Congressional Record: September 29, 2004 (Senate)
Page S9873-S9916
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REFORM ACT OF 2004
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will
resume consideration of S. 2845, which the clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (S. 2845) to reform the intelligence community and
the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the
U.S. Government, and for other purposes.
Pending:
Wyden Amendment No. 3704, to establish an Independent
National Security Classification Board in the executive
branch.
Collins Amendment No. 3705, to provide for homeland
security grant coordination and simplification.
Specter Amendment No. 3706, to provide the National
Intelligence Director with the authority to supervise,
direct, and control all elements of the intelligence
community performing national intelligence missions.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, the debate now will resume on the
amendment offered by the Senator from Pennsylvania. As discussed last
night, we have an informal agreement that Senator Roberts would be
recognized for--is it 25 minutes, I ask Senator Roberts?
Mr. ROBERTS. I thought the agreement was 30.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I could not hear the Senator from Maine. She
said there had been an order that the Senator be recognized?
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, if I can respond to the Democratic
leader's inquiry, there was an informal discussion
[[Page S9874]]
last night. There was not an order entered, to the best of my
knowledge, but an informal agreement that Senator Roberts would be
recognized, and it was either 25 or 30 minutes. I am uncertain.
Mr. ROBERTS. If the distinguished chairman will yield, I am not sure
of the timeframe. I think my remarks will be approximately 30 minutes.
I hope they will not go over 30 minutes. But that would be my goal.
Mr. REID. My only inquiry here is, Senator Harkin wishes to speak for
10 minutes sometime. We recognize we should have gotten to the bill
earlier than we have, but we didn't, and now with the dialog that has
gone on Senator Harkin believes he needs to speak, so we need to
somehow figure a way to allow him to do that.
The Senator from Maine has the floor. We understand that. But is
there some way between the two managers we can get Senator Harkin some
time here this morning? Otherwise he is just going to hang around and
cause trouble.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, if I could complete my sequencing here.
After Senator Roberts, Senator Levin had asked to be recognized on the
Specter amendment. They were both here last night, so I want to respect
their requests as well.
I wonder if we could arrange for Senator Harkin to speak after the
first series of votes today, for 10 minutes.
Mr. REID. That is fine. After the first vote today I ask unanimous
consent Senator Harkin be recognized.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. REID. Senator Stevens to follow Senator Harkin.
Ms. COLLINS. As part of that sequencing, it would be 10 minutes for
Senator Harkin and 10 minutes for Senator Stevens--oh, I am sorry.
Senator Stevens is on the bill?
Mr. REID. It would be 15 minutes for Stevens, 15 for Harkin? Or
unlimited for Stevens?
Ms. COLLINS. Senator Stevens is going to be speaking on the bill so
he has asked for an unlimited amount of time.
Mr. REID. We understand Senator Stevens, being the President pro
tempore of the Senate, can speak as long as he wants. Again I repeat,
after the first vote Senator Harkin will be recognized for 15 minutes,
and then Senator Stevens will be recognized.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is
so ordered.
The Senator from Kansas is recognized.
Amendment No. 3706
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Specter
amendment. Before I begin, I would like to commend the managers of the
bill, Senators Collins and Lieberman, for their extraordinary patience
and their hard work as we continue working through this process.
Senators Collins and Lieberman are very prominent and hard-working
Senators. They have been given a very tough assignment and a limited
timeframe in which to complete it. Nevertheless, they have produced a
bill which is a step in the right direction.
As chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I look forward to
working with the Senators who serve on the committee of assignment by
the leadership as the Senate attempts to make intelligence reform a
reality.
Simply put, the Specter amendment would give the national
intelligence director, or what we call now the NID, the authority to
direct and supervise and control our national intelligence collection
agencies. In doing so, it will create a clear chain of command that
will leave no doubt in anybody's mind that the national intelligence
director is in charge and is accountable.
There is no rush to judgment on this issue. The debate in which we
are currently engaged is the same debate that has been going on for
decades, centered on how to grant increased authority to the Director
of Central Intelligence, or a new national intelligence director, while
leaving undisturbed the intelligence community's structural status quo.
Time and time again, those who have struggled with this conundrum have
found we simply can't get there from here under that context. In other
words, I believe it takes significant organizational change to overcome
the inherent conflicts in the current structure of our national
intelligence community.
True empowerment requires a national intelligence director with both
budget authority and the authority to direct and control the activities
of the intelligence collection agencies. One without the other will
once again leave us with an intelligence head who can neither succeed
nor be held fully accountable.
Let me state that the bill reported by the Governmental Affairs
Committee does address the question of budget authority very
effectively. It is significant and well contained. The bill leaves
unaddressed, however, the issue of the national intelligence director's
authority to direct, to supervise, and control the activities of our
national intelligence collection agencies.
In short, the bill, in my opinion, preserves divided loyalties
inherent in the current structure. Why is it so difficult to give this
new NID direct control over all of the intelligence community agencies?
It is no secret. The issue centers on the fact that the National
Reconnaissance Office, which designs and acquires our spy satellites,
the National Security Agency, which collects our signal intelligence,
and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, which processes and
disseminates our satellite imagery, all fall under the direct control
of the Secretary of Defense.
These agencies, while essential to the collection of national
intelligence, have also been deemed essential to the Pentagon's ability
to fight and to win wars. In essence, these agencies serve two masters:
The head of the intelligence community and the Secretary of Defense.
This tension has existed for decades, and it continues today. As long
as the Secretary of Defense directs the day-to-day activities of these
agencies, the new national intelligence director will continue to
struggle with a structure that undermines his ability to succeed as the
head of the intelligence community.
It appears to me that under today's bill the national intelligence
director's authority concerning collection will be about the same as
the DCI's has been for over 50 years. I do not mean to be a pessimist,
but history has shown in practice that these authorities to ``establish
requirements,'' ``manage the collection task,'' and ``resolve the
conflicts'' have limited ability when an agency works with the
Secretary of Defense and not for the head of the intelligence
community.
Why has it been so difficult to streamline the chain of command in
the intelligence community? Because when the Defense Department comes
up on the radar screen and announces to Congress and the media that its
ability to defend America will be undermined if it loses direct control
over its intelligence agencies, Members of Congress rightfully pause
and they certainly take note. This is especially true today when
American forces are engaged in combat. This, however, should not lead
to what we call paralysis.
During this debate, we have heard a great deal about support to our
dedicated, brave men and women in uniform, i.e., the warfighters. Many
of my colleagues have argued and will continue to argue that the
national intelligence director must not be allowed to direct and
supervise the control of activities of our national intelligence
collection agencies. In their view, granting such an authority would
undermine the Secretary of Defense's ability to fight and win wars. For
this to be true, the national intelligence director would have to deny
our military commanders the information they need to wage war. I cannot
conceive of any circumstance where that would be the case.
I am a member of the Armed Services Committee. I am a former Marine
officer. I would not sanction any legislation that I thought would
limit the ability of our troops to fight and to win wars. I recognize
the special requirements of the Department of Defense. As chairman of
the Intelligence Committee, I also know that the Department of Defense
is only one of the major consumers of intelligence. Important, yes;
major, yes; but one.
I often hear people referring to the Department of Defense as the
principal consumer of intelligence. While the Department is a
significant and important consumer of intelligence, we need
[[Page S9875]]
to remember one thing: The principal consumers of intelligence are the
President of the United States, the Congress, and the National Security
Council. They are the principal consumers. The Department of Defense is
a major consumer.
In time, the Department of Homeland Security is likely to become a
voracious consumer of intelligence, perhaps on a par with the
Department of Defense.
I do not believe the defense of the homeland is any less important
than prosecuting the war. Consequently it does not make sense to have
80 percent of our intelligence collection apparatus controlled by one
consumer, and that is the Department of Defense.
If we give the national intelligence director the authority to manage
all of the national collection agencies, that will ensure one office is
responsible and accountable for meeting the intelligence requirements
of all consumers including, of course, that of the Department of
Defense. If any Cabinet member believes their intelligence requirements
are not being met, he or she can address the issues to the national
intelligence director. If a Cabinet member does not agree with NID's
decision, they can take it up with the President of the United States.
I also note that in testimony before Congress, the directors of two
of the Pentagon's intelligence collection agencies--the National
Security Agency and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency--stated
that having their agencies transferred to the control of a national
intelligence director would not degrade their level of support to the
military.
Let me repeat that. The directors of two of the Pentagon's
intelligence collection agencies--the National Security Agency and the
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency--stated that having their
agencies transferred to the control of a national intelligence director
would not degrade their level of support to the military.
Additionally, some have argued that giving the national intelligence
director line control of agencies with uniformed military personnel
would be complicated. There will certainly be some issues to be
resolved, to be sure. But the Department of Defense regularly details
military personnel to agencies and offices outside of the Department of
Defense. We would not be breaking new ground here. We have had civilian
control of the military since the founding of this Nation, and I don't
see how civilian control by a national intelligence director is
qualitatively different than civilian control by the Secretary of
Defense. They both work for the President.
There has been a lot of talk about that fact in regard to meetings we
have had with people in uniform and the Secretary of Defense and a
certain Senator asking, How would you feel if your budget was
controlled by somebody who didn't wear a uniform? Well, the Secretary
of Defense doesn't wear a uniform. When the military appears before the
Congress, they don't wear a uniform. Neither does the Secretary of
Army, Navy, or Air Force wear a uniform.
Let me detail a few examples to illustrate why direct control is so
important to the success of the national intelligence director.
As recently as last week--I would like for Members to pay attention
to this--as recently as last week, the Senate Intelligence Committee
received a very troubling briefing in closed session that clearly
demonstrated that even on matters relating to the terrorist threat to
our homeland, today, now, the terrorist threat that we face, the
intelligence agencies still stubbornly refuse to adequately share
information. Why are these agencies still not sharing? Some progress
has been made. But why are they still not sharing? Is it because the
DCI doesn't have adequate budget authority? No. They don't share it
because they work for 15 different bosses and no one holds them
accountable for information sharing. The national intelligence director
can cajole, he can plead, he can consult all he wants; he can
promulgate policies and guidelines all day long. He can create grand,
trusted information networks. But without a national intelligence
director with direct control, there will be no one to force adequate
information sharing within the intelligence community.
Let us take another example.
We have all heard former DCI Tenet's now famous declaration of war
against al-Qaida in 1998. Mr. Tenet ordered that no resource was to be
spared in this critical effort. He declared war as a result of Osama
bin Laden issuing fatwas to kill Americans.
What happened as a result of this bold order? Not much. The National
Security Agency went its own way, saying: Thank you, Mr. DCI, for your
interest in national security, but we are going to retool for a threat
that has nothing to do with terrorism.
What would have happened if Mr. Tenet had the authorities granted to
the national intelligence director under the Collins-Lieberman bill
when he made his 1998 declaration? He might have said: We are at war,
and the NSA will see that reflected in the budget you will receive in
the next year or so, assuming Congress does not make any changes to it.
That is budget authority. That is the crowbar he would use in terms of
influence. However, with the authorities to direct, supervise, and
control, which are provided in the Specter amendment, Mr. Tenet would
have been able to order the NSA to stop retooling for the other threat,
get to work that day, focus their efforts on al-Qaida. In the 21st
century, threats evolve too quickly to wait a year or so for the
national intelligence director's budget change to have any effect. The
NID must have direct control in order to make immediate changes.
The bill before the Senate today is a significant step in the right
direction. Credit goes to Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman. There
are many good provisions in the bill which should improve the
intelligence community, but it is missing something very important--a
clear chain of command and accountability.
As the examples I have cited demonstrate, a clear chain of command
and accountability that comes with it are essential to real and lasting
reform. If we do not make the hard choices now, I fear after yet
another series of intelligence failures--and Lord knows I do not want
to sit as chairman of the Intelligence Committee and have any more ``Oh
my God'' hearings in regard to past tragedies from Khobar Towers to
embassy bombings to the Khartoum chemical plant to the failure to even
try to come as close as possible to predicting the India nuclear blast,
Somalia, the USS Cole, and obviously September 11. We do not want to go
back down that road.
I fear the Senate Intelligence Committee will be right back in its
hearing room listening to the newly minted national intelligence
director testify while he enjoys a great deal of budget authority he
still lacks the real authority to perform the day-to-day operations of
our intelligence agencies and therefore lacks ability to lead as we
expect and as he must. I urge my colleagues to support the Specter
amendment so there is no doubt in anyone's mind that the national
intelligence director is in charge and is accountable.
I will take a few more moments to comment on some of the debate I
have heard concerning this amendment. This is not a new debate. What I
heard in the Senate yesterday and today represents an age-old tension
that has existed since the intelligence community was created.
Ms. COLLINS. Would the Senator yield briefly for a unanimous consent
request?
Mr. ROBERTS. Certainly, I would be more than happy, in the middle of
shining the light of truth into darkness, to yield for a unanimous
consent request.
Ms. COLLINS. I apologize for interrupting the Senator. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that the only amendments remaining to the bill
other than the pending amendments be the two lists I now send to the
desk; provided further that they be subject to second degrees that are
related to the subject matter of the first degree; further, that all
other provisions governing the consideration of this bill remain in
effect.
Mr. SPECTER. Reserving the right to object, would the distinguished
chairwoman repeat that unanimous consent request?
Mr. REID. Mr. President, basically what we have done, we now have a
finite list of amendments. The two cloakrooms have hotlined every
Senator, and we have, I am sorry to say, more than 200 amendments, but
that is
[[Page S9876]]
the finite list, and the Senator from Pennsylvania is on the list.
Mr. SPECTER. Parliamentary inquiry: For how many amendments am I on
the list?
Mr. REID. Seven.
Ms. COLLINS. Seven plus the pending amendment.
Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Chair.
Mr. ROBERTS. If the Senator will yield, may I ask if the 21
amendments I have drafted, amendments that would improve the nature of
the bill, are they included in that list?
Ms. COLLINS. They are indeed.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Ms. COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. President.
I thank the Senator.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, if the Senator will allow me to make a
statement as to what we are going to do here for a minute, I will be
very brief.
The two leaders have directed the two managers of the bill that the
next step will be to get a filing deadline. Hopefully that will be in
the next few hours. We may not be able to do it until tomorrow, but we
are working as quickly as we can to make sure amendments people have
submitted will be drafted. We are moving along as quickly as we can.
The list of amendments is as follows:
Shelby, Domestic Preparedness; Shelby, Domestic
Preparedness; Shelby, NID; Ensign, Relevant; Ensign,
Relevant; Inhofe, Relevant; Inhofe, Relevant; Inhofe,
Relevant; Inhofe, Relevant; Inhofe, Relevant; Inhofe,
Relevant; Inhofe, Relevant; Lugar, Relevant; Lugar, Relevant;
Voinovich, Presidential Appointments; Cornyn, Human
Smuggling; Cornyn, State and Local Law Enforcement; Cornyn,
Drivers Licenses.
Snowe, IG; Snowe, Red Teams; Snowe, NIE Reports; Snowe,
NCTC Reports; Snowe, Relevant; Snowe, Relevant; Allard,
Marshall Imagery; Allard, Personnel Authorities; Allard,
Personnel Authorities; Allard, Geospatial Informatrion;
Cornyn, Cyber Security; Grassley, Money Laundering/Terror
Financing; Grassley, IG/Whistleblower Protection; Grassley,
Visas; Grassley, Visas; Grassley, Related; Grassley, Related;
Grassley, Related.
Hutchison, Center for Alternative Intel. Analysis;
Hutchison, Relevant; McConnell, Related; McConnell, Related;
McConnell, Related; McConnell, Related; Domenici, Natl.
Critical Infrastructure Center; Domenici, Border
Surveillance; Domenici, WMD Intel. Center; Sessions,
Relevant; Sessions, Relevant; Sessions, Relevant; Sessions,
Relevant; Sessions, Relevant; Sessions, Relevant; Sessions,
Relevant; Sessions, Relevant; Sessions, Relevant; Sessions,
Relevant.
Kyl, Relevant; Kyl, Relevant; Kyl, Relevant; Kyl, Relevant;
Kyl, Relevant; Kyl, Relevant; Chambliss, Border Security;
Chambliss, Document Security; Chambliss, Relevant; Chambliss,
Relevant; Chambliss, Military Intel.; McCain, Relevant;
McCain, Relevant; McCain, Relevant; McCain, Relevant; McCain,
Relevant; McCain, Relevant; McCain, Relevant; McCain,
Relevant; McCain, Relevant; McCain, Relevant.
Roberts, NID Agency Control; Roberts, Definitions; Roberts,
IC/NFIP Programs; Roberts, IC/NFIP Programs; Roberts, Non-
NFIP DIA Programs; Roberts, Intel-Sharing; Roberts, NIDs
Authorities; Roberts, NIA; Roberts, NID; Roberts, Sect. 504
of Natl. Sec. Act of 1947; Roberts, NID Control of CIA;
Roberts, Reprogramming and Transfers; Roberts, New
Positions Subject to NID Concurrence; Roberts, NID
Authority; Roberts, NID Authority; Roberts, Analytic
Review Unit; Roberts, GC Provision; Roberts, IG Provision;
Roberts, NCTC and NIC Responsibilities; Roberts, SecDef
Responsibilities to NID for NIP; Roberts, NID Authority;
Roberts, NID Authority; Roberts, NID; Roberts, Relevant;
Roberts, Relevant.
Hatch, Punishment for Stowaways; Hatch, FBI Translators;
Hatch, Expedited Terrorist Removal; Warner, Relevant; Warner,
Relevant; Warner, Relevant; Warner, Relevant; Warner,
Relevant; Warner, Relevant; Warner, Relevant; Warner
Relevant; Warner, Relevant; Warner, Relevant; Warner,
Relevant; Warner, Relevant; Warner, Relevant; Warner,
Relevant; Warner, Relevant.
Stevens, Relevant; Stevens, Relevant; Stevens, Relevant;
Stevens, Relevant; Stevens, Relevant; Stevens, Relevant;
Stevens, Relevant; Stevens, Relevant; Stevens, Relevant;
Stevens, Relevant; Stevens, Relevant; Stevens, Relevant;
Stevens, Relevant; Stevens, Relevant; Stevens, Relevant;
Stevens, Relevant; Stevens Relevant; Stevens, Relevant;
Stevens, Relevant; Stevens, Relevant; Gregg, FBI; Gregg,
Relevant; Coleman, Information Network; Coleman, Strike;
Collins, Relevant; Collins, Relevant; Collins, Relevant.
Talent, Relevant; Burns, Federal Flight Deck Officer Prog.;
Burns, Relevant; Burns, Relevant; Specter, Relevant; Specter,
Relevant; Specter, Relevant; Specter, Relevant; Specter,
Relevant; Specter, Relevant; Specter, Relevant; Specter,
Relevant; Specter, Relevant; Specter, Relevant; Frist,
Relevant; Frist, Relevant; Frist, Relevant; Frist, Relevant;
Frist, Relevant; Frist, Relevant to any on list; Frist,
Relevant to any on list; Frist, Relevant to any on list;
Frist, Relevant to any on list; Frist, Relevant to any on
list.
Collins, Relevant; Collins, Relevant; Collins, Relevant;
Collins, Relevant; Collins, Relevant; Collins, Relevant to
any on list; Collins, Relevant to any on list; Collins,
Relevant to any on list; Collins, Relevant to any on list;
Collins, Relevant to any on list; Collins, Managers'
amdendments; Voinovich, Ethics in government.
____
Akaka, 1. Relevant; 2. Relevant; 3. Relevant; 4. Relevant.
Baucus, 1. Relevant.
Bayh, 1. Congressional Reform.
Biden, 1. Relevant; 2. Relevant.
Bingaman, 1. Terrorism; 2. Lab Employees; 3. Chief Science
Officer; 4. Relevant.
Boxer, 1. Relevant; 2. Relevant; 3. Relevant.
Byrd, 1. Relevant; 2. Relevant; 3. Relevant; 4. Relevant.
Cantwell, 1. Biometric Visas.
Carper, 1. Rail Security.
Clinton, 1. Relevant; 2. Relevant; 3. 2nd degree to Collins
Formula Grants.
Conrad, 1. Relevant; 2. Relevant; 3. Relevant.
Corzine, 1. Relevant; 2. Relevant; 3. Relevant.
Daschle, 1. Related; 2. Related; 3. Related to any on the
list; 4. Related to any on the list.
Dayton, 1. NID Communication with Congress.
Dorgan, 1. Nano-technology.
Durbin, 1. Civil liberties; 2. Civil liberties; 3. Foreign
language, Science, technology education.
Feingold, 1. Information sharing; 2. Relevant.
Feinstein, 1. State and Local; 2. DoD Tactical; 3. National
Intel University; 4. Clarify sub-official role; 5.
Colocation; 6. FBI General; 7. Reserve Corps; 8. Related; 9.
Related.
Graham, 1. NIC; 2. Education and Training; 3. Relevant; 4.
Relevant.
Jeffords, 1. Interoperability; 2. Preparedness; 3.
Security; 4. Critical Infrastructure.
Harkin, 1. Civil Liberties; 2. Civil Liberties; 3. Related.
Hollings, 1. MTSA deadlines.
Inouye, 1. TSA.
Lautenberg, 1. NID Five year term (re-newable); 2. Close
Business with Terrorists Loophole; 3. Risked Based Homeland
Security; 4. Port Security; 5. Rail Security; 6. Saudi
Arabia.
Leahy, 1. Relevant; 2. Relevant; 3. Translators Report Act;
4. FISA Oversight; 5. FBI Reform Act; 6. USA Patriots
Restoration Act; 7. Whistle Blower Protections; 8.
Information Sharing Enhancement; 9. Civil Liberties Review
Board Improvements; 10. Passenger Screening/Watch Lists; 11.
Passenger ID verification.
Levin, 1. Intel Requirements; 2. Alternative Intel; 3.
Critical Infrastructure Protection; 4. Budget Authority; 5.
Relevant; 6. Relevant.
Lieberman 1. Relevant; 2. Relevant; 3. Relevant; 4.
Relevant to any on list; 5. Relevant; 6. Relevant; 7.
Relevant to any on list; 8. Relevant to any on list; 9.
Relevant to any on list; 10. Relevant to any on list.
Hollings, 1. Creating National Intelligence Coordinator.
Nelson (FL), 1. Relevant; 2. Relevant; 3. Relevant.
Reed, 1. LNG; 2. Transit Security.
Reid, 1. Relevant; 2. Relevant.
Rockefeller, 1. Relevant; 2. Relevant; 3. Relevant to any
on the list; 4. Relevant to any on the list.
Sarbanes, 1. Civil liberties.
Schumer, 1. Signal Corps; 2. Biometric Screening; 3. Port
Security; 4. Cyber Security; 5. Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act; 6. Saudi Arabia; 7. Truck Security; 8. Rail
Security; 9. Relevant; 10. Relevant; 11. Relevant.
Wyden, 1. Independent Security Classification Board (S.A.#
3704); 2. Databases.
Mr. ROBERTS. What I heard in the Senate yesterday in regard to
comments on this debate represents an age-old tension that has existed
since the intelligence community was created.
Members heard numerous quotes from statutes such as title 10, title
50. The heart of this debate, however, is whether we will give an
individual unambiguous control of intelligence activities in the United
States. We can quote from the United States Code all day. The point is
the laws could be changed. That is what we do in the Congress. The
debate today is about what the law should be, not what the law is.
Arguing the status quo is convenient, but it is not always correct.
This bill gives the new national intelligence director one very good
tool. It is called budget authority. It does not give him control. The
Specter amendment gives the national intelligence director control,
which means accountability and real reform.
As we have debated this issue, I have heard many Members cite the
words and reported opinions of the 9/11 Commission. The 9/11 Commission
has done a great service to this country, but the Commissioners
themselves have made it clear they do not have all the answers.
The 9/11 Commission did produce an excellent study of the failures
leading
[[Page S9877]]
up to the attacks of September 11. The Governmental Affairs Committee
bill is faithful to the lessons the Commission drew from its work. It
is an excellent report. But I remind my colleagues that the
Commission's report was based on a single case study--the period
leading up to the attacks of September 11. However, a broader
historical examination of our intelligence community leads many--
including this Senator--to the important conclusion that over the last
50 years, the intelligence community has drifted due to the lack of or
absence of a clear chain of command and the lack of accountability that
a clear chain of command can bring. That clear chain of command
requires giving the national intelligence director the authority to
direct, to control, and to supervise our national collection agencies.
Our job is not to take the work of the 9/11 Commission as a sacred
text which is not to be questioned or altered; our job is to take their
work and integrate it with the lessons learned over the 50-plus years
of history of our intelligence community and nearly 30 years of
congressional oversight by the Intelligence Committee. As the Senator
from Pennsylvania has pointed out, his amendment incorporates many of
those lessons.
Yesterday, I also heard Members argue that the Specter amendment
would create confusing chains of command for the National Security
Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence collection elements of the
Defense Intelligence Agency. I respectfully disagree.
In addition to providing the national intelligence director with the
authority to direct, supervise, and control these agencies, the Specter
amendment clarifies other provisions of law to specifically address
this concern. It amends title 10 and title 50, adds two new provisions
to the law to specifically clarify that the Directors, again, of the
National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence
collection elements of the Defense Intelligence Agency report directly
to the national intelligence director.
While this amendment gives the national intelligence director direct
control over these agencies, they remain ``combat support agencies''--
nobody quarrels with that--and the Secretary of Defense will still have
influence over them. That is by design. No one is trying to change
that. I think it is much better than the bill's current language in
which the Secretary of Defense has direct control of these agencies,
and the NID only has influence and persuasion. I can tell you from past
history, influence and persuasion do not get you very far at the
Pentagon.
Some have argued that only the Secretary of Defense can manage the
combat support agencies. Some argue that only if the Secretary of
Defense manages the Pentagon's national intelligence collection
agencies will the warfighter receive adequate support. This is a
fallacy. As I said earlier, there is no reason to believe the Defense
Department will not receive the support it needs if the Pentagon's
national intelligence collection agencies report to the national
intelligence director.
The amendment provides the Secretary of Defense with important
feedback mechanisms to make sure the Department is getting the national
intelligence support it needs.
First, the Secretary of Defense is required to provide the national
intelligence director with some performance appraisals for the
directors of the national intelligence collection agencies. Second, the
national intelligence director will receive recommendations from the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff based upon a biannual review of
the combat support plans for the National Security Agency; again, the
National Reconnaissance Office; again, the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency; and the DIA, again, the Defense Intelligence
Agency.
Working with the Secretary of Defense through these feedback
mechanisms, the national intelligence director will ensure that the
Defense Department's intelligence needs are met. Clearly, this
amendment recognizes the important support role these agencies play to
the Department of Defense in its role as an intelligence consumer.
Now, I also heard the argument yesterday that giving the national
intelligence director direction, supervision, and control of the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency is a bad idea because that
agency is responsible for making maps. I point out that this agency
used to be named the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, but they
changed its name to signal a change in the manner in which it would
perform its mission.
The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, or the NGA, uses
intelligence data acquired by satellites and other means and melds that
data into the maps that our entire Government uses. This is what is now
called geospatial intelligence. The maps we use have the full benefit
of the intelligence data we gather all around the world. Mapmaking is
not inconsistent with the national intelligence director's mission.
Another argument heard yesterday against the Specter amendment was
that the 9/11 Commission had considered granting the NID direction,
supervision, and control authorities but rejected the idea on the
grounds that the duties of managing these agencies would overload the
national intelligence director. However, I note that the Secretary of
Defense controls the military services, the Reserves, the unified
commands, the defense agencies, field activities, literally millions of
uniformed and civilian personnel, and those who mow the yard outside
the Pentagon.
So if I understand correctly, in order not to overburden the national
intelligence director, we will leave the national intelligence
collection agencies under the control of an already extremely busy and,
I might add, effective Secretary of Defense. This logic escapes me.
I also heard an argument that the
9/11 Commission had rejected granting the national intelligence
director greater authorities because the Commissioners preferred what
was described on the Senate floor as a ``lean, mean modern corporate
structure.''
I ask my colleagues, What successful modern corporation would not
give its chairman and CEO the authority to direct, supervise, and
control every component of the organization for which he or she was
held accountable by the shareholders? We should not confuse direction,
supervision, and control with micromanagement.
I also heard the argument that the Specter amendment would promote
group-think within the intelligence community. Well, I can tell you
that the Senate Intelligence Committee wrote the book on the occurrence
of group-think in its report on the prewar assessments on Iraq's WMD
programs.
It is a problem that we on the committee watch very carefully every
week, almost every day. I do not believe the Specter amendment will
promote any kind of group-think. I would be concerned about the risk of
group-think if we were proposing to grant the national intelligence
director the authority to direct, supervise, and control the analytical
content of our national analytical agencies. That is not what Senator
Specter's amendment proposes. It proposes direction, supervision, and
control over the Department of Defense's national intelligence
collection agencies.
Additionally, as was seen in the committee's examination of the
prewar assessments--as I say, it took us over a year, 22 professional
staff members; we interviewed over 220 analysts--the creation of a
strong national intelligence director will prevent group-think in the
intelligence community. A strong director will ensure a level playing
field in which the analysis of all agencies will be given full
consideration and equal consideration based upon the quality of the
analysis when intelligence community assessments are being developed.
If anyone has studied the committee's Iraq report--and I encourage
Senators to read it, 511 pages--they know that the lack of a level
playing field was a major problem.
Mr. President, with that I am going to conclude my remarks. I urge
Members to support the Specter amendment.
The Specter amendment has been described as a ``bridge too far.''
This well-known term is a product of the tragic Battle of Arnhem,
Holland, in 1944.
Many historians see the tragedy of Arnhem as a combination of errors,
i.e., the undertaking, for some political
[[Page S9878]]
reasons, of an ill-advised military campaign opposed by American
commanders; i.e., and a massive intelligence gap that failed to detect
a large concentration of German armor in the area.
Mr. President, the ``bridge too far'' analogy is apt, but it cuts in
favor of the Specter amendment. We must not, for political reasons,
fail to make the hard decisions that are necessary to ensure a strong,
in-charge national intelligence director.
These decisions are difficult. They are hard. But these decisions are
critically needed. The changes we make today have one overarching goal:
to prevent another intelligence failure on the order of Arnhem and
September 11. Because of those failures, the allies suffered 17,000
casualties and, obviously, on September 11, 3,000 died.
Failure to approve the Specter amendment may be seen by historians as
a tragic half-measure that led to another Arnhem or another September
11.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Bond
immediately follow me in order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I associate myself with the remarks of the
distinguished chairman of the Intelligence Committee.
I rise today to support the amendment offered by Senator Specter.
This amendment has the support of Senators Specter, Shelby, and
Roberts--two former chairmen of the Intelligence Committee, as well as
the current chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. I
have had the pleasure to work closely with these colleagues, and I
respect their experience and their independent thinking on intelligence
matters.
This amendment is also cosponsored by a bipartisan group of Senators
from the Intelligence Committee. This amendment establishes the goals
set forth by 14 Senators who addressed a letter to Chairman Collins and
Senator Lieberman on September 20, 2004, in which they sought to ensure
that the national intelligence director has the ability to control the
day-to-day operations of all of our national intelligence assets.
I consider myself privileged to serve as a member of the Intelligence
Committee during these difficult and historic times. Yet I can also say
that during these years I have heard too many excuses for intelligence
failures. I have seen firsthand the damage that comes when the head of
the intelligence community lacks the ability to effectively lead our
national intelligence agencies.
The chairman and the ranking minority member of the Governmental
Affairs Committee have taken on a monumental task, for which I am
grateful. They have been charged with writing a bill that modifies the
National Security Act of 1947, to give the national intelligence
director greater budget control and stronger authority to manage the
intelligence community. This task, as we all know, has been extremely
complicated.
It is particularly difficult when one considers the broad authorities
that the National Security Act of 1947 already granted to the Director
of Central Intelligence, as head of the intelligence community.
Under that act, the DCI was given substantial authority to develop a
budget for national intelligence activities, to set election
requirements and priorities, and to direct intelligence analysis. The
Intelligence Committee has observed over time, however, that the DCIs
cannot exercise their authorities because they do not have actual
control over the operations of the national intelligence agencies. This
is because the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance
Office, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency report
operationally to the Secretary of Defense, and DCIs have had to
negotiate and cajole to ensure that their operational initiatives were
met. As a result, to keep from hindering this day-in/day-out
negotiation, DCIs were unable to effectively exercise their broad
budget authorities.
