Congressional Record: September 28, 2004 (Senate)
Page S9778-S9784
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REFORM ACT OF 2004
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will
resume consideration of S. 2845, which the clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (S. 2845) to reform the intelligence community and
the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the
U.S. Government, and for other purposes.
Pending:
McCain amendment No. 3702, to add title VII of S. 2774, 9/
11 Commission Report Implementation Act, related to
transportation security.
Wyden amendment No. 3704, to establish an Independent
National Security Classification Board in the executive
branch.
Collins amendment No. 3705, to provide for homeland
security grant coordination and simplification.
Amendment No. 3705
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, last evening, on behalf of myself,
Senator Carper, and Senator Lieberman, I offered an amendment to
rewrite the formula for the Homeland Security Grant Program. The
amendment we brought before the Senate was unanimously reported as a
separate bill by the Governmental Affairs Committee.
We should always keep in mind that should there be another terrorist
attack on our country, people will be calling 911; they will not be
calling the Washington, DC, area code. It is our first responders--our
firefighters, our police officers, our emergency medical personnel--who
are always on the scene first. We know that from the tragic attacks of
9/11, and, as Secretary Ridge has pointed out many times, homeland
security starts with the security of our hometowns. For this reason, we
have come together in a bipartisan way, representing large States and
small States, to draft the Homeland Security Grant Enhancement Act, and
we have offered it as an amendment to this bill. It would streamline
and strengthen the assistance we provide to our States, communities,
and first responders who protect our homeland.
The underlying Homeland Security Act contains virtually no guidance
on how the Department of Homeland Security is to assist State and local
governments with their homeland security needs. In fact, the 187-page
Homeland Security Act mentions the issue of grants to first responders
in but a single paragraph. The decisions on how Federal dollars should
be spent or how much money should be allocated to home were left to
another day when Congress enacted that important legislation, but it is
now time for Congress to finally address this critical issue.
We know that much of the burden for homeland security has fallen on
the shoulders of State and local officials across America, those who
are truly on the front lines. In crafting the amendment before us, the
Governmental Affairs Committee listened first and foremost to our first
responders. We held three hearings on this vital topic and negotiated
for 2 years to produce the amendment that Senator Carper, Senator
Lieberman, and I are offering. The bipartisan measure was approved by
the Governmental Affairs Committee by a 16-to-0 vote, and it currently
has 29 cosponsors, including the distinguished Presiding Officer.
There are several groups that are active with first responders who
are supporting our legislation. They include the National Governor's
Association, Advocates for EMS, National Council of State Legislators,
Council of State Governments, the National Association of Counties, the
National League of Cities, and the Fraternal Order of Police.
As you can see, Mr. President, our approach has widespread support.
It is supported by Senators from big States, such as Michigan and
Ohio--and I want to particularly commend the Senators from those States
for their hard work on this legislation--and small States, such as my
home State of Maine and the State of the Senator from Delaware.
The wide breadth of support demonstrates the balanced approach our
amendment takes to homeland security funding. It recognizes that
threat-based funding is a critical part of homeland security funding.
It does so by almost tripling the homeland security funding awarded
based on threat and risk. This has been a particular concern to Senator
Clinton, who has brought this issue before the Senate a couple of
times.
The amendment, however, also recognizes that first responders in each
and every State are on the front lines and have needs. Therefore, the
bill maintains a minimum allocation for each State.
The legislation will also improve the coordination and the
administration of homeland security funding by promoting one-stop
shopping for homeland security funding opportunities. It establishes a
clearinghouse to assist first responders and State and local
governments in accessing homeland security grant information and other
resources within the new department. This clearinghouse will help
improve access to information, coordinate technical assistance for
vulnerability and threat assessments, provide information regarding
homeland security best practices, and compile information regarding
homeland security equipment purchased with Federal funds.
Establishment of these improvements will mean first responders can
spend more time training to save lives and less time filling out
unnecessary paperwork.
This amendment will establish a fair and balanced approach to
allocating this critical funding. I am very pleased to have worked with
the Senator from Delaware on this and I yield to him for any comments
he might have, unless, of course, the ranking member would like to
speak first.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I appreciate the recognition. Senator
Collins and I have to go a short walk to a meeting, so I take this
opportunity and use it briefly to rise in support of the Collins-Carper
amendment submitted by the chairman of the committee and the
distinguished Senator from Delaware, who worked very hard on this very
important topic and area before the 9/11 Commission Report was assigned
to the Governmental Affairs Committee.
This is an important addition to the National Intelligence Reform
Act, the underlying proposal that came out of our committee last week,
because it would help ensure that in these dangerous times the needs of
our States and local first responders are met in a reasonable and
coordinated way.
In the past 3 years since September 11, beginning on September 11,
our first responders and preventers have made real progress in boosting
America's preparedness to deal with the threat of terrorism. But as an
independent task force of the Council on Foreign Relations found last
year: the United States has not reached a sufficient national level of
emergency preparedness and remains dangerously unprepared to handle
catastrophic attack on American soil--dangerously unprepared. That I
take to refer particularly not to the law enforcers, who are the first
preventers, but to the capacity of our total response system at the
local and State level to respond to a catastrophic attack.
This amendment, unanimously approved by a total nonpartisan vote in
our committee, is an important first step in ensuring that our local
first responders get the resources they need.
[[Page S9779]]
First, this amendment simplifies the existing homeland security grant
process by creating an interagency committee to coordinate Federal
requirements for homeland security planning and reporting, and it
eliminates redundancies. It would establish a clearinghouse to offer
local communities one-stop shopping for information on available
Federal grants.
Second and most important, this amendment would reform the way
homeland security grant money is currently distributed.
In crafting these funding provisions, the committee acted consistent
with the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission to significantly
increase the amount of homeland security funding distributed based on
threats but, the judgment we reached, not to eliminate a minimum amount
to go to every State. The reason for that is unfortunately the reality
of the terrorist threat and the nature of our terrorist enemies. Yes,
they have shown they will strike at visible national symbols, that to
some extent they will focus on big cities, but the fact is that anyone
who pays attention to the terrorist mode of operating around the world
will see what they also do is to strike at unpredictable, undefended,
vulnerable targets.
Remember, these people do not hold themselves to any rules of
civilized or humane behavior, so they have no hesitancy to put a bomb
on a bus occupied by families, men, women, children; to attack a school
and wantonly slaughter children, in some cases their teachers. In a
reality such as this, gruesome and chilling as it is, the fact is every
part of America needs some help from the Federal Government in getting
itself prepared to prevent and respond, and that is exactly what this
amendment would do.
I continue to believe that this part of our own domestic army of
preventers and responders in the war on terrorism is not adequately
funded. This amendment does not of itself change that, but it does
represent a sensible bipartisan approach and goes a long way to
ensuring that whatever funding we do provide--and I hope that number
will increase--is allocated in a manner that is best designed to
protect all of the American people.
I thank Senator Collins and Senator Carper for the extraordinary work
they did on this issue in our committee. Senator Carper, characteristic
of himself, took hold of a complicated problem with difficult political
ramifications to it but a real critical national need attached to it
and worked very hard to bring about this result, which I feel very
strongly deserves the overwhelming support of Members of the Senate.
I thank the chair, and I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, before the Senator from Delaware makes
his comments, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Minnesota,
Mr. Coleman, be added as a cosponsor to the underlying bill, S. 2845,
and that he also be added as a cosponsor to the pending amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, the Senator from Minnesota has been one
of our most diligent committee members in attending all of the hearings
we held throughout the August recess. He was an active member of the
committee throughout the debate on this legislation, and I am very
grateful to have his support and cosponsorship.
I say to the Senator from Connecticut that I think along with the
cosponsorships we picked up yesterday, this is a sign that as people
look at our legislation and learn more about it, it is gaining even
more support.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. CARPER. Mr. President, before the chairman of our committee and
Senator Lieberman head for their meeting, I want to say in plain view
of everyone how proud I am of the leadership they have provided to our
committee. At a time when much of Washington, DC, was taking the month
of August off, they made sure that our committee did not. At a time
when most Senators were scattered around the world, the country, and
back in their own States, they made sure we were here, and not just for
any purpose but to participate in a series of excellent hearings.
I believe, and correct me if I am wrong, we have had a total of eight
hearings thus far in the last month on this subject, from all kinds of
people within the CIA, folks who have been National Security Advisers,
Secretaries of Defense, Secretaries of State, Secretaries of Homeland
Security. We have heard from the Commissioners themselves, the cochairs
of the Commission, and from their senior staff. It has been an
extraordinary education. It has taken me a while to get my arms around
these issues. As we finished our markup, I said to both Senator Collins
and Senator Lieberman that a lot had not been clear to me as we went
through the course of those hearings, but as we went through the course
of the markup a number of issues, questions that had not been in focus
for me, came into focus.
I thank you for providing this extraordinary month and a half for us
to prepare to offer this package to our colleagues in the Senate. You
have done really good work. We are proud of you.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Thank you.
Ms. COLLINS. Will the Senator yield on that point?
Mr. CARPER. I am happy to yield.
Ms. COLLINS. I thank the Senator for his generous comments. I know
Senator Lieberman joins me in commending the Senator from Delaware for
his active participation in our hearings. I believe the Senator from
Delaware, as the Senator from Minnesota, made an extraordinary effort
to be there, to question the witnesses, and all of us now quote the
Senator from Delaware in various places and occasions, in reminding our
colleagues that:
The main thing is to keep the main thing the main thing.
Those words have become inexorably linked to the debate on
intelligence reform. We thank the Senator for that as well.
Mr. CARPER. Mr. President, the record should show those words should
not be directly attributed to me. They are actually the words of a
recently departed minister, Methodist minister from our State, Brooks
Reynolds, who would have been 89 years old on election day. He used to
give the opening prayer at the Delaware General Assembly. We would
convene every January. Among the things he would say to all of us who
would gather there in Dover in the legislative hall:
The main thing is to keep the main thing the main thing.
With respect to the underlying legislation, we have done a good job
of doing that. What we have come up with is legislation that I think is
well designed to ensure that key decisionmakers--be it the President or
the President's Cabinet, those of us who serve in the House and Senate,
those who serve in the intelligence communities themselves--that we
have the information we need to have, we have it in a timely way, and
that we have the information objectively. That will enable us to better
protect this country from terrorism in the 21st century. That is the
main thing, and I believe the legislation before us today really does
help us keep the main thing the main thing.
I wish to say a word or two, if I may today, about the amendment
Senator Collins and I have offered. It seeks to address the issue of
how to allocate funds to first responders, and to also enable the
system of distribution that we have to move forward with a little less
difficulty, a bit more smoothly, and maybe somewhat more efficiently.
First, I wish to say how much I have enjoyed working with Senator
Collins. We have worked on it well over a year, and to express thanks
to my staff and especially to John Kilvington on my staff for the great
work he has done with me and with Senator Collins's team.
What we seek to do with this amendment before us today, I say to my
colleagues, is to make a series of much needed reforms to the state of
the Homeland Security Grant Program. As many of my colleagues are
aware, funding under the State Homeland Security Grant Program today is
distributed somewhat arbitrarily. Much of the money that is made
available for grants each year is distributed on a per capita basis. It
is based on a formula that is actually included in the PATRIOT Act.
[[Page S9780]]
Some have criticized our current homeland security grant formula
saying it shortchanges larger States such as New York that are at the
most risk for attack. I agree. No one here, though, disputes the fact
that States such as New York and California deserve the biggest share
of Federal funds.
But let me say clearly that funding should not be based on population
alone. This may come as a surprise to some of you from big States such
as Minnesota or Wyoming, but my home State of Delaware is not very big
but we still have major vulnerabilities. We have a significant port on
the Delaware River, the Port of Wilmington. Through that port, frankly,
more bananas come than any other port on the east coast--grapes,
Chilean fruit, and steel. Delaware has been known through its history
as the chemical capital of the world, home to major companies such as
DuPont and Hercules and others. We have a number of plants that dot the
landscape. Delaware is a financial center for our country, in downtown
Wilmington, DE.
A lot of people go through Delaware. If you do, you probably know I-
95 passes through Delaware, one of the busiest highways in the country.
Interstate 495 does as well. The Northeast corridor for Amtrak passes
through Delaware. Both freight railroads, CSX and Norfolk Southern, two
of the busiest railroads in America, pass through Delaware.
To our east, we have the Delaware River, a heavily trafficked river
with some cargo, including some hazardous cargo that goes through our
States, between our State and New Jersey on that river. On the other
side of the Delaware is New Jersey and there is a nuclear powerplant in
Summit, NJ. All of these factors tend to make our State a not
unattractive target for terrorists.
We need to make sure that whatever we do, we protect States such as
Delaware that may not be the most populous but do have real safety and
security concerns. I believe--I might be wrong, but I believe with this
amendment we have found a way to do that without shortchanging our
sister States around the country.
The 9/11 Commission rightly pointed out that the current grant
formula simply does not direct the Federal Government's scarce homeland
security resources to the States and localities that need it the most.
They called on Congress to create a new formula based on an assessment
of threats and vulnerabilities that take into account real risk factors
such as population density and the presence of critical infrastructure.
Our amendment does just that. The formula we have crafted ensures
that the majority of Federal first responders' aid each year goes to
the States most vulnerable to attack. In my judgment and the judgment
of my colleagues, our cosponsors, the formula is a fair one. It would
ensure that big States such as New York and California and smaller,
less populated States such as Delaware, or less populous States such as
Wyoming or Minnesota, receive our fair share of Federal homeland
security dollars.
Large States will do much better under this formula in the amendment
than they do under current law. This is especially true for States with
large, densely populated cities or those that are located along an
international border. It is my hope that this amendment will also
better account for needs in States such as Delaware that have small
populations but are located in risky parts of the country and have
other significant vulnerabilities.
In addition, our amendment gives the Secretary of Homeland Security
the authority to distribute a portion of each year's grant funding
directly to large cities such as New York or Washington, DC, where we
are gathered today, to help them meet their unique security needs.
We do all of this while preserving the small State minimum set out in
current law. This will ensure that small States such as ours will
continue to receive the resources they need, that we need, to protect
our citizens from potential terrorist attack.
In addition to these important formula changes which have been
alluded to by both Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman, our amendment
makes this Homeland Security Grant Program much more user friendly.
I don't know if our Presiding Officer or my colleague from Minnesota
talked to their Governors recently or their mayors. Senator Coleman was
once a mayor so he could be talking to himself on this one, I suppose.
But any of us talking to our Governors or mayors or first responders
over the last couple of years know how inefficient this program can be
and how frustrating it can be to deal with. Under the current system,
anyone seeking a grant is faced with, believe it or not, a 12-step
application process--12 steps. Once this process is complete, first
responders then have to sit around and wait, sometimes for months,
before they see that first dime.
Our amendment dramatically streamlines this process; shortening the
12-step application process to 2 steps, requiring that States pass
grant funds down to the local level within 60 days of receipt. Our
amendment also ensures that cities and local governments are involved
in their State's planning and application process. Our amendment also
includes an important provision giving States significant new
flexibility to use first responder aid they receive to meet their most
pressing security needs.
Under the current system, States are given funding in four
categories: No. 1, planning; No. 2, training; No. 3, they can use this
money for exercises, and, No. 4, for equipment purchases. The States
must spend a certain amount of money in each category, even if their
homeland security plan calls for a different spending plan.
We propose, on the other hand, to give States the ability to apply
for a waiver that would allow them to use unspent training money, for
example, to purchase needed equipment, if that is where their needs
were to lie or, frankly, the converse could be true.
Finally, our amendment creates a one-stop shop within the Department
of Homeland Security. That one-stop shop would enable applicants to
obtain grant information and other assistance. It also lays the
groundwork for future reforms by authorizing a major review of all
existing homeland security-related grant programs.
As part of this review, an interagency committee will look at
planning, will look at application and paperwork requirements in an
effort to ensure that the different programs are coordinated and do not
impose duplicative requirements on applicants. The committee would then
make recommendations for changes aimed not at eliminating programs but
at making sure all of those programs work together in a coordinated
fashion with as small an administrative burden on applicants as
possible.
In conclusion, this amendment is based on bipartisan legislation
reported out of the Governmental Affairs Committee unanimously this
past June. It is a product of more than a year of debate on that
committee about how we could better serve our first responders. The
amendment enjoys the support of Democrat and Republican Senators from
both large States and from small States, and when we have the
opportunity to vote on this amendment, I will certainly urge our
colleagues to vote for its adoption.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.
Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I want to congratulate my colleague, the
Senator from Delaware, for the outstanding work he has done on this
amendment and, in fact, as the Senator from Maine noted, his work
involved in the series of hearings that we had to allow us to come
before this body with a piece of legislation that will make America
safer.
If I may reflect first on the process of the underlying bill, we had
a series of I believe eight hearings. Sometimes folks say we move too
slow in these hallowed halls. There was a concern that in less than 2
months we would come before this body with a bill that provides major
restructuring of the way in which we handle the threat of terrorism in
this country, that some might say we moved too hastily. But one
wouldn't say that if they observed the process.
Within those eight hearings, we had a wellspring of information. We
heard from heads of the CIA in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s across party
lines. I think of that hearing. We talked about the ``three wise men''
who came before
[[Page S9781]]
us. We heard from agents who were active in the field in hearings that
were not open to the public in which in fact the names of the agents
themselves were still kept confidential. We heard from members of the
Commission. We heard from representatives of the families of the
victims.
It was for me, relatively new in this body, who served as a mayor, as
the Presiding Officer has served as a mayor, and involved in politics
at what I call the bottom of the political food chain, a fascinating
educational experience. I learned a lot. I think my colleagues, no
matter how long they were in this body, learned a lot. We have all
learned a lot in the post-September 11, 2001 world.
As a result of what we heard, we come before this body with some
needed reform--reform that has broad bipartisan support. I believe the
process we used represents the best of what this body is all about,
working in a bipartisan way dealing with some difficult issues, issues
of life and death, truly life and death, coming to some conclusions,
and in the end making America a safer place.
I associate myself with the comments of my colleague from Delaware as
he talked about the process because I shared that experience.
I also want to talk about the underlying amendment, the Collins-
Lieberman-Carper amendment, again from the prospective of a former
locally elected official who appreciates one-stop shopping. When I was
dealing with licensing in the city of St. Paul, one of the things we
did was set up one-stop shopping so folks didn't have to go to 16
different places to fill out where the application was, what had to be
in it, who you had to talk to, and it made a difference. I talked with
our consumers. I know because I talked to them. When you are mayor and
go down the street, people will grab you by the elbow and tell you
about the experience. They appreciated it.
With a matter as complex, as serious, and as profound as dealing with
the issue of homeland security in a time when our Nation faces threats
of terrorism, we managed in this amendment to do a number of things
which I believe are very helpful. We simplified a process. We have
taken something that was a 12-step process and made it a 2-step
process.
We have accelerated the process requiring States to provide 80
percent for the homeland security resources they receive at the local
level within 60 days without moving the money forward. There are needs
out there. People deserve to know that the resources are there.
We provided flexibility, targeting the most vulnerable areas, and
also making sure that all parts of the country and all States have an
opportunity to do what needs to be done to provide a greater measure of
safety against the threat of terrorism.
Minnesota is a big State. Wyoming is a big State geographically, but
not a big State in population. Much of the area of Minnesota is rural.
Yet within the State of Minnesota, which is a big State but not a
highly-populated State, with about 5 million people, we have the Mall
of America, probably one of the most frequented tourist places in the
United States. Every year 35 million people visit the Mall of America.
