic civil liberties board. I and
several of my colleagues noted in a letter to the President that the
board was not a bipartisan or independent entity. It had no authority
to access information and it had no accountability. It was housed in
the Department of Justice, and it was comprised solely of
administration officials from the law enforcement and intelligence
communities, precisely the communities that the board would have an
obligation to oversee. It was the proverbial case of the fox guarding
the henhouse. This would not have resulted in a vigorous consideration
of policy that the Commission intended.
As the Commission noted, the ``burden of proof for retaining a
particular governmental power should be on the Executive, to explain
(a) that the power actually materially enhances security and (b) that
there is adequate supervision of the Executive's use of the powers to
ensure protection of civil liberties. If the power is granted, there
must be adequate guidelines and oversight to properly confine its
use.''
We should be looking for ways to ensure that this burden of proof
will be met, rather than weakening oversight and accountability.
As the 9/11 Commission noted, when it comes to security and civil
liberties, ``while protecting our homeland, Americans should be mindful
of threats to vital personal and civil liberties. This balancing is no
easy task, but we must constantly strive to keep it right.''
Senator Kyl's amendment fails to ``keep it right,'' and I urge that
the Senate honor the spirit of the recommendations of the 9/11
Commission, and reject it.
Senators Collins and Lieberman have it right in their bill and we
should not allow that to be gutted.
I ask unanimous consent that a letter to the President from myself
and others on this subject be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
U.S. Senate,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC, September 21, 2004.
Hon. George W. Bush,
President of the United States,
The White House, Washington, DC.
Dear President Bush: We are writing in response to the
recent creation and activities of the Administration's Board
on Safeguarding Americans' Civil Liberties.
One of the key recommendations of the 9/11 Commission was
the creation of a civil liberties board to balance the
enormous powers granted by the people to the government for
protection against terrorism. Critically, it concluded: ``We
must find ways of reconciling security with liberty, since
the success of one helps protect the other.''
There is no doubt that such a board is needed given
heightened civil liberty tensions created by the realities of
terrorism and modem warfare. The tools of the information age
include precise data-gathering, networked databases, and
tracking and sensing technologies impervious to the common
eye. With such powerful tools comes heightened
responsibility.
But the civil liberties board established by the August 27,
2004, Executive Order and the manner in which it is
proceeding do little to further the goal of balancing liberty
and security. The board resembles a presidential advisory
team, and not an independent, bi-partisan entity. Housed in
the Department of Justice, the board will be comprised solely
of Administration officials from the law enforcement and
intelligence communities, precisely the communities that the
board will need to oversee. In essence, this board's
responsibility would be to oversee itself; it is the
proverbial case of the fox guarding the hen house. Further,
the board has no meaningful investigative authority, and
there is no apparent role for Congress.
While such an entity may help inform the White House of the
impact of Administration policies on civil liberties, it is
no substitute for the sort of civil liberties board that
would meet the 9/11 Commission's call for an ``enhanced
system of checks and balances to protect the precious
liberties that are vital to our way of life.'' Simply put,
the Executive Order does not establish an entity with the
authority, independence and accountability necessary to
protect civil liberties.
Further, the board's hasty meeting, with no discussion of
these matters, and with no advance notice to the public, is
inherently inconsistent with the very characteristics of
openness and accountability necessary to protect civil
liberties. A post-meeting press release is simply not the
kind of open communication that will foster any trust and
confidence in this board's ability to protect the liberties
we hold dear.
It is important that we have a civil liberties board that
can think critically and independently about the policies we
implement as a nation and how they impact our fundamental
rights. Choices about its composition, powers and
accountability should serve that goal and will need to be
openly discussed and carefully weighed. The board must be
able to participate in the policymaking process, review
technology choices, peer into various agencies and assess
actions, review classified materials, and investigate
concerns. In particular, the hoard will need to be
sufficiently independent of the Department of Justice to
assess its actions without compromise.
Accountability is essential. We cannot assign a board such
significant responsibilities without periodically reviewing
its progress to ensure that its mandates are being met.
Regular reports to Congress and the public provide such
checks.
As the 9/11 Commission noted, when it comes to security and
civil liberties, the ``balancing is no easy task, but we must
constantly strive to keep it right.'' We agree. We must do
this right and we must do it together. Congress is currently
considering various proposals to create an effective civil
liberties board that can achieve these goals, and we hope
that the Administration and its civil liberties advisors will
support and cooperate with Congress in its development.
Sincerely,
Patrick Leahy,
Edward M. Kennedy,
Russell D. Feingold,
U.S. Senators.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I retain the remainder of my time.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
[[Page S10484]]
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the
order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Will the Senator suspend? Is time yielded to the Senator from West
Virginia?
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from
West Virginia.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I rise to speak in opposition to the
amendment of my good friend from Virginia, Senator Warner. The Warner
amendment would effectively undermine the ability of the national
intelligence director to manage the intelligence programs by changing
the definition in the bill of what constitutes a national intelligence
program.
Under the Collins-Lieberman bill, the national intelligence program
includes all programs--all programs--projects, and activities of a
number of national intelligence agencies, including the National
Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the
National Reconnaissance Office.
The Collins-Lieberman bill has been carefully crafted to provide the
new intelligence director with the consolidated budget, personnel, and
tasking authority necessary to manage the newly defined national
intelligence program. The Warner amendment seeks to unravel this. It is
a major ``undoing'' amendment. It unravels these unified authorities
under the intelligence director by giving the Secretary of Defense
significant control over the National Security Agency, the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office.
I specifically mention this troika of national intelligence
agencies--NSA, NGA, and the NRO--because each agency is partially
funded through the Joint Military Intelligence Program budget, known as
JMIP.
For instance, in the President's fiscal year 2005 budget request, 30
percent of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency's budget comes
from the JMIP. Similarly, hundreds of millions of dollars in the NRO
and NSA budgets are funded through JMIP.
The Warner amendment would eliminate these programs from the
definition of the national intelligence program, thereby splitting the
management of these national intelligence agencies between the national
intelligence director and the Secretary of Defense.
It is very important to note that these programs are not--repeat
not--tactical military intelligence programs. The Secretary of Defense
would retain control over these tactical military programs under the
pending bill. So under the Collins-Lieberman bill, the national
intelligence director, consistent with the 9/11 Commission mandate, is
given authority over the programs and activities of these three basic
programs.
But now the Warner amendment would have the Senate say: Hold on, we
do not want the director to have complete authority over these
agencies. We want a sizable portion of their activities to be jointly
shared, jointly managed, jointly tasked by the national intelligence
director and the Secretary of Defense.
That is exactly what the situation is today and why we are trying to
change all of this. It is exactly the type of bifurcated arrangement
the 9/11 Commission highlighted as fundamentally dysfunctional. This is
exactly the type of crossways organizational setup that inhibits our
intelligence community from achieving efficiency and effectiveness of
management that we need to protect our national security. This is
exactly the type of problem the Collins-Lieberman bill would correct.
Adoption of the Warner amendment would strip away from the national
intelligence director an essential ability to manage what is now an
intelligence community in name but not in reality.
I urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment. Mr. President, I yield
the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from West Virginia
for his comments.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that it be in order for the
Senator from Arizona and the Senator from Georgia to each have 2
minutes to discuss their amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Arizona is recognized for 2 minutes.
Amendment No. 3801
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, we are going to be asking unanimous consent
to withdraw amendment No. 3801, which is an amendment Senator Chambliss
and I offered to deal with the problem of overlapping and redundant
civil rights and privacy investigations, entities, or individuals that
would be added to those that already exist to protect civil rights and
privacy in the national intelligence director office and other offices
of the intelligence community.
The head of the 9/11 Commission, Philip Zelikow, the Executive
Director, noted one of the biggest problems we have with our
intelligence collection and analysis when he said:
We also found--
``We'' meaning the 9/11 Commission--
that the 9/11 story illustrated the danger of risk aversion
from constant worry of being investigated. We gave several
important examples of officials who overinterpreted existing
legal constraints for fear of exceeding their authority. We
were also astonished by the extent to which CIA officials,
beyond any others in the Government, already conduct their
work in a manner that anticipates and guards themselves for
the prospect of future investigations.
We found this in the Intelligence Committee, and the 9/11 Commission
found the same thing--a profound aversion to taking risks because of
all the people looking over the shoulders of these agents, ready to
pounce on them if they do anything wrong or make a mistake.
What does the underlying legislation do? It exacerbates the problem
because it requires that existing agencies of the Government either
designate an existing officer or create a new position for privacy and
civil liberties. Notwithstanding the fact that each Department--
Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, CIA, and others--already
have officers with the responsibility, including an inspector general,
chief privacy officer, and the officer for civil rights and civil
liberties.
In each one of these agencies, those officers currently exist. There
is a new mandate placed on all of them, in addition to which the
President, following the 9/11 Commission recommendation, appointed his
own board on Safeguarding American's Civil Liberties, and the bill
creates a privacy and civil liberties oversight board with subpoena
power and puts under the National Intelligence Authority an officer for
civil rights and liberties and a privacy officer, in addition to the
already existing inspector general.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for an additional 30
seconds.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. KYL. And the creation of an ombudsman. This is overkill. It is
going to exacerbate the problem of risk aversion with having too many
people looking over the shoulder of too many people we tasked with the
difficult job of collecting and analyzing intelligence.
Mr. President, 9/11 did not happen because we had too many people
with privacy being violated or civil rights being violated. It happened
because our intelligence was not good enough. Too many of these are
going to impede our intelligence, and that is why we offered this
amendment. I regret we are going to have to withdraw it, but I
appreciate the fact that the sponsors of the legislation are committed
to working with us in the conference to try to bring a better balance
to the bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Arizona for
his tremendous leadership on this particular issue.
I voted yesterday with our leadership to invoke cloture on this bill,
but, frankly, I did so reluctantly because I sympathize with the
comments that the Senator from Alaska, Mr. Stevens, made just yesterday
and the day before relative to the fact that we are rushing into an
issue that is so complex that we really need to take the time to do
this right. But I understand we are at
[[Page S10485]]
the end of this session and that we need to get this bill done and get
it to conference. That is the only reason that Senator Kyl and I are
willing to withdraw this amendment. Let's get it to conference and try
to clean this up there.
Once again, I have been reminded about the problems we have at the
CIA under the leadership now of a new CIA Director whose hands are
going to be tied by this particular provision that we are seeking to
modify in this bill. We are concentrating, from an overall intelligence
reform standpoint, on building up our collection of intelligence
through human assets. But now with the creation of the civil liberties
board in this bill, a political bureaucracy is being established that
is going to be looking over the shoulder of every CIA agent around the
world and is going to have the ability to determine whether that CIA
agent violated the civil liberties of somebody in the prosecution of
gathering intelligence. I think this is a very harmful provision in
this bill.
The Senator from Arizona has provided strong leadership on this
issue, and I thank him for that. We need to clean up the provision of
the bill as it relates to the civil liberties board before we destroy
the morale of our agents in the field. While I regret we are going to
have to withdraw the amendment at this point in time, I also am
encouraged by the comments of the chairman, as well as Senator
Lieberman, that they are willing to work with us as we move into
conference. It is critical to make the necessary modifications in
conference to ensure that our intelligence community has a free hand in
trying to gather intelligence to protect the lives of our citizens
without violating civil liberties, and without violating privacy
rights. Our intelligence professionals have and will conduct their
dangerous and important work within the framework of our laws.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
Amendment No. 3801, Withdrawn
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be
withdrawn.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I thank the two Senators. I understand
their concern. This issue is going to be the subject of much
discussion, I am sure, in the Senate-House conference. I very much
appreciate the issues they have raised. I take them seriously, and I
appreciate their cooperation in withdrawing the amendment. I thank my
colleagues.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I join Senator Collins in thanking the
Senator from Georgia and the Senator from Arizona for their support of
the bill, for their deep commitment to national security, for raising
the questions they have raised, which are good questions, and, frankly,
for being willing, as we approach the final passage of this bill, to
not press this particular concern and to allow us to go forward.
I look forward to working with them on matters of intelligence and
national security in the years ahead.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Amendment No. 3742, As Modified
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that we proceed
to the consideration of the Roberts amendment, No. 3742, as modified.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Kansas.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending
amendment be set aside.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. ROBERTS. I ask unanimous consent to call up amendment No. 3742,
with a modification.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is pending.
The amendment (No. 3742), as modified, is as follows:
amendment no. 3742, as modified
On page 33, between lines 2 and 3, insert the following:
SEC. 114. FUNDING OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
(a) Funding of Activities.--(1) Notwithstanding any other
provision of this Act, appropriated funds available to an
intelligence agency may be obligated or expended for an
intelligence or intelligence-related activity only if--
(A) those funds were specifically authorized by the
Congress for use for such activities;
(B) in the case of funds from the Reserve for Contingencies
of the National Intelligence Director, and consistent with
the provisions of section 503 of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 413b) concerning any significant anticipated
intelligence activity, the National Intelligence Director has
notified the appropriate congressional committees of the
intent to make such funds available for such activity; or
(C) in the case of funds specifically authorized by the
Congress for a different activity--
(i) the activity to be funded is a higher priority
intelligence or intelligence-related activity; and
(ii) the National Intelligence Director, the Secretary of
Defense, or the Attorney General, as appropriate, has
notified the appropriate congressional committees of the
intent to make such funds available for such activity.
(2) Nothing in this subsection prohibits the obligation or
expenditure of funds available to an intelligence agency in
accordance with sections 1535 and 1536 of title 31, United
States Code.
(b) Applicability of Other Authorities.--Notwithstanding
any other provision of this Act, appropriated funds available
to an intelligence agency may be obligated or expended for an
intelligence, intelligence-related, or other activity only if
such obligation or expenditure is consistent with subsections
(b), (c), and (d) of section 504 of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414).
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) The term ``intelligence agency'' means any department,
agency, or other entity of the United States involved in
intelligence or intelligence-related activities.
(2) The term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(A)(i) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives; and
(ii) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee
on Appropriations of the Senate;
(B) in the case of a transfer of funds to or from, or a
reprogramming within, the Department of Defense--
(i) the committees and select committees referred to in
subparagraph (A);
(ii) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives; and
(iii) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and
(C) in the case of a transfer of funds to or from, or a
reprogramming within, the Federal Bureau of Investigation--
(i) the committees and select committees referred to in
subparagraph (A);
(ii) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives; and
(iii) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate.
(3) The term ``specifically authorized by the Congress''
means that--
(A) the activity and the amount of funds proposed to be
used for that activity were identified in a formal budget
request to the Congress, but funds shall be deemed to be
specifically authorized for that activity only to the extent
that the Congress both authorized the funds to be
appropriated for that activity and appropriated the funds for
that activity; or
(B) although the funds were not formally requested, the
Congress both specifically authorized the appropriation of
the funds for the activity and appropriated the funds for the
activity.
On page 33, line 3, strike ``114.'' and insert ``115.''.
On page 35, line 1, strike ``115.'' and insert ``116.''.
On page 38, line 21, strike ``116.'' and insert ``117.''.
On page 40, line 10, strike ``117.'' and insert ``118.''.
On page 43, line 1, strike ``118.'' and insert ``119.''.
On page 200, between line 18 and 19, insert the following:
SEC. 309. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS ON FUNDING OF INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES.
Section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
414) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(3)--
(A) in subparagraph (A), by adding ``and'' at the end;
(B) by striking subparagraph (B); and
(C) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (B);
and
(2) in subsection (e), by striking paragraph (2) and
inserting the following new paragraph (2):
``(2) the term `appropriate congressional committees'
means--
[[Page S10486]]
``(A)(i) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives; and
``(ii) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
``(B) in the case of a transfer of funds to or from, or a
reprogramming within, the Department of Defense--
``(i) the committees and select committees referred to in
subparagraph (A);
``(ii) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives; and
``(iii) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and
``(C) in the case of a transfer of funds to or from, or a
reprogramming within, the Federal Bureau of Investigation--
``(i) the committees and select committees referred to in
subparagraph (A);
``(ii) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives; and
``(iii) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;
and''.
On page 200, line 19, strike ``309.'' and insert ``310.''.
On page 201, line 11, strike ``310.'' and insert ``311.''.
On page 203, line 9, strike ``311.'' and insert ``312.''.
On page 204, line 1, strike ``312.'' and insert ``313.''.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I thank Chairman Collins and Senator
Lieberman for working with me to include this provision in the act. It
preserves an important requirement from section 504 of the National
Security Act of 1947. It is very simple: That funds appropriated for an
intelligence activity must be specifically authorized.
I appreciate your cooperation on this matter. It is a very simple
amendment.
I yield to the distinguished chairman of the Governmental Affairs
Committee.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I thank Senator Roberts for offering this
amendment. As chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, his
expertise and advice on this bill have been invaluable. As he
indicates, this preserves a requirement in section 504 of the National
Security Act of 1947 that funds appropriated for an intelligence
activity must also be specifically authorized before being obligated or
expended.
It is my understanding that other committees with interest in this
matter have been consulted and there is no objection. I will ask for
the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I strongly support this amendment and
thank Senator Roberts for offering it. I thank him generally for the
many ways in which he has strengthened this bill.
The bottom line here is this amendment will ensure that intelligence
activities, which by their nature are classified and not subject to
public scrutiny, receive specific review and authorization by the
Senate and House of Representatives Intelligence Committees. It is
another way to make clear that what we have said all along, that this
bill does not represent an alteration of power and authority between
the Congress and the executive branch, is in fact what happens. I thank
the Senator and I am glad to support the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The yeas and nays have been requested. Is
there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The question is on agreeing to the amendment, as modified.
The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from North Carolina (Mr.
Edwards) and the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry) are necessarily
absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Murkowski). Are there any Senators in the
Chamber desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 98, nays 0, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 198 Leg.]
YEAS--98
Akaka
Alexander
Allard
Allen
Baucus
Bayh
Bennett
Biden
Bingaman
Bond
Boxer
Breaux
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Byrd
Campbell
Cantwell
Carper
Chafee
Chambliss
Clinton
Cochran
Coleman
Collins
Conrad
Cornyn
Corzine
Craig
Crapo
Daschle
Dayton
DeWine
Dodd
Dole
Domenici
Dorgan
Durbin
Ensign
Enzi
Feingold
Feinstein
Fitzgerald
Frist
Graham (FL)
Graham (SC)
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Harkin
Hatch
Hollings
Hutchison
Inhofe
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kohl
Kyl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Lott
Lugar
McCain
McConnell
Mikulski
Miller
Murkowski
Murray
Nelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)
Nickles
Pryor
Reed
Reid
Roberts
Rockefeller
Santorum
Sarbanes
Schumer
Sessions
Shelby
Smith
Snowe
Specter
Stabenow
Stevens
Sununu
Talent
Thomas
Voinovich
Warner
Wyden
NOT VOTING--2
Edwards
Kerry
The amendment (No. 3742), as modified, was agreed to.
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, for the information of my colleagues, I
am going to ask unanimous consent that we go to Senator Leahy's
amendment No. 3945. I anticipate that being accepted on a voice vote.
Therefore, there will be no further rollcalls until 2 o'clock, for the
information of my colleagues.
Mr. REID. Could we make that 2:15?
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I would be glad to amend the request to
make it 2:15. I ask unanimous consent that be the order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Vermont.
Amendment No. 3945
Mr. LEAHY. Madam President, I understand my amendment regarding
translators, No. 3945, is now before the Senate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. It is pending.
Mr. LEAHY. Madam President, this is an amendment on behalf of myself
and Senator Grassley. We did this because 3 years ago, a law was passed
requiring the Attorney General to report on the FBI translators
program, why it was failing, and how he is going to fix it. The
Attorney General has never followed the law and submitted that report.
Our amendment requires the Attorney General to submit a report on FBI
translators within 30 days of enactment of this act.
Senator Grassley, of course, is well known as being one of the most
vigilant people on FBI oversight issues.
Last week the Justice Department's Office of Inspector General
released an unclassified version of its Audit of the FBI's Foreign
Language Program. The report shows that despite concerns expressed for
years by some of us in Congress and by former FBI contractors, among
others, and despite an influx of tens of millions of dollars to hire
new linguists, the FBI foreign language translation unit continues to
be saddled with growing backlogs, systemic difficulties, security
problems, too few qualified staff, and an astounding lack of
organization.
What is the use of taping thousands of hours of conversations of
intelligence targets in foreign languages if we cannot translate the
material promptly, securely, accurately and efficiently? The
administration owes Congress and the American public an explanation as
to why it has repeatedly failed to take the necessary steps to fix
these serious intelligence failings.
Almost 3 years ago, Congress required the Attorney General to report
upon where the FBI translators program was failing and how he was going
to fix it. The Attorney General has never submitted that report.
To make sure that report is delayed no more, and to respond to the
Inspector General's recommendations, Senator Grassley and I have
offered the Translator Reports Act of 2004 as an amendment. I am proud
to be joined in this effort by my friend from Iowa, who has been ever-
vigilant on FBI oversight issues.
Our amendment requires the Attorney General to submit a report on FBI
translators within 30 days of enactment of the National Intelligence
Reform Act. It also adds further reporting requirements that will be
crucial to understanding whether or not the FBI is capable of fixing,
and has fixed, the problems outlined by the Inspector General.
[[Page S10487]]
This report will allow Congress to meet the 9/11 Commission's
directive that Congress exercise greater oversight over the
counterintelligence and counterterrorism needs of the executive branch.
I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of the amendment.
Madam President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I appreciate the Senator from Vermont
working with Senator Lieberman and me. His amendment would require the
Attorney General to submit annual reports to the House and Senate
Judiciary Committees on the number of translators employed or
contracted for by the FBI and other components of the Department of
Justice, the needs of the FBI for translation services, a description
of the implementation of quality control procedures, among other
provisions.
As we know, there is a serious backlog of translation in the FBI, and
this sends a very strong message that Congress is going to be carefully
monitoring the progress of this program.
I urge support for the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I thank the Senator from Vermont for
this amendment. It responds to a direct call, a conclusion of the 9/11
Commission report that the FBI did not dedicate sufficient resources to
the surveillance and translation needs of counterterrorism agents and
lacks sufficient translators proficient in Arabic and other key
languages.
The reporting requirement contained in this amendment will obviously
help and force Congress to determine the scope of the problem and
develop possible fixes. I thank the Senator from Vermont for his
initiative and accept the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment?
If not, the question is on agreeing to amendment No. 3945.
The amendment (No. 3945) was agreed to.
Mr. LEAHY. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Ms. COLLINS. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the
order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Amendment No. 3821, As Modified
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I call up among the pending
amendments amendment No. 3821 offered by the Senator from Iowa, Mr.
Harkin.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is pending.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I ask unanimous consent on behalf of Senator Harkin to
send a modification of the amendment to the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is so
modified.
The amendment, as modified, is as follows:
On page 158, between lines 9 and 10 insert the following:
(C) the minority views on any findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Board resulting from its advice and
oversight functions under subsection (d).
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I urge adoption of the amendment, as
modified.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the modified
amendment?
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Very briefly, the Harkin amendment is focused on a
requirement relative to the new board we are creating in this proposal.
The new board, to watch out for the privacy and civil liberties rights
of American citizens and others, is required to make periodic reports
to Congress. This amendment now simply says that in those reports,
there should be an opportunity for minority views to be recorded as
well. It is a good amendment, as modified, having eliminated some more
controversial provisions. I urge its adoption.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I very much appreciate the fact that
the Senator from Iowa has worked with us on it. The revised amendment,
unlike the original, is one I support and I, too, urge adoption of the
modified amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate?
If not, the question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 3821), as modified was agreed to.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Ms. COLLINS. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Ms. COLLINS. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Amendment No. 3809, as Modified
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed to
the consideration of Levin amendment No. 3809, as modified.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is pending.
Amendment No. 3962 To Amendment No. 3809, as Modified
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I call up a second-degree amendment to
that amendment. The second degree is numbered 3962. I ask unanimous
consent that it be considered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Maine [Ms. Collins], for herself and Mr.
Lieberman, proposes an amendment numbered 3962 to amendment
No. 3809, as modified.
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that further
reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 1, line 3, strike ``military'' and all that follows
through page 2, line 9, and insert the following:
uniformed services personnel, except that the Director may
transfer military positions or billets if such transfer is
for a period not to exceed three years; and
(E) nothing in section 143(i) or 144(f) shall be construed
to authorize the Director to specify or require the head of a
department, agency, or element of the United States
Government to approve a request for the transfer, assignment,
or detail of uniformed services personnel, except that the
Director may take such action with regard to military
positions or billets if such transfer is for a period not to
exceed three years.
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I am going to have Senator Levin first
discuss this issue, and then Senator Lieberman and I will respond.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, military personnel comprise an important
part of the national intelligence community. Managing military
personnel is the appropriate function of the Secretary of Defense and
the military departments.
The bill, as drafted, would permit the transfer of military personnel
within the national intelligence program. This amendment strikes that
language and does not permit the transfer of the military personnel
within the national intelligence program.
The second-degree amendment makes it clear that the positions, of
course, cannot be transferred. In other words, providing that the
people who are in those positions are not transferred by the national
intelligence director, if it is just the money for the positions, which
providing it falls within the scope of reprogramming, for instance, and
can be done in any event; providing it is the positions or the money
attached to the positions that are transferred from one part of the
intelligence community to another, that we do not prevent. It is the
transfer of uniformed people that cannot be accepted, and this
amendment would prevent that from happening.
So if we are in a situation, for instance, where the national
intelligence director says, I want those five people from a particular
agency, and if these are uniform military personnel, that would not be
possible when my amendment is adopted. The national intelligence
director would be able to transfer positions, or the money, and say
[[Page S10488]]
$400,000 or $1 million or whatever, providing, again, it is within or
below the limit that is established, which would require programming
approval by the Congress; providing it is below that limit, the NID
continues to have that authority, which he would have in any event, to
transfer funds or positions from one place to another. So we don't
touch the money or the positions.
However, we maintain a chain of command. We maintain military
careers. These are uniform military careers, and we do not have an
outside civilian person changing that career by transferring a uniform
military person from one place to another.
I thank my colleagues, the managers of the bill, for working out this
language with us. It is a very important change in terms of military
careers, in terms of military personnel, in terms of the management of
military personnel, in terms of morale. But it does not disturb, again,
the budgetary power or the shifting around of budgets--or billets, as
we call them--or positions, providing, again, they are underneath and
within the limits established by the reprogramming procedures that have
been established, where individual agency heads are allowed to transfer
money from one place to another. If it is above that limit, it is
established by the reprogramming procedures, then, of course, they have
to go through the normal reprogramming process before money can be
transferred from one place to another.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized.
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, the Collins-Lieberman bill grants the
national intelligence director the authority to transfer personnel
within the national intelligence program to meet higher priorities.
This is extremely important authority because we want to make sure the
NID can, for example, staff up the National Counterterrorism Center
with individuals from a variety of agencies, including military
personnel who may be at the Defense Intelligence Agency, for example.
But the compromise that we have reached addresses two important
concerns. One, it puts a 3-year limit on the length of time for this
personnel. That is important because we don't want to disrupt the
military careers of individuals who are temporarily transferred.
Second, it makes clear that we are talking about slots, or billets, and
not individual members of the military.
In other words, the NID cannot say: I want ``Colonel Murkowski'' to
go to the National Counterterrorism Center. Instead, the NID would say:
I want a linguist to go to the National Counterterrorism Center, or
describe what the slot may be.
I think this is a good compromise on this issue, and it leaves intact
the strong authority of the national intelligence director, while
addressing the legitimate concerns raised by Senator Levin.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I rise to support this modification
of the amendment. Here, again, we have reasoned together about the
significant changes that will come about as a result of the underlying
proposal in the creation of an NID. I think it will come out with a
result that is fair and will be effective.
As I have said before, our intelligence forces today are like an army
without a general. The whole idea of creating an NID is to put somebody
in charge. Part of being in charge has to mean the ability to transfer
the forces to places where the director thinks they are needed.