There is no greater example in my eyes--or at least modern example--
than in 1998, when former DCI George Tenet recognized that we needed to
direct all of our intelligence resources to defeating al-Qaida. This
was his famous ``declaration of war'' against al-Qaida, and he declared
that no resource of intelligence would be spared to defeat al-Qaida. He
was ignored by the intelligence community that he was in charge of
leading.
For example, the National Security Agency retooled for a different
signals intelligence mission, not for the war on al-Qaida. We simply
cannot ignore this example of unused DCI authorities. We cannot forget
the lessons of past intelligence failures. I am concerned that the best
intentions of the Governmental Affairs legislation will never be
fulfilled and that the good authorities granted to the national
intelligence director under the legislation will never be effectively
exercised.
The debate we are having today about the authorities of the national
intelligence director versus the Secretary of Defense has occurred in
this town over and over again since the National Security Act was first
passed back in 1947. As the intelligence community grew, the
authorities of the Director of Central Intelligence were diluted as the
Secretary of Defense gained a greater share of control over our
intelligence agencies.
We have a unique opportunity in the next few weeks to establish a
structure that puts someone truly in charge of our national
intelligence mission. I think we have to take this opportunity to
clarify the confused chains of command that have handcuffed past
Directors of Central Intelligence.
With a national intelligence director empowered to ``supervise,
direct and control'' our national collection assets, we will implement
real reform, not just establish another bureaucratic level and finally
have one person who is actually accountable to the President and to
Congress. Only with the Specter amendment's clear chains of command
will we give the national intelligence director the authorities
necessary to meet his vast responsibilities.
Some will argue that the Specter amendment goes too far; that it is
just too hard to separate the NSA, NRO, and NGA from the Department of
Defense; that it will hinder intelligence support for the warfighters.
The argument made has not been compelling. Why are clear chains of
command a bridge too far, as some have suggested? That is a clear
image, but it does not illuminate the argument. Why should we rely on a
mishmash of budget and personnel controls to put a national
intelligence director nominally in charge when we know that real
control and accountability will only come with a clear chain of command
to the director? We have all been saying that for months and so has the
9/11 Commission. Why are we talking about current provisions of law to
show that these combat support agencies can't be separated from the
Defense Department?
Let's not let arguments about current law confuse the issue. We are
talking about putting a national intelligence director in charge. We
are debating a bill that would change current law. If the Specter
amendment requires, we can accommodate other necessary provisions.
Finally, no one believes that the NSA, NRO, NGA, and DIA would stop
supporting the warfighter if this amendment is enacted. Really, does
anybody? The answer to that is no. If I believed that, I would not
support this amendment. Why would a national intelligence director turn
off the intelligence support upon which our warfighters rely so much? I
have never known a DCI to do such a thing. No national intelligence
director would ever shortchange the warfighter. No President or
Congress would ever permit that. In fact, the Specter amendment
recognizes the unique position of the Department of Defense as an
intelligence consumer--giving the Secretary of Defense the right to
prepare annual performance evaluations for the Directors of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the NRO, NSA, NGA, and DIA, and maintaining the
Joint Chiefs biannual review of the combat support plans of the NRO,
NSA, NGA, and DIA.
What the Specter amendment does not do is maintain the current
confused chains of command for the national intelligence collectors
within the Department of Defense. The Specter amendment recognizes that
accountability and effective management are only possible with clear
chains of
[[Page S9879]]
command. The blunt tool of budget control is not an effective mechanism
for flexible midcourse corrections in intelligence collection that a
national intelligence director must be able to make, without having to
negotiate or consult for his or her priorities.
If the confused chains of command of the status quo are an effective
mechanism for control, we should ask the Secretary of Defense if budget
control would be sufficient for him to ``coordinate'' a war. If the
Secretary of Defense only controlled the Army's budget, would that be
sufficient command of the Third Infantry Division? If he only
controlled the Navy's budget, could he order an aircraft carrier from
one ocean to another and expect it to move? If the answers to those
questions are no, then why should we settle for anything less than full
direction, supervision, and control of national intelligence collection
for the national intelligence director?
I support the Specter amendment. I know everybody on this floor is
sincerely trying to resolve these problems as best they can. I commend
the distinguished committee for the work it has done in bringing this
bill to the floor and the two leaders on the floor. But I think we
should support the Specter amendment. I urge all my colleagues to do
the same.
I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri.
Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I thank the Chair and appreciate the words
of my colleagues.
In spite of years of recognition that intelligence was in dire need
of reform, the catalyst of this year's reform initiative was the
tragedy of September 11, 2001. The intelligence failure of Iraq's WMD
programs only underscores this point.
I applaud many of the provisions of the Collins-Lieberman bill.
However, I stand in support of the Specter amendment as a means to
provide absolutely essential powers to the national intelligence
director. For those who may just happen to be listening for the first
time, the national intelligence director is now known as the NID. But
this NID must have powers to bring together fully and effectively our
national collection efforts.
In spite of my respect and admiration for the efforts of my
colleagues, I remind the Senate that now is the time for bold action.
This deliberative body must be prepared to stare down very powerful
executive branch bureaucracies--and a few of our own--that are
instinctively protecting their turf. Three thousand dead Americans
should be a message to all of us that we must make significant changes.
A witness before the Senate Intelligence Committee put it well. She
said:
History's lesson is to make the most of reform
opportunities when they arise because they do not arise often
and they do not last long. We have one of those rare windows
of opportunity now. And if the past is any guide, there will
not be another chance for a generation. These realities mean
that reforms should be sweeping because they will be lasting.
The choices we make will be with us for decades to come.
I fear we are not being as bold in the underlying bill as
circumstances demand. We all agree that the 9/11 Commission published a
great report outlining in detail the events of September 11, 2001.
We could not and we should not detract from their efforts. However,
one fundamental concern I have in this is that it is now 3 years after
9/11, and we are only now taking action, largely based on the
recommendation of a panel not specifically chartered to focus on the
intelligence failures leading to 9/11.
I am concerned that a commission directed by law to investigate the
``facts and circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001,'' has become the only basis for intelligence
reform.
Well, there is a lot of work that has been going on in this body and
in the other body about intelligence reform that is not covered in the
9/11 report.
Just since the end of the Cold War, there have been many major
studies of intelligence reform, staffed by intelligence professionals.
They include the joint Senate/House inquiry into 9/11, the Aspin-Brown
Commission, IC21 study, the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence study, the Scowcroft review, and many others.
As I listen to the debate on this Collins-Lieberman bill, I am
concerned that the truly meritorious recommendations and thoughts from
these other commissions have been largely disregarded. Rather, I seem
to hear--behind most of the key provisions in the bill--the rationale
that ``the 9/11 Commission said so.'' Well, we do respect and take
seriously the work of the 9/11 Commission, but we must be sure that we
consider the other recommendations of studies specifically examining
the intelligence process. I happen to think that many of those are more
accurately reflective of the needs of the intelligence community.
Recommendation No. 1, from the joint Senate/House inquiry into the 9/
11 intelligence failure was:
Congress should amend the National Security Act of 1947 to
create and sufficiently staff a statutory director of
national intelligence who shall be the President's principal
advisor on intelligence and shall have the full range of
management, budgetary, and personnel responsibilities needed
to make the entire U.S. intelligence community operate as a
coherent whole.
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence's staff study
entitled, ``IC21,'' or ``Intelligence Community in the 21st Century,''
stated:
The [intelligence community] would benefit greatly from a
more corporate approach to its basic functions. Central
management should be strengthened, core competencies
(collection, analysis, and operations) should be reinforced
and infrastructure should be consolidated wherever possible.
The 9/11 Commission's Vice Chairman, Lee Hamilton, for whom I have a
great deal of respect, admitted to our committee in open session that
they really had not even considered more bold reform. He said the
Commission simply looked at things they thought they could accomplish.
I believe the word he may have used was ``pragmatic.'' They simply did
not consider more bold reforms, so maybe we ought not to consider their
recommendations as final. It is up to us. We have the ultimate
responsibility of passing this bill. Are we going to pass what is
pragmatic, what seems to be the least upsetting to the bureaucracies or
do we want to be bold and pass something that will make
the intelligence community work? Count me in the latter category.
Yesterday, my good friend, the chairman of the committee writing this
bill, alluded to some of the concerns I have. When responding to
concerns about DOD being shortchanged by the NID's budget authority,
she reminded us all that ultimately the President determines the
budget. That will always be the case. Let us not also forget that the
bureaucracies of the OMB and many committees of the Senate and the
House also determine the budget. There is simply too many ways to water
down the limited real authority that budgetary powers provide. More
real day-to-day authorities are needed, especially if we are to hold a
NID accountable for our intelligence efforts. As bothersome as the OMB
is in the effective operation of Government--I say that only half
facetiously--does anybody think the OMB runs the agencies of
Government? They mess them up sometimes. There are a lot of areas I can
tell you where the OMB has shortchanged vitally important activities.
But run them? I don't think so. Budgetary authority is not the same
thing as running an agency.
The way I read the bill, it seems as though any agency or department
that didn't want to chafe under a powerful NID has found a way out.
This bill leaves the door open for several key agencies, such as the
State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, INR; major
portions of the FBI'S intelligence operations capabilities; the
Department of Energy's Office of Intelligence; the Treasury
Department's Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, and
others, to avoid the authority of a NID. So under the Governmental
Affairs bill, a NID who declares war on al-Qaida--as referenced by
Chairman Roberts of the Intelligence Committee a few minutes ago--will
have even fewer troops to try to muster for this war, and little
additional power that doesn't already exist today.
Let us recall that every knowledgeable voice on this issue is
adamant: If you create a NID, he must be given power; otherwise, you
create an intelligence czar and have made the problem worse. We have
created a drug czar
[[Page S9880]]
and all kinds of czars, but they are not able to get the job done. As I
continue to listen to DOD proponents, I am concerned that insufficient
authorities are granted in the GAC bill, and they will be even further
eroded, putting us one step closer to creating an intelligence czar
with a great title and very little authority.
One of the recurring themes we always hear on the Intelligence
Committee--on which I have had the pleasure to serve for only a year
and three-quarters--is the reluctance of the agencies to share
information with those who need to know. We know all too well there are
many legitimate reasons not to share intelligence. We understand the
need to protect sources and methods. We also understand that decisions
not to disseminate some information may rightly involve protecting U.S.
civil liberties. But parochialism, poor information architectures, and
bureaucratic confusion should not be included amongst the reasons to
squirrel away intelligence that we need by cognizant analysts
throughout the community.
Three years after 9/11, and after dozens of hearings in which
intelligence community management describes ``seamless'' intelligence
sharing, we end up prying a little deeper to find out that it simply is
not the case. While there have been improvements in some areas of
intelligence sharing, they are often done under duress. As soon as the
``heat'' is off, you can bet that those parochial agencies will return
to intelligence hoarding, not intelligence sharing. We must empower a
NID to force appropriate intelligence sharing even in times when the
congressional and executive spotlights are not on the issue.
I believe it has already been referred to on the Senate floor that at
a recent hearing, the intelligence committee was truly dumbfounded as
we listened to different agencies talk about a specific threat. Two
agencies had a very different view of the severity of that threat when
they started talking to each other at the witness table.
One of the agencies said: We have information that you don't have.
They were supposed to be working on the same threat. I asked a dumb
question. I said: Why didn't you share it? They said it was sensitive
information. Well, wait a minute. They were trying to give us a
recommendation on a very serious matter, and the two agencies that were
supposed to work together on this serious matter didn't want to share
information with each other? I used to think when we worked on a need-
to-know basis, if you have a sensitive collection system, you need to
keep the name and identity very closely guarded. They were happy to
tell us in the Intelligence Committee the reason they were keeping a
particular source on another matter in confidence was because it was so
sensitive. I will tell you one thing. If you have ever seen a sieve, it
looks too much like the Intelligence Committee. We don't need to know
the names or even the identifying features of an intelligence source in
the committee. But if that is the essential element on which the
analysts are going to determine whether this particular source is
reliable, they ought to be sharing it on a very limited basis with all
of the people involved in the task.
I understand that the information that was gathered by the Iraqi
Survey Group after the war was very effective because they brought in
collectors and analysts from different agencies who were working on the
same problem and they put their heads together. What a wonderful thing.
They must have had a table. They laid out the information on the table.
They did what informally is called ``red teaming'' and they came up
with better estimates.
The NID, the national intelligence director, needs to be able to take
care of this himself, not to negotiate with the positions with other
departments or go to the White House and Congress and say, will you get
these guys together to talk?
This reluctance to share information appears to be so deeply
ingrained that only direct orders to do so are adequate, not budgetary
influences.
Let me be candid. As a member of the Intelligence Committee I am
convinced that the worst offenders of not sharing intelligence are the
CIA and the NSA, but there are others. Arm twisting that is largely
limited to budgetary problems and powers will not solve the problem. We
know getting the information shared among agencies, red teaming, as
they say, is very important. In other words, if the players are at the
table, they are going to get their best result when everybody turns
over their cards and shows what they are holding, but right now some of
the agencies are going to the table and keeping their cards face down,
saying, boy, we know some stuff, it is in our hand, and we are not
going to show you.
Budget authority alone is not going to get them to turn over the
cards. Red teaming cannot be successful unless the cards are turned
over and the red team knows what cards the CIA is holding, for example.
Full deference should be given to civil liberties concerns, and I
hope that the Collins-Lieberman provisions for improving information
architectures within the intelligence community will allow for getting
the right intelligence to the right people, and in the case of very
sensitive intelligence or any other critical, possibly damaging
intelligence, only to the right people. But it has to be gotten to the
people who need it.
Some have argued that the Specter amendment will lead to too much
centralized control, therefore group-think. Not likely. Let's be clear.
The Specter amendment deals with national collection, entities of the
NSA, NGA, portions of the DIA and CIA. This will help streamline
collection and reduce inefficiencies. It will allow the NID truly to
harness the collection capabilities against our Nation's primary
threat: The terrorists.
This leaves capabilities organic to the DOD currently funded under
the Joint Military Intelligence Program, JMIP, and the Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities, somewhat glamorously acronymed the
TIARA, still firmly under DOD control, as they should be. DOD will not
be shortchanged and our Nation will have a more effective collection
effort.
Today, the DOD is the most voracious consumer of intelligence. That
is why they have the lion's share of the intelligence budget and
significant organic collection assets whose sole function is support to
the warfighter. However, national collectors must be unified in an
effort to meet national needs which include those of the
key intelligence entities in our war or terror: DOD, CIA, FBI, and the
Department of Homeland Security, where the appetite for terrorism-
related intelligence collection will only continue to grow.
I heard debate yesterday on the combat support agencies. Nobody
denies that these agencies, the NRO, the NSA, and the NGA, are still
combat support agencies, but as their name suggests, they also serve
national interests. When we examine this in a larger light, we realize
that having these agencies report directly to the Secretary of Defense
solely made sense during the Cold War. However, as I mentioned earlier
in this statement, the decisions we make today will be with us for
decades to come.
The world has changed. The war on terror is not going to go away
soon. While DOD is still a voracious consumer of intelligence, it is
now a partner with the CIA, FBI, the Department of Homeland Security,
and others in the war on terrorism. As other agencies continue to join
CIA and DOD as coequals, it makes sense to have a national intelligence
director who can see to the needs of all of these agencies and best
harness all national collection capabilities to meet our national
needs.
Again, we need to look decades down the road. We must recognize the
need to empower a NID to meet these needs. I believe Chairman Roberts
has already mentioned this several times, but let me state that the
Directors of the National Security Agency and the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency stated that having their agencies transferred to
the control of a NID would not degrade their level of support to the
military. Considering their testimony, as well as other commentary and
the maintenance of DOD's military intelligence collections, the
Pentagon need not fear the Specter amendment in any way.
It so happens I have a personal interest in this. As many of my
colleagues know, my son is a young ground intelligence second
lieutenant in the Marine Corps. I certainly do not want to
[[Page S9881]]
do anything that would interfere with his or his comrades' ability to
get the information, the intelligence, the estimates, and the tactical
intelligence they need to leave them hanging out without adequate
cover. My colleagues can bet I would never do that.
I conclude by giving some thoughts from Dr. David Kay, the interim
head of the Iraqi Survey Group, who testified before us many times and
who was a real bright light in gathering intelligence. He is certainly
not afraid to speak the truth in spite of whom he may offend. He told
the Intelligence Committee:
I am concerned, however, that simply creating a national
intelligence director, even one that seems to have--and we
think has--real powers . . . and we think budget and
personnel authority is real power, we will not end up
addressing the real problems . . .
Well, budget and personnel authority is some power but, as Dr. Kay
indicated, it is not real power.
Dr. Kay further stated:
I think you need to place the national intelligence
director in charge, charged by you, Congress, with ensuring
that all of the collection assets of this government work to
support the national intelligence strategies and priorities.
Dr. Kay recognizes the need for a unified collection effort. We
cannot afford to waste or misuse scarce collection assets. I think Dr.
Kay also knows the frustration of fragmented control quite well. He was
a DCI special adviser on Iraq and then, as I have noted, headed the
intelligence efforts of the Iraq Survey Group, or ISG. He wrestled with
authorities quite frequently. In large part, this was due to the
limited powers of the DCI vis-a-vis other department heads, but when
they made progress is when they coordinated and cooperated and the
agencies worked together.
I urge my colleagues to support the Specter amendment. This is a key
fix to give the NID some of the powers he or she will need if we are to
ask the NID to be accountable for our national intelligence effort.
I yield the floor.
Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise to express my strong support for
the Specter amendment currently pending before the Senate. However, I
want to first take a moment to commend Senator Collins and Senator
Lieberman for their hard work and dedication to this important
legislation. These are difficult issues and I believe that we all
strive to reach the same goal--a safer, more secure America. The
question before us now is how we best accomplish that goal.
I have long advocated for significant overhaul of the intelligence
community in order to change the way it operates and specifically who
controls the community and its assets. For too long, the intelligence
community has lacked a strong leader with the ability to command and
control the multitude of agencies that operate as independent parts
without a focused direction.
I do not believe that Congress's action in 1947 intended to create
the intelligence framework we currently have--a framework where no one
has the ability to direct the actions of the community as a whole. I
believe that Congress intended to create a Director of Central
Intelligence with clear lines of authority and accountability within
the intelligence community--one that is much like what we are
attempting to create now with a national intelligence director.
The underlying bill does take some important steps toward the
creation of a national intelligence director with the power and
authority to chart a path for real reform within the intelligence
community. Unfortunately, I believe that the underlying bill fails to
provide the national intelligence director with all of the authorities
required to provide the unity of leadership and accountability
necessary for real reform.
I believe that clear lines of authority between the national
intelligence director and our national intelligence collection
agencies, extending beyond budgetary control, are critical to our
success in countering national security threats of the 21st century.
The national intelligence director must have the ability to direct,
supervise and control the elements of the intelligence community.
There must be no doubt in anyone's mind that the national
intelligence director is in charge. Without the additional authorities
that are provided in the Specter amendment, there will be doubt.
The Specter amendment seeks to eliminate any question about who is
ultimately in charge of the intelligence community. With the additional
authority included in this amendment, there will no longer be an
opportunity for finger pointing and excuse making.
Ultimately, the national intelligence director will either be
congratulated for the success of the intelligence community or held
accountable for their failures.
I believe that budgetary authority is an important part of the
overall structure of a strong national intelligence director. But
beyond that, he or she must have day-to-day operational control of all
elements of the intelligence community performing national intelligence
collection missions, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the
National Reconnaissance Office, the National Security Agency, and the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the humint parts of the
Defense Intelligence Agency.
Giving the national intelligence director budget authority but not
day-to-day operational control will leave the intelligence agencies
serving two masters and will inevitably maintain the status quo that
has continuously failed us. Fundamental change is a must if we are
going to work to prevent any further attacks.
I believe this amendment serves as a perfect complement to the
actions taken in the National Intelligence Reform bill. This amendment
simply enhances the authority of the national intelligence director.
I continue to believe that change for the sake of change will do
nothing to accomplish our goal. A powerful national intelligence
director is a vital part of our future fight against the terrorists
that have dedicated their lives for the purpose of destroying America
and its citizens. If we truly want to create a strong national
intelligence director who has the authorities necessary to command and
control our intelligence community and its assets, we must pass the
Specter amendment.
I urge my colleagues to take advantage of this opportunity and
support this amendment to ensure that true change is possible through
the enabling of a powerful national intelligence director.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I oppose the Specter amendment and I will
take a few minutes to explain my opposition. I think all of us are in
favor of bold moves, of having a powerful new national intelligence
director and having analysis that is independent and objective, much
more so than has been the case in the last few decades and recently, to
have that analysis done by a group which can bring together all of the
information and come up with a coordinated position which is
independent and objective, and the NCTC is able to do that.
This amendment would place the National Security Agency and the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the NSA and the NGA, and the
National Reconnaissance Office, the NRO, under the direction,
supervision, and control of the national intelligence director and
would do the same for the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency
regarding the national intelligence collection mission of the DIA.
In doing so, this amendment would have the national intelligence
director basically be substituted for the Secretary of Defense in the
military chain of command. There are thousands of uniformed members of
our military who are currently in those agencies.
To break the chain of command and to say for the first time we are
going to take thousands of uniformed personnel and put them under the
supervision, direction, and control of a civilian agency head would
create havoc inside of the military, would create a very unfortunate
precedent, and would in the process be creating a new agency, a new
agency that would require a supervisory staff similar to the
supervisory staff that now exists in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense for the agencies which would be transferred.
Those are the two major reasons I have problems. There is a third I
want to talk about in a moment. But the two major reasons I have are
that it would require the creation of a whole new supervisory
bureaucracy for these
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agencies in the national intelligence director's office. You cannot
supervise these agencies, from the national intelligence director's
perspective, without having people to engage in that supervision the
way the Office of the Secretary of Defense now supervises and overseas
these agencies. So we would be creating a new bureaucracy.
We should be breaking down walls between bureaucracies, not building
up a new bureaucracy.
When the 9/11 Commission reached its conclusion and when they
testified in front of us, they told us they decided not to create a
department. They thought that would be overcentralization. They were
bold. I don't think anybody can successfully argue here that the 9/11
Commission was not bold. They were bold. They made some major shifts,
in terms of budget execution authority and in terms of personnel
authority. In shifting those authorities over the agencies which we are
debating here to the NID, they made a major decision relative to power,
relative to control. But they decided they would not go toward a more
centralized new agency; that they would rather coordinate with the
budgeting personnel power in a new powerful NID but not create a new
bureaucracy in the process.
There are many reasons why their decision--and I focus on the 9/11
Commission recommendation at our hearing--was a wise one. Their
approach was not just bold in terms of recommending the transfer of
budget and personnel authority, but it was wise in not creating a new
bureaucracy in the process.
The chain of command is such that we now do not put large numbers of
our uniformed military people outside of the chain of command and under
the command and control of civilian supervisors. We do not do that.
There is a purpose for having a chain of command from your commander
inside the military, which is clear, which you must abide by. That is
what you sign up for when you join the military and that is what is so
essential to military effectiveness, that the chain of command be solid
and that it not be broken in the way this amendment would break a chain
of command.
These agencies we are talking about today are integral parts of the
Defense Department. They are recognized for the support they provide to
combat operations. Indeed, when the Congress adopted the Goldwater-
Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986, we created the concept of ``command
support agencies.'' Pursuant to that legislation, the DIA and the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency have been designated by law as
command support agencies. We hear that designation will continue. But
it is pretty hard to square that with what this amendment proposes,
which is that they would not be inside the military chain of command.
They would still have the label but not the reality. They would be
called combat support agencies, but they would not be in the chain of
command of the Department of Defense.
The combat support functions of the DIA and the NSA and the NGA have
been recognized in law. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is
required by law to evaluate periodically, and not less often than every
2 years, the responsiveness and readiness of these agencies to support
operating forces in the event of war or threats to national security.
The pending amendment would preserve the form of the periodic review.
That periodic review by the JCS Chairman of the combat support agencies
of the intelligence community would be retained, but it would be a
report which is in form only because it is the Secretary of Defense who
is charged with being responsible for the combat capabilities of the
Armed Forces.
The NID, the national intelligence director, does not have the
responsibility that the Secretary of Defense has for the combat
capabilities of our Armed Forces. So to simply say, well, there will
still be a periodic review by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of the
combat support agencies of this community, but then to say that report
goes to the NID, the national intelligence director, instead of going
to the person who we make responsible for the combat abilities of the
Armed Forces, is a hollow gesture. It says that one thing will continue
to be true, we will still call them a combat support agency, but when
it comes to the real world of where that review goes, it will go to the
person, the national intelligence director, who is not the person
responsible for the combat capabilities of the Armed Forces. So we have
a break in the chain of command, which is unprecedented, which creates
all kinds of problems inside the military in terms of military
effectiveness, which weakens not only the power of the Secretary of
Defense but which undermines his responsibility to make sure we have
full combat capability inside of the Department of Defense.
For these reasons, that we should not be creating a new bureaucracy,
we should be breaking down walls of old bureaucracies; that this
amendment would require new supervisory staff over these entities if
they are going to be transferred to the national intelligence director
in order to help him perform the supervision of these agencies, which
is now performed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense; and because
this would represent an unprecedented break in the chain of command
that now exists, and which is so critical to our military
effectiveness, I believe the 9/11 Commission reached the right balance.
Their balance was one which was conscious and conscientious; it was
bold but it was wise.
I have one other thought which I want to share and then I will yield.
These agencies now do analysis on their own. We got some very important
analysis before the Iraq war, in fact, from the Defense Intelligence
Agency, analysis which was different from the analysis produced by the
Central Intelligence Agency. If we are serious about wanting
alternative views relative to intelligence; if we are serious, as the
9/11 Commission urges us to be and as I hope we are, about ending the
politicization and misuse of intelligence to support policy positions;
if we are serious about promoting objectivity and independence of
analysis, we would want these agencies not to be shifted because their
analysis should not be under the control of the national intelligence
director. Their analysis should be independent and objective. For these
agencies to be shifted outside of where they now are, separate from the
national intelligence director, and put underneath his umbrella, is
going to make us weaker when it comes to the most critically important
reform we should be producing, which is to have objective, independent
analysis of intelligence which can be provided to the policymakers and
not shaped to support policies of the policymakers.
To remove these agencies that now are in a position to provide
alternative analysis and to put them under the aegis of the national
intelligence director will make that many fewer sources of independent,
objective intelligence that will be available to our policymakers. That
is a real loss.
There are other provisions in this bill and other provisions I hope
will be added during the amendment process to promote the objectivity
and independence of intelligence analysis.
We have had too much abuse in this area. We have had too much shaping
and exaggeration, going back at least as far as the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution, when intelligence was misused, to the Iran-Contra years
when intelligence was misused, shaped, and exaggerated in order to
support particular policy positions, and the same thing happened before
the Iraq war. We have to find ways to break down any kind of group-
think, any kind of a monolithic approach to intelligence, and we have
to make it more difficult for a national intelligence director to be
doing the shaping, to be in total control of the analysis of
intelligence.
That is why having an NCTC office separate from NID is so important.
Having an NCTC director who is subject to the confirmation of the
Senate is so important. That is why some of the other provisions which
we were able to add in committee to promote the independence and
objectivity of the intelligence analysis are so important.
We should not be reducing the numbers of sources of independent
analysis of intelligence, as this amendment would do, by putting these
agencies that now produce intelligence analysis under the aegis,
supervision, and operational control of the national intelligence
director. It is too much concentration of that critically important
analysis power under one person. We
[[Page S9883]]
should be wary of doing that. We should be moving in a very different
direction.
We should be finding ways to plot independence and objectivity of
intelligence so we don't have a repeat of the fiasco we just saw where
we had 500 pages, according to a bipartisan Intelligence Committee
report, of instances where intelligence was shaped, stretched, and
exaggerated, and they all moved in one direction. All those
intelligence changes and all the shaping was moved in the direction of
supporting a particular policy of the administration. That is a great
danger.
This amendment, because it concentrates or would concentrate agencies
that are currently involved in intelligence analysis under the NID,
increases the danger rather than reduces the danger of having
intelligence which is shaped to support policy rather than provide
support for objective information and objective estimates to the
policymakers.
I oppose this amendment. I hope it will be defeated.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator
DeWine be added as cosponsor of the pending amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I am advised that Senator Shelby would
like to speak to the bill. He is now chairing the Banking Committee,
which is hearing from the 9/11 Commission. I have talked to the manager
of the bill. I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set
aside so we might start utilizing the time of the floor on another
amendment which I intend to offer.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
Amendment No. 3761
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. Specter], for himself
and Mrs. Feinstein, proposes an amendment numbered 3761.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
(Purpose: To specify a term of service for the National Intelligence
Director)
On page 10, between lines 16 and 17, insert the following:
(d) Term of Office; Removal.--(1) The term of service of
the National Intelligence Director shall be ten years.
(2) An individual may not serve more than one term of
service as National Intelligence Director.
(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) shall apply with respect to any
individual appointed as National Intelligence Director after
the date of the enactment of this Act.
(4) If the individual serving as Director of Central
Intelligence on the date of the enactment of this Act is the
first person appointed as National Intelligence Director
under this section, the date of appointment of such
individual as National Intelligence Director shall be deemed
to be the date of the commencement of the term of service of
such individual as National Intelligence Director.
On page 10, line 17, strike ``(d)'' and insert ``(e)''.
On page 11, line 3, strike ``(e)'' and insert ``(f)''.
On page 11, line 5, strike ``subsection (c)'' and insert
``subsection (e)''.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, this amendment would give the national
intelligence director a 10-year term, the same kind of a term the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation now has. The debate on
this bill generally has stressed--and appropriately so--the need for a
strong, independent national intelligence director.
The interest of having policy determinations guide our new
intelligence estimates has been stressed repeatedly. There is a very
broad, historical precedent of the desirability of taking steps to
guarantee to the maximum extent possible that the intelligence
estimates will be independent and will not be in line to try to promote
some specific policy objective.
The 10-year term, as I say, is modeled after the term of the Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
When I offered this amendment in committee, I had a provision for
removal only for cause. After considering the matter, I have stricken
that provision because I believe it is unnecessary. I believe by
analogy to the FBI Director, the inference is plain that the removal
can be only for cause.
I will refer very briefly to comments by Senator Byrd on July 26 of
1976 when the FBI Director was given the 10-year term. Senator Byrd
said, ``The setting of a 10-year term of office by Congress would as a
practical matter preclude or at least inhibit a President from
arbitrarily dismissing an FBI director for political reasons.''
Senator Byrd goes on to note that obviously a successor would have to
be confirmed by the Senate. But there could not be the removal of the
FBI Director for political reasons. The implication is pretty clear
that removal can only be for cause.
The additional views of Senator Levin on the national intelligence
reform bill which he submitted on September 27 contain a very good
summary of authorities on this proposition generally. I am going to
cite a number of the authorities which Senator Levin referred to in
those additional views. I complimented Senator Levin a few moments ago
on the floor of the Senate for the quality of his views which he
submitted and said I was going to quote him. He said it was
unnecessary, but I believe in the interest of full disclosure that it
is good to give Senator Levin that credit.
The references to what happened with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
where that intelligence reports were used--and inappropriately used--
for representations about intelligence to support the administration's
position are well known historically. The Secretary of Defense at that
time, McNamara, cited classified information to support the passage of
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution which President Lyndon Johnson wanted.
Those citations were made to support the conclusion that the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution ought to be adopted.
The analyst for the National Security Archive, John Prados, said that
Secretary McNamara used the intercepts as a ``trump card'' during the
1964 hearings to ``silence doubters.'' According to the views of Mr.
Prados, Secretary McNamara asserted that ``intelligence reports from a
highly classified and unimpeachable source reported that North Vietnam
was making preparations to attack our destroyers, and ``the attack was
underway.'' Finally, ``The North Vietnamese lost two ships in the
engagement.'' Those materials turned out to be unsubstantiated, as a
matter of fact.
It was notorious that Central Intelligence Director William Casey
misrepresented intelligence during the Iran-Contra period. The
bipartisan Iran-Contra report specified that Director Casey
``misrepresented or selectively used available intelligence to support
the policy that he was promoting.''
In former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Robert Gates'
memoirs entitled ``From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of
Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War,'' former CIA Director
Gates said or referred to Bill Casey as a DCI who had his own foreign
policy agenda and had the estimating program as a powerful instrument
in forcing the pace of the policy area.