We have, of course, the Mississippi River in Minnesota which starts
as a little stream right up there in Itasca and becomes the great
Mississippi of legend, of Mark Twain, and eventually finds its way to
Louisiana and into the gulf.
Along the Mississippi, we have a nuclear powerplant on an Indian
reservation, the Prairie Island Reservation right on the Mississippi
River in Minnesota. We have Duluth, which is located on Lake Superior,
which is the gateway to the Great Lakes and transatlantic shipping.
We have miles and miles of border between Minnesota and Canada, a
border that is not heavily populated, that is easily crossed, a border
which in certain conditions is pretty tough to police. It is pretty
tough up in International Falls where it is minus 28 or 30 degrees
Fahrenheit without wind chill. Border agents up there have to learn how
to pull a trigger on a pistol when it is very cold. It is not that
easy. They have to learn how to use snowmobiles and float planes, and
all sorts of things that may not be seen in other parts of the country.
But we face challenges. Obviously, we heard from Delaware, and the
Presiding Officer would be on the floor now talking about Wyoming. He
would talk about the challenges that are faced there.
This is an amendment that provides the targeting of resources in the
areas where clearly there is the greatest threat but provides the
needed flexibility so that places such as International Falls in
Minnesota or the Mall of America or a nuclear powerplant on the
Mississippi River can also be protected.
This is an amendment that is a product of the process I talked about.
It has bipartisan support. It has the support of Senators from large
States and small States. It is something I believe my colleagues will
and should overwhelmingly support.
I am honored to speak on behalf of this amendment and to urge its
adoption. In doing so, I truly believe it will make this country a
safer place and it will make it easier and make it quicker. It will
make it much more practical for folks throughout this country to access
the funds they need to provide a greater measure of protection against
the threat of terrorism.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. CARPER. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I would like to address two provisions in
the underlying bill that were the subject of much debate, much
discussion during our hearings on the 9/11 Commission recommendations.
One of them had to do with the recommendation as to whether the
national intelligence director should serve at the pleasure of the
President or should serve a fixed term.
The 9/11 Commission recommended that the national intelligence
director serve at the pleasure of the President. Some observers,
however, have suggested that making the NID serve a fixed term would
help preserve the independence of the national intelligence director.
The Collins-Lieberman bill creates a NID who will be appointed by the
President, confirmed by the Senate, and who will serve at the pleasure
of the President. This is one of those discussions where the words of
the Senator from Delaware ring true: the importance of making sure we
keep the main thing the main thing.
We had come before us, as I indicated earlier, three former Directors
of the Central Intelligence Agency: William Webster, James Woolsey, and
Stansfield Turner. Each of them testified that among all the powers of
the NID and the variables we needed to consider when deciding whether
to create a national intelligence director, the most important quality,
the most important variable for the national intelligence director to
be effective is to have the support of the President of the United
States.
The national intelligence director will be responsible for overseeing
a broad range of intelligence functions and operations in this country.
His ability to provide that kind of leadership and direction in many
ways will be contingent upon having the support of the Commander in
Chief, having the support of the President of the United States.
Robert Mueller, who served a 10-year term as FBI Director, testified
that the NID should serve at the pleasure of the President. Director
Mueller distinguished the FBI, which is expected to be an independent
investigative agency, from the office of the NID, which will be
responsible for advising the President on intelligence matters, and
that advice will be shaping the President's policy decisions. Among the
responsibilities of the NID is to be the principal adviser to the
President himself.
Some believe that having the NID serve a fixed term could help
insulate the national intelligence director from political pressure.
However, what it would do is to insulate the national intelligence
director from the President. We cannot afford, in these difficult and
[[Page S9782]]
challenging times, at a time when America is under the threat of
terrorist attack, to have the national intelligence director
marginalized by a President who does not trust the national
intelligence director.
The national intelligence director will be one of the most powerful
individuals in the U.S. Government, and he will be one of the
President's closest advisers. As such, the President has to be able to
select his own national intelligence director. And all those in the
intelligence operations, all those in other branches of Government
who are involved in intelligence gathering, intelligence processing,
and intelligence formulation of operation need to understand that the
national intelligence director has the absolute confidence of the
President of the United States.
There are a number of alternative mechanisms to protect the
objectivity and the independence of the national intelligence director.
But, again, I think it is critically important that the national
intelligence director have the support of the President. And those
thoughts are not just the thoughts of this Senator, but they were the
expressed opinions of three former Directors of the Central
Intelligence Agency who came before our committee and the opinion of
the current head of the FBI who himself has a 10-year term.
One of the other issues that was the subject of a great deal of
discussion and focus was what type of authority the national
intelligence director should have to develop and execute the budget for
national intelligence. It was said many times, whoever controls the
money has the power.
We have made a judgment in this bill to have a strong national
intelligence director, a national intelligence director who has the
confidence of the President of the United States, but also a national
intelligence director who will have control over the development of the
budget for the national intelligence program, including the authority
to coordinate, prepare, direct, and present to the President the annual
budget for the national intelligence program.
This bill gives the NID the authority to manage and oversee the
execution of the national intelligence program, including visibility
and control over how money is spent. It ensures that the core national
intelligence agencies--the CIA, NSA, NGA, NRO, FBI Office of
Intelligence, and the Department of Homeland Security Directorate of
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection--are entirely within
the budgetary authority of the national intelligence director. And it
gives the national intelligence director influence over the budgets of
intelligence-related activities and organizations that are outside the
national intelligence director.
Our approach is consistent with the recommendations of the 9/11
Commission, which said the NID must be given--and I quote--``control
over the purse strings,'' including the power to submit a unified
budget for national intelligence, to receive the appropriation for
national intelligence, and to apportion the funds to the appropriate
agencies in line with the budget.
The Commission viewed these budget authorities as absolutely
essential to achieve the objectives of intelligence reform. One of the
chairs of the Commission, Mr. Hamilton, said:
We would not create the national intelligence director if
he or she did not have strong budget authority.
Former Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency who testified
before our committee also supported giving the national intelligence
director strong budget authority.
William Webster, who was both head of the CIA and the FBI, said:
Control of the budget is essential to effective management
of the intelligence community.
James Woolsey, former Director of the CIA, said:
If budget execution authority is given to the [national
intelligence director], he will or she will have a much
better ability to say to the Secretary of State or the
Secretary of Defense, ``Look, I sympathize. I understand. I
know this fluent Arabic linguist is a very rare asset, but
you did not hear me. I really need her or him.''
Again, who controls the money has the power.
As Chairman Hamilton said: The Commission would not have created a
national intelligence director if he or she did not have strong budget
authority.
Senior officials in the Office of the Director of Central
Intelligence also believe that stronger budget authority is needed in
order for the national intelligence director to truly be in charge of
the intelligence community.
John McLaughlin said the person responsible for the intelligence
community should ``have full authority to determine, reprogram and
execute all funding for the core national intelligence agencies,
principally CIA, NSA, the NGA and NRO.''
On and on, the advice the committee received was very clear: If you
want to have a strong national intelligence director, you must give him
or her strong budget authority.
Consumers of intelligence also testified that it would be desirable
for the national intelligence director to have strong budget authority.
Secretary of State Colin Powell, at the hearing of our committee on
September 13, 2004, said:
The [Director of Central Intelligence] was there before,
but the DCI did not have the kind of authority [needed]. And
in this town, it's budget authority that counts. Can you move
money? Can you set standards for people. So you have access
to the President? The [national intelligence director] will
have all of that, and so I think this is a far more powerful
player. And that will help the State Department.
Some of those who have brought a different perspective have said that
the Director of Central Intelligence already has the needed authority
but simply has failed to use it, and that if budget execution authority
is needed, it should be given to the national intelligence director by
Executive order.
With respect to the NFIP budget, the testimony before our committee--
much of it in closed session--demonstrated that the Director of Central
Intelligence authorities in practice are considerably weaker than they
might appear on paper. So what we heard was how things work in the real
world. What we heard was the day-to-day reality of how authority can be
used, how it can be challenged. If it is not crystal clear, if it is
not absolutely clear, if it is not unequivocal, as laid out in this
bill, then, in fact, it may not in practice be as strong as one would
desire.
The testimony also demonstrated considerable confusion about the
actual extent of the Director of Central Intelligence legal authority
which I found to be quite interesting. We would have before us various
members of the intelligence community, and there would actually be a
cross-discussion going on as to whether there was, in fact, this
authority that one person believed was there but that the other person
didn't believe was there. What we do in this bill is to get rid of the
confusion and make it clear. We clarify any ambiguity in the existing
language and make unmistakably clear Congress's intent that the
national intelligence director, not the Department heads, will have the
final say in developing the national intelligence budget.
With respect to receiving the appropriation and budget execution, the
Director of Central Intelligence clearly does not have these key
authorities today. Neither the administration nor we believe these
authorities could be given to the Director of Central Intelligence,
much less the national intelligence director, which has not yet been
created by Congress, without congressional action.
There is simply no excuse for Congress not to act. This bill provides
the kind of action that was clearly laid out before our committee as
needed, as supported by those both in the intelligence network and the
system, those who are making the decisions and those who are working
with the decisions that are being made.
I do hope this body supports the recommendation of the Commission,
the recommendation that is part of the bill before us.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at 2:15, the Senate
proceed to a vote in relation to the McCain amendment No. 3702, with no
second degrees in order to the amendment prior to the vote; provided
further that there be 2 minutes of debate equally divided prior to the
vote. Finally, I ask consent that following the vote, Senator Stevens
be recognized in order to make a statement.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, would the Chair indicate, there are still
two additional amendments that are pending?
[[Page S9783]]
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the Senator's request, there is just one
amendment.
Mr. REID. I understand the unanimous consent request talks about one
amendment, but if we dispose of that amendment, there would still be
two amendments pending.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
Mr. REID. I would hope that following Senator Stevens's statement, we
could make arrangements to vote on those two as early as possible this
afternoon and move on to other matters on this bill. All of these
matters have been debated thoroughly. I would hope that after that, the
majority leader can arrange a time to vote on these amendments. We are
ready over here. No objection.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. COLEMAN. We will talk to the Members over the lunch hour and see
if we can work this out.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Homeland Security
Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I am here today on the eve of the debate
that will be occurring on Thursday evening. I know most Americans will
be watching. I think they are probably the most important debates,
certainly, since the Kennedy-Nixon debate, which was the first one.
The issue, of course, is related to the security of the country. I am
going to focus my few remarks on security here at home, in terms of
homeland security.
Whatever you think of the war on terror abroad--and there are many
different views and we will hear some of those on Thursday night--my
view--and I tend to be hawkish--is that hawks should be as angry or
more angry with the President than doves, because the bottom line is
that Iraq wasn't thought through. We don't have a plan and there is
nowhere really to go. The idea of keeping faith and saying, well, there
will be elections in January and that will make everything better, that
is similar to the idea that we will win the war in 3 weeks and that
will make everything better. It is simply not thought through and there
are all these chimerical sort of wishes and hopes.
First, the election will not be held in many parts of the country.
Second, I don't think it is going to make the basic problems go away. A
devastating commentary on the war in Iraq is that we have been unable
to spend money on infrastructure. One of the whole theories is that we
were going to rebuild the country and show the Iraqis a better life.
Because the terrorists who are there--who are despicable--have been
able to do so much in terms of sabotage and criminal activities, in
terms of taking those workers who would rebuild Iraq and treating them
so brutally, it has made it basically impossible to rebuild. The
President and his administration admitted as much when they took back
the money for rebuilding and are now putting it into security.
Again, what everyone thinks about the war overseas--and there are
many different views, and I believe John Kerry will enunciate a view
that is far more consonant with the American people than what President
Bush has done so far. I say that as somebody who supported the $87
billion and the vote to go to war, because I believe we need a strong,
aggressive foreign policy.
I believe the war on terror is the vital discussion of this decade
and of our generation, probably. To win the war on terror, you need a
good offense and a good defense. On defense, I regret to say,
basically, this administration has not come close to doing what is
necessary.
When you ask why, the bottom line is very simple: They don't want to
spend the money. Their idea after idea after idea about air security,
port security, rail security, truck security--we have the technology,
not to make certain a terrorist attack doesn't occur but certainly to
decrease the odds of it. When you go to the people in the agencies and
ask why are you not doing this or that, they say: We don't have the
money. When we come to the floor and argue about homeland security--as
we just did when the Appropriations bill on homeland security came
forward--we were told by my friend from Mississippi, the chairman, that
we are spending enough. Let me tell you, we are not spending close to
enough in any one of these areas.
Let's say, God willing, we manage to wipe out al-Qaida in the next
year or two, and let's say the problems in Iraq subside--in my view,
because Kerry will be elected and will handle them a lot better than
President Bush has--we are still going to have new terrorist threats.
Terrorism can be described in a single sentence, which is that the
very technology that has blessed our lives and accounted for so much of
the prosperity we have seen over the last two decades has an evil
underside; namely, that small groups of bad people can get ahold of
that technology and use it for terrible purposes. So if al-Qaida is
gone--and let's hope they will be--and if terrorism in Iraq greatly
declines--and let's hope that occurs--there are going to be new groups
that start using this terrorism and using it against us and trying to
use it in our homeland. It could be Chechnians; maybe they will have a
meeting and decide that instead of blowing up movie theaters and
airplanes in Moscow, the real answer is to go after the United States.
Maybe it will be East Timorese, who have been fighting for independence
in east Asia. For all we know, it could be skinheads in Montana who
decide to do this--a couple of them did it in Oklahoma City--but in a
more structured and destructive way, God forbid. So we cannot even keep
track of the various groups that could hurt us.
The sad fact is, if 500 random people around the world, with some
leadership, were injected with an evil virus and they were to decide,
fanatically, they would devote the next 5 years of their lives to
figuring out how to hurt America and try to implement it, the odds are
too high that they could succeed.
So do we need a good offense? Yes, we do. Do we need a good defense?
You bet. On area after area after area, we are not doing enough. Let me
catalog a few.
Air security, here we are doing something of a better job than we
have done in the past. The screeners, for all the problems they have,
are a lot better than they were before 9/11 when they were paid minimum
wage by private security companies. Some didn't speak English
adequately. We are inspecting cargo.
But probably the No. 1 way terrorists could now hurt us as we travel
in the air is by using shoulder-held missiles. We know the terrorists
have them, al-Qaida has them, and they are available on the black
market. We are slow walking any attempt to put on our commercial
airplanes the mechanism to deflect the rockets, the heat-seeking
rockets that emerge from shoulder-held missiles.
Mr. REID. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. SCHUMER. Yes.
Mr. REID. Is the Senator aware that on at least five different
occasions we have had votes on the Senate floor where we have asked for
increased funding for homeland security and the Bush people have turned
it down through various ways? I amplify that by saying these are all
set forth in Senator Byrd's best-selling book. Is the Senator aware we
tried to get money for real homeland security--not security in Iraq but
security for the American people--and this has been turned down; is he
aware of that?
Mr. SCHUMER. I am aware of it, and it frustrates me to no end.
Senator Byrd has had amendments, Senator Murray has had amendments,
Senator Corzine has had amendments, Senator Clinton and I have had
amendments, one after the other, and they are turned down.
I say to my colleague from Nevada, I have asked people in the
administration, both present and former--a few who quit in disgust--are
President Bush and his people not aware of the dangers? They basically
say, no, they are aware of the dangers, but they don't want to spend
any money here at home. They would rather have all the money go to tax
cuts, and so it is not that they do nothing in each of these
[[Page S9784]]
areas; they do the bare minimum: Let's have a study and let it take 2
years. Let's decide on what to do down the road.
For every year we wait, we become more vulnerable.
Mr. REID. Being more specific, is the Senator aware we have tried to
address rail security and Amtrak security? Turned down. On several
occasions, port security, turned down. Is he aware we have tried to get
specific money to first responders? Turned down. The Senator is aware
of this and other measures--for example, hazardous chemicals security,
which Senator Corzine has pushed so much. The Senator is aware of each
of these, and we have had votes and have been turned down on the floor
by the majority on all requests.
Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I am aware, to answer my good friend from
Nevada, of this. I am frustrated by it, and, frankly, I am befuddled by
it because an administration that is so aggressive when it comes to
taking the war overseas and will ask us for billions and billions more
at the drop of a hat----
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired.
Mr. SCHUMER. I thank the Presiding Officer.
____________________
Congressional Record: September 28, 2004 (Senate)
Page S9784-S9805
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REFORM ACT OF 2004--Continued
Mr. THOMAS. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Amendment No. 3702
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There will now be 2 minutes of debate equally
divided on the McCain amendment.
The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, this amendment is designed to address
transportation security-related recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.
The amendment is almost identical to Title VII of S. 2774, the 9/11
Commission Report Implementation Act of 2004, which Senator Lieberman
and I introduced earlier this month.
The amendment implements the Commission's recommendations on
transportation security in the following three ways: One, establishing
a national strategy for transportation security; two, assigning
responsibility for the ``no-fly list'' to the Transportation Security
Administration; and, three, enhancing passenger and cargo screening.
This amendment is the next step in fulfilling the mandate of the 9/11
Commission recommendations and ensuring we move forward in addressing
the vulnerabilities in our transportation systems. These provisions
should not be controversial, and I urge my colleagues to support the
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to support the amendment which I
cosponsored with Senator McCain. This is the first of several he and I
will be introducing, along with other Members, which would implement
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission not included in the underlying
bill that Senator Collins and I have introduced which focuses on
intelligence reform.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I am pleased to support my
colleague's amendment to implement the 9/11 Commission's
recommendations on improving aviation security. Senator McCain and I
have worked closely over the last several years to strengthen our
aviation security network. Although I strongly agree with the 9/11
Commission's recommendations for improving aviation security, I believe
that Congress must go further than the Commission's recommendations if
we are to continue to improve our aviation security system.
It is for this reason that I have filed my bill, S. 2393, the
Aviation Security Advancement Act, as an amendment to this legislation
as well. I would note that Senator McCain is a cosponsor of my bill. In
addition, to incorporating the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission,
my bill also includes specific requirements to improve air cargo and
general aviation security, which I have long felt to be significant
gaps in our security system and the 9/11 Commission specifically cited
as a weakness. My bill also authorizes funding for these new security
requirements.
This legislation was passed unanimously out of the Commerce Committee
last week. This legislation is also supported by the airline industry.
I hope that the Senate will consider this legislation later this week.
My amendment is cosponsored by Senators Hollings, Lautenberg, Snowe,
and Schumer.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The yeas and nays have been ordered.
The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 3702.
The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. Akaka), the
Senator from North Carolina (Mr. Edwards), and the Senator from
Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry) are necessarily absent.
The result was announced--yeas 97, nays, 0, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 189 Leg.]
YEAS--97
Alexander
Allard
Allen
Baucus
Bayh
Bennett
Biden
Bingaman
Bond
Boxer
Breaux
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Byrd
Campbell
Cantwell
Carper
Chafee
Chambliss
Clinton
Cochran
Coleman
Collins
Conrad
Cornyn
Corzine
Craig
Crapo
Daschle
Dayton
DeWine
Dodd
Dole
Domenici
Dorgan
Durbin
Ensign
Enzi
Feingold
Feinstein
Fitzgerald
Frist
Graham (FL)
Graham (SC)
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Harkin
Hatch
Hollings
Hutchison
Inhofe
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kohl
Kyl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Lott
Lugar
McCain
McConnell
Mikulski
Miller
Murkowski
Murray
Nelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)
Nickles
Pryor
Reed
Reid
Roberts
Rockefeller
Santorum
Sarbanes
Schumer
Sessions
Shelby
Smith
Snowe
Specter
Stabenow
Stevens
Sununu
Talent
Thomas
Voinovich
Warner
Wyden
NOT VOTING--3
Akaka
Edwards
Kerry
The amendment (No. 3702) was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, it is my understanding that Senator
Stevens no longer needs to use his time at this time. I believe he will
be speaking later. So I ask unanimous consent to vitiate the order that
reserved time for Senator Stevens and instead have Senator Hutchison
recognized to offer an amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Texas.