Senator Levin was understandably concerned about the impact that
might have on the military chain of command. In an initial proposal he
said these transfers could not occur without the approval of the
Secretary of Defense. We thought that would frustrate the authority
that we are trying to give to the national intelligence director. So we
have come to a very reasonable compromise, which is, as Senator Collins
and Senator Levin said, with regard to uniform military personnel
working within the intelligence community. If the NID believes he needs
three, four, or five positions from military intelligence, the slots
can be moved. But the NID, with regard to uniformed military personnel,
cannot go in and say, I want--as Senator Collins said--``Colonel
Murkowski'' to be transferred to the national intelligence center, or
some other subdivision of the intelligence community. That is quite
reasonable. But it would allow the position, the slot, to be
transferred. And then, presumably, for a process of negotiation, it
would allow a process of negotiation to go on for the Secretary of
Defense or the NID, or their designees, as to who actually filled that
slot. With regard to nonuniformed personnel, including military
personnel, those within the Department of Defense, they can be
transferred by the national intelligence director, acting on his own.
I think this is a very good, balanced compromise. I thank Senator
Levin for his characteristic thoughtfulness. I even thank him for his
persistence, which I think has brought about a good result. I am happy
to support this amendment, as modified.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, my thanks to the managers, not just for
their work on this amendment, but their work generally on this bill. It
has been exemplary and a model to all of us in this Senate as to how we
can achieve things on a bipartisan basis. They worked together
beautifully, and I commend them for it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No.
3962 to amendment No. 3809, as modified.
The amendment (No. 3962) was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No.
3809, as modified, as amended.
The amendment (No. 3809), as modified, as amended, was agreed to.
Mr. LEVIN. I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
____________________
[Congressional Record: October 6, 2004 (Senate)]
[Page S10512-S10543]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:cr06oc04-155]
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REFORM ACT OF 2004--Continued
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the Senate has voted overwhelmingly to
invoke cloture on the national intelligence reform bill. I voted
against cloture on the bill. The Senate leadership, in supporting
cloture on this bill--I speak most respectfully--argued that this
debate has gone on long enough. In essence, that is what has been
stated.
[[Page S10513]]
I will soon begin my 47th year in this body. I never thought I would
see the demise of the Senate as a debating institution. I am very sorry
about that. I have seen the demise of the Senate as a debating
institution. I have been here when debate on a bill went over 100 days.
Today's situation is eerily reminiscent of the autumn of 2002. A few
years ago, the hue and cry went up for all Senators to support a
massive bureaucratic reshuffling of our homeland security agencies and
a war resolution--I will refer to in that way--against Iraq just weeks
before election day.
Like a whipped dog fearing his master, the Senate obediently complied
with the demands of the White House, to which our leadership said: let
us get this matter behind us; let us get it behind us.
I know many of the Members who come to this body in this day and time
are from the other body, and I speak most respectfully of the other
body. I came from the other body likewise. But I can remember when I
was in the other body I often said, Thank God for the Senate of the
United States. That is when I was still in the other body. Thank God
for the Senate of the United States. They take their time over there to
debate. In this day and time, we do not take time to debate.
Hindsight reveals the mistakes that the Senate made 2 years ago.
Today, the Department of Homeland Security finds itself bogged down by
bureaucratic infighting, unresolved turf wars, and insufficient
funding. The central argument for the war resolution against Iraq, the
threat of weapons of mass destruction, has disintegrated into a mess of
lies and hot air. The calls for Congress to act quickly were revealed
to be ill-advised, misguided, misinformed.
The 108th Congress has an opportunity to learn from the mistakes of
the 107th Congress. Yet the repeated calls by Senators for immediate
action on this bill suggests we have learned very little.
Most of the hundreds of amendments offered to this bill, or certainly
scores of amendments, have focused on trying to speed up reforms that
we already do not understand. Apparently, few Senators have dared to
speak about the need for caution in arranging a massive, secretive
bureaucracy. It would be the most secretive around.
The risk that this bill will grow into a hydra-headed monster
increases exponentially as election day nears. Many believe the House
bill will include a number of provisions unrelated to intelligence
reform, all the way from amendments on immigration to reauthorization
of the PATRIOT Act. I hear lately the House has no intention of adding
that last mentioned measure. In the rush to pass this bill on a
political timetable, what type of Faustian bargains will be struck to
jam this bill through the Congress? We have had it happen before. We
have been jammed on these important bills. We have had our backs
against the wall because of some nearing date, perhaps of a recess, and
so forth. What kind of deals with the devil will be made in order to
get this bill done in time for election day? That is the big rush--get
this bill through in time for election day.
Even one Republican Member of the House of Representatives is
concerned that a slam-dunk conference would open the door to
politically motivated poison pills. Why is there such a clamor to vote
on a bill that is increasingly viewed as a way to make political hay in
the hours before a Presidential election? Will Senators even get to
read the conference report on this bill before we are expected to vote
on it? If we pass this bill, who knows what may be lurking in the walls
surrounding that conference between the two Houses unless the House
should decide to accept the Senate-passed bill, making it all the more
important for the Senate to take our time and thoroughly debate the
bill.
The mistake of how the Senate is choosing to consider this bill is
not the fault of the 9/11 Commission. That panel is a group of
experienced and dedicated public servants. Their research went straight
to the heart of the question that has burned in the minds of millions
of Americans for 3 years: Namely, how did such a powerful Nation fail
to defend itself from those attacks?
In chilling detail, the panel's report lays out the facts about how
the U.S. Government failed to stop 19 hijackers--not from Iraq--19
hijackers armed with box cutters; 19 hijackers, not from Iraq, not a
one. Not even one of those 19 hijackers came from Iraq. Yet some have
attempted to tie the hijackers with Iraq.
``The document is an improbable literary triumph,'' declared U.S.
Circuit Judge Richard Posner in the New York Times Book Review.
``However, the commission's analysis and recommendations are
unimpressive,'' he said, ``not sustained by the report's narrative,''
he said, ``come to very little . . . [and more] of the same.''
That is pretty harsh criticism. And contrary to what some believe
about the critics of intelligence reform, Judge Posner is not
protecting his turf, and he does not have an ax to grind.
The Senate Appropriations Committee held hearings 2 weeks ago on the
September 11 recommendations. A bipartisan array of national security
experts pleaded with the Congress as they gave testimony to the
Appropriations Committee, pleaded with the Congress not to rush these
reforms.
My, what an impressive list of names: The former chairman of the
Senate Intelligence Committee, David Boren; former Senator Bill
Bradley; former Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci; former Secretary
of Defense William Cohen--we all remember him. He has been an
outstanding Secretary of Defense. He was a Republican--former CIA
Director Robert Gates; former Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre;
former Senator Gary Hart; former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger--he
indicated we ought to take several months on this bill--former chairman
of the Senate Armed Services Committee Sam Nunn--there is a good one
for you. I served in the Senate with Sam Nunn. I served on the Armed
Services Committee when he was chairman. Here is a man who is a
careful, careful legislator--former Senator Warren Rudman, Republican
from New Hampshire; former Secretary of State George Shultz, another
Republican.
Among them they have decades of knowledge and experience, and the
Congress stands ready to dismiss their concerns out of hand.
I pointed out that several of these distinguished persons are
Republicans just to emphasize there are several preeminent Republicans
who have had great experience in government who say: Wait, take your
time. What is the hurry here? Why the big hurry?
This group of 11 experienced public servants who urged the Congress
to stop, look, and listen, they have no turf to protect. They have long
since left the service of the executive and legislative branches. Why
does the Senate not take their advice? Why does the Senate not pause to
listen to their sage advice?
Let us remember that 2 years ago Members of Congress fell all over
themselves in a mad frenzy to adopt the advice of Senator Hart and
Senator Rudman to create a Department of Homeland Security. Anyone who
did not agree with the Hart-Rudman report was viewed as being
obstructionist or out of touch. But today, the Senate sloughs off the
counsel of those same two men to slow down--slow down. That is what the
Senate is all about.
The Senate is not a second House of Representatives with a 6-year
term. Thank God for that. As I said many years ago when I was a Member
of the other body, the body that is closest to the people, I said thank
God for the Senate. So I did not come to this body with any idea of
changing the rules to make it a second House of Representatives with a
6-year term. I never thought that about it. I have thought that it is
meant to be a place where men and women could argue as long as their
feet would hold them erect. I have said time and again that as long as
we have a forum in which elected representatives of the people can
speak out, speak out without fear and speak out as long as they want to
speak on a matter they feel very deeply about, thank God, the people's
liberties will be secure.
But today, as I say, the Senate sloughs off the counsel of these
eminent luminaries to slow down. How quickly we turn on the advice of
our friends.
I fear the Senate wants change, in some instances, merely for the
sake of
[[Page S10514]]
change, and that we do not yet possess an adequate understanding of why
we are doing what we are doing. It is not even clear why or how the 9/
11 Commissioners arrived at all of their recommendations. The
Commission's report does not explain it. What recommendations did the
Commission consider and reject, and why did they reject the
recommendations? Did the 9/11 panel receive any independent assessments
of their ideas before they were published? Will the Commission's
proposals prevent intelligence failures in other areas, such as
stopping a repeat of the Iraq weapons of mass destruction fiasco? Even
as the Senate rushes to pass this intelligence reform bill, with one
eye on the public opinion polls, of course, and the other on the
adjournment date, we do not know the answer to these questions.
Given the Senate's failure to ask more questions about the creation
of a Department of Homeland Security and the need for war in Iraq, I
would hope this Chamber would be more circumspect about rushing to
restructure our intelligence agencies on the eve of a Presidential
election.
These agencies are very secretive--very secretive. And look at the
power Congress is about to give the national intelligence director.
Look at the power. He is not an elected individual. I would hope that
the Senate would pause to consider the powers that may be shifted to
the executive branch in this legislation. I also hope that Senators
will consider if such a timid Congress could possibly exercise proper
oversight over a powerful and secretive bureaucracy.
We are being naive about these intelligence reforms. It may be
comforting to embrace the 9/11 report, and I hold in the highest regard
the members, as I say, of that Commission and for its work. It may be
comforting to embrace the 9/11 report, but its reforms ignore more
fundamental intelligence problems.
At the Appropriations Committee hearing on September 21, 2004, I
asked Henry Kissinger: If the 9/11 Commission's recommendations had
been implemented in 2002, would our intelligence agencies have come to
a different conclusion about Iraq's nonexistent weapons of mass
destruction? His answer was no, nothing would have been different.
There still would have been false claims of huge stockpiles of WMD in
Iraq.
Mr. President, we are all too focused just on the failings of 9/11.
The Senate has not focused enough attention on the intelligence
failures leading to war in Iraq, in which, as of the last reading of
the news reports, we have lost 1,061 men and women. For what? For what
did they give their lives? I would wonder, if I had a grandchild who
had gone and lost his life in this war, for what did he give his life?
Was it worth it? Was it worth it to invade a country under the new
doctrine of preemption, which flies right into the face of the
Constitution of the United States?
I did not hear the Constitution mentioned last night in the debate. I
am not sure, maybe I had my back turned at the moment. I have a sick
wife and maybe, perhaps, I did not hear it. But I certainly did not
hear it in the first debate between Mr. Bush and Mr. Kerry; not one
time did I hear the Constitution mentioned. And I did not hear it
mentioned last night. Yet it is mentioned every day throughout this
country in the courtrooms of this Nation, the Constitution of the
United States. Here we have these Presidential debates and nobody--if I
find I am mistaken about last night's debate, I will certainly amend my
words in this respect, but I do not believe I missed something there.
The Senate has not focused enough attention on the intelligence
failures leading to the war in Iraq. We have not focused enough
attention on the nuclear threat posed by Iran and North Korea. We have
not focused enough attention on China. We have not focused enough
attention on the proliferation of deadly germs and gases.
Any of these challenges could be responsible for the next
catastrophic attack on our country or our interests, and they are
conspicuously ignored by this bill. Congress is showing myopic vision
in failing to see the universe of threats to this country. Terrorism
may be the most immediate threat to our country, but it is not the only
threat.
As a Member of the Senate and as the then-chairman of the
Appropriations Committee in the Senate, I and my committee responded
quickly to the attack of 9/11. Within 3 days, Congress passed an
appropriations bill, appropriating $40 billion--within 3 days, $40
billion. Congress, both Houses, passed an appropriations bill
appropriating $40 billion. In other words, $40 for every minute since
Jesus Christ was born, $40 for every minute since Jesus Christ was
born--$40 billion. So Congress acted quickly.
We all are concerned. There is no monopoly of concern on either side
of the aisle here. I support the effort to reform our intelligence
agencies. I support the creation of a national intelligence director.
But I do not support this hurry in which we are engaged. We need to
stop, look, and listen, debate, offer amendments, answer questions,
hold more hearings, like Ted Stevens and I holding hearings in the
Appropriations Committee.
I have been one of the harshest critics of the status quo.
Intelligence agencies are expected to uncover terrorists plots against
our country and produce unbiased, accurate intelligence, free from
political interference. The CIA and other agencies have fallen
tragically short on both marks. However, I am not convinced that the
Congress fully understands the implications of the reforms proposed by
the 9/11 Commission, and the rush to vote on these issues before the
Presidential elections means it will not have that opportunity. Henry
Kissinger called attention to that fact.
We are legislating in an atmosphere, just before a Presidential
election, that is not conducive to thoughtful reform of these
intelligence agencies. But the greatest contribution the Senate can
make to the cause of the 9/11 families is to take the time to get those
reforms right. Prematurely cutting off debate on this bill only
succeeds in further politicizing a process that is more mindful of
election day than it is the result of this debate.
Like 2 years ago, the Senate is being stampeded into voting on major,
far-reaching legislation. The result of this ill-considered course is
easily seen: Any reforms the Congress enacts will be the product of
rush and haste rather than thoughtful deliberation. We owe more to the
memories of those who lost their lives on September 11.
Mr. President, a little earlier I made the statement to the effect
that I heard no one in last night's debate on either side mention the
Constitution of the United States. My press has since called me and
told me I was wrong. That, indeed, one of the candidates--and he said
Senator Edwards--did mention the Constitution of the United States.
Thank God for that.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following the
remarks of the Senator from Virginia and I be recognized to offer a
Warner-Levin amendment which which has now been worked out and cleared.
I think Senator Warner is somewhere nearby. If there is no objection, I
ask unanimous consent to put us next in line with that amendment, which
is a modified amendment and has been agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Pennsylvania.
HEALTH CARE
Mr. SANTORUM. Mr. President, I rise to talk about an issue that is
getting quite a bit of play in the press, other than the security issue
having to do with our intelligence community and homeland security.
This is a different kind of security issue. It is an issue having to do
with health care. I wanted to discuss with Members today the two
approaches that the candidates for President have about health care and
what the consequences are to the consumer, to the patient, as well as
to the taxpayer and to our health care system in general.
This is a very important debate we are having about health care
because there is an acute problem. It is a problem that, candidly, this
Congress has not dealt with. We saw in the debates last night and other
conversations about the importance of a Patients' Bill of Rights, which
would have done nothing but add more cost to the health care system. It
would have caused more uninsured, and that is the term I want to focus
on today, ``the uninsured.''
As I travel around Pennsylvania--and I am sure this is true for my
colleagues as they travel in their States--
[[Page S10515]]
what we hear repeatedly is the problem of the spiraling cost of health
care. A Patients' Bill of Rights would have done nothing but add more
cost to that system and add more to the uninsured problem. What we
don't hear are answers from Congress on how to deal with the problem of
the uninsured.
We have two Presidential candidates who have laid out a plan to deal
with this very complex problem. I will say that Senator Judd Gregg
chaired a task force on our side of the aisle that put forth a variety
of different proposals to deal with the uninsured because it is a very
complicated group of people in the sense that there isn't one reason
people are uninsured. Senator Gregg has given eloquent talks about the
approach we have offered. But, candidly, we have not moved forward on
this on either side of the aisle to try to bring it to fruition.
The Presidential candidates have put forward some ideas. I wanted to
talk about both of those plans.
Let me first talk about Senator Kerry's plan. Senator Kerry has
proposed a plan which, according to the revenue estimates, runs in the
area of about $1.5 trillion over the next 10 years, $1.5 trillion in
new spending for tax breaks to provide for the uninsured. What the
Senator from Massachusetts has suggested is that this $1.5 trillion
will cover roughly 27 million people who are currently uninsured, which
would make up a little over half of the uninsured in America. But at a
cost of $1.5 trillion over 10 years to get someone insured in America,
one person under his proposal is $5,500 per insured per year--not per
family, per insured per year, $5,500 in Government subsidies to provide
for insurance per year. That is a very high-cost way of trying to
provide insurance.
On top of that, not only is it a high-cost way, but as you will see
in a moment, it is a very bureaucratic way. It is a very inefficient
way, and it is a further Government takeover of the private health care
system. It federalizes under Medicaid a dramatic expansion of Medicaid
for a lot of the people who currently are either uninsured or in many
cases insured by private sector employers.
I want to talk about the fiscal voodoo that is going on as to how
this program is going to be paid for, which is one of the many
proposals that Senator Kerry has put forth in the election. But this is
by far the most expensive, $1.5 trillion. He says he is going to pay
for it by repealing the Bush tax cuts.
As you can see from this chart, the Bush tax cuts, scored over the
next 10 years, will cost the Treasury $1 trillion. So there is still an
unaccounted for half a trillion dollars, if we repeal all of them.
Now, what he has said is he only wants to repeal the ones that are on
those who make over $200,000. Well, if we go down here and look at what
is the tax cut for those who make $200,000, it is roughly $612 billion
over the next 10 years, which is less than half of this $1.5 trillion.
There is still almost $900 billion in unaccounted-for new spending or
tax incentives in the Kerry plan that are not paid for. He could add an
additional $400 billion, roughly, in getting rid of the 10-percent
bracket and the marriage penalty, the child credit, and the middle-
class rate reductions. We can do that, too. We are still half a
trillion dollars short.
The plan doesn't add up. It adds up to a fiscal disaster. As many
know, the biggest group of people, as far as percentage, who pay in
this bracket for which the Senator from Massachusetts wants to
eliminate this tax reduction is small businesses. These are the job
creators. He wants to eliminate tax incentives for people in small
business who are the job creators. He wants to get rid of, I assume, or
add other taxes on to pay for the additional $900 billion it is going
to take to pay for this new proposal which spends $5,500 per person to
provide insurance for them. I would just suggest that that is a very
costly way.
Let me contrast that with the President's approach, which does not,
as Senator Kerry's plan does through his program, displace private
insurance. What do I mean by that? The reason this costs so much is
because he is going to be insuring more people than the 27 million in
his new program, but a lot of those people he is insuring are already
insured.
He is going to take them from the private sector and move them to the
public sector. That is why it costs so much. It is a new publicly borne
cost that is now a privately borne cost. The taxpayers are going to pay
for this, as opposed to employers and employees.
What the President has done is a much smarter, more targeted
approach. He put together a plan that does not cost $1.5 trillion but
$129 billion. It spends $1,900 to attract someone who is currently
uninsured into the new insurance pool that will be created, and it does
so in a way that doesn't take someone who has insurance and displaces
them into a public pool, which is what the Kerry plan does. So this is
a much more commonsense approach, leaving the private insurance market,
which has served our country so well, in place and not replacing it
with a public sector plan, but creating incentives through low-income
tax credits, small employer tax credits, above-the-line deductions,
some private market reforms, like AHPs and other things, to broaden the
pool for people to be able to purchase health insurance.
This will add almost 7 million people to the ranks of the insured
from the ranks of the uninsured. It does so at a responsible cost,
something we can likely afford over the next 10 years, as opposed to
blowing a hole through the deficit. I find it remarkable that we hear
over and over again from the Senator from Massachusetts about how this
President has very high deficits, yet we look at a plan here that,
under the current scenario he proposes, is a $600 billion repeal of
taxes to pay for a $1.5 trillion program. If you are talking about
blowing a hole in the deficit, this will do so, and then some; it will
add about $100 billion in new deficits every year as a result of this
proposal.
This is only part of the problem. The other part of the problem is
how the Kerry plan works. Unlike the Bush plan which, again, doesn't
displace people from the private sector to the public sector, does not
cost $5,500 per person to get them into the insured category, Senator
Kerry's plan is incredibly complicated and promises things he cannot
deliver. For example, he talks about how he is going to provide the
same health plan that Members of Congress have, by participating in the
Federal Employees Health Benefit system. He said that, and then the
Federal Employees Union got to him and said, whoa, whoa, whoa, you are
not going to do that; you are not going to put everybody into our
insurance pools. That is going to drive up the cost of our health care
dramatically. You can say you are going to give everybody what Members
of Congress have, but we are going to set up a separate pool.
So he sets up a separate insurance pool. It is not what Members of
Congress have. It is something completely different. It sets up this
insurance pool that people can participate in, but the cost of that
pool is going to be based on who enrolls in it. So I don't understand
how that will save any money, because all insurance pools are based on
who is enrolled in the plan. So there is this idea that somehow or
other we are going to give you a congressional health care benefit--
which, by the way, is the same as every other Federal employee--for
nothing, when in fact they are going to get something like a
congressional health care plan. Let me assure you, it won't be for
nothing; it will be for a lot of money, in a very complicated way.
This is a chart that tries to describe how the Kerry plan works from
the standpoint of the Medicare portion over here, including schools, by
the way. Schools are going to be responsible for being a social service
agency and signing up people for Medicaid. Now we talk so much about
how schools are being asked to do so much more when it comes to
education. Senator Kerry has another idea for them. They are going to
take the responsibility for enrolling children into Medicaid as part of
their responsibilities.
Over here, you have sort of how we interact with the doctors and the
hospitals. You have this new agency, the premium rebate pool agency--
not a particularly creative acronym. We have this agency that is going
to determine what is covered, how much we pay. So you are going to
have, in a sense, the Federal Government making these decisions as to
what doctors you see, how much they are going to pay these doctors,
what is going to be covered by these plans.
[[Page S10516]]
Again, it is not just an expansion of Medicaid, which is very costly,
and bringing a lot of new people into the Medicaid Program, many of
whom already have insurance, not only setting up this other plan to
deal with how we are going to handle the ``private market reforms''
Senator Kerry wants to impose to help, in this case, those who are
high-cost patients in the health care system. So here is the
congressional health plan, and you have all these different
organizations, or different functions with new organizations, and some
are going to be organizations that will have increased responsibility
to offer this new congressional health plan, which isn't a
congressional health care plan.
You have a tax credit idea. It is not simple. In fact, Senator Kerry
has not been particularly clear about how these tax credits will work.
He has several of them, not just one. There are four different tax
credits Senator Kerry is going to put in place here. Here they are.
This is a very complicated system, and it is an extremely costly
system, and one that puts more people into Government, less in the
private sector, and when private sector reforms happen, puts more
oversight into the Government over the private sector--all at the cost
of $1.7 trillion.
This is not the direction we want to take in health care. We don't
want more Government oversight of the private sector to drive up costs
in the private sector. We don't want more people from the private
markets going into the Government pools, and we don't want to create
the shell game that Senator Kerry is in the area of the new
congressional health plan, which isn't a congressional health plan.
The idea of tax credits has some appeal to me. The President's
proposal is to try to provide tax credits. But this is a very
complicated plan, and it has not been well spelled out. We worked very
hard to try to understand it. It is not a very well thought out,
planned out approach. I suggest this is bad policy. This is complicated
policy. It is very costly policy. It doesn't deliver to people what has
been promised. What it does deliver is a big tax bill, or very big
deficits in the future, neither of which is something we should be
desirous of here in the Senate.
With that, I think we have done a pretty good comparison of where the
President wants to go, which is responsible reform and the
encouragement of people who do not have insurance to be insured,
without disrupting the private markets, without increasing the size of
the Government-run health care plans, and doing so at a responsible
cost, as opposed to Senator Kerry, who wants to dramatically increase
Government's role in health care, increase the Government's role in
overseeing private health care, and play a shell game because it sounds
good that you are getting congressional health care for nothing, when
in fact you are not, and for a lot. Again, I will give Senator Kerry
credit for the tax credit idea, but it is very foggy and not
particularly well thought out, in my opinion. So I think it is a
failure on all fronts. It is very complicated and will not serve the
best interests of the patients in America and will not serve the
interests of taxpayers in America.
With that, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from
Virginia is recognized.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am joined by my colleague, the ranking
member of the Armed Services Committee, the Senator from Michigan. This
is an amendment which we have jointly worked out together.
Amendment No. 3875, As Modified
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, from a parliamentary standpoint, I now
send a modification to amendment No. 3875 to the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is so
modified.
The amendment (No. 3875), as modified, is as follows:
On page 210, strike line 23 and insert the following:
SEC. 336. COMPONENTS OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.
(a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
this Act, the National Intelligence Program shall consist of
all programs, projects, and activities that are part of the
National Foreign Intelligence Program as of the effective
date of this section.
(b) Joint Review of Certain Programs.--(1) The National
Intelligence Director and the Secretary of Defense shall
jointly review the programs, projects, and activities as
follows:
(A) The programs, projects, and activities within the Joint
Military Intelligence Program as of the effective date of
this section.
(B) The programs, projects, and activities within the
Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities program as of
the effective date of this section.
(C) The programs, projects, and activities of the Defense
Intelligence Agency as of the effective date of this section
that support the intelligence staff of the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the intelligence staffs of the unified
combatant commands, and the portions of the sensitive
compartmented communications systems that support components
of the Department of Defense.
(2) As part of the review under paragraph (1), the Director
shall consult with the head of each element of the
intelligence community.
(3)(A) The review under paragraph (1) with respect to the
programs, projects, and activities referred to in paragraph
(1)(C) shall be completed not later than 60 days after the
date on which the first individual nominated as National
Intelligence Director after the date of the enactment of this
Act is confirmed by the Senate.
(B) Upon completion of the review under paragraph (1) of
the programs, projects, and activities referred to in
paragraph (1)(C), the Director shall submit to the President
recommendations regarding the programs, projects, or
activities, if any, referred to in paragraph (1)(C) to be
included in the National Intelligence Program, together with
any comments that the Secretary of Defense considers
appropriate.
(C) During the period of the review under paragraph (1) of
the programs, projects, and activities referred to in
paragraph (1)(C), no action shall be taken that would have
the effect of prejudicing the outcome of such review.
(4)(A) The review under paragraph (1) with respect to the
programs, projects, and activities referred to in
subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1) shall be completed
not later than one year after the effective date of this
section.
(B) Upon completion of the review under paragraph (1) of
the programs, projects, and activities referred to in
subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1), the Director
shall submit to the President recommendations regarding the
programs, projects, or activities, if any, referred to in
such subparagraphs to be included in the National
Intelligence Program, together with any comments that the
Secretary of Defense considers appropriate.
SEC. 337. GENERAL REFERENCES.
Mr. WARNER. I thank the Presiding Officer. I shall be very brief on
this matter.
The distinguished manager and comanager have worked with my staff and
Senator Levin and myself, and we have come to an agreement on this
issue.
Again, it is an amendment by myself, Mr. Levin, Mr. Stevens, Mr.
Inouye, Mr. Allard, Mr. Sessions, Mr. Cornyn, and Mr. Chambliss.
I start by referring to the 9/11 report. This is a very important
report which has been a roadmap for so many of the provisions and it is
a roadmap I have used for this provision.
I read from page 412:
The Defense Department's military intelligence programs--
the joint military intelligence program (JMIP) and the
tactical intelligence and related activities programs
(TIARA)--would remain part of that department's
responsibility.
That is the purpose of this amendment. It is to clarify. I think it
was the intent of the managers all along. They made statements
comparable to what is in the 9/11 report from which I just quoted and,
therefore, this amendment would leave in place those programs being
performed by what we call the combat agencies, largely under a
contractual relationship, and they would remain in place, but with the
understanding that upon completion of a review, to be conducted by the
national intelligence director and the Secretary of Defense, if they
reach, as is specified under the bill, a joint opinion as to the
desirability to move them into the national intelligence program, in
all likelihood that can be achieved.