Former Secretary of State George Shultz, in his memoir ``Turmoil and
Triumph, My Years as Secretary of State,'' published in 1993, referred
to former Director of the CIA Bill Casey, who had very strong policy
positions and was so ideological that they inevitably colored his
selection and assessment of materials, once again, using the position
of intelligence director to have a determination of policy.
Former Director of the CIA and also former Director of the FBI
William Webster testified before the Senate Governmental Affairs
Committee on August 16 of this year and said:
With respect to relations with the President, while the
leader of the intelligence community must be the principal
adviser on intelligence to the President, he must work hard,
very hard, to avoid either the reality or the perception that
intelligence is being framed or that is read, spun, to
support a foreign policy of the administration.
The 10-year term, so it does not coincide with the term of the
President, is designed to give the national intelligence director the
reality of independence and certainly to avoid the
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perception that the intelligence is being spun for the interests of the
chief executive.
Two days after Judge Webster testified, the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence heard from former chief weapons inspector David Kay,
who said:
Intelligence must serve the Nation and speak truth to power
even if in some cases elected leaders choose, as is their
right, to disagree with the intelligence with which they are
presented. This means that intelligence should not be part of
the political apparatus or process.
A 10-year term would seek to ensure, guarantee, that the national
intelligence director was independent, and was not a part of the
political process or apparatus.
Mr. Kay went on to say:
This is, I think, if you move forward on a national
intelligence director legislation, is going to be the hardest
thing to communicate, that the national intelligence director
must serve the national security objectives of the Nation,
and he serves whoever is the President best by giving him
unvarnished truth, which will often not be welcome.
Again, a 10-year term would guarantee that kind of independence to
the national intelligence director.
On the same day, former GEN Charles Boyd told the Intelligence
Committee of the enormous pressures that political appointees are under
to ``give the President what he wants rather than what he doesn't want
but needs,'' and the upshot of what General Boyd had to say was that
rather than seeking a special and close relationship to the President,
General Boyd articulates a standard for an intelligence director
``ought to be his distance from the President, his independence of the
President, his professionalism and be respected as such.''
Again, a 10-year term would promote that.
A few days ago, on September 21, the very distinguished Center for
Strategic and International Studies, a group consisting of former
Senators and former Secretaries of Defense, former Directors of the
Central Intelligence Agency, and two former Secretaries of State, had
this to say:
When intelligence and policy are too closely tied the
demands of policymakers can distort intelligence and
intelligence analysis, can hijack the policy development
process. It is crucial to ensuring the separation that the
intelligence community leader have no policy role. A single
individual with a last word on intelligence and some policy
as well could be a dangerously powerful actor in the national
security arena using intelligence to advocate for particular
policy positions, budget requests, or weapon systems that
often lack the knowledge to challenge.
Here, again, the citation of authorities supports the concept that
the national intelligence director ought to be objective, ought not to
be seeking to promote any special policy of the chief executive and all
of that would be enhanced by the 10-year term.
The amendment which I offer, I do so on behalf of the Senator from
California, Senator Feinstein, and myself.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I certainly understand the intent of the
Senator from Pennsylvania in offering this amendment. Indeed, he
offered it during the markup of the Governmental Affairs Committee. It
was debated at length.
Initially, in considering this issue, I, too, was inclined to believe
that the new national intelligence director should have some sort of
term of office. However, the testimony we heard through our eight
hearings changed my mind in this regard.
Under our legislation, S. 2845, the NID serves as the principal
adviser to the President. The individual not only manages the
intelligence community and heads up the new national intelligence
authority, but serves as the principal adviser to the President. I am
stressing that role because I believe that is key to why the director,
in fact, should not have a fixed term. It is essential that the NID
enjoy the full confidence and trust of the President of the United
States. That was a point made by the 9/11 Commission chairman, Tom
Kean, at our very first hearing on July 30. But we heard that repeated
time and again by our witnesses. All of the former DCIs who came before
the committee, representing a variety of times and administrations,
were unanimous in their view that the new NID should serve at the
pleasure of the President.
The then Acting Director of the CIA John McLaughlin made the point at
our September 8 hearing that for the NID to successfully clarify our
assignment of serving as the principal adviser to the President, he
must enjoy the President's trust and confidence.
Consider a situation where the Presidency changes parties during that
10-year-period. It would be very awkward for a new President of a
different party to inherit the national intelligence director from the
previous administration. Their world views and philosophy may have
nothing in common. Yet the President has to have a close and trusting
relationship with the national intelligence director. The President
should be able to choose his or her own person for that critical post.
Proponents of having a 10-year term have frequently compared this
proposal to the 10-year term of the Director of the FBI. I would note
that I asked Director Mueller whether he thought the new NID should
have a 10-year term similar to his. He said he did not think a 10-year
term or any fixed term was appropriate for the national intelligence
director. He said the role of the FBI Director is very different from
the role of the national intelligence director.
Over and over again during our hearings, Senator Lieberman and I
raised this question with the witnesses because we, too, were trying to
reach the right determination. Over and over again, the advice was the
same, whether it was the 9/11 Commission, the Acting Director of the
CIA, the former Directors of the CIA, or Director Mueller of the FBI.
Over and over again, they advised against setting a term.
So we need to create a position where the individual will enjoy the
full confidence and trust of the President of the United States. That
is the only way that individual can effectively carry out the role he
is assigned in this legislation to serve as the President's principal
intelligence adviser.
For these reasons, I urge my colleagues to oppose the amendment of
the Senator from Pennsylvania.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I also rise to oppose this amendment by
the Senator from Pennsylvania. This is, as Senator Collins has
indicated, a matter we discussed in what I thought was a very
thoughtful discussion in our committee deliberation on a similar
amendment.
There are good arguments on both sides. The objective here is to
balance the independence we want our national intelligence director to
have with the importance of having a trusting relationship with the
President of the United States. In the end, I concluded it would be
wrong to give a fixed term to the national intelligence director for
the reason to which I just heard Senator Collins refer.
Remember, we have given the national intelligence director two main
responsibilities. One is to administer the intelligence community. The
other is to be the principal intelligence adviser to the President of
the United States. In fact, one could argue, although the national
intelligence director as administrator has many customers, if you will,
for intelligence, the No. 1 customer is the President of the United
States as President and certainly as Commander in Chief. So that is a
relationship that must be a trusting relationship.
The danger is that an incoming President will be given someone in
whom he does not have that kind of confidence. Unfortunately, history--
recent history--gives us an example of that, without attributing blame.
President Clinton and then-Director of the FBI, Mr. Freeh, had a
relationship that was not mutually confident, and, therefore, he had
somebody in that critical position who had very little contact with the
President of the United States. He was Director of the FBI, not the
principal personal intelligence adviser in the sense of giving advice
personally to the President of the United States.
The concern about the independence of the national intelligence
adviser is an important one. I feel very strongly that in this bill
Senator Collins and I offer, and our committee offers to the Senate, we
have done a lot to protect the independence of the national
intelligence director.
[[Page S9885]]
For instance, contrary to the original proposal of the 9/11
Commission, which proposed that this office of the national
intelligence director be in the White House, we said no, that may raise
questions and in fact problems with regard to the independence of the
NID if he or she is just down the hall from the President. That ought
to be out of the Executive Office of the President and established as
an independent agency.
We went well beyond that in a title particularly that was added in
our committee, most of the work of which was done by Senator Levin,
which is all about the independence of the office, the objectivity of
the intelligence that the adviser, the director gives to the President,
to the country, to the agencies he serves, independence even to the
extent that we say the national intelligence director should be like
the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board in this sense: that he does
not need administration approval to testify before Congress, does not
need his testimony cleared, if you will, by the OMB.
So there is a lot built in here that is meant to guarantee, as best a
statute can, the independence of this office, without hamstringing--if
that is the right phrase here--a President with a national intelligence
director in whom he does not have trust or in whom he loses trust as
time goes on.
But this is that critical a position. I would not want to give a
national intelligence director a set term any more than I would want to
give a Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, Director of OMB, or
National Security Adviser fixed terms. These are positions that must
every day be filled by people who enjoy the confidence and trust of the
President of the United States.
For that reason, I oppose the amendment and urge our colleagues to do
so as well.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Murkowski). The Senator from Pennsylvania.
Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I think Senator Lieberman has advanced
an argument in support of my amendment. If I could have the attention
of Senator Lieberman, when I quote him, I want to quote him to his
face. I want him to hear what I have to say.
I say to Senator Lieberman, we agree more often than we disagree,
although we are at odds on two of my amendments today.
But when the distinguished Senator from Connecticut cites the
relationship between President Clinton and FBI Director Freeh, I think
he is supporting my argument. He is supporting my argument about the
need for independence. There was an investigation being conducted by
the FBI on campaign finance irregularities, and the President--I would
not call him a subject, but he was a part of those who were being
looked into on the soft money issue.
Then, without unduly belaboring the point, on this floor we had the
impeachment proceeding. Issues involved were obstruction of justice and
perjury. So the kind of independence the Director of FBI had by virtue
of a 10-year term, I think, served the Nation well.
Going back to the administration of President Nixon, without going
into any detail, you had activities by the FBI Director which led to
this 10-year term to insulate the Director from the appointing
authority by the President.
When the chairwoman refers to a philosophy of having the national
intelligence director, appointed by a preceding President, serving the
President, I suggest this is not like a Cabinet officer, such as the
Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense, who is supposed to
carry out the policy of the President, who is supposed to have the same
philosophy. Here we have a national intelligence director who is
supposed to tell the President what the objective facts are on
intelligence. It is inevitable in human relations, if you know what
somebody wants to hear, an inclination to tell somebody what that
person wants to hear, especially if that person is the appointing
power.
So on the question of confidence and trust, I think the American
people would have more confidence and trust in a national intelligence
director who is independent from the President.
When the talk and the argument is made about an adviser, here again,
the national intelligence director is not an adviser like the Secretary
of State or the Secretary of the Treasury or the Secretary of Health
and Human Services, carrying out the President's policies and seeking
to give him advice to carry out those policies. Here we want somebody
who will be strong and independent and objective and tell it like it
is, even if it is not what the President wants to hear, and even if it
contradicts the policies which the President wants to carry out.
This bill does contain some elements stressing the independence of
the national intelligence director such as not requiring permission to
testify before Congress, putting affirmative obligations on the
national intelligence director to keep the Congress informed as well as
the chief executive informed.
I think this is an important addition, to have a strong, independent,
objective national intelligence director.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, first let me say to Senator Specter
that he is quite right, we do, much more often than not, agree on
matters. Unfortunately this amendment is not one of them,
notwithstanding the arguments he just made.
There is an interesting historical note we are familiar with that
when the 10-year term for the FBI Director came into effect, I was not
here, but I gather it was as a matter of reform as against the
effective lifetime term that the former Director, Mr. Hoover, had. So
that was in that reality.
Here is the circumstance I am worried about. We have done everything
we can in this bill to create independence in the national intelligence
director position and to set standards that say: You have to level with
the President. The worst thing that can happen is if you feel you have
to create a good personal relationship and satisfy policy desires. In
fact, we have language in here that is quite remarkable that says the
national director ``must provide intelligence to the President that is
timely, objective, independent of political consideration, and based on
all sources available to the intelligence community, information that
has not been shaped to serve policy considerations, that comes from a
variety of intelligence assessments and analytical views.''
I am quoting directly from our proposal.
We have set up the office of ombudsman, a very unusual office, and,
thanks to a combination of Senator Rockefeller and Senator Shelby,
created within it an analytical review unit which will do a kind of
quality control on the work of the intelligence director, again to try
to ensure that there is a real independence and objectivity and
willingness to speak the truth.
The situation I would worry about, if we have a director for a fixed
year term of 10 years, would be that the President simply loses
confidence in that director for one reason or another. So on critically
important questions such as we have seen in our time--do you send
American troops into combat, what foreign policy do we adopt toward
threatening nations such as Iran and North Korea--if you have a
President lacking confidence or trust, and it could be in the
competence of the individual or in his or her dispassion or
objectivity, you leave the President either without adequate
intelligence advice on matters of great national importance or you
encourage the President to end-run the national intelligence director,
go directly to the head of the CIA and other agencies. That is not a
healthy situation.
Of course, it totally undercuts exactly what we are trying do to do,
which is to create a national intelligence director who will oversee
the total intelligence community. For those reasons, in this situation,
I continue to oppose the Specter amendment.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that at 2 p.m.
today, the Senate proceed to a vote in relation to the Specter
amendment No. 3761, regarding a 10-year term, provided that no
amendment be in order to the amendment prior to that vote. I also ask
consent that following that vote, the Senate proceed to a vote in
relation to the Specter amendment No. 3706 regarding the NID
consolidation, again with no second degrees in order
[[Page S9886]]
to the amendment prior to the vote on the first degree. And finally, I
ask that the order with respect to the statements of Senator Harkin and
Senator Stevens begin following those two votes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. REID. Reserving the right to object, could we change that request
to 2:15 p.m. rather than 2 o'clock?
Ms. COLLINS. I would so modify the request.
Mr. REID. The other is in the form of a question. What could happen
here is one person could get the floor and keep it until 2:15. We need
some ability to make sure there is an equitable distribution of time
during the next 2 hours. I am wondering if the chairmen have an idea
how we can divide the time. I see a couple of Senators on the floor.
Any one of them could get the floor and talk until 2:15.
Ms. COLLINS. I would say to the Senator that we would welcome people
coming to the floor with their amendments. Generally, these amendments
are not breaking down along party lines.
Mr. REID. We have two votes set at 2:15. My question, though, is, are
we going to divide the time prior to that or just let things happen as
they will? That is fine with us.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, if I may answer the question, my hope
is--and I believe it is the chairman's hope--that we will stay on the
bill and people will come over and introduce more amendments, that we
have more debate between now and 2:15.
Mr. REID. Is my friend saying the debate is basically completed on
these two amendments?
Ms. COLLINS. Senator Shelby and Senator DeWine wish to speak.
Mr. REID. If the two managers don't have a concern, I don't either.
What we would do is, if the statements are completed, there would be
nothing wrong with people setting the amendments aside and offering
other amendments.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Absolutely.
Ms. COLLINS. I believe we are very near the end of the debate.
Mr. REID. I have no objection.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Ms. COLLINS. I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.
Mr. DeWINE. Madam President, I come to the floor to support the
Specter amendment. I would first like to congratulate my colleague from
Maine for the fine job she has done. This is a very difficult bill to
put together. It has taken a lot of work. She and Senator Lieberman are
certainly to be congratulated.
I would call everyone's attention to the fact that the 9/11
Commission was not the first commission to point out the need for more
power in the person who is in charge of our intelligence. Just about
every commission that has looked at intelligence reform has come to
this conclusion.
Beginning in 1947, the period right after World War II gave birth to
the modern intelligence community. Ever since then, this has been a
problem. There was a grand compromise that was made at that time and
that compromise set us on this path. The situation, though, has gotten
worse and worse as time has gone on. And as some of my colleagues have
pointed out, we have reached the point where, when George Tenet knew
and understood, as frankly few people in this country did, about the
threat from Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida and declared war, he looked
around and frankly did not have the troops. And the reason he did not
have the troops was he did not control the budget. He did not have the
power.
He had the responsibility, but he did not have the power. So we have
a problem and everybody, I think, understands that. My concern all
along has been that we would create this new position, supposedly over
the entire intelligence community. Yet this new position would not have
the authority. I think Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman have given
that person authority, but I don't think, frankly, they have gone far
enough.
If you look at the language Senator Specter has included in his
amendment, it is a significant improvement over the language of this
bill. I ask my colleagues to read the language. If you are concerned
about giving this person authority, the Specter language is much
better. The worst thing we could do would be to create this new
position and think we have given him or her authority and not have
given them the authority.
I wonder if I may get the attention of my colleague from Maine at
this time, if I may explore with the Senator part of this bill. Again,
I thank my colleague for the great work she has done on this bill. I
believe she has done a very good job. I am trying to understand the
language. As I have told her privately and I have told her again
publicly, I prefer the Specter language. But I would like to clarify a
little bit what this new position, the NID position--whoever occupies
it--what he or she would be able to do under the Senator's bill. If I
may pose a couple of questions.
If we can start with the NGA and the whole issue of the satellites,
this has been a problem in the past. We don't have to on the floor
today go over the problem of the moving of satellites. I ask my
colleague this. Let's say that the NID did, in fact, want to move a
satellite positioned on country A, and wants to get intelligence from
country Z. What ability does that person have to do that? Can you point
to the specific language in the bill that would get this done very
quickly?
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I will find the specific language to
show the Senator from Ohio. I have the language. The NID would
establish collection and analysis requirements for the Intelligence
Community, determine collection and analysis priorities, manage and
issue collection and analysis tasking, and resolve conflicts in the
tasking abilities of the intelligence community. So the language is
very clear that the NID would have enhanced authority to resolve the
kinds of conflicts that sometimes do occur now on the allocation of
satellite resources, for example.
Mr. DeWINE. So it is the Senator's feeling that--and everything is
very time sensitive--in a matter of hours this person could make the
decision and basically order this to be done?
Ms. COLLINS. The Senator is correct. Perhaps it will be of some
comfort to the Senator from Ohio to know that the language in this
regard was suggested to our committee by Senator Roberts and comes from
his bill. There is very strong language regarding the issue the Senator
has raised.
Mr. DeWINE. I appreciate that. If my colleague could answer this: In
a real-world situation, when we are dealing with satellites--and we
will not go into the countries on the floor--if a decision had to be
made in a matter of hours, if we need this information and we need to
move from here to there, could that be ordered? I am using the
word ``ordered.'' I am not talking about consultation or prayer
together. I am talking about ordering it. Can that be ordered? Can this
person order this to be done, saying it will be done, I don't care what
anybody else says?
Ms. COLLINS. As I indicated to the Senator from Ohio--and I thought I
was very clear in answering his question--it says the NID can issue
directions in the collection and analysis tasking. I think the language
is very clear that the answer is yes.
Mr. DeWINE. I appreciate what the language is, but I want to know,
for the history we are establishing today, if my colleague believes
that would include the term ``order.'' In other words, a direction that
this will be done.
Ms. COLLINS. The term of art is the issue. That is the correct legal
language to use. It is adopted from Senator Roberts' bill. My answer is
yes.
Mr. DeWINE. I appreciate that.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. If the chairman will yield, these are very important
questions the Senator from Ohio is raising. I want to assure him,
first, that we raised the same questions during our committee's
deliberation, including meetings with the heads of these national
intelligence agencies that are within the Department of Defense. The
Senator from Ohio is undoubtedly aware of the reality, which is that
the current Director of Central Intelligence has the authority under
law to convene a committee, an interagency committee, which every day
apparently makes, as one witness said to us, thousands of decisions
about where our signal intelligence and image intelligence assets go.
In fact, one of the heads of an agency said he didn't remember a time
when there was an inability to agree. There is also, clearly,
[[Page S9887]]
in the end, both in current law, as I understand it, and in the
proposal we are making, if the rare situation occurs, you have to have
somebody in power to make that decision. Now it is the CIA. Under our
proposal, it would be the national intelligence director.
Mr. DeWINE. I appreciate the response. I was just saying to my
colleague that my understanding of the reading of recent history has
been that the power has not been adequate, with all due respect, and
that the history has indicated there have been times when it has not
been satisfactory, the results have not been where they should have
been, which would indicate to me that the status quo is not acceptable.
That is why I am asking whether the new language--I am trying to
understand whether the new language is a significant improvement over
the status quo. We are on the floor under the understanding that the
status quo is not acceptable. I congratulate my colleagues for trying
to improve the status quo. I know they are working to do that. That is
why I asked that question.
Let me move on to another question.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. If the Senator will yield, if I may respond. I want to
refer the Senator to page 14 of our bill in section 4, enumerating the
powers of the national intelligence director. We say ``establish
collection and analysis requirements for the intelligence community to
determine collection and analysis priorities, issue and manage
collection analysis tasking, and resolve conflicts in the tasking of
elements of the intelligence community within the national intelligence
program, except as otherwise agreed with the Secretary of Defense
pursuant to the direction of the President.''
So this is language that completely mirrors existing statute for the
Director of Central Intelligence. From testimony we heard, it is
fortunately working very well that the conflicts, by the testimony of
at least one head of one of the agencies, just do not occur; they work
it out.
Mr. DeWINE. I say to my colleague that there are Members besides
myself who can privately tell the Senator that there is a history that
would indicate this does not work, that the status quo is not
acceptable.
If what the Senator is telling me today is this is not really much
change from the status quo, then I say to my colleague that we have a
major problem.
I reference the language in the old law. I think my colleague may be
right, and let me read the old law, which is the status quo today, and
this is the power that the head of the intelligence community has
today: establish the requirements and priorities to govern the
collection of national intelligence by elements of the intelligence
community; next, approve collection requirements; determine collection
priorities and resolve conflicts in collection priorities levied on
national collection assets, except as otherwise agreed with the
Secretary of Defense pursuant to the direction of the President.
Just on its face, one would think that resolving these conflicts is
already given to the DCI today, and that is why, frankly, I prefer the
language of the Specter amendment which talks about the director
overseeing the execution of the national intelligence program and to
supervise, direct, and control the operations, which to me is the key
language.
I yield to my colleague.
Ms. COLLINS. If the Senator would yield on that point, I do not want
the Senator to mistakenly believe there are no changes in our bill with
regard to current law. There is a very critical change.
Mr. DeWINE. If I could reclaim my time, the problem is the colleague
of the Senator just told me there was not much of a change at all, and
this is the problem with the language: One of the Senators saying there
is a change and the other saying there is not much change. That is
ambiguous, which is the problem, with all due respect to both of my
colleagues, who are great friends. It is the language; it is not the
Senators.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Perhaps it was my language that was confusing. I do
not think the statutory language is.
The fact is, there is an addition of authority to the NID--there is
no question about that--that the DCI does not have, and that is to
issue and manage collection and analysis tasking.
What I was trying to say earlier, and I want to distinguish this, is
the current law enables the DCI to convene the agency representatives,
which they do every day, to resolve and decide where our national
assets go, and then to resolve a conflict, as described in the language
that I read from, which is what the current DCI has.
We have added, very importantly, and the Senator is right, the
ability of the national intelligence director additionally to issue and
manage collection and analysis tasking.
Mr. DeWINE. Reclaiming my time, so there is a change?
Ms. COLLINS. If the Senator will yield?
Mr. DeWINE. I will yield.
Ms. COLLINS. There is a very significant change, as I said to the
Senator when he first raised this very important question. We recognize
that the current Director of the CIA cannot issue tasking, cannot
require the collection of information, under this section of the law.
That is why we took language recommended by Senator Roberts, included
it in the bill that I believe the Senator from Ohio may have
cosponsored, which strengthened that authority by adding the language,
``issue and manage collection and analysis tasking.'' That is not in
current law.
Mr. DeWINE. I appreciate that. I will have to go back and study this
a little bit more.
I say to my colleague from Maine, I am happy with her answer when she
responded to my question, can this be ordered, and her response, I
believe, was yes. In other words, under her bill the NID could order
the satellite to be moved. Because I think there is a problem.
The evidence is that in the past there have been some problems--I am
not saying it is a problem that occurs all the time; it probably gets
worked out most of the time--but there have been some problems and I
think this needs to be a situation where there has been a problem or
there might be a problem, be ordered, it has to be. So I certainly
appreciate the response.
Let me ask another question, if I could. Moving to the area of signal
intelligence, NSA, let us say the NID, under the Senator's bill,
decided it was in our national interest to move the assets, move the
resources, from listening to country X to terrorist Y organization. It
is the same type of issue but again a real world issue. We are moving
our assets; we have to make this decision very quickly in the real
world. Could that person order that to be done?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. If the Senator would yield for a response.
Mr. DeWINE. I yield.
Ms. COLLINS. My answer would be the same. The NID has the authority,
has the power, to use the words of Senator from Ohio, to issue these
orders, to task these agencies to carry out these directives.
I note that because the NID has the authority to manage the budgets
of these agencies, he has a pretty big stick to use as enforcement.
Mr. DeWINE. If we can just talk back and forth a minute, let me
interject and then the Senator can respond. I appreciate the progress
the Senator has made in regard to the budget, and I think that is very
important, but we have seen from our work on the Intelligence
Committee, in looking at the intelligence community, a lot of these
decisions that are being dealt with in the real world, are very time
sensitive so when a budget change is made, we are talking about the
next year or 2 years. Those are very important. They are changing
directions. That is important. So I congratulate the Senator for making
that change.
I am not concerned that the Senator has not done that in her bill.
The Senator has done that. What I am concerned about is the execution.
For example, I see in the Specter language: direct, oversee, execute
the national intelligence program. Then he goes on to say: supervise,
direct, and control the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency,
the National Security Agency, et cetera.
So what I see in the Specter language that gives me a great deal of
comfort is
[[Page S9888]]
``supervise, direct, control operations.'' To me, ``operations'' is the
key language because now we are dealing with things that are very time
sensitive.
What I worry about is not the long-term planning. I am convinced that
the Senator has taken care of that and I congratulate her for that.
What I worry about is real world examples that I have now, such as we
are listening to one country, or we have assets over here that we need
to move very quickly over here and target a terrorist organization, and
say we have limited assets, can we do that. It is a hypothetical, but
could that decision be made?
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I think the Senator from Ohio is
raising excellent, important questions in this debate, but he is
creating a misimpression of what the bill does with regard to budget
authority.
This is not 1 year off or 2 years off. The NID has budget execution
authority, not just putting the budget together for presentation and
recommendation to the President; he executes the budget as the year
goes by. He has strong authority to reprogram funds with congressional
approval and notification, I hasten to say, and to transfer funds.
He has extensive authority to transfer personnel. He has the right
under our bill to appoint the heads of these agencies with concurrence
from the Secretary of Defense. That is a major change from current law.
If the Senator from Ohio is saying, as he is, that the NID should
have direct line authority over the day-to-day operations of these
combat support agencies, I disagree with the Senator from Ohio. I
believe it does not make sense and, in fact, the NID could not handle
running these agencies day to day. As Senator Levin indicated earlier,
you would have to create an enormous supervisory staff within the
office of the NID if you were going to transfer that authority from the
Secretary of Defense. Clearly, the NID has the authority to direct the
collection and analysis of information by the heads of these agencies,
but I do not think he should be running them day to day.
Mr. DeWINE. If I could follow that up with a question, since the
Senator raised it--and I think I know her answer, but I want to make
sure I do understand her answer--talking about moving people around,
according to the newspapers--this is what is published in the
newspapers--there is a problem with a backlog apparently in listening
to tapes of intercepts, at least that is what has been in the
newspaper. Would the NID have the authority to move linguists from one
agency to another to correct that problem? For example, if they had to,
they could move them from the DIA to the CIA?
Ms. COLLINS. Absolutely.
Mr. DeWINE. This person, he or she, could pick up the phone and say:
We are going to move 50 people, 100 people from over here to over
there?
Ms. COLLINS. Absolutely.
Mr. DeWINE. This person does not have to call the SECDEF, does not
have to do anything?
Ms. COLLINS. If the Senator will yield so I can respond to his
question.
Mr. DeWINE. Surely.
Ms. COLLINS. There is very strong authority for the NID to transfer
personnel who are working within the national intelligence program
throughout the Federal Government and, indeed, I would envision the
staffing of the National Counterterrorism Center would come from the
NID taking linguists, analysts, operatives, collectors--all sorts of
expertise--from the various intelligence agencies. And I know for a
fact we need to give the NID that power because I visited with the head
of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center who does not have that power
and finds it very difficult to get the personnel resources he needs.
Mr. DeWINE. I appreciate the answer. So the Senator is saying this
person can actually go in to DIA and say: I want those people. I want
them. We are going to take them from DIA, and we are going to put them
over here at CIA because I know best what the priorities need to be,
and this is national security, and we are going to get it done.
Ms. COLLINS. Will the Senator yield for a response?
Mr. DeWINE. I certainly will.
Ms. COLLINS. The DIA employees who are part of the national
intelligence program, yes, the answer is yes. DIA employees who are
part of DOD's tactical intelligence programs, which are outside the
scope of the authority of the NID, the answer in that case would be no.
So it depends. But if they are part of the national intelligence
program, which thousands of DIA employees are, the answer is yes.
Mr. DeWINE. I appreciate that. What I do not understand, though, is
what I thought I heard earlier on about the Senator's distinction
between tasking and control. That does sound like control to me. The
Senator from Maine is saying they can task but they cannot control.
Basically, that sounds like control to me if you can move someone.
Ms. COLLINS. I disagree with the Senator, so I do not know how to
respond. I was saying the NID does not run the day-to-day, daily
operations of the NSA, for example.
Mr. DeWINE. And I appreciate that. But in direct response to my
question, the Senator is saying that person could, in fact, make that
command decision, pick up the phone and say, ``We are moving 50
people,'' and that would be done, and that would be it. I want to make
sure on the record because I think it is going to be very important 2
years from now or 18 months from now, and I would hate for the NID
person to come before our committee and say: ``I can't move people
around.''
Ms. COLLINS. If the Senator will yield for a response.
Mr. DeWINE. I am happy to yield.
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I direct the Senator from Ohio to the
exact language in the bill. On page 27, starting on line 21:
(C) in accordance with procedures to be developed by the
National Intelligence Director, transfer personnel of the
intelligence community funded through the National
Intelligence Program from one element of the intelligence
community to another element of the intelligence community;
I think that language is crystal clear that the NID could, indeed,
take a linguist from the counterterrorism division of the FBI and
transfer that individual to the National Counterterrorism Center, or an
analyst from DIA who is funded through the national intelligence
program and shift that individual to the counterterrorism center. I
think it is very clear.
Mr. DeWINE. I thank my colleague from Maine for answering these
questions. As always, she is very eloquent and has been very thoughtful
in her questions and her work on the bill. I congratulate her for the
good work she has done.
Madam President, I do appreciate my colleague's answers. I will be
voting in favor of the Specter amendment simply because I think it is
more clear. I think it adds something to this bill. I think it makes it
more specific. It is clear. When we are done with our work, then it
will be up to the great bureaucracy, the men and women who are out
there to defend us--and I do not use ``bureaucracy'' in a derogatory
way at all; these are great people doing wonderful work out there who
are defending us--it will be up to them to make this work. We have an
obligation to do our best to give them something that will work and to
give them the language that will allow the clearest lines of authority.
I believe if you take the Collins-Lieberman bill, which is good work,
and you then add the Specter amendment, the Specter amendment makes it
clearer, makes it more precise, and makes the lines of authority much
easier to understand.
I believe it also will deal with a concern I have had for a long
time, as we saw this reform coming, and that is my fear that we would
create this new position, give them authority, and do a pretty good
job, but not quite give them all the authority this person needs.
We have had the opportunity in the Intelligence Committee to listen
to some of the things that have gone wrong for the last few years, and
there have been a lot of things that have gone wrong. It is not only
organization. It is not only line authority. It is not only the fact
that the DCI did not have enough power, but that is part of it. This
bill goes a ways to deal with that. I believe the Specter amendment
improves it further and makes it clearer, and is the right way to go.
Somebody has to be in charge. The buck has to stop somewhere. Never
[[Page S9889]]
again do we want to be in a position where it is not clear who is in
charge. Never again does this country want to be in a position where
the top person in intelligence doesn't have all the authority he or she
needs to protect us, to protect our children, to protect our families.
The Specter amendment will make it very clear where the buck stops. The
buck will stop with this person whom we are now calling the NID and who
is called the NID under the Collins-Lieberman bill. So I will vote in
favor of the Specter amendment. I urge my colleagues to vote in favor
of it as well.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. I wonder if the Senator from Ohio would address a question
which his question raised in my mind, having spent a lot of time trying
to figure out what the line is, in terms of supervision and control.
Let me put the hypothetical this way. I would also appreciate the
managers perhaps listening to it as well.
We have a new national intelligence director. The first question the
Senator from Ohio asked, the first that I heard, at least, was: Can
that director direct, order--in the words of the chairman, ``task''--
the collection, let's say, of signals intelligence in Iraq instead of
Afghanistan? Can he or she make that decision?
We only have certain resources. We have to allocate them. Can that
director, after consulting, presumably--because these are day-to-day
consultations, as the Senator from Connecticut says; these go on every
single day, these decisions on allocations and priorities. But
hopefully, after going through that process, can that NID, that
director, say: OK, folks, I have heard it; we have to make a decision.