Amendment No. 3711
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 3711, which is
at the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Texas [Mrs. Hutchison] proposes an
amendment numbered 3711.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading
of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
(Purpose: To provide for air cargo safety, and for other purposes)
At the appropriate place, insert the following:
TITLE --AIR CARGO SAFETY
SEC. --01. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Air Cargo Security
Improvement Act''.
SEC. --02. INSPECTION OF CARGO CARRIED ABOARD PASSENGER
AIRCRAFT.
Section 44901(f) of title 49, United States Code, is
amended to read as follows:
[[Page S9785]]
``(f) Cargo.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall
establish systems to screen, inspect, or otherwise ensure the
security of all cargo that is to be transported in--
``(A) passenger aircraft operated by an air carrier or
foreign air carrier in air transportation or intrastate air
transportation; or
``(B) all-cargo aircraft in air transportation and
intrastate air transportation.
``(2) Strategic plan.--The Secretary shall develop a
strategic plan to carry out paragraph (1) within 6 months
after the date of enactment of the Air Cargo Security
Improvement Act.
``(3) Pilot program.--The Secretary shall conduct a pilot
program of screening of cargo to assess the effectiveness of
different screening measures, including the use of random
screening. The Secretary shall attempt to achieve a
distribution of airport participation in terms of geographic
location and size.''.
SEC. --03. AIR CARGO SHIPPING.
(a) In General.--Subchapter I of chapter 449 of title 49,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``Sec. 44925. Regular inspections of air cargo shipping
facilities
``The Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish a
system for the regular inspection of shipping facilities for
shipments of cargo transported in air transportation or
intrastate air transportation to ensure that appropriate
security controls, systems, and protocols are observed, and
shall enter into arrangements with the civil aviation
authorities, or other appropriate officials, of foreign
countries to ensure that inspections are conducted on a
regular basis at shipping facilities for cargo transported in
air transportation to the United States.''.
(b) Additional Inspectors.--The Secretary may increase the
number of inspectors as necessary to implement the
requirements of title 49, United States Code, as amended by
this subtitle.
(c) Conforming Amendment.--The chapter analysis for chapter
449 of title 49, United States Code, is amended by adding at
the end the following:
``44925. Regular inspections of air cargo shipping facilities''.
SEC. --04. CARGO CARRIED ABOARD PASSENGER AIRCRAFT.
(a) In General.--Subchapter I of chapter 449 of title 49,
United States Code, is further amended by adding at the end
the following:
``Sec. 44926. Air cargo security
``(a) Database.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall
establish an industry-wide pilot program database of known
shippers of cargo that is to be transported in passenger
aircraft operated by an air carrier or foreign air carrier in
air transportation or intrastate air transportation. The
Secretary shall use the results of the pilot program to
improve the known shipper program.
``(b) Indirect air carriers.--
``(1) Random inspections.--The Secretary shall conduct
random audits, investigations, and inspections of indirect
air carrier facilities to determine if the indirect air
carriers are meeting the security requirements of this title.
``(2) Ensuring compliance.--The Secretary may take such
actions as may be appropriate to promote and ensure
compliance with the security standards established under this
title.
``(3) Notice of failures.--The Secretary shall notify the
Secretary of Transportation of any indirect air carrier that
fails to meet security standards established under this
title.
``(4) Withdrawal of security program approval.--The
Secretary may issue an order amending, modifying, suspending,
or revoking approval of a security program of an indirect air
carrier that fails to meet security requirements imposed by
the Secretary if such failure threatens the security of air
transportation or commerce. The affected indirect air carrier
shall be given notice and the opportunity to correct its
noncompliance unless the Secretary determines that an
emergency exists. Any indirect air carrier that has the
approval of its security program amended, modified,
suspended, or revoked under this section may appeal the
action in accordance with procedures established by the
Secretary under this title.
``(5) Indirect air carrier.--In this subsection, the term
`indirect air carrier' has the meaning given that term in
part 1548 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations.
``(c) Consideration of Community Needs.--In implementing
air cargo security requirements under this title, the
Secretary may take into consideration the extraordinary air
transportation needs of small or isolated communities and
unique operational characteristics of carriers that serve
those communities.''.
(b) Assessment of Indirect Air Carrier Program.--The
Secretary of Homeland Security shall assess the security
aspects of the indirect air carrier program under part 1548
of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, and report the
result of the assessment, together with any recommendations
for necessary modifications of the program to the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the
House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure within 60 days after the date of enactment of
this Act. The Secretary may submit the report and
recommendations in classified form.
(c) Report to Congress on Random Audits.--The Secretary of
Homeland Security shall report to the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House of
Representatives Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure on random screening, audits, and
investigations of air cargo security programs based on threat
assessments and other relevant information. The report may be
submitted in classified form.
(d) Conforming Amendment.--The chapter analysis for chapter
449 of title 49, United States Code, as amended by section 3,
is amended by adding at the end the following:
``44926. Air cargo security''.
SEC. --05. TRAINING PROGRAM FOR CARGO HANDLERS.
The Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish a
training program for any persons that handle air cargo to
ensure that the cargo is properly handled and safe-guarded
from security breaches.
SEC. --06. CARGO CARRIED ABOARD ALL-CARGO AIRCRAFT.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall
establish a program requiring that air carriers operating
all-cargo aircraft have an approved plan for the security of
their air operations area, the cargo placed aboard such
aircraft, and persons having access to their aircraft on the
ground or in flight.
(b) Plan Requirements.--The plan shall include provisions
for--
(1) security of each carrier's air operations areas and
cargo acceptance areas at the airports served;
(2) background security checks for all employees with
access to the air operations area;
(3) appropriate training for all employees and contractors
with security responsibilities;
(4) appropriate screening of all flight crews and persons
transported aboard all-cargo aircraft;
(5) security procedures for cargo placed on all-cargo
aircraft as provided in section 44901(f)(1)(B) of title 49,
United States Code; and
(6) additional measures deemed necessary and appropriate by
the Secretary.
(c) Confidential Industry Review and Comment.--
(1) Circulation of proposed program.--The Secretary shall--
(A) propose a program under subsection (a) within 90 days
after the date of enactment of this Act; and
(B) distribute the proposed program, on a confidential
basis, to those air carriers and other employers to which the
program will apply.
(2) Comment period.--Any person to which the proposed
program is distributed under paragraph (1) may provide
comments on the proposed program to the Secretary not more
than 60 days after it was received.
(3) Final program.--The Secretary of Homeland Security
shall issue a final program under subsection (a) not later
than 90 days after the last date on which comments may be
provided under paragraph (2). The final program shall contain
time frames for the plans to be implemented by each air
carrier or employer to which it applies.
(4) Suspension of procedural norms.--Neither chapter 5 of
title 5, United States Code, nor the Federal Advisory
Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall apply to the program
required by this section.
SEC. --07. PASSENGER IDENTIFICATION VERIFICATION.
(a) Program Required.--The Secretary of Homeland Security
may establish and carry out a program to require the
installation and use at airports in the United States of the
identification verification technologies the Secretary
considers appropriate to assist in the screening of
passengers boarding aircraft at such airports.
(b) Technologies Employed.--The identification verification
technologies required as part of the program under subsection
(a) may include identification scanners, biometrics, retinal,
iris, or facial scanners, or any other technologies that the
Secretary considers appropriate for purposes of the program.
(c) Commencement.--If the Secretary determines that the
implementation of such a program is appropriate, the
installation and use of identification verification
technologies under the program shall commence as soon as
practicable after the date of that determination.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator
Snowe be added as a cosponsor of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I rise today to offer the Air Cargo
Security Act as an amendment to the Intelligence Reform Act. This is a
measure that we need to pass to answer some of the criticisms in the 9/
11 Commission Report regarding cargo security.
I am going to talk further about this bill, but I would like to offer
Senator McCain some of the time to also talk because he was one of the
cosponsors. It went through the Commerce Committee with his
chairmanship. We all agree this is a bill that is needed to add to the
security that is in the bill in accordance with the 9/11 Commission
Report.
[[Page S9786]]
I yield to Senator McCain for his remarks, and then I will finish my
presentation.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Texas. She has
been on this issue for at least 3 years that I know of. We passed this
bill twice through the Senate. Under the chairmanship of Senator
Hutchison, we had extensive hearings on this issue in the Commerce
Committee.
I believe this is a very important issue. Senator Hutchison has many
important aviation assets in her State, including major airports that
are not only for passengers but for ports of entry as well.
I say to Senator Hutchison, thank you, because I think this is a very
important bill. I tell my colleagues, it has been passed twice through
the Senate. It is unfortunate that we have to go back and revisit it.
Finally, we made a commitment that we would try to address all 41 of
the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, not always in a positive
fashion but at least have them addressed. This is one of the
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.
I thank Senator Hutchison, and I urge my colleagues to support this
very important amendment. Air cargo, according to many experts, is a
subject that certainly needs increased security and increased
attention. I think this amendment does that. I thank my colleague from
Texas, Senator Hutchison.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman of
the Commerce Committee, Senator McCain, for adding his support to this
bill. We would not have gotten it through the Commerce Committee
without his support. I think it adds immeasurably to the bill that is
before us today.
Congressional action following 9/11 quickly created the
Transportation Security Administration to address the appalling
security gaps exposed by terrorists. We took drastic but appropriate
steps to considerably increase security of our airports and planes, and
3 years later we are light-years ahead of where we were on that
horrific day.
I am pleased that the 9/11 Commission raises issues that are similar
to those I have discussed since we enacted the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act. The Commission report states:
Concerns also remain regarding the screening and transport
of checked bags and cargo. More attention and resources
should be directed to reducing or mitigating the threat posed
by explosives in vessels' cargo holds.
I have worked since 2001 to enact stringent air cargo security
standards and, along with Senator Feinstein, introduced the Air Cargo
Security Act to create a comprehensive system to secure shippers,
freight forwarders, and carriers. The Senate has twice passed this bill
unanimously, but it remains stalled in the House of Representatives.
The bottom line is this: Are we safer than on September 11?
Absolutely. But have we done enough? Not yet. So I think we can do
more. I think this is an opportunity for us to address this issue.
The Air Cargo Security Act will make a difference in our Nation's air
security. One thing we have not provided since 9/11 is security in the
belly of the aircraft equal to protections for passenger areas and
airports. Cargo is shipped on passenger aircraft, in some cases,
without being screened. That is why we need this amendment.
The Air Cargo Security Act would establish a reliable known-shipper
program, mandate inspections of cargo facilities, and direct the
Transportation Security Agency to work with foreign countries to
institute regular inspections at facilities that bring cargo into the
United States.
The legislation would develop a training program for air cargo
handlers and give TSA the power to revoke the license of a shipper or
freight forwarder whose practices are unsound. These provisions will go
a long way toward further securing aircraft in our country. All of us
want America to have the safest aviation system in the world. Closing
the cargo loophole is an important step.
There is no doubt in my mind that the traveling public is
considerably safer. We have made changes to ensure our screeners
undergo background checks, training, and testing. Checked bags are
scrutinized, flight crew training is constantly being improved, and we
are traveling in a more secure system. But we must address the cargo
issue.
Mr. President, 22 percent of all air cargo in the United States is
carried on passenger flights, only a tiny fraction of which is
inspected.
Beyond transport on passenger planes, there are other issues in the
cargo arena. Identification cards used by workers are generally not
secured with fingerprints or other biometric identifiers. Background
checks for cargo employees are still inadequate.
Perhaps the weakest link in the cargo security chain is the freight
forwarder. These are the middlemen who collect cargo from the shippers
and deliver it to the air carrier. Regulations governing these
companies are lax, and the TSA is finding security violations when it
conducts inspections. Under current law, however, TSA lacks the
authority to revoke the shipping privileges of freight forwarders that
repeatedly violate security procedures. This air cargo security
amendment would give TSA that power.
Air cargo security is not a new problem. In 1988, Pan Am 103 went
down over Lockerbie, Scotland, because of explosives planted inside a
radio in the cargo hold of a passenger airplane. The 1996 Valujet crash
in the Everglades was caused by high-pressure tanks that never should
have been put on a passenger aircraft in the first place.
My amendment will strengthen air cargo security on all commercial
flights. It establishes a more reliable known shipper program by
requiring inspections of facilities, creating an accessible shipper
database, and providing for tamper-proof identification cards for
airport personnel. It gives TSA the tools required to hold shippers
accountable for the contents they ship by allowing the administration
to revoke the license of a shipper or freight forwarder engaged in
unsound or illegal practices. This is the most important part of the
bill. The TSA has told me time and again they need to have this
capability in order to revoke licenses when they find an unsafe
situation.
I have had the support of my colleagues, such as Senator McCain.
Senator Lott, the chairman of the Aviation Subcommittee, has worked
with me on this bill. We have passed this bill twice in the Senate. It
is a bill we have looked at, we have vetted. We have had hearings.
I see my colleague Senator Lott, the chairman of the Aviation
Subcommittee, is on the floor of the Senate. He knows this bill. He
worked with me to perfect it. If we can put this amendment on this very
important piece of legislation, it will add immeasurably to our
aviation security. We will have the most secure aviation system in the
world with this amendment on this particular legislation.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I congratulate the Senator from Texas for
her determination in this area. It is one of the places where there was
a gap in our aviation security. It is one that she has been working on,
thinking about, going back to the last Congress. I think one of the
last things we did in the last Congress was the Senate let this issue
go through, but we didn't get it completed. She has continued to work
on it. There were some concerns. Those concerns have been worked on and
developed and straightened out, and this is a good piece of
legislation. It passed the full Commerce Committee overwhelmingly last
week. It is supported by the industry. I want the record to show that
it would not be happening if it were not for her determination and her
leadership. It is good legislation.
The title of this bill is National Intelligence Reform Act. I want us
to concentrate on the intelligence area and the reforms that are
necessary to give the national intelligence director the real strength
he or she may need to make sure our intelligence community does its
job. It talks about the national counterintelligence center. This was
done at the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission for intelligence and
security reforms. So while I don't want this to just become a debate
about various
[[Page S9787]]
security areas, I would like us to focus on intelligence. This is an
area where there clearly was a gap. This is an area where thoughtful
legislation was available. I believe it is appropriate to be added.
I hope we will support the chairman of the committee and the ranking
member who have worked hard to get this legislation through in a
reasonable time. We will have some good debates, and we will have some
disagreements. We will have some votes. But at the end of the day, we
need to get this done because the Commission has made it clear where
there are gaps and where there are problems, both in the executive
branch and in the legislative branch. We also have to have the follow-
on congressional reforms that will allow us to do a better job on
oversight because we are part of the problem.
For those who have questions or have concerns or have amendments, my
argument is, come forth. Let's have the amendments. Let's debate them
in the light of day. Let's have a full debate and let's vote. But let's
get this done because this is about real issues. A lot of times we
debate, we vote on things that won't affect our lives immediately or
affect people's ability to do the job under national security. But this
legislation is about lives. It is about what happened on 9/11. It is
about what will happen again if we don't step up to this important
issue and make sure that our executive branch is set up in such a way
as to do the job, that they have the right chain of command and that
somebody is in charge, somebody who reports only to the President,
somebody who can make a decision about the placement of satellites,
somebody who will give us the information we need to know, not only
about how much money is spent but where it is spent.
That has been one of our problems. The Congress has not been putting
money in many instances where it should have gone so that our
intelligence community would have had what they needed to do the job.
Just this very day, we understand the FBI does not have the linguists
they need to translate intercepts. Now it has become so voluminous it
is uncontrollable. That is scary. But it is a real problem. We are not
going to solve it just with this bill or just in this week. If we don't
begin now, it will make the day even more inevitable or closer that we
are going to have another disaster on our hands.
I am here today to tell the committee members I support their effort.
They have done a good job. We can make it stronger, I believe. But I am
going to be supporting getting this work completed.
I thank the chairman of the committee and I thank the sponsor of this
amendment for the work she has done on this cargo security issue.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman of
the Aviation Subcommittee, the Senator from Mississippi. In fact, one
of the unanimous consents we had when we took this intelligence reform
bill to the floor was that all the amendments would have to be relevant
to the 9/11 Commission. The amendment before us is relevant. I think
because the Senate has acted on this, it will be a valuable
contribution to the bill.
I appreciate the help and counsel of the Senator from Mississippi. I
thank the distinguished chairman and ranking member of the Governmental
Affairs Committee for bringing this bill to the Senate floor. We will
pass this bill, and it will be a good bill. We are all going to work
together to make that happen, which the distinguished chairman and
ranking member have already proven.
I ask for the yeas and nays at the appropriate time for whenever it
can be scheduled along the lines that the chairman and ranking member
would schedule.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There appears to be.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, before the Senator from Mississippi has
to leave the floor, I want to thank him for his advice and his support
as we bring this very important legislation before the Senate for
consideration. I very much value the advice and support of the Senator,
and I appreciate all he is doing to help move this legislation forward.
He has been a very early voice in identifying the flaws in our current
intelligence system and has been stalwart in his support for
significant reform. I thank the Senator from Mississippi.
I also commend the Senator from Texas for her continued effort to
examine the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and to pursue
legislative solutions, particularly in the area of improving the
security of cargo and general aviation security in general. Senator
Hutchison has been a longtime leader in this area. Her amendment
encompasses a significant portion of S. 165 that the Senate passed by
unanimous consent in May. I commend her for her foresight in
recognizing areas of concern that have been singled out by the 9/11
Commission.
In the Commission's report, for example, the Commission noted that:
Major vulnerabilities still exist in cargo and general
aviation security.
The Commission went on to say that:
The TSA and Congress must give priority attention to
improving the ability of screening checkpoints to detect
explosives.
The Commission says:
More attention and resources should be directed to reducing
or mitigating the threat posed by explosives in vessels'
cargo holds.
These are all areas of weakness identified by the Commission that the
Senator from Texas would address in her amendment. It will assist in
implementing several of the Commission's recommendations and as a whole
will help to make our Nation's air passengers, air carriers, and air
cargo more secure. I would note that the Department of Homeland
Security has no objections to the Senator's amendment. When the roll
call does occur, I will be urging our colleagues to support her
efforts.
I yield the floor.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to support the amendment of
Senator Hutchison. I thank her for proposing it. She was ahead of her
time because she has been on this case, along with members of the
Commerce Committee, at least since March of last year, when the bill
came out of the Commerce Committee; in fact, the Senate passed this
bill unanimously in May of 2003.
Unfortunately, there has been no action that meets up with this bill
in the House. So Senator Hutchison is quite right to introduce this as
an amendment to our underlying reform of the intelligence community.
This is directly relevant to the 9/11 Commission's conclusion that
``major vulnerability still exists in cargo and general aviation
security. These, together within adequate screening and access
controls, continue to present aviation security challenges.'' That
comes from the 9/11 Commission.