I thank the managers. I yield the floor to my distinguished colleague
from Michigan. I thank my distinguished colleague, Senator Levin, for
his work on this very important amendment, an aspect of which is
tailored to meet a concern that the Senator from Michigan has.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, my concern about the definition of
intelligence programs that the budget execution authority would be
transferred to relates to the definition in the bill
[[Page S10517]]
that, in turn, relates to the Defense Intelligence Agency.
There are a number of Defense Intelligence Agency programs which, in
my judgment, should not have their budget execution authority
transferred to the new national intelligence program. Specifically,
there are three programs. These are a small set of DIA programs but,
nonetheless, there are three in particular to which I refer.
First is the intelligence staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Second
is the intelligence staff of the combatant commanders. Third is certain
sensitive communications systems which support the Department of
Defense command structure.
The principal purpose of those programs is to support joint or
tactical military operations, and I think it would be a mistake to
transfer the budget execution authority for those three programs to the
national intelligence director. They are just simply too deeply
embedded in supporting joint or tactical military operations for that
to make sense.
However, rather than trying to resolve that debate here and rather
than having the bill transfer the budget execution to the national
intelligence program, what we have arrived at is a compromise which
does the same thing relative to these programs, as Senator Warner just
outlined, relative to a number of other programs; that is, we assign
and task the new national intelligence director and the Secretary of
Defense to review these DIA programs, then to make a recommendation as
to where the budget execution ought to rest, whether it should be in
the national intelligence program or in the Department of Defense, and
then to make a recommendation to the Office of Management and Budget
and then to the President who would make the decision on this issue.
The review would be an expedited review. It would not take more than
60 days. But it would make it possible to have this decision in review
based on the facts relating to this program rather than to make an
abstract judgment about all programs in the Defense Intelligence Agency
in this bill.
During this period of review, we have agreed that nothing would be
done to prejudice the outcome of this review. With the adoption of this
amendment, assuming it is adopted, then my amendment No. 3810 will be
withdrawn because that is the purpose of this amendment.
Again, as I did with another amendment earlier today, I thank the
managers of the bill for working with us to make this possible. It is a
very rational approach, as well as a good compromise to a very
complicated situation. We want to avoid--we want lines to be clear, but
we do not want them to be arbitrary in a way which will force budget
execution of programs to be where they logically should not be.
I also thank Senator Warner for his leadership on a very related
issue. The way in which we have addressed these two issues is similar
but not exactly the same. It just makes a lot of sense.
I thank the managers for their willingness to work with us on this
matter.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sununu). The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague and
ranking member. Given that the two of us are about to start a hearing
in 10 minutes, I guess it is best we go to the adoption of the
amendment, but I yield for any comments the distinguished chairman may
like to make.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, first, I thank the distinguished chairman
and ranking member of the Armed Services Committee for working so
closely with Mr. Lieberman and me on this very important issue to set
forth a process for determining what intelligence assets belong in the
NIP, the national intelligence program, versus the joint military
intelligence program and the tactical program.
The Collins-Lieberman bill gives the national intelligence director
strong budgetary authority over the national intelligence program.
Senator Lieberman and I envision that his program will be composed of
the intelligence assets that serve national purposes, meaning those
that pertain to the interests of more than one department.
In the long run, I strongly believe the budgets for the National
Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the
National Reconnaissance Office should be wholly within the national
intelligence program.
Currently, these agencies have split budgets, and the heads of these
agencies tell us that leads to a great deal of administrative
inefficiency. Now, it is possible that some intelligence assets from
the Department of Defense's Joint Military Intelligence Program may
ultimately be moved to the national intelligence program, but, of
course, military intelligence assets that principally serve joint or
tactical military needs should stay within the Department of Defense,
and I think the language is very clear on this point.
Through this amendment, we have tried to address concerns that both
Senators have raised. I think the compromise language does address and
alleviate those concerns. The reviews that are underway will help us
better define the parts of the intelligence budget that will be
completed within 1 year after the effective date, in one case 60 days,
in the case that Senator Levin is concerned with the three activities
in the Defense Intelligence Agency.
The reviews mandated in this compromise amendment will provide a
rational process for determining which assets belong in the national
intelligence program and which do not. I very much appreciate the
cooperation of our colleagues, and I do urge adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to support the amendment as
modified. In fact, I know that the chairman and ranking member of the
Armed Services Committee have to go to a hearing, so that may only
shorten the praise that I want to offer to them.
Mr. LEVIN. The Senator can take his time.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Take my time?
Mr. LEVIN. Yes.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I truly thank them for their extraordinary service on
behalf of our national security generally but also for their work on
this amendment. We had some very good discussions about this, and I
never had a moment where I felt they were doing this just to protect
turf. I know they were pursuing these questions with a genuine interest
in what would work best for our national security, both the
intelligence and the military sides of it.
This is not an uncomplicated problem. We are setting up a national
intelligence director. We want that person to coordinate the
intelligence community, and budget authority is a critical part of
that. Senator Warner is quite right, obviously, in the section that he
read from the 9/11 Commission Report.
Interestingly, as my colleagues on the Governmental Affairs Committee
may remember, when Dr. Zelikow, the chief of staff of the Commission,
came before our committee, he said they had changed their mind a bit on
putting the Joint Military Intelligence Program into the Department of
Defense budget control because of the Commissioners' concern that the
national intelligence assets--the National Security Agency, Geospatial
Agency, and Reconnaissance--all have a single budgetary accountability,
in this case to the national intelligence budget. I believe in the long
run that is the way it ought to go.
I must say in my own mind, perhaps simplistically, I always believed
that what we wanted to do was to say that the national intelligence
director should have control over the national intelligence budget;
that the Secretary of Defense should have clear control over TIARA, the
tactical intelligence budget; and that the Joint Military Intelligence
Program was somewhere in between. We had to find a rational way to
decide where authority went.
I think in some sense what we are saying in this legislation is we
are not quite ready to make those decisions. So this amendment that we
agreed to essentially freezes the status quo with regard to the JMIP
and the particular programs that we discussed in the Defense
Intelligence Agency, subjects them to review, consideration of all of
the factors--effectiveness, budgetary authority, all the rest, military
effectiveness--and then has a decision made ultimately by the Office of
Management and Budget on recommendation from the national intelligence
director.
[[Page S10518]]
It is a very strong, balanced, reasonable conclusion which does no
damage to the basic purpose of this legislation and provides for,
ultimately, a rational allocation of budget authority in the shared
interest of our national security, which is, after all, what this is
all about.
So this is really what legislating is supposed to be about. I thank
my colleagues for all the work they and our staffs have done, and I
move adoption of the modified amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, the yeas and nays had been ordered. I ask
unanimous consent that the order for the yeas and nays on this
amendment be vitiated and that we have a voice vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is
so ordered.
The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 3875), as modified, was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. I want to thank our colleagues and managers of the bill
and, as always, thank Senator Warner. The managers have worked so well
with us, and I want to thank them for that, and also thank them for the
way they worked with each other.
Amendment No. 3810, Withdrawn
Mr. LEVIN. I ask unanimous consent that amendment No. 3810 now be
withdrawn since that was covered in the amendment which was just
adopted.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Alaska.
Amendment No. 3827, As Modified
Mr. STEVENS. I call up amendment No. 3827, and I send to the desk a
modified version of that amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk
will report.
Mr. STEVENS. I think it is already before the Senate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment has now been modified.
The amendment (No. 3827), as modified, is as follows:
(Purpose: To strike section 206, relating to information sharing)
On page 126, strike lines 23 through 25.
On page 127, line 1, strike ``(2)'' and insert ``(1)''.
On page 127, line 4, strike ``(3)'' and insert ``(2)''.
On page 128, strike lines 1 through 3 and insert the
following:
(3) Environment.--The term ``Environment'' means the
Information Sharing Environment as described under subsection
(c).
On page 130, strike line 10 and insert the following:
(c) Information Sharing Environment.--
On page 130, line 20, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 133, lines 5 and 6, delete ``Director of the Office
of Management and Budget'' and insert ``principal officer as
designated in subsection 206(g)''.
On page 133, line 10, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 134, line 2, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 134, line 22, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 135, beginning on line 16, strike ``the Director of
Management and Budget shall submit to the President and'' and
insert ``the President shall submit''.
On page 135 strike lines 19 through 22 and insert
``Environment. The enterprise architecture and implementation
plan shall be prepared by the principal officer in
consultation with the Executive Council and shall include--
''.
On page 135, line 24, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 136, line 3, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 136, line 5, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 136, line 7, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 137, beginning on line 4, strike ``Network'' and
insert ``Environment''.
On page 137, line 8, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 137, line 11, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 137, line 14, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 137, line 16, strike ``Network;'' and insert
``Environment; and''.
On page 137, line 18, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 137, line 21, strike ``that the Director of
Management and Budget determines'' and insert ``determined''
and insert a period.
On page 138, strike lines 1 through 3 and insert the
following:
(g) Responsibilities of Executive Council for Information
Sharing Environment.--
On page 138, beginning on line 4, insert ``(1) Not later
than 120 days after the date of enactment, with notification
to Congress, the President shall designate an individual as
the principal officer responsible for information sharing
across the Federal government. That individual shall have and
exercise governmentwide authority and have management
expertise in enterprise architecture, information sharing,
and interoperability.''
On page 138, beginning on line 6, strike ``The Director of
Management and Budget'' and insert ``The principal officer
designated under this subsection''.
On page 138, beginning on line 9, strike ``Network'' and
insert ``Environment''.
On page 138, line 14, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 138, line 17, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 138, line 21, strike ``to the President and''.
On page 139, line 5, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 140, strike lines 5 through 17.
On page 140, strike lines 18 and 19 and insert the
following:
(h) Establishment of Executive Council.--
On page 140, strike line 20 through line 24 and insert
``There is established an Executive Council on information
sharing that shall assist the principal officer as designated
under subsection 206(g) in the execution of the duties under
this Act concerning information sharing.''.
On page 141, line 1, insert ``The Executive Council shall
be chaired by the principal officer as designated in
subsection 206(g).''
On page 141, beginning on line 4, strike ``, who shall
serve as the Chairman of the Executive Council''.
On page 142, beginning on line 2, strike ``assist the
Director of Management and Budget in--'' and insert ``assist
the President in--''.
On page 142, beginning on line 4, strike ``Network'' and
insert ``Environment''.
On page 142, line 8, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 142, line 11, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 142, line 12, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 142, beginning on line 15, strike ``Network;'' and
insert ``Environment; and''.
On page 142, strike lines 22 through 24, and insert ``(F)
considering input provided by persons from outside the
federal government with significant experience and expertise
in policy, technical, and operational matters, including
issues of security, privacy, or civil liberties.
On page 143, beginning on line 7, strike ``the Director of
Management and Budget, in the capacity as Chair of the
Executive Council,'' and insert ``the principal officer as
designated in section 206(g)''.
On page 144, strike line 3 and all that follows through
page 145, line 10.
On page 145 line 11, strike ``(j)'' and insert ``(i)''.
On page 145, beginning on line 14, strike ``through the
Director of Management and Budget'' and insert ``principal
officer as designated in section 206(g)''.
On page 145, line 16, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 145, line 21, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 145, line 22, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 146, line 4, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 146, line 7, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 146, line 9, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 146, line 13, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 147, line 2, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 147, line 6, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 147, line 8, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 147, line 11, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 147, line 17, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 147, line 22, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 148, line 6, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 148, line 8, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 148, line 16, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 148, line 17, strike ``(k)'' and insert ``(j)''.
On page 148, line 20, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 148, line 24, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 149, line 3, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 149, line 5, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 149, line 10, strike ``(l)'' and insert ``(k)''.
On page 149, line 13, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 149, line 14, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 149, beginning on line 14, strike ``the Director of
Management and Budget'' and insert ``the principal officer as
designated in section 206(g)''.
[[Page S10519]]
On page 149, line 19, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 150, line 2, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 150, line 9, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 150, line 13, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 150, line 16, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 150, line 18, strike ``(m)'' and insert ``(l)''.
On page 150, beginning on line 23, strike ``Network'' and
insert ``Environment''.
On page 151, line 2, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 151, line 3, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 152, line 7, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 152, line 11, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 152, line 19, strike ``(n)'' and insert ``(m)''.
On page 152, beginning on line 21, strike ``to the Director
of Management and Budget''.
On page 153, line 1, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I again thank the managers of the bill,
Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman and their staffs, for working
with us on this amendment. That amendment has now been modified, and I
think it meets the objections or the reservations that were set forth
by the administration Statement of Position, the so-called SAP, that we
received on this bill.
It has been modified to make certain that the President will have the
authority to designate an entity. We all agree, we hope, that he will
not delegate this matter to the national intelligence director. I think
it is a function that is essential to carry out the purposes of this
bill. Therefore, I am offering the modified amendment.
I ask unanimous consent that the amendment, as modified, be
considered and adopted, and the motion to reconsider be laid upon the
table.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is
so ordered. The amendment is agreed to.
The amendment (No. 3827), as modified, was agreed to.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 3839, Withdrawn
Mr. STEVENS. I ask unanimous consent that amendment No. 3839 be
withdrawn from consideration. I am still sad about the vote that was
against the position I supported with regard to disclosing the
aggregated top line of intelligence. I hope before we are through with
this bill that we will find some way to accommodate some of the
reservations I have about that process, but in any event I withdraw the
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is withdrawn.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I say to the two Senators, it is my
intention now to support this bill. I congratulate them for listening
to us. Sometimes I have raised my voice. One newspaper said I shouted
at the distinguished Senator from Maine. That is just my trial lawyer
voice, and I apologize for it.
I do thank the Senator for her courtesy and apologize if I have been
mistaken in terms of the tone of my voice, but that is my voice. I
cannot do much about it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I thank the senior Senator from Alaska
for his cooperation and his many helpful suggestions for improving this
bill. I have great affection and respect for the senior Senator. I very
much appreciate the fact that he is going to support this bill on final
passage. That means a great deal to me and will certainly assist us. I
look forward to continuing to consult with him as we move through the
conference process, and I will tell the senior Senator from Alaska that
I am very relieved today to see that he is not wearing his ``Incredible
Hulk'' tie but, rather, a very restrained tie from some national
museum, I believe. I know that bodes well for the day ending well.
Again, I thank the Senator. I very much enjoy working with him.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I am delighted that we have reached a
meeting of the minds on the information-sharing part of the bill, which
preserves intact the considerable reforms that are called for which
will protect our national security, as advanced by Senator Durbin, but
also quite appropriately embrace the concerns that Senator Stevens and
the administration had as to who would be in charge of this
transformation.
Second, I grew up in a family where if you were not passionate and
didn't raise your voice about things that mattered to you, it was
thought that something was wrong. I also want to make clear that when
you raised your voice the other day, I did not think you were only
shouting at the Senator from Maine, I thought that I was also included
as a recipient.
Look, it reminds me of the old Teddy Roosevelt line about being in
the arena, not standing on the side reading a newspaper but getting
into the arena and fighting with all your heart for what you believe
in. I admire the Senator greatly for doing that. I would much rather
have him on my side rather than against me, and that is why I am
particularly thrilled to hear the announcement of the Senator from
Alaska that he will support this measure as amended.
I thank him and I yield the floor.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I have spoken just now with the two managers
of the bill. There is not going to be a vote in the immediate future.
As the record indicates, this legislation has to be completed by 4:30,
so final passage certainly will take place at 4:30. There may be an
amendment or two before that time, but there is nothing right now. If
people are on their way over, they should turn around and go back.
There probably won't be anything, probably within the next hour.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded call the roll.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, of all the testimony presented to the
Committee on Governmental Affairs during our eight hearings on the
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission perhaps none was more powerful
than that of Mary Fetchet. Her son, Brad, died in the World Trade
Center on September 11. Here are a few of her words.
She said:
When American lives are at stake, indifference or inertia
is unacceptable. When critical reforms are implemented to
make our country safer, I will know that neither Brad's life
nor the lives of nearly 3,000 others who perished on
September 11 were lost in vain.
Throughout this debate it has been the families of the victims of 9/
11 who have reminded us of why we are here and why these reforms are so
important.
In passing the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004--as I believe
we will later this afternoon--the Senate will reject indifference and
inertia. We will endure critical reforms to make our country safer. We
will declare that the lives lost to terrorism were not lost in vain.
The action we take in their memory will benefit people of good will in
this country and throughout the world today and for many years to come.
This legislation will make the most sweeping changes in our
intelligence structures in more than 50 years. It is the result of
enormous effort. The issues are complex and many. The timetable was
tight, but the stakes were so high and the times so dangerous that we
simply could not delay this urgent task. Now we are on the threshold of
getting the job done and getting it done right.
I am deeply grateful to my good friend Senator Lieberman. This
legislation would not have been possible without his tireless effort
and his bipartisan spirit. From the moment we were first assigned the
task of developing this legislation on July 22nd, our fellow members of
the Governmental Affairs Committee dug in with energy and intellect. I
am grateful to the Presiding Officer as one of the committee
[[Page S10520]]
members for his contributions. It was an August recess we will never
forget.
We are very grateful to the leaders of the Senate. Senator Frist and
Senator Daschle had the confidence in our committee that they felt they
could charge us with this enormous and critical undertaking.
Our whips, Senator Reid and Senator McConnell, have also been very
helpful. Senator Reid has been a constant presence in the Chamber
throughout this debate.
We could not have accomplished all that we did without our dedicated
staff, led by Michael Bopp and Joyce Rechtschaffen. We have worked so
closely with them. We have worked arm in arm. They have literally
worked day and night to produce this bill. I am so proud of their
extraordinary efforts.
Our staffs were supplemented by hard-working detailees from the CIA,
the DIA, and other agencies, as well as by members of the Commission
staff who, rather than going back to their previous jobs and lives,
worked with us on the committee to help give the benefit of their
expertise. Without the efforts of all these staff members we never
could have gotten the job done. I am very grateful to all of them.
This legislation, however, is not merely the result of months of
extraordinary effort by our committee or of the expert and insightful
testimony we heard from more than two dozen witnesses at eight
hearings. Rather, it builds upon a rock-solid foundation laid by the 9/
11 Commission and the investigation that it conducted over 20 months,
including 19 days of hearings with 160 witnesses. I thank all
Commission members for all of their extraordinary effort.
The need for reform in our intelligence system was not, however,
suddenly revealed in hearings spurred by one catastrophic failure 3
years ago. The failures that led to that day are numerous and reach
back many years. They were overlooked in terrorist attack after
terrorist attack for more than a decade. The call for reform was made
in studies, commission reports, and legislation going back half a
century. It is a call we can no longer ignore.
Our committee was guided by clear principles. An intelligence
community designed for the Cold War must be transformed into one
designed to win the war against global terrorism and future national
security threats. The new structure must build upon the strengths of
the old and recognize the considerable improvements made since
September 11.
The unique experience, expertise, and viewpoints of the 15 agencies
that comprise our intelligence community are assets that must be
preserved. The barriers to information sharing, cooperation, and
coordination within the community, what the 9/11 Commission calls
stovepipes, must be demolished. In their place must come a structure
with the agility the times and the threats demand--not another layer of
bureaucracy.
We were determined, in crafting this new structure, that we not
infringe upon the freedoms that define us as Americans. The legislation
that came out of our committee by a unanimous vote adhered to these
important principles and it has been strengthened by the vigorous
debate we have had in the Senate during the past week. The debate has
not merely been vigorous but also highly informed. Throughout these
proceedings, it has been clear the commitment that drove our committee
to act is shared by the full Senate. From the authorities of the
national intelligence director to the structure of our transformed
intelligence community to the protection of civil liberties, many
critical issues have been raised, debated, and resolved. I particularly
thank the members of the Committee on Armed Services, the Select
Committee on Intelligence, and the Appropriations Committee,
particularly their chairs and ranking members. Their knowledge and
their input have been invaluable.
Many important issues have been raised and will be resolved as this
transformation continues. One of the most remarkable aspects of this
debate has been the widespread recognition that intelligence reform is
not a single act but an ongoing process.
The fundamental obligation of government is to protect its citizens
and those protections must evolve to meet new threats. This legislation
brings about much-needed reforms and it creates an environment in which
this ongoing process can continue.
I began these remarks with a quote from a mother who has suffered the
worst loss any parent can endure. She turned her loss into positive
advocacy. It is Senator Byrd, however, who inspires me to end these
remarks with a quote from the Constitution.
To form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote
the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity . . .
The opening lines of our Constitution provide, in some ways, a job
description of America's Government that is a miracle of clarity as
well as an awesome challenge. Rarely does one piece of legislation
encompass all of its elements or do we have the opportunity to do so in
a way that clearly demonstrates the spirit that animates it. This is
one of those rare times. Let us do what the times demand. Let us act to
approve this legislation this afternoon and by doing so make our
country safer.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.
Mr. LEAHY. Has the Senator from Maine completed her statement?
Ms. COLLINS. Yes.
Amendment No. 3915, As Modified
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, after 9/11, there was broad agreement that
the absence of an accurate, reliable, and comprehensive terrorist watch
list was a serious deficiency. Unfortunately, 3 years later, we still
have not accomplished this important task.
My amendment, which has been modified to reach an agreement with
Senators Collins and Lieberman, addresses this deficiency. It requires
a report to Congress on the watch list, specifically on the standards
in place to ensure we have a list that is reliable and accurate, and
that we have procedures for determining threat levels and the
consequences to listed individuals. It also mandates a process for
individuals erroneously listed on the ``Automatic Selectee'' and ``No-
Fly'' lists to have their names removed. Finally, it would require an
assessment of the privacy and civil liberty implications of using these
lists. It is critical that we have a complete, accurate and
consolidated watch list, but we also need to be mindful of our
liberties in the process.
We know that one of the most senior and respected Members of this
Senate who for decades has taken the same flight was told he could not
board because he was, apparently, on some kind of terrorist list. They
said: Of course, it is an obvious error, and we will get it cleared up.
But repeatedly when he tried to get on the same plane, he was
continually stopped.
Now, as a Member of the Senate, after six or seven times of this
happening, and after calls from the White House, the head of Homeland
Security and others, the problem was finally corrected. Can you imagine
what it is like if you are Jane Smith or John Jones from a small town
somewhere in this country, but you have to travel on business and your
name is there, and you lose important clients, you lose important
business, or you are unable to get home to visit a friend or a family
member, and you probably cannot pick up the phone and call the White
House and say, ``Look, this is the sixth or seventh time I have been
mistakenly barred from traveling. Please fix it''?
Now, there are other concerns I would like to have addressed, but
this modified version reflects the agreement with Senators Collins and
Lieberman.
Mr. President, I believe the modified amendment is at the desk, and I
ask unanimous consent it be in order to call up my amendment No. 3915
and that it be so modified.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is so
modified.
The amendment, (No. 3915) as modified, is as follows:
At the appropriate place, insert the following:
SEC. __. TERRORIST WATCH LISTS
(a) Criteria for Watch List.--The National Intelligence
Director of the United States, in consultation with the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, and
the Attorney General, shall report to Congress on the
criteria for placing individuals on the Terrorist Screening
Center consolidated screening watch list, including
[[Page S10521]]
minimum standards for reliability and accuracy of identifying
information, the degree of information certainty and the
range of threat levels that the individual poses, and the
range of applicable consequences that apply to the person if
located. To the greatest extent consistent with the
protection of law enforcement sensitive information,
classified information, and applicable law, the report shall
be in unclassified form and available to the public, with a
classified annex where necessary.
(b) Safeguards Against Erroneous Listings.--The Secretary
of Homeland Security shall establish a process for
individuals to challenge ``Automatic Selectee'' or ``No Fly''
designations on the applicable lists as maintained by the
Transportation Security Administration and have their names
removed from such lists, if erroneously present.
(c) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Department of Homeland Security
Privacy Officer shall submit a report assessing the impact of
the ``No Fly'' and ``Automatic Selectee'' lists on privacy
and civil liberties to the Committee on the Judiciary, the
Committee on Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on
Commerce, Science and Transportation of the Senate, and the
Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Government
Reform, the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
and the Select Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives. The report shall include any recommendations
for practices, procedures, regulations, or legislation to
eliminate or minimize adverse effects of such lists on
privacy, discrimination, due process and other civil
liberties, as well as the implications of applying those
lists to other modes of transportation. In its analysis, the
report shall also consider the effect these recommendations
would have on the ability of such lists to protect the United
States against terrorist attacks. To the greatest extent
consistent with the protection of law enforcement sensitive
information, classified information, and applicable law, the
report shall be in unclassified form and available to the
public, with a classified annex where necessary.
(d) Effective Date.--Notwithstanding section 341 or any
other provision of this Act, this section shall become
effective on the date of enactment of this Act.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask for the regular order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I thank Senator Leahy for working with
Senator Lieberman and me on his amendment. It requires two reports
related to watch lists: one on the criteria for listing a name on the
Terrorist Screening Center's consolidated watch list, and another on
the effect of the ``automatic selectee'' and ``no-fly'' lists on
privacy and civil liberties.
We worked with him to incorporate some modifications that make the
amendment acceptable to the two managers and incorporate some
recommendations from the administration.
I am well aware of some of the problems with the watch list. A
constituent of mine from Camden, ME, a retired physician, has the
misfortune to have a name that is identical to a name that is on the
watch list. Every time he flies, he encounters great difficulties. I
believe the Senator's amendment will help to address that.
It is important to ensure we are safe and that those who want to do
us harm do not have access to aircraft. But at the same time we want to
make sure that law-abiding travelers are not impeded from conducting
their travels simply because they have the misfortune to share a name
with someone on the watch list.
The process required by the Senator, I think, will be helpful. I urge
adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no further debate, the question is
on agreeing to the amendment, as modified.
The amendment (No. 3915), as modified, was agreed to.
Mr. LEAHY. I move to reconsider the vote.
Ms. COLLINS. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, first, I thank the distinguished chair of
the committee for her cooperation and help, and also commend her and
her distinguished ranking member for moving this far along.
Amendment No. 3916, As Modified
Mr. President, a major weakness uncovered after 9/11 was the failure
of Government agencies to share information with one another. The 9/11
Commission recommended a government-wide information system to ensure
that we connect the dots. The Commission also recommended that the
``[p]rotection of privacy rights should be one key element'' of
implementing the system. Given the sweeping powers that Congress is
about to grant for building an information sharing system, we have to
protect the privacy and civil liberties of the American people.
After all, we fought a Revolution to guarantee our privacy. The
distinguished Presiding Officer and the distinguished chair know,
because they come from New England, that the Revolution was fought on
our soil.
We all agree we must maximize this information, but we must also
maximize the protection of personal information. And we need assurances
that private information will be protected before we build the system,
not after. We certainly do not want to repeat what happened with CAPPS
II, when $100 million of taxpayer money was spent on deploying a system
that then subsequently collapsed because we failed to adequately
account for civil liberties and privacy concerns.
My amendment, which has been modified to reach an agreement with
Senators Collins and Lieberman, would require that we take advantage of
available privacy-enhancing technology that would prevent unauthorized
dissemination of information. It also requires the Administration to
fulfill its obligations to report to Congress on plans for the network
before spending funds to build it. This oversight is critical to
ensuring the network maximizes security while balancing civil liberties
and privacy.
Senators Collins and Lieberman have agreed to accept this important
amendment.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that it be in order to call up
amendment No. 3916, and that it be modified.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is pending.
Without objection, the amendment is so modified.
The amendment, No. 3916, as modified, is as follows:
On page 132, line 23, strike ``and''.
On page 133, line 3, strike the period and insert ``;
and''.
On page 133, between lines 3 and 4, insert the following:
(L) utilizing privacy-enhancing technologies that minimize
the inappropriate dissemination and disclosure of personally
identifiable information.