We are collecting signals in Iraq; we are not going to do it in
Afghanistan.
The chairman's answer was ``yes.'' It seems to me that ought to be
very reassuring to folks.
The next question is, should that director be responsible for
deciding which airplane it is that is going to do the collection? My
good friend from Ohio says no, I think, shaking his head no. But that
is what is left to the day-to-day operations. That is why you need to
leave that decision on which airplane is going to go over Iraq to the
day-to-day operational decisions inside of that agency. You can't
transfer all of those decisions to a NID. That is where I think the
Senator from Ohio would draw the line, I hope. That is clearly where I
draw the line.
Mr. DeWINE. If I could respond?
Mr. LEVIN. I am happy to yield.
Mr. DeWINE. My colleague and I have, I think, the same objectives. My
colleague from Maine and I have the same objectives. I think our
differences are, frankly, down to what language accomplishes this. I
think, also, I have more skepticism and bring to the table maybe more
skepticism about how the world works. I am usually the optimist. But on
this I am skeptical about the ability of this new position, someone
whom we are now throwing into a newly created position, to be able to
drive his or her agenda. I am concerned about it. I think it is a
concern based on reason. There is a reason to be concerned about it,
knowing the bureaucracy and how it works.
I think the Specter language is more clear, it is more precise:
Supervise, direct, control operations. That doesn't mean picking planes
or worrying about the day-to-day activities. That is not how I
interpret it. It is not how I interpret it.
Mr. LEVIN. If the Senator will yield, I don't know any other way you
can.
Mr. DeWINE. It is your time.
Mr. LEVIN. If the Senator will yield to respond, and I don't want to
interrupt, but that is exactly what the words ``controlling
operations'' mean. That is what the word ``operations'' means.
I think the Senator from Ohio is correct in pressing for clear
answers to the wording in the bill. There are plenty of places where I
have some similar questions which I will be raising by amendment, but I
don't think this is one of them. I don't think this is one of the
places. Because I think the bill is clear here that when the NID issues
collection tasking, that is exactly what the Senator from Ohio wants,
is to issue collection tasking, I believe.
But what I believe the Senator from Ohio does not want is to control
the day-to-day operations as to how that task will be carried out. Yet
that is what the Specter language results in.
Rather than clarifying this issue as between the order or the task,
and how you are going to carry it out, it blurs the issue. Because once
the Senator from Ohio says it is not his understanding of the Specter
language that the operations which will now be assigned to NID include
the day-to-day operations, then where is that line drawn? If it is not
the day-to-day operations, if you are truly shifting those agencies to
the responsibility and control of the NID, of course he is responsible
for the day-to-day operations. Where is the line, where is the
operations point divided between the NID who controls operations under
Specter and the operations not controlled by the NID, under your
understanding?
Mr. DeWINE. If I can respond, I understand my colleague's point. It
strikes me that we have come a long way in this debate and the
evolution of this bill. I think we have gone in the correct direction.
I look at where we were 2 months ago or 3 months ago in this debate--it
is all for the good. When every one of us speaking on the Senate floor,
all four of us who are down here at this moment are basically saying we
want the same thing and what we are now debating, I believe, is the
language to get there. I think my colleagues, Senator Lieberman,
Senator Collins, my colleague from Michigan, would agree we are saying
basically we want the same thing. I think that is good.
We are going to vote different ways on the Specter amendment, but I
think this is progress because there is a consensus that has emerged
that we want this head of intelligence in this country to be
accountable, to have the control that person lacking them has, so the
buck will stop with that person, so when they come in front of our
committee we can't hear the excuses. It is going to be a great
improvement.
I congratulate my colleagues for the great work they have done. I
think this debate we have had here for the last 45 minutes has been a
very good one. I think we have clarified some things and we clearly
clarified, at least in my mind, the intent of the authors of this bill.
I think we created some interesting legislative history about what
the power of this person should be. There should be no doubt in any
person's mind in the future, NID or anyone who has to deal with him,
what their powers should be in this area. I think that is all for the
good.
I thank my colleague and yield the floor.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank my friend from Ohio.
In closing, I do have some questions about certain words in this
particular paragraph which I will raise later on the floor, relative
particularly to the establishment of requirements, because I think the
consumer must establish the requirements and not the NID. I think there
is also an issue about analysis, because I think we ought to be
promoting greater numbers of analyses, and not getting into group-
think. We should be promoting independent, objective analysis and I
think this wording probably or unintentionally could concentrate or
centralize that in a NID.
I think that is an unintended result, but we can discuss that later.
But on this one issue that is raised in this amendment, it seems to me
this amendment goes exactly in the direction all of us want, which is
we need somebody to make a tasking decision, to have that power, and to
do it exactly as our friend from Ohio said. You can't at a critical
moment have that confused or diffused or uncertain. If something has to
be done quickly, someone has to make a decision, and the person who
makes a decision in this bill is clearly the NID on the tasking of the
intelligence. That is where the decision, it seems to me, has to
reside.
But again, I think the Specter amendment, because it goes into the
operational side after the task is issued, goes too far, and rather
than clarifying an issue will put the responsibility purportedly on
somebody who can't handle that responsibility, who doesn't have the
horses to handle that responsibility inside of his agency, unless you
recreate the entire Department of Defense almost inside the NID
[[Page S9890]]
in order to carry out those day-to-day operations to effectuate the
task collection which properly belongs with the NID.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, before the Senator from Ohio leaves
the floor, I want to thank him. Although we disagree on the Specter
amendment, his questions have illuminated the details of the underlying
Governmental Affairs Committee proposal in a way that I as one of the
sponsors feel shows a balance, which is we are trying to do something
the 9/11 Commission says we urgently and desperately need to do, which
is to fill the gap where the Commission said there is no one in charge
of America's intelligence today--a lot of great assets but no one in
charge. It is like an army without a general or a football team without
a quarterback.
So we are creating a national intelligence director. We are giving
that position, that strength, which the current director of Central
Intelligence doesn't have. We are separating that position from the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. But we are not giving the
director line authority over the constituent agencies. He is going to
be there to call the plays, if you will, to resolve conflicts, to make
sure all the assets of the intelligence community--here we do have
totally shared goals--are serving the national interest and all of the
customers of the intelligence community and, most importantly, serving
the President of the United States who represents the national
interest, but not in control with line authority over the constituent
agencies.
As has been said, we think that will make, and the 9/11 Commission
said it will create, a top-heavy organization. We don't need to do it.
I am quoting Secretary of State Powell's statement which he made to
us on September 13 when he testified at a hearing. He said:
The director of central intelligence was there before but the DCI did
not have that kind of authority.
I add parenthetically that is the authority we are giving the
national intelligence director.
Colin Powell said:
In this town, it is budget authority that counts. Can you
move money? Can you set standards for people? Do you have the
access needed to the President? The NID will have all of
that. I think this is a far more powerful player, and that
will help the State Department.
There is a substantial transformation of what exists now. But it
doesn't remove day-to-day control over operations from the individual
departments. It is that balance that is part of the strength of our
proposal, I submit to my colleagues. There are those on both sides who
are unhappy about our balance. Senator Specter is stating it much too
simplistically and we didn't go far enough to give power to the NID, so
his amendment would effectively create a secretary of intelligence with
line control over all the constituent parts of the intelligence
community.
There will be other amendments from people who feel we have gone too
far, particularly with regard to the Department of Defense, because in
fact we do change budget control authority from the Department of
Defense to the national intelligence director, to strengthen that
position for exactly the reason Secretary Powell says, acknowledging
that the intelligence director serves the President and the entire
Government insofar as Government agencies need good intelligence,
including the State Department. And the Secretary effectively said to
us, he explicitly said, he is confident that the State Department will
get more and better intelligence which it needs to advise the President
on the conduct of our foreign policy. It is critical. Obviously, the
needs for the Defense Department and warfighters are also critical, but
they are not the only ones who need intelligence in our Government. The
new director will, I think, better be able to satisfy all of those
customers for the best possible intelligence.
I think it has been a helpful debate. I hope our colleagues who are
not on the floor are keeping an ear to the debate, or at least their
staff is, because it reminds me of some of the debates we had in the
Governmental Affairs Committee which ultimately led us to a point where
there were many disagreements along the way, with almost 50 amendments
filed, where the bill was reported out of committee on a nonpartisan
vote, unanimous vote.
I don't have explicit hopes that will happen in the full Senate, but
I look forward to as thoughtful an exchange as we have just had,
leading to a resounding vote for the kind of transformational reform of
our intelligence community that the 9/11 Commission recommends, which
we all know is desperately needed as soon as possible to better protect
the American people from the clear and present danger of terrorist
attacks.
I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Talent). The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. STEVENS. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum
call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, is there any time limit on speaking right
now?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is no time limit.
Mr. STEVENS. There is a vote set for 2:15?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I come to the Senate to make extensive
remarks on this bill. I do so with the full realization that my
schedule prevented me from attending the hearings of the committee on
which I am a member, chaired by Senator Collins and the ranking member,
Senator Lieberman. I commend them for their activities through July and
August with the hearings they conducted. During that period of time,
the Senator from Hawaii and I were in a parliamentary conference with
the Chinese National Peoples Congress, and we had other events that
prevented us from being in Washington while they conducted the
hearings.
I preface this to say I voted for the bill to come out of the
committee, but at the time I stated specifically to the managers of the
bill that I would have some amendments in the Senate and whether I
voted for the final passage of this bill would depend upon the outcome
of some of those amendments.
Let me also say in this preface to my comments that as the staff
reports were prepared by the 9/11 Commission, and my staff delivered
those to me from the Internet and I read those--I also read the report
when it first came out--and then, on the increased pressure that came
from the members of the former 9/11 Commission to have early
consideration of this subject, I reread the report and formed some very
fixed opinions about this subject.
I have never seen members of a Commission, which went out of
existence upon delivering the report, lobby the Congress so hard. My
understanding is they raised a considerable amount of money, rehired
some of their staff, and are currently lobbying the Congress. I do hope
they have complied with the lobbying laws. In any event, this pressure
has been significant and it is compelling the Congress to judgment in a
very short period of time, in my judgment.
As I said, I have read and reread the 9/11 Commission Report. Last
week, our Appropriations Committee held hearings on the report
recommendations. We did that because when I returned to Washington I
found there was a series of people who indicated they had not been
heard by the Governmental Affairs Committee who wanted to have an
opportunity to present testimony to the Congress.
We heard from Dr. Henry Kissinger; from three former military
commanders in chief: GEN Joe Ralston, U.S. Air Force, retired, former
commander of the U.S. European Command and supreme allied commander of
Europe and NATO; ADM Dennis Blair, U.S. Navy, retired, former commander
of the U.S. Pacific Command; ADM James Ellis, retired, former commander
of the U.S. Strategic Command. Our committee also heard testimony from
Dr. John Hamre, president and CEO of the Center for Strategic and
International Studies and former Under Secretary of Defense. We heard
from Judge Richard Posner of the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, and Dale Watson, former Executive Assistant Director
of Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence for the FBI.
[[Page S9891]]
Our committee spent 2 days listening to the testimony on the 9/11
Commission's recommendations. Each witness who appeared was an expert
in his field with years of dedicated service to the Nation. After
listening to their thoughts and suggestions, I have come to the
conclusion we have only begun to scratch the surface for what needs to
be considered by the Congress before we finally act on this subject.
Copies of the hearings we held before the Appropriations Committee
have been given to every Senator and to all intelligence-related staff
of the Senate. They are available to anyone who wishes. They were
printed as a public document.
Since the passage of the National Security Act in 1947, at least 19
commissions, committees, and panels have made recommendations aimed at
reorganizing our Nation's intelligence community. Those proposals have
led to changes in internal agency direction, precedence, or directive,
and to new statutes, but none of those reports were adopted in their
entirety or in this type of timeframe or context.
During last week's hearings before our committee, Senator Inouye
asked whether it would be wise for Congress to make a decision about
restructuring the intelligence community in the next 2 weeks. Judge
Posner, who is a very erudite professor of law at the University of
Chicago in addition to being a Federal circuit judge--he also recently
authored a very thoughtful article on intelligence reform in the New
York Times--testified he thought it would be ``unwise and most
unfortunate.'' He expressed doubts that the analytical problems could
be resolved in that timeframe and expressed concerns that the
Presidential campaign and politics should not be the right setting for
this reform.
I agree with Judge Posner. However, I have approached this
legislation as a committee member with an open mind, and I am hopeful
that the Senate will move forward on some reforms during this year.
I do have concerns about current efforts to restructure the Nation's
intelligence community. For starters, the witnesses I heard last week
revealed serious issues with the underlying document for these efforts.
That was the
9/11 Commission Report. The Commission's recommendations do not reflect
their own account of what happened on September 11. As Judge Posner
said before our committee:
The first 338 pages of the commission's report are an
extremely detailed and thorough narrative of the background
to the attacks themselves, and the immediate response.
It is a very fine job. . . . Then after that, the
commission goes off on what is really a different tangent in
considering organizational change because it is not clear,
from reading their narrative, that the problems were
organization[al] problems for which organization[al]
solutions or reorganization would be indicated. So I think
there is a mismatch between this very detailed narrative and
a rather more summary discussion of organizational change
that really does not match the problems that the report
itself had identified.
That is the end of Judge Posner's quote.
Because the Commission's recommendations are somewhat divorced from
its own account of what happened on 9/11, the Commission adopts, in my
view, a flawed vantage point from which to suggest reforms. For
example, one of the concerns Judge Posner expressed in our hearings
last week was that the report--and again I quote--
. . . really is oriented toward preventing not new threats,
but a repetition of 9/11. Now, an exact repetition of 9/11 is
extremely unlikely because that has already happened. We know
about that. What I think we have to worry [more] about [is
the threat of] biological terrorism, nuclear terrorism,
agricultural terrorism because, you know, destruction of
agriculture by biological weapons could be as destructive as
biological warfare against people. So we ought to try to
think about the disasters that have not happened, but that is
very difficult to do, so we tend to think about what has
already happened.
That is the end of Judge Posner's comments about that.
As we debate this legislation, one of the things we must keep in mind
is there have been substantial changes in our intelligence-gathering
methods and operations since 9/11. We personally witnessed those on
trips to Afghanistan and Iraq during this past year. The situation we
faced in the morning of 9/11 is not the situation we face today, and
the threats, although related, are not identical. Efforts to reorganize
the intelligence community must take into account the current state of
operations and the broad scope of the risks we face. We cannot be
mesmerized by just one threat.
As I said, I am not opposed to intelligence reform. But any changes
should reflect the current context of intelligence. Since 9/11, many
members of the intelligence community have testified before Senate
committees, and they have told us they are doing things differently,
that today there is a free flow of ideas that did not exist before 9/
11. Congress should not take any action that might--intentionally or
unintentionally--stifle that progress.
I support many aspects of this legislation. I am in favor of the
creation of a national intelligence director who can serve as the
President's primary intelligence adviser. I also support the creation
of a national counterterrorism center. However, I am very concerned
about the way the NID's role is defined in this legislation. I urge
Members to read it. Read it. Look at the pages. There are nine and a
half pages that describe the powers of this person. It would do well
for people to understand what it says, what the real context of this
is. This person is going to be a very unique individual. What I fear
is, this person is going to assemble underneath the NID a series of
staff people who will be telling other people what to do based upon
their understanding of what the director of NID intended to do. Quoting
from the bill:
The National Intelligence Director shall--
determine the annual budget for the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the United States by--
providing to the heads of the departments containing
agencies or elements within the intelligence community and
that have one or more programs, projects, or activities with
the National Intelligence program, and to the heads of such
agencies and elements, guidance for development [of] the
National Intelligence Program budget pertaining to such
agencies or elements. . . .
It goes on, all the way through. The national intelligence director
is in charge of preparing the annual defense budgets, including those
for the Department of Defense related to military intelligence
programs, with the concurrence of the Secretary. He would be in charge
of ``collection and analysis requirements'' for the entire intelligence
community. He is going to have to ``provide advisory tasking on the
collection of intelligence to elements of the United States Government
having information collection'' activities. He will have the right to
go to any Department or agency of the Federal Government and say,
``What are you doing?'' and have access to their information. He will
``manage and oversee the National Counterterrorism Center,'' which,
again, I say, I do believe in that type of center, but can he manage
that and be a director at the same time?
I urge the Senate to look at the job description of this one person.
No person on Earth can do all those things. What he is going to do is
assemble a whole series of subordinates who will tell the existing
agency heads, many of whom are constitutional officers, Secretaries,
confirmed by the Senate, to perform the functions of their Department.
But this person is going to have assistants telling those Secretaries
what to do and demanding they have access to information those
Secretaries have collected through their own processes. Now, I think,
if you read this, this is an enormous task for any individual. An NID
is needed, but that type of bureaucracy that is set up by this bill is
just overwhelming.
He also ensures ``that appropriate officials of the United States
Government . . . have access to a variety of intelligence assessments
and analytical views,'' protecting ``intelligence sources and
methods,'' establishing ``requirements and procedures for the
classification of intelligence.''
He is a czar, one person. Now, we know not one person can do all
those things. This means to me a new level of bureaucracy, an appointed
level, not described in this bill at all. But he is going to have a
series of people working for him. I am told there will probably be 800
people in this office of national intelligence director. There is the
flaw. There is the flaw, and the President's letter yesterday mentioned
it.
This legislation also gives the NID authority to set security,
personnel, and informational technology standards all the way across
the intelligence
[[Page S9892]]
community. In other words, no matter whether you are the FBI, CIA, or
DIA, you must follow the standards set by the NID to do your business.
Unheard of, just unheard of.
This also includes the establishment and direction over information
sharing. This person alone will determine who shares what information.
Now, I believe this effort will create more problems than it solves.
Judge Posner, again, addressed this in his testimony to our committee
last week. He said:
The commission thinks the reason the bits of information
that might have been assembled into a mosaic spelling 9/11
never came together in one place is that no one person was in
charge of intelligence.
He means at that time. But he said:
That is not the reason. The reason, or rather, the reasons
are, first, that the volume of information is so vast that
even with the continued rapid advances in data processing it
cannot be collected, stored, and retrieved and analyzed in a
single database. . . .
That is an objective of this bill. Anyone in the industry will tell
you it is not possible yet.
Second, legitimate security concerns limit the degree to
which confidential information can safely be shared,
especially given the ever-present threat of moles like the
infamous Aldrich Ames.
Now, Mr. President, still quoting Judge Posner:
And third, the different intelligence services and the
subunits of each service tend, because information is power,
to hoard it. Efforts to centralize the intelligence function
are likely to lengthen the time it takes for intelligence and
analyses to reach the President, reduce diversity and
competition in the gathering and analysis of intelligence
data, limit the number of threats given serious consideration
and deprive the President of a range of alternative
interpretations of ambiguous and incomplete data--and
intelligence data will usually be ambiguous and incomplete.
That is, again, the end of Judge Posner's comment.
Giving the NID information-sharing authority may actually prove to be
counterproductive. The implications Judge Posner raises need full
debate and discussion. I hope we will have some of that today. At the
very least, we cannot assume that Congress has rectified this problem
by simply vesting information-sharing authority in one individual, only
one individual, because that is the process for information sharing.
What if, in a later administration, the NID wants more centralized
control? What if that person shares the viewpoint of the prior
administration that there should be walls between these agencies? He
will determine when they learn what is going on between one agency and
another. That is the implication of what we are hearing here. We took
down the walls with the PATRIOT Act. We said no more walls. Yet here is
one person who determines the total rules for sharing. And probably
under the current atmosphere, the return to the walls is impossible,
but this authority does not prevent walls.
There is no limit on the NID's concept of sharing. That person alone
will determine what sharing is between agencies and who gets the
information and who has access to it.
I am also concerned about the language in this legislation concerning
the structure of the office of NID. I mentioned that before. We don't
need to create a new bureaucracy here, and it seems to me this
legislation risks doing just that. We need to delete or significantly
revise the parts of this bill that delve into unnecessary or excessive
detail about the organization of the office of NID. Again, I call the
attention of Senators to the bill itself. It has greater detail
concerning specific authority for one individual than I have ever seen.
The Statement of Administration Policy, dated September 28,
specifically addressed this issue of creating ``a cumbersome new
bureaucracy'' or ``legislated mandated bureaucracy will hinder, not
help, in the effort to strengthen U.S. intelligence capabilities and to
preserve our constitutional rights.''
Continuing from the administration's letter:
The Administration urges the Senate to delete or
significantly revise these problematic provisions.
We will have amendments to do just that at a later time.
I believe we must take time to carefully consider the people in the
field now and how this legislation will impact them. I recently had
occasion to meet with the chiefs of station of the CIA from around the
world. I was most impressed with what they said about how long it takes
to establish a position as a chief of station and how long it takes to
develop assets who have the willingness and the ability to go into a
neighboring country or in the same country they are in and try to
obtain the information we need about developments that might threaten
our future.
Currently there are 175,000 persons working in the intelligence
community. One hundred fifty thousand of them are military personnel
today. They do an incredible job with much personal sacrifice, many
under difficult circumstances and far away from their families for
years. The creation of the NID will have serious consequences for them
and the Department of Defense intelligence personnel. The consequences
for the Department of Defense intelligence personnel must be carefully
considered as we adopt these reforms.
I don't believe you can alter one piece of this puzzle without having
an impact somewhere else. I am concerned not only about the impact the
legislation will have in terms of unintended consequences of the big
picture but also the impact it will have on our career intelligence
operatives who are working out in the field today.
I hope to go on to that later. We had a gap in our development of
human intelligence, and it was a serious gap for a series of years. It
takes more than 5 years to develop one of these people. Now we are
operating with a group of human intelligence experts which is very
limited.
This legislation says the NID will ``establish intelligence
collection and analysis requirements for the intelligence community.''
This arrangement will centralize the prioritization and control of
intelligence and, I believe, could detrimentally affect military
leaders outside Washington, DC.
The NID would inevitably focus on the current crisis in Washington--I
assume, this doesn't say anywhere, that NID will be here, somewhere
near the President--possibly shortchanging the long-term collection and
analysis needed for intelligence preparation for battlefields in
distant regions.
Currently there is a diversity within intelligence. I do believe in a
NID, but I believe in more of a coordinator than a commander. This
creates a new commander in chief of intelligence. The Constitution
didn't create one. I do believe this is a very difficult proposition
the way it is described, what the powers and authorities will be.
When combat occurs, intelligence could swing into full force to
support the troops, but by then it would be too late. We need a
consistent peacetime intelligence effort to ensure that we can either
avoid conflict or give U.S. forces high-quality information when they
must engage an enemy.
I am also concerned about the nature of the NID position. Right now
we have one agency that deals with domestic threats and another that
deals with foreign threats. There are reasons for this division.
Domestic and international threats are distinct and require different
intelligence tactics and strategies. The NID collapses international
and domestic intelligence concerns into one position, one control, one
definition authority, and one access authority. I do believe that this
is the kind of situation Judge Posner warned us about last week where
we would have an intelligence community that is too rough on our
citizens or too gentle with foreign threats because it needs to adhere
to uniform policies across the domestic and international context. If
that is not the intent, the bill should so state.
There is a reason for different approaches to foreign threats than
those that are internal within our constitutional authorities. I
believe Judge Posner's warning ought to be listened to by the Senate.
We do not need an intelligence community that is too rough on our own
citizens and too gentle with foreign threats.
I believe the NID position should reflect what Dale Watson, another
witness before our committee, recommended last week. He has a long
service in the FBI intelligence division. This was his judgment:
This position must be a job and not a position. The
individual who has this responsibility of being the NID needs
to work within the NID and within the intelligence community.
The NID should not be a public relations job. The NID should
not be on the
[[Page S9893]]
speaking circuit or conducting liaison. The NID should be a
central-focused individual that looks at where [we] are
across the board in all areas. . . . I think the NID ought to
be a term appointment. I think the NID has to have the
responsibility and be able to do the task.
What we are really saying is, Congress should not rush to implement
the recommendations put forth in the 9/11 Commission report. For my
part, I hope to spend more time in the Chamber listening to my
colleagues and exchanging views on this legislation.
As of now I am inclined to support a course that creates a national
intelligence director and a national counterterrorism center, gives
them 6 months to get up and running, and then invites them to come and
tell those of us in Congress who must make the final decision what
additional authorities and changes they actually need. This director
ought to become familiar with what we have now before he tries to fix
it.
That is one of the things we learned as young men, I thought. If the
watch is running and it works, you ought not to try to fix it until you
know that there might be some way you can improve it.
This situation is just the opposite. I do think we ought to look
forward in this week to a debate that is one that will be productive so
that the changes in the administration's letter we received yesterday
are not only listened to but they are accommodated to the maximum
extent possible.
I have a series of questions that I want to read into the Record.
These are questions I intend to ask the managers of these bills as we
go through this process. It is a long list of questions, I will say.
The first is in regard to military personnel.
Based on the fact there is no differentiation between civilian and
military personnel in your bill, could the NID have the power to hold
military personnel for more than their stated rotations, more than
their career path that they are on? For example, could they hold a
military person at the National Counterterrorism Center longer than is
detailed from the Department of Defense? If they could, what is the
effect on their ability for promotion in the future? If needed for a
military mission, how would the Secretary of Defense or one of the
service chiefs be able to have that military individual returned to a
nonintelligence program or position?
Is it true that once in the NID, the NID has control over the
individual person's future, particularly when, I remind the Senate,
again, 80 percent of the people we are talking about are Department of
Defense people, most of whom have career programs, are on a career
path, and part of that path involves being an intelligence official for
a period of time?
Also, based on the educational requirements designated for personnel
in the national intelligence program by the national intelligence
director, how would this be reconciled for those military personnel who
must complete military education courses for the advancement of their
careers?
Periodically, particularly the officers, and some noncommissioned
officers, must complete additional military education courses in order
to move upward, have upward mobility in their particular service.
Also, how much control would the DOD have over military personnel
assigned to the NID? Would the NID control their assignments and their
careers? How would the NID ensure that they have the requisite training
and assignments to remain competitive for promotion within their parent
military service? What role does the Secretary of Defense have in
meeting the statutory responsibilities in title 10 and title 5 for the
Armed Forces personnel?
I have heard comments that this new national intelligence director
organization could, as I said, be in excess of 800 people. If that is
true, it would seem that this legislation will create a new bureaucracy
to deal with intelligence.
So I asked the managers directly, how large will the national
intelligence director organization be? Does the NID have unlimited
ability to hire people? Where would the personnel for such a structure
come from? There is already a shortage of intelligence people in the
intelligence community. Where are these people going to come from? Is
he going to take them from the CIA or the DIA? And if he does, do they
lose their career path? Is everybody subject to the control of the NID?
Can he tell them you must come? I thought intelligence was a volunteer
organization. I think it must be if we are to be successful.
Why does this legislation single out the FBI for the NID's ability to
fix the rate of pay? This bill gives only the NID the power to fix the
rate of pay for the FBI and the intelligence section. Why doesn't it
extend this to all personnel involved if he is to be so powerful? It
seems to be a very strange section.
The number of qualified personnel in the intelligence field is fairly
limited. Will the creation of the NID and this organization dilute the
numbers? How long would it take to build and to grow the additional
numbers if they are required in order to create and fulfill the
obligations of the director under this reorganization?
I have some questions about the Department of Defense directly. If
the national intelligence assets are transferred to a new national
intelligence director, how do we ensure to our military commanders that
national assets will be reliably available to them before a conflict?
They have control under this bill when the conflict comes, when they
have the right to obtain their own intelligence. How will the
Department of Defense relate to its defense support agencies, such as
the NRO, National Reconnaissance Agency, or NSA, or the National Geo
spatial-Intelligence Agency, NGA, if they are effectively under the
national intelligence agency? Will they still be combat support
agencies, subject to the military leaders, as they are now--the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense? Where does this fit in?
Will the NID have the power to convert current military positions into
civilian positions? Where does he recruit from?
Within this bill, I would like to have an answer as to whether you
have altered the definition of ``joint military intelligence
programs.'' I do not see such a definition, but it is a very important
segment of intelligence.
As to the budget, am I correct in understanding the NID controls the
budget of the NSA, NGA, NRO, and that the NID recommends nominees to be
directors of these entities, with the concurrence of the Secretary of
Defense? What happens to the current directors? Is this some time off
in the future? Can he immediately clear the deck and put new people in
charge of the agencies? These agencies, along with DIA, are both
national and combat support agencies. How will the proposed bill ensure
these agencies remain responsive to the military forces they support if
their funding and personnel are controlled by another department?
How does the National Security Advisory and Office of Management and
Budget fit into the overall role of coordination or budget coordination
envisioned by this legislation?
Particularly, how would the national intelligence director, with
strong budgetary and personnel authority and the ability to control the
dollars, 85 percent of which are now controlled by the Department of
Defense, still maintain a relationship with the DOD? Does it control
the whole 85 percent or just the part that is related to the defense
agencies specifically mentioned? Currently, I assume the committee
knows that the payroll for all of those people comes through the
Department of Defense. This assumes, I take it, that the payroll will
now come through the budget of the NID. Which ones are you going to
pay? Who will make the separation, the Secretary of Defense or NID, as
to which ones NID pays and which ones the Department of Defense pays?
That is going to be a headache, in my opinion.
The bill provides the national director, in terms of an organization,
with the power to reach into other departments to manage personnel,
budget, and acquisition programs. Is this on a day-by-day basis, or on
the basis of a plan or the formation of a divide-and-command authority?
It seems to be that. It seems to be an invitation for turmoil that will
cause operational problems as soon as it is created. He is supposed to
reach in and tell them I will manage your personnel, your budget, and
your acquisitions? A series of things is on the books that envisions
particular acquisitions by various agencies over the period ahead. Some
of those laws, apparently, will have to
[[Page S9894]]
be changed if this person's authority is to be effective, because it
will conflict with existing laws, if they are not changed.
How do the benefits of centralization of the intelligence function
impact the benefits of diversity and competition in the production of
useful intelligence? Does the committee believe that diversity in
competition is not needed and that is intended by this bill?
Is it possible to link the national intelligence director to the
National Security Council and place it under the control of the
national security adviser? Is that possible? Today, the President is in
control of those entities within the executive branch, and they are
personally responsible to him. That is what the letter we received
yesterday says. I hope we think twice about the lines of authority and
what are the prerogatives of the President as Commander in Chief and as
President of the United States under the Constitution.
Currently, national intelligence priorities are established by the
President and the National Security Council. Does a national
intelligence director with such powers weaken the NSC process and the
roles of the National Security Adviser and the Secretary of State? Will
they still have the same role, notwithstanding this national
intelligence director is going to have the authority to tell them and
make the decisions on what intelligence they need in carrying out their
authorities as constitutional advisers to the President?
Could some of the objectives sought by the reorganization be achieved
by strengthening the existing institutions? I am not sure that has been
considered adequately. That seems to be the compelling rush of the 9/11
Commission--throw everything out and set up something new. There is not
even a period for transition in this process. This cannot happen
overnight. The reorganization proposed by this bill would take at least
a year. During that process, what happens to careers and to people's
morale? Why can we not build on what we have, rather than creating
something so new that has the extreme power to invade every agency that
even touches any piece of intelligence?
Does this legislation create a system in which intelligence is
reported to two masters? For example, would the members of the
intelligence community be under the control of the national
intelligence director and their own agency bosses? I assume that is the
case. How does it work on a day-to-day basis if they are not? I assume
persons employed by one agency are responsible to the person who hired
them. This bill now envisions, I take it, that the NID has the right to
hire and fire in any of the agencies involved.
Will the system envisioned by this legislation create conflicts in
collection and analysis tasking? Currently, there is a working
relationship between these agencies as to who is going to pursue one
subject or another, as they task the analysis of information coming in
on a daily basis. I don't see why the system creates other conflicts in
that process.
The 9/11 Commission report highlighted that there was a lack of
information sharing within the intelligence community. But evidence
points out this was just as serious within agencies as it was across
agencies. How can problems of sharing within agencies be solved by
layering another set of controls over all of the agencies?
We ought to think about what happens to the agencies that exist now
and how they should transition into this national intelligence director
realm, and not assume it is automatically created as soon as the bill
is passed.