The Commission concluded that we are safer than we were on September
11, 2001, but we are not yet safe. This underlying bill is aimed at
reforming our intelligence community so we will be safe, so we can see
the threats coming at us, hear them, and stop them before the
terrorists are able to strike, but also that we may adopt other
provisions of the 9/11 Commission report.
Senator McCain and I introduced an amendment that was the first to
pass a short while ago. I hope this amendment will pass as well,
because it tightens existing weaknesses, loopholes in the screening of
cargo transported in passenger aircraft, opening up a vulnerability
that we all fear terrorists may exploit to strike at us.
I thank the Senator from Texas for not only being foresighted last
year in seeing this weakness in our defenses to terrorism but for
coming forth and introducing this amendment. It will strengthen the
bill Senator Collins and I and other members of the Governmental
Affairs Committee have brought out and, therefore, I urge its adoption.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, we are making very good progress on this
significant bill that does focus on the
[[Page S9788]]
safety and security of the American people. This morning the Democratic
leader and I opened up stressing the importance of making very
efficient use of our time on the floor.
A lot has been accomplished even since this morning, but we have a
lot to do. This morning the leadership on both sides of the aisle
talked, and we have talked in our caucuses, of the importance of
collecting today all of the amendments that might potentially be
offered on this bill. People have been studying the issue since August.
The bill was marked up in committee in a very thorough way. A lot of
amendments were offered and debated, some of which will be debated
again on the floor. Because we need to finish the bill this week, if at
all possible, it means, given the fact that there are a lot of evening
commitments which will preclude us from doing a lot of voting tonight,
we have to get this universe of amendments today.
Thus, I ask all of our colleagues to give us, through the managers,
their potential amendments today, and if they plan on offering
amendments, we absolutely must have them today.
We are not looking for amendments, but if people have serious
amendments they feel need to be debated, if we have that list, and
shortly thereafter--and it would be in all likelihood some time
tomorrow--we will ask to have the complete language of each of those
amendments.
The initial reaction by some is: you are moving too fast. Again, this
is something we announced several weeks ago, that we would be going to
the bill yesterday. We have made progress. The bill has been out, and
people have had time to address it. We ask people over the next hour or
couple of hours to let us know what amendments they may want to offer
so we can have that list, and then shortly thereafter--not tonight, but
shortly thereafter--we will have a deadline by which we need to have
those amendments, to have the language. It is the only way we will have
an orderly process to address the substance of this very important
bill.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, will the Republican leader yield?
Mr. FRIST. I will.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, Senator Daschle announced in our caucus that
he was in agreement with the majority leader. In conjunction with the
Republican cloakroom, we are going to hotline this and tentatively have
9:30 or 10 o'clock in the morning--whenever the two cloakrooms agree
they can get their work done, we will have a time for Members to let us
know what amendments they might want to offer.
Senator Daschle is always very cautious to make sure we have ample
time to offer amendments, but this is an extraordinary piece of
legislation, and Senator Daschle agrees with the Republican leader that
we should set a time shortly thereafter, either tomorrow evening--or I
assume tomorrow evening, when Members will actually have to file their
amendments.
The concept of the majority leader is certainly one with which
Senator Daschle agrees. So we are ready to have our hotline go out, and
theirs. We will look at amendments in the morning and find out what the
universe of those amendments is, and then those people are going to
have to step forward and offer amendments at a later time and enter
into a consent agreement if at all possible later on tomorrow.
Mr. FRIST. Good. Mr. President, as you can hear, this is a bipartisan
effort, with full cooperation back and forth between the managers and
the leadership. We felt it was important to restate the sense of
efficiency with which we have to address this bill. That is what we
would like to see happen.
Again, please let us know your amendments in the next several hours.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote occur in
relation to the pending amendment, that is, the Hutchison amendment No.
3711, at 4:30 p.m. today, with no amendments in order to the amendment
prior to the vote; further, that there be 2 minutes equally divided for
closing remarks prior to the vote.
Mr. REID. Reserving the right to object, if the leader can withhold
for a minute, unless there is something that would cause us to vote at
4:30 p.m., we might be able to get that done a half hour earlier.
Mr. FRIST. From our side, because of various commitments, 4:30 p.m.
is the best time.
Mr. REID. No objection.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, part of the scheduling is to do just that,
so we can have another amendment fully considered and then yet even
another amendment. For planning purposes, 4:30 p.m. seems to be the
most appropriate time. We will continue to debate and vote on
amendments. Then hopefully by 4:30 p.m., we will be able to schedule
additional votes as well.
Again, I encourage all Members to come forward now and notify us of
their amendments and to work through the managers to offer appropriate
amendments.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, if the distinguished majority leader is
finished, Senator Nelson is here and wishes to be recognized for 5
minutes to talk about the situation in Florida. Is that all right with
the two managers?
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, if I might say a word before that and
then I will be happy to yield the floor to Senator Nelson. Maybe I
should yield to the chairman who will probably say the same thing I
will be saying.
I am very grateful to the Senate majority leader and to the Senate
Democratic leader for this agreement and for the pace they are setting
for consideration of this bill on a bipartisan basis. These are not
ordinary times. This is not ordinary legislation. It goes to the heart
of our security. We want to have thoughtful debate.
The chairman of the committee, Senator Collins, and I found in the
committee that when we let some time for debate occur, people came to
very thoughtful conclusions, totally without regard to party. The votes
on all the amendments went all around the lot. I think people
ultimately felt good about the process.
By setting these deadlines now for amendments to be noticed and then
filed, we are going to expedite exactly that kind of thoughtful
consideration so we can get this done with the same feeling of, well,
confidence that we are doing the right thing. We are not only doing
something we need to do quickly, but we are doing it the right way. So
I thank the majority leader and Senator Daschle for their help on that
matter and the help they have given to Senator Collins and me.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I, too, thank our leaders for their
cooperation in moving this bill forward. The process they have outlined
is a fair one. It will help us know how many amendments there are, and
we will work with the sponsors of those amendments to ensure adequate
debate.
If the Senator from Florida could tell me how much time he
anticipates needing.
Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, if I take 1 minute per
hurricane in Florida, that would be a total of 4 minutes.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, we would be happy, in light of the
devastation to his State, to give the Senator from Florida 10 minutes,
if that would be helpful.
Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, to the distinguished Senator
from Maine, it will not be necessary for 10 minutes, but the Chair of
the committee is very gracious.
It seems all I talk about on the floor of the Senate is the
hurricanes that have ravaged Florida. I would like to say to the
leadership of the committee, I support their legislation. I am looking
forward to voting for it. They have done a magnificent job. It is very
timely, and I hope the wisdom they have displayed will be displayed by
the House of Representatives so we can get a quick agreement and a
conference and go about the process of reforming our intelligence
apparatus. My congratulations.
Florida Hurricanes
It does seem that I have spoken over and over about hurricanes and
about the need for disaster assistance. Indeed, I am making that plea
again. When we passed the Department of Homeland Security funding bill
2 weeks ago, the chairman of the Appropriations Committee had
committed, in a colloquy on the Senate floor, that he would address it.
I take him at his word, and I am sure his word is good.
Now that the President has requested additional funds, the question
for us
[[Page S9789]]
and Florida is speed in enacting this legislation quickly so that money
can get to the people who desperately need it in direct, outright FEMA
grants. They need assistance to rebuild their homes. They need Small
Business Administration loans so that they can rebuild their lives and
their businesses. Then there are a myriad of Federal disaster
assistance programs to local governments so that we can rebuild our
communities, so that we can pick up the debris.
There is one part of Florida where debris is all over our communities
from three hurricanes that have hit the same place. We need to rebuild
our roads and bridges, our airports, our military facilities, and NASA
at the Kennedy Space Center. So time is of the essence, and I implore
our leadership to get that message through to the White House and to
the leadership at the other end of this Capitol to get these funds.
It is the intention of the chairman of the Appropriations Committee,
who just told me this a few minutes ago, to attach this money to the
Homeland Security bill, but if that bill gets hung up for whatever
reason, then this emergency funding needs to come out of here like a
rocket taking off at the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station so that it
can get to our people.
Needless to say, after two hits, one wonders just what is in store,
and how they are going to pick up the pieces of their lives. But when
three hit, and then four, one can imagine how distressed our people
are. Help us. We need speed. We need action now.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the
following cosponsors be added to Collins-Carper-Lieberman-Coleman
amendment No. 3705: Senators Voinovich, Leahy, Akaka, Rockefeller,
Nelson of Nebraska, and Hagel.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, Senator Voinovich, along with Senator
Levin, was very instrumental in helping to draft the compromise
represented in this amendment. I talked earlier about the efforts of
the Senator from Delaware and the Senator from Connecticut, but I also
wanted to acknowledge that Senator Voinovich and Senator Levin worked
very hard to help us strike the right balance in allocating funding so
that large States with high-threat areas would receive additional
funding. Yet we wanted to make sure that we recognize that every State,
regardless of size or population, has certain vulnerabilities.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Amendment No. 3706
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 3706 on behalf of
Senator Shelby, Senator Roberts, Senator Bond, Senator Wyden, Senator
Bayh, Senator Feinstein, and myself.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the pending amendment is
laid aside.
The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Specter), for himself,
Mr. Shelby, Mr. Roberts, Mr. Bond, Mr. Wyden, Mr. Bayh, and
Mrs. Feinstein, proposes an amendment numbered 3706.
Mr. SPECTER. I ask unanimous consent the reading of the amendment be
dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(The text of the amendment is printed in today's Record under ``Text
of Amendments.'')
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, this is one of two amendments which I
intend to offer to strengthen the position of the national intelligence
director. At the outset, I join many others in complimenting the
chairwoman, Senator Collins, and the ranking member, Senator Lieberman,
for their leadership and their outstanding work in presenting the bill
which is now on the floor.
This measure is a long time in coming for decision by the Congress.
In my view, had there been a strong national intelligence director in
existence prior to September 11, 2001, the attack on
9/11 might well have been prevented. There were many indicators
present. Had they all been put together, I think there is a good chance
we could have avoided the calamity of that day.
There is a famous FBI report from Phoenix about this suspicious
character who wanted to learn how to fly an airplane but who was not
interested in takeoffs or landings. That information never got to the
appropriate authority in headquarters at the FBI. There were two al-
Qaida suspects in Kuala Lumpur known to the Central Intelligence
Agency, information not communicated to the INS, to Immigration, so
that those two al-Qaida agents came into the United States and were
among the 19 hijackers who perpetrated the atrocities of 9/11.
There was an extensive investigation conducted by the Minneapolis
office of the FBI, the famous 13-page, single-spaced memorandum by
special agent Coleen Rowley about Zacarias Moussaoui. Had those leads
been followed, had there been an application for a warrant under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act using the right standard--the FBI
used the wrong standard--that would have produced a great deal of
information which could have, in combination with other information,
been pieced together to have warned us of the impending attack.
There is the information from NSA, where there was the tip that
something was going to happen on 9/11 which was either not translated
or not communicated to the Intelligence Committee.
There had been the information about Murad, an al-Qaida operative
back in 1996, and his plans to fly an airplane into the CIA.
Those are only some of the threats. In combination and along with
others, had we had all the information together, had we known what
could have been pieced together, I think the likelihood is present that
9/11 could have been prevented.
During my tenure as chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee
during the 104th Congress, the Intelligence Committee reported a bill,
S. 1718, which sought to lodge effective power in the Director of
Central Intelligence. That position theoretically was in charge of all
the intelligence community but, because of lack of authority, lack of
budget control, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency was
never able to carry out the role of being the unifier, the real leader
of the intelligence community.
In section 707 of that bill, it provided for:
Enhancement of authority of Director of Central
Intelligence to manage, budget, personnel, and activities of
the intelligence community.
On a cross referral, by the time it got to the Armed Services
Committee, the substance was taken out. There was a big turf battle and
the effort to lodge authority in the Director of CIA to do effective
direction and management of the Central Intelligence Agency went to
naught.
Thirty days after 9/11, Senator Lieberman and I introduced
legislation to create the Department of Homeland Security. That was on
October 11 of 2001. When special agent Coleen Rowley testified before
the Judiciary Committee in June of 2002, there was finally impetus to
get support from the administration to move ahead with a Department of
Homeland Security, and when the matter was debated on the floor of the
Senate, the effort was made to vest authority in the Secretary of
Homeland Security to direct other intelligence agencies. It seemed to
us that when we were creating a new department, Homeland Security, this
was an opportune time to pick up the strands of what had been attempted
by S. 1718 back in 1996, and by many others.
It wasn't my idea alone. The Scowcroft Commission had come up with
similar recommendations. Others had called for real power and real
authority in a national director. It seemed to us that that was the
time, with the new Department of Homeland Security, to give this
effective power to the newly created Secretary of Homeland Security.
Our efforts, again, were unsuccessful because of the turf battles,
because of the interests of the CIA and the Department of Intelligence,
DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense and the
FBI, and the
[[Page S9790]]
other agencies to protect their own turf.
In October of 2002, the House of Representatives passed a bill and
went home leaving the Senate with the alternative of either taking the
bill or letting the matter go over until the next year. I was prepared
at that time to offer the amendment to give the Secretary of Homeland
Security authority to direct some real power. After talking to
Secretary Ridge, talking with the Vice President, and talking with the
President, rather than have no bill at all, it was decided to proceed
and let the matter stand without having that kind of authority for the
Secretary of Homeland Security.
There the matter languished until the families of the victims of
September 11 became a powerful advocacy group, which led to the
creation of the 9/11 Commission, and the 9/11 Commission report was
filed in July of this year. There was very substantial momentum finally
to create a national intelligence director with some real authority to
really manage the entire community.
Senator McCain, Senator Lieberman, Senator Bayh, and I have produced
a bill as had been recommended by the
9/11 Commission and then the Governmental Affairs Committee proceeded
to have hearings, came back after the recess in late July, had hearings
in August, marked up the bill, and passed it out of committee last
week. So it is now on the floor in a context where there is
considerable public pressure created by the 9/11 Commission report and
what the families of the victims have done. And the momentum is
present.
There has been very substantial opposition to moving at this time.
There are those who say this legislation is precipitous, that it ought
not to be passed on the eve of an election, that we have more of an eye
on 11/2, the election date, than we have on 9/11.
I reject those contentions. This issue has been under study for
decades, and personally on my behalf since I spent 8 years on the
Intelligence Committee and chaired the committee during the 104th
Congress.
The 9/11 Commission unanimously and emphatically has called for the
creation of a national intelligence director. It is my view that is a
proposition whose time has come.
When I offered the amendment in committee, which was rejected
although we received five votes in the committee, there was very
intense lobbying coming, as I understand it--you can never present
competent evidence which would stand up in court but a lot of lobbying
from the protectors of their turf.
My amendment to create the strength of the national intelligence
director was deferred until this day. It is my hope and expectation
that from this bill we will have a national intelligence director if it
is the one proposed by amendment or if it is the one which is in the
bill which has been reported by the committee.
It is my conclusion after very substantial study and after very
substantial thought and after very substantial consideration that we
need a very strong national intelligence director. We need an
independent national intelligence director who will stand up to the
executive branch, who will stand up to the Congress, who will tell the
Congress exactly what is needed by way of resources, and who will have
the stature and strength to get that job done.
There is an enormous controversy about the resolution to authorize
the use of force which Congress passed and the President acted on--a
lot of concern about the adequacy of the intelligence which led to that
judgment, the 77 votes in this body joined by a majority of Democrats
as well as Republicans. But there is no doubt that however one views
the resolution for use of force, it would have been highly desirable to
have better intelligence.
The amendment which is embodied in amendment No. 3706 would give
substantial additional authority to the national intelligence director
than is contained in the committee bill. It would put the CIA under the
national intelligence director. The national intelligence director
would have the authority to manage and oversee the intelligence
community, including the CIA, the NSA, the National Security Agency,
the NRO, the National Reconnaissance Office, the NGA, the National
Geospacial Agency, and national collection from the Defense
Intelligence Agency leaving tactical intelligence within the Department
of Defense as it is now.
Valid considerations have been raised that tactical intelligence
ought to be left in the Department of Defense so the Department of
Defense can carry out its functions. My amendment would leave that
important facet with the Department of Defense.
The national intelligence director under the committee bill has
budget authority over the Federal Bureau of Investigation. After a
great deal of thought, this amendment No. 3706 does not include the FBI
under the supervision, direction, and control of the national
intelligence director as the other agencies enumerated would have the
national intelligence director with the authority to supervise, direct,
and control which, in my judgment, would give the national intelligence
director the authority to manage and oversee the national intelligence
community in an effective way.
The essence of my bill was circulated to the Governmental Affairs
Committee with a letter dated August 3 of this year. I put the bill
into the Congressional Record on September 7. I introduced the bill on
September 15 under the caption of S. 2081. The amendment embodied in
No. 3706 is somewhat different, as I have described it.
We are dealing here with agencies where there are inbred cultures of
concealment. It is very difficult to get information, even as chairman
of the Senate Intelligence Committee.
My experience has shown it was very difficult for the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency to know fully and adequately what has
happened within his own agency. One of the matters which I referred to
during the committee hearings was information which was disseminated by
the CIA Chief of Reports and Requirements in the Soviet East European
Division of the Central Intelligence Agency. This was a man who was in
the CIA from 1950 until 1991. He had information which was tainted by
the Soviet Union--information where the individual conceded that he
knew the intelligence came from Soviet-controlled sources and that he
disseminated that information at the highest levels of government
without disclosing that fact to the individuals whom he transmitted the
information that it came from controlled or tainted sources.
That information was transmitted, including transmission on January
13 of 1993. So it went to President George Herbert Walker Bush and it
went to President-elect Bill Clinton.
When I took his testimony and expressed shock at what he had done,
the individual confidently responded that he had acted entirely
properly because disclosure of the controlled source that the
information was tainted would have made it even harder, as he put it,
to sell the intelligence to policymakers; that there was no reason to
believe the Soviets used deception was inaccurate, and no customer
would use it unless he had concealed the fact it was tainted.
This was an extraordinary approach, as I saw it, but I think
revealing as to what happens within the Central Intelligence Agency,
within the Bureau, where the individuals have their empires, where they
know better than anybody else, and transmit information to the
President of the United States and the President-elect, knowing it to
be tainted and not telling the President or President-elect that it was
tainted because they then would not use it, and saying that the
information was given because the CIA agent, the CIA individual, knew
that it was correct. That is just the height of audacity but I think
indicative of the kinds of problems we face with the cultures of
concealment that we have in the intelligence agencies.
Another matter which I refer to, in the course of the committee
hearings, is relevant for presentation; that is, the difficulty of
having adequate oversight over the intelligence agencies and the duties
that the intelligence agencies have to make disclosures to the
oversight committee.
In the spring of 2002, when I chaired a subcommittee of oversight on
the Department of Justice and had a wide-ranging subpoena, a document
was presented which I ask unanimous consent
[[Page S9791]]
be printed in the Record, Mr. President.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
December 9, 1996.
To: Mr. Esposito.
From: Director.
Subject: Democratic National Campaign Matter.
As I related to you this morning, I met with the Attorney
General on Friday, 12/6/96, to discuss the above-captioned
matter.
I stated that DOJ had not yet referred the matter to the
FBI to conduct a full, criminal investigation. It was my
recommendation that this referral take place as soon as
possible.
I also told the Attorney General that since she had
declined to refer the matter to an Independent Counsel it was
my recommendation that she select a first rate DOJ legal team
from outside Main Justice to conduct that inquiry. In fact, I
said that these prosecutors should be ``junk-yard dogs'' and
that in my view, PIS was not capable of conducting the
thorough, aggressive kind of investigation which was
required.