On page 153, between lines 2 and 3, insert the following:
(o) Limitation on Funds.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of this section, none of the funds provided
pursuant to subsection (n) may be obligated for deployment or
implementation of the Network unless the guidelines and
requirements under subsection (e) are submitted to Congress.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I understand there is no objection to this
amendment from the managers of the bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, again, I thank Senator Leahy for
modifying his amendment to address concerns that the manager raised. I
have no objection to the modified amendment, and I urge its adoption.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment,
as modified.
The amendment (No. 3916), as modified, was agreed to.
Mr. LEAHY. I move to reconsider the vote.
Ms. COLLINS. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 3913 Withdrawn
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I have an amendment No. 3913, which I will
soon withdraw. It is on the subpoena powers of the civil liberties
board created in this bill.
We have worked hard to strengthen the powers of the board both at the
committee level and then here on the floor, and I believe we have made
great progress. We added teeth to this oversight body and fought
against efforts to weaken it.
I think the goal of this amendment, which is to give the board
enforcement power for its subpoena authority, is an important one.
However, in order to expedite the passage of this bill, I will withdraw
the amendment now. I look forward to working with my colleagues on this
important issue next year. But I also understand the need to expedite
[[Page S10522]]
the passage of this bill. There may be another time to bring this up. I
will withdraw the amendment now, though I look forward to working with
my colleagues on the issue next year.
I withdraw the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is withdrawn.
Mr. LEAHY. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Vermont for his
cooperation on that last issue. As I have explained to my colleagues,
the bill strikes a very delicate balance on the civil liberties board's
power, and there were amendments to strengthen it as well as amendments
to weaken it. I appreciate my colleagues' cooperation on both sides of
the aisle. I am sure there will be more discussion of this issue as we
go along.
I thank the Senator from Vermont and suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Consolidation of Amendments
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that it be in
order for previously agreed upon amendments, which I will list, to be
consolidated into one title under the heading: ``9/11 Commission Report
Implementation Act,'' with a short title section (a), short title: This
act may be cited as the ``9/11 Commission Report Implementation Act of
2004.''
The amendments should be included in this order: No. 3942, No. 3807,
No. 3702, No. 3774, No. 3705, No. 3766, No. 3806.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the
absence of a quorum.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Ms. STABENOW. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Ms. STABENOW. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be
permitted to speak for up to 30 minutes and have that time allotted
against my 1 hour postcloture.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, will the
Senator from Michigan inform me whether her statement is going to be
germane to the bill as is required in the postcloture situation?
Ms. STABENOW. Mr. President, I will ask to speak as in morning
business using this time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I will not object because I am aware that
the Senator could speak for up to an hour under the cloture rules,
although I remind the Senator that she could not speak on the subject
about which she appears to be ready to speak. But in the interest of
moving forward, and since there have been others today who have also
spoken as in morning business, I will not object. I do think it is
unfortunate, however.
(The remarks of Mrs. Stabenow are printed in today's Record under
``Morning Business.'')
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise today to commend my colleagues on
the adoption of amendment No. 3765 to S. 2845, the National
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, which will create an Office of
Geospatial Management within the Department of Homeland Security, DHS.
This amendment originated as a stand alone bill, S. 1230, which was
introduced by Senator Allard and amended by Senators Collins,
Lieberman, and myself in a Governmental Affairs Committee business
meeting. I thank Senator Allard, who shares my interest in geospatial
information sharing, for offering this amendment, as well as Senators
Collins and Lieberman for their continued support on this issue.
Much of the discussion that has grown from the 9/11 Commission report
has centered around the institutional stovepipes that impede
information sharing within the Government, which is why this amendment
is so important. While the term ``geospatial'' is foreign to many, the
tools it describes are relied upon by all. The 9/11 Commission
recommended that the President ``lead a government-wide effort to bring
major national security institutions into the information revolution.''
Geospatial coordination is a critical component of that effort.
Geospatial technologies, such as satellite imagery and aerial
photography, provide data that create the maps and charts that can help
prevent a disaster from occurring or lessen the impact of an
unforeseeable event by equipping first responders with up-to-date
information. In the event of a terrorist chemical attack, knowing which
way a contaminated plume will travel can save lives. Similarly, the
damage of a natural disaster, such as a wildfire, can be lessened by
maps that help predict which areas will be in the path of the blaze.
All levels of government are more effective and efficient when
employing geospatial technology, especially in the area of homeland
security. According to DHS, geospatial information is used for
intelligence, law enforcement, first response, disaster recovery, and
agency management--virtually every function of the Department.
When the Department was created in 2003, it brought together
components from 22 separate agencies, each of which managed its
geospatial needs independently. In the past year, the Department has
encountered significant difficulties integrating personnel, financial
systems, and computer systems from the legacy agencies. Geospatial
information has been no different.
A September 2004 Government Accountability Office, GAO, report
entitled ``Maritime Security: Better Planning Needed to Help Ensure
Effective Port Security Assessment Program,'' found that the
development of a geographic information system, GIS--GIS is often used
as a synonym for geospatial to map the Nation's most strategic ports
would greatly benefit the Coast Guard as it implements the Port
Security Assessment Program. A GIS would integrate all security
information pertaining to one port into a single database so that it is
easily accessible and can be frequently updated. In addition, it would
give the Coast Guard the ability to visually map a port so that it can
quickly identify the location and surrounding environment of an at-risk
container before deploying a response team, for example.
However, GAO also found that:
The Coast Guard lacks a strategy that clearly defines how
the (GIS) program will be managed, how much it will cost, or
what activities will continue over the long term.
The legacy agencies that make up DHS had traditionally managed their
own geospatial procurement. But many of the homeland and non-homeland
security missions of DHS complement each other. Sharing maps and data
reduces redundancy, provides savings, and ensures better information
for disaster response.
Currently, the DHS Chief Information Officer, CIO, is working to
break down this geospatial stovepiping within the Department by naming
a Geospatial Information Officer. However, there is no single office in
DHS officially responsible for geospatial management and, therefore, no
corresponding budget. In the present structure, the Geospatial
Information Officer does not have the authority to compel the five DHS
directorates to cooperate with his efforts. The entire agency should
make geospatial coordination a priority.
A geospatial management office needs to be created and codified
within DHS. A congressionally mandated office would give the Geospatial
Information Officer more authority with which to do this job.
[[Page S10523]]
The Office of Geospatial Management has the potential to
significantly increase the quality of the resources homeland security
officials rely on by reducing redundancy and improving the quality of
geospatial procurement. But in order to do this it needs authority and
funding.
This office would also serve as a mechanism for coordinating with
State and local authorities. Much of the geospatial information
available today is created at the State and local levels. Centralizing
this information will make it more widely available to first responders
and other homeland security officials.
In order to facilitate this process, it is also important that local
governments initiate their own coordination efforts. In June 2003, the
city of Honolulu conducted a pilot program to foster geospatial
coordination and collaboration among public and private stakeholders in
critical infrastructure protection. Representatives from local and
State government, utility companies, and other private organizations
came together to identify potential impediments to geospatial
information sharing in Honolulu and to develop a plan to circumvent
those impediments. I commend the government of the City and County of
Honolulu for hosting such an exemplary event. This sort of commitment
at a local level is crucial to breaking down the geospatial stovepipes
that exist at all levels of government. I hope other cities will follow
suit.
This amendment will help DHS to better coordinate its activities, and
will ultimately make our Nation safer and prevent duplicative spending.
I appreciate my colleagues' endorsement of this important issue, and
urge that this language be maintained in the final version of the
intelligence reorganization bill that is sent to the President.
Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I strongly support the intelligence
reform bill now before the Senate, and I will vote for it.
The 9-11 Commission worked incredibly hard in a bipartisan manner to
identify how to better protect our country from terrorism. They have
given us a roadmap to protect our people, and we should move forward
with it promptly.
In their report, the commissioners said we need clear direction for
our country's intelligence community. They stressed better coordination
as a key area where we can make the greatest difference. The bill on
the floor does that, it has bipartisan support, and we should move it
forward.
As a member of both the Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee
and the Senate's 9/11 Working Group, I have looked closely at these
challenges. And over the past few years, I have worked closely with the
Department of Homeland Security, including the Coast Guard, FBI, TSA,
Border Patrol, as well as the National Guard and local law enforcement
throughout Washington State. Through our work together, I have learned
first hand the difficulties they face every day in defending our
country.
I especially want to commend the September 11 families who bravely
stood up and spoke out. They forced our government to fully examine the
terrorist attacks and to find ways to make our people safer. Their
brave advocacy has made a difference.
Mr. President, this is an important step toward achieving a truly
integrated national effort in the global war on terror. I am proud to
support it.
Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I rise today in support of S.2845, the
National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004. The bill before us today is
the result of tireless work by the Government Affairs Committee and its
able chair and ranking member. It also reflects intensive consideration
by other committees with jurisdiction over issues addressed in the
bill, including the Judiciary and Appropriations Committees of which I
am a member. The bill makes some important changes in the way our
intelligence community is managed. It is a bipartisan bill which
strikes a balance between ensuring that we have a strong national
intelligence director, on the one hand, and that we meet the
intelligence needs of the agencies which house our intelligence
collection systems, on the other.
The 9/11 Commission threw down the gauntlet when it released its
final report, calling on Congress and the President to enact meaningful
reforms that will help prevent future catastrophic terrorist acts. In
painstaking detail, the commission made clear how the attacks of
September 11, 2001, took place and how our government struggled to
respond. They then made 41 distinct recommendations across a wide range
of policy areas creating a framework for our efforts. We have a
responsibility to enact as many of these recommendations as feasible.
With the threat of terrorism still high, we must have the best
intelligence at our fingertips, a robust law enforcement effort, and an
effective homeland defense if we are to foil future catastrophic terror
attacks.
S. 2845 is an important first step. I believe the reforms in this
bill fully implement the commission's recommendations on the need for a
more unified intelligence effort. They address the lack of intelligence
sharing among the 15 agencies which make up our intelligence community.
Recognizing the limitations of the Director of Central Intelligence,
who technically has the authority to manage all our intelligence
resources, the bill centralizes the management and coordination of
intelligence agencies by creating a national intelligence director or
NID who has strong budgetary and personnel powers. The NID will also
have the authority to create uniform classification standards and to
set collection priorities. Yet the bill leaves the intelligence
resources of each agency within their existing organizations so those
agencies can effectively and efficiently meet their intelligence
collection needs, so military operations and readiness are not
compromised, and so we can maintain the diversity of views critical to
sound intelligence analysis.
Beyond a more unified approach to intelligence collection and
analysis, the Commission called for a more integrated response to our
enemies. As the Commission noted, our bulky national security
institutions are still structured to respond to the Cold War. In
retrospect, it is no surprise that they were unable to respond to a
non-state terrorist network. By unifying the intelligence resources
dispersed across the government, we are striving to create a more
nimble intelligence apparatus that can lead our response to these non-
traditional threats. To that end, this bill enacts the Commission's
recommendation to establish a civilian-led joint command for
counterterrorism--a National counterterrorism Center--to act on joint
intelligence by integrating civilian and military counterterrorism
efforts across the government and to serve as the President's principal
advisor on joint operations. The NCTC will help address many of the
operational shortcomings identified in the 9/11 Commission report.
Intelligence reform is an important bulwark in the war on terror but
it is not our only line of defense. Even if the intelligence reforms in
this bill were in place before 9/11, they would not guarantee that the
events of that fateful day could have been averted. That is why I
supported the McCain transportation security and the Hutchison cargo
security amendments. These amendments direct TSA to produce a national
transportation strategy, to implement a system for comparing names of
air passengers against the consolidated terrorist watch lists, to
screen all air passengers and their carry-on bags for explosives, and
to set up a system to screen air cargo. And I am pleased that we have
accepted amendments that address the role of diplomacy, foreign aid,
and the military in the war on terrorism. The 9/11 Commission
recommendations in these areas have not received nearly as much
attention as the recommendations relating to intelligence reform. I
hope that we address these recommendations more fully in the next
Congress. We must act broadly and on many fronts to put an end to the
threat posed by al-Qaida and those who subscribe to its ideology.
As we work to bolster our national preparedness in areas of border
security and emergency preparedness, we must balance the privacy and
civil liberties of individuals against our national security
requirements. While some have suggested otherwise, these principles are
not mutually exclusive, and I strongly believe that we can preserve
both. S.2485 recognizes the importance of individual rights by creating
a
[[Page S10524]]
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. By providing the Civil
Liberties Board with appropriate authority, the legislation ensures
that its members will have access to the information they need to
provide informed advice to the Executive Branch, Congress, and the
American public as to how we can best protect privacy without
compromising security.
As we complete action on this bill, we are reminded of the deep sense
of urgency that pervades our work. I appreciate that there are some in
this body who wish we had taken a slower approach. Last month, the
Senate Appropriations Committee held hearings on the 9/11 Commission
recommendations with a particular focus on intelligence reform.
Witnesses, including Dr. Henry Kissinger, raised concerns, some of
which have been addressed in amendments. The general sentiment of those
hearings, however, was that we should approach intelligence reform much
more gingerly. Unfortunately, we do not have the luxury of time. Many
of the reforms we enact today are based on recommendations that were
made by previous commissions. These are not new ideas that require more
study. The 9/11 Commission did us a tremendous service by creating a
framework for action and by galvanizing the political will to enact
these needed reforms.
Finally, Mr. President, I want to hail the bipartisan spirit in which
this bill was crafted. For too long, Congress has ignored the views of
the minority at its peril. We have budget resolutions that represent
the priorities of just one party and conference committees that do the
same. It is impossible to address the problems of the day unless we put
our differences aside to work on real solutions that have broad
support. This intelligence reform bill is an important reminder of how
much more we could accomplish if we would just work together. I want to
urge my colleagues who will serve on the conference committee to
maintain the bipartisan spirit in which this bill has been considered
in the Senate. When the final version of this bill comes before the
Senate, it should not go beyond the recommendations of the 9/11
Commission in its scope, and it should not include partisan provisions
that jeopardize passing meaningful reform in this Congress.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss this body's efforts
to reform the U.S. intelligence community.
My distinguished colleagues from Maine and Connecticut have worked
hard to develop legislation to address some of the executive branch
structural reforms recommended by the 9/11 Commission. To be sure,
there is a need to change, the way we do business if we are to
effectively battle terrorist organizations, like al-Qaida, and protect
the American people from another devastating terrorist attack. But I
believe that many provisions of the bill before us are tackling the
problem from the wrong angle.
I think it is important that we move forward with deliberate speed.
Past efforts, like the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, should set an
example. That overhaul of the Defense Department took several years
from start to finish. It was a huge undertaking, as is our current
effort to reform the intelligence community. The 9/11 Commission did a
good job of cataloguing and critiquing the failures of 9/11--I believe
it spent some 18 months on that effort. But it spent far less time
developing the recommendations to solve the problems. We are now acting
on those recommendations over a period of less than 2 weeks on the
Senate floor. It is important to ask whether, in the middle of a war,
it is wise to attempt such a fundamental reorganization with a deadline
of October 8 for Senate consideration, a conference and then adoption
of a conference report.
Nevertheless, I will support moving this legislation forward, as the
President has strongly urged us to do, so that we may try to resolve
outstanding issues in the Senate-House conference committee. As
Congress prepares its final intelligence reform bill to be sent to the
President, we must be especially careful to do no harm. I will continue
to press the issues about which I am concerned during the conference.
Today I plan to discuss: No. 1, how the 9/11 Commission
recommendations fail to thoroughly address the problems it identified;
No. 2, deficiencies in the Governmental Affairs Committee proposal; and
No. 3, what I think we should be doing instead--focusing on
intelligence community reform, instead of just reorganization. I will
also touch very briefly on two additional areas in which I had proposed
amendments: visa reform, and tools and resources for fighting terror.
Former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger identified one of the
key problems with the 9/11 Commission recommendations:
[The Commission] has . . . proposed a substantial
reorganization of the intelligence community--changes that do
not logically flow from the problems that the Commission
identified in its narrative.
The Commission identified four categories of failures by the U.S.
Government that ultimately led to the attacks of September 11, 2001:
imagination, policy, capabilities, and management. After reviewing the
9/11 Commission's narrative of these failures and studying its 41
recommendations to prevent future such failures, I am hard pressed to
see what most of the recommendations have to do with the problems
identified.
I will briefly touch on each of these broad problems identified by
the Commission and assess how they will be addressed by both the
Commission and later the Senate's legislation.
First, lack of imagination. I agree that this problem was a
significant contributor not only to the failure of intelligence
community to predict the 9/11 attacks, but also the vast majority of
the intelligence failures that have plagued our intelligence community
over the past 20 years. A lack of imagination is simply an extension of
the much broader and more pervasive cultural problems such as risk
aversion, group think and a lack of competitive analysis that continue
to hamper our intelligence and law enforcement agencies. I will deal
with these problems in more detail later; but it is clear that none
of the Commission's recommendations or this bill's provisions begin to
address this culture problem; and, in fact, one recommendation could
substantially increase risk aversion, a problem exacerbated by the
bill's redundant provisions piling on layers of civil liberties and
privacy review.
The Commission itself notes that ``Imagination is not a gift usually
associated with bureaucracies,'' and so it is ironic that Commission
proposes to create an even more bureaucratic intelligence structure.
Chairman Kean and Vice Chairman Hamilton contend that an empowered NID
will foster competitive analysis and quash group think because that
individual will draw on the perspectives of all the intelligence
agencies, rather than just the CIA, as the DCI is now more likely to
do.
But a convincing case can be made that the creation of national
intelligence director with budgetary authority over most of the
intelligence community could actually exacerbate the community's lack
of imagination. Under such a centralized system, it is far more likely
that agencies, like DHS's Information Analysis office, will be inclined
to provide a commonly accepted view because the NID will control their
budgets. As such, they will lack the protection that their previous
patron--the Department of Homeland Security, in this case--provided
them. Risk aversion and group think are, therefore, likely to become
even more widespread problems.
The second failure identified by the Commission is one of policy.
Here the report faults not the intelligence community, but political
leaders, including Members of Congress, for failing to act even when
there was a clear threat. Terrorists had demonstrated time and time
again that they were at war with us: in 1993 at the World Trade Center;
in 1995 at a U.S. military barracks in Saudi Arabia; in 1998 at the
U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania; and in 2000 with the bombing of
the USS Cole. Almost a decade of attacks resulted in little more than a
single cruise missile strike that destroyed a pharmaceutical plant.
This failure of decisionmaking really calls for a fix that can't be
legislated--good leadership.
The Commission makes a number of related recommendations on how to
fight the war on terror, with the goal of making another attack less
likely. These range from the obvious, ``make a long-term commitment to
Afghanistan,'' to the irrelevant and unwise, declassifying the overall
intelligence
[[Page S10525]]
budget. On the whole, however, most of recommendations are already
being implemented in some fashion, and have been underway since shortly
after the attacks. I commend to my colleagues a fact sheet prepared by
the White House detailing its implementation of the majority of the 9/
11 Commission's recommendation.
On a more specific level, one area where not enough work has been
done is that of terrorists' travel. The Commission correctly identifies
the importance of the problem arguing, ``[f]or terrorists, travel
documents are as important as weapons,'' and I am, therefore, surprised
that the Commission and the committee have decided to put that issue on
the backburner. I will return to this issue in more detail shortly, but
it is one area where Congress can make an important contribution to
U.S. security and we should not abdicate that responsibility.
The third failure is one of capabilities. It is here that the 9/11
Commission highlights numerous glaring weaknesses in how the
intelligence community shared information, prepared for potential
attacks and planned for U.S. responses. The Commission recommends
improvements in information sharing and the parts of this legislation
that seek to implement these are important.
Regardless of how we ultimately decide to organize the intelligence
community, it is important that we improve and streamline information
sharing. Congress has already taken some important steps toward that
objective. For example, the PATRIOT Act, enacted shortly after the
September 11 attacks, improved information sharing by breaking
down legal barriers between intelligence and law enforcement, but it is
clear we will not be able to make the Patriot Act provisions permanent
in this bill.
Unfortunately, the 9/11 Commission overlooks the fact that solving
the capabilities problem requires far more than just improving the
sharing of information. The problem extends beyond what intelligence is
available to an analyst at any given time. The 9/11 Commission, the
Joint House-Senate Inquiry into the 9/11 attacks, and the recently
completed Senate Select Committee on Intelligence investigation into
pre-war intelligence on Iraq all point to far deeper deficiencies. They
identify core cultural problems. Indeed, too often the right
information is not collected due to, among other things, excessive risk
aversion, and analysis of the information is not adequately questioned
to ensure that group think has not replaced sound judgment.
The Commission focused on only one recommendation for fixing a
laundry list of problems with the CIA's collection and analysis, and
only one recommendation on improvements to the FBI's intelligence
capabilities. On the other hand, the Commission devoted three
recommendations to protecting civil liberties, though none is designed
to prevent a future attack.
The last failure identified by the Commission is one of management.
It is this failure that leads the Commission to recommend the creation
of the National Intelligence Director. The report highlights the
inability of then-DCI George Tenet to mobilize the entire intelligence
community after he issued a memo stating, ``We are at war'' with
terrorists. However, the 9/11 Commission's report states that the DCI's
memo had ``little overall effect on mobilizing the CIA.'' If even the
CIA, where the Director has complete budgetary and line control, did
not respond to the DCI's memo, we should not be confident that simply
putting someone at the top of a new organizational chart is the panacea
that some claim.
It warrants noting that the 9/11 Commission details an example, from
before 9/11 and the changes that followed, where the intelligence and
law enforcement communities were able to mobilize, break down
stovepipes and information was shared ``widely and abundantly.'' This
example--termed the ``Millennium Exception'' by the Commission--focuses
on the last weeks of December 1999, when the government ``acted in
concert to deal with terrorism.'' The Government's approach to this
threat, demonstrate the power of strong leadership and commitment,
despite what some call a disjointed intelligence organization.
Too often problems of management have less to do with organizational
structure, and more to do with the managers themselves. I fear that we
are rushing to implement sweeping organizational changes because it is
the easy thing to do, not because it is necessarily the right thing to
do. In the meantime, the hard work of changing the culture of the
community seems to have been pushed to the side.
The Senate is currently considering a reorganization package that
contains a number of the 9/11 Commission's 41 recommendations. Among
the most significant, the bill establishes a Senate-confirmed national
intelligence director with strong budget, personnel, security, and
other authorities; creates a national counterterrorism center, NCTC, to
integrate intelligence capabilities and develop joint counterterrorism
plans; redefines the National Foreign Intelligence Program as the
National Intelligence Program--which includes the national collection
agencies within the Defense Department, NSA, NGA, and NRO; and contains
provisions that require the establishment of an information sharing
network.
The bill is called the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004. But
it does not reform the intelligence community; it reorganizes it. It
does not get at the fundamental problems in the intelligence community
identified by the 9/11 Commission and the other intelligence
investigations and inquiries over the last several years. And,
unfortunately, in at least one glaring respect, it violates the first
rule of medicine and legislating in that it does do harm. Moreover,
even if the reshuffling of bureaucracy can ultimately be made to work,
doing so now, while our country is at war, makes it very hard to supply
our strategists, planners, and warfighters the information they need,
when they need it.
I have taken under careful advisement the cautious tone of many
former and current officials. For example, in his testimony to the
Senate Armed Services Committee on August 17, 2004, Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated:
In pursuit of strengthening our nation's intelligence
capabilities, I would offer a cautionary note. It is
important that we move with all deliberate speed; however,
moving too quickly risks enormous error . . . And we are
considering these important matters while waging a war.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS, recently
released a statement, signed by an experienced group of former
officials, urging similar caution. The statement was endorsed by:
former Senators David Boren, Bill Bradley, Gary Hart, Sam Nunn, and
Warren Rudman; former Secretaries of Defense Frank Carlucci and William
Cohen; former Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre; former Director
of Central Intelligence Robert Gates; former Secretary of State and
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger; and former Secretary of
State George Shultz. It said:
Rushing in with solutions before we understand all of the
problems is a recipe for failure.
In his testimony, Secretary Rumsfeld discussed in detail his concerns
about how intelligence community reorganization could potentially
adversely affect the Defense Department. He expressed his strong
reservations about the national collection agencies--the NSA, NGA, and
NRO--being removed from the Defense Department, where they are now
located, and aligned under the direct leadership of the national
intelligence director. He stated:
``We wouldn't want to place new barriers or filters between
the military Combatant Commanders and those agencies when
they perform as combat support agencies. It would be a major
step to separate these key agencies from the military
Combatant Commanders, which are the major users of such
capabilities.
The Defense Department worked tirelessly in the decade after the
first gulf war to ensure that the speed and scope of intelligence
support to military operations would be improved for future conflicts.
It was General Schwartz
kopf's view that the national intelligence support during Desert Storm
was not adequate. Now, as we have seen from the success of our military
operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the broader War on Terror, ``gaps
and seams,'' as Secretary Rumsfeld refers to them, have been
drastically reduced.
General Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also expressed
his
[[Page S10526]]
concerns on the subject during his testimony to the Senate Armed
Services Committee, stating:
. . . for the warfighter, from the combatant commander down
to the private on patrol, timely, accurate intelligence is
literally a life and death matter every day. . . . As we move
forward, we cannot create any institutional barriers between
intelligence agencies--and of course that would include the
National Security Agency, the National Geospacial-
Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance office
and the rest of the warfighting team.
I am concerned that the reorganization package before the Senate
places this effective system in jeopardy.
In S. 2485, the NSA, NGA, and NRO remain within DOD; but this is
somewhat deceiving. These national collection agencies will also be
within the newly defined National Intelligence Program. The Committee-
reported bill would essentially remove the Secretary of Defense from
any meaningful management role over these agencies.
First, the national intelligence director would have the authority to
appoint the heads of these agencies, albeit with the concurrence of the
Secretary of Defense. What makes this unusual and potentially
problematic? Well, consider the fact that the Director of the National
Security Agency, a general officer, is dual-hatted as the Deputy
Commander for Network Attack, Planning, and Integration at Strategic
Command, or that the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office
also serves as an Under Secretary of the Air Force. These positions
truly support the mission of the Defense Department
Second, the national intelligence director would have the authority
to execute the budgets of these agencies. It is one thing to say that
the NID should manage the entire budget for the National Intelligence
Program, and, therefore, to help develop agencies' budgets and even
receive their appropriation. It is quite another to altogether remove
the Secretary of Defense from the loop by requiring that the NID
suballocate funding directly back to the agencies. This effectively
removes the Secretary from the management loop.
I have studied the Defense Secretary's testimony to the Senate Armed
Services Committee, as well as the testimony of other experts. I am
also aware that there were some good amendments in the committee markup
to help preserve the Defense Department's equities. But I am still not
convinced that we are doing no harm. As General Myers commented during
the course of the Senate Armed Services Committee's discussion on the
subject, ``[T]he devil's in the details.''
I recognize that during the course of the Senate's debate on this
bill, several of my colleagues have offered amendments to ensure that
the equities of the Defense Department are protected, and I applaud
them for their efforts.
So, while I am not convinced we are doing no harm--particularly with
respect to ensuring our warfighters have the intelligence support they
need--I am also not convinced that we are necessarily doing much good.
Again, the solutions of the 9/11 Commission, and, in turn, the Senate
bill, don't seem to match the problems.
I would like to discuss an example of what I believe we could do to
help minimize our chances of another catastrophic terrorist attack--by
addressing cultural problems in the intelligence community, including
risk aversion, group think, and a failure of leadership.
I was a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee for 8 years and
participated in the first of the post-9/11 evaluations--the joint
Senate-House inquiry, formally named the Joint Inquiry into
Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist
Attacks of September 11, 2001. Along with the current Intelligence
Committee chairman, I offered additional views to that report which,
had I been part of the 9/11 Commission, I would similarly have
submitted. Those additional views describe the core cultural problems
in the intelligence community that can't simply be solved by
reorganizing agencies. On this, the Commission report and the bill
before us missed the mark in many respects.