Would the national intelligence director's role in crafting
intelligence policy supplant that of other Cabinet Secretaries? Under
this bill, would the Cabinet Secretaries lose their own organic
capability to do intelligence analysis? Are we telling the Secretary of
State he cannot hire somebody to do intelligence that he thinks he
needs? If so, would this undercut Cabinet Secretaries who are
constitutional officers of the Government charged with managing the
instruments of foreign and security policy for the country?
I do not think we should proceed to create a national intelligence
director that has the power to tell those Cabinet Secretaries what they
can do in terms of gathering intelligence and analysis.
How would these same Cabinet Secretaries fulfill the constitutional
authority vested in them by Congress unless they have the power to make
an independent judgment about what is the proper conclusion from the
intelligence available to them?
Could the national intelligence director function without having the
analytical branch of the CIA placed under his or her direction? I say
that again, the only analytical branch we really have is the CIA, and
this bill seems to say that the NID gets that analytical branch of the
CIA. If it does not, will we have duplicate analytical branches? What
is the role of CIA under this concept, as far as analysis is concerned?
If the essential relationship between analysts and operators is
weakened, does the operational branch become rudderless and the
analytical branch too academic? Would the CIA become an organization
for conducting clandestine activities only?
I do not think this bill tells us what we expect from CIA in the
future. It says what we expect the NID to do, but it really does not
reaffirm the role of any existing agencies that I have defined.
Creating an intelligence czar with domestic surveillance authority
that is not under the Attorney General, and measures that separate
domestic intelligence from law enforcement, go against all the lessons
learned by democratic governments the hard way. What are the concerns
and dangers of merging domestic and foreign counterterrorism operations
under one organization?
Again, I refer to extensive comments Judge Posner made to us before
our committee. How will competing views on intelligence be brought to
the President's attention? Indeed, how will competing views merge at
all in a structure that is so centralized and under the control of the
NID?
Much of the bill which stems from the recommendations of the 9/11
Commission report seem to be directed only to the threat of Islamic
terrorism, which I agree is a tremendous threat. But does this
legislation enable us to better deal with the growing worldwide threats
of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other very serious
problems in terms of intelligence gathering and analysis?
How much will congressional oversight be reduced if this bill becomes
law? It appears to point toward one committee but has total budget
authority, total reorganization authority dealing with one person who
has total authority in the intelligence community. It eliminates
diversity. It eliminates even the opportunity for a separate think. It
is going to be a two-group thinks, and if they work together, where is
the diversity in this community? Where do we get accurate analyses if
we can have only the one that is made by the NID?
We created the Department of Homeland Security in an election cycle.
I think the experts are telling us now that the transition has not been
successful, and the current organization falls short of its goals, as
far as homeland security. But isn't that the same environment we face
right now, Mr. President? Can we avoid some of the same mistakes we
made and have experienced through the Department of Homeland Security
and its legislation and development of this legislation?
Would the National Counterterrorism Center be involved in operations?
Why would there be a director of operations listed in this organization
unless it is involved in operations? If it is, doesn't that complicate
planning for operations that currently go on within the Department of
Defense, CIA, FBI, and other agencies? Are they all subject to the
control of the NID, even in terms of operations?
I do not think that is the intent, but again I do not think it is
clear. It is my understanding that the inspector general would have
authority to conduct investigations of the relationships among elements
of the intelligence community within the national intelligence program
and the authority to investigate relationships among elements of the
intelligence community within the national intelligence program and
other elements of the intelligence community.
If a close reading of this bill grants authorities to the inspector
general of this community far greater than other
[[Page S9895]]
inspectors general--I was asked that question once and was told it is
just the same as the others; that it was just the same. I challenge
that now because I do not think other inspectors general have the
authority to investigate relationships between the communities, nor do
I think the inspector general should have the authority to audit
interagency processes in addition to the programs and operations within
the national intelligence authority. It presumes we can find an
inspector general and his staff that will have the right to complete
access of all the intelligence to which the national intelligence
director has access. I seriously question that in connection with
intelligence.
Does the authority to investigate interagency processes create a
tension between the inspector general of the NID and inspectors general
of other agencies? I do not see anything that says the Department of
Defense inspector general or all of the inspectors general in the
intelligence community--and they all have them--is subordinate to all
of them, yet this person has authority to investigate interagency
processes that are really relationships between agencies, not how the
agencies function, not whether something is going on, but whether they
are getting along. Who is getting along with whom? What are you going
to do with existing IGs? What is their role under this bill?
I do not think it is spelled out at all. I think the bill authorizing
the inspector general of the NID to provide policy direction to improve
the effectiveness of interagency process, without consulting the
Secretaries of Cabinet departments, without consulting agency heads,
and without consulting the inspectors general in the agencies
themselves, has not been thought through at all.
I do believe the authority to provide policy guidance politicizes the
position of inspector general to NID and it would endanger the IG's
independence, which I believe is critical to conducting fair and
unbiased audits in investigations. I also think there ought to be some
statement of the relationship we expect to exist between the NID and
the inspector general and the inspectors general of individual agencies
that are subordinate to the NID.
Those are just a few of the questions that came to my mind as I read
through this bill and report and the comments that have been made. I do
hope we have time to explore some of those questions because I think
they need to be answered. I do think we need to take care of what the
relationship is between this NID and particularly the Department of
Defense.
I hope we can work together and find a way to answer the requests
made by the administration that were stated yesterday. I thank the
Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska yields the floor. Who
seeks recognition? The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending
amendment be set aside.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Amendment No. 3766
(Purpose: To ensure the availability of electromagnetic
spectrum for public safety entities)
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I have an amendment at the desk and ask
for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The bill clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain] proposes an amendment
numbered 3766.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading
of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(The amendment is printed in today's Record under ``Text of
Amendments.'')
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my amendment
be set aside to allow Senator Lautenberg to propose an amendment and to
speak for no longer than 10 minutes, at which time I will return to my
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The
Senator yields the floor. The Senator from New Jersey is recognized.
Amendment No. 3767
Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Arizona for
his patience. I send my amendment to the desk and I ask for its
immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from New Jersey [Mr. Lautenberg] proposes an
amendment numbered 3767.
Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the
reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
(Purpose: To specify that the National Intelligence Director shall
serve for one or more terms of up to 5 years each)
On page 10, line 2, insert ``(1)'' after ``Director.--''.
On page 10, line 5, insert ``, for a term of up to 5
years'' after ``Senate''.
On page 10, after line 5, insert the following:
(2) The National Intelligence Director may be reappointed
by the President for additional terms of up to 5 years each,
by and with the consent of the Senate.
Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, first, I commend the chairman of the
committee and our esteemed ranking member and say I am pleased to see
that we have a chance to wrap up discussion on this reform attempt in
the time we are presently allowing.
I offer an amendment to establish a 5-year term for the national
intelligence director. Our colleague from Pennsylvania has put forward
an amendment to extend the term for the national intelligence director,
to put in place a term that is 10 years in length, and I salute the
Senator's attempt to try to assure objectivity for the new intelligence
chief. The Senator from Pennsylvania and I share the same goal and that
is to do all we can to make sure the national intelligence director is
as independent and nonpartisan as possible.
My specific proposal differs from the approach used by the Senator
from Pennsylvania. Mine would establish a 5-year term, not a 10-year
term, for the national intelligence director. Under my amendment, if
the President wants to reappoint that person, he could, as long as he
sends the nomination to the Senate and we confirm him or her.
Under Senator Specter's amendment, the director's term would be
limited to a single 10-year term. I think a formula of 5-year terms
that could be renewed is more practical. If we are serious about
objective intelligence, then we have to provide a national intelligence
director with as much independence as we can, that allows him to tell
the President things the President may not generally want to hear. The
NID should be able to provide information and analysis to the President
without necessarily worrying about job security.
During one of our hearings in the Governmental Affairs Committee on
intelligence reform earlier this month, I asked interim CIA Director
John McLaughlin what he thought of a limited term for the national
intelligence director. His response was that it may be yet another way
to ensure the objectivity and nonpolitical character of whoever holds
that office.
Interim Director McLaughlin is on target. A term for the national
intelligence director will bolster objectivity and help keep politics
out of our intelligence data.
Some of my colleagues have voiced concern that they want to make sure
the director is someone the President trusts, and I wholeheartedly
support that. I agree it is critical that the individual and the
President have a relationship built on trust. I believe my amendment
bolsters that trust. With an independent, objective national
intelligence director, the President can trust that the data he gets is
objective.
When it comes to intelligence data, a President surely does not want
a simple yes-man. The President needs independent, clean, quality
analysis.
Unlike the amendment that has been proposed, my amendment does not
restrict the director to only one term. If the President wants to
renominate the same person to serve in the post again, then he may do
so, and the Senate will then decide whether to confirm the person for
another term.
I want to be clear that while the amendment provides a degree of
independence to the NID, it is not absolute. Under my amendment, the
President could certainly dismiss the NID if he
[[Page S9896]]
did not have further confidence in his ability to perform. In fact, all
it takes for the President to remove the director is the will to do so.
So I believe my amendment will help improve the quality of nominees for
the position of national intelligence director. With a 5-year term in
place, there will be an expectation that the individual serve both
Democrats and Republicans. Given what I hope will be a nonpartisan
mandate, we will see much more objective and nonpartisan nominees.
I urge my colleagues to support this amendment, and I yield the
floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sununu). The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I know the Senator from Arizona is in the
Chamber to offer his amendment so I will speak only very briefly.
Senator Lautenberg's amendment is an improvement over the amendment
offered by the Senator from Pennsylvania because it is a shorter term
and it does allow the President to remove the NID without specifying a
cause, but I still find it problematic.
We are talking about the individual who is going to be the principal
adviser to the President. The witnesses were virtually unanimous in
advising us that that individual has to have the trust and confidence
of the President and that it would be a mistake to set a term.
I argue further against this amendment in the context of the Specter
amendment. In light of the fact that the Senator from Arizona is
waiting, I will not repeat those arguments at this time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I believe under the previous unanimous
consent agreement that Senator Lautenberg's amendment will be set aside
and we will return to the consideration of my amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The
Senator is correct.
Mr. McCAIN. I also understand that at 2:15 there will be votes as
previously ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the vote will occur
at 2:15 in relation to the Specter amendment No. 3761.
Amendment No. 3766
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I would like to use the time between now
and the time the vote is ordered to briefly talk about the amendment,
but before I do I will say I understand there is controversy associated
with this amendment. I do not intend, nor do I believe, that we should
hold up the progress of this legislation and I would be more than
willing to agree to a time agreement immediately upon completion of the
pending votes to give the opponents of this amendment time to consider
that.
I would also point out to both proponents and opponents of this
amendment this issue is very well known. There may be some Members who
are not that familiar with this amendment, but it goes all the way back
to 1997 when we had hearings before the Commerce Committee on May 15,
1997, where following the Oklahoma bombing there was, in the view of
the witnesses, an urgent requirement to get spectrum to the public
safety community as quickly as possible. That was 7 years ago. The same
arguments are being used today as were used 7 years ago after the
Oklahoma tragedy. So I believe this amendment addresses, as Senator
Lieberman and I had committed to do to the families and to the members
of the 9/11 Commission, the fact that we would act one way or another
on all 41 of their recommendations.
This addresses the following recommendation made by the 9/11
Commission:
Recommendation: Congress should support pending legislation
which provides for the expedited and increased assignment of
radio spectrum for public safety purposes. Furthermore, high-
risk urban areas such as New York City and Washington, D.C.,
should establish signal corps units to ensure communications
connectivity between and among civilian authorities, local
first responders, and the National Guard. Federal funding of
such units should be given high priority by Congress.
What we are talking about is not only addressing the expedited aspect
of their recommendation but also increased assignment. That is why, in
this legislation, all of those who are presently using analog spectrum
would be required by a date certain, December 31, 2008, without
exception, without loophole, to move off of the analog to digital
spectrum.
To take care of those who are still using over-the-air broadcasting,
$1 billion would be set aside from the auction of this spectrum in
order to provide the provision of set top boxes for those Americans who
are still using over-the-air television as their primary way of
receiving television signals. This is a small amount compared to the
immense value of the spectrum itself.
This amendment is supported by the 9/11 Commission. I have a letter
from them and statement in support of it.
It says:
We write in support of your amendment to S. 2845 regarding
public safety spectrum. Your amendment provides for the
expedited and potentially increased assignment of spectrum
for public safety purposes. By creating a funding mechanism
to aid first responders in the purchase of new equipment, it
also recognizes that spectrum alone is insufficient to
address the deficiencies in public safety interoperability.
In this way, your amendment squarely addresses the needs of
public safety cited in the 9/11 Commission report.
We urge your colleagues to support this amendment, because
it takes significant steps to addressing the urgent needs of
police, fire, emergency medical, and other public safety
agencies. By establishing a firm date of December 31, 2007,
for the return of spectrum long promised to public safety,
your amendment provides much-needed certainty with respect to
access to this spectrum. And by establishing a firm date of
December 31, 2008, for completion of the digital television
transition nationwide, your amendment creates an essential
funding mechanism for the purchase of public safety equipment
using proceeds from the auction of the broadcast analog
spectrum. This latter deadline also ensures that the return
of broadcast spectrum for public safety occurs with minimal
risk of litigation, minimal impact on consumers, and with
maximum flexibility of the Congress to allocate additional
spectrum to public safety if it concludes such an allocation
is necessary.
Finally, we urge the Senate to reject efforts to weaken
your amendment by adding loopholes purporting to offer
``flexibility'' to the assignment of spectrum to public
safety entities. The need for this spectrum is too great; the
stakes are too large; and the time is too pressing to succumb
to efforts to delay these critical measures for first
responders everywhere.
I will talk about the successful efforts orchestrated by the National
Association of Broadcasters to delay indefinitely the transition from
analog to traditional spectrum. Now that my friend from Montana is in
the Chamber, I will quote from a speech he made in 1997, 7 years ago,
which basically lays out the same concerns he and the National
Association of Broadcasters have today.
It is time we acted. It's time we gave these people the spectrum they
deserve. We can do that, along with providing those who are now and
will only receive over-the-air television a set top box, which will
allow them to receive digital television signals.
Mr. President, I think we are close to 2:15.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has half a minute remaining.
Mr. McCAIN. I understand, as I said before, that there is controversy
associated with this. I will be more than happy to agree to a time
agreement, a very reasonable time agreement to debate this issue and
vote on this amendment.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be 2
minutes equally divided between the two votes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is
so ordered. There will be 2 minutes, equally divided.
Mr. DOMENICI. Between the votes. Not on the first amendment.
Ms. COLLINS. Prior to the second vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Amendment No. 3761
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, under the previous order we are now going
to proceed to a vote on Senator Specter's amendment, No. 3761. That is
the amendment that would set the 10-year term for the national
intelligence director. I move to table the amendment.
I ask for the yeas and nays.
[[Page S9897]]
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a
sufficient second.
The question is on agreeing to the motion. The clerk will call the
roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. Akaka), the
Senator from North Carolina (Mr. Edwards), and the Senator from
Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry) are necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 93, nays 4, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 191 Leg.]
YEAS--93
Alexander
Allard
Allen
Baucus
Bayh
Bennett
Biden
Bingaman
Bond
Boxer
Breaux
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Campbell
Cantwell
Carper
Chafee
Chambliss
Clinton
Cochran
Coleman
Collins
Conrad
Cornyn
Corzine
Craig
Crapo
Daschle
Dayton
DeWine
Dodd
Dole
Domenici
Dorgan
Durbin
Ensign
Enzi
Feingold
Fitzgerald
Frist
Graham (FL)
Graham (SC)
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Harkin
Hatch
Hollings
Hutchison
Inhofe
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kohl
Kyl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Lott
Lugar
McCain
McConnell
Mikulski
Miller
Murkowski
Murray
Nelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)
Nickles
Pryor
Reed
Reid
Roberts
Rockefeller
Santorum
Sarbanes
Schumer
Sessions
Shelby
Smith
Snowe
Stevens
Sununu
Talent
Thomas
Voinovich
Warner
Wyden
NAYS--4
Byrd
Feinstein
Specter
Stabenow
NOT VOTING--3
Akaka
Edwards
Kerry
The motion was agreed to.
Mr. BOND. I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that
motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 3706
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now
proceed to a vote in relation to Specter amendment No. 3706. There will
be 2 minutes of debate equally divided prior to the vote.
Who seeks time?
The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I would like to split the 1 minute on the
opponents' side, 30 seconds for myself and 30 seconds for the Senator
from Connecticut.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Ms. COLLINS. I ask the Senator from Pennsylvania, do you want to go
first?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, this amendment gives the national
intelligence director authority to supervise, direct the kind of
managerial authority which is indispensable if the national
intelligence director is to be effective.
Of those of us who have dealt with the Central Intelligence Agency,
Senator Roberts, the current chair of the committee, is forcefully in
favor of this amendment, as is Senator Shelby, former chairman of the
committee, as am I. Very forceful arguments were made today by members
of the committee--Senator Hatch, Senator Bond, Senator DeWine.
But if we are really to bring the intelligence community under
management, if we are really to have the kind of coordination, to have
all of the information in one locale, where 9/11 could have been
prevented, and to have accountability, it is indispensable to do more
than give budget authority, which is all the committee bill does, but
to give the national intelligence director the authority to supervise,
direct real management authority to get the job done.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, in deciding to keep the NSA and the NGA
within the Department of Defense, we were mindful of the fact that
these agencies are combat support agencies. We do not want to sever the
link between these agencies and the Secretary of Defense. We have
already given the NID strong power in terms of budget, in terms of
appointing the heads of these agencies, with concurrence from the
Secretary of Defense. I urge opposition to the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I also urge opposition to the Specter
amendment. The fact is, our committee has found a balance. We have
created someone in charge of the intelligence community who is not
there now, giving that person the authority Senator Collins has
referred to, but leaving line control over the agencies of the
intelligence community, including the Department of Defense, within the
Department of Defense and those existing agencies.
The fact is, this amendment goes too far and goes too far politically
because if this amendment should pass, this bill is not going to go
anywhere in the House, and we will end up leaving ourselves vulnerable.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time has expired.
The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. I move to table the amendment.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There appears to be a sufficient second.
The question is on agreeing to the motion.
The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. Akaka), the
Senator from North Carolina (Mr. Edwards), and the Senator from
Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry) are necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 78, nays 19, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 192 Leg.]
YEAS--78
Allard
Allen
Baucus
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Breaux
Bunning
Burns
Byrd
Campbell
Cantwell
Carper
Chafee
Chambliss
Clinton
Cochran
Coleman
Collins
Cornyn
Corzine
Daschle
Dayton
Dodd
Dole
Domenici
Dorgan
Durbin
Ensign
Enzi
Feingold
Feinstein
Fitzgerald
Frist
Graham (FL)
Graham (SC)
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hollings
Hutchison
Inhofe
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kohl
Kyl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Lugar
McCain
McConnell
Mikulski
Miller
Murray
Nelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)
Nickles
Pryor
Reed
Reid
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Schumer
Sessions
Smith
Stabenow
Stevens
Sununu
Talent
Thomas
Voinovich
Warner
NAYS--19
Alexander
Bayh
Bennett
Bond
Brownback
Conrad
Craig
Crapo
DeWine
Harkin
Hatch
Lott
Murkowski
Roberts
Santorum
Shelby
Snowe
Specter
Wyden
NOT VOTING--3
Akaka
Edwards
Kerry
The motion was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from
Iowa, Mr. Harkin, will be recognized for 15 minutes.
Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, how much time does the Senator from Iowa
have?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will be recognized for 15 minutes
under the previous order.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Ms. COLLINS. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Iraq and al-Qaida
Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, there is no longer any doubt about
President Bush's reelection strategy. It is the same strategy that was
used in the election 2 years ago: They invoke the images of the 9/11
attacks and warn that new terrorist attacks are imminent. They stoke
Americans' fears and anxieties. And, of course, they accuse their
opponents of being weak on terrorism, not willing to defend America.
The events of 9/11 were traumatic, and we all understand Americans'
fear
[[Page S9898]]
of a new terrorist attack. But it is despicable to politicize this
fear. It is despicable to exploit people's anxieties for political
advantage. But this administration has done this again and again.
This is exactly what Vice President Dick Cheney was up to when he
warned that if John Kerry is elected President, then ``the danger is
that we'll get hit again, that we'll be hit in a way that will be
devastating.''
You have to appreciate the pure Orwellian beauty of that statement.
It was on President Bush's watch that we suffered the September 11
attack, a real attack, not a hypothetical one, and that attack happened
despite multiple warnings to Mr. Bush from the CIA that al-Qaida was
planning to attack America. Yet now his attack dog Vice President has
the gall to warn that if John Kerry is elected President, the
terrorists will hit us with a ``devastating attack.''
As I said, this is the administration's reelection strategy: Fear and
smear; politicize the terrorist threat; exploit people's fears and
anxieties for political advantage.
Late last week, President Bush and his allies escalated this strategy
to a new level. They are now saying, in effect, that Senator Kerry is
giving aid and comfort to the terrorists, and that as Republican
Representative Tom Cole crudely put it:
If George Bush loses the election, Osama bin Laden wins the
election.
Last Tuesday, the senior Senator from Utah, and a good friend of
mine, Senator Hatch, said that terrorists ``are going to throw
everything they can between now and the election to try and elect
Kerry.''
Last Monday, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said
terrorists in Iraq ``are trying to influence the election against
President Bush.''
Last Thursday, President Bush said Senator Kerry's statements on Iraq
``can embolden the enemy.''
And Vice President Cheney called Senator Kerry ``destructive'' to the
war on terrorism.
This morning our colleague from Arizona, Senator Kyl, criticized an
earlier floor statement by Senator Kennedy. Senator Kyl said that
Senator Kennedy's criticisms of the President's policy in Iraq were
``giving confidence to the enemy.'' That was said just this morning on
the floor of the Senate.
This is disturbing. Since when is an entirely legitimate and
justified criticism of the President's policy in Iraq ``giving
confidence to the enemy.'' This is an outrageous accusation. It has no
place on the Senate floor for legitimate debate.
I remind the Senator from Arizona of the wise words of President
Dwight Eisenhower who said that criticism and dissent are the bedrock
of democracy. This is what President Eisenhower said in 1954 at
Columbia University:
Here in America, we are descended in blood and in spirit
from revolutionists and rebels--men and women who dared to
dissent from accepted doctrine. As their heirs, we may never
confuse honest dissent with disloyal subversion.
That was President Dwight Eisenhower.
So we will not be silenced by accusations of disloyalty or
accusations that we are helping the enemy or giving confidence to the
enemy. Is all we are supposed to do hush up and allow Mr. Bush's
reckless policies to lead us deeper and deeper into the quagmire?
These gentlemen claim to have such excellent access to the
terrorists' thoughts. It would be nice if they would turn that
knowledge into an effective policy against the terrorists. Instead, at
key junctures, this administration has made disastrously wrong choices
and repeatedly these decisions have played into the terrorists' hands.
Look at the record.
It is a fact that the September 11 attacks happened despite repeated
warnings to the President from the CIA that al-Qaida was planning to
attack America. Those warnings included an August 8, 2001, President's
daily briefing which he received when he was on vacation in Crawford,
TX, titled ``Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S.'' That is not a
subhead or a sentence in the memo; that is the title of the memo: ``Bin
Laden Determined to Strike in U.S.''
Let's look at the rest of the record.
President Bush botched the single best opportunity to capture bin
Laden when we had him cornered in Torah Borah in Afghanistan, and yet
the President removed intelligence personnel and predator aircraft from
Afghanistan to put them in Iraq.
It was President Bush who 3 years ago pledged to smoke bin Laden out
of his cave but has utterly failed to do so. Instead, by successfully
defying the President, because we have been so bogged down in the
quagmire of Iraq, bin Laden has become a folk hero across much of the
Muslim world. He has attracted not only thousands of new recruits but
dozens of imitators, new bin Ladens, forming their own terrorist
organizations to attack America and Americans.
It was President Bush who diverted, as I said, our military and
intelligence resources from the hunt of bin Laden in order to attack
Iraq.
It was President Bush whose taunt of ``bring it on'' did indeed bring
it on--a nationwide insurgency in Iraq, an urban guerrilla that has
trapped our Armed Forces, as I said, in a quagmire.
It was President Bush whose unilateral approach on Iraq served to
alienate many of our oldest allies and to turn world opinion against
the United States.
It was President Bush whose invasion and occupation of the second
largest Arab country has outraged much of the Muslim world and has been
a recruiting bonanza for terrorism. Indeed, George W. Bush's policies--
reckless and wrong--have been the best recruiting tool imaginable for
al-Qaida.
This is an astonishing record of mistakes, misjudgments,
miscalculations, and mismanagement. It is an astonishing record of
George W. Bush again and again playing into Osama bin Laden's hands. It
is sort of like watching the cartoon of Wile E. Coyote chasing the Road
Runner, only it is not funny. It is a colossal tragedy that has put our
Nation at even greater risk.
Ironically, President Bush's father, the first President Bush, warned
against the folly of invading and occupying Iraq. On February 28, 1999,
speaking to a group of Desert Storm veterans at Fort Myer, VA, he said:
Had we gone into Baghdad--we could have done that, you guys
could have done it, you could have been there in 48 hours--
and then what? Whose life would be on my hands as the
Commander in Chief because I unilaterally went beyond
international law, went beyond the stated mission and said
we're going to show our macho? We're going into Baghdad.
We're going to be an occupying power--America in an Arab land
with no allies at our side. It would have been disastrous.
That is not this Senator saying that; that is former President Bush
in February 1999.
Now, of course, we heard the same pathetic warnings from Brent
Scowcroft, James Baker, and other foreign policy specialists, but this
President and his partner Dick Cheney and their posse of
neoconservative intellectuals thought they knew better. They reveled in
words like ``slam dunk'' and ``cakewalk.'' And so now the disaster Bush
41 warned against has become a reality under Bush 43.
President Bush repeatedly says that his No. 1 job is to protect the
American people. But the view of professionals on the front line is
that he has failed to do so.
The Iraq invasion has set back, rather than advanced, the war on
terrorism and al-Qaida. Osama bin Laden remains at large. Our Armed
Forces are bogged down in Iraq with casualties rising above 8,000 and
are not available to respond to real threats to the United States. In
the wake of the Abu Ghraib prison scandals, our moral authority and
credibility on the world stage are at rock bottom.
I was watching former President Jimmy Carter, winner of the Nobel
Peace Prize, at the Carter Center just a few days ago saying that he
has visited 120 countries around the world, and he believes that at no
time in the history of our country has our esteem, credibility, and
moral authority been at such a low point.
Despite President Bush's loud threats toward the so-called ``axis of
evil'' on his watch, North Korea has acquired nuclear weapons. Iran
appears to be proceeding with impunity to develop its own nuclear
arsenal. Again, this is an extraordinary record of mistakes,
misjudgments, miscalculations, and missed opportunities.
As a consequence of the choices made by this President over the last
4 years, I believe today America is weaker, less
[[Page S9899]]
secure, and more vulnerable. It is indeed time, past time, to change
these policies.
I ask unanimous consent that at the termination of my remarks, two
articles, ``Growing Pessimism on Iraq,'' Wednesday, September 29,
Washington Post, and an article appearing on September 28 in the New
York Times, ``Iraq Study Sees Rebels' Attacks as Widespread,'' be
printed in their entirety in the Record.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibits 1 and 2.)
Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa has 3 minutes 40 seconds
remaining.
Mr. HARKIN. I want to correct one other thing that was said this
morning by the Senator from Arizona. He talked about the connections
between al-Qaida and Iraq. He quoted Mr. Tom Kean speaking about that
relationship, and I will quote, in its entirety, from page 66 of the
report:
The reports describe friendly contacts and indicate some
common themes in both sides' hatred of the United States. But
to date we have seen no evidence that these or the earlier
contacts ever developed into a collaborative operational
relationship. Nor have we seen evidence indicating that Iraq
cooperated with al-Qaida in developing or carrying out any
attacks against the United States.
Sure, it is true that al-Qaida had relationships with Iraq. They had
relationships with Saudi Arabia. They had relationships in Egypt. They
had relationships in a lot of countries. But as the report clearly
shows on page 66, there was no operational relationship between al-
Qaida and Iraq as determined by the Commission.
I yield back whatever time I have remaining.
Exhibit 1
[From the Washington Post, Sept. 29, 2004]
Growing Pessimism on Iraq
(By Dana Priest and Thomas E. Ricks)
A growing number of career professionals within national
security agencies believe that the situation in Iraq is much
worse, and the path to success much more tenuous, than is
being expressed in public by top Bush administration
officials, according to former and current government
officials and assessments over the past year by intelligence
officials at the CIA and the departments of State and
Defense.
While President Bush, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld
and others have delivered optimistic public appraisals,
officials who fight the Iraqi insurgency and study it at the
CIA and the State Department and within the Army officer
corps believe the rebellion is deeper and more widespread
than is being publicly acknowledged, officials say.
People at the CIA ``are mad at the policy in Iraq because
it's a disaster, and they're digging the hole deeper and
deeper and deeper,'' said one former intelligence officer who
maintains contact with CIA officials. ``There's no obvious
way to fix it. The best we can hope for is a semi-failed
state hobbling along with terrorists and a succession of weak
governments.''
``Things are definitely not improving,'' said one U.S.
government official who reads the intelligence analyses on
Iraq.
``It is getting worse,'' agreed an Army staff officer who
served in Iraq and stays in touch with comrades in Baghdad
through e-mail. ``It just seems there is a lot of pessimism
flowing out of theater now. There are things going on that
are unbelievable to me. They have infiltrators conducting
attacks in the Green Zone. That was not the case a year
ago.''
This weekend, in a rare departure from the positive talking
points used by administration spokesmen, Secretary of State
Colin L. Powell acknowledged that the insurgency is
strengthening and that anti-Americanism in the Middle East is
increasing. ``Yes, it's getting worse,'' he said of the
insurgency on ABC's ``This Week.'' At the same time, the U.S.
commander for the Middle East, Gen. John P. Abizaid, told
NBC's ``Meet the Press'' that ``we will fight our way through
the elections.'' Abizaid said he believes Iraq is still
winnable once a new political order and the Iraqi security
force is in place.
Powell's admission and Abizaid's sobering warning came days
after the public disclosure of a National Intelligence
Council (NIC) assessment, completed in July, that gave a
dramatically different outlook than the administration's and
represented a consensus at the CIA and the State and Defense
departments.
In the best-case scenario, the NIC said, Iraq could be
expected to achieve a ``tenuous stability'' over the next 18
months. In the worst case, it could dissolve into civil war.
The July assessment was similar to one produced before the
war and another in late 2003 that also were more pessimistic
in tone than the administration's portrayal of the resistance
to the U.S. occupation, according to senior administration
officials. ``All say they expect things to get worse,'' one
former official said.
One official involved in evaluating the July document said
the NIC, which advises the director of central intelligence,
decided not to include a more rosy scenario ``because it
looked so unreal.''
White House spokesman Scott McClellan, and other White
House spokesmen, called the intelligence assessment the work
of ``pessimists and naysayers'' after its outlines were
disclosed by the New York Times.
President Bush called the assessment a guess, which drew
the consternation of many intelligence officials. ``The CIA
laid out several scenarios,'' Bush said on Sept. 21. ``It
said that life could by lousy. Life could be okay. Life could
be better. And they were just guessing as to what the
conditions might be like.''
Two days later, Bush reworded his response. ``I used an
unfortunate word, `guess.' I should have used `estimate.' ``
``And the CIA came and said, `This is a possibility, this
is a possibility, and this is a possibility,''' Bush
continued. ``But what's important for the American people to
hear is reality. And the reality's right here in the form of
the prime minister. And he is explaining what is happening on
the ground. That's the best report.''
Rumsfeld, who once dismissed the insurgents as ``dead-
enders,'' still offers a positive portrayal of prospects and
progress in Iraq but has begun to temper his optimism in
public. ``The path towards liberty is not smooth there; it
never has been,'' he said before the Senate Armed Services
Committee last week. ``And my personal view is that a fair
assessment requires some patience and some perspective.''
This week, conservative columnist Robert D. Novak
criticized the CIA and Paul Pillar, a national intelligence
officer on the NIC who supervised the preparation of the
assessment. Novak said comments Pillar made about Iraq during
a private dinner in California showed that he and others at
the CIA are at war with the president. Recent and current
intelligence officials interviewed over the last two days
dispute that view.