I also advised the Attorney General of Lee Radek's comment
to you that there was a lot of ``pressure'' on him and PIS
regarding this case because the ``Attorney General's job
might hang in the balance'' (or words to that effect). I
stated that those comments would be enough for me to take him
and the Criminal Division off the case completely.
I also stated that it didn't make sense for PIS to call the
FBI the ``lead agency'' in this matter while operating a
``task force'' with DOC IGs who were conducting interviews of
key witnesses without the knowledge or participation of the
FBI.
I strongly recommended that the FBI and hand-picked DOJ
attorneys from outside Main Justice run this case as we would
any matter of such importance and complexity.
We left the conversation on Friday with arrangements to
discuss the matter again on Monday. The Attorney General and
I spoke today and she asked for a meeting to discuss the
``investigative team'' and hear our recommendations. The
meeting is now scheduled for Wednesday, 12/11/96, which you
and Bob Litt will also attend.
I intend to repeat my recommendations from Friday's
meeting. We should present all of our recommendations for
setting up the investigation--both AUSAs and other resources.
You and I should also discuss and consider whether on the
basis of all the facts and circumstances--including Huang's
recently released letters to the President as well as Radek's
comments--whether I should recommend that the Attorney
General reconsider referral to an Independent Counsel.
It was unfortunate that DOJ declined to allow the FBI to
play any role in the Independent Counsel referral
deliberations. I agree with you that based on the DOJ's
experience with the Cisneros matter--which was only referred
to an Independent Counsel because the FBI and I intervened
directly with the Attorney General--it was decided to exclude
us from this decision-making process.
Nevertheless, based on information recently reviewed from
PIS/DOC, we should determine whether or not an Independent
Counsel referral should be made at this time. If so, I will
make the recommendation to the Attorney General.
Mr. SPECTER. The essence of the document disclosed that there had
been an effort by ranking officials in the Department of Justice to try
to influence the FBI not to pursue an investigation on campaign finance
irregularities in December of 1996 because at that time Attorney
General Reno was under consideration for reappointment. The relevant
part of this document from Director Freeh to Mr. Esposito, who was his
deputy handling this matter:
I also advised the Attorney General of Lee Radek's comment
to you that there was a lot of ``pressure'' on him and PIS
[Public Integrity Section] regarding this case because the
``Attorney General's job might hang in the balance'' (or
words to that effect). I stated that those comments would be
enough for me to take him and the Criminal Division off the
case completely.
This matter was not brought to the attention of the Judiciary
Committee as a matter of oversight. In my judgment, this is the kind of
a matter which the Director, on his own, without request, without
knowledge by the oversight committee, without subpoena, as it was
disclosed some 4 years later, should have turned over as a matter of
oversight.
Another amendment which I intend to offer would give the national
intelligence director a 10-year term on the analogy to the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. That would enable the director of
national intelligence to have a substantial degree of independence
since his term would outlast the term of the President--4 years or,
with reelection, a total of 8 years.
We have seen in today's press reports of very substantial problems in
the FBI, where there are inadequate translators and a great deal of
information from al-Qaida has gone untranslated. I have talked to FBI
Director Mueller, who tells me the information is dated, but there is
still a significant problem in having sufficient translators to handle
that important matter so we have our intelligence in hand.
The national intelligence director is going to have to be strong and
independent, with enough stature, with a tenure of a 10-year term, to
come to the Congress and be able to see to it that adequate funds are
provided for the intelligence community.
The media reports are full of information that show very substantial
problems on what would happen in Iraq after a military victory with the
insurgents. The national intelligence director is going to have to be
strong and independent and bring those matters to the attention of the
Congress as well as to the executive branch.
It is my hope that in this legislation we will do a complete job and
structure the responsibilities of the national intelligence director to
give him the authority on budget and the authority on supervision,
direction, and control to effectively manage and oversee the entire
intelligence community.
That is an abbreviated statement of a great many considerations. At
this time, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Smith). The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, Senator Specter is offering the first of
what I anticipate will be many amendments to alter the authority of the
national intelligence director. He is arguing that the Collins-
Lieberman bill does not go far enough. Later on in this debate you will
hear from those who believe our bill empowers the NID too far, with too
much authority in the NID.
Our approach gives the national intelligence director full budget
authority, including the authority to execute, reprogram, and transfer
funds over the entire budgets of the National Security Agency, the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National
Reconnaissance Office, which are all now located within the Department
of Defense.
Our bill also gives the NID enhanced tasking authority, the power to
transfer personnel and authority over the selections of the heads of
these agencies with concurrence from the Secretary of Defense.
What it does not do is sever the link between these agencies and the
Secretary of Defense, nor does it give the NID exclusive control over
these agencies. And that would be the impact of Senator Specter's
amendment. He would sever the link between these agencies and the
Secretary of Defense, and he would give the NID exclusive control over
these agencies. I think that would be a mistake.
I believe our legislation strikes the right balance in the
relationship that it sets forth between the NID and these agencies. I
note that our approach is consistent with the recommendations of the 9/
11 Commission. It is consistent with the recommendations of the
administration. The 9/11 Commission, indeed, opposes adoption of
Senator Specter's amendment. The Commission believes it would be a
mistake to sever that link between these agencies and the Secretary of
Defense.
In deciding to keep these agencies--the NSA, the NGA, and the NRO--
within the Department of Defense, we were cognizant of the fact that
the NSA and the NGA are designated as combat support agencies. We did
not want to in any way weaken or break the bonds between these agencies
and the military forces that serve in that capacity. Indeed, many
current and former defense officials warned that taking such a step
would be counterproductive and would risk breaking something that is
working well for the military today.
For example, at our hearings, Secretary Powell said:
We should not break the link between these intelligence
organizations and the organizations that they are supporting,
especially within the military context and the direct kind of
support that the NRO and similar organizations give to the
warfighter.
I would note that by severing that link, the Specter amendment would
create some real anomalies. For example, in his proposal, he requires
that every 2 years, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would
submit to the national intelligence director a report on the combat
readiness of these organizations. Why would a report on
[[Page S9792]]
combat readiness go to the national intelligence director rather than
to the Secretary of Defense?
There are some other unanticipated consequences of the Specter
amendment that illustrate how wholesale changes to the status of NGA,
NRO, and the NSA might have completely unintended consequences. For
example, title X, section 442(b) now provides that the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall improve means of navigating
vessels of the Navy and the merchant marine by providing, under the
authority of the Secretary of Defense, accurate and inexpensive
nautical charts, sailing directions, books on navigation, and manuals
of instructions for the use of all vessels in the United States and of
navigators generally. The Specter amendment, in changing the Secretary
of Defense to the national intelligence director, would make the
national intelligence director responsible for a navigation mapping
responsibility that has nothing to do with intelligence. That is just
an example of some of the unintended consequences.
Again, the approach taken by Senator Specter--and I know he has given
this matter a great deal of thought--does not have the support of the
9/11 Commission. It does not have the support of the administration. It
would sever the link between these combat support agencies and the
Secretary of Defense.
I will note that these three agencies within the Pentagon do serve
customers other than the Secretary of Defense. There are other
consumers, such as the CIA, for the intelligence information they
produce. That is why our legislation does give the NID significant
authority over these agencies, including budget authority, the ability
to transfer personnel, and the ability, with the concurrence of the
Secretary of Defense, to name the heads of these agencies. That is the
right balance. But to break that link between these agencies and the
Secretary of Defense simply, in my judgment, does not make sense.
I urge opposition to the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, with great respect for Senator Specter,
friend and colleague, I rise to oppose this amendment.
I want to say that Senator Specter has been a very constructive
member of the Governmental Affairs Committee, not just on this matter
but on so many others that come before the committee. He has
contributed substantially to the strength of the bill that is before
the Senate that Senator Collins and I have offered. He and I talked
quite seriously about this earlier in the year, and ultimately my
conclusion was that it would construct a bridge too far.
We have a crisis, which the 9/11 Commission documents, which is that
we have an intelligence community, as we discussed yesterday and showed
on the graphs, without a leader, without anyone in charge. It is so
frustrating to the point of being infuriating to read the lengthy
narrative at the beginning of the 9/11 Report to see documented the
failure to connect the dots. The cases that Senator Specter mentioned--
one agency knowing something, not telling it to another agency, which
might well have either kept out some of the terrorists who struck us on
September 11--should have--or would have opened our eyes to the plot
that was being hatched that FBI agents came face to face with, this is
a system, the American intelligence community, without a leader.
The most urgent recommendation, according to Governor Kean and
Congressman Hamilton, that the Commission makes to us is to create a
strong national intelligence director and then, right alongside that, a
strong counterterrorism center--connect the dots. We have done this.
Senator Collins documented the various powers we have given to the
national intelligence director.
First, this has been a recommendation of commission after commission.
Going back to the late 1940s, when the National Security Act was
adopted and the Central Intelligence Agency was created, post Second
World War, there was the creation of the Director of Central
Intelligence who was supposed to be not just the head of the CIA but
the overseer of our entire intelligence community. The position was
taken but hamstrung. It was not given the power. The DCI was the same
person as the head of the CIA. That contributed to the community being
without a leader.
In this bill we separate these two positions. We create the
overarching national intelligence director, separate from the head of
the CIA, and we give that national intelligence director real budget
authority, personnel authority and tasking, assignment coordinating
authority, which we are convinced will make us a lot safer and stronger
against the threat of terrorism here at home and against Americans and
others throughout the world.
The Specter amendment goes further than that and would provide that
not only would the national intelligence director in the underlying
bill direct, oversee, and execute the budgets of these agencies, but he
or she would also supervise, direct, and control their day-to-day
operations. That approach would create a department in everything but
name and put the national intelligence director in charge of multiple
agencies on a day-to-day basis.
One of the witnesses before our committee was Philip Zelikow,
Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission. We asked Dr. Zelikow: Did
the Commission consider creating a department of intelligence, giving
the national intelligence director the powers that the Specter
amendment would give?
Dr. Zelikow said: Yes, the Commission considered creating such a
department but decided against it on several bases.
And they are the bases of my opposition to the Specter amendment.
First, the current job that the Director of Central Intelligence had--
which was CIA Director, director of presumably the overall intelligence
community and principle intelligence adviser to the President--was in
itself more than one person could do. To give powers to the national
intelligence director for day-to-day operations of the agencies under
his or her control would again give more authority, more responsibility
than the Commission decided was appropriate and manageable.
The Commission also opted for what they considered to be a more
modern management approach. They didn't want to create another big
Federal bureaucracy; they wanted to create, really patterned after some
very large and very successful private corporations in this country, a
central management system, strong as our national intelligence director
would be, with budget, personnel, tasking authority, but not top heavy,
agile, and not in response or in charge of the day-to-day decisions of
all of the agencies under that position. That is what we have in the
approach we are taking in this bill.
Senator Collins said some people will say--and you will hear of
amendments on this floor, as the debate goes on, from Members and those
outside the Chamber who feel the bill Senator Collins and I have put
before the Senate gives the national intelligence director too much
power. They will try to strip away that power or fuzz it up so that it
is not clear and the status quo can remain. There will be plenty of
opportunity to argue against that when those amendments are filed.
But here we are in the middle of a war on terrorism, struck as we
were on September 11, under a continuing threat of attack, alerts all
over, particularly in Washington and New York--real concern--and to do
what looks like protecting the status quo of the particular authority
of existing agencies doesn't make sense. There will be those who feel
our bill goes too far.
I don't mean to put words into Senator Specter's mouth because he is
very eloquent, but this amendment suggests we have not gone far enough.
The Commission deliberately decided not to take the National Security
Agency, National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, and National
Reconnaissance Organization out of the Department of Defense. The
Commission was concerned, Dr. Zelikow said, about the balance between
national and departmental guidance, and they didn't want to tilt the
balance too far away from defense. The Commission's executive director
portrayed the Commission's idea of a lean, creative command center this
way:
Since terrorism poses such a revolutionary challenge to old
ways of executive management in our national security
bureaucracy,
[[Page S9793]]
counterterrorism requires an innovative response.
I believe the underlying bill does exactly that: real authority,
decisionmaking authority, but lean and, may I add, mean, because the
people who are threatening us are very mean.
The other thing the kind of structure we have created does is make it
harder for the problems that many in the Senate and Committee on
Intelligence cited in its report on prewar intelligence are worried
about, which is group-think. There is an increased danger that persons
at the top of the daily operations of the organizations--there is a
danger that you will begin to have not the competition of ideas we want
to see in our intelligence community and that we feel strongly will be
encouraged by the national intelligence director we are creating by the
language in the bill, the focus on independence and objectivity of
intelligence and by the national counterterrorism center, which is
ultimately the place where everybody who knows anything about a
particular problem--in this case terrorism--and maybe the director will
create other centers on weapons of mass destruction for particularly
problematic countries like Iran or North Korea. Everybody in the
Government who knows anything about that will sit down together to
share what they have collected in the way of intelligence, share their
analysis of it, and then plan jointly on how to stop it, how to deal
with the threat represented by those situations.
So I believe Senator Specter's intentions are very good, and I admire
him for them. But I think at this moment they are a bridge too far,
both in the substance of where he would take us and also, frankly, in
terms of the probability of any such measure passing Congress. There is
an urgency to our deliberations, as we have said over and over again. I
think if we reach too far, we may end up with nothing and nothing
maintains the status quo, which failed us on September 11 and will fail
us again unless we act.
I oppose the amendment. I thank the Chair and I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, by way of a very brief reply at this
time, others will say the committee bill goes too far, and the
committee bill stands between others who would reject any
reorganization of the national intelligence community. The amendment I
have offered doesn't go to that point.
The question is, what is the best way to reorganize the national
intelligence community? When reference is made to the comments by Mr.
Zelikow, the executive director of the 9/11 Commission, he made an
analysis of S. 2811, which is a bill similar to the amendment now
pending, but it is not the same. I think it is an overstatement to say
that the 9/11 Commission rejects the amendment I have offered because
it hasn't been considered by the Commission.
Former Senator Bob Kerrey, who was vice chairman of the Intelligence
Committee during my tenure as chairman, called me, unsolicited, and
said that he favored the elements which I had offered and thought it
was preferable to have the national intelligence director with greater
authority, which I was proposing.
I believe it is a fair statement to say that the 9/11 Commission
would be pleased to see us move to establish a national intelligence
director, whether it was along the lines of the committee report or
whether it was along the lines of my amendment. I say, too, that it is
important to establish a national intelligence director with as many
powers as we can reasonably give the national intelligence director. I
think that is what the 9/11 Commission is looking for. I don't think it
can be accurately said that the 9/11 Commission rejects the substance
of my amendment. Certainly, former Senator Bob Kerrey, who was a member
of the 9/11 Commission, was not, as far as I can say from an
unsolicited call. He said he liked the substance of what I was
offering.
I think other Senators are going to be interested in participating in
the debate. It was unknown, generally, what sequence would occur as to
the offering of the amendment. But I think others will want to come and
be heard.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia is recognized.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I rise to oppose the amendment
offered by Senator Specter. I do so with regret but with conviction.
Regarding the phrase ``direct and control their day-to-day
operations,'' if somebody wants to make the national intelligence
director strong, that will certainly do it. The question is, what does
that mean? What are the implications? That goes into the law, and then
people have to interpret what that law means. I think if there is
anywhere we want to be quite clear, we want the American people,
through public law, to understand how far the national intelligence
director can go and, on the other hand, to what point can that
particular person not go.
We give that person all kinds of authority, and I think the
appropriate authority, but when we get into managing and direct control
of the day-to-day operations, that is a phrase which concerns me
greatly, and I say so not as one Senator from West Virginia but as vice
chairman of the Intelligence Committee.
My understanding is that this was brought up in the Governmental
Affairs Committee and was defeated by a vote of 12 to 5, which is not
nip and tuck.
I think the recommendations that were central to the 9/11 Commission
were very forthright, and Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman have
reflected in their bill, which I am proud to cosponsor, very strong
measures: a unified budget--oh, there are some people around town who
are not very happy about that, which is all right--personnel,
management authority over the national intelligence programs.
But then we come back to the phrase ``direct and control their day-
to-day operations,'' and that makes me go to an argument which I am
quite sure, since I was not on the floor, was used by both good
Senators who are managing this bill. And that is, what I think they
tried to do is they figured some people would want to have the national
intelligence director stronger than what they proposed, and others
would want to have the national intelligence director weaker than what
they proposed. I heard cases on both sides.
As I hear those cases, I am drawn more back to the possibility of the
one I think is the more sensible approach as a person who has been in
government for a long time but also, quite frankly, I am interested in
passing a bill and passing a bill that we are pretty sure will be doing
no harm as a result of the passing of that bill. I am not sure the
Specter amendment meets that particular test.
We have all these agencies, and we want to create some sense of
order, but we do not want to get unnecessarily in the way in places
where we should not of the combatant commanders, which Senator Collins
mentioned in her excellent opening statement yesterday. There are some
things which the military should be able to make decisions about
outside of the national intelligence director, and they are allowed to
so do on a modest basis, but on an important basis, by this bill.
The Collins-Lieberman bill strikes exactly the correct balance on
this matter, and I think balance, generally speaking, is what works in
this country and balance is generally what gets bills passed in a
closely divided Senate.
Their bill explicitly acknowledges the connection and, at times, the
tension with what I have just spoken about, and that is the needs of
the military and the needs of the intelligence community.
The Collins-Lieberman bill accommodates the uniformed military's
legitimate need to control its operations. I think that is right
without shortchanging the consumers of the intelligence, such as the
President of the United States, Congress, and senior officials
throughout the Government, such as the Secretary of State and the
Secretary of Homeland Security.
Their bill correctly recognizes the new national intelligence
director will have to rely on the expertise of his newly created
deputies which are left, to my way of thinking, in their bill very
intelligently just floating a bit so that he can decide wisely how best
to do that rather than decide everything in a period of a week or two.
I think Chairman Kean and Vice Chairman Hamilton have endorsed the
approach contained in the Collins-Lieberman bill. That would be good
[[Page S9794]]
enough for me on most matters, and it certainly is on this matter. The
notion that the national intelligence director established under this
bill would not be sufficiently empowered to effectively manage the
intelligence community is not borne out when one reads this
legislation, and that is what they are doing. They are doing the
managing of the national intelligence aspect.
Without going on at great length, I like the balance. It is the
nature of this body to seek out that kind of balance. We have to be
realistic that we are faced in the days ahead with some fairly strong
probable assaults upon this bill by those from the Armed Services
Committee and perhaps some from other committees, and our strength in
being able to get a bill passed, in knowing we passed a good bill, is
by sticking to a moderate and centrist course which, in fact, is quite
radical in terms of everything which has taken place since the National
Security Act of 1947. This bill is an enormous update.
I just wish to be understood as being strongly for the approach of
Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman. I thank the Presiding Officer.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from West Virginia
for his excellent comments. He states the case very well.
There are two final points that I would like to make on Senator
Specter's amendment, and that is, when we asked Philip Zelikow, the
executive director of the 9/11 Commission, to comment on this, he gave
us a history of why the Commission specifically rejected this approach,
and we talked about many of the reasons.
But one other that he mentioned is that one damaging consequence of
stripping NSA, NGA, and NRO out of the Department of Defense is that
then the Pentagon might well feel obligated to recreate the
capabilities within the Department at great expense and creating many
more opportunities for bureaucratic conflict. That was a point made by
the executive director in expressing his opposition to Senator
Specter's amendment and in giving us an insight into why the Commission
specifically rejected the route taken in this amendment.