First, let's consider risk aversion, which plays out not only in the
intelligence community, but also in foreign policy decisionmaking,
economics, business investments, and so on. There are many potential
reasons for risk aversion--a particular action might have adverse,
unintended consequences, might get one into trouble with one's
superiors, or might simply draw unwanted attention, just to name a few.
When an individual or a government acts, there is always a calculation
of risk; but some governments and some individuals are more willing to
take chances than others. This is a product of both leadership and
environment.
An aversion to taking risks--even when they should be taken--plagues
our intelligence community. Indeed, in the course of our congressional
inquiry on the 9/11 attacks no intelligence or law-enforcement agency
escaped being described by its own officials as hampered by an aversion
to thinking critically, exposing their views to others, and being
willing to boldly take risks. Time and time again, this has contributed
to intelligence failures--most recently, of course, 9/11 and the
intelligence communities' claims about Saddam's stockpiles of weapons
of mass destruction.
The 9/11 Commission also addressed the issue of risk aversion within
the CIA, noting the net result for that agency pre-9/11:
. . . an organization capable of attracting extraordinarily
motivated people but institutionally averse to risk, with its
capacity for covert action atrophied, predisposed to restrict
the distribution of information, having difficulty
assimilating new types of personnel, and accustomed to
presenting descriptive reportage of the latest intelligence.
One of the most well known examples of the problem of risk aversion
in the context of the 9/11 attacks was the FBI's failure to respond to
the ``Phoenix Memorandum,'' written by a Phoenix special agent who
wanted to alert his superiors about suspicious individuals seeking
pilot training. The now-famous electronic communication to FBI
headquarters recommended that the FBI consider seeking authority to
obtain visa information from the State Department on individuals who
obtained visas to attend flight school.
The intelligence operations specialists at headquarters who reviewed
the memo told the staff of the congressional joint inquiry that they
had decided among themselves that seeking that authority raised
profiling concerns. These concerns stemmed at least in part from
previous public allegations of racial profiling against FBI agents who
had questioned two Middle Eastern men acting suspiciously on a flight
from Phoenix to Washington, DC, in 1999.
On a broader--not case-specific--level, the intelligence community's
clandestine service has been seriously hampered by an aversion to
taking risks. According to the 9/11 Commission's report, James Pavitt,
the head of the CIA's Directorate of Operations, recalled that covert
action had gotten the clandestine service into trouble in the past, and
he had no desire to see it happen again.
It is likely that this ``trouble'' was at least in part a result of
congressional actions, for example the 1976 Church Committee
investigation, which was set up in the wake of revelations about
assassination plots organized by the CIA. The investigation resulted in
some 183 recommendations, and subsequent legislative proposals and
debate that consumed considerable attention over a number of years. In
part, that debate focused on specific, clearly defined limitations and
prohibitions on intelligence activities.
Obviously, as we move forward with reforming congressional oversight
of the intelligence community, there will be a need to balance strong
and effective oversight with not hamstringing the community and
creating an even more risk averse environment.
The culture of risk aversion in the clandestine service was also
accentuated by executive branch actions during the Clinton
administration. For example, risk aversion in the clandestine service
was compounded by the 1995 Deutch Guidelines, CIA guidelines
promulgated by then-Director of the CIA, John Deutch, which severely
limited the ability of CIA case officers to meet with and recruit
foreign nationals who may have been involved in dubious activities or
have blood on their hands. Incidentally, during his tenure, Mr. Deutch
also conducted a CIA-wide ``asset scrub,'' which applied an inflexible
reporting standard to all CIA spies
[[Page S10527]]
that, if not met, resulted in their automatic firing. How can you
effectively penetrate an organization or adversarial regime without
dealing with unsavory characters? Thankfully, the Deutch Guidelines
were finally repealed by the DCI in July 2002; but, their repercussions
had a lasting effect on the culture of the Directorate of Operations.
So, here we have a clandestine service unwilling to take the risks
that are, by nature, part of the job. Compound that with the fact that
the DO had few resources. Between 1992 and 1998, the Central
Intelligence Agency closed one-third of its overseas field stations,
lost one-quarter of its clandestine service case officers, lost 40
percent of its recruited spies, and CIA intelligence reports declined
by nearly one-half.
The result of this deterioration of a key part of our intelligence
community was that, before 9/11, we had not one human source inside al-
Qaida's command structure. What did the 9/11 Commission recommend to
transform the clandestine service into a unit more effectively able to
penetrate al-Qaida.
The CIA Director should emphasize . . . ``(b) transforming
the clandestine service by building its human intelligence
capabilities; (c) developing a stronger language program,
with high standards and sufficient financial incentives; (d)
renewing emphasis on recruiting diversity among operations
officers so they can blend more easily in foreign cities; (e)
ensuring a seamless relationship between human source
collection and signals collection at the operational level;
and (f) stressing a better balance between unilateral and
liaison operations.
As Reuel Gerecht, American Enterprise Institute scholar, commented in
a recent article in the Weekly Standard, ``That's it. In a 447-page
report on the intelligence failings of 9/11, the clandestine service
gets nine lines. The important bit--`transforming the clandestine
service . . .' is a 10-word platitude.'' The intelligence reform bill
we are considering this week similarly fails to delve into this central
problem. Even if we put the resources back in, we have not figured out
how to deal with the mentality now ingrained in our covert officers.
Finally, as I previously noted, I believe the bill currently before
the Senate will exacerbate the risk aversion problem in at least one
respect: its creation of an excessive, redundant bureaucracy to oversee
the protection of privacy and civil liberties. Should there be
protections and oversight? Yes. But should there be so many layers of
such oversight that intelligence officers are more worried about
getting into trouble than about adequately performing their missions?
Certainly not.
The provisions in this bill dealing with privacy and civil liberties
are quite extensive. In summary, the bill establishes: two officers
within the National Intelligence Authority, one responsible for
privacy, the other for civil rights and civil liberties; an Inspector
General within the National Intelligence Authority, who, in part,
monitors and informs the National Intelligence Director of any
violations of civil liberties and privacy; an Ombudsman within the
National Intelligence Authority to protect against so-called
politicization of intelligence; an independent Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board with extensive investigative authorities; and
privacy and civil liberties officers within the Departments of Justice,
Defense, State, Treasury, Health and Human Services, and Homeland
Security, the National Intelligence Authority, the Central Intelligence
Agency, and any other department, agency, or element of the Executive
Branch designated by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board to
be appropriate for coverage.
These provisions reach far beyond what the 9/11 Commission
recommended--an executive branch board to oversee the protection
privacy and civil liberties. The President already created such a board
through executive order on August 27.
Under the construct offered in the Governmental Affairs Committee
bill there will simply be too many people performing the same task. It
will be inefficient; it will be counterproductive; and it will add yet
another legal hurdle for our intelligence officers to overcome. Our
goal should be to make it easier for them to do their jobs--to detect
and prevent future catastrophic terrorist attacks--not more difficult.
Let's not forget why we are reforming the intelligence community. It is
to prevent another 9/11. The problem is not that we invaded suspects'
privacy, but that we didn't know enough about them to prevent the
attack.
I offered an amendment to S. 2845, which I discussed several times on
the floor of the Senate, to eliminate some of this redundant oversight.
I withdrew that amendment reluctantly, but with the understanding that
the issue would be resolved in conference. I plan to continue to press
my case on this matter because I believe it is central to ensuring that
we do not make worse the already existing problem of risk aversion
within the intelligence community.
Second, group think. This problem is not unrelated to the problem of
risk aversion. The result of analysts' fears of taking risks is often
that they are unable to think outside the box, to break free of the
generally-accepted assumptions held by their agency or by the rest of
the intelligence community.
In his August 16 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee,
former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger discussed the problem at
length, stating:
Different organizations will drift gravitate towards
different ways of organizing reality--based upon their range
of responsibilities and, also, their interests in a narrower
sense. Most individuals make themselves comfortable in their
own organizations by not challenging a prevailing consensus.
Another cause of group think is simply a lack of imagination. In a
recent op-ed in the Washington Post, Henry Kissinger raises some
important questions about the reforms currently being pursued. He
states that the basic premise of the ``current emphasis on
centralization'' through the creation of a director of national
intelligence ``seems to be that the cause of most intelligence failures
is inadequate collection and coordination.'' Kissinger believes,
however, that ``the breakdown usually occurs in the assessment stage.''
He attributes that breakdown to a failure of imagination to connect the
dots of available knowledge. His op-ed describes in detail how a lack
of imagination led to the major intelligence failures of the last 4
decades: the 1973 Middle East War, the Indian nuclear test of 1998, the
September 11 attacks, and the failure to find WMD stockpiles in Iraq.
How do we solve this problem? Well, let's take the issue of Iraq's
weapons. The Senate concluded in its bipartisan report on the
intelligence community's assessment:
The presumption that Iraq had active WMD programs was so
strong that formalized IC mechanisms to challenge assumptions
and ``group think,'' such as ``red teams,'' ``devil
advocacy,'' and other types of alternative, or competitive
analysis, were not utilized.
Former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger recommends precisely what
the bipartisan report said was lacking. In his testimony, SASC, August
16, he stated:
The only solution within an organization is to establish a
Devil's Advocacy organization to challenge the prevailing
beliefs.
This is an imperfect solution, as Secretary Schlesinger further
notes, but, still, if we had had such mechanisms, we would have had a
far greater chance of reaching the truth. Yet, neither the Commission
nor the Committee recommends such a ``red team'' or ``devil's
advocacy'' entity or process. We will have to do it by amendment.
This is one place where we can learn from our past successes and
failures. Historically speaking, ``red teams,'' have been helpful
inside and outside of the intelligence community. In the 1970s, for
example, the intelligence community persisted in underestimating the
size and scale of the Soviet arms build-up. In response, Congress
created a ``red team'' called Team B to review the IC's analysis. Team
B's report, which documented how far off the intelligence community
was, laid the foundation for President Reagan to rebuild the U.S.
military in the 1980s.
More recently, the Rumsfeld Commission on the ballistic missile
threat was created to play devil's advocate with the findings of the
intelligence community. Not surprisingly, the Commission found the
estimates far off, dramatically underestimating the time it would take
for a country to procure or produce a ballistic missile.
The chairmen of the 9/11 Commission, Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton,
recognize the group think problem in their
[[Page S10528]]
September 8 Washington Post op-ed, and offer that their proposed
reforms ``institutionalize information-sharing, thus guaranteeing a
competitive airing of views.'' They further state:
We don't want dissent quashed by group-think; we want
competing analyses to be shared broadly . . .
But as key experts, like Henry Kissinger and Jim Schlesinger, point
out, it is valid to question whether centralized intelligence--which we
are now pursuing--encourages conformity, making the problem of group
think worse. At best, that structural change will do nothing to affect
the problem.
Last, but certainly not least, leadership is a problem that simply
cannot be solved legislatively. Conversely, good leadership can
potentially solve the other cultural issues I have identified.
Al-Qaida's attack on Washington and New York occurred after a long
period of poor leadership at the highest levels of the U.S. Government
regarding terrorism. Despite repeated assaults on the United States and
its interests, the U.S. Government was still unwilling to treat
terrorism as a true national security issue until after 9/11.
This was, of course, partly a failure of political leadership. But
the intelligence community is not absolved, either. The problem of
inadequate allocation of resources in the intelligence community, for
example, was at least partly a result of confused leadership in the
community. In spite of a 1998 declaration of war on al-Qaida by the
Director of Central Intelligence, two key organizations--namely, the
Defense Intelligence Agency and the Federal Aviation Administration--
were not allowed, though they offered, to throw their support behind
the antiterror effort.
Counterterrorism analytic centers were fragmented across the
administration at the Pentagon, the CIA, and various FBI locations.
Only after 9/11 did various intelligence and law enforcement entities
begin to put aside their parochialism and work together in a more
productive manner. And certainly reorganization was a partial fix for
the problem--in particular, the new Terrorist Threat Integration
Center, TTIC, which merges and analyzes all threat information in a
single location under the direction of the DCI, has been beneficial.
But, with better leadership of the intelligence community, the
condition would not have been so prevalent in the first place. It would
not have taken a monumental disaster for these entities to cooperate
more effectively with one another.
I would now like to briefly discuss visa reform. I am pleased that
the Collins-Lieberman bill, with the addition of Kyl amendment No.
3926, will at least tighten up immigration law to require, in statute,
that most temporary visa applicants be personally interviewed by State
Department consular officers during the application process, and that
all such applicants be required to actually complete their visa
applications to get a visa. Past misuse of immigration law allowed 15
of the 19 September 11 hijackers to enter the United States without
completing their applications or being interviewed.
Some might question why such State Department regulations need to be
included as statutory language in the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Section 214(b) of the INA governs the admission of nonimmigrants to the
United States. It presumes that an alien who applies for a temporary
visa actually intends to stay in the United States permanently ``until
he establishes to the satisfaction of the consular office'' that he
intends to stay temporarily. This means that the burden of proof is on
the alien to show that he is eligible to receive a visa and that he
will not overstay or otherwise violate the terms of the visa. Had the
State Department required its consular affairs officers to implement
section 214(b) correctly, and thus to conduct in-person interviews and
require that visa applications be completely and accurately filled out,
to meet the burden of proof requirement, the tragedy of 9/11 could have
been prevented.
The intent of Section 214(b) was not carried out by the State
Department consular affairs officers who issued visas to the 9/11
hijackers. Fifteen of the 19 men who flew hijacked airplanes into the
World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the Pennsylvania countryside were
Saudi nationals who should have been denied admission to the United
States under section 214(b) because their visa applications contained
inaccuracies or omissions. These were not trivial mistakes in spelling
or punctuation. The applications omitted such fundamental information
as: means of financial support, home address, and destination or
address while in the United States. According to an October 28, 2002
National Review article by Joel Mowbray under the title and subtitle
``Visas for Terrorists: They were ill-prepared. They were laughable.
They were approved,'' only one of the 15 applicants listed an actual
destination address for inside the United States. The rest listed
locations such as ``California,'' ``New York,'' or simply ``Hotel.''
Section 214(b) should also have been used to require face-to-face
interviews of those applying for nonimmigrant visas. Only two of the 15
Saudi hijackers were interviewed by State Department officials. Such
laxity by consular officers, however, occurred under guidelines and
practices put in place by senior State Department officials. According
to cables and other written notices sent over time by Mary Ryan, who
was Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs on September 11, 2001,
shortening the visa application process wherever possible was a ``very
worthy goal.''
Such top-down guidelines were explored in an October 2002 GAO report,
``Border Security: Visa Process Should Be Strengthened as Antiterrorism
Tool.'' The report says the State Department's written guidelines and
resulting practices for visa issuance allowed for ``widespread
discretionary adherence among consular officers in adhering to the
burden of proof requirements included in section 214(b).'' The GAO
report also says the State Department's ``Consular Best Practices
Handbook'' gave consular managers and staff the discretion to ``waive
personal appearance and interviews for certain nonimmigrant visa
applicants.''
The 9/11 Commission was provided detailed information about the State
Department's use of section 214(b) and its contribution, in my opinion,
to the tragedy of 9/11. In a letter to the 9/11 Commission on April 23,
2004, I said how important it was that the 9/11 Commission focus on the
State Department's contribution to the dysfunction of the visa-issuance
system prior to September 11. In a followup letter on May 13, 2004 to
the Commission, I stated that correct use of the statutory law
governing nonimmigrant visa issuance could have kept several, if not
all, of the 9/11 hijackers from entering the country.
The amendment that the bill managers have accepted is based on the
regulations promulgated by the State Department in the Foreign Affairs
Manual it issued after September 11. It requires that all aliens who
apply for a nonimmigrant visa submit to an in-person interview with a
consular affairs officer. Although the primary purpose of the in-person
interview is to determine whether an applicant will overstay his or her
visa, it is also a prime opportunity for a consular affairs officer to
gauge the intent of the applicant to try to make sure that the
applicant does not intend to harm the United States. I recognize that
not every person may have to be interviewed, so my amendment allows
applicants under the age of 12, individuals over the age of 65,
diplomats, and certain other individuals to be exempt from the in-
person interview requirement if the consular affairs officer deems it
appropriate.
My amendment also requires that, even if the nonimmigrant visa
applicant falls into a category for which an interview is not
necessarily required, one will be required if he is not a national of
the country in which he is applying for a visa; if he was previously
refused a visa; or if he is listed in the Consular Lookout and Support
System. CLASS is the State Department's database that lists all
applicants about whom the Department has security concerns. Finally, my
amendment requires that all applicants for nonimmigrant visas provide
complete and accurate information in response to every question on the
nonimmigrant visa application. This is to ensure that the application
is completely filled out and that the applicant has provided enough
information to meet the burden of proof required by section 214(b) of
the INA.
[[Page S10529]]
The codification of these few provisions will help ensure that
terrorists are not able to enter the country using legally issued
visas. Provisions to that effect ought to be in any piece of
legislation aimed at preventing additional terrorist attacks on this
country. I appreciate the willingness of Senators Collins and Lieberman
to work with me to modify the amendment to make it acceptable.
Before I close, I want to note that I have separately discussed
another related area in serious need of attention: making sure we have
the legal authorities and resources we need to effectively fight
terror. I had prepared several amendments on this topic, which I
intended to introduce to this bill, but because some Members
erroneously believed that these amendments were highly controversial, I
chose not to pursue them.
These amendments, one of which was my Tools for Terrorism, TFTA, bill
in its entirety, others of which were parts of that bill, should not
have been considered controversial. TFTA is not new--it is composed of
bills that have been pending, have been approved by the Justice
Department, and have been the subject of nine separate hearings. TFTA
consists of all or part of 11 bills currently pending in the House and
Senate. Every provision of the bill previously has either been
introduced as a bill in the House or Senate or had a committee hearing.
Every provision of the bill has the full support of the Justice
Department. Collectively, the provisions of this bill have been the
subject of nine separate hearings before House and Senate committees
and have been the subject of four separate committee reports.
Furthermore, collectively, the bills included in TFTA have been pending
before Congress for 13 years.
That said, in the interest of allowing the Senate to move forward
quickly, and noting that some of the provisions of my TFTA bill are
included in the House version of the Intelligence Reform bill, I have
decided to continue to try to press my case during the House-Senate
conference.
My intention today was not to create a sense of futility in this
body's efforts, but rather to express reservations about the proposed
solutions and highlight those areas I know need to be resolved if we
are to effectively wage the war on terror. A careful reading of the
congressional joint inquiry report, the Senate's Iraq intelligence
investigation, and the 9/11 Commission's narrative of the failures that
led to 9/11 all point to far deeper deficiencies than can be solved by
bureaucratic reorganization.
I plan to vote for this bill, but I do so recognizing that it is
imperfect, and also with the clear intention of continuing to press my
case for various modifications in conference.
Finally, while it is true that, if we do reform right, we will be
able to improve our intelligence, it will never be the case that our
intelligence is perfect. It is next to impossible to imagine every
possibly means by which we might be attacked. As Judge Richard Posner
points out in his New York Times Book review:
The [9/11 Commission] narrative points to something
different, banal and deeply disturbing; that it is almost
impossible to take effective action to prevent something that
hasn't occurred previously.
This does not mean we should not try; it does mean that we have to be
realistic about the limitations of intelligence.
Those limitations make solid political leadership all the more
important. Intelligence, diplomacy, military, law enforcement--these
are all tools in our arsenal to fight the war on terror and whatever
other threats may come our way. Decisionmakers must be willing to use
them effectively. That is what will offer our greatest protection
against another devastating attack.
Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, Congress has no more solemn obligation
than to ensure our Government can effectively defend the American
people. We must put America's security first.
The attacks of September 11 exposed serious weaknesses at every level
of our Government's response to terrorism.
Since that awful day, many of us in Congress have resolved to do
everything possible to understand how a handful of terrorists could
defeat the entire U.S. Government's defenses and then adapt those
defenses in order to prevent future attacks and make America safer.
The bill we are about vote on reflects the lessons of our inquiries.
It is thorough, thoughtful, bipartisan, and most important, rooted
firmly in the facts behind the greatest failure of American
intelligence in our lifetime.
When enacted, this legislation will improve our Government's ability
to disrupt and prevent the kind of devastating attacks we witnessed
that fateful day 3 years ago. In short, it will make America and
Americans more secure.
I can think of no more important action this Senate can take in the
remaining days of this session than to pass this legislation and move
it to a conference with the House.
Immediately following the attack of the World Trade Center and
Pentagon, Congress began a thorough investigation to uncover precisely
what went wrong in the days leading up to September 11.
The House and Senate Intelligence Committees conducted a bipartisan
inquiry.
They received thousands of pages of documents, conducted hundreds of
hours of hearings, and heard from scores of Government and
nongovernment witnesses who offered meaningful insights into what
happened and how.
The unanimous, bipartisan recommendations of that report were
available in December 2002.
Independent of this effort, President Bush had asked GEN Brent
Scowcroft, National Security Advisor to former President Bush, to
examine our intelligence community and suggest reforms that could make
it function more effectively.
According to press accounts, the recommendations of that
investigation were available in March 2002.
In addition, despite opposition from the White House, a strong
bipartisan coalition was forged in the Congress to establish an
independent, blue ribbon commission to investigate the circumstances
surrounding the 9/11 attacks and provide us with a roadmap for how to
improve our defenses, specifically those of our intelligence community.
The White House eventually gave the Commission its support and its
cooperation. The unanimous, bipartisan recommendations of that
commission were released in July 2004.
That is three separate investigations in less than 3 years--three
separate investigations that originated in either the Congress or the
Bush administration. Each investigation represented different points of
view and perspectives. Yet each investigation reached the same
conclusion: If our intelligence community is to respond quickly and
effectively to terrorism, there must be a single person in charge with
the authority to allocate resources and direct personnel. There must be
a single person responsible for setting the direction of our
intelligence operations.
And there must be a single person accountable for the success or
failure of those operations.
The legislation before us reflects the lessons learned from these
investigations and it is particularly faithful to the 9/11 Commission's
recommendations.
Not only does this legislation establish a national intelligence
director with real power, it goes on to make a series of fundamental
changes in the intelligence community and related Government agencies.
Just as important as what it does, is what it does not do. It does
not stray from the 9/11 Commission's recommendations. It avoids
extraneous issues that would have only brought divisiveness and delay
to this debate. Time is of the essence.
As Governor Kean said when releasing his commission's report:
Every day that passes is a day of increased risk if we do
not make changes.
America could not wait and the Senate wisely focused on the most
urgent challenges at hand.
I am especially grateful to Senators Collins and Lieberman, the
managers of this important legislation.
Shortly after the 9/11 Commission issued its report, Senator Frist
and I assigned them the difficult task of taking the Commission's
recommendations on the executive branch and producing a bill that
converts these proposals into legislative language.
[[Page S10530]]
They have not only done that, they have managed to grasp the details
of this complicated bill and produce strong bipartisan support for
their bill.
As I noted above, Senate passage will get this bill to a conference
with the House and their version of this legislation. Unfortunately, it
appears that some in the other body do not share this goal of swiftly
enacting the 9/11 Commission's recommendations. They do not believe we
should limit our work to the 9/11 Commission's work. Nor do they
believe our top goal should be to defeat terrorists rather than push
partisan political agendas.
Many of the people who are apparently willing to pursue this course
have fought real reform efforts from the start. They opposed forming
the 9/11 Commission. They opposed cooperating with the 9/11 Commission.
They opposed giving the Commission the time and funding it needed to do
its job. It is not surprising to learn now that they are now opposed to
giving the Commission's recommendations a fair hearing.
We can't afford to keep kicking this can down the road. It may seem
obvious, but there are some who seem not to understand that American
lives are at stake.
This is the best--and perhaps last--opportunity to enact meaningful
comprehensive reform legislation to make Americans more secure.
With today's strong bipartisan vote, the Senate can make a clear
statement that we are ready to seize this opportunity to protect
America and more effectively fight terrorism.
I hope our colleagues in the House who have opposed the Commission's
work to this point will be able at long last to set aside their
partisan agenda and follow the bipartisan example of the Senate.
The families of the victims of 9/11 and, indeed, all Americans should
expect no less from their elected representatives.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I want to voice my strong support for S.
2845, the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, and to commend my
colleagues on the Governmental Affairs Committee for their careful work
in drafting this important legislation. In producing this bill,
Senators Collins and Lieberman have managed to combine urgent action
with careful deliberation. I hope that this difficult balance can be
maintained in conference.
While the authors of this bill deserve our thanks, the fact is that
we would not be debating desperately needed intelligence reforms today
had it not been for the work of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks upon the United States--and for the work of the many concerned
Americans, including families of 9/11 victims, who fought to establish
the Commission and to protect its independence and authority. The 9/11
Commission worked hard to produce a thorough account of the facts
concerning what the various elements of the U.S. Government knew, what
action was taken to address the terrorist threat, and where
communication and coordination broke down. All Americans deserve
answers to these questions. And we have a duty to act on the
Commission's recommendations and to put this country on a firmer,
smarter footing to fight the terrorist forces that have attacked this
country and wish to attack us again.
At the same time, we know that reorganization for its own sake is
simply disruptive and distracting--a smokescreen of busy work and
changing flow charts that can obscure serious flaws rather than remedy
them. And needlessly trampling on the civil liberties, protected by our
Constitution and guarded by generations of Americans, in the name of
reform would be a horrible mistake. Hundreds of thousands of brave men
and women have died defending our freedoms throughout our history. We
cannot fail to guard those precious freedoms now.
The Senate bill creates a civil liberties board to evaluate new
policies and ensure that civil liberties concerns are considered as the
President and executive agencies propose and implement policies to
protect the Nation against terrorism. The Commission specifically
recommended the creation of such a board within the executive branch
that would have as its primary mission the protection of our citizens'
civil liberties. I am pleased that Senator Kyl agreed to withdraw an
amendment that would have undermined this provision. The supporters of
this amendment suggested that efforts to protect our privacy and civil
liberties will undermine the work of the intelligence and law
enforcement community. I respectfully disagree. Americans reasonably
expect their Federal Government to protect them from terrorism while
respecting their privacy and civil liberties. We can, and must, do
both.
The Collins-Lieberman bill is the right approach. It is important
that the privacy and civil liberties oversight provisions in this bill
be included in the final legislation that goes to the President's desk.
Similarly, it would be a grave mistake for the conference to add
extraneous provisions increasing the power of the Government, such as
those contained in another amendment offered by Senator Kyl that derive
from the so-called PATRIOT II proposal. We have not had the kind of
full and informed debate on these proposals that the 9/11 Commission
called for. For this bill to remain true to the Commission's
recommendations, it cannot be used as a way to bypass the very
deliberation that the Commission said is essential.
Even after we finish work on this bill, our work will be far from
complete. The Commission's intelligence reform proposals have been the
focus of most of the media attention surrounding the 9/11 report, and
they are at the heart of the legislative efforts in which we are
currently engaged. But the Commission's call for more focused,
effective ways to attack the terrorists and their organizations, and,
critically, to prevent the continued growth of terrorism, deserve
equally intense examination and action.
We need to make a long-term commitment to denying terrorists
sanctuaries, and to cultivating new generations of partners, not
enemies, overseas. As the ranking member of the Subcommittee on African
Affairs, I know that we do not have the intelligence resources or the
diplomatic resources that we should around the world. We do not really
have any policy at all to deal with Somalia, a failed state in which
terrorists have operated and found sanctuary. And there is a great deal
of work to be done to help countries in which we know terrorists have
operated to improve the basic capacities of border patrols who could
stop wanted individuals, and customs agents who could help stop weapons
proliferation and auditors who could freeze terrorist assets. And we
can do more to help root out the corruption that undermines these
safeguards at every turn.
I am pleased that the Senate accepted an amendment that I offered to
this bill, which arises from my experience with African affairs. I know
many Africanists are concerned about terrorist activity in the Sahel,
and the U.S. Government is working with partners in that region to
address this issue. Some of these same terrorists are based in north
Africa, above the Sahel, which various parts of the U.S. Government and
our own congressional committees consider to be a different region of
the world, one usually lumped together with the Middle East rather than
sub-Saharan Africa. In other words, getting counter-terrorism right in
Mali really requires understanding a number of things about Algeria,
and getting it right in the Horn of Africa requires an understanding of
Yemen as well as Kenya. But the policymakers who specialize in these
places don't necessarily work together.