``Pillar is the ultimate professional,'' said Daniel Byman,
an intelligence expert and Georgetown University professor
who has worked with Pillar. ``If anything, he's too soft-
spoken.''
``I'm not surprised if people in the administration were
put on the defensive,'' said one CIA official, who like many
others interviewed would speak only anonymously, either
because they don't have official authorization to speak or
because they worry about ramifications of criticizing top
administration officials. ``We weren't trying to make them
look bad, we're just trying to give them information. Of
course, we're telling them something they don't want to
hear.''
As for a war between the CIA and White House, said one
intelligence expert with contacts at the CIA, the State
Department and the Pentagon, ``There's a real war going on
here that's not just'' the CIA against the administration on
Iraq ``but the State Department and the military'' as well.
National security officials acknowledge that the upcoming
presidential election also seems to have distorted the public
debate on Iraq.
``Everyone says Iraq certainly has turned out to be more
intense than expected, especially the intensity of
nationalism on the part of the Iraqi people,'' said Steven
Metz, chairman of the regional strategy and planning
department at the U.S. Army War College. But, he added, ``I
don't think the political discourse that we're in the middle
of accurately reflects anything. There's a supercharged
debate on both sides, a movement to out-state each side.''
Reports from Iraq have made one Army staff officer question
whether adequate progress is being made there.
``They keep telling us that Iraqi security forces are the
exit strategy, but what I hear from the ground is that they
aren't working,'' he said. ``There's a feeling that Iraqi
security forces are in cahoots with the insurgents and the
general public to get the occupiers out.''
He added: ``I hope I'm wrong.''
____
Exhibit 2
[From the New York Times, Sept. 29, 2004]
Iraq Study Sees Rebels' Attacks as Widespread
(By James Glanz and Thom Shanker)
Baghdad, Iraq, Sept. 28.--Over the past 30 days, more than
2,300 attacks by insurgents have been directed against
civilians and military targets in Iraq, in a pattern that
sprawls over nearly every major population center outside the
Kurdish north, according to comprehensive data compiled by a
private security company with access to military intelligence
reports and its own network of Iraqi informants.
The sweeping geographical reach of the attacks, from
Nineveh and Salahuddin Provinces in the northwest to Babylon
and Diyala in the center and Basra in the south, suggests a
more widespread resistance than the isolated pockets
described by Iraqi government officials.
The type of attacks ran the gamut: car bombs, time bombs,
rocket-propelled grenades, hand grenades, small-arms fire,
mortar attacks and land mines.
``If you look at incident data and you put incident data on
the map, it's not a few provinces,'' said Adam Collins, a
security expert and the chief intelligence official in Iraq
for Special Operations Consulting-Security Management Group
Inc., a private security company based in Las Vegas that
compiles
[[Page S9900]]
and analyzes the data as a regular part of its operations in
Iraq.
The number of attacks has risen and fallen over the months.
Mr. Collins said the highest numbers were in April, when
there was major fighting in Falluja, with attacks averaging
120 a day. The average is now about 80 a day, he said.
But it is a measure of both the fog of war and the fact
that different analysts can look at the same numbers and come
to opposite conclusions, that others see a nation in which
most people are perfectly safe and elections can be held with
clear legitimacy.
``I have every reason to believe that the Iraqi people are
going to be able to hold elections,'' said Lt. Col. William
Nichols of the Air Force, a spokesman for the American-led
coalition forces here.
Indeed, no raw compilation of statistics on numbers of
attacks can measure what is perhaps the most important
political equation facing Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and the
American military: how much of Iraq is under the firm control
of the interim government. That will determine the
likelihood--and quality--of elections in January.
For example, the number of attacks is not an accurate
measure of control in Falluja; attacks have recently dropped
there, but the town is controlled by insurgents and is a ``no
go'' zone for the American military and Iraqi security
forces. It is a place where elections could not be held
without dramatic political or military intervention.
The statistics show that there have been just under 1,000
attacks in Baghdad during the past month; in fact, an
American military spokesman said this week that since April,
insurgents have fired nearly 3,000 mortar rounds in Baghdad
alone. But those figures do not necessarily preclude having
elections in the Iraqi capital.
Pentagon officials and military officers like to point to a
separate list of statistics to counter the tally of attacks,
including the number of schools and clinics opened. They cite
statistics indicating that a growing number of Iraqi security
forces are trained and fully equipped, and they note that
applicants continue to line up at recruiting stations despite
bombings of them.
But most of all, military officers argue that despite the
rise in bloody attacks during the past 30 days, the
insurgents have yet to win a single battle.
``We have had zero tactical losses; we have lost no
battles,'' said one senior American military officer. ``The
insurgency has had zero tactical victories. But that is not
what this is about.
``We are at a very critical time,'' the officer added.
``The only way we can lose this battle is if the American
people decide we don't want to fight anymore.''
American government officials explain that optimistic
assessments about Iraq from President Bush and Prime Minister
Allawi can be interpreted as a declaration of a strategic
goal: that, despite the attacks, elections will be held. The
comments are meant as a balance to the insurgents' strategy
of roadside bombings and mortar attacks and gruesome
beheadings, all meant to declare to Iraq and the world that
the country is in chaos, and that mayhem will prevent the
country from ever reaching democratic elections.
In a joint appearance last week in the White House Rose
Garden, Mr. Bush and Dr. Allawi painted an optimistic
portrait of the security situation in Iraq.
Dr. Allawi said that of Iraq's 18 provinces, ``14 to 15 are
completely safe.'' He added that the other provinces suffer
``pockets of terrorists'' who inflict damage in them and plot
attacks carried out elsewhere in the country. In other
appearances, Dr. Allawi asserted that elections could be held
in 15 of the 18 provinces.
Both Mr. Bush and Dr. Allawi insisted that Iraq would hold
free elections as scheduled in January.
``The question is not whether there are attacks,'' said one
Pentagon official. ``Of course there are. But what are the
proper measurements for progress?''
Statistics collected by private security firms, which
include attacks on Iraqi civilians and private security
contractors, tend to be more comprehensive than those
collected by the military, which focuses on attacks against
foreign troops. The period covered by Special Operations
Consulting's data represents a typical month, with its
average of 79 attacks a day falling between the valleys
during quiet periods and the peaks during the outbreak of
insurgency in April or the battle with Moktada al-Sadr's
militia in August for control of Najaf.
During the past 30 days those attacks totaled 283 in
Nineveh, 325 in Salahuddin in the northwest and 332 in the
desert badlands of Anbar Province in the west. In the center
of Iraq, attacks numbered 123 in Diyala Province, 76 in
Babylon and 13 in Wasit. There was not a single province
without an attack in the 30-day period.
Still, some Iraqis share their prime minister's optimism
when it comes to the likelihood that elections, and a closely
related census, can be carried out successfully amid so much
violence. ``We are ready to start,'' said Hamid Abd Muhsen,
an Iraqi education official who is supervising parts of the
census in Baghad. ``I swear to God.''
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.
Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, the Democratic leader, the managers of the
bill, and the leadership on both sides have been in conversation over
the last 30 minutes or so looking at the schedule for the bill that is
on the Senate floor. It is a critically important bill. We have made
good progress, and if we look at the way the day has been spent, it has
been spent on very significant legislation. But if we project that out
and look at the reality, we have 300 amendments that have been given to
the managers and to leadership on a bill that we absolutely will finish
before we depart.
We will finish reform of the executive branch, which is on the floor,
and reform of the Senate, before we leave on October 8. There is also a
lot of other business--the appropriations, the continuing resolutions,
and the extensions.
With that recognition, we have 300 amendments. In a little bit, the
Democratic leader and I will have a unanimous consent for a filing
deadline tomorrow during the afternoon so that everybody will, as we
said earlier this morning and late last night, get their amendments in,
and language so that we can fully assess how many amendments we are
going to really have to deal with. Our deadline that we set this
morning at 10 did generate 300 potential amendments.
It is clear we are going to have to pick up the pace on issues that
have been discussed thoroughly in committee. We are going to have to,
in a very efficient way, have our managers deal with them on the Senate
floor and go through the amendments in an orderly way. At some point it
may be necessary for us to file cloture. It is not something we want to
do, but if we file cloture we would still be able to have germane
amendments introduced. That is not the intent, but unless we can work
through the amendments, have the amendments submitted, have people come
to the floor today, tonight, tomorrow, Friday, and Monday, it is
something that at least we will have to consider. I say that, again, to
give some sense of urgency that we need to have these amendments come
forward. We need to see them, and we need to have the managers have the
opportunity to debate them and vote on them expeditiously.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The minority leader is recognized.
Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I add my voice of support for what the
majority leader said. We want Senators who have amendments to come to
the floor to offer them. As we get this filing deadline agreement, we
are also going to ensure that Senators are protected. We know there is
a backlog with the legislative counsel and that it will take a little
time to draft them. So we will accommodate Senators with that practical
consideration in mind, but we hope that Senators understand Friday is
going to be a full day of work, and we need a lot of amendments offered
on Friday.
We are going to have to have all of these amendments debated, and we
will look at the circumstances at some point. I will support the
cloture motion if we are not making adequate progress. So Senators need
to offer their amendments, agree to time limits, and move this
legislative process along.
We will get that filing agreement this afternoon, and Senators then
will have the opportunity to be clearer as to their intention with
regard to these amendments. It is not our desire to hold them precisely
to the language of the amendment, but we need to know how many real
amendments there are.
I support the majority leader's commitment to both the bill pending
as well as to the organization of the legislative branch prior to the
time we leave. Both of these matters have to be addressed, and I think
as we continue to work as successfully as we have, we can accomplish
this work before we leave. We just need the cooperation of all Members
in that regard.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.
Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, we are making good progress. We will
continue to come to the floor to give a perspective given the fact that
we have so little time before we depart. Again, we are going to finish
both the internal oversight as well as the external oversight before we
leave because we need to keep working in an efficient, rapid, but
obviously deliberative way. We both thank the managers for their
tremendous job and leadership thus far.
[[Page S9901]]
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama.
American Cannot Go Wobbly on Iraq
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I know we are in a political season, and
I suppose that will impact our business in the Senate as we address the
many issues that are before us. But the Senator from Iowa just made
some comments about where we are in the war on terror that I think need
to be discussed.
First, I remember when former President Bush called Maggie Thatcher
to ask for her support for his action during the first gulf war. Saddam
Hussein had invaded Kuwait and he asked for her support.
Maggie Thatcher said: Of course, Mr. President. Just do not go wobbly
on me.
That phrase was discussed quite a lot at the White House. Everyone
understood that once a commitment is made to do something like confront
a tyrant like Saddam Hussein after he invaded the sovereign nation of
Kuwait, that you could not go wobbly once action was undertaken.
Secondly, we spent weeks and months in this body discussing the
problem of Saddam Hussein. I know my distinguished friend from Iowa was
a military pilot and can appreciate the fact that our aircraft were
being fired on over a thousand times as they enforced the no-fly zones
over Iraq related to the U.N. resolutions that arose after Hussein's
attack on Kuwait.
We were spending billions of dollars maintaining our aircraft in the
region because we were concerned about Saddam Hussein. He was in
violation of 16 U.N. resolutions, and we urged him to come clean
several times. We gave him one last chance to join the civilized
nations of the world. He was given those warnings in clear and
unequivocal ways. This Senate discussed it and voted on it. We voted
with a three-fourths majority to support the President and to authorize
the President to make one final demand on Iraq and Saddam Hussein to
renounce their weapons of mass destruction, to renounce their
activities in violation of the U.N., and to demonstrate that he had
complied with the demands of the civilized world.
Saddam Hussein rejected that opportunity, and we knew at the time if
he did not comply, that hostilities would begin.
We are all grownups in this body and we knew what it meant when we
voted. At the time, the distinguished junior Senator from Massachusetts
and now the Democratic nominee for President voted for the resolution
that authorized the President to commence hostilities. Now some want to
go wobbly. They say that things are not going perfectly. Since we have
an election cycle on, they believe they can just say anything they want
even if it undermines our soldiers in the field or if it encourages the
enemy. And I would add that these detractors will say that if anybody
accuses them of harming the effort to defeat terrorism or complains
about the impact to the morale of our troops in the field, why, they
will just say it is free speech. They believe they can say whatever
they want to.
Of course there is free speech. Any Senator in this body can come
forth and say whatever they want to. I do not intend to impugn the
motives of any who express their views about the hostilities in Iraq at
this point. But I would just say this: Some things can hurt. When we
have a Senator in an official hearing or on the floor of the Senate
make statements before the world such as that the misbehavior that
occurred and the illegalities that occurred in Abu Ghirab prison
indicated that Saddam Hussein's prison had been ``opened under new
management,'' I suggest to you that Senator is subject to being
criticized for it. That is because he was wrong, No. 1, and No. 2, it
encouraged and gave fodder for those who want to complain that the
United States is on a mission to harm the Iraqi people and not to
establish a sovereign, free, prosperous government, which is what we
want to do. That is our goal.
So it is legitimate that we express concerns about some of the
statements made by colleagues. That is an honest debate. If people, in
effect, think we have Saddam Hussein's prisons under new management,
they have a right to say so. But I submit we have had hearing after
hearing, and the evidence clearly shows it is not true. It is not
correct. We ought not be saying such falsehoods on the floor of the
Senate.
They say things are so bad in Iraq and we are worse off at home.
However, Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi recently said:
``It's very important for the people of the world really to
know what we are winning. We are making progress in Iraq. We
are defeating terrorists. Najaf, Samarra, Mosul, Basra are
all live examples that a lot of progress has been made. And
this is all because of the determination of the Iraqi
people.''
They say that the elections can't be held in Iraq. We have heard that
argument. This is what Prime Minister Allawi said:
``We are definitely going to stick to the timetable of
elections in January of next year. We are doing our best to
ensure that we meet the time of the elections. We are adamant
that democracy is going to prevail, it is going to win Iraq.
We are going to stick to this time, and I call upon the
United Nations to help us in providing whatever it takes to
make the elections a success in Iraq. January next, is going
to be a major blow to terrorists and insurgents. Once we go
through the democratic process, once we achieve progress
towards democracy, the terrorists will be defeated.''
So said Prime Minister Allawi.
Here is what the Iraqi people say. An International Republican
Institute poll in Iraq showed this: 87 percent of Iraqis polled
nationwide indicated they plan to vote in the January elections.
Eighty-seven percent planned to vote!
Most observers understand that it is not good if people won't
participate in an election. You would rather have them vote. Whichever
side of an issue you prefer, you still want to vote. But a massive
boycott of an election would be something that would be serious and
cause us concern if people weren't interested in an election. But 87
percent said they intend to vote. Seventy-seven percent said that
``regular, fair elections'' were the most important political right
for the Iraqi people. Seventy-seven percent said that.
Here is what the critics say: The U.S. went to war without a ``broad
and deep coalition,'' and this has ``divided our oldest alliance,
NATO.''
But here are the facts. There are more Iraqi and non-U.S. soldiers on
the ground stabilizing Iraq than there are U.S. forces. Besides the
United States, there are 32 countries contributing approximately 25,000
soldiers to the coalition operating in Iraq; 15 of the 26 NATO
countries have troops on the ground in Iraq. The Iraqi Government has
approximately 154,500 soldiers and police forces on hand to provide
security and stability throughout the country.
On 22 September, our NATO allies agreed to further implement the
decision by the heads of state and government to increase the
assistance to the Government of Iraq with the training of its security
forces. General Patreus, commander of the 101st Airborne, is over there
now. Actually, he was formerly the commander of the 101st. He led them
in northern Iraq and Mosul, and he has now gone back to train Iraqi
forces. He is a remarkable general with incredible capacity for work,
and energy. I am confident that he will be successful.
I know there is much to be accomplished. We have a lot of high goals
in Iraq. It is not an easy matter. It is going to be a tough battle,
but we are making progress. We will prevail, and we must not go wobbly.
I yield the floor.
Amendment No. 3766
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, what is the pending business?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment of the Senator, No. 3766, is the
pending business.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I would like to discuss my amendment. We
are in some discussions right now with other staffs, and hopefully we
may have an agreement that would then allow us to agree by voice vote
to this amendment. But I want to talk about it because it is a very
important issue. It is important to our first responders. It is
important to our broadcasters. It is important to public safety.
There is a long history, going back at least to Oklahoma City, that
the failure to have the ability to communicate costs the lives of
innocent Americans. It really is not any more complicated than that.
I ask unanimous consent that a letter to me from the Association of
Public-Safety Communications Officials-
[[Page S9902]]
International, the Congressional Fire Services Institute, the
International Association of Chiefs of Police, the International
Association of Fire Chiefs, Major Cities Chiefs Association, Major
County Sheriffs' Association, and the National Sheriffs' Association be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
September 28, 2004.
Hon. John McCain,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator McCain, we are writing to express our strong
support for your proposed amendment to S. 2845, the
``National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004,'' to establish a
firm date to provide additional radio spectrum for our
nation's first responders.
As you know, police, fire, emergency medical and other
public safety agencies face severe shortages of radio
spectrum in much of the nation, and are often forced to
operate on crowded radio frequencies that are incompatible
with their neighboring agencies. Additional public safety
spectrum would enhance our homeland security by promoting
more interoperable radio communications, alleviating
dangerous congestion on existing radio systems, and allowing
for the implementation of state-of-the-art communications
technologies to protect the safety of life and property.
In 1997, Congress required that certain television
broadcast spectrum be reallocated for public safety use, but
limited access to that spectrum until the uncertain end of
the digital television (DTV) transition. Your amendment would
establish a firm date of January 1, 2008, to make that
already allocated public safety spectrum available
nationwide, and end the DTV transition overall as of January
1, 2009. The amendment would also provide a source of funding
for future interoperable radio communications, and create an
opportunity for further public safety spectrum allocations.
We urge the Senate to reject amendments to your proposal
that would add uncertainty for public safety spectrum
availability. Without a firm date, state and local
governments will not be able to proceed to plan, fund, or
construct new interoperable radio communications systems.
Thank you for your continued support of our nation's first
responders.
Sincerely,
Gregory Ballentine,
President, Association of Public-Safety Communications
Officials-International.
Steve Edwards,
Chairman, Congressional Fire Services Institute.
Chief Joe Polisar,
President, International Association of Chiefs of Police.
Chief Robert A. DiPoli,
President, International Association of Fire Chiefs.
Chief Harold Hurt,
President, Major Cities Chiefs Association.
Sheriff Margo Frasier,
President, Major County Sheriffs' Association.
Sheriff Aaron D. Kennard,
President, National Sheriffs' Association.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I will quote from some of the letter. It
says:
We are writing to express our strong support for your
proposed amendment to S. 2805 . . . to establish a firm date
to provide additional radio spectrum for our Nation's first
responders.
What is the situation today? The situation today is that there are
television stations that are on frequencies, channels 60 through 69,
that will remain there forever under the present situation. In other
words, in an appropriations bill--not through the Commerce Committee
but in an appropriations bill--language was included that said that the
broadcasters do not have to achieve a transition from analog to digital
until 85 percent of the viewing audience in America had access to HDTV.
In testimony before the committee, Chairman Powell of the Federal
Communications Commission said that is never. That is never, he said--
or decades. We have to get this spectrum freed up so we will have it
available for all of our first responders so in the case of a disaster
or an attack, they will have the ability to communicate with each
other.
As the letter points out, in 1997, and that was 7 years ago:
. . . Congress required that certain television broadcast
spectrum be reallocated for public safety use, but limited
access to that spectrum until the uncertain end of the
digital television transition.
The problem is, for 7 years, since we assigned that date, we have not
made that transition and, as I stated, if Chairman Powell is correct,
we will never make that transition to the point where the analog
spectrum would have to be returned.
The letter from these public safety and first responders states:
We urge the Senate to reject amendments to your proposal
that would add uncertainty for public safety spectrum
viability. Without a firm date, State and local governments
will not be able to proceed to plan, fund or construct new
interoperable radio communications systems.
That is the heart of it.
I repeat that the reason I am proposing this amendment is because the
9/11 Commission stated this as one of their urgent recommendations that
needed to be acted upon.
I have been made painfully aware over the years of the power and
influence of the National Association of Broadcasters. In 1997, they
got billions of dollars worth of digital spectrum. They have sat before
our committee and promised that by 2003 or 2004 all of it would be
returned--all of their analog spectrum would be returned. And, of
course, they were able to prevail time after time. I am not going to
waste the valuable time of this body describing how they were able to
do that. But we are now facing a situation where we have to get this
spectrum freed up. We have to do it.
Some will argue it is not enough. We have had testimony before our
committee that we need more spectrum for public safety; that we need
more for first responders. But right now we don't have enough. Right
now. We need to clear this up.
Let me also point out who is sitting on the spectrum channels 60 to
69. Unfortunately, a lot of it is Hispanic television. Some of it is
religious broadcasters, and by moving them off that spectrum it
obviously would be somewhat discriminatory. The spectrum is being used,
as I mentioned, in television broadcasting. This amendment would
authorize auctioning off the analog spectrum that is not used and the
proceeds from that would be used to purchase set-top boxes for those
individuals or families who are still only receiving over-the-air
television.
I remind you again why the spectrum is so critical. It is not a new
issue. In 1995, the Federal Communications Commission and the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration established a Public
Safety Wireless Advisory Committee to evaluate the needs of Federal,
State, and local public safety officials through the year 2010. The
committee included distinguished experts from public safety agencies,
equipment manufacturers, commercial service providers, and the public
at large. This organization filed its report on September 11, 1996,
making key recommendations. The first recommendation was stated quite
directly: ``More spectrum is required.''
The committee explained, ``In the short term''--talking about 5
years, talking about 1996 when their report was issued--``approximately
25 Megahertz of new Public Safety allocations are needed. The present
shortages can be addressed by making part of the spectrum presently
used for television broadcast channels 60-69 available as soon as
possible.''
That was back in 1996.
Among other recommendations, the PSWAC noted, ``Funding limitations
will remain a major obstacle in the adoption of needed improvements in
Public Safety communications systems. At a time when government budgets
are tight, alternative methods of funding future Public Safety
communications systems must be identified. Otherwise the substantial
benefits afforded by technology will not be realized.''
The recommendations of this distinguished commission are as true
today as they were 7 years ago. And yet we have continued to fail to
deliver this spectrum to public safety.
In 1997, I chaired a hearing examining public safety spectrum issues.
My committee heard first-hand accounts of the troubles experienced a
the Oklahoma City bombing. We heard chilling testimony from Oklahoma
City Council Member Mark Schwartz about the day of the bombing. He
said, ``We had our trailer command post, the State, the
[[Page S9903]]
county, the Feds: We were next door to one another, because we could
not communicate in any other way in our crisis.'' He told the story of
standing with an FBI agent whose cell phone was not operating. The only
way the agent could communicate with Washington was through a friend of
Mr. Schwartz in Florida who had two phone lines in his house. The
friend used one line to talk to Oklahoma City and the other line to
talk to the FBI in Washington. Mr. Schwartz explained, ``You could not
use your cell phones, because they were jammed. Southwestern Bell at
this time went down. . . . This is why this additional public safety
spectrum has to be in place. Because it means saving lives. And I do
not care where it is in this country, the public is entitled to it.''
That hearing was 7 years ago. We are no better off today. The 9/11
Commission report made the following observation: ``The inability to
communicate was a critical element at the World Trade Center, Pentagon,
and Somerset County, crash sites, where multiple agencies and multiple
jurisdictions responded. The occurrence of this problem at three very
different sites is strong evidence that compatible and adequate
communications among public safety organizations at the local, State,
and Federal levels remains an important problem.'' Nothing has changed.
What happened during those 7 years? Congress got the message, at
least partially, following the PSWAC report. In the Balanced Budget Act
of 1997, Congress allocated 24 megahertz to public safety. Big win for
public safety, right? Wrong. The 24 megahertz was just an empty
promise. Why? Because broadcasters insisted on an exception to this
requirement. That exception continues to exist today with no end in
sight. Under current law, public safety will not receive access to the
spectrum until completion of the digital television transition. I asked
FCC Chairman Powell at a hearing earlier this month, ``if neither the
FCC nor Congress took any further action, when do you think the digital
television transition would be complete? He replied, ``decades.''
We cannot wait decades. We cannot stand by while another Oklahoma
City or Pentagon or New York incident occurs hoping for broadcasters to
act in the best interests of the public rather than the best interest
of themselves. We must act now.
The Wall Street Journal characterized the issue quite well on Monday:
``You would think that these days, Congress would be on a terrorism
high alert, paying any price to keep the homeland secure. But there's
at least one chink in Washington's antiterror resolve, as was evident
in the U.S. Senate last week. It involves the broadcasting lobby and
the high-stakes politics associated with the transition to digital TV.
Most people have heard about big D.C. lobbies like the ones for tobacco
and guns. Compared with the broadcasters, though, they're but a few
suburban moms writing letters. Multichannel News, a trade paper, says
the broadcast industry is `so potent it's considered immune from the
laws of political physics.' ''
The article proceeds to describe the SAVE LIVES Act calling it ``an
easy and obvious solution.'' But the article aptly describes the fate
of the bill last week in the Senate Commerce Committee: ``But the
broadcasting lobby liked virtually nothing about the bill, and senators
couldn't muscle up the political will to pass it. The Commerce
Committee voted 13-9 against the McCain proposal, approving a vastly
watered-down alternative. Only four channels would have to be returned
by 2008, and even that handover could be delayed indefinitely if
broadcasters could persuade the FCC that doing so would cause
``consumer disruption.'' The National Association of Broadcasters, the
main lobby group, says it is only concerned about preserving the
ability of millions of Americans to watch free broadcast TV; it also
says it is moving as quickly as it can toward digital television.
Maybe. It's also possible that Congress, in doing the broadcasters'
bidding, has managed a striking bifecta: a ridiculous technology policy
that leaves it open to the charge of being soft on terrorists.
I ask my colleagues: If there is another disaster--and I pray every
single night that there never is--whether it be a terrorist attack,
whether it be a natural disaster, with which we are now becoming
unfortunately more and more familiar, will we be able to tell the first
responders that we have taken every possible action to give them the
ability to communicate with one another to save lives?
I hope I can work out an agreement with my friend from Montana, who
has a different philosophical view on this issue, which I respect. I
hope I can work out an agreement with him so that we can move forward
and close this loophole that has been created, at the same time
understanding there are legitimate concerns that broadcasters have in
arranging for this transition to take place. But we cannot have it be
endless.
I yield the floor.
Mr. BURNS. Mr. President, the Senator from Nevada has asked for 5
minutes. I will let him have his 5 minutes now and I will follow him.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. LEAHY. Reserving the right to object, and I will not object, is
that 5 minutes on the amendment or on another matter?
Mr. ENSIGN. On the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
Mr. ENSIGN. Mr. President, very briefly, I rise in strong support of
what Senator McCain is trying to do. This underlying bill is acting on
a lot of the proposals the 9/11 Commission has brought forward. It has
recognized some serious problems we face in this global war on
terrorism and has asked Congress to address those--at least some of
those problems--in this bill. Senator McCain has tried with this
amendment to address some more of those problems.
Frankly, we do have a problem with first responders. They do not have
the spectrum they need to be able to communicate properly during
disasters. We have seen that a few times in the past. The 9/11
Commission has strongly recommended we take the kind of action Senator
McCain is trying to take today and free up the spectrum from the
broadcasters, the spectrum they have agreed to give up next year--
frankly, the hard deadline Senator McCain has put forward is actually
years out from that--and the broadcasters are now saying they cannot do
that. It would be too expensive for them and cause all kinds of
problems.
The broadcasters have had this spectrum for free for a long time. In
the agreement--forgetting the digital spectrum--they were supposed to
get off of the analog spectrum, which is part of the spectrum we want
to give to some public safety groups for better communication.
This is not just a question of radios being able to work. In the
future, with the technology that is out there, we are talking about
video, about broadband over some of this spectrum that will make our
first responders much more effective in the jobs they are doing.
The amendment Senator McCain has brought forward will not only help
first responders in the case of a terrorism attack, but it will also do
a lot of good things for our economy. Freeing up this much spectrum
will probably raise, according to estimates I have seen, around $50
billion for the U.S. Government to help with the deficit. It will
stimulate investment in America. It will create jobs.
There will be incredibly exciting new technologies brought forward
that we cannot imagine today if this spectrum is freed up.
It also goes to the heart of American competitiveness. We are falling
behind on a technology front from the rest of the world. We have to
deploy broadband widely across America. Spectrum is a very important
part of deploying broadband, and it is critical that we move this
process forward, that we not let a special interest group block what
will benefit virtually every American.
I rise in strong support of the McCain amendment. I am hopeful we can
get this worked out, if not on this bill, on a bill in the near future.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from
Montana is recognized.
[[Page S9904]]
Amendment No. 3773 to Amendment No. 3766
(Purpose: To ensure the availability of electromagnetic spectrum for
public safety entities)
Mr. BURNS. Mr. President, we do not want to prolong this debate
because we have already discussed it in the Commerce Committee. I have
a second-degree amendment that tightens that loophole down a little
bit, but I want to set the record straight.
The 9/11 Commission recommendation read this way:
Congress should support pending legislation which provides
for the expedited and increased assignment of radio spectrum
for public safety purposes.
That is all it said. There is spectrum available if the FCC would
only assign it.
When we accelerate the transition to digital we are taking the small
market television people almost off the air. In fact, some would say
that we are turning off about 73 million TV sets. As long as you set a
hard date on a transition, those who would supply the equipment for
that transition that you have to have, it seems as though the prices
never come down.
I have been in the market a little bit. I might have rode in town on
the last load of pumpkins, but I didn't fall off the load and break my
head. As long as there is a date there, the price will stay high and
some of the little stations will never be able to make the transition.
I have the smallest TV market in the United States called Glendive,
MT. It is 258th in all the markets. They cannot afford that. In 1998, I
sent a check down there to buy the time when I was running for the
Senate, and the buy was the biggest buy they had all year. They called
me back and wanted to know if I wanted them to send the deed to the
station. They thought I had bought the station.
That is what we are looking at. Do we want to take off these little
stations? We are talking about public safety--free over the air.
Television does weather, a lot of announcements and public service in
our local news. How many people could not take their eyes off the
televisions in this market whenever these twisters were going around in
advance of and behind all of the hurricanes and the leftover hurricanes
that come through this area. Do we want to lose those free over-the-air
broadcasters? I don't think so, not with the service they provide to
our local communities.
We have talked with the first responders, and we have done a lot of
work with the first responders. We have a bill on the Senate floor
today called E 9-1-1, and the heart of that bill is to make sure that
every time you pay your phone bill you pay a little tax, and that money
goes to the States so that these communication centers can upgrade,
modernize. When you dial 9-1-1 on your cell phone, they can locate you
as if you dialed in on a wired line.
I think that is a no-brainer. It only took 4 years to pass the
original bill. Now we have to make sure the money goes to the right
place. Senator Clinton of New York and I have been working on that for
2 years. And it still hasn't passed.
This underlying bill we are talking about, as recommended by the 9/11
Commission, this legislation should not even be on this bill because
they are talking about intelligence. They are talking about if
something bad were to happen in this country. We are talking about
after it happens, and that is a whole new kettle of fish.
I am offering a second-degree amendment in the form of a substitute.
Basically, it tightens up the loophole that the Senator from Arizona is
so concerned about.
I will read it into the Record:
(B) to the extent necessary to avoid customer disruption
but only if all relevant public safety entities are able to
use such frequencies free of interference by December 31st,
2007, or are otherwise able to resolve interference issues
with relevant broadcast licensee by mutual agreement.
That is what we are saying, that the first responders have to ask for
it. I will tell you, and I agree with the Senator from Arizona, we are
going to lose some stations--and those channels, some of them are
minority stations--as a result of this legislation.
I appreciate where the Senator from Arizona wants to go, but I will
tell you, market forces usually do a better job in transitioning us
into a new era than hard and fast dates do. They do it in an economical
sense and let everybody, all competitors, compete and survive in the
marketplace.
We know there is going to be demand for high-definition television. I
can remember, in 1991, going to the Consumer Electronics Convention in
Las Vegas. Do you know what they wanted to do? They wanted the
Government to set the standards of high-definition television. My
message then was: You do not want the Government to set standards,
because when we put them in law, they are there for a long time. Your
competition is international. You set the standards. The industry sets
the standards, the standards in which they can compete and still make
the transition to and use the new technologies that are to come.