I also note that Senator Specter's amendment, while it is intended to
create clear lines of authority between the NID and the combat support
agencies, in reality could well create much ambiguity and confusion.
While the amendment gives the NID supervision, direction, and control
over these combat support agencies, it keeps them housed in DOD
buildings, on DOD land, and the amendment does not take away from the
Secretary of Defense the direction and control he currently has over
these agencies.
For example, the law that created the National Imagery and Mapping
Agency, which is now the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,
establishes that Agency under the authority, direction, and control of
the Secretary of Defense. Yet under the Specter amendment, the NSA, the
NGA, and the NRO would fall under the line authority of both Agencies.
I think that would create tremendous confusion and ambiguity.
Mr. President, I see the time for the vote has arrived.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The next 2 minutes will be equally divided by
the proponents and opponents prior to the vote occurring at 4:30.
Mr. SPECTER. Parliamentary inquiry: I believe we have 2 more minutes
until 4:30.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. And those 2 minutes will be equally divided.
Mr. SPECTER. I seek recognition to make a comment about the pending
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, we can get more into the details on
rebuttal as to what Senator Collins has said. I do not think it is
accurate that we are taking away key authority from the Department of
Defense, but I want to print in the Record a letter signed by 14
Senators objecting to the committee bill saying that it ``does not give
the NID additional authorities will be required to provide the unity of
leadership and accountability necessary for real intelligence reform.
In particular, we feel strongly that the NID must have day-to-day
operational control of all elements of the Intelligence Community
performing national missions.'' It is signed by Senators Roberts,
Shelby, DeWine, Hatch, Lott, Snowe, Voinovich, Bayh, Graham, Wyden,
Bond, Hagel, Chambliss, and myself. There is the current chairman,
Senator Roberts, and three prior chairmen, Senator Shelby, Senator
Graham, and myself.
I ask unanimous consent that this be printed in the Record together
with a memorandum from me to the members of the Senate Intelligence
Committee dated December 5, 1995.
A December 9, 1996 memorandum has already been printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, September 20, 2004.
Hon. Susan Collins, Chairman,
Hon. Joseph Lieberman, Ranking Member,
Committee on Governmental Affairs,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Collins and Senator Lieberman: We would like
to congratulate both of you for your hard work to draft
legislation to reform and strengthen the Intelligence
Community. We have covered much ground over the last few
months, unraveling the complicated issue of intelligence
reform. As a result of your outstanding leadership, we are
close to enacting meaningful reform. We understand that your
bill includes many important provisions, particularly the
creation of a National Intelligence Director (NID) with
strong budget authority.
We are writing to you, however, to express our serious
concern that the current draft of the bill, as described by
your summary and after review by Governmental Affairs
Committee members and staff, does not give the NID additional
authorities that will be required to provide the unity of
leadership and accountability necessary for real intelligence
reform. In particular, we feel strongly that the NID must
have day-to-day operational control of all elements of the
Intelligence Community performing national missions. To
fulfill the historic intent of the National Security Act of
1947, we must provide the NID--as head of the Intelligence
Community--the additional authorities necessary to match the
position's responsibilities and to ensure accountability. To
address these concerns, we request the opportunity to meet
with you prior to any further committee action on the
legislation.
In addition to day-to-day operational control of all
elements of the Intelligence Community performing national
missions, some members also believe that we must either
explicitly create a new agency, or at least provide the NID
with supervision, direction, and control similar to a
department or independent agency head.
Clear lines of authority between the NID and our national
intelligence agencies, extending beyond budgetary control,
are critical to our success in countering 21st Century
national security threats. There must be no doubt in anyone's
mind that the NID is in charge and is accountable.
Thank you for you leadership under very challenging
circumstances, and we look forward to meeting with you prior
to the committee mark-up of intelligence reform legislation.
Working together, we can achieve the real intelligence reform
that we all seek.
Sincerely,
Pat Roberts, Mike DeWine, Trent Lott, George V.
Voinovich, Bob Graham, Christopher S. Bond, Saxby
Chambliss, Richard Shelby, Orrin Hatch, Olympia Snowe,
Evan Bayh, Ron Wyden, Chuck Hagel, Arlen Specter.
____
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC, December 5, 1995.
To: Members, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
From: Arlen Specter.
Re Ames Damage Assessment Inquiry.
On November 29, 1995, Charlie Battaglia, Fred Ward and I
and Gerry Prevost, from CIA's Office of Inspector General,
went to the home of L in Springfield, VA, to take his
testimony because L advised that his medical condition was
such that he could not come to the Committee. The deposition
lasted about one hour and 45 minutes., The transcript is
available for your review.
L began working for the CIA in 1950 and during the period
from 1980 to 1991, L was Chief of Reports and Requirements in
CIA's Soviet East European Division. He was responsible for
determining the quality of Soviet sources, assessing the
authenticity of the intelligence, and disseminating those
reports to policymakers.
L readily conceded that he knew intelligence data came from
Soviet controlled sources and that he disseminated such data
to the highest levels of our government without disclosing
the fact that it came from such controlled sources.
When I expressed shock at this, L confidently responded
that he had acted entirely properly because disclosure of the
controlled source would have made it even harder to ``sell''
the intelligence to policy makers, there was no reason to
believe the Soviets used deception, no customer could use it
unless his unit gave permission, and no customer would make
any decision based on one or two documents.
[[Page S9795]]
L boasted that often U.S. general officers came to him
directly for assessments of Soviet information much to the
consternation of his division director.
When L was told that his successor, Z, denied knowing that
such intelligence data came from a source known to be
controlled by the Soviets, L responded ``bullshit.'' Z
received only a letter of reprimand for passing on
intelligence data from Soviet controlled sources without
appropriate disclosures.
It is had to comprehend: (1) how L failed to understand
that his conduct posed a grave threat to U.S. national
security and was an unconscionable arrogation of power unto
himself; (2) how his superiors (some of whom reportedly knew
what he was doing) could permit him to function in this
manner for so long; and (3) why the Agency has not turned
heaven and earth to root out this kind of attitude and
conduct. From the Ames case and other matters, L's conduct
and attitude appears to represent a deep-seated institutional
problem for the Agency.
Detailed questioning must be undertaken of the supervisors
of L and Z, including the Directors, to determine how this
could have gone on so long. Extensive work remains to be done
to trace to whom the controlled data went, what decisions
such data influenced and what damage the U.S. sustained from
such decisions.
Amendment No. 3711
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, do I have 1 minute remaining before
the vote begins?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 1 minute.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I hope my colleagues will support this
air cargo security amendment. This is an amendment that the Senate has
voted on twice and passed. It will add significantly to the security of
our aviation community. The airports and the top of the airplane are
very safe. We have done a super job of creating those safe areas, but
what we have not done is matched that with cargo security, what is in
the belly of the airplane. We want a seamless aviation system, and with
this amendment I think we will have the safest aviation system in the
world.
I am very proud to have the support of so many of my colleagues, and
I hope we send a strong message that this amendment should be added to
the final bill. I appreciate the support of the chairman, the ranking
member, the chairman of the Commerce Committee, and the Aviation
Subcommittee as well.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I urge support for Senator Hutchison's
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I ask unanimous consent to speak for not more than 1
minute.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The
Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair.
Mr. President, I rise to support Senator Hutchison's amendment. It
really strengthens the basic bill that we brought before the Chamber.
It would reorganize our intelligence community to better deal with the
threat of terrorism. We want this core proposal to be a vehicle for
responding to the other recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and to
close as many of the points of vulnerability that we have in America to
terrorists as we possibly can.
The Commission said major vulnerabilities still exist in cargo and
general aviation security. This amendment would go a long way toward
ending those vulnerabilities. I thank the Senator from Texas, and I
urge adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following the
conclusion of the vote I be recognized to speak in opposition to the
Specter amendment for 10 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The question is on agreeing to Hutchison amendment No. 3711. The yeas
and nays have been ordered.
The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. Akaka), the
Senator from New Jersey (Mr. Corzine), the Senator from North Carolina
(Mr. Edwards), and the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry) are
necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 96, nays 0, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 190 Leg.]
YEAS--96
Alexander
Allard
Allen
Baucus
Bayh
Bennett
Biden
Bingaman
Bond
Boxer
Breaux
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Byrd
Campbell
Cantwell
Carper
Chafee
Chambliss
Clinton
Cochran
Coleman
Collins
Conrad
Cornyn
Craig
Crapo
Daschle
Dayton
DeWine
Dodd
Dole
Domenici
Dorgan
Durbin
Ensign
Enzi
Feingold
Feinstein
Fitzgerald
Frist
Graham (FL)
Graham (SC)
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Harkin
Hatch
Hollings
Hutchison
Inhofe
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kohl
Kyl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Lott
Lugar
McCain
McConnell
Mikulski
Miller
Murkowski
Murray
Nelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)
Nickles
Pryor
Reed
Reid
Roberts
Rockefeller
Santorum
Sarbanes
Schumer
Sessions
Shelby
Smith
Snowe
Specter
Stabenow
Stevens
Sununu
Talent
Thomas
Voinovich
Warner
Wyden
NOT VOTING--4
Akaka
Corzine
Edwards
Kerry
The amendment (No. 3711) was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized for 10
minutes.
amendment no. 3706
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the Specter
amendment. I wish to compliment the managers of the bill, Senators
Collins and Lieberman. I thought their arguments were overwhelmingly
persuasive in support of the President's position and indeed the 9/11
Commission that these agencies--the National Security Agency; the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the former Mapping Agency, as
we knew it; and the National Reconnaissance Office--have important
intelligence functions. They are collection agencies. They must remain
under the managerial supervision of the Secretary of Defense. I feel
ever so strongly about that.
These three agencies are designated in law as combat support
agencies, servicing our troops, the men and women of the Armed Forces
wherever they are in the world facing harm's way, today, tomorrow, and
in the future.
The President announced, on September 8, that these three agencies
would not--I repeat, would not--be moved from the Department of
Defense. This decision was based on two very important principles: One,
no reform measures that the President advocates should disrupt ongoing
operations in the war on terrorism. I am certain all colleagues fully
appreciate the sensitivity of that extremely important decision and
principle not to move these three agencies. Secondly, no ambiguity
should be introduced in the chain of command, from the President
through the Secretary of Defense down to the combatant commanders. That
is vital to the war on terrorism and indeed other military operations.
These three agencies are designated combat support agencies providing
direct intelligence support to the unified combatant commanders
currently fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in other theaters.
The Secretary of Defense is accountable to the President. Under law--
I shall turn to the law momentarily. To ensure that these agencies
provide the proper intelligence to our military customers, the
Secretary of Defense must be able to direct them in executing their
operational missions.
I would like to pause for a minute and draw to my colleagues'
attention the law. It reads, for the Secretary of Defense:
The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director
of Central Intelligence, shall--
(1) ensure that the budgets of the elements of the
intelligence community within the Department of Defense are
adequate to satisfy the overall intelligence needs of the
Department of Defense. . . .
Further on down it reads:
(4) ensure that the elements of the intelligence community
within the Department of Defense are responsive and timely
with respect to satisfying the needs of operational military
forces. . . .
[[Page S9796]]
I do not see how the amendment of my colleague from Pennsylvania
modifies the existing law, and that is imperative if this amendment is
to be effective.
I draw my colleagues' attention further to the law, and that is title
10 with respect to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. I read from
section 193:
(a) Combat Readiness.--(1) Periodically (and not less often
than every two years), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff shall submit to the Secretary of Defense a report on
the combat support agencies. Each such report shall
include--
(A) a determination with respect to the responsiveness and
readiness of each such agency to support operating forces in
the event of a war or threat to national security; and
(B) any recommendations that the Chairman considers
appropriate.
That law would have to be modified in some way were this amendment to
be adopted.
So, in conclusion, Mr. President and colleagues, I foresee a
potential disruption to operations were this amendment to become law.
Numbers are classified, but approximately one-half of the employees of
these agencies are Active-Duty military personnel.
In addition to national requirements, these agencies provide great
volumes of tactical-level support to the warfighter.
Also, in existing law, I draw to my colleagues' attention that the
Under Secretary of the Air Force is dual-hatted as a Director for the
NRO. So that, too, would have to be amended and changed. Furthermore,
the Director of the NSA is dual-hatted. He is a Deputy Commander of
Strategic Command for Information, warfighting responsibility.
So in conclusion, I strongly support the position of the
distinguished chairman and ranking member and urge colleagues to vote
against this amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have listened with a keen interest, as
I always do, when the Senator from Virginia speaks. The concerns which
I have seen in my tenure on the Intelligence Committee and as chair--
and I served with the Senator from Virginia on the Intelligence
Committee--is the dominance of the Department of Defense on the budget
and the lack of coordination with the other intelligence agencies, the
Central Intelligence Agency, and the counterintelligence branch of the
FBI.
The citations of authority which the Senator from Virginia raises can
all be accommodated. In a very careful way, very carefully crafted, we
have left the Department of Defense with the necessary intelligence
gathering for them to perform their mission and their function.
When the national intelligence director has overall supervision and
management, it does not mean that the Secretary of Defense will not
have access to information from the NRO or the NSA or the other
branches. When we hear those citations of authority, they can all be
molded consistent with the amendment I have offered, which, as the most
recent enactment, governs and dominates.
So I know the sincerity and I know the perspective of the chairman of
the Armed Services Committee. When I had introduced S. 1718 back in
April of 1996, and it was referred to the Armed Services Committee, it
was emasculated, really, on a turf struggle. I think there is a very
heavy overtone of the turf battle which is present here this afternoon
at this moment.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the one thing we want to avoid is
patchwork legislation. I have drawn to the attention of my colleague--
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I yield the floor. I had the floor, but I
do yield it.
Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague. But, I say to the Senator, I would
be happy to enter into a colloquy with you on this point.
Mr. SPECTER. Then in that event I will stay standing.
Mr. WARNER. I would hope you do so.
I pointed out specific provisions of the law requiring certain
accountability of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs. We do not want to do patchwork legislation.
My understanding, after reading and studying your amendment, is you
take these three entities out of the Department of Defense. I do not
read into the amendment where there is a residual authority left in the
Secretary to perform the functions as prescribed in title 10 and, to
some extent, title 50.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, through the Chair, I would inquire of the
Senator from Virginia, what does he see which would stop those various
officers from complying with those requirements and still allow the
national intelligence director to have overall management? That is my
question to the Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. I will wait for the Senator from West Virginia to answer.
You directed it to the Senator from West Virginia.
Mr. SPECTER. I hadn't meant to promote Senator Warner.
Mr. WARNER. I am trying to inject a little lightheartedness.
Mr. SPECTER. If you are confused on the substance of the question,
maybe the court reporter could repeat it.
Mr. WARNER. I say to my good friend, a little humor now and then is
well advised. But I understand precisely the question directed to me.
Let us read your amendment. Would you read your amendment and show me
where that residual authority under titles 10 and 50 are left in the
Secretary of Defense?
Mr. SPECTER. There is nothing in the amendment which takes the so-
called residual authority from the Secretary of Defense. The amendment
gives to the national intelligence director management and supervision,
but it does not undercut the directions of the statutes to which you
have referred.
Mr. WARNER. I would draw that argument to the attention of the
distinguished manager of the bill. My understanding, in reading some of
your comments, is that I do not find in this amendment where there is a
clear delineation of authority and that managerial responsibility, as
required under titles 10 and 50, remains in the Secretary of Defense.
Ms. COLLINS. If the Senator will yield on that point, I think this
points out the confusion and ambiguity I pointed out earlier due to the
way the Specter amendment is drafted. I agree that it creates confusion
and also that the implications of substituting the national
intelligence director for the Secretary of Defense throughout the laws
creating these agencies creates a lot of unintended problems. That is
one reason I believe this amendment should be defeated.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, the concept of unintended consequences is
not an unusual argument. It can be attenuated in many directions. My
submission to this body is that the amendment is plain on its face,
that it seeks to create a national intelligence director who has the
authority to manage the intelligence community. When the Senator from
Virginia cites responsibilities in existing law, there is nothing in my
amendment which undercuts that law, nothing at all. Ambiguity, like
beauty, is in the eye of the beholder, and in this situation, on the
face of the amendment, there is no ambiguity.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am reading from section 305, Defense
Intelligence Agency. I believe that is clear on the DIA, but I do not
see it with reference to the National Reconnaissance Office. ``The
Director of the National Reconnaissance Office shall be under the
direction, supervision, and control of the NID.'' I just see no
residual managerial authority left in the Secretary of Defense to
fulfill his statutory requirements under titles 10 and 50.
``Line of authority: The Director of National Reconnaissance shall
report directly to the national intelligence director regarding the
activities of the National Reconnaissance Office.'' I mean, there is
the clear English language.
I say to my good friend, he may be well intentioned, but I am
somewhat at a loss to find any reference in this amendment that
preserves that residual responsibility which you have represented to
the Senate.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I regret the Senator from Virginia is at
a loss, but that doesn't affect the plain language of the amendment and
the fact that it doesn't disturb the responsibilities under the section
cited by the Senator from Virginia.
[[Page S9797]]
Mr. WARNER. Might I just hand you the amendment and ask you to point
to the language which you feel leaves the residual authority in the
Secretary of Defense?
Mr. SPECTER. I think the amendment speaks for itself, I say to
Senator Warner.
Mr. WARNER. I have given every opportunity to my colleague. I stand
by my representations to my colleagues and I support the managers of
the bill in having this amendment defeated.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, the bottom line of the Specter amendment
is that it would sever the reporting relationship between the heads of
these three combat support agencies and the Secretary of Defense. I
don't think that makes sense. I understand these three agencies serve
consumers of intelligence other than the Pentagon, other than the war
fighters, but the Pentagon, the war fighter, is a very important
consumer of the intelligence produced by these agencies, and that is
why in our legislation we gave a lot of thought to how to handle the
organization of these agencies and the reporting requirements.
We followed the advice of the 9/11 Commission. We kept a reporting
relationship to the Secretary of Defense in acknowledgment of the
combat support agency role played by these organizations. But in
recognition of the fact that they also provide critical intelligence to
the CIA and to a host of other agencies and to the President, we
recognized that they are national as well.
What we have is a dual reporting responsibility to both the Secretary
of Defense and the new national intelligence director. We do strengthen
the control of the national intelligence director in significant ways
in acknowledgment that these are national assets. We give the director
control over the budget of these agencies. We allow the director to
appoint the heads of these agencies with concurrence from the Secretary
of Defense. The new national intelligence director can transfer
personnel and funds. But we should not sever the link between those
agencies and the Secretary of Defense. That would be a big mistake.
I urge my colleagues to oppose the Specter amendment.
I appreciate the support of the chairman of the Armed Services
Committee.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if the distinguished manager would yield
for a question, the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania, in support
of his amendment, submitted for the record a letter dated September 20,
2004, signed by a number of colleagues. Here is a statement that I
believe confirms the proposition I just enunciated, that the amendment
would strip the Secretary of all of his responsibilities as existing in
other statutes. I will read it:
We are writing to you, however, to express our serious
concern that current draft of the bill, as described by your
summary and after review--
It is addressed to the chairman.
--by the Governmental Affairs Committee members and staff,
does not give the NID additional authorities that will be
required to provide the unity of leadership and
accountability necessary for real intelligence reform. In
particular--
This is the operative sentence.
--we feel strongly that the NID must have day-to-day
operational control of all elements of the intelligence
community performing national missions.