These geographic stovepipes hamper good policy, and cap fragment the
picture that our intelligence community is able to piece together. And
it is not just Africa, and it is not just terrorism. Where National
Intelligence Centers are established with a specific regional focus,
the National Intelligence Director needs to ensure that regular contact
and cooperation among linked centers is institutionalized, not ad hoc.
My amendment strengthens information sharing, and signals Congress's
intent to ensure that the centers that are eventually established are
as effective as possible.
There is also much more to getting our policies right when it comes
to homeland security and emergency preparedness, and that work will
continue long after we complete work on this bill. We still lack a
comprehensive homeland security plan with clear priorities, deadlines,
and accountability.
[[Page S10531]]
Without such plans, it is not possible to properly target our homeland
security dollars to meet our most pressing needs. We are getting on the
right track, however. The Commission recommended that future
transportation security budgets be based on a thorough assessment of
threats and vulnerabilities, and I am pleased that the Senate adopted
my amendment to the fiscal year 2005 Department of Homeland Security
bill to require just that. Senator McCain also included a provision to
require a national transportation security strategy, and I was pleased
to support it. These steps will help, but there is more we must do.
I was also pleased to support the amendment offered by Senator
Collins to coordinate and simplify the homeland security grant process,
which is based on a bill I cosponsored. This important amendment will
make it much easier for local first responders to get funding by
reducing the many, and often redundant, grant application steps. The
amendment also gives local officials far more flexibility in spending
homeland security dollars, including paying for overtime costs
associated with homeland security tasks and training. Successful
programs, such as FIRE Act grants, the COPS program, and the Emergency
Management Performance Grant program, are protected in this
legislation. The amendment allocates funding based on threat, as
recommended by the Commission, but also maintains baseline funding so
that States and local officials can have a predictable stream of
funding to meet the homeland security needs faced by all jurisdictions.
This amendment will help simplify and rationalize the current homeland
security grant system. However, I agree with Senator Lieberman that
more resources must be allocated to meet our homeland security needs.
I hope that the conference is able to quickly agree upon a final
version of this bill that follows the Senate's approach and does not
contain extraneous and controversial provisions. And I look forward to
continuing to work with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to
ensure that what we have learned from the 9/11 Commission becomes a
part of how we do business every day. This intelligence reform bill is
a very good start, not the end, of the efforts we must make to bring
about real changes that will enhance our security and the security of
our children.
Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, first, let me again thank my colleagues
from Maine and Connecticut for their hard work preparing and bringing
an intelligence reform bill to the Senate floor. Reforming the
intelligence community is serious business, and I appreciate the
professional and thoughtful approach taken by the Government Affairs
Committee, especially the chairman and ranking member.
I rise today to express some of my concerns on S. 2845, the National
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004.
First, it is important to fully understand exactly why we are
debating the reformation of our intelligence community in the first
place. Our enemy has attacked us in new ways that no one ever thought
about or occurred before in the entire history of mankind. The attacks
on 9/11 were made on predominately civilian targets, using commercial
civilian airlines, loaded with totally innocent, ordinary citizens. No
one really planned for an attack of this nature because as a God-
fearing nation, it was hard to imagine that some human beings could be
so evil, so warped in their interpretation of their own religion that
they believe the slaughter of innocent people by the thousands is
somehow condoned or even approved by their God. Well, we now know the
nature of our enemy, and it is dangerous beyond anything we have known
in the past. And we are reminded of our enemy's evil nature every time
we see a video of an innocent person pleading for their life or being
beheaded in Iraq. These Islamic terrorists have in effect ``hijacked''
the Muslim faith, distorted it to meet their own twisted philosophy of
life, and we must stop them.
Let me be absolutely clear on this point: the Islamic terrorists want
to frighten us, they want to disrupt our economy and our way of life,
and they want to kill us; they will stop at nothing, including suicide
attacks to achieve their evil goals. I have said in this chamber many
times that effective intelligence is our first line of defense against
this enemy and only good intelligence will prevent them from ever again
attacking us on our own homeland.
That is why we are here today to put more ``teeth'' into our
intelligence community. We are here to debate and vote on legislation
that should provide more security for our citizens.
The Collins-Lieberman legislation that we are considering is a good
bill in many ways, but it only marks the beginning of a process to
rebuild our intelligence capabilities, not the end.
The bill establishes a National Intelligence Director; a position
that I view as the ``foundation'' upon which all other intelligence
reform measures will be built. However, there are some other measures
relative to intelligence reform that will require our attention as soon
as possible.
This bill leaves the intelligence community at fifteen members, eight
of which are in the Department of Defense. As you know, I had a
bipartisan amendment that was co-sponsored by my colleague from
Nebraska, Senator Ben Nelson, that would create a unified command for
military intelligence giving the new National Intelligence Director a
single point of contact for military-related intelligence requirements
and collection capabilities instead of eight. This is a major issue
that must be addressed soon; otherwise the National Intelligence
Director will have an unrealistically large span of control.
Collectively, the eight members of the intelligence community that
this bill leaves in the Department of Defense are huge, with tens of
thousands of people and multi-billion dollar budgets. How someone
outside of the Department of Defense, like the national intelligence
director, could adequately and efficiently manage these vast
intelligence capabilities by dealing with eight separate military
members is beyond me. Senator Nelson and I are committed to fix this
shortcoming by introducing a bill to create a unified combatant command
for military intelligence this coming January.
The Central Intelligence Agency is left intact in this bill, which is
the right decision. But the bill does not adequately address the
importance of human intelligence, HUMINT, or emphasize rebuilding this
critical capability. HUMINT is a dirty and dangerous occupation, and
it, more than any other intelligence discipline, will be the key to
eliminating al-Qaida and all other terrorist organizations. We really
owe our HUMINT case officers in the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, and other agencies all our thanks,
support, and the resources necessary to get the job done.
The portion of this bill that creates a civil liberties board with
broad subpoena power is particularly troubling to me. We need to take
more risks in HUMINT and we need to rebuild the morale of our HUMINT
collectors. What kind of message are we sending to our intelligence
agents in the field who are risking their lives to protect us by
creating a board designed to look over their shoulders and, which is
redundant to the President's Board on Safeguarding Americans' Civil
Liberties? We could create a morale problem throughout our intelligence
community that might take years to repair and, I hasten to add, at a
time when we need HUMINT more than ever to protect our citizens.
I am voting for S. 2845, the National Intelligence Reform Act of
2004, because it does establish the national intelligence director and
gives statutory authority for the newly created National
Counterterrorism Center. However, I will continually seek ways to
address my concerns with this bill, some of which I have mentioned
above. I want to reiterate again, that this bill marks only the
beginning of the process to reform our intelligence community, not the
end.
I yield the floor.
Mr. ENSIGN. Mr. President, I rise to discuss the recommendations of
the
9/11 Commission Report that deal with the integrity of our borders and
visitor access to America.
In the decade before 9/11, al-Qaida studied how to exploit gaps and
weaknesses in the passport, visa, and entry systems of the United
States and other countries. Al-Qaida actually set up its own passport
office in Kandahar and developed working relationships with
[[Page S10532]]
travel facilitators--travel agents, document forgers, and corrupt
government officials.
Since 9/11, some important steps have been taken to strengthen our
homeland security. While these efforts have made us safer, we are not
safe enough. A real world example was reported this past Saturday by
the Washington Post. Peru and the U.S. intercepted a criminal network
with possible al-Qaida links that smuggled Arabs into America after
receiving false papers in Lima. Keeping Americans secure means being
diligent on all fronts, at home and abroad.
The amendment that I am offering ties directly to two important
recommendations of the Commission Report prohibiting terrorist travel
to our country.
The first is the Commission recommendation that ``Targeting travel is
at least as powerful a weapon against terrorists as targeting their
money. . . Better technology and training to detect terrorist travel
documents are the most important immediate steps to reduce America's
vulnerability to clandestine entry.''
Americans need to know that every reasonable step is being taken to
ensure that those who would harm our country and our citizens do not
travel freely and easily into the United States. This is a task that
deserves our full attention when the vast number of travel documents
handled in our embassies, consulates, and border stations is
considered. Specialists must be developed and deployed in consulates
and at the border to detect terrorists through their travel practices,
including their documents.
Last year there were about seven hundred consular officers stationed
overseas in 211 posts. In addition to processing six million non-
immigrant visa applications and nearly 600,000 immigrant visa
applications, they provided a full range of services to American
citizens. Chronic understaffing has led to an over-reliance on foreign
workers to screen and review visa applications, jobs that normally
would be handled by American officers. This process leaves too many
gray areas; one mistake or intentional oversight in a foreign nationals
review of an application could mean the lives of thousands of
innocents. My amendment goes a long way to bolster the visa application
process by mandating that American consular officials review and
approve each and every immigrant and nonimmigrant visa application.
Over the last 2 years the State Department has hired an average of 65
new consular officials. That number has not proven enough. My amendment
provides the State Department the authority to increase the number of
consular officials by 150 each year for 4 years, ensuring that trusted
American resources are responsible for reviewing all visa applications.
Currently, consular officers only receive an overview in fraudulent
document training. My amendment mandates that these consular officers
are suitably trained in detecting fraudulent documents and document
forensics, prior to beginning their service.
Our due diligence cannot stop here.
The second Commission recommendation that relates to my amendment
states that we should ``. . . raise U.S. and border security standards
for travel and border crossing over the medium and long term . . .''
The Commission goes on to say that ``It is elemental to border security
to know who is coming into the country. Today more than 9 million
people are in the United States outside the legal immigration system.''
Pre-9/11 the INS had only about 2,000 agents for interior enforcement
and only 9,800 border patrol agents. With the priorities of the agency
concentrated on immigration and narcotics, our northern border was
often neglected and no major counterterrorism effort was underway.
These gaps in our security created a weakness that allowed the loss of
over 3,000 innocent citizens. More robust enforcement of routine
immigration laws could have made a difference.
We must have the resources to be able to detect and, if need be,
detain terrorists who seek entry through our borders. My amendment
makes providing the necessary personnel for border security and
immigration enforcement a top priority. It provides authority to
increase the number of border patrol agents by 1,000 each year for a 5-
year period. It also increases the number Immigration and Customs
Enforcement investigators by 800 per year for a period of 5 years.
The Commission found that many of the 19 9/11 hijackers, including
known operatives, could have been watchlisted and were vulnerable to
detection by border authorities; however, without adequate staff and
coordinated efforts, the evildoers were allowed unhampered entry.
The world has changed dramatically since 9/11 when the evil doers
used our open and trusting society against us. We can not allow a
repeat of that tragedy. This amendment will allow those who guard our
frontiers the tools they need to ensure the safety of the citizens of
the United States of America.
Ms. SNOWE. Mr President, I rise to address a very specific but
invaluable component of the intelligence reform package before us
today.
As many may know, before the release of the 9/11 Commission report
earlier this year, I introduced stand-alone legislation--cosponsored by
Senator Mikulski--creating an Inspector General for Intelligence. The
``Intelligence Community Accountability Act of 2004'' proposed an
independent inspector general for the entire intelligence community--
all fifteen agencies and department members. I introduced this
legislation largely as a result of my experience as a member of the
Senate Intelligence Committee which undertook a year-long investigation
on the pre-war intelligence of Iraq.
I commend the efforts and tremendous work of the authors of the
underlying bill--they have embraced the concept and spirit of my
earlier bill and have included language in their legislation creating
an Inspector General for the National Intelligence Director. I would
also like to thank Senators Roberts, Mikulski and Feinstein for their
support in being original cosponsors of an amendment I was prepared to
offer on this subject. I will not offer that amendment but I want to
make clear my intentions to continue working for better and more
comprehensive accountability in our intelligence community.
In that vein, I want to express my strong opposition to any amendment
or proposal that would weaken the language on the authorities and
powers of the NID's inspector general. Any such amendment, if accepted
or approved, would be a grave step backward in an area that is in
critical need of a step forward. . . . I am of course talking about
accountability in the intelligence community.
Any amendment to scale back the IG provisions of the bill would fly
in the face of the 521-page report that followed the committee's
investigation on Iraq pre-war intelligence and would ignore vital
problems of information sharing that have been found throughout the
community.
Any inspector general who is to serve the National Intelligence
Director must have the power and authority to access employees and
information in the agencies that lie in the national intelligence
program. How can an IG be effective if his hands are tied because of
turf battles and arguments over jurisdiction?
My preference would be to enhance some of the authorities of the
NID's inspector general as proposed by the underlying bill, but I would
rather work to preserve the bill's language as it exists now than to
gut it through the passage of any proposal that rescinds the abilities
of the IG to delve into the coordination and communication between and
among the various entities of the intelligence community.
Issues of accountability have often been central to the work we as
Senators do in seeking to bring better government to our constituents--
particularly when matters of national security are at stake.
I saw firsthand the consequences of serious inadequacies in
accountability during my 12 years as a member of the House Foreign
Affairs International Operations Subcommittee and as Chair of the
International Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. During the 99th Congress, I worked to bring the State
Department Accountability Review Board into fruition as part of the
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986.
[[Page S10533]]
Among other issues, it was a lack of accountability that permitted
the radical Egyptian Sheik Rahman, the mastermind of the first World
Trade Center bombing in 1993, to enter and exit the U.S. five times
totally unimpeded even after he was put on the State Department's
Lookout List in 1987, and allowed him to get permanent residence status
by the INS even after the State Department issued a certification of
visa revocation. In 1995 and again after the terrorist attacks of 9/11,
I introduced legislation establishing Terrorist Lookout Committees in
our embassies and consulates abroad--all in an effort to create more
accountability in the protection of our homeland.
In this same vein, my membership on the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence has allowed me to realize that the need for greater levels
of accountability in our intelligence community is and must be a
priority. It is all too evident that in addressing the key concerns and
problems seen in the management of our intelligence agencies,
accountability is an area unquestionably in need of dramatic
improvement.
I am pleased that as intelligence community reform has gained
momentum, the concept of an inspector general has been very much a part
of the debate. Indeed, an inspector general is included in the broad
and comprehensive intelligence reform legislation authored by Senator
Feinstein--legislation that I was proud to co-sponsor earlier this
year.
An inspector general for the whole intelligence community was also
included in reform legislation offered by Senator Graham, the former
chairman of the Senate intelligence community. Language creating a
community-wide inspector general was contained in the proposal
by current Intelligence Committee Chairman Roberts as well as the
recent bill offered by Senators McCain and Lieberman.
And as I indicated, an inspector general is included in the
underlying bill crafted by the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee. I
commend and, once again, thank all of my colleagues for including this
key component in their proposals. This bill takes a step forward in
addressing the key issue of intelligence community accountability and
it should not be weakened by any additional amendments or
modifications.
The belief that any new Director of National Intelligence should have
an independent inspector general is one that few seriously dispute. In
testimony before the intelligence committee in July, former Deputy
Secretary of Defense John Hamre stated that an inspector general ``will
help far more in driving and shaping the quality of outputs from this
community.'' And Secretary of State Colin Powell called an inspector
general a ``good idea'' while speaking before the Governmental Affairs
Committee.
When I first drafted and then introduced my stand-alone legislation
in early June, I had certainly envisioned that the inspector general
the bill would establish would reside within a newly re-organized
intelligence community. When I introduced my bill, I stated then that
it was intended to be part of a larger initiative to overhaul the
entire intelligence community's organizational structure. We have
reached that point, and I am here today to continue my efforts to
ensure that the final product the Senate approves contains the best
possible mechanisms to bring accountability to the community.
As I indicated earlier, I have participated in this national debate
on bettering our diplomatic, intelligence and national security
services on many fronts and for many years. But it was as a member of
the Senate Intelligence Committee, which spent a year reviewing the
pre-war intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs,
the regime's ties to terrorism, Saddam Hussein's human rights abuses
and his regime's impact on regional stability that I realized the real
and dire need for intelligence community change.
In looking at the intelligence community, we must remember that it is
an amorphous entity made of up fifteen agencies, parts of departments,
and independent bodies all spread out within our Federal Government.
They each have their own mission, chain of command, procedures, history
and institutional paradigms. The necessity for a stronger, independent
head of the intelligence community became obvious to me and that
measures must be legislated and instituted to hold the community and
its amalgamation of agencies more accountable for the failures and
shortcomings we had discovered.
The committee's report on the pre-war intelligence on Iraq revealed
systemic flaws in the intelligence community, perhaps, most notably in
many instances, a stunning lack of accountability and sound, ``hands-
on'' management practices. These poor management practices contributed
to the mis-characterization of intelligence reporting on Iraq's WMD
programs.
I recognize that intelligence analysis is an imprecise art, with
rarely--if ever--any absolutes; however, our report revealed that many
judgements regarding Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs and
capabilities were based on old assumptions allowed to be carried over
year after year, virtually unchecked and unchallenged, without any
critical re-examination of the issue.
In short, there was a lack of analytic rigor performed on one of the
most critical and defining issues spanning more than a decade--that of
the preponderance of weapons of mass destruction within Iraq and the
looming threat they posed to Iraq's neighbors and to the U.S.
Intelligence community managers, collectors and analysts believed
that Iraq had WMDs, a notion that dates back to Iraq's pre-1991 efforts
to retain, build and hide those programs. In many cases, the
committee's report showed that the intelligence community made
intelligence information fit into its preconceived notions about Iraq's
WMD programs.
From our review, we know the intelligence community relied on sources
that supported its predetermined ideas, and we also know that there was
no alternative analysis or ``red teaming'' performed on such a critical
issue, allowing assessments to go unchallenged. This loss of
objectivity or unbiased approach to intelligence collection and
analysis led to erroneous assumptions about Iraq's WMD program.
For example, the committee's review showed that analysts minimized
reporting from a biological weapons source because the source reported
information that did not fit with their beliefs about the existence of
mobile biological weapons facilities.
We also know that the key judgment in the National Intelligence
Estimate that Iraq was developing an unmanned aerial vehicle ``probably
intended to deliver biological warfare agents'' overstated what was in
the intelligence reporting. This review revealed that some intelligence
community UAV analysts failed to objectively assess significant
evidence that clearly indicated that non-biological weapons delivery
missions were more likely.
In addition, the committee's report revealed that, despite
overwhelming evidence suggesting that the aluminum tubes Iraq was
trying to procure were for artillery rockets, some intelligence
community analysts rejected information and analysis from experts,
including the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Department of
Energy, who refuted the claim that the tubes were being procured for
use in Iraq's nuclear weapons program. This information was rejected
because it did not fit into some analysts' notion that Iraq was
procuring these tubes as part of its nuclear reconstitution effort.
Clearly stated, the intelligence community failed to ``think outside
the box,'' a phrase often used by the community's analytic cadre to
describe more innovative approaches to examining a problem set.
Critical thinking and objectivity are crucial elements in both the
collection and analytic trade crafts and ought to be ingrained, by
appropriate training and effective oversight by management, in every
collector and analyst entering the ranks of the intelligence community.
Management has the responsibility to ensure analysts are trained to
produce--and actually produce--the best, most objective, unvarnished
assessments, and both management and the analysts and collectors have
the responsibility to ensure that their trade-craft is practiced
properly.
Along this same line of accountability, our report revealed how poor
leadership and management resulted in the intelligence community's
failure to convey the uncertainties in many of
[[Page S10534]]
the assessments in the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's
Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction.
For example, the intelligence community assessed that Iraq had mobile
transportable facilities for producing biological warfare agents but
failed to alert intelligence consumers that this assessment was based
primarily on reporting from a single human intelligence source to whom
the intelligence community never had direct access and with whom there
were credibility problems.
In the analysis on Iraq's chemical weapons activities, the
intelligence community failed to explain that several assessments were
based on layers of analysis of a single stream of intelligence
reporting regarding the presence of a tanker truck that was assessed to
be involved in the possible transshipment of chemical munitions.
Finally, during coordination sessions with Secretary Powell in
preparation for his speech before the United Nations in February 2003,
the intelligence community was instructed to include in the
presentation only corroborated, solid intelligence.
In fact, from our review we learned that the DCI told a national
intelligence officer who was also working on the speech to ``back up
the material and make sure we had good stuff to support everything.''
When Secretary Powell spoke before the UN, he said that every statement
he was about to make would be ``backed up by sources, solid sources . .
. based on solid intelligence.''
Incredibly, from our review, we know that much of the intelligence
provided or cleared by the CIA for inclusion in Secretary Powell's
speech was incorrect and uncorroborated. For example, the IC never
alerted Secretary Powell that most of the intelligence regarding Iraq's
mobile biological warfare program came from one source with
questionable credibility nor did anyone alert Secretary Powell to the
fact one of the sources cited in his speech was deemed to be a
fabricator--something known by IC analysts since the May 2002 issuance
of a ``fabrication notice.''
An independent, over-arching community-level inspector general who
can delve into the communication between and among agencies, or the
lack thereof, can assist in bridging the disconnects that lead to such
failures. This IG should be properly empowered to reach into and across
the bureaucratic and organization lines that separate each community
agency so that next time, if the Department of Energy's assessments
about the intended use of aluminum tubes by a dangerous regime are
ignored or cast aside, someone can be held accountable.
There is no question that the intelligence community requires
systemic changes. We are here today to do just that. Americans have a
right to know that their intelligence services are doing the best job
possible in protecting their security. I say this even while I must
recognize the dedication and professionalism of the thousands of
Americans who make up our intelligence community.
Each day across this country and around the world, they labor, mostly
without recognition, to keep this country safe from harm. Our
intelligence employees work under very demanding conditions and in
environments that are extremely dangerous and can often shift without
notice.
It is their vigilance upon which we rely to give us the forewarning
necessary to counter the many dangers present in our world. Although it
is impossible to directly express our deep appreciation for their
efforts, we have an obligation to express our eternal gratitude to
those who serve America so well.
Yet, however appreciative we are of the service done by those who
work in the fifteen agencies that make up our nation's intelligence
community, we as a Congress have a responsibility to continue to work
to find ways to help them do an even better job, and more importantly,
to ensure that any failures are not repeated and that we learn from
past mistakes. At the same time, we have an obligation to the people of
this country to ensure that both pride and comfort in our intelligence
services exist. The people of this Nation, and those of us elected to
represent them, have a right to know that when mistakes are made,
corrections soon follow. That is what brings us here today.
I ask unanimous consent that a chart entitled ``Decades of
Terrorism'' be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Decades of Terrorism
Oct. 23, 1983--Beirut Barracks bombing; Dec. 12, 1983--US
Embassy bombing, Kuwait; Sept. 20, 1984--East Beirut bombing;
Dec. 3, 1984--Kuwait Airways hijacking; April 12, 1985--
Madrid restaurant bombing.
June 14, 1985--TWA flight 847 hijacking; Oct. 7, 1985--
Achille Lauro attack; Dec. 18, 1985--Rome and Vienna
bombings; April 2, 1986--TWA flight 840 bombing; April 5,
1986--Germany disco bombing.
Dec. 21, 1988--Pan-Am Flight 103 bombing; Feb. 26, 1993--
World Trade Center bombing; Nov. 13, 1995--US Military HQ
attack, Saudi Arabia; June 5, 1996--Khobar Towers bombing;
Aug. 7, 1998--US Embassy bombings in Africa.
Oct. 12, 2000--USS Cole attack; Sept. 11, 2001--9/11; May
12, 2003--Housing compound bombing in Saudi Arabia; May 29-
31, 2004--Saudi oil company attacks; June 11-19, 2004--Paul
Johnson kidnaping/execution.
9/11 Commission Report
``The massive departments and agencies that prevailed in
the great struggles of the twentieth century must work
together in new ways, so that all the instruments of national
power can be combined.''
Ms. SNOWE. This chart beside me illustrates in the starkest of terms,
what we are dealing with. . . ..and what this legislation is all about.
I call the contents of this chart to the attention of my colleagues to
serve as a reminder of ``the big picture.'' The goal of this reform
movement is and has always been to make sure our intelligence agencies
are better equipped, organized and managed so that we are in a greater
position to detect threats and stop attacks. We want an intelligence
community that is better prepared to ensure we don't keep adding to
this list.
I also refer my colleagues to a quote from the preface of the 9/11
Commission Report: ``The massive departments and agencies that
prevailed in the greatest struggles of the twentieth century mush work
together in new ways, so that all the instruments of national power can
be combined.'' This bill we are debating today speaks directly to this
charge. And it is my view that a strong Inspector general is a vital
component of that effort.
An inspector general will help to enhance the authorities of the
National Intelligence Director that we will shortly create, assisting
this person in instituting better management accountability, and
helping him/her to resolve problems within the intelligence community
systematically.
Ideally, the inspector general for intelligence should have the
ability to investigate current issues within the intelligence
community, not just conduct ``lessons learned'' studies. The IG should
have the abilities to seek to identify problem areas and identify the
most efficient and effective business practices required to ensure that
critical deficiencies can be addressed before it is too late, before we
have another intelligence failure, before lives are lost.
In short, an inspector general for intelligence that can look across
the entire intelligence community will help improve management,
coordination, cooperation and information sharing among the
intelligence agencies. A strong, effective IG will help break down the
barriers that have perpetuated the parochial, stove-pipe approaches to
intelligence community management and operations.
As I stated earlier, I was prepared to offer an amendment that would
have expanded on the language already included in the underlying bill--
but let me be clear, there are many positive aspects of the inspector
general as contained in this bill.
I am pleased, for example, that the bill ensures independence of the
IG by including a separate budget account for his office. I also
welcome the language pertaining to staffing, reports, subpoena powers
and complaint procedures.
I have no doubt that the authors of the underlying bill and I share
the same goal--an independent IG with proper authorities to assist in
preventing some of the failures I've detailed here today.
As the Chairman of the intelligence committee stated last week on the
Senate floor, members of the committee received a frightening briefing
[[Page S10535]]
last week in closed session where we were told that despite the current
terrorist threat we face, and the high state of alert we live under,
information sharing between the intelligence agencies is still not
taking place and no one is holding anyone accountable for their failure
to do so.
Too many incidents of failure to prevent attacks, failure to properly
collect the needed intelligence, failure to adequately analyze that
intelligence and failure to share information within the community beg
for better accountability in the entirety of the community. Who better
to do this than a single IG, who can reach across the community, work
with the existing individual agency IG's, and confront any problem with
a macro, overarching view? It is my hope that the new inspector general
for the NID, as authorized in this bill, will take great strides to
guarantee that information sharing and accountability are woven into
the fabric of the intelligence community. Mr. President, this is the
whole reason we are here today.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thought I would take this moment of
quiet on the floor--we are just about a half hour away from voting
final passage of this bill--to thank my staff and the staff of Senator
Collins, which is led by Michael Bopp. My staff is led by Joyce
Rechtschaffen and Kevin Landy, who has been a team leader on this
effort. It has been a mighty team. They worked very hard to help
Senator Collins and me put the hearings together on the 9/11 Commission
Report; to work, many of them, over August in addition to working on
the hearings, to draft the legislation I introduced with Senator McCain
to adopt the nonintelligence parts of the Commission report, and then
to work in the week and a half--this being the eighth day of
consideration on the floor--to see this bill at the point it is now.
I am very proud that the committee, in the first instance, and now
the Senate itself, has responded to the challenge of the 9/11
Commission Report. But, more to the point, it has responded to the
deficiencies in our current systems of intelligence and homeland
security generally and brought forth a bill that I am convinced, if we
can hold it through conference, which we certainly intend to do, will
make the American people a lot safer in an age of terrorism.