That is basically what we are talking about. So I offer this
amendment in the form of a substitute and ask for its adoption.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I presume we are about ready to perhaps
dispose of this amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is the Senator from Montana sending an
amendment to the desk?
Mr. BURNS. I can do that.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, while the amendment is being sent to the
desk, let me say I appreciate the way these two Senators and all
involved have worked this out. I think this is a suitable arrangement.
The spectrum issue and its availability to first responders is very
important. But this loophole was an opportunity for the spectrum issue
to be avoided, perhaps in perpetuity.
I think the language we have here is reasonable language. I commend
my colleagues for being willing to work through it where we will not
have an extended debate through the afternoon, which is the right thing
to do.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I join with the Senator from
Mississippi in thanking and congratulating Senator McCain and Senator
Burns for this agreement. I also thank Senator Lott for his part in
securing this agreement. I know he was very helpful. They really
reached not only an amicable but a meaningful compromise on how to
accomplish one of the goals of the 9/11 Commission, which in its report
describes the consequences of the inability of public safety officials
to communicate at the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and in
Pennsylvania.
The Commission recommended, specifically, that the Congress ``support
pending legislation which provides for the expedited and increased
assignment of radio spectrum for public safety purposes.''
Senator McCain offered an amendment. The potential existed not only
for disagreement about it but for very long debate which would have
made it hard for the Senate to move forward expeditiously on the urgent
underlying legislation. Senator Burns and Senator McCain have reached
an agreement which is meaningful. It gets something done. I might say,
I hope and believe that it may set a precedent for other amendments
pending.
There are a lot of people who have said we face some intractable
issues on this bill, but here we see clear evidence we can work through
these issues and, in that sense, set a precedent for how we can work
through the other pending issues on this bill.
I thank everyone involved. I will strongly support the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Cornyn). The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Burns
amendment be proposed as a second-degree perfecting amendment to the
McCain amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. McCAIN. I think that clears up the parliamentary situation. So we
are now considering the Burns second-degree amendment to the McCain
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
[[Page S9905]]
The Senator from Montana [Mr. Burns] proposes an amendment
numbered 3773 to amendment No. 3766.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(The amendment is printed in today's Record under ``Text of
Amendments.'')
Mr. McCAIN. That clears up the parliamentary situation.
I thank my friend from Montana. I know how involved he has been on
this issue. I was referring back to a hearing we had in 1997 on this
issue. I do thank him. This compromise is certainly not what he wanted
and it is not what I wanted. I also thank Senator Lott for his good
offices in helping, as well as the cooperation of the staffs, as well
as that of Senator Hollings and his staff.
Again, this is not what I wanted. This is not what Senator Burns
wanted. But this is a way to achieve the primary recommendation of the
9/11 Commission, which is to free up spectrum for first responders.
I will not quote again because I do not have it right here, but it is
important we get this spectrum to our public safety and first
responders so they will be able to communicate in case of a disaster or
attack.
The compromise amendment modifies my proposal by eliminating the
requirement that all broadcasters vacate the analog spectrum by a date
certain. Significantly, this compromise still provides the certainty
that public safety was seeking, that they will receive the spectrum
they were promised in 1997 by January 1, 2008.
This was not my preference on how to proceed. I never believed in
treating broadcasters differently. However, this amendment does so by
requiring broadcasters on channels 62 through 69 to vacate their
spectrum if there is a bona fide request made by public safety. The NAB
is supporting this amendment and has decided to treat its members
differently.
This approach has been agreed to by Senators Burns, Hollings, and
myself. Again, it was not my preference to proceed in this
discriminatory manner, but in the interest of ensuring passage this
year, I thought this was a positive step for public safety. However, I
remind my colleagues this disparate treatment should be reviewed by the
FCC this year.
The FCC can remedy this discriminating treatment by completing its
work toward ending the DTV transition. I urge the FCC to do so. I also
urge the incoming chairman, Senator Stevens, and Chairman Barton of the
Commerce Committee in the House to review this discriminatory treatment
and the DTV transition upon Congress's return in January.
Lastly, I remind my colleagues that this approach does not provide
public safety the much needed money for equipment or consumers, a
subsidy to ensure all over-the-air viewers can continue to view
television. It was not my preference to strand public safety or
consumers in this manner. I hope in the near term Congress will
readdress this need to support public safety equipment funding. I thank
my colleagues.
Mr. President, I do not believe there would be any further debate. I
think the Senator from Montana would agree to have a voice vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Arizona, the
Senator from Montana, and the Senator from Mississippi for working on
this issue. I very much appreciate that. I urge adoption of the
amendment by a voice vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment?
If there is no further debate, without objection, the second-degree
amendment is agreed to.
The amendment (No. 3773) was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on amendment No. 3766,
as amended?
If not, without objection, the amendment, as amended, is agreed to.
The amendment (No. 3766) was agreed to.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 3774
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask
for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain], for himself and Mr.
Lieberman, proposes an amendment numbered 3774.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(The amendment is printed in today's Record under ``Text of
Amendments.'')
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, on behalf of myself and Senator Lieberman
I propose an amendment that includes a number of the national
preparedness provisions recommended by the 9/11 Commission and is
similar to the related proposal we introduced as part of S. 2774 on
September 7. It does not address the issue of homeland security grants
or spectrum allocation, as those issues will be addressed separately. I
believe that this amendment will be non-controversial, and I hope that
my colleagues will support it.
One of the lessons that we learned from the terrorist attacks of
September 11 is that not only was our country not prepared to prevent
the terrorist attacks, but we were not adequately prepared to
immediately respond to the attack. One of the fundamental lessons
learned is that we need to do more to prepare our first responders and
the general public to respond to a terrorist attack.
The stories of the New York City Police Department not being able to
communicate with the New York City Fire Department have led serious
efforts to increase the amounts of money devoted to increasing
interoperability. Lives of the brave men and women of the fire
department and the people working at the World Trade Center were lost
during the terrorist attacks due, in part, to a lack of communication
and the lack of a coordinated strategy to respond to large scale
disasters. We must continue to work to ensure that we equip our first
responders with the equipment and training necessary to ensure both
their safety and their ability to carry out their critical missions.
The Commission's report emphasizes the importance of teamwork,
collaboration, cooperation, and the involvement of key decisionmakers.
Their recommendations build upon these themes. The report recommends
that emergency response agencies nationwide should adopt the Incident
Command System to ensure that there is a command structure in place
when responding to an emergency. This amendment expresses the Sense of
Congress that the Secretary for Homeland Security require homeland
security grant applicants aggressively implement the ICS and unified
command systems. The amendment also would follow the Commission's
recommendation to remedy the long-standing liability and
indemnification impediments to the provision of mutual aid in the
National Capital Region.
Consistent with the recommendations, the amendment also would direct
the Secretary of Homeland Security to work with the Federal
Communications Commission, the Secretary of Defense, and State and
local government officials to encourage and support the establishment
of consistent and effective communications capabilities in the event of
an emergency in a high-risk urban area. The Secretary is also directed
to work with the Secretary of Defense to plan for supplying additional
back-up communications support in the event of an emergency.
As pointed out by the 9/11 Commission, the private sector controls
approximately 85 percent of the critical infrastructure in the Nation,
and the report therefore places particular emphasis on the importance
of private sector preparedness. The Commission report endorses the
American National Standards Institute, ANSI, and National Fire
Protection Association, NFPA, voluntary Standard on Disaster/Emergency
Management and Business Continuity Programs. The amendment would direct
the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish a program to promote
private sector preparedness for terrorism and other emergencies,
including urging companies to adopt this ANSI/NFPA standard.
[[Page S9906]]
In striving to protect our Nation from the threat of terrorism, we
must continuously analyze our weaknesses and prepare for the threats of
the future. This amendment directs the Secretary of Homeland Security
to fulfill this important responsibility by reporting to Congress
regularly on his work to complete vulnerability and risk assessments,
and the adequacy of the government's plans to protect our Nation's
critical infrastructure.
As our Nation continues to stand vigilant against the threats of
future terrorist attacks, this amendment takes on additional meaning.
Despite all the work done since September 11, it is likely that we will
be struck by terrorists again. We must continue to work to ensure that
we are ready to respond to any attack. This amendment strives to get us
closer to that goal.
Again, I believe that this amendment should be noncontroversial, and
I urge my colleagues to support it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I commend the Senator from Arizona for
his amendment. It would implement five important recommendations of the
9/11 Commission that would improve our national preparedness. This
amendment would support efforts underway to ensure that Federal, State,
and local entities all use what is known as the incident command
system. I know that our first responders in Maine are leaders in the
Nation in using and training with this system. They have told me how
critical it is for effective response to terrorist attacks for there to
be a working command structure in place. This can only be accomplished
with training and organization before an attack or other such
emergency.
Senator McCain's amendment would enable the first responders
protecting our Nation's Capital to save lives regardless of which side
of the Potomac they happened to be on. It does that by establishing an
interstate mutual aid compact in the Washington, DC area. It would
encourage coordination and communication in urban areas. It would
encourage private sector preparedness and help private industry to be
better prepared for an attack as well. It would ensure that a
nonregulatory, voluntary program be established to promote preparedness
within the private sector, using a consistent methodology to address
preparedness.
Finally, it encourages the Department of Homeland Security to take a
hard look at critical infrastructure, which the Department is already
doing, and report to Congress about its findings.
I urge my colleagues to accept the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I am proud to be a cosponsor of this
amendment with Senator McCain. It is part of legislation that we
introduced early in September, along with Senators Specter and Bayh and
others, to implement all the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.
This definitely complements the core of the proposal that Senator
Collins and I and the members of the Governmental Affairs Committee
made to the full Senate.
The underlying bill would make historic changes to reform our
intelligence community to do the best job we possibly can of knowing
where our terrorist enemies are, what they are planning, and to strike
at them before they can strike at us based on that intelligence.
We have to be prepared for occasions when terrorist attacks may
succeed. That is exactly what this measure is all about. It is
preparing our local communities to join in the prevention of attacks
and then to improve the public and private infrastructures to be ready
to respond in the best possible way.
The 9/11 Commission recognized that even big cities with first
responders and public service systems that are highly well regarded can
be overwhelmed by a terrorist attack as we saw on September 11. That is
why this amendment would encourage people to come together, to work
together to coordinate the capabilities of each of their communities
into a greater unified force.
This amendment would, therefore, help promote integrated emergency
command systems that give an array of response agencies at the local
level clear roles and leadership in the event of a crisis.
Specifically, it encourages the Department of Homeland Security to
condition its terrorism preparedness grants on evidence that the
communities are adopting a so-called incident command system, a
coordinated system which I have seen in effect in communities in
Connecticut and around the country.
The amendment also calls on the Department of Homeland Security to
help create emergency community capabilities in urban areas that are
most likely to be targeted for terrorist attacks. This is the
complement to the agreement between Senators McCain and Burns we just
adopted.
Finally, the amendment urges the Secretary of Defense to regularly
report on the plans and strategies of NORTHCOM, the northern command,
the new command designed to defend, through the military, the U.S.
homeland. We want to know more about the role envisioned for NORTHCOM,
to ensure that the unique capabilities of the DOD are well organized,
prepared, and available should the President need to activate them for
the defense of our homeland.
Together these provisions are going to bolster our defenses against
terrorism, even as the underlying bill--if I can put it this way--works
to strengthen our offense, which is the offense of the best, most
coordinated intelligence system we can have.
I strongly urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
Before I yield the floor, if there is no further debate, I believe
this is a noncontroversial amendment, though a substantial one, and I
urge its adoption.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment?
If not, without objection, the amendment is agreed to.
The amendment (No. 3774) was agreed to.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Hawaii is recognized.
Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I rise this afternoon to address the
question of intelligence reform and the future of our national security
establishment.
I believe this is the single most important issue to be addressed by
the Congress this year. Today, the Senate is considering legislation
which would overturn the current structure of the intelligence
community, primarily in response to the recommendations of the
Commission established to review the tragedy of 9/11.
While I agree that improvements are needed, I urge all of my
colleagues to approach this matter very cautiously. We live in
interesting and very dangerous times. Many felt that with the collapse
of the Soviet Union we had entered into a new era of world peace. I
think most of us here recall that we, the President and the Congress,
immediately proceeded to claim a peace dividend, and we sought to reap
its benefits by cutting back on national security spending. Perhaps it
was the right thing, in a world that had indeed fundamentally changed,
to reduce our national security spending. Important programs in both
defense and intelligence were curtailed.
In hindsight, some now question why certain areas of the budget were
reduced. As the Cold War ended, it was clear we needed to review our
national security programs. For 45 years, our defense and intelligence
capabilities had keenly focused on the Soviet Union. We had devised
weapons systems, strategies, and intelligence capabilities, all
designed to counter that threat. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, our
leaders have been working to adjust the focus of our national security
apparatus to de-emphasize certain elements of our strategy and
accentuate others. These changes have taken a long time and some have
met resistance. Those of you who know the military history might recall
that during World War I, with the advent of tanks and other motor
vehicles, it became apparent that the horse cavalry was obsolete; it
simply had no place on the 20th century battlefield. Yet while that war
ended in 1917, it took until the 1930s for the Army to completely
eliminate the horse cavalry from its ranks.
In his highly acclaimed account of the Cuban missile crisis, ``The
Essence of Decision,'' Graham Allison explains how President Kennedy
was surprised when Khrushchev wanted to negotiate the removal of our
missiles from Turkey, while he removed missiles from
[[Page S9907]]
Cuba, but President Kennedy had already directed that the Turkish
missiles be removed.
After 42 years in the Senate, I am aware of how frustrating it can be
to change the massive national security bureaucracy. It has frustrated
the reformers in those agencies who recognize what needs to be done.
Each Secretary of Defense and CIA Director since 1990 has worked to
change the emphasis of these agencies from a Cold War focus, and they
are succeeding, albeit very slowly.
The Congress can legislate changes, but that is only half the battle.
As President Kennedy discovered, those who have to implement these
changes must do so. We should not be fooled into thinking this bill
will be fully implemented, unless it does right by the agency it seeks
to change and is supported by them. As written, I do not believe this
bill meets that test.
It is clearly our responsibility to make constructive recommendations
that can lead to improvements in our national security bureaucracy.
That is what the people expect of us. We must be sure that the bill we
pass is in fact constructive and will not create greater problems than
it solves. If we pass legislation that fundamentally alters the current
intelligence structure, we can ensure that it will lead to a period of
several years during which the new intelligence community will
experience growing pains.
Furthermore, if, in our attempt to strengthen the control of the head
of intelligence, we disenfranchise those it is supposed to support, the
impact of this bill will clearly be adverse. I understand the
frustrations of my colleagues and of all Americans who suffered because
of 9/11--those who lost loved ones in particular, but in reality all
Americans because our lives were changed by that tragedy.
Every Member of Congress wants to improve our defenses against any
further terrorist attack. I say to each of my colleagues again, what is
most important, what is absolutely critical is that we make changes
that are positive, that improve our national security structure, and
that do not have unintended consequences that could jeopardize our
security.
We all recognize that we face a new enemy, one that knows no borders
and operates beyond the norms of civilized society, but we also know
that we have 130,000 troops standing in harm's way, who face a threat
significantly different than the one we face here at home.
The new national security system we create must allow us to meet both
of these challenges, as it must be able to protect us from the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and from the threats of
nations that might seek to harm us, our allies, or our interests around
the world.
I often remark that we have the greatest military in the world,
perhaps in the history of mankind. Our young men and women who put on
the uniform of this country serve us magnificently. Let me remind you
that it is only 1 percent of our citizens who serve in our Armed Forces
to protect the remaining 99 percent of us. We are truly in their debt.
It is for them that I strongly support a robust budget to strengthen
defense every year. It is also for them that we must ensure we do
nothing to weaken the support they get from the intelligence community.
I would like to note that, in addition to our military, our Nation is
lucky to be served by the men and women in our intelligence community.
They represent the best in public service. There are those who have
criticized our intelligence community since 9/11, but the men and women
in this field are truly dedicated, patriotic Americans. In seeking to
change how we manage intelligence we must be sure that we remember
those who serve in both of these communities.
We are focusing on intelligence reform in this bill because there is
need for further improvement. The tragedy of 9/11 and the faulty
intelligence which had many believing that Iraq had weapons of mass
destruction demonstrate that our system is not perfect. It was exactly
these problems which led the 9/11 Commission and many others to call
for reforming intelligence.
Like all Americans I commend the Commission for its work. It did a
masterful job of reviewing the facts, combing through the massive data,
and presenting the results in clear and concise prose. Their report
provides a great reconstruction of the events of 9/11 and why it
occurred. However, some not that the conclusions they draw may not be
fully justified by the facts they uncovered.
Last week, the Appropriations Committee received testimony from
several expert witnesses. We heard from a distinguished jurist, Judge
Richard Posner, who studied the 9/11 Commission report and was
disturbed by its recommendations. He concluded that the Commission went
way beyond the evidence presented.
The Commission contends that we had an intelligence failure, that it
was a systemic problem as opposed to several mistakes being made by our
intelligence community. They blame it on a failure to connect the dots
and a lack of imagination.
In their analysis, and also cited by the Committee, for example, they
note that several terrorists met in Malaysia and that a few proceeded
from there to the United States and took part in the attack on 9/11.
They conclude with hindsight that the CIA should have recognized that
these terrorists were linked to the bombing of the USS Cole and should
have informed the FBI and the State Department about the meeting.
It is this type of evidence which the Commission and the Governmental
Affairs Committee both cite as the justification for an overhaul of our
intelligence infrastructure.
We all wish that our analysts would have been prescient enough to
recognize the relationship among these terrorists, and their connection
to the Cole bombing, and the importance of the Malaysian meeting.
We all wish that these same analysts would have made that information
available to the FBI and State Department where there exists a
possibility that it would have triggered an investigation of their
movements here. But I for one believe it would have taken a lot of luck
for that to have happened--more than simply connecting the dots or
having better imagination.
Consider this point. It has been more than 3 years since the attack
on our Nation. In that time, we have devoted billions of dollars and we
have sacrificed many young lives in the war on terrorism, but as far as
we know, Osama bin Laden remains hidden from view directing the
farflung al-Qaida network.
Would anyone seriously claim that we have not worked hard enough to
connect the dots since 9/11?
Intelligence is a tough business. Like me, many of our colleagues
have been involved in intelligence oversight for the Congress. I am not
telling them something new.
We have witnessed advances in communications and in command and
control and other technologies which have revolutionized intelligence.
But, with all the highly sophisticated tools in our arsenal, we still
can not find Osama.
Earlier this year, former CIA Director Tenet testified to the
Congress that it would take another 5 years before we had successfully
rebuilt an inadequate human intelligence capability in the war on
terror. Some immediately held up the Director's statement as an
indication that we have not addressed human intelligence requirements.
And that is simply not the case.
For 50 years we promoted human intelligence, but our focus was on
defeating international communism in places where it was taking root,
primarily in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. In some cases it takes a
generation to build a human intelligence network. When we took our
peace dividend, we set back the efforts to refocus human intelligence
on newer threats.
When the Director says it will take another 5 years, it is not
because we haven't been responsive since the rise of al-Qaida. Should
we have been working on this more vigilantly? Maybe. But I ask you: Who
among us knew at the end of the Cold War that the greatest challenge we
were likely to face in the future would come from the son of a Saudi
construction magnate?
Had we known that at the time of Desert Storm, could we have
convinced all of our colleagues that there should be no peace dividend
because we needed to prepare for al-Qaida? We all know the answer to
that.
[[Page S9908]]
So I ask you: How will changing the intelligence structure solve this
dilemma? Will it allow us to grow our human intelligence capability
overnight? Obviously not, but it could distort the working relationship
among the various agencies so that intelligence support is harder for
the agencies, such as the Defense Department, to get.
That could lead agencies with the financial wherewithal to provide
that capability internally. That outcome would be expensive and very
harmful.
The Commission looks at this issue only through the lens of
terrorism, and seeks to ensure better coordination within the
community.
In so doing, it fails to consider the varied responsibilities and
needs of all the actors which depend on intelligence.
As you know, as ranking member of the Defense Appropriations
Subcommittee, I have access to virtually all of our Nation's secrets,
including those in the Defense Department and in intelligence programs
as well.
Over the past 3 years our Committee has been informed of multiple
threats, most of which have never been publicized. The intelligence
community must treat each warning with utmost care. They must research
and investigate each one to determine its veracity, and then respond
appropriately to those incidents which are deemed credible.
In many cases what some call connecting the dots is really like
searching for a needle in a haystack. And, just to make it more
difficult, there are many hay stacks to examine and in some cases the
needle looks exactly like hay. Sure the needles are there and
theoretically they could be found, but should we really expect our
analysts to find them every time?
Furthermore, I want everyone to realize that we are not standing
still. We have come a long way in improving intelligence cooperation.
We created the Terrorist Threat Integration Center to bring analysts
from various parts of the community to work together.
The enactment of the PATRIOT Act brought down a wall which had
previously blocked information sharing between various parts of the
intelligence community and the FBI. Our defense and intelligence
leaders are working to break stovepipes and to ensure that information
sharing is working.
Certainly more improvements are needed in intelligence cooperation
and in new technology to improve information sharing.
Our Nation has the finest national security apparatus--defense and
intelligence--in the world. It is not perfect and it never will be.
Some areas can be improved. But it is a critical capability.
Our warfighters--our young men and women who, as we speak, are
serving in harm's way--depend on seamless intelligence. It is our
solemn duty to ensure that we can continue to provide them the best. We
must make sure that we do not inadvertently take actions which could
sever the link between our defense capabilities and intelligence
support.
We cannot take the Secretary of Defense out of the loop simply
because we seek to strengthen the head of the intelligence community.
So what changes shall we make to improve the intelligence capability
of this country?
First, I would suggest, as recommended by the Commission and the
Governmental Affairs Committee, that we establish a national
counterterrorism center.
The one real failing of the intelligence community in preparing for
9/11, be it in the FBI, the CIA, the NSA or other organizations was the
inability or unwillingness to share terrorist intelligence and analysis
completely and seamlessly among the disparate parts of this community.
Many improvements have already been made, but the one reform that
truly can respond to the cries from the families of 9/11 victims is to
address this issue, and to address it now. This is the most critical
change that needs to be legislated and our Intelligence and Armed
Services Committees need to follow up to make sure it is implemented
and is effective in conducting it mission.
That center needs to be the clearing house for all intelligence on
counter-terrorism, both foreign and domestic. It needs to work across
disciplines and agencies, and it needs to have the support of all of
the intelligence community. It needs to be the analytical capability
for the community in the field of counterterrorism.
We need to join foreign and domestic analysis together to be sure
that we get the full intelligence picture. However, because this Nation
believes that foreign and domestic intelligence programs must be
separated to ensure that civil liberties and the rights of all
Americans are safeguarded, I would urge my colleagues not to give this
organization any operational role.
It certainly should conduct analysis and strategic planning, but
operational planning and operations should continue to be handled as
they are today through other parts of the intelligence community
working with the Defense Department overseas and the FBI working here
at home in conjunction with other relevant domestic agencies.
I believe that as we establish this new organization, the national
intelligence director's charter should ensure that this national
counterterrorism center receives the resources it needs and that the
director should focus his efforts on this one challenge in its first
year of existence.
I agree with the managers of the bill that other intelligence centers
may need to be created, but I believe the decision to do so should come
from the President based on the recommendation of the national
intelligence director with the concurrence of the National Security
Council and the Congress.
Most important, we have to make sure we come up with the right
solutions for the rest of the intelligence community. What may be right
for counterterrorism may not be the solution that best serves our
intelligence needs for weapons proliferation or for our military. For
those reasons, I am not comfortable with rushing this process.
Some criticize the community for a ``group think'' outlook. They say
that the analysis that indicated that in all probability Iraq was in
possession of weapons of mass destruction is an example of group think.
I am one who questioned the results of that analysis.
With hindsight, I speculate that the community failed because it
tried to provide policy makers the answer they wanted rather than a
fair interpretation of the facts. Nonetheless, if group think was a
problem, how will that be improved by greater centralization of the
analytical capabilities in the community? Won't that only exacerbate
that problem?
And by creating a more powerful intelligence director with a closer
tie to policy making, won't that likely lead to more attempts to sway
analysts to reach politically acceptable conclusions?
These are the troubling facts that were not addressed by the 9/11
Commission and are not adequately considered in this bill.
Last week, the Appropriations Committee received testimony from seven
witnesses, all of whom are experts in the field of national security
and counterterrorism. Included among them were Dr. Henry Kissinger, the
current head of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and
former Deputy Secretary of Defense, Dr. John Hamre.
I do not believe I would be overstating their views to say they were
quite concerned with the legislation being proposed by the Governmental
Affairs Committee.
Their counsel was to be cautious. Dr. Kissinger recommended that
Congress study this issue more carefully.
He urged us to take another 6 months before we moved forward on what
is the most significant Government overhaul since the National Security
Act of 1947.
Last week, noted experts in national security, including former
Secretary of State George Shultz, former CIA Director William Gates,
former Secretaries of Defense Bill Cohen and Frank Carlucci, and former
Senators Nunn, Hart, Bradley, Rudman and Boren, all recommended that
the Congress proceed cautiously. They urged all of us to remember the
old medical adage: First, do no harm.
This is a most important debate and a most important issue. I know
some of my colleagues worry that if we do not
[[Page S9909]]
act now we will lose the opportunity for significant change. I
recognize this concern. But enacting bad legislation in haste because
there is a popular demand to act is not the proper way for this body to
respond.
The Senate was created to cool the passions of the people. Our
history, our culture, even our rules are all deeply instilled with the
concept of proceeding cautiously.
I urge my colleagues to agree with those of us who recommend
beginning the process of reform by establishing a new central authority
for intelligence, a national intelligence director, any by responding
to the specific challenges raised by the events of 9/11 with the
creation of a national counterterrorism center.
But I believe we need to give a new administration and Congress more
time to determine how the rest of the national security apparatus will
be structured. Let us use the coming year to determine how we balance
the additional responsibilities and share power among the various
components of our national security agencies.
This matter is too important to rush through in 2 weeks in the heat
of a Presidential campaign. Please let us act responsibly.
I yield the floor.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I want to give my colleagues an update on
an amendment that was offered yesterday. It is an amendment that was
offered by Senator Wyden on behalf of himself, Senator Snowe, Senator
Graham, and Senator Lott. I believe we have reached an agreement on a
compromise to that amendment, which deals with declassification.
Actually, I recall the Presiding Officer, Senator Cornyn, is also a
cosponsor of the amendment.
We have been able to work out an alternative to the amendment. We are
just waiting for language to come from legislative counsel. It is my
hope, and I believe the hope of Senator Lieberman, that we will be able
to dispose of that amendment this afternoon.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank the chairman. That is certainly
my hope. I am grateful that all the parties have come together about
this amendment. I think we have a solution that doesn't create another
board but does realize the goals that Senator Wyden and the other
bipartisan sponsors of the amendment have, to have a reasonable means
of asking for a second look, if I can put it that way, at a
classification decision made by the executive branch with regard to
congressional access to intelligence information. I am very pleased
about that and I hope we can get the language here and do it this
afternoon.
I also say to our colleagues how important is the announcement made
earlier today by the bipartisan leadership, Senator Frist and Senator
Daschle. I hope people will respond to it. First, I thank the two of
them for the extent to which they have worked in support of the effort
Senator Collins and I are making and that they are together in support
of the effort, which is exactly the standard that needs to be set as we
work on this critical national security matter.
Second, there is a clear message, which is that Senator Frist and
Senator Daschle may together move to invoke cloture unless there is a
steady movement of Senators to the floor introducing their amendments,
because there is an excessive--there is an indication of an intention
to file over 200 amendments. Senator Frist has made clear that we are
not going to depart from Washington until we finish this bill and take
action on the report of the working group, led by Senators McConnell
and Reid, with regard to reform of congressional oversight of
intelligence, as urged on us by the 9/11 Commission.
I am very grateful for that statement of policy by the leadership. We
ought not leave here until the Senate completes its work on these two
critically important matters. These are urgent. There would simply be
no excuse to our constituents, to the American people at large, to have
left for political campaigns while the Nation is under clear and
present danger of terrorist attack, with a certain unsettling imminence
suggested as we lead up to our national elections.
I join with Senator Collins in thanking our colleagues who have come
to the floor with amendments; those, as was the case with Senators
McCain and Burns, who worked out a very significant and real compromise
on what could have been a long distraction on the road to adopting our
proposal.
I hope people will now come to the floor. We will be here for a while
more today. Obviously, we will be here tomorrow. Leadership told us we
will be here Friday and Monday. The sooner we get these amendments in
and consider them and dispose of them, the sooner we are going to pass
this bill, move on to legislative reform, and recess.
With thanks for the pace we are setting so far and for the support we
are receiving, I urge Members who have amendments to come to the floor
and offer them at this time. We are open for business.
I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent I be recognized as
in morning business for 15 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(The remarks of Mr. Durbin are printed in today's Record under
``Morning Business.'')
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be
recognized for 2 minutes as if in morning business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Commodity Check-Off Program
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I think we are all familiar with what the
Commodity Check-Off Program is. It is a program that is voluntary in
all commodities. It allows people to donate to the USDA a small
percentage of profits in order to promote their product. This is
something that has worked especially well, and something we are having
a little problem with now because the USDA says if they change this
amount, they do not have the authority to do it.
I will introduce a bill that will give them that authority. It is
supported by all farm organizations, by the administration, by the Farm
Bureau, by the Farmers Union. There is no opposition. I anticipate that
it will be taken up on the floor, and I will introduce it in time.
I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Graham of South Carolina). Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I have asked the two managers of the bill
if I might speak in morning business for a few minutes. Let me ask for
7 minutes, and if they need the floor to do business on the 9/11
Commission bill, I will give up the floor. I want to speak of something
I think is very important.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Disaster Aid
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, first I will talk about disaster aid. I
will talk specifically about disaster aid for family farmers in the
northern Great Plains who have been hard hit.
We have been talking a lot about disaster aid for people who have
been victims now of four successive hurricanes in the Southeast. God
bless those people who have been victims of the hurricanes. They have
had a difficult time. Perhaps none of us can understand how
[[Page S9910]]
awful it has been for them. Those storms have swept a wide tract across
the southeastern corner of the United States.
I have always believed, in my service in the United States Congress,
that for those who need help because of natural disasters, the Congress
should help. I have always voted for assistance, when I served in the
both the House and the Senate. The people who await the aid need to
understand we want to make certain we provide this assistance during
this difficult time.
In recent days, I have been reading reports about the disaster aid
that the Senate included in the Homeland Security Appropriations bill.
In that bill, the Senate included legislation dealing agricultural
disaster assistance for family farmers around the country, not just in
the Southeast. Now some are saying maybe the disaster aid we put in the
Homeland Security appropriations bill will have to be stripped out. I
want to talk about that for a moment.
It is critically important that we provide disaster aid not only for
those people and those farmers in the Southeast, but also for other
farmers around the country who have lost their entire crops due to
weather-related disasters.
I was reading an e-mail from a young woman. She wrote an e-mail that
I will paraphrase. It describes the culture of family farming and
describes why I care so much and why some of my colleagues are so
passionate about this issue. Her name is Annie. She writes that her dad
is a farmer and was diagnosed with an inoperable brain tumor that
proved to be cancerous. He has now been taking aggressive treatment.
The prognosis is not great. She said: When we found out about dad's
cancer, our neighbors told us not to worry about the farm. She said:
My youngest brother was trying to manage the farm on his own this
summer, but on August 25, 100 neighbors showed up at the farm with
combines, grain carts, trucks, and semis to harvest the wheat. The
local Case dealership donated some manpower and some machinery. The
local crop insurance agency catered an outdoor barbecue to feed 150
people who worked.
She sent pictures of her dad, who is suffering from a brain tumor,
but more importantly a picture of all the combines that came over, all
the trucks, all donated, all from folks who showed up because they knew
a neighbor was in trouble. It is part of the culture and the value
system of family farming. The network of farms that dots the prairies
in this country, especially in the northern Great Plains that I know so
much about in terms of family farming, is part of the culture of this
country.
A wonderful author named Richard Critchfield talked of the origin of
family values that originated on family farms, and moved to small towns
and big cities to refresh and nourish family values in this country.
That is why family farms are so critically important.