It goes on. So it is very clear.
I would say that they do single out the term ``national missions,''
but these combat support agencies perform both national missions and
tactical combat missions. They are not clearly separable. I mean the
soldier, sailor, airman, and marine in the field today relies on
satellite intelligence, which is a national mission of, say, the NRO,
as well as the tactical support the NRO gives in various ways.
So I feel that as I read the amendment, it is totally contradictory
of the desire of the 9/11 Commission, totally contradictory of the
advice and counsel that the President has given the Congress, am I not
correct?
Ms. COLLINS. The Senator is correct and his points are well taken. In
reading to me the statement from that letter, the Senator has brought
up another important point. Do we really believe that the national
intelligence director should have line authority, day-to-day
operational authority over all of those agencies? We know that the 9/11
Commission found that one reason the CIA Director was not as effective
as he should be was he had too many jobs. He is head of the
intelligence community, he runs the CIA, and he is the principal
adviser to the President.
Under the formulation proposed by the Senator from Pennsylvania, we
would be worsening that problem by giving the NID line authority, day-
to-day operational authority. That person cannot possibly run all of
those agencies and still coordinate, oversee, and manage the
intelligence community.
So I believe this amendment goes too far. The Specter amendment
essentially creates a de facto department of intelligence, as my
colleague from Connecticut has pointed out, and that approach was
specifically rejected by the 9/11 Commission. They specifically
considered what should be the reporting relationships of these three
combat support agencies. They rejected the approach taken by the
Specter amendment. The administration also opposes that approach. Our
committee rejected that approach. Our witnesses did not think that
approach was wise.
I urge my colleagues to join in opposition to the amendment offered
by Senator Specter.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, may I ask my distinguished colleague
another question? This is a letter which is now submitted for the
Record. It contains the names of about eight or nine other Senators.
Have any of those Senators come to clarify this point? I would like to
study what they have said.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, in committee, some of the Senators who
signed that letter participated in the debate. They did not convince
the majority of the committee members. So far in this debate today, I
don't believe that other advocates of this approach have yet been
heard, but they may well be heard tomorrow. I know Senator Bond wants
to speak. I think there are both proponents and opponents who still
wish to be heard.
Mr. WARNER. I hope to be on the Senate floor when they do that. I
wonder if the managers of the bill might acquaint them with the title
10 and title 50 provisions and ask where in the amendment those
provisions are modified; otherwise, we are going to end up with a
patchwork. That is one thing I know this chairman and ranking member do
not wish to have.
Ms. COLLINS. The Senator's point is well taken.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank Senator Warner, who chairs the
Armed Services Committee, which the chairman of our committee and this
ranking member are privileged to serve on, for his statement, his
reference to sections of statute that could be compromised and indeed
overridden if this amendment of the Senator from Pennsylvania were
adopted.
I thought that the colloquy between Senator Warner and Senator
Collins was very illuminating. I hope our colleagues had a chance to
listen to it because it did, I believe, ultimately explain why this is
a bridge too far, a motto from the Second World War, where the troops
were sent to take one bridge too far--I have the feeling that Senator
Warner is going to know the background of this ``bridge too far''
reference--too far to hold the bridge and, as a result, the overall
effort collapsed.
I am afraid this stretches too far and it weighs down the reforms we
are trying to make. I believe the colloquy between Senator Warner and
Senator Collins is a great argument for the balance we have struck. We
leave the line authority over these national intelligence agencies with
the Defense Department. Without going into details--because it is
classified--thousands of men and women in uniform serve in these
agencies. So we want to leave that line authority with the Secretary of
Defense but create a reporting authority to the national intelligence
director because the NID will oversee the entire intelligence
community.
This has been a wonderful learning experience for Senator Collins and
me. We met with the head of the NSA, General Hayden, and the head of
the NGA, General Clapper, and it was fascinating to hear the extent to
which they are not only providing day-to-day technical military
intelligence to help their personnel in the field at Central
[[Page S9798]]
Command today, and other commands, but the way in which they are also
providing, because of their extraordinary capabilities, daily
assistance and intelligence security to law enforcement agencies. That
is the balance we tried to strike.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I will pose a question to both managers,
also members of the Armed Services Committee. As we proceed with this
legislation, I am sure you are bearing in mind that we recall the
aftermath of the 1991 war in which we participated in liberating
Kuwait. You will recall as a member of the committee that General
Schwarzkopf came before us at that time as sort of an after-action
report. He talked in some detail about what he felt were shortcomings,
particularly in the tactical intelligence, as to what he needed as a
warfighter, as commander of the forces. That sounded alarms throughout
the system. It startled many of us that that shortfall existed to that
extent. Immediately the then Secretary of Defense and the successive
Secretary of Defense--particularly Secretary Rumsfeld--have done
everything possible to strengthen and remove the weaknesses that were
in the system at that time.
As we proceed on this bill, I hope we have been mindful of particular
tactical strengths that have been built into the existing system. It
would be my fervent hope that nothing in this bill would roll back that
progress. I wonder if the managers might address that, since both are
members of the Armed Services Committee and have experience with the
gulf war and what has been done in the ensuing years.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Senator for his question, my chairman of
the Armed Services Committee. It is an important question, one that
Senator Collins and I weighed as we went through this process of
accepting the assignment from the bipartisan leadership to consider and
recommend to the Senate on the 9/11 Commission Report. We both take not
only our responsibility to protect America's security under the
Constitution seriously, we take our membership on the Armed Services
Committee seriously. We have a purpose here. We want to put somebody in
charge. The 9/11 Commission Report says the intelligence community
doesn't have a leader. They are not coordinating their effort. As we do
that, we said we want to make sure we don't compromise the quality and
availability of intelligence to our warfighters. In fact, we believe
our proposal not only doesn't compromise the quality of intelligence,
but will ultimately improve it because there will be better
coordination.
Even from within some of these agencies, national assets under the
Defense Department, high officials said to us that they don't benefit,
they don't think the military benefits, the warfighters benefit from
the current ambiguity. Make those lines clear, and all the customers,
if I can use that term, of intelligence will benefit, including the
military.
Senator Warner knows that in specific regard to the so-called TIARA,
or tactical intelligence budget of the military, that remains totally
within the Defense Department, and so do most of the joint military
intelligence programs. So the answer is a resounding yes. We understand
the uncertainty, the anxiety because of our bill. The 9/11 Commission
recommendations represent change. It does take the budget authority and
put it under the national intelligence director for national
intelligence programs, including these three within the Defense
Department. So we understand the anxiety. But we think we put together
a balanced system that will not only first provide the No. 1 customer
of intelligence, the President of the United States, with the best
intelligence, with the coordinated unity of effort that he requires,
but do the same for the warfighters. That is our firm belief.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, that is reassuring. If I might further
inquire of my distinguished colleague, I was given today, and I expect
the managers maybe earlier received this, in any event, this is the
September 28 communication from the Executive Office of the President
to the Senate. It is entitled ``Statement of Administration Policy.''
Has that been printed in the Record as yet today?
Ms. COLLINS. It has not.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, at this point in
the debate or at the conclusion of our colloquy, to print this
Statement of Administration Policy in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Statement of Administration Policy
The Administration supports Senate passage of S. 2845,
commends the Committee for its expeditious attention to these
important intelligence reform issues, appreciates the
Committee's efforts to include important provisions proposed
by the Administration, including specific and detailed budget
authorities for the National Intelligence Director (NID), and
looks forward to working with the Congress to address the
Administration's concerns outlined below. This measure will
build upon actions already taken by the Administration,
including in the President's recently issued Executive
Orders, as well as upon the recommendations of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11
Commission).
The Administration supports, in particular, the
establishment of a NID with full, effective, and meaningful
budget authorities and other authorities to manage the
Intelligence Community including statutory authority for the
newly created National Counterterrorism Center. The
Administration will oppose any amendments that would weaken
the full budget authority or any other authorities that the
President has requested for the NID. The Administration will
work in the legislative process to continue to strengthen and
streamline intelligence reform legislation and to make
adjustments to ensure that the President continues to have
flexibility in combating terrorism and conducting
intelligence activities.
The Administration is concerned about the excessive and
unnecessary detail in the structure of the Office of the NID.
In particular, provisions of S. 2845 would, in the aggregate,
construct a cumbersome new bureaucracy in the office of the
NID and in the Executive Office of the President with
overlapping authorities. Legislatively mandated bureaucracy
will hinder, not help, in the effort to strengthen U.S.
intelligence capabilities and to preserve our constitutional
rights. The Administration urges the Senate to delete or
significantly revise these problematic provisions.
The Administration opposes the Committee's attempt to
define in statute the programs that should be included in the
National Intelligence Program; the Administration believes
that further review is required. The Administration also
believes that the Committee bill's provision relating to the
NID's role in acquisition in major systems needs further
study to ensure that the requirements of major consumers are
met.
The Administration supports the strong information-sharing
authorities granted to the NID in the bill. The
Administration is concerned that the extensive authorities
and responsibilities granted to the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) to implement an information sharing network are
both outside of OMB's usual responsibilities and are
inconsistent with the goal of ensuring a NID with effective
authority to manage the Intelligence Community. These
responsibilities should be granted to the NID in such a way
as to remain consistent with section 892 of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002. The Administration also believes
that the detail in which the legislation prescribes the
network is excessive; the network would be more likely to
accomplish its beneficial goal if the bill simply provided
the authority necessary for its establishment while
leaving the details to be worked out and altered as
circumstances require.
The Administration is also very concerned about the
provisions that would purport to reorganize the President's
internal policy staff by merging the National Security
Council and the Homeland Security Council. Based on the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, the Congress
should not legislate and make permanent the internal
organization of the President's own Executive offices or
otherwise limit the flexibility needed to respond quickly to
threats or attacks.
The Administration is also concerned that the Committee
bill mandates disclosure of sensitive information about the
intelligence budget. The legislation should not compel
disclosure, including to the Nation's enemies in war, for the
amounts requested by the President, and provided by the
Congress, for the conduct of the Nation's intelligence
activities.
The Administration opposes the provision in the Committee
bill purporting to require the President to select a single
department or agency to conduct all security clearance
investigations. Although the Administration supports
improvements to the security clearance process, this
provision would impermissibly interfere with the President's
need for flexibility in conducting security clearance
investigations and does not recognize the special needs of
individual intelligence agencies.
The 9/11 Commission found that the creation of a NID and
National Counterterrorism Center, ``will not work if
congressional oversight does not change too.'' The
Administration notes that the bill does not address this
vital reform component or the parallel recommendation to
consolidate oversight for the Department of Homeland
Security. The Administration believes the legislation
[[Page S9799]]
should also address the Commission's recommendation to ensure
rapid consideration by the Senate of national security
appointments.
The Administration notes that the Committee bill did not
include Section 6 (``Preservation of Authority and
Accountability'') of the Administration's proposal; the
Administration supports inclusion of this provision in the
Senate bill. The legislation should also recognize that its
provisions would be executed to the extent consistent with
the constitutional authority of the President: to conduct the
foreign affairs of the United States; to withhold information
the disclosure of which could impair the foreign relations,
the national security, deliberative processes of the
Executive, or the performance of the Executive's
constitutional duties; to recommend for congressional
consideration such measures as the President may judge
necessary or expedient; and to supervise the unitary
executive.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I think it is a document that will be of
value to all Members of the Senate if they have not received it.
I would like to draw the attention of the two managers to that
operative paragraph 2:
The Administration supports, in particular, the
establishment of a NID with full, effective, and meaningful
budget authorities and other authorities to manage the
Intelligence Community including statutory authority for the
newly created National Counterterrorism Center. The
Administration will oppose any amendments that would weaken
the full budget authority or any other authorities that the
President has requested for the NID. The Administration will
work in the legislative process to continue to strengthen and
streamline intelligence reform legislation and to make
adjustments to ensure that the President continues to have
flexibility in combating terrorism and conducting
intelligence activities.
It is the operative phrase that ``the Administration will oppose any
amendments that would weaken the full budget authority,'' and the
preceding sentence where they said ``a NID with full, effective, and
meaningful budget authorities.''
Mr. President, first, I would like to ask the two managers, is the
purport of this paragraph consistent with all the several provisions in
the bill that refer to budget authority, in their judgment?
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, to answer the question of the Senator
from Virginia, I believe it is consistent. I direct the Senator's
attention to the very first sentence of this Statement of
Administration Policy where it states: ``The Administration supports
Senate passage of S. 2845.'' That is the bill before us. That is the
bill that is also known as the Collins-Lieberman bill.
Mr. WARNER. Without diminishing in any way that very encouraging
sentence, if you go on to read the totality of this communication,
there are expressly in here some reservations, but I will not get into
that at this point in time.
I want to go back to these words, ``full, effective, and meaningful
budget authorities.'' We just had a debate on the Specter amendment,
which I believe, with no disrespect to my good friend and colleague, is
an extreme viewpoint on this, and I am hopeful the Senate will not
adopt it, but we do come back to this pivotal question, and tomorrow I
hope to bring forth some amendments. Now that I see the expressed
language and the Senator assured me her bill tracks this, I have to
have some clarification--at least I shall seek clarification--of what
is the remaining role of the Secretary of Defense with regard to those
portions; namely, these three combat agencies, together with DIA, what
is the residual area of collaboration, jointness, in the preparation of
the budget--preparation is part 1--and then the execution of the budget
after it goes through the authorization and appropriations process and
begins to come back to the several departments and agencies.
So let's talk about what the Senator believes this language--which is
consistent, as she says, with the language in the bill--I presume the
Senator's language would not be modified or changed by this--what is
left to the Secretary of Defense in regard to the budget authority?
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, to respond to the question of the Senator
from Virginia, our bill makes very clear that the budgets for the
tactical intelligence programs remain under the authority of the
Secretary of Defense. That is consistent with the position of the
administration, and it is also consistent with the position of the 9/11
Commission.
What we are seeking to do is to put national intelligence assets--the
budget for those programs--under the national intelligence director
and, indeed, much of the budget for these agencies is currently within
the National Intelligence Program, or what is now known as the NFIP,
the National Foreign Intelligence Program, because as the Senator is
well aware, these agencies are providing intelligence not just to the
combatant commanders, the troops, DOD, but as one of the generals with
whom we met told us, he talks far more often to the Director of the CIA
than he does to the Secretary of Defense.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I really think that is an important
representation the Senator has made, but I do not read in this language
of the communication from the White House the distinction that she
draws between tactical and national. Can I refer the Senator again to
this language?
Ms. COLLINS. If we look at the administration's legislative language
they have sent up, they, too, exclude the tactical intelligence assets.
I think what this language is intended to convey is, as one of our
witnesses said--as many of our witnesses said--the worst thing we could
do is to create a national intelligence director who did not have
budget authority. That power of the purse is arguably the most
important authority given to the NID, but no one, to my knowledge, has
advocated giving the NID authority over the tactical intelligence in
the Department of Defense.
Mr. WARNER. I draw the attention of the distinguished managers to the
words ``the Administration will oppose any amendments that would weaken
the full budget authority. . . .'' It is the word ``full.''
Ms. COLLINS. Yes, that the President has requested for the NID.
Mr. WARNER. To me ``full'' is the whole basket. It could be
interpreted that way.
Ms. COLLINS. What I am telling the Senator is that if he looks at the
language sent up by the administration, he will see--and if he looks at
the language in our bill, he will see there has never been discussion
in putting tactical intelligence--
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I acknowledge that, the JMIP and the TIARA
in the language sent up. But it seems to me the writer of this could
have been somewhat more explicit in the communication because this is
an important communication to guide Senators desiring to establish
their voting pattern in connection with the Senator's bill.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I say to the Senator, I, obviously, am
not the author--
Mr. WARNER. I think I pressed the point far enough and I think the
Senator from Maine has been very courteous in her responses. I just
want to bring to the attention of colleagues, when this says ``full,''
it is your understanding it did not include the JMIP, the TIARA, and
those programs; is that correct?
Ms. COLLINS. That is correct, other than there may be some programs
that are now part of the JMIP that are not principally for--and I see
my colleague from Michigan joined us; we had a long debate in committee
about this--that are not principally used for joint military purposes,
but rather are national intelligence assets, and an example of that
would be DIA.
Mr. WARNER. I am privileged to be in this colloquy with my friends. I
would like to have the assurance of the ranking member of the committee
that he concurs in the statements just made by our distinguished Chair.
Mr. LIEBERMANN. Mr. President, my reflex is to say I do, but I must
say I was distracted for a while, so I do not know everything the
Senator said.
Mr. WARNER. The question is the language sent up by the
administration did have a breakout of the budget authority as relates
to certain parts of the overall programs performed by these combat
agencies.
I ask our distinguished manager of the bill whether this language in
the communication today which said the administration opposed any
amendments, because I proposed to have an amendment tomorrow--it may be
opposed by the administration, but I want to make sure that the phrase
``full budget authorities'' is not amending what they sent up by way of
language.
[[Page S9800]]
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, the sentence is subject to more than
one interpretation. So I am not sure what the meaning of it is, but I
can assure the Senator about what the intention of the underlying bill
is and that is the way in which I look forward to continuing this
discussion and debating any amendments the Senator might have.
I found a quote that may be reassuring to the Senator. It is from
General Hayden, Director of the National Security Agency, when he
testified before the House Select Committee on Intelligence on August
18 of this year about the 9/11 Commission recommendations. He said an
empowered national intelligence director, with direct authority over
the national agencies, including his own, should not be viewed as
diminishing our ability or willingness to fulfill our responsibility as
combat support agencies, which I found reassuring. That is certainly
our intention and I hope the Senator from Virginia will find that
reassuring as well. That, combined with the possibility that the
administration might oppose one of the Senator's amendments, I hope
will lead the Senator to reconsider.
Mr. WARNER. Well, time will tell. I ask unanimous consent to have
printed at this point in the Record a copy of the administration--I
think the Senator referred to it as a bill although it was never
introduced--language they sent up which made a clear reference and
distinction to what budget authority was given to the NID and what
residual remains in the Secretary of Defense. Am I correct on that?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I have no objection. I think that would
be helpful.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Reserving the right to object, and I will not object,
my understanding is, as the Senator said, this is not a complete bill.
It was legislative language for parts of what ultimately have been
covered in our bill.
Mr. WARNER. Yes.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I have no objection.
Mr. WARNER. It was a communication from the administration----
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Absolutely.
Mr. WARNER. I guess to the managers of the bill or the committee.
Nevertheless, it is a document expressing the intentions, and the
distinguished chairman has clearly indicated that her bill tracks that.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield?
Mr. WARNER. Yes.
Ms. COLLINS. I do not want to give the impression that our
legislation tracks the administration's legislation in all respects,
because it does not. What I was saying to the Chair and to the Senator
from Virginia is there has never been support for bringing the tactical
intelligence assets, bringing the budget for those programs under the
national intelligence director's control. Our legislation specifically
carves them out and keeps them under the control of the Pentagon. So I
am a bit perplexed by this debate because nobody is proposing what the
Senator seems to be fearing.
Mr. WARNER. I asked that if a construction of this language we
received today is full budget authority, it could lead someone to the
conclusion that everything was transferred.
Ms. COLLINS. The full budget authority, in my view, applies to the
national intelligence assets.
Mr. WARNER. Good. And if they had inserted that in there, it would
have been clearer, I hasten to add. We are not going to debate this
further. In fairness, having raised this question, I think the Senator
has brought considerable clarification. It may be the administration
may be more forthcoming about what they precisely meant by the use of
full budget authority in the use of this communication, but let me
proceed in my questioning with regard to the residual authority of the
Secretary of Defense over those budgets in the combat agencies, and I
would like to add DIA, which is also a combat agency.