I want to list the names of all the members of my staff who have
worked so hard to bring this legislation to the edge of adoption: Mike
Alexander, David Barten, Rajesh De, Chistine Healey, Larry Novey, Holly
Idelson, Beth Grossman, Mary Beth Shultz, Andrew Weinschenk, Fred
Downey, Kathy Sedden, Donny Williams, Jason Yanussi, Dave Berick, Adam
Sedgewick, Megan Finlayson, Rachel Sotsky, Tim Profeta, William
Bonvillian, Laurie Rubenstein, Leslie Phillips, Chuck Ludlam, and Janet
Burrell.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, while the distinguished comanager of the
bill is on the floor--I am sorry Senator Collins is not on the floor--
on behalf of the whole Senate, we need to extend to you our
congratulations. We all applaud and commend the great work done. This
has been a very difficult job. While those of us who were home in
August, doing the things we do--having townhall meetings and doing
campaign events--you and Susan were here doing work to get us in a
position so when we came back here there would be an instrument that
you could recommend to the other members of your committee who worked
with you during this downtime in August--most of it down. This vehicle
is now about to be completed. It is a sea change. It is the first part
of what the 9/11 Commission recommended, and it is good work. The
Senator from Connecticut and Senator Collins should feel very good
about their accomplishment. I think it is not only a significant
improvement from what we had, it is a sea change in what we had before.
The American people are going to be safer as a result of this. Congress
is going to be more responsible as a result.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank my friend from Nevada for his
kind words. I thank him for his characteristic presence and support on
the floor.
This has been an extraordinary chapter in my own legislative career
here and one that I am very grateful to have had. It has been a real
honor to work with Senator Collins. I think from the beginning she and
I went into this process having had a good relationship working on the
committee as Chair and ranking member. This was a moment where we
should be working together without any regard to party liabilities or
party caucuses; this was an urgent matter of national security.
America was attacked on 9/11, 2001. The 9/11 Commission report was an
indictment of various parts of our intelligence and security systems--
border security, for instance--and an appeal for urgent action to close
those gaps, to strengthen where we are vulnerable; again, an enemy to
cause us harm and death, the likes of which we have never faced before;
as someone else wrote, ``an enemy who hates us more than they love
their own lives.''
Senator Collins and I from the beginning went forward on not only a
bipartisan basis but on a nonpartisan basis--which turned out to be the
case in our committee as well--and with the strong support of the
bipartisan leadership of Senator Frist and Senator Daschle. That has
been the case on the floor of the Senate.
I am proud to say that I believe the proposal came from the
Governmental Affairs Committee as a strong proposal. I feel that within
a half hour of moving to final passage it has grown stronger as a
result of action taken by the full Senate on the floor.
There is work yet to be done. Obviously, passing the Senate doesn't
make it law; we have to go to conference and present something to the
President which he can sign. But I think everyone here has caught the
moment of urgency and responded to it in the national interest. This is
a great way for us to end this session. I am speaking now apart from
the national security implications--just what service in the Senate is
all about and what message we send to the American people.
The message here is not just in the content of this law proposal but
in the way we have done it, which is we are capable still in an
increasingly political or partisan time, particularly prior to a
national election, to put all that aside and do what is best for the
American people.
I note the presence on the floor of my friend and colleague from
Arizona. He and I have worked very hard together.
We thank our colleagues on both sides. In addition to the core parts
of the Governmental Affairs Committee bill which adopted the critical
intelligence recommendations of the 9/11 Commission establishing a
national intelligence director, a national counterterrorism center,
Senator McCain and I offered amendments which accomplish and respond to
all of the other major recommendations of the 9/11 Commission with
regard to border security, for instance, and foreign policy; outreach
to the Muslim world so that this bill, as we are ready to vote on it,
really meets the challenges of the 9/11 Commission and responds to the
pleas of the families who lost loved ones on 9/11 to do whatever we
humanly could to make sure nothing like 9/11 ever happens again in the
United States of America. I believe the product we are about to vote on
does exactly that.
I thank the Chair and note the presence of other colleagues on the
floor. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Cornyn). The Senator from New Hampshire.
Mr. SUNUNU. Mr. President, I rise at this time as we head toward a
vote on final passage to voice my strong support for this legislation.
But equally important, I wish to pay tribute to the work of Senator
Lieberman and Senator Collins in fashioning this legislation in a
bipartisan way. I am pleased to serve on the Governmental Affairs
Committee with both of them.
This has been put together in a way that reflects the core
recommendations of the September 11 Commission. It takes our
intelligence-gathering system and creates a strong intelligence
director but gives that director the kind of budget and personnel
responsibility that will enable him to be effective as we continue to
fight a long war on terrorism--a global fight the length of which we
can't determine right now but whose priority and importance is
undisputed. It takes all of the assets of our intelligence-gathering
network--the assets that serve our national intelligence operation but
puts them
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under the national intelligence director--and gives that director the
authority and the flexibility that is going to be necessary to be
effective.
It deals with important issues such as border security and
transportation today under the responsibility of the Commerce
Committee. It creates a counterterrorism center--something that has
already been done. But it is important that we authorize the
counterterrorism center which is going to be responsible for putting
together all of our efforts in dealing with terrorist threats,
collecting and distributing that to law enforcement officials, and
making sure that our objective of identifying threats to this country,
whether it is through financing or the movement of personnel and
materials, is done effectively.
While this legislation responds to the September 11 Commission
recommendations, I think it is also important to recognize that the
September 11 Commission report dealt with the weaknesses that led to
the attacks in New York City and Washington and the downing of the
plane in Pennsylvania. In order for this legislation to be effective,
we need to continue to make sure all of our intelligence assets are
focused on the future. There are going to be new threats and new
challenges in what will be an evolving fight. The counterterrorism
center is going to have to evolve over time to deal with new threats
from different parts of the world.
We are going to have to improve our techniques for information
sharing. We are going to have to develop new technologies for
information gathering around the world. We will have to continue to
improve our human intelligence system--something that was,
unfortunately, lacking in the years which led up to September 11. This
is going to be a continuing process of change.
I think it is most important that this legislation creates the
infrastructure and a culture and a leadership structure that can
respond to these changes which can evolve with the times and that can
deal with the unexpected.
If there is one thing we can be sure of, it is that the fighting of
terrorism around the world will include many unexpected, unpredictable
events. But if we are to succeed, we want to make sure our
intelligence-gathering operation has all the tools and the support that
is necessary.
This is a very strong piece of legislation. It was put together in a
bipartisan way, but it is not strong because it is bipartisan. I think
it is receiving the bipartisan support because it is a strong,
thoughtful piece of legislation.
We have a lot of work left to do. We are going to go to a conference
with the House, and that in and of itself will be a long process to
overcome any differences in the legislation. But I hope in the end and
I believe in the end this will be a bill that makes our intelligence-
gathering capability and our ability to fight terrorism around the
world stronger and which will meet with the core and the thrust of the
September 11 Commission report.
Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, later this afternoon the Senate is
expected to adopt an amendment by the majority leader that establishes
a national counterproliferation center. Establishing such a center now
is premature and prejudges the ongoing work of the WMD Commission on
which I have the honor of serving.
I am one who said we have to get this done, and have done everything
under my power to be of some small assistance to the managers of the
bill to complete our work on the 9/11 Commission's recommendations. So
I find myself in kind of an interesting position saying that we ought
to slow down on this one, but I am saying it because this issue was not
addressed by the 9/11 Commission.
The President asked the WMD Commission to examine whether the U.S.
Government should establish a national counterproliferation center and
to offer our recommendation. If I may quote from the President's
remarks on the day that he announced the establishment of the WMD
Commission:
Given the growing threat of weapons and missile
proliferation in our world, it may also be necessary to
create a similar center in our government to bring together
our intelligence analysis planning and operations to track
and prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. I
asked the committee commission headed by Judge Laurence
Silberman and Senator Chuck Robb to determine the merits of
creating such a center.
In other words, the WMD Commission has been chartered to determine
the creation of such a center. I have to tell my colleagues, as a
member of that Commission, we have not yet reached a point where we
could either recommend or not recommend. The Commission and its staff
have held a number of discussions on the desirability of establishing a
counterproliferation center, and we will soon examine the structure and
responsibilities that such a center might entail, if it should be
established at all. In response to the President's specific request, we
will issue a formal recommendation in our final report in March.
This amendment could seriously undermine the work of the WMD
Commission. The amendment would establish a national
counterproliferation center before the Commission has even had a chance
to fully study the issue. Rather than waiting for an in-depth review of
the pros and cons of moving ahead with such a center--a review that
will be fully completed in March--this amendment goes ahead and does it
anyway. The proponents of this amendment, and I understand that, have
argued that the center would not be established for a year after
enactment of the underlying bill and the structures and
responsibilities could be changed later. But if we are planning to
delay establishing the center for a year and if we are open to changes
which would presumably require changes in law, then why are we passing
this amendment? Why interrupt the work of the WMD Commission when we
could have the benefit of their assessment in a few months?
If the WMD Commission concludes no center is needed, or something
different is more appropriate, then it would be very hard to find an
opportunity to take this recommendation into account, short of passing
legislation that will rescind this amendment if it is enacted.
I don't believe we should interfere with the WMD Commission's work.
What we should do is allow all of the facts to be considered and
debated, and then we can take the appropriate actions at that time.
Let's make no mistake, establishing this center would be a very
significant action by the Congress. It cuts to the heart of the
security issues that we all agree are critical to our Nation. We need
to make sure that if we are going to do this, we do it right. We should
await the WMD Commission's report, hear a variety of opinions, and
structure the center, if it is needed, in a way that makes the most
sense of the task at hand. We should not take the shortcuts on an issue
of such importance, but I am afraid we are on the verge of doing just
that.
We owe it to the American people to fully assess the implications of
building a national counterproliferation center. This will be far
reaching. I don't believe any Members have had a chance to examine this
in any detail. The amendment puts the cart before the horse and I
strongly oppose it.
I repeat again, the 9/11 Commission did not address the issue of
counterproliferation. They addressed a broad variety of issues but
counterproliferation was not one of them. And weapons of mass
destruction, in the sense of the charter of the WMD Commission, was not
part of their deliberations.
I have strongly supported the 9/11 Commission recommendations. I am
proud of the work Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman have done in
addressing every single one of the 9/11 Commission recommendations with
the exception of two that have to do with the congressional
reorganization.
Having said that, this amendment is out of the purview of the
September 11 Commission and, frankly, out of the purview of this
pending legislation.
The majority leader has assured me there will be language, certain
caveats about how it could be changed, et cetera, and I appreciate
that. We have had a significant dialog on the issue. But the difference
I have with the amendment and the majority leader is basically that we
have said we are going to establish this national counterproliferation
center, period.
[[Page S10537]]
This is not an issue of national emergency. I think it does a
disservice to the WMD Commission on which I serve, which would report
out in March their recommendations and conclusions, and we would be
acting, then, on far firmer ground.
Maybe we can talk about it more after this bill is passed. I know the
White House has severe reservations about this amendment. Maybe we
could continue a dialog on it and at least make this amendment
significantly more palatable so that the Weapons of Mass Destruction
Commission recommendations that come out in March can be fully and
completely considered.
I thank the majority leader for his commitment to maintaining a
dialog on this issue. I may not be able to speak again in the Senate,
but I again express my profound and deep appreciation to Senator
Collins and Senator Lieberman who have displayed adequately for all
Americans as well as Members of this body that if there is a cause
great enough and people good enough that we will act in a bipartisan
fashion for the good of this Nation.
I have been in this body for only 18 years, but this is one of my
prouder moments because of the way this entire body has acted in the
national interest.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
Amendment No. 3895, as Further Modified
Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I rise to comment on the amendment we will
be voting on in a bit. It does center on the establishment of a
counterproliferation center.
I appreciate the comments of my distinguished colleague from Arizona.
We have had the opportunity to talk over the course of today about this
amendment and we have a modification. I have talked to the White House
and, based on that conversation, made further modifications.
The reason we should vote on this amendment and it should be a part
of this package that we can all be very proud of passing here in 10,
15, or 20 minutes is that the greatest threat facing our country is not
a terrorist. We all know it is not just the terrorists. The greatest
threat is a terrorist armed with some sort of weapon of mass
destruction.
In debate the other night before 60 million people, President Bush
and Senator Kerry cited the nexus between proliferation and terrorism
being their single greatest concern and the most significant challenge
our country faces. This whole concept of counterproliferation--talk
about a counterproliferation center is not a new idea, but it is a new
component of U.S. policy and has been looking at the safety and
security of the American people and an overhaul of our intelligence
gathering and intelligence system. The counterproliferation is an
important component to be addressed.
Counterproliferation is a broad topic and it includes everything the
United States and its allies do to halt, to deter, to stop, to roll
back the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery
systems and related materials.
It means interdicting these dangerous materials before they get into
the hands of the world's most dangerous terrorists. It means stopping
these items before terrorist groups can assemble them into weapons and
deliver them to our homeland.
Again, we are talking about counterproliferation, not just
counterterrorism. But counterproliferation also means unraveling those
proliferation networks that supply, sustain, finance, and enable
proliferation suppliers and customers. They are the linkages and supply
chains between countries that proliferate, firms that proliferate,
middlemen, and their customers around the globe.
The most famous network unraveled by the U.S. and its partners was
the AQ Khan network. It was this network that supplied Libya, Iran, and
possibly others, with nuclear equipment, materials, and know-how.
Counterproliferation works, but it takes close cooperation, it takes
close coordination, and it takes teamwork within the United States, and
with our friends and allies around the world.
The most famous interdiction of recent times was the stopping of the
BBC China, a ship that was delivering nuclear parts and components to
Libya before being interdicted at a friendly port by some of our
European allies. This interdiction had a major effect on prompting
Colonel Qadhafi to come clean and to give up his programs.
With more and more countries possibly pursuing weapons of mass
destruction programs, and with those same proliferators skirting
international laws, treaties, and export control regimes,
counterproliferation can help fill the gap and slow or stop this
dangerous trade.
The President's Proliferation Security Initiative was a positive step
in this direction, but there is more that we can do and we should do.
This amendment directs what we can and should do.
The President's Proliferation Security Initiative is supported by
over 60 countries, and nearly two dozen are active participants. As we
expand globally, however, we, at the same time, need to develop
internally. Indeed, the 9/11 Commission called for strengthening the
Proliferation Security Initiative in its report and its
recommendations.
Establishing a National Counterterrorism Center is necessary. We are
doing that. But the National Counterterrorism Center will be focusing
on terrorists and terrorist groups. The Nation needs a similar center
that, working closely with the National counterterrorism Center, will
focus, clarify, and coordinate our country's counterproliferation
efforts.
In other words, as the counterterrorism center focuses on the
customers, the end users of these dangerous weapons--the terrorists--
the national counterproliferation center will be focusing on the
suppliers and brokers and distributors of these weapons. This separate
center will endeavor to stop these activities before they ever reach
the terrorists, before they ever reach the bad guys.
That is what my amendment does. Establishing a national
counterproliferation center not only promotes this critical function
called counterproliferation that is so necessary to defend our country,
it also breaks down the stovepipes that currently exist within the
executive branch.
This amendment tracks very closely to the structure, authorities, and
roles established for the National Counterterrorism Center. Further, we
have made changes to this amendment as amendments to the National
Counterterrorism Center have been offered on the floor.
This amendment has also been modified to make clear that
counterproliferation does not include programs such as the Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program and other threat reduction programs; that our
traditional nonproliferation efforts as they pertain to treaties and
regimes are not included; and that it does not apply to programs that
provide protective gear, clothing, and other items that protect our
troops on the battlefield from weapons of mass destruction attacks.
Finally, as my distinguished colleague from Arizona said, I am well
aware--we all are--that the President has a Commission studying this
issue. That is why this amendment sets the parameters for a national
counterproliferation center without getting into the explicit detail.
It also does not call for any existing agencies or efforts to be
disestablished.
The amendment is also consistent with the framework and authorities
for the NID that have been established in the underlying bill.
I have also modified the implementation date so that this center does
not have to be established until late next year.
All of this gives the President the flexibility to fine-tune the
center based on the findings of his Commission. It also gives him time
to establish the center, particularly since the administration will be
busy in the coming months setting up the counterterrorism center.
The bottom line is this: Just as we take the offensive in the global
war on terrorism, we must similarly take the offensive in stopping the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Our nonproliferation
efforts are a good defense, but they are not sufficient. We need a good
offense, and counterproliferation is just the answer.
The role of the national counterproliferation center, therefore, is
to coordinate, plan, and manage
[[Page S10538]]
those efforts. It is to break down the stovepipes that exist in this
nascent effort. It is to deny the terrorists and others access to
weapons of mass destruction and their materials while the National
Counterterrorism Center works to dismantle terrorist groups and bring
terrorists to justice.
Mr. President, establishing a national counterproliferation center is
not only the smart thing to do, it is something we must do. I encourage
my colleagues to give this amendment their full support. Doing so will
make the country and the American people much safer.
Let me also add, in response to the Senator from Arizona, we have
received input from the White House on how to improve this amendment.
We have incorporated their ideas. The White House, at this point, does
not oppose this amendment.
I am confident this amendment does strike the proper balance between
establishing the national counterproliferation center and, at the same
time, leaving the President more than sufficient time--a year--and
flexibility to modify it as he sees fit or as the Commission
recommends.
This amendment is crafted in a manner so as to leave the whole range
of details for the President and the Commission to flush out as they
see fit.
Finally, the modified amendment also includes a provision we worked
on with a number of Senators, including Senator McCain's staff, that
makes clear that the intent of this amendment is not to undermine or
override the Commission.
Mr. President, I yield the floor and do appreciate the consideration
of my colleagues in supporting this amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Democratic whip.
Mr. REID. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I know of no further debate on the
leader's amendment. The modification has been sent to the desk. Mr.
President, this is the Frist amendment No. 3895, as further modified.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is further modified.
The amendment, as further modified, is as follows:
On page 94, strike line 5 and insert the following:
SEC. 144. NATIONAL COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER.
(a) National Counterproliferation Center.--(1) Within one
year of enactment of this Act there shall be established
within the National Intelligence Authority a National
Counterproliferation Center.
(2) The purpose of the Center is to develop, direct, and
coordinate the efforts and activities of the United States
Government to interdict the trafficking of weapons of mass
destruction, related materials and technologies, and their
delivery systems to terrorists, terrorist organizations,
other non-state actors of concern, and state actors of
concern.
(b) Director of National Counterproliferation Center.--(1)
There is a Director of the National Counterproliferation
Center, who shall be the head of the National
Counterproliferation Center, and who shall be appointed by
the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate.
(2) Any individual nominated for appointment as the
Director of the National Counterproliferation Center shall
have significant expertise in matters relating to the
national security of the United States and matters relating
to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their
delivery systems, and related materials and technologies that
threaten the national security of the United States, its
interests, and allies.
(3) The individual serving as the Director of the National
Counterproliferation Center may not, while so serving, serve
in any capacity in any other element of the intelligence
community, except to the extent that the individual serving
as Director of the National Counterproliferation Center is
doing so in an acting capacity.
(c) Supervision.--(1) The Director of the National
Counterproliferation Center shall report to the National
Intelligence Director on the budget, personnel, activities,
and programs of the National Counterproliferation Center.
(2) The Director of the National Counterproliferation
Center shall report to the National Intelligence Director on
the activities of the Directorate of Intelligence of the
National Counterproliferation Center under subsection (g).
(3) The Director of the National Counterproliferation
Center shall report to the President and the National
Intelligence Director on the planning and progress of
Counterproliferation operations.
(d) Primary Missions.--The primary missions of the National
Counterproliferation Center shall be as follows:
(1) To develop and unify strategy for the
Counterproliferation efforts of the United States Government.
(2) To make recommendations to the National Intelligence
Director with regard to the collection and analysis
requirements and priorities of the National
Counterproliferation Center.
(3) To integrate Counterproliferation intelligence
activities of the United States Government, both inside and
outside the United States, and with other governments.
(4) To conduct stgrategic planning and develop recommended
courses of action for multilateral and United States
Government Counterproliferation activities, which--
(A) involve more than one department, agency, or element of
the executive branch (unless otherwise directed by the
President) of the United States Government; and
(B) include the mission, objectives to be achieved, courses
of action, parameters for such courses of action,
coordination of agency operational activities,
recommendations for operational activities, and assignment of
national, departmental, or agency responsibilities.
(5) To ensure that the collection, analysis, and
utilization of Counterproliferation intelligence, and the
conduct of Counterproliferation operations, by the United
States Government are informed by the analysis of all-source
intelligence.
(e) Duties and Responsibilities of Director of National
Counterproliferation Center.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, at the direction of the President and the
National Intelligence Director, the Director of the National
Counterproliferation Center shall--
(1) serve as a principal adviser to the President and the
National Intelligence Director on operations relating to
interagency Counterproliferation planning and activities;
(2) provide unified strategic direction for the
Counterproliferation efforts of the United States Government
and for the effective integration and deconfliction of
counterproliferation intelligence and operations across
agency boundaries, both inside and outside the United States,
and with foreign governments;
(3) advise the President and the National Intelligence
Director on the extent to which the Counterproliferation
program recommendations and budget proposals of the
departments, agencies, and elements of the United States
Government conform to the policies and priorities established
by the President and the National Security Council;
(4) advise the President on, the selections of personnel to
head the nonmilitary operating entities of the United States
Government with principal missions relating to
Counterproliferation;
(5) advise the President and the National Intelligence
Director on the science and technology research and
development requirements and priorities of the
Counterproliferation programs and activities of the United
States Government; and
(6) perform such other duties as the National Intelligence
Director may prescribe or are prescribed by law;
(f) Directorate of Intelligence.--(1) The Director of the
National Counterproliferation Center shall establish and
maintain within the National Counterproliferation Center a
Directorate of Intelligence.
(2) The Directorate shall have primary responsibility
within the United States Government for the analysis of
information regarding proliferators (including individuals,
entities, organizations, companies, and states) and their
networks, from all sources of intelligence, whether collected
inside or outside the United States.
(3) The Directorate shall--
(A) be the principal repository within the United States
Government for all-source information on suspected
proliferators, their networks, their activities, and their
capabilities;
(B) propose intelligence collection and analysis
requirements and priorities for action by elements of the
intelligence community inside and outside the United States;
(C) have primary responsibility within the United States
Government for net assessments and warnings about weapons of
mass destruction proliferation threats, which assessments and
warnings shall be based on a comparison of the intentions and
capabilities of proliferators with assessed national
vulnerabilities and countermeasures;
(D) conduct through a separate office independent analyses
(commonly referred to as ``red teaming'') of intelligence
collected and analyzed with respect to proliferation; and
(E) perform such other duties and functions as the Director
of the National Counterproliferation Center may prescribe.
(g) Directorate of Planning.--(1) The Director of the
National Counterproliferation Center shall establish and
maintain within the National Counterproliferation Center a
Directorate of Planning.
(2) The Directorate shall have primary responsibility for
conducting strategic planning and developing courses of
action for Counterproliferation activities, as described in
subsection (d)(4).
(3) The Directorate shall--
[[Page S10539]]
(A) provide guidance, and develop strategy and interagency
plans, to counter proliferation activities based on policy
objectives and priorities established by the National
Security Council;
(B) develop plans under subparagraph (A) utilizing input
from personnel in other departments, agencies, and elements
of the United States Government who have expertise in the
priorities, functions, assets, programs, capabilities, and
operations of such departments, agencies, and elements with
respect to Counterproliferation;
(C) assign responsibilities and propose courses of action
for Counterproliferation operations to the departments and
agencies of the United States Government (including the
Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Department of Homeland Security, and other departments and
agencies of the United States Government), consistent with
the authorities of such departments and agencies;
(D) monitor the implementation of operations assigned under
subparagraph (C) and update interagency plans for such
operations as necessary;
(E) report to the President and the National Intelligence
Director on the performance of the departments, agencies, and
elements of the United States with regard to the plans
developed under subparagraph (A); and
(F) perform such other duties and functions as the Director
of the National Counterproliferation Center may prescribe.
(4) The Directorate may not direct the execution of
operations assigned under paragraph (3).
(h) Staff.--(1) The National Intelligence Director may
appoint deputy directors of the National Counterproliferation
Center to oversee such portions of the operations of the
Center as the National Intelligence Director considers
appropriate.
(2) To assist the Director of the National
Counterproliferation Center in fulfilling the duties and
responsibilities of the Director of the National
Counterproliferation Center under this section, the National
Intelligence Director shall employ in the National
Counterproliferation Center a professional staff having an
expertise in matters relating to such duties and
responsibilities.
(3) In providing for a professional staff for the National
Counterproliferation Center under paragraph (2), the National
Intelligence Director may establish as positions in the
excepted service such positions in the Center as the National
Intelligence Director considers appropriate.
(4) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure that
the analytical staff of the National Counterproliferation
Center is comprised primarily of experts from elements in the
intelligence community and from such other personnel in the
United States Government as the National Intelligence
Director considers appropriate.
(5)(A) In order to meet the requirements in paragraph (4),
the National Intelligence Director shall, from time to time--
(i) specify the transfers, assignments, and details of
personnel funded within the National Intelligence Program to
the National Counterproliferation Center from any element of
the intelligence community that the National Intelligence
Director considers appropriate; and
(ii) in the case of personnel from a department, agency, or
element of the United States Government and not funded within
the National Intelligence Program, request the transfer,
assignment, or detail of such personnel from the department,
agency, or other element concerned.
(B)(i) The head of an element of the intelligence community
shall promptly effect any transfer, assignment, or detail of
personnel specified by the National Intelligence Director
under subparagraph (A)(i).
(ii) The head of a department, agency, or element of the
United States Government receiving a request for transfer,
assignment, or detail of personnel under subparagraph (A)(ii)
shall, to the extent practicable, approve the request.
(6) Personnel employed in or assigned or detailed to the
National Counterproliferation Center under this subsection
shall be under the authority, direction, and control of the
Director of the National Counterproliferation Center on all
matters for which the Center has been assigned responsibility
and for all matters related to the accomplishment of the
missions of the Center.
(7) Performance evaluations of personnel assigned or
detailed to the National Counterproliferation Center under
this subsection shall be undertaken by the supervisors of
such personnel at the Center.
(8) The supervisors of the staff of the National
Counterproliferation Center may, with the approval of the
National Intelligence Director, reward the staff of the
Center for meritorious performance by the provision of such
performance awards as the National Intelligence Director
shall prescribe.
(9) The National Intelligence Director may delegate to the
Director of the National Counterproliferation Center any
responsibility, power, or authority of the National
Intelligence Director under paragraphs (1) through (8).
(10) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure that
the staff of the National Counterproliferation Center has
access to all databases and information maintained by the
elements of the intelligence community that are relevant to
the duties of the Center.
(i) Support and Cooperation of Other Agencies.--(1) The
elements of the intelligence community and the other
departments, agencies, and elements of the United States
Government shall support, assist, and cooperate with the
National Counterproliferation Center in carrying out its
missions under this section.
(2) The support, assistance, and cooperation of a
department, agency, or element of the United States
Government under this subsection shall include, but not be
limited to--
(A) the implementation of interagency plans for operations,
whether foreign or domestic, that are developed by the
National Counterproliferation Center in a manner consistent
with the laws and regulations of the United States and
consistent with the limitation in subsection (h)(4);
(B) cooperative work with the Director of the National
Counterproliferation Center to ensure that ongoing operations
of such department, agency, or element do not conflict with
operations planned by the Center;
(C) reports, upon request, to the Director of the National
Counterproliferation Center on the performance of such
department, agency, or element in implementing
responsibilities assigned to such department, agency, or
element through joint operations plans; and
(D) the provision to the analysts of the National
Counterproliferation Center electronic access in real time to
information and intelligence collected by such department,
agency, or element that is relevant to the missions of the
Center.
(3) In the event of a disagreement between the National
Intelligence Director and the head of a department, agency,
or element of the United States Government on a plan
developed or responsibility assigned by the National
Counterproliferation Center under this subsection, the
National Intelligence Director may either accede to the head
of the department, agency, or element concerned or notify the
President of the necessity of resolving the disagreement.