In my part of the country this year we did not have hurricanes, but
in the spring we had torrential rains. These are pictures of the same
State. This is the southwestern corner of my State. It looks exactly
like a moonscape, or perhaps the surface of Saturn, as we have seen in
pictures. There is no vegetation, nothing growing. There has been a
protracted drought. I had people tell me north of Hettinger, North
Dakota, they had 2.2 inches of total moisture from January 1 to July
1--6 months, 2.2 inches of total moisture. Their land was destroyed; no
vegetation at all.
This picture is the same State, the State of North Dakota, with a
farmer standing in his field inundated by water. There were 1.7 million
acres in North Dakota not planted this year. Let me say that again: 1.7
million acres could not be planted. Farmers like this farmer standing
in the middle of his field risk everything. When they cannot plant
their entire farm, they will go broke if they do not get some help.
Drought and inundated by torrential rains, they could not plant 1.7
million acres, and in August, when the corn and beets needed heat units
to grow, we had a freeze. It was a very unusual occurrence in North
Dakota, but it froze in August, a frost that damaged some of these
crops.
The Senate passed a disaster aid package for victims in the Southeast
recovering from the hurricanes, and also passed an agricultural
disaster aid package on the Homeland Security bill. We need to finish
that job.
I hear and now read in the National Journal and Congressional
Quarterly that some are saying it is likely we will not keep the
agricultural disaster package in the Homeland Security bill through the
conference committee, because we have some people who do not want that
to happen. I would say to those people: There is not a difference
between the reimbursement for a crop that was lost in northern Florida
or a crop that was lost in northern North Dakota due to a weather-
related disaster. They both occur in counties that are disaster
counties. They both occur in a way that is devastating to the family
farmer and will injure that family in an irreparable way unless this
country says, We are here to help you.
I want to tell those who are saying this cannot be done: this must be
done. We will help those folks who have been injured by the four
hurricanes, but we will also insist on helping others across a wide
band of this country who were injured by torrential rains and by a
protracted drought in the heartland and parts of the West. There is a
broad consensus in the Senate that disaster aid must be helpful also to
family farmers in other parts of America. We cannot allow this to be
dropped. We must continue to impress upon those who would not include
this assistance that when we provide disaster aid, it must include all
of those who have been affected and devastated by weather-related
disasters.
If I might mention one additional point. We are currently dealing
with homeland security and terrorism in the Senate. I commend the
managers of the bill on both the Republican and Democrat side. I have
watched the debate and the discussion. I think it has been wonderfully
done, very professionally handled.
National Registry Of Convicted Sex Offenders
Mr. President, terrorism comes in many forms. Within our country, one
form of terror is perpetrated by sex offenders.
I have introduced a piece of legislation to deal with this problem. I
would like to describe why it is important that the Senate Judiciary
Committee act on this legislation. And let me, at the outset, thank
Senator Hatch, the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, for his support
of it.
Not quite one year ago, a young coed at the University of North
Dakota was working at a shopping center in Grand Forks, ND. At about 5
in the afternoon, she left her job to walk out to her car. She was
abducted and brutally murdered.
The alleged murderer is now in jail. He will be standing trial. This
man had been incarcerated 23 years for violent sex offenses in
Minnesota, and then let out of prison. He was considered a high-risk
offender, but he was let out of prison to go back on the streets, with
no monitoring of any sort.
That afternoon, when this young woman named Dru Sjodin walked out of
that shopping center, her assailant was free to roam that parking lot,
to abduct her and to brutally murder her.
After this tragic crime, I found out that there was a serious flaw in
the way that sex offenders are tracked in this country. If you were
living, for example, in Grand Forks, ND, as this young college coed
was, and you checked the North Dakota sex offender registry, you would
not know that violent sex offenders had been let out of jail in
Minnesota and were living in your area, just a few miles across the
state line.
I think there ought to be a publicly available national database of
convicted sex offenders who are released from prison, so people are
able to get a meaningful list of sex offenders in their area, including
offenders across state lines.
I also think when a high-risk sex offender is about to be released
from prison, the local State attorney ought to be notified, to
determine whether to seek further incarceration for the protection of
the public.
Third, if a high-risk sex offender is, in fact, released from prison,
then there ought to be intensive monitoring following that person's
release, for a period of at least one year.
In this case, a high-risk, dangerous offender was released from
prison after
[[Page S9911]]
23 years. He was under zero supervision. A wonderful young coed from
the University of North Dakota walked out of a shopping center. She was
abducted at knifepoint and then brutally murdered.
Maybe we save some lives with a bill, which would be known as Dru's
Law, that would require a national database to be made available to the
American public through the internet.
Maybe we can avoid future circumstances where high-risk sex offenders
are turned loose with zero supervision.
I thank Senator Hatch and Senator Leahy. They have both reviewed this
legislation, and both think it has merit. It is not something that
would cost very much. It is something that has a great deal of common
sense to it. I also thank Senators Dayton, Coleman, Conrad, Johnson,
Lugar, and Durbin, who on a bipartisan basis have cosponsored this
legislation.
I passed a piece of legislation very much like this about 2 years
ago. A young woman named Jeanna North, who was 11 years old, was
murdered in Fargo, ND, by a man named Kyle Bell. He was being hauled
around the country by a private company that was contracted by the
State to haul prisoners from one facility to another.
I do not think a convicted murderer should ever leave the arms of law
enforcement, and turned over to a private company. But I found out it
is done all the time. If they are going to haul a convicted murderer, a
violent offender, they will often contract with a private company.
It turns out, they contracted with a company that took this man named
Kyle Bell, this murderer, and hauled him around the country. They
stopped for gas. One guard was asleep, the other was in buying a
cheeseburger, and Kyle Bell crawled out of the bus and walked into a
parking lot of a shopping center, wearing his street clothes, mind you.
That will never happen again. There is now a law on the books. It
says if you are a private company hauling violent offenders, then there
are certain responsibilities with respect to the restraints to be used,
the clothing the prisoners must wear while being transported--bright
orange clothing--and the Justice Department of the United States must
establish consistent rules.
So what happened with Kyle Bell, the fellow who murdered young Jeanna
North, is not going to happen again. Someone is not going to walk into
a shopping center in street clothes because a private contracting
company was transporting a convicted murderer and one was asleep in the
van and the other was buying a cheeseburger and the convicted murderer
walks off. That is not going to happen again.
Sometimes it is just a matter of common sense. It seems to me with
respect to this issue of Dru's Law, dealing with high-risk convicted
sex offenders, we can do much, much more, and we should do much, much
more.
I, once again, say to Senator Hatch and Senator Leahy, thank you for
your cooperation. I know you have been working to see how we might move
this legislation. I am looking forward to having it a part of other
legislation that moves from the Judiciary Committee.
Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Amendment No. 3704
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, the Senator from Oregon, Mr. Wyden,
along with a very impressive bipartisan group of cosponsors, introduced
an amendment of real import 2 days ago. We said we would try very hard
to work it out. I am quite delighted and grateful that we have worked
it out in a way that is acceptable to all involved and it accomplishes
a very significant public purpose. I thank the Senator from Oregon for
all he did to bring us to that point.
I happily yield the floor to him.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon.
Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I express my appreciation to both the
distinguished Senator from Connecticut and the chairman of the
committee, Senator Collins. As I said on Monday, the Senate is well
served by having this bipartisan duo that has long practiced good
government steering us on this important piece of legislation.
The Senator from Connecticut is absolutely right; the three of us
have worked very cooperatively over the last few days. Senator Lott
also has made a valuable contribution, as well as Senator Cornyn,
Senator Dayton, and Senator Snowe. A bipartisan group of Senators has
been concerned about this issue. I believe the legislative counsel's
office will have the actual language to bring to the Senate very
shortly, probably in 10 or 15 minutes.
With the agreement of the Senator from Connecticut, I will take a few
minutes to outline what the distinguished Senator from Maine, the
Senator from Connecticut, myself, Senator Lott, and our group have
agreed to.
The ability to stamp a Government document secret is one of the most
powerful tools in our Government. The backdrop for this whole debate
was best summed up by Governor Kean, who did such a good job in
chairing the 9/11 Commission, who said three-quarters of all the
documents he saw associated with his work on the 9/11 Commission that
were classified should not have been classified. The power to stamp, in
effect, Government documents secret is now a power wielded by people in
the belly of 18 Federal agencies where they now classify more than 14
million new documents each year. This is a power that costs taxpayers
about $6.5 billion a year, and it is a power that is simply out of
control.
Senators on both sides of the aisle recognize that the system used to
classify information for national security purposes is broken. It has
been the premise of our bipartisan group that it is possible to fight
terrorism ferociously, aggressively, and at the same time make sure
that the public's right to know information the public is entitled to
is addressed.
When we look, for example, at the Senate Intelligence Committee--
Senator Lott, Senator Snowe, Senator Bayh and I serve on that
committee--had it not been for the exceptional work of Chairman Roberts
and Senator Rockefeller, much of what we tried to do with respect to
our bipartisan report on prewar intelligence would have simply been
censored. It would have all been drowned in a sea of black ink. So what
we need to do is bring some common sense to this area which is now a
hodgepodge of laws and regulations and directives. We are now in a
position to outline the changes we have agreed to in our legislation.
First--most importantly--this legislation establishes an independent
body known as the independent national security classification board
which would review existing or proposed classification of any document
or material. They would, in effect, be part of an effort for the first
time to ensure that there would be an independent board to which there
can be an appeal of classification decisions. Although right now an
executive agency has had an appeals body, it has been off limits to
congressional requests. For the first time, there will be an
independent board that will look at these classification issues and
there will be a right of the Congress to appeal a decision.
The distinguished chair of the committee was not on the floor, but I
want to express while she is here my appreciation to her. What this has
been all about from the very beginning is not a Democratic or
Republican issue.
This has been about righting the imbalance between the executive
branch and the legislative branch with respect to classification
decisions. That is what we have been able to do. It ensures that any
President's prerogatives as Commander in Chief are maintained. That is
essential with respect to national security issues.
We will also have a chance to bring some real independence to the
process of how Government documents are classified by ensuring that for
the first time there is an independent route to have a classification
decision reviewed.
That process will come after we have had a top-to-bottom review of
the standards and processes used to classify information. The chair of
the committee and I have talked about this in the past. What has been
striking is we have never even done a review of the processes that are
now used to classify
[[Page S9912]]
documents. People such as those who run the National Archives have said
that has been a factor in our having such a chaotic system.
So for the first time, again, Congress would have input into the
scope of the review that would take place with respect to how
Government documents are classified as well as the guidelines or
standards that would be issued as a result of the review.
The independent national security classification board the amendment
establishes would assume the duties of a group now known as the public
interest declassification board. The new board would be made up of nine
individuals, five of whom are appointed by the President and four of
whom are appointed by the Senate and the House leadership. This is an
effort to try to maintain a new kind of balance between the legislative
branch and the executive branch.
In order to make sure that balance is maintained over time, the new
board may recommend changes in the classification of all or portions of
documents, but the President does not have to accept them. However, the
key feature here is, if the President chooses not to accept a
recommendation of the independent national security classification
board, the President would have to submit to Congress in writing the
justification for a decision not to implement the recommendation.
To reiterate, there would be an independent body to which Congress
can appeal national security classification decisions, but at the same
time, if the President doesn't see it in the same way the independent
board does, the President, as Commander in Chief, still has the power
to exercise the constitutional prerogative as the President determines,
but for the first time it would have to be done in writing. I do not
subscribe to the view that there is an inherent conflict between the
executive branch's accountability to Congress and the American people
on one hand and the constitutional role of the President as Commander
in Chief. We have long needed a balance in this area, a balance between
the public's need for sound, clear-eyed analysis, and the executive's
desire to protect the Nation's legitimate security interests.
In my view, there is no room in this equation for the use of
classification to insulate officials and agencies from politics. That
was essentially the motivation that got Senator Lott and Senator Snowe
and a bipartisan group of us in the first place. We have seen this
abused again and again.
Senator Moynihan did exceptional work years ago, documenting how so
many documents have been classified largely because they were trying to
provide political cover rather than protection for this country's
national security. Senator Moynihan was a mentor to me because when I
came to the Senate, I said I was interested in making changes.
Senator Collins has been very helpful. She has also been helpful on
some of the other issues we will take up in the course of this
legislation, particularly the data mining area, where she and Senator
Lieberman have a great interest as well.
But Senator Lott, Senator Bob Graham, Senator Cornyn, Senator Snowe--
the group who worked on this issue--are very appreciative of the help
we received from the chair and the ranking minority member.
This amendment involves millions of Government documents. It involves
more than $6 billion that is spent on the classification system each
year.
I think we are starting now to lift this kind of fog of secrecy--
changing a classification system that rewards secrecy and discourages
openness. We will have the amendment actually before the Senate
probably in a few minutes. In the interest of time--I know the hour is
late and Senators have amendments--I wanted to speak about this, and I
wanted to describe what it was that we have agreed to.
Senator Collins's staff and Senator Lieberman's staff have put in a
lot of hours with us over the last few days. I am very appreciative and
particularly pleased that it would be possible to make these kinds of
changes. Senator Moynihan was right years ago when he advocated a
process that brought some real independence and a right of appeal to a
classification decision. The amendment we will offer tonight does just
that.
I see the distinguished chairman of the committee in the Chamber. I
yield the floor at this time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I express my appreciation to Senator
Wyden. He is always so good to work with on so many issues, and we have
enjoyed working on this one as well.
I want to recognize that Senator Lott was also very involved in the
negotiations and working with Senator Lieberman and me to modify this
amendment in a way to preserve the goal of the amendment, and yet to
address some concerns we had about creating a new board, unnecessary
bureaucracy, or some duplication.
As I indicated when Senator Wyden first offered his amendment, I
believe he is addressing a very real problem, and that is improving the
way we classify and declassify documents. I know the members of the
Intelligence Committee have been very frustrated with the process that
they went through in developing a lengthy report, only to have so much
of it redacted and to have no good way of appealing those redactions,
no good way of challenging what many members of that committee, on both
sides of the aisle, viewed as excessive secrecy or excessive
classification.
I have been concerned that the original amendment intruded
unnecessarily into the President's constitutional prerogative and
duplicated some of the provisions in our bill. I believe the changes we
have worked out so cooperatively go a very long way toward addressing
the concerns we had while advancing the goal.
Rather than creating a new board to review the classification policy,
Senator Wyden's amendment would now ensure that Congress has an
opportunity to make comments regarding the Presidential review of
classification policies already established under the Collins-Lieberman
bill, and even more importantly to the Senator who has said we need an
independent place for Congress to go to bring appeals regarding
classification decisions, the revised amendment has agreed to build
upon a board that already exists, the Public Interest Declassification
Board. The amendment would change the name of that board to the
Independent National Security Classification Board. This board was
established in 2001, but it is still being put into place.
Under the Wyden amendment, it will have specific authority to hear
appeals of classification decisions from specified congressional
committees. The board would then make a recommendation to the
President, which the President could either accept or reject. If the
President rejects the board's decision, then the President, as the
Senator indicated, would have to send a written justification of that
decision to Congress. This framework helped to address some of the
concerns we had about the original amendment.
I will note that this is not the administration's favorite amendment,
even in the revised form, but I believe we have struck a fair balance
and I am prepared to recommend that we accept the amendment once we get
it. I understand it is going to be here momentarily. There were a few
technical glitches.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, again, I thank Senator Wyden. It was a
pleasure for us and our staffs to work with him and his staff. As I
said, this is a substantial accomplishment. I particularly enjoyed the
Senator's reference to the late, great Senator Pat Moynihan. I have a
vision of Pat in Heaven smiling right now. I can see that smile. He is
probably not wearing that hat that we all loved so much at the time.
The important thing here is this is a right of appeal, if you will,
regarding the President's power to classify documents. That is a right
that will exist in a limited number of Members of Congress,
interestingly and importantly, of both parties. The ultimate
beneficiaries, of course, are the American people.
Members of Congress have access to matters that are fully classified.
So this is really the public's right to know. If these Members of
Congress decide that the public has a right to know, ought to have a
right to know the content of something that has been classified, they
will have the right to
[[Page S9913]]
appeal to this board for review. It is a very finely balanced
compromise that is substantial, real, and preserves the President's
right as Commander in Chief to have the final word. So this was real
legislating in the public interest.
I thank the Senator and his cosponsors for the leadership and
persistence that brought this matter to the floor and results now in
this agreement which I think will receive unanimous consent from the
Senate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon is recognized.
Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I will be very brief. Again, I express my
appreciation to the chair and ranking minority member. The chair made
an important point with respect to the executive branch. Clearly, no
President, no executive branch is going to ever hold a rally in favor
of this kind of idea.
I think the Senator mentioned Senator Lott. Senator Lott has been
invaluable from the very beginning. He said we just have to build in--
whether it is Democrats or Republicans--a new sense of independence. I
have tried to say that there is no question in my mind, whether it was
a Democratic administration or a Republican administration, what you
are talking about are human beings who I think inherently are going to
be concerned about something coming out. So out comes the stamp and
something is marked ``classified,'' and by the time the rubberstamp
program is done, you have millions of documents classified in our
country for reasons that have nothing to do with national security.
The Senator from Maine has summed it up very well. I am sure we are
going to continue to hear from the administration as this is debated in
the Senate and in the House. I do think we have struck a balance that
ensures that by giving the President, in effect, the first word on a
classification decision, through their appointees having the ability to
classify a Government document and, in effect, the last word on a
subject, because the independent board makes the recommendation to the
President, if the President decides he doesn't want to go along with
the independent board, they get the last word by stating in writing why
they think the independent board is off base. I think that is the kind
of balance between the executive branch and the legislative branch that
we ought to have.
What pleases me is tonight this is the end of the line for a
classification system that, in effect, encourages secrecy, discourages
openness, and I am glad a bipartisan effort could have put all this
time into it. I think we will have the amendment over here quickly.
With the concurrence of the chair and the ranking minority member, it
is not my intent to ask for a recorded vote. I think we can do it on a
voice vote.
I yield the floor.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Amendment No. 3727
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Cornyn, I send an
amendment to the desk, and I ask unanimous consent that the pending
amendment be set aside.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk
will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Maine [Ms. Collins], for Mr. Cornyn,
proposes an amendment numbered 3727.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading
of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
(Purpose: to amend provisions of law originally enacted in the Clinger-
Cohen Act to enhance agency planning for information security needs)
At the appropriate place, insert the following:
SEC. __. AMENDMENTS TO CLINGER-COHEN PROVISIONS TO ENHANCE
AGENCY PLANNING FOR INFORMATION SECURITY NEEDS.
Chapter 113 of title 40, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in section 11302(b), by inserting ``security,'' after
``use,'';
(2) in section 11302(c), by inserting ``, including
information security risks,'' after ``risks'' both places it
appears;
(3) in section 11312(b)(1), by striking ``information
technology investments'' and inserting ``investments in
information technology (including information security
needs)''; and
(4) in section 11315(b)(2), by inserting ``, secure,''
after ``sound''.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, this proposal amends the Cohen-Clinger
Act to explicitly require Federal agencies to emphasize information
security from the earliest possible stages of a new system's IT capital
planning and investment decisionmaking process.
The Office of Management and Budget has instructed agencies through
its budget guidance that information security must be a vital part of
the capital planning and investment control process. Amending the
Cohen-Clinger Act to codify this guidance will ensure that the law
reflects a certain threat environment in cyberspace and requires that
information security be an integral part of the Federal acquisition
process for the long term.
Security should be reinforced as we migrate toward a more
interoperable environment. I believe this amendment is helpful. It is
my understanding that it has been cleared on both sides.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, this is a good amendment. I thank
Senator Cornyn for offering it. I urge its adoption.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate?
If not, the question is on agreeing to amendment No. 3727.
The amendment (No. 3727) was agreed to.
Ms. COLLINS. I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that
motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Amendment No. 3763
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Coleman, I send an
amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Maine [Ms. Collins], for Mr. Coleman,
proposes an amendment numbered 3763.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading
of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
(Purpose: to strike the amendments made by section 202, regarding the
National Homeland Security Council)
On page 117, strike line 1 and all that follows through
page 118, line 7.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, Senator Coleman has offered an amendment
that would strike the language in our bill that merges the Homeland
Security Council into the National Security Council. I note that the
administration yesterday in its Statement of Administration Policy, in
which it endorsed passage of our legislation, expressed considerable
concern about the provisions that would reorganize the President's
internal policy staff by merging the National Security Council and the
Homeland Security Council. The administration feels strongly that
Congress should not legislate and make permanent the internal
organization of the President's own executive offices or otherwise
limit the flexibility needed to respond quickly to threats or attacks.
In looking further at this issue, I agree with the concerns raised by
the administration. Senator Coleman's amendment striking the merger of
those two councils within the Executive Office of the President is
acceptable to me.
That is what his amendment would accomplish. I believe the amendment
has been cleared on both sides and I urge its passage.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to support the amendment. I
thank
[[Page S9914]]
Senator Coleman for submitting it. The Homeland Security Council was,
as I recall, created by the President and then made into statute as
part of the Homeland Security Act that created the Department of
Homeland Security. It was meant to be an advisory board to the
Secretary of Homeland Security and also a place to which the Secretary
could bring representatives of other departments that might not be in
the security community normally, such as the Department of Health and
Human Services, in terms of bioterrorism, for instance. So I think it
has played an important role.
The 9/11 Commission report very gently recommended that we consider
merging the Homeland Security Council into the National Security
Council. Senator Coleman raises a concern that I think is justified as
to, one, whether all of these items ought to be on the agenda of the
National Security Council, which is already quite busy; two, that this
council has a constructive role to play uniquely for the Department of
Homeland Security, and insofar as one of the thoughts behind the
Commission's suggestion was that merging the Homeland Security Council
into the National Security Council would provide a forum where disputes
between departments could be resolved, the President, of course, always
reserves the right to call the heads of the relevant departments
together to do that.
So the long and the short of it is, I think it is too early to--what
was the Mark Twain line? The rumors of my death are premature, or
something like that. I think the same could be said of the Homeland
Security Council. There is a reason for it to live on. Senator
Coleman's amendment achieves that, and I support it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Alexander). Is there further debate?
If not, the question is on agreeing to amendment No. 3763.
The amendment (No. 3763) was agreed to.
Ms. COLLINS. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Amendment No. 3704, As Modified
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Wyden, I send a
modification of the Wyden amendment No. 3704 to the desk. I ask
unanimous consent that the amendment be so modified.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is so
modified.
The amendment (No. 3704), as modified, is as follows:
On page 134, line 14, insert ``issue guidelines'' before
``on classification''
On page 134, strike lines 16 and 17 and insert the
following:
commonly accepted processing and access controls, in the
course of which review, the President may consider any
comments submitted by the Select Committee on Intelligence,
the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, and the
Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives regarding--
(i) the scope of the review the President should undertake
in formulating the guidelines under this subparagraph; and
(ii) the substance of what guidelines should be issued.
On page 177, after line 17, add the following:
SEC. 226. CONGRESSIONAL APPEALS OF CLASSIFICATION DECISIONS.
(a) Redesignation of Public Interest Declassification Board
as Independent National Security Classification Board.--(1)
Subsection (a) of section 703 of the Public Interest
Declassification Act of 2000 (title VII of Public Law 10-567;
50 U.S.C. 435 note) is amended by striking `` `Public
Interest Declassification Board' '' and inserting ``
`Independent National Security Classification Board' ''.
(2) The heading of such section is amended to read as
follows:
``SEC. 703. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
BOARD.''.
(b) Review of Classification Decisions.--
(1) In general.--The Independent National Security
Classification Board shall, pursuant to a request under
paragraph (3), review any classification decision made by an
executive agency with respect to national security
information.
(2) Access.--The Board shall have access to all documents
or other materials that are classified on the basis of
containing national security information.
(3) Requests for review.--The Board shall review, in a
timely manner, the existing or proposed classification of any
document or other material the review of which is requested
by the chairman or ranking member of--
(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Relations, or the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate; or
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
International Relations, or the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(4) Recommendations.--
(A) In general.--The Board may make recommendations to the
President regarding decisions to classify all or portions of
documents or other material for national security purposes or
to declassify all or portions of documents or other material
classified for such purposes.
(B) Implementation.--Upon receiving a recommendation from
the Board under subparagraph (A), the President shall
either--
(i) accept and implement such recommendation; or
(ii) not later than 60 days after receiving the
recommendation if the President does not accept and implement
such recommendation, transmit in writing to Congress
justification for the President's decision not to implement
such recommendation.
(5) Regulations.--The Board shall prescribe regulations to
carry out this subsection.
(6) Executive agency defined.--In this section, the term
``Executive agency'' has the meaning given that term in
section 105 of title 5, United States Code.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, this modification was debated earlier
this evening. There is no further debate on the amendment as modified.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment,
as modified.
The amendment (No. 3704), as modified, was agreed to.
Ms. COLLINS. I move to reconsider the amendment and I move to lay it
on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, in consultation with the managers of the
bill, it is the desire of the majority leader and Democratic leader to
keep moving tonight. I will send an amendment to the desk and ask for
its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the pending amendment is
laid aside.
Amendment No. 3781
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, in the study of the 9/11 report, frequent
reference is made to the Goldwater-Nichols Act. It is a piece of
legislation in which, as a member of the Armed Services Committee, I
had a great deal of participation, working on this particular statute.
It was an attempt, and a successful attempt, to rewrite the defense-
related laws, and describes certain changes which would make the
Department and particularly the Joint Chiefs of Staff a more effective
body.
I want to refer to one provision.
I ask unanimous consent that certain portions of the statute be
printed in the Record following my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1).
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, that provision reads as follows:
Advice and Opinions of Members Other Than Chairman . . . A
member of the Joint Chiefs--
That could be the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval
Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the Commandant of the
Marine Corps.
I repeat:
A member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--other than the
Chairman--may submit to the Chairman advice or an opinion in
disagreement with, or advice or an opinion in addition to,
the advice presented by the Chairman to the President--
That is the President of the United States--
--the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense.
If a member submits such advice or opinion, the Chairman
shall present the advice or opinion of such member at the
same time he presents his own advice to the President, the
National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, as
the case may be.
We learned that in the course of the past 18 months or maybe longer--
I will not try to define the exact period of time--when our President
was making
[[Page S9915]]
decisions in connection with certain advice he was receiving from the
intelligence community--I will just touch on this lightly, and perhaps
others will want to address this with more specificity--certain
caveats, being other opinions--the opinions, say, of the Director of
Central Intelligence--were not brought with sufficient force and effect
to the attention of the policymakers.
The purpose of my amendment is to enable a framework by which,
following the precedents of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, certain
individuals in the contemplated new legislative framework as described
by the distinguished chairman and members of the Governmental
Operations Committee, other opinions will be brought to the attention
of the President at such time as the NID is briefing the President.
I will refer with specificity to the amendment I have sent to the
desk at this time. The first paragraph is technical, so I will omit
that. I will go right to the operative paragraph:
Advice and opinions of Members other than Chairman. ``Members''
refers to the Joint Intelligence Community Council which is
established, it is my understanding, by the chairman's statute.
A member of the Joint Intelligence Community Council (other
than the Chairman) may submit to the chairman advice or an
opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an opinion in
addition to, the advice presented by the National
Intelligence Director to the President or the National
Security Council, in the role of the Chairman as Chairman of
the Joint Intelligence Community Council. If a member submits
such advice or opinion, the Chairman shall present the advice
or opinion of such member at the same time the Chairman
presents the advice of the Chairman to the President or the
National Security Council, as the case may be.
The Chairman shall establish procedures to ensure that the
presentation of the advice of the Chairman to the President
or the National Security Council [or the Secretary of
Defense] is not unduly delayed by reason of the submission of
the individual advice or opinion of another member of the
council.
Lastly, ``Recommendations to Congress:
Any member of the Joint Intelligence Community Council may
make such recommendations to Congress.
I presume that would be interpreted as the leadership of both Houses
and the chairmen and ranking members of the relevant committees.
The reason I have not been more specific here is that we are awaiting
the decisions of the group on which I am privileged to serve headed by
the distinguished whip, Mr. McConnell, and on other side the
distinguished whip, the Senator from Nevada, Mr. Reid.
In other words, as we look at the revisions that will be proposed in
connection with the oversight responsibilities of the Congress, that
may require some refinement.
I will reread it:
Any member of the Joint Intelligence Community Council may
make such recommendations to Congress relating to the
intelligence committee as such member considers appropriate.
I think that is the insurance that is quite visible to put in place
such that other opinions can be considered by the President of the
United States.
Throughout, the 9/11 report referred to: We have to have imagination.
We often use the phrase ``be competitive'' with opinions within the
structure of the intelligence committee. I believe that is all good. I
really do. And the purpose of this amendment is to ensure that there is
in law a procedure that these important members of this council will
have the opportunity to see that their views are presented
contemporaneous--at the same time the President receives the views of
the NID. That is the purpose of the amendment.
I understand tonight it will be pending, and at such time as the
distinguished chairman of the committee wishes to come over and review
the subject with others, I would be happy to do so.
Exhibit I
(d) Advice and Opinions of Members Other Than Chairman.--
(1) A member of the Joint Chief of Staff (other than the
Chairman) may submit to the Chairman advice or an opinion in
disagreement with, or advice or an opinion in addition to,
the advice presented by the Chairman to the President, the
National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense. If a
member submits such advice or opinion, the Chairman shall
present the advice or opinion of such member at the same time
he presents his own advice to the President, the National
Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, as the case
may be.
(2) The Chairman shall establish procedures to ensure that
the presentation of his own advice to the President, the
National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense is not
unduly delayed by reason of the submission of the individual
advice or opinion of another member of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
(e) Advice on Request.--The members of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, individually or collectively, in their capacity as
military advisers, shall provide advice to the President, the
National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense on a
particular matter when the President, the National Security
Council, or the Secretary requests such advice.
(f) Recommendations to Congress.--After first informing the
Secretary of Defense, a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the
Department of Defense as he considers appropriate.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman of the
Senate Armed Services Committee for coming forward this evening and
laying down this amendment. He has explained very clearly the purpose.
I very much appreciate that explanation.
As the Senator is aware, the ranking member of the committee had a
commitment for this evening. I would like to hold the amendment over
until tomorrow morning. But I am very grateful to the Senator for
laying down the amendment this evening so that we can continue to make
progress on this bill. As always, he has given his proposal a great
deal of thought. I appreciate the parallels that he is drawing to the
provisions of the Goldwater-Nickles Act and the fact that the members
of Joint Chiefs are allowed to present their views independently to
Congress and to the President. I very much appreciate his laying down
the amendment tonight. I look forward to having further consideration
in the morning.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman for her
views.
I ask unanimous consent that Senator Stevens be listed as a cosponsor
of the amendment. There may be others in due course that would like to
do so.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am privileged to offer one of the first
amendments. I have other amendments of which I think the chairman is
aware. We are going to comply with her request and the leadership to
have the text before them within the amendments that are established. I
want to be very constructive as a working partner as we move forward
with this important piece of legislation.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, the distinguished chairman of the Senate
Armed Services Committee is always constructive in every way. I very
much appreciate the thought and the knowledge he has and the depth with
which he explores important issues.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on that note, I best yield the floor.
Amendment No. 3781
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for himself and Mr.
Stevens, proposes an amendment numbered 3781.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
(Purpose: To modify the requirements and authorities of the Joint
Intelligence Community Council)
On page 119, beginning on line 17, strike ``upon the
request of the National Intelligence Director.'.'' and insert
``at least monthly and otherwise upon the request of the
National Intelligence Director or another principal member of
the Council.
``(e) Advice and Opinions of Members Other Than Chairman.--
(1) A member of the Joint Intelligence Community Council
(other than the Chairman) may submit to the Chairman advice
or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an opinion
in addition to, the advice presented by the National
Intelligence Director to the President or the National
Security Council, in the role of the Chairman as Chairman of
the Joint Intelligence Community Council. If a member submits
such advice or opinion, the Chairman shall present the advice
or opinion of such member at the same time the Chairman
presents the advice of the Chairman to the President or the
National Security Council, as the case may be.
``(2) The Chairman shall establish procedures to ensure
that the presentation of the
[[Page S9916]]
advice of the Chairman to the President or the National
Security Council is not unduly delayed by reason of the
submission of the individual advice or opinion of another
member of the Council.
``(f) Recommendations to Congress.--Any member of the Joint
Intelligence Community Council may make such recommendations
to Congress relating to the intelligence community as such
member considers appropriate.''.
Ms. COLLINS. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Coleman). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
____________________