(j) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) The term ``Counterproliferation'' means--
(A) activities, programs and measures for interdicting
(including deterring, preventing, halting, and rolling back)
the transfer or transport (whether by air, land or sea) of
weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and
related materials and technologies to and from states and
non-state actors (especially terrorists and terrorist
organizations) of proliferation concern;
(B) enhanced law enforcement activities and cooperation to
deter, prevent, halt, and rollback proliferation-related
networks, activities, organizations, and individuals, and
bring those involved to justice; and
(C) activities, programs, and measures for identifying,
collecting, and analyzing information and intelligence
related to the transfer or transport of weapons, systems,
materials, and technologies as described in subparagraph (A).
(2) ``Counterproliferation'' does not include--
(A) the Cooperative Threat Reduction and other threat
reduction programs run or administered by the Department of
Defense, Department of Energy and Department of State;
(B) the nonproliferation efforts and activities of the
United States Government as they apply to the implementation
and management of nonproliferation treaties, conventions, and
regimes; or,
(C) programs designated to protect members of the Armed
Forces from the employment of weapons of mass destruction by
developing and fielding protective equipment, gear and
clothing, and other means to enhance the survivability of
Armed Forces personnel on the battlefield.
(3) The term ``states and non-state actors of proliferation
concern'' refers to countries or entities (including
individuals, entities, organizations, companies, and
networks) that should be subject to counterproliferation
activities because of their actions or intent to engage in
proliferation through--
(A) efforts to develop or acquire chemical, biological, or
nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems; or
(B) transfers (either selling, receiving, or facilitating)
of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, or
related materials.
(k) Reports on Eestablishment.--(1)(A) The President shall
submit to Congress a report on the plans of the President to
establish the National Counterproliferation Center as
required by this section.
(B) The report shall be submitted not later than six months
after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not later
than 30 days before the date of the establishment of the
National Counterproliferation Center.
(2) The President shall submit to Congress from time to
time such updates of the plans under paragraph (1)(a) as the
President considers appropriate. Each update shall include
such recommendations for legislative or administrative action
as the President considers appropriate to improve the
effectiveness of the National Counterproliferation Center
consistent with its mission.
(m) Construction With Certain Conditions.--Nothing in this
section shall override recommendations contained in the
forthcoming final report of the President's Commission on
Weapons of Mass Destruction, established by Executive Order
in February 2004, that will improve the effectiveness of the
National Counterproliferation Center:
[[Page S10540]]
Provided further, That in the case of a conflict between the
WMD Commission's final report and the National
Counterproliferation Center as established in this section,
the Congress and the President shall consider the
Commission's recommendations and act as soon as practicable
thereafter to make such modifications to statute as deemed
necessary.
SEC. 145. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CENTERS.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment,
as further modified.
The amendment (No. 3895), as further modified, was agreed to.
Ms. COLLINS. I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. REID. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I have a series of cleared amendments at
the desk. Some of them are modifications of previously submitted
amendments. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that the amendments be
considered en bloc, modified as necessary, agreed to en bloc, with the
motions to reconsider laid upon the table.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
Mr. REID. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Amendment No. 3896
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Frist
amendment No. 3896 be considered at this point.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is now
pending.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I know of no further debate on this
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 3896) was agreed to.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Amendment No. 3876, Withdrawn
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I have worked with the distinguished
managers. Like so many things in the course of our legislative process,
we have worked out a very large number of items, and they have been
accepted. One remains and, in my judgment, the various good-faith
proposals simply do not meet the criteria that I feel has to be
established. So I have two courses of action. One, which I intend to
follow, is to withdraw the amendment. The second, of course, would be
to press this on with a vote. Frankly, given the structure of the
vote--I don't say this as criticism--it does not allow the time in
which to get sufficient information and viewpoints to my colleagues to
prevail on such a vote. So I think the better course of action for this
Senator is to continue to press my concerns in the course of the
conference.
At this time, I call up amendment No. 3876.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is pending.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask that the amendment be withdrawn.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WARNER. For a little expression of the explanation of the
amendment, I go back to two very important documents. The first is a
letter dated September 28, 2004, Statement of Administration Policy. I
ask unanimous consent that the following paragraph be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
The Administration notes that the Committee bill did not
include Section 6 (``Preservation of Authority and
Accountability'') of the Administration's proposal; the
Administration supports inclusion of this provision in the
Senate bill. The legislation should also recognize that its
provisions would be executed to the extent consistent with
the constitutional authority of the President: to conduct the
foreign affairs of the United States; to withhold information
the disclosure of which could impair the foreign relations,
the national security, deliberative processes of the
Executive, or the performanceof the Executive's
constitutional duties; to recommend for congressional
consideration such measures as the President may judge
necessary or expedient; and to supervise the unitary
executive.
Mr. WARNER. That paragraph states that:
The Administration opposes the Committee's attempt to
define in statute programs that should be included in the
National Intelligence Program.
I believe we have to work this out in a clearer fashion. It is also
more clear than what is in the amendment structure today, so I will put
that aside and then go to the subject of this amendment.
The last paragraph of the September 28 letter reads:
The Administration notes that the Committee did not include
Section 6, (``Preservation of Authority and Accountability'')
of the Administration's proposal; the Administration supports
the inclusion of this provision in the Senate bill.
That was the basic intent of my amendment; therefore, I will take the
opportunity to work on that during the course of conference in the
hopes of achieving that goal.
I thank the managers for their effort to work on it, and we will
hopefully work on it further to achieve this administration goal.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I very much appreciate the cooperation of
the chairman of the Armed Services Committee. We have incorporated many
of his suggestions into the bill. I appreciate his advice.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Modification to No. 3807
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to modify
amendment No. 3807, with the changes at the desk, notwithstanding its
prior adoption.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The modification is as follows:
hold driver's licenses and personal identification cards.
(4) Negotiated rulemaking.--
(A) In general.--Before publishing the proposed regulations
required by paragraph (2) to carry out this title, the
Secretary of Transportation shall establish a negotiated
rulemaking process pursuant to subchapter IV of chapter 5 of
title 5, United States Code (5 U.S.C. 561 et seq.).
(B) Representation on negotiated rulemaking committee.--Any
negotiated rulemaking committee established by the Secretary
of Transportation pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall include
representatives from--
(i) among State offices that issue driver's licenses or
personal identification cards;
(ii) among State elected officials;
(iii) the Department of Homeland Security; and
(iv) among interested parties, including organizations with
technological and operational expertise in document security
and organizations that represent the interests of applicants
for such licenses or identification cards.
(C) Time requirement.--The process described in
subparagraph (A) shall be conducted in a timely manner to
ensure that--
(i) any recommendation for a proposed rule or report is
provided to the Secretary of Transportation not later than 9
months after the date of enactment of this Act; and
(ii) a final rule is promulgated not later than 18 months
after the date of enactment of this Act.
(c) Grants to States.--
(1) Assistance in meeting federal standards.--Beginning on
the date a final regulation is promulgated under subsection
(b)(2), the Secretary of Transportation shall award grants to
States to assist them in conforming to the minimum standards
for driver's licenses and personal identification cards set
forth in the regulation.
(2) Allocation of grants.--The Secretary of Transportation
shall award grants to States under this subsection based on
the proportion that the estimated average annual number of
driver's licenses and personal identification cards issued by
a State applying for a grant bears to the average annual
number of such documents issued by all States.
[[Page S10541]]
(3) Minimum allocation.--Notwithstanding paragraph (2),
each State shall receive not less than 0.5 percent of the
grant funds made available under this subsection.
(d) Extension of Effective Date.--The Secretary of
Transportation may extend the date specified under subsection
(b)(1)(A) for up to 2 years for driver's licenses issued by a
State if the Secretary determines that the State made
reasonable efforts to comply with the date under such
subsection but was unable to do so.
(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to the Secretary of Transportation for
each of the fiscal years 2005 through 2009, such sums as may
be necessary to carry out this section.
SEC. __08. SOCIAL SECURITY CARDS.
(a) Security Enhancements.--The Commissioner of Social
Security shall--
(1) not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of
this section, issue regulations to restrict the issuance of
multiple replacement social security cards to any individual
to minimize fraud;
(2) within 1 year after the date of enactment of this
section, require verification of records provided by an
applicant for an original social security card, other than
for purposes of enumeration at birth; and
(3) within 18 months after the date of enactment of this
section, add death, fraud, and work authorization indicators
to the social security number verification system.
(b) Interagency Security Task Force.--The Commissioner of
Social Security, in consultation with the Secretary of
Homeland Security, shall form an interagency task force for
the purpose of further improving the security of social
security cards and numbers. Not later than 1 year after the
date of enactment of this section, the task force shall
establish security requirements, including--
(1) standards for safeguarding social security cards from
counterfeiting, tampering, alteration, and theft;
(2) requirements for verifying documents submitted for the
issuance of replacement cards; and
(3) actions to increase enforcement against the fraudulent
use or issuance of social security numbers and cards.
Amendments Nos. 3733, As Modified, 3760, 3837, As Modified, 3861, As
Modified, 3880, As Modified, 3924, As Modified, 3977, 3978, 3979, and
3980
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, Senator Lieberman and I have a series of
cleared amendments at the desk. Some of these are modifications of
previously submitted amendments. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent
that the amendments be considered en bloc, modified as necessary,
agreed to en bloc, with the motions to reconsider laid upon the table.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendments were agreed to, as follows:
amendment no. 3733, as modified
At the appropriate place, insert the following:
SEC. __. REPORT ON USE OF DATABASES.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Data-mining.--The term ``data-mining'' means a query or
search or other analysis of 1 or more electronic databases,
where--
(A) at least 1 of the databases was obtained from or
remains under the control of a non-Federal entity, or the
information was acquired initially by another department or
agency of the Federal Government;
(B) the search does not use a specific individual's
personal identifiers to acquire information concerning that
individual; and
(C) a department or agency of the Federal Government or a
non-Federal entity acting on behalf of the Federal Government
is conducting the query or search or other analysis to find a
pattern indicating terrorist, criminal, or other law
enforcement related activity.
(2) Database.--The term ``database'' does not include
telephone directories, information publicly available via the
Internet or available by any other means to any member of the
public without payment of a fee, or databases of judicial and
administrative opinions.
(b) Reports on Data-Mining Activities.--
(1) Requirement for report.--Beginning one year after the
effective date of this section the National Intelligence
Director shall submit a report, public to the extent possible
with a classified annex, to Congress on all activities of the
intelligence community to use or develop data-mining
technology.
(2) Content of report.--A report submitted under paragraph
(1) shall include, for each activity to use or develop data-
mining technology that is required to be covered by the
report, the following information:
(A) A thorough description of the data-mining technology,
the plans for the use of such technology, the data that will
be used, and the target dates for the deployment of the data-
mining technology.
(B) An assessment of the likely impact of the
implementation of the data-mining technology on privacy and
civil liberties.
(C) A thorough discussion of the policies, procedures, and
guidelines that are to be developed and applied in the use of
such technology for data-mining in order to--
(i) protect the privacy and due process rights of
individuals; and
(ii) ensure that only accurate information is collected and
used.
(D) Any necessary classified information in an annex that
shall be available to the Committee on Governmental Affairs,
the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence and Committee on the Judiciary of the House
of Representatives.
(3) Time for report.--The report required under paragraph
(1) shall be submitted not later than September 30th of each
year.
(4) Expiration.--The requirements of this subsection shall
expire 4 years after the date of enactment of this Act.
amendment no. 3760
(Purpose: To provide that the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board include in certain reports, any proposal that the Board advised
against, but actions were taken to implement)
On page 158, line 5, strike ``and''.
On page 158, line 9, strike the period and insert ``;
and''.
On page 158, insert between lines 9 and 10, the following:
(C) each proposal reviewed by the Board under subsection
(d)(1) that--
(i) the Board advised against implementation; and
(ii) notwithstanding such advice, actions were taken to
implement.
amendment no. 3837, as modified
At the end, add the following:
TITLE IV--ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY NORTHERN BORDER SECURITY PILOT PROGRAM
SEC. 401. ESTABLISHMENT.
The Secretary of Homeland Security may carry out a pilot
program to test various advanced technologies that will
improve border security between ports of entry along the
northern border of the United States.
SEC. 402. PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Required Features.--The Secretary of Homeland Security
shall design the pilot program under this title to have the
following features:
(1) Use of advanced technological systems, including
sensors, video, and unmanned aerial vehicles, for border
surveillance.
(2) Use of advanced computing and decision integration
software for--
(A) evaluation of data indicating border incursions;
(B) assessment of threat potential; and
(C) rapid real-time communication, monitoring, intelligence
gathering, deployment, and response.
(3) Testing of advanced technology systems and software to
determine best and most cost-effective uses of advanced
technology to improve border security.
(4) Operation of the program in remote stretches of border
lands with long distances between 24-hour ports of entry with
a relatively small presence of United States border patrol
officers.
(5) Capability to expand the program upon a determination
by the Secretary that expansion would be an appropriate and
cost-effective means of improving border security.
(b) Coordination With Other Agencies.--The Secretary of
Homeland Security shall ensure that the operation of the
pilot program under this title--
(1) is coordinated among United States, State and local,
and Canadian law enforcement and border security agencies;
and
(2) includes ongoing communication among such agencies.
SEC. 403. ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS.
(a) Procurement of Advanced Technology.--The Secretary of
Homeland Security may enter into contracts for the
procurement or use of such advanced technologies as the
Secretary determines appropriate for the pilot program under
this title.
(b) Program Partnerships.--In carrying out the pilot
program, the Secretary of Homeland Security may provide for
the establishment of cooperative arrangements for
participation in the pilot program by such participants as
law enforcement and border security agencies referred to in
section 402(b), institutions of higher education, and private
sector entities.
SEC. 404. REPORT.
(a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than one year after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
Homeland Security shall submit to Congress a report on the
pilot program under this title.
(b) Content.--The report under subsection (a) shall include
the following matters:
(1) A discussion of the implementation of the pilot
program, including the experience under the pilot program.
(2) A recommendation regarding whether to expand the pilot
program along the entire northern border of the United States
and a timeline for the implementation of the expansion.
SEC. 405. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be
necessary to carry out the pilot program under this title.
amendment no. 3861, as modified
At the appropriate place, insert the following:
SEC. __. BORDER SURVEILLANCE.
(a) In General.--Not later than 6 months after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security
shall submit to the President and the appropriate committees
of Congress a comprehensive plan for the systematic
surveillance of the
[[Page S10542]]
Southwest border of the United States by remotely piloted
aircraft.
(b) Contents.--The plan submitted under subsection (a)
shall include--
(1) recommendations for establishing command and control
centers, operations sites, infrastructure, maintenance, and
procurement;
(2) cost estimates for the implementation of the plan and
ongoing operations;
(3) recommendations for the appropriate agent within the
Department of Homeland Security to be the executive agency
for remotely piloted aircraft operations;
(4) the number of remotely piloted aircraft required for
the plan;
(5) the types of missions the plan would undertake,
including--
(A) protecting the lives of people seeking illegal entry
into the United States;
(B) interdicting illegal movement of people, weapons, and
other contraband across the border;
(C) providing investigative support to assist in the
dismantling of smuggling and criminal networks along the
border;
(D) using remotely piloted aircraft to serve as platforms
for the collection of intelligence against smugglers and
criminal networks along the border; and
(E) further validating and testing of remotely piloted
aircraft for airspace security missions; and
(6) the equipment necessary to carry out the plan.
(7) A recommendation regarding whether to expand the pilot
program along the entire southwestern border.
(c) Implementation.--The Secretary of Homeland Security
shall implement the plan submitted under subsection (a) as a
pilot program as soon as sufficient funds are appropriated
and available for this purpose.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out
the provisions of this section.
amendment no. 3880, as modified
On page 19, between lines 14 and 15, insert the following:
(c) Consistency of Personnel Policies and Programs With
Certain Other Personnel Policies and Standards.--(1) The
personnel policies and programs developed and implemented
under subsection (a)(8) with respect to members of the
uniformed services shall be consistent with any other
personnel policies and standards applicable to the members of
the uniformed services.
(2) It is the sense of the Senate that the NID shall seek
input from the Secretary of Defense, the secretaries of the
military departments, and, as appropriate, the Secretary of
Homeland Security in developing and implementing such
policies and programs.
On page 19, line 15, strike ``(c)'' and insert ``(d)''.
On page 20, line 4, strike ``(d)'' and insert ``(e)''.
amendment nno. 3924, as modified
At the appropriate place, insert the following:
SEC. __. ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE.
(a) Definition of Enterprise Architecture.--In this
section, the term ``enterprise architecture'' means a
detailed outline or blueprint of the information technology
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that will satisfy the
ongoing mission and goals of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and that sets forth specific and identifiable
benchmarks.
(b) Enterprise Architecture.--The Federal Bureau of
Investigation shall--
(1) continually maintain and update an enterprise
architecture; and
(2) maintain a state of the art and up to date information
technology infrastructure that is in compliance with the
enterprise architecture of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
(c) Report.--Subject to subsection (d), the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation shall report to the House and
Senate Judiciary Committees, on an annual basis, on whether
the major information technology investments of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation are in compliance with the enterprise
architecture of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
identify any inability or expectation of inability to meet
the terms set forth in the enterprise architecture.
(d) Failure to meet terms.--If the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation identifies any inability or
expectation of inability to meet the terms set forth in the
enterprise architecture in a report under subsection (c), the
report under subsection (c) shall--
(1) be twice a year until the inability is corrected;
(2) include a statement as to whether the inability or
expectation of inability to meet the terms set forth in the
enterprise architecture is substantially related to
resources; and
(3) if the inability or expectation of inability is
substantially related to resources, include a request for
additional funding that would resolve the problem or a
request to reprogram funds that would resolve the problem.
(e) Federal Bureau of Investigation's Enterprise
Architecture, Agency Plans and Reports--This section shall be
carried out in compliance with the requirements set forth in
Sec. 206(f) and (1).
amendment no. 3977
On page 4, beginning on line 10, strike ``information
gathered, and activities'' and inserting ``foreign
intelligence gathered, and information gathering and other
activities''.
On page 4, line 16, insert before the period the following:
``, but does not include personnel, physical, document, or
communications security programs''.
On page 23, line 8, strike the period and insert ``as it
pertains to those programs, projects, and activities within
the National Intelligence Program''.
On page 24, line 10, insert ``transactional deposit'' after
``establish''.
On page 181, line 9, insert ``or involving intelligence
acquired through clandestine means'' before the period.
amendment no. 3978
(Purpose: to authorize the Secretary of State to increase the number of
consular officers, clarify the responsibilities and functions of
consular officers, and require the Secretary of Homeland Security to
increase the number of border patrol agents and customs enforcement
investigators)
At the end, add the following:
TITLE IV--OTHER MATTERS
SEC. 401. RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS OF CONSULAR
OFFICERS.
(a) Increased Number of Consular Officers.--The Secretary
of State, in each of fiscal years 2006 through 2009, may
increase by 150 the number of positions for consular officers
above the number of such positions for which funds were
allotted for the preceding fiscal year.
(b) Limitation on Use of Foreign Nationals for Visa
Screening.--
(1) Immigrant visas.--Subsection (b) of section 222 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1202) is amended by
adding at the end the following: ``All immigrant visa
applications shall be reviewed and adjudicated by a consular
officer.''.
(2) Nonimmigrant visas.--Subsection (d) of such section is
amended by adding at the end the following: ``All
nonimmigrant visa applications shall be reviewed and
adjudicated by a consular officer.''.
(c) Training for Consular Officers in Detection of
Fraudulent Documents.--Section 305(a) of the Enhanced Border
Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (8 U.S.C. 1734(a))
is amended by adding at the end the following: ``As part of
the consular training provided to such officers by the
Secretary of State, such officers shall also receive training
in detecting fraudulent documents and general document
forensics and shall be required as part of such training to
work with immigration officers conducting inspections of
applicants for admission into the United States at ports of
entry.''.
(d) Assignment of Anti-Fraud Specialists.--
(1) Survey regarding document fraud.--The Secretary of
State, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland
Security, shall conduct a survey of each diplomatic and
consular post at which visas are issued to assess the extent
to which fraudulent documents are presented by visa
applicants to consular officers at such posts.
(2) Requirement for specialist.--
(A) In general.--Not later than July 31, 2005, the
Secretary of State shall, in coordination with the Secretary
of Homeland Security, identify the diplomatic and consular
posts at which visas are issued that experience the greatest
frequency of presentation of fraudulent documents by visa
applicants. The Secretary of State shall assign or designate
at each such post at least one full-time anti-fraud
specialist employed by the Department of State to assist the
consular officers at each such post in the detection of such
fraud.
(B) Exceptions.--The Secretary of State is not required to
assign or designate a specialist as described in subparagraph
(A) at a diplomatic and consular post if an employee of the
Department of Homeland Security is assigned on a full-time
basis to such post under the authority in section 428 of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 236).
SEC. 402. INCREASE IN FULL-TIME BORDER PATROL AGENTS.
In each of fiscal years 2006 through 2010, the Secretary of
Homeland Security shall, subject to the availability of
appropriations for such purpose, increase by not less than
1,000 the number of positions for full-time active duty
border patrol agents within the Department of Homeland
Security above the number of such positions for which funds
were made available during the preceding fiscal year. Of the
additional border patrol agents, in each fiscal year not less
than 20 percent of such agents shall be assigned to duty
stations along the northern border of the United States.
SEC. 403. INCREASE IN FULL-TIME IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT INVESTIGATORS.
In each of fiscal years 2006 through 2010, the Secretary of
Homeland Security shall, subject to the availability of
appropriations for such purpose, increase by not less than
800 the number of positions for full-time active duty
investigators within the Department of Homeland Security
investigating violations of immigration laws (as defined in
section 101(a)(17) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1101(a)(17)) above the number of such positions for
which funds were made available during the preceding fiscal
year.
[[Page S10543]]
amendment no. 3979
(Purpose: To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to ensure that
nonimmigrant visas are not issued to individuals with connections to
terrorism or who intend to carry out terrorist activities in the United
States)
At the end, add the following new title:
TITLE IV--VISA REQUIREMENTS
SEC. 401. IN PERSON INTERVIEWS OF VISA APPLICANTS.
(a) Requirement for Interviews.--Section 222 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1202) is amended by
adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(h) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the
Secretary of State shall require every alien applying for a
nonimmigrant visa--
``(1) who is at least 12 years of age and not more than 65
years of age to submit to an in person interview with a
consular officer unless the requirement for such interview is
waived--
``(A) by a consular official and such alien is within that
class of nonimmigrants enumerated in section 101(a)(15)(A) or
101(a)(15)(G) or is granted a diplomatic visa on a diplomatic
passport or on the equivalent thereof;
``(B) by a consular official and such alien is applying for
a visa--
``(i) not more than 12 months after the date on which the
alien's prior visa expired;
``(ii) for the classification under section 101(a)(15) for
which such prior visa was issued;
``(iii) from the consular post located in the country in
which the alien is a national; and
``(iv) the consular officer has no indication that the
alien has not complied with the immigration laws and
regulations of the United States; or
``(C) by the Secretary of State if the Secretary determines
that such waiver is--
``(i) in the national interest of the United States; or
``(ii) necessary as a result of unusual circumstances; and
``(2) notwithstanding paragraph (1), to submit to an in
person interview with a consular officer if such alien--
``(A) is not a national of the country in which the alien
is applying for a visa;
``(B) was previously refused a visa, unless such refusal
was overcome or a waiver of ineligibility has been obtained;
``(C) is listed in the Consular Lookout and Support System
(or successor system at the Department of State);
``(D) may not obtain a visa until a security advisory
opinion or other Department of State clearance is issued
unless such alien is--
``(i) within that class of nonimmigrants enumerated in
section 101(a)(15)(A) or 101(a)(15)(G); and
``(ii) not a national of a country that is officially
designated by the Secretary of State as a state sponsor of
terrorism; or
``(E) is identified as a member of a group or sector that
the Secretary of State determines--
``(i) poses a substantial risk of submitting inaccurate
information in order to obtain a visa;
``(ii) has historically had visa applications denied at a
rate that is higher than the average rate of such denials; or
``(iii) poses a security threat to the United States.''.
SEC. 402. VISA APPLICATION REQUIREMENTS.
Section 222(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1202(c)) is amended by inserting ``The alien shall
provide complete and accurate information in response to any
request for information contained in the application.'' after
the second sentence.
SEC. 403. EFFECTIVE DATE.
Notwithstanding section 341 or any other provision of this
Act, this title shall take effect 90 days after date of the
enactment of this Act.
amendment no. 3980
(Purpose: To require the establishment of pilot projects relating to
the coordination of information among emergency first responders, and
for other purposes)
At the appropriate place, insert the following:
SEC. __. REGIONAL MODEL STRATEGIC PLAN PILOT PROJECTS.
(a) Pilot Projects.--Consistent with sections 302 and 430
of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 182, 238), not
later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act,
the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the
Executive Director of the Office of State and Local
Government Coordination and Preparedness and the
Undersecretary for Science and Technology, shall establish
not fewer than 2 pilot projects in high threat urban areas or
regions that are likely to implement a national model
strategic plan.
(b) Purposes.--The purposes of the pilot projects required
by this section shall be to develop a regional strategic plan
to foster interagency communication in the area in which it
is established and coordinate the gathering of all Federal,
State, and local first responders in that area, consistent
with the national strategic plan developed by the Department
of Homeland Security.
(c) Selection Criteria.--In selecting urban areas for the
location of pilot projects under this section, the Secretary
shall consider--
(1) the level of threat risk to the area, as determined by
the Department of Homeland Security;
(2) the number of Federal, State, and local law enforcement
agencies located in the area;
(3) the number of potential victims from a large scale
terrorist attack in the area; and
(4) such other criteria reflecting a community's risk and
vulnerability as the Secretary determines is appropriate.
(d) Interagency Assistance.--The Secretary of Defense shall
provide assistance to the Secretary of Homeland Security, as
necessary for the development of the pilot projects required
by this section, including examining relevant standards,
equipment, and protocols in order to improve interagency
communication among first responders.
(e) Reports to Congress.--The Secretary of Homeland
Security shall submit to Congress--
(1) an interim report regarding the progress of the
interagency communications pilot projects required by this
section 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act; and
(2) a final report 18 months after that date of enactment.
(f) Funding.--There are authorized to be made available to
the Secretary of Homeland Security, such sums as may be
necessary to carry out this section.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I thank everyone who has worked so hard
on this bill, particularly my colleague and partner, Senator Lieberman.
I believe we are ready to move to third reading.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading and was read
the third time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill having been read the third time, the
question is, Shall the bill, as amended, pass?
Ms. COLLINS. I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There appears to be a sufficient second.
The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from North Carolina (Mr.
Edwards) and the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry) are necessarily
absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bennett). Are there any other Senators in
the Chamber desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 96, nays 2, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 199 Leg.]
YEAS--96
Akaka
Alexander
Allard
Allen
Baucus
Bayh
Bennett
Biden
Bingaman
Bond
Boxer
Breaux
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Campbell
Cantwell
Carper
Chafee
Chambliss
Clinton
Cochran
Coleman
Collins
Conrad
Cornyn
Corzine
Craig
Crapo
Daschle
Dayton
DeWine
Dodd
Dole
Domenici
Dorgan
Durbin
Ensign
Enzi
Feingold
Feinstein
Fitzgerald
Frist
Graham (FL)
Graham (SC)
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Harkin
Hatch
Hutchison
Inhofe
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kohl
Kyl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Lott
Lugar
McCain
McConnell
Mikulski
Miller
Murkowski
Murray
Nelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)
Nickles
Pryor
Reed
Reid
Roberts
Rockefeller
Santorum
Sarbanes
Schumer
Sessions
Shelby
Smith
Snowe
Specter
Stabenow
Stevens
Sununu
Talent
Thomas
Voinovich
Warner
Wyden
NAYS--2
Byrd
Hollings
NOT VOTING--2
Edwards
Kerry
The bill (S. 2845), as amended, was passed.
(The bill will be printed in a future edition of the Record.)
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
____________________