As the Senator says in her bill, those sections which are tactical
are in the discretion of the Secretary in the preparation of the
budget, and he would collaborate with the NID in preparing those
sections. Now, on the national intelligence collection, I think the
chairman agrees with me that the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines
utilize that in carrying out their tactical missions, although it
classifies the NRO and the gathering in space as the national program.
Am I correct? It does feed into the tactical portion?
Ms. COLLINS. The Senator is correct.
Mr. WARNER. So, therefore, should not the Secretary of Defense have a
voice--and I would like to see how we can describe that voice--in the
compilation of that budget for the national program which in part
supports the efforts of the forces in the tactical missions?
Ms. COLLINS. I would say to the Senator that the Secretary already
does have a voice. There is a requirement that as the national
intelligence director develops the budget to be recommended to the
President, he must do it in consultation with the Secretary of Defense
and the Secretary of Energy for the part of the intelligence community
that is under the Secretary of Energy's control, et cetera.
In addition, we create a new entity called the joint intelligence
community council, which I think already has an acronym, on which the
Secretary of Defense will serve, which serves as an advisory board to
the national intelligence director.
I also point out to the distinguished Senator from Virginia that
ultimately it is the President's call on the budget. These are
recommendations made by the national intelligence director. It is the
President who ultimately decides.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, that is very helpful. I wonder if the
Senator's staff would provide for the Record at this point an insertion
of those references in the bill which supports the Senator's very
important representation to the Senate just now, that the Senator feels
he has the consultation role and such other roles as to assure the
Secretary of Defense that he has a voice in the preparation of the
budget.
Ms. COLLINS. Those provisions are extremely clear in the bill. I do
not see how they can be ambiguous.
Mr. WARNER. I just wanted to have the pages annotated. I think my
colleague witnessed several colleagues today saying it would be helpful
if we could get a clearer understanding of some things, and I think the
Record today could be of help to those who want to see in the Senator's
bill precisely those sections which underpin the Senator's important
representation. I ask if the Senator might consider putting that into
the Record.
Ms. COLLINS. I would be happy to put the provisions in the Record. I
question why it is necessary when everybody has the bill available. It
is on page 12, for example, lines 20 through 25, in describing what the
national intelligence director shall do. It says:
Developing and presenting to the President an annual budget
for the National Intelligence Program after consultation with
the heads of agencies or elements, and the heads of their
respective departments . . .
I do not see how it could be clearer.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I was not challenging the language. I was
simply trying to get a reference. The Senator provided it, and I thank
the chairman.
If I could transition to the second part of this, the budget is
prepared and approved by the President. It is then acted upon by the
Congress by authorization and appropriation and it goes to the NID. Am
I correct?
Ms. COLLINS. After Congress acts.
Mr. WARNER. Yes.
Ms. COLLINS. And the law is signed by the President.
Mr. WARNER. Right.
Ms. COLLINS. The appropriation is received by the NID for the
national intelligence program.
Mr. WARNER. Right.
Ms. COLLINS. Not for what is known as TIARA or JMIP.
Mr. WARNER. I thank the chairman. That portion of the budget then
goes back to be administered by the Secretary of Defense; is that
clear?
Ms. COLLINS. Which portion?
Mr. WARNER. That nonnational portion.
Ms. COLLINS. Correct.
Mr. WARNER. It goes back to the Secretary of Defense. I thank the
distinguished chairman on that point.
I see on the floor my distinguished colleague, the ranking member of
the
[[Page S9801]]
Armed Services Committee. I wondered, since he followed this colloquy
and I know he has worked very hard in this area with the Senator from
Virginia, have some of his concerns which he has expressed to me been
touched on in this colloquy?
Mr. LEVIN. I wonder if the Senator from Virginia has the floor. Who
has the floor?
Mr. WARNER. I think I have the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Alexander). The Senator from Virginia has
the floor.
Mr. LEVIN. I ask unanimous consent I be able to respond to the
Senator from Virginia without his losing the right to the floor.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I think I have the floor. I am quite happy
to yield to my colleague to respond to my inquiry.
Mr. LEVIN. On the first part of the inquiry, what is interesting to
me, and ironic, is the Director of Central Intelligence has that same
authority the chairman just read from page 12, line 20, that is
provided to the NID, which is to develop and present to the President
the annual budget for the national intelligence program. That is the
same authority as exists in current law to the intelligence director.
So there is no change in terms of presenting and developing the budget.
Where the real changes take place are after the budget or after the
appropriation is adopted, and then it depends--then the law will change
who it is that executes that budget authority. That is where we get
very complicated changes.
I think the discussion and debate is very important, that we analyze
which specific programs, projects, and activities, budget execution--
not presentation or preparation--but execution is transferred to the
NID from where it currently is. That is where I think we all would
benefit from a description of specific programs which are not
transferred. There are some in the tactical area. But there are also
some that are transferred--very few, perhaps 3 percent of the 80
percent of the budget that is transferred, in terms of budget execution
to the NID--that in my judgment should not be transferred. A very tiny,
few programs, including the intelligence--the J-2 programs that are out
in the combatant commanders, including the communications
infrastructure between the JCS and the combatant commanders. Those
specific programs--and I know my good friend from Virginia knows these
programs--those specific programs clearly belong in the Defense
Department's budget execution, in my judgment. However, they are
transferred.
To try to answer the Senator's question, I think it would be very
illuminating, in addition to what he has asked for, if we could take
some examples, and there are very few, of some programs where budget
execution is transferred to the NID that should not be. I emphasize
again, so this is not mischaracterized, I am talking here about less
than 3 percent of the 80 percent of the budget which is transferred.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I apologize for interrupting the Senator.
Mr. LEVIN. No, I am done.
Ms. COLLINS. The leaders have been waiting for Senator Lieberman and
me since 5:30 for a meeting and they have summoned us again. I did not
want to walk off the floor without explaining to my distinguished
colleagues the fact that we have already kept our leaders waiting for
more than 20 minutes.
Mr. ROBERTS. Will the distinguished Senator yield?
Mr. WARNER. Yes, if I could make a preliminary statement, and then I
will be glad to yield. As a matter of fact, I will yield the floor. If
you seek the floor, I am going to yield it momentarily.
Mr. ROBERTS. I was going to ask a question of the distinguished floor
manager. I thank the distinguished Senator from Virginia for his
courtesy.
It is my understanding we are not going to vote on the Specter
amendment as of this evening; is that right?
Ms. COLLINS. I am sorry, I couldn't hear the Senator.
Mr. ROBERTS. It is my understanding we are not going to vote on the
Specter amendment as of this evening; is that correct?
Ms. COLLINS. The Senator is correct. The vote will occur tomorrow.
Mr. ROBERTS. Do we have an idea approximately what time tomorrow
morning?
Ms. COLLINS. We do not. We have not been able to determine how many
people still want to speak on the amendment. We are trying to
accommodate those who do wish to speak.
Mr. ROBERTS. One Senator who is asking you some questions now would
like to speak, and I would like to have 20 to 25 minutes, if that would
be all right, speaking as the chairman of the Intelligence Committee.
If I could have an understanding? I know you will work very hard and I
know there has been a lot spoken tonight; I understand that. But I
would like to speak in favor of the Specter amendment, if in fact that
could be arranged, or have that understanding with the Senator.
Ms. COLLINS. I would certainly welcome that. Perhaps we can try with
the help of the floor staff to order the series of speakers. We will
make sure the distinguished chairman of the Intelligence Committee is
protected in that regard.
Mr. LEVIN. I ask unanimous consent also that I be given 5 minutes in
opposition to the Specter amendment tomorrow morning, and if I am not
here because of the full committee meeting we have at Armed Services,
that my statement be made part of the record at that time.
Ms. COLLINS. We hope the Senator will be here.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, first I thank the distinguished manager
and ranking member for engaging in I think a very important colloquy. I
wanted to make a record for some colleagues who have asked a number of
questions, and I think we made an interesting record here that
will help in their deliberations and thought processes.
I will have amendments tomorrow, hopefully to clarify some things
which I feel should be clarified. They are constructive amendments, I
say to the distinguished chair and ranking member, because I want to be
cooperative and supportive of the President and your efforts. But I do
feel very strongly that there are some amendments.
My colleague, Senator Levin, and I have worked together. It may well
be we will jointly put in some amendments tomorrow on this subject. Not
in a manner of a turf battle. I am really quite in temper that that
word continues to be brought up, because I personally am striving to do
what is best for this country and to make our intelligence system
stronger as a consequence of this legislative process. I think it can
be achievable. But I have to get clarifications. The language in this
message that came up today about full budget authority seems to be
somewhat contradictory of some other things. But we will work it out.
I thank the distinguished managers and I yield the floor.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Briefly, I thank Senator Warner for his statement in
opposition to the Specter amendment and for the questions which he
raised which I think have been helpful and clarifying. No doubt this
discussion will continue in the days ahead.
I thank the Chair.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, it is not very often that things come up
that require an immediate fix, but I think one has.
First, I ask unanimous consent I be recognized to speak as in morning
business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(The remarks of Mr. Inhofe pertaining to the introduction of S. 2855
are printed in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills
and Joint Resolutions.'')
Mr. INHOFE. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. VOINOVICH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
[[Page S9802]]
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. VOINOVICH. Mr. President, I rise to address the critical issue
that is before the Senate--reform of our intelligence community and
restructuring of the Federal Government to enhance our ability to wage
the global war on terror and protect our Nation from other threats.
I commend Senators Collins and Lieberman and their staffs for their
hard work and leadership on this issue, and I am proud to be a
cosponsor of this legislation.
I also thank the Senate leadership for making this a priority. There
is no issue more important for us to address. In fact, I believe this
legislation is the most important I have worked on since coming to the
Senate in 1999.
The war on terror is unlike any conflict we have fought--covert holy
warriors seeking to infiltrate our society and those of our allies to
do us grievous harm. Against this radical enemy, intelligence is of the
greatest importance. We must do everything we can to strengthen our
intelligence capabilities. If you think of what we need to do about
terrorism, we need to attack, we need to prevent, and we need to
prepare. Intelligence is the greatest weapon we have in all three of
those categories.
Before I comment on this legislation before us, however, I would like
to first offer some principles and thoughts that have guided my
deliberations.
First, we must do no harm. Great progress has been made since
September 11, 2001, to improve the operations of our intelligence
community and make our country more secure. There is no greater
evidence of that than when I travel in Ohio to various large urban
areas. I am so impressed with the cooperation that now exists as
contrasted to what was there before 9/11. Because we are making
progress, we must be sure that we do not inadvertently set back our
current efforts. We must implement additional improvements.
Second, we must not restructure the intelligence community to deal
solely with the threat of terrorism caused by Islamic extremists, as
pressing a concern as that is. There are many other threats that
require close scrutiny by the intelligence community. Reform must
address the threats that will confront America 10 and 20 years in the
future in addition to those faced today.
For example, the United States must continue to monitor regional
conflicts which have the potential to undermine stability in various
parts of the world such as India, Pakistan, China, and Taiwan. Regional
conflicts, such as between India and Pakistan, are motivated by
political, social, and historical reasons unique to their own
countries. In the event that regional conflicts should escalate to such
proportions that chemical, biological, or even nuclear weapons would be
used, as would be possible in the event of a conflict between India and
Pakistan, U.S. interests certainly would be threatened. The
intelligence community must remain keenly aware of what is happening in
other areas of the world so that the U.S. is not only prepared and able
to respond but so that we can do everything in our power to prevent
such a crisis from happening.
The United States must also monitor threats presented by rogue
nations such as North Korea, rogue states that have the ability to
foster regional instability and harm U.S. interests. They, too, must be
closely monitored as dictators such as Kim Chong-il look to enhance
their power and position. If not, the U.S. risks strategic surprise
which would be devastating to our national security interests.
Additionally, the United States must address the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. These weapons have the ability to cause
grave harm to Americans and life as we know it if found in the wrong
hands. They could be used by terrorists against cities in the United
States, they could be used in regional conflict, or they could be used
by a rogue state to enhance its power.
Third, we should make it clear to the American people that the
different perspectives presented on the Senate floor are legitimate. A
review of the hearings held by various congressional committees during
August and September demonstrated that many former Government officials
who have had distinguished careers in senior national security posts
hold contradictory opinions on the 9/11 Commission recommendations and
related national security issues.
Fourth, reforming the Federal Government to address the challenges of
global terrorism is going to take several years to accomplish. It is
not going to happen that fast. It is my hope that during the next
Congress we will address the critical challenges confronting the
Federal law enforcement community, for example. For example,
rationalizing responsibility and missions and personnel systems is
vital to ensure that Federal law enforcement is best equipped to
confront foreign terrorists operating in the United States.
I am pleased that we have addressed some of the needs of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation in the legislation we are considering today.
But much more remains to be done, and it is important for our national
security to finish this job.
As my colleagues may know, I sponsored legislation that became law
that requires the Office of Personnel Management to study Federal law
enforcement personnel systems and recommend improvements. I was
concerned that we were going forward with personnel changes and getting
some coordination between those law enforcement agencies and the
homeland security, but we were failing to do the same thing with law
enforcement agencies that were outside of the Department of Homeland
Security. The Office of Personnel Management has implemented that
legislation. They have made some significant recommendations on how we
can improve the relationships, classifications, and so forth, with
those outside of Homeland Security. It would be my hope that we
implement those recommendations.
Regarding the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, I strongly
support creating a robust national intelligence director, but I have
been wrestling with exactly how much authority we should give the new
national intelligence director. I appreciate the balance that Senators
Collins and Lieberman were trying to achieve in their legislation. It
is clear to me that these authorities should not be diminished.
In fact, in committee I offered an amendment that would give the
national intelligence director reorganization authority over the
national intelligence program so that the director could identify
efficiencies and eliminate unnecessary duplication of effort. It is
unfortunate that my amendment was weakened in committee, and I am still
considering amendments to strengthen the management authority of the
national intelligence director.
The intelligence community budget process is extremely complex.
Indeed, the manner in which these agencies interact with each other is
probably the most complicated interagency process in the Federal
Government. The budgets of the 15 intelligence community agencies,
including all those of the Armed Forces, are intertwined in the
National Foreign Intelligence Program, the Joint Military Intelligence
Program, the tactical intelligence and related activities.
The Collins-Lieberman legislation seeks to bring clarity to the
situation by defining a national intelligence program. However, we may
be able to improve this budget definition, and I will weigh all
amendments to do so carefully.
At the same time, we must be careful not to erode the budget
authority of the national intelligence director. I understand that some
of my colleagues may offer amendments to give the national intelligence
director a fixed term in an attempt to immunize this individual from
political pressure. I would note that a host of other provisions,
including a strong inspector general for the intelligence community and
an ombudsman to specifically guard against political concerns, have
been created to do exactly that.
Quite the contrary, a fixed term is unnecessary and could diminish
the effectiveness of the national intelligence director. A close and
trusting working relationship with the President is going to be key to
the success of the effectiveness of the national intelligence director.
We should not weaken this relationship by mandating a fixed-term
appointment.
[[Page S9803]]
The Governmental Affairs Committee heard testimony from three former
Directors of Central Intelligence, and all agreed that the national
intelligence director should serve at the pleasure of the President. An
incoming President should not be stuck with a national intelligence
director from a previous administration.
I know that the Presiding Officer, in his former capacity as Governor
of the State of Tennessee and as a member of the Bush Cabinet,
understands that if this individual doesn't have the confidence of the
President of the United States, his or her effectiveness is going to be
diminished a great deal. So much of what this person can accomplish
will have a lot to do with that relationship with the President because
there are going to be situations where there are going to be
differences of opinion. Finally, the boss has to decide them. If you
have somebody there that has the job and doesn't have the confidence of
the boss, we are in trouble.
Mr. President, although this legislation deals primarily with
improving structured roles and missions, the human capital challenges
confronting our intelligence community must not be overlooked.
In March of 2001--it seems like a long time ago--my Government
Management Subcommittee held a hearing entitled ``The National Security
Implications of the Human Capital Crisis.'' The panel of distinguished
witnesses that day included former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger,
a member of the U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st
Century. Secretary Schlesinger concluded his testimony with these
remarks:
As it enters the 21st century, the United States finds
itself on the brink of an unprecedented crisis of competence
in Government. The maintenance of American power in the world
depends on the quality of U.S. Government personnel, civil
and military, at all levels. We must take immediate action in
the personnel area to ensure that the United States can meet
future challenges. That fixing of the personnel problem is a
precondition for fixing virtually everything else that needs
repair in the institutional edifice of U.S. national security
policy.
He was so right. Secretary Schlesinger's insightful comments were
reinforced by the 9/11 Commission on page 399 of the report. The
Commission said ``significant changes in the organization of the
Government.'' The Commission went on to say:
We know that the quality of people is more important than
the quality of the wiring diagrams. Some of the saddest
aspects of the 9/11 story are the outstanding efforts of so
many individuals straining, often without success, against
the boundaries of the possible. Good people can overcome bad
structures, but they should not have to.
I will never forget that after 9/11 the first thing that came to my
mind was we didn't have the right people with the right knowledge and
skills at the right place at the right time. If you go back and look at
all of the report, it gets back to that situation and also the fact
that they weren't communicating with each other.
I am pleased that the Collins-Lieberman legislation includes some
important human capital provisions. I offered an amendment in
committee, which was unanimously accepted, that provides enhanced
classification and pay flexibilities for intelligence analysts at the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Specifically, my amendment enables the FBI to work with the OPM to
develop new classification standards and pay rates for intelligence
analysts. The amendment also allows the bureau to improve their
performance management system for their intelligence analysts and
establishes two congressional reporting requirements. The amendment was
completely within the spirit of the 9/11 recommendations, which noted
that the FBI should create a specialized and integrated national
security workforce consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and
surveillance specialists who are recruited, trained, rewarded, and
retained to ensure the development of an institutional culture with
strong experience in intelligence and national security throughout the
organization.
I thought the other incredible thing after 9/11 was the cry that went
out: Can anybody speak Farsi? Can anybody speak Arabic? You would have
thought that after the Persian Gulf war there would have been a very
aggressive effort, because of the instability of the area, for us to
bring in people who could speak Farsi and Arabic. If you looked at the
State Department a couple years ago, you would have found we had all
kinds of linguists who could speak fluent Russian. But the threat had
changed. We didn't have the capacity to change with that threat.
Hopefully, with this new national intelligence director, we are going
to be able to have that flexibility.
It is my hope that this amendment will provide the Federal Bureau of
Investigation with essential human capital flexibilities specifically
targeted to building an elite cadre of intelligence analysts. In
addition, Senator Lugar and I will offer another amendment to the bill
to improve the Presidential appointment process, which has been broken
for decades. Over the coming days, I want to work with Senators Collins
and Lieberman on this amendment.
This amendment addresses a critical recommendation in the 9/11
Commission Report. It is a problem I have been examining for years.
During my time in the Senate, I have found political appointees to be
dedicated and diligent professionals who want to make a difference for
our country. They often leave high-paying corporate jobs only to find
their commitment to our Nation requires an increase in workload and a
decrease in salary.
I talked to one individual who filled out the financial disclosure
form and all that was required. He said that it cost him $200,000 to
pay the professional people to do all the things that were required in
this disclosure form that is now currently in effect with the Federal
Government. I suspect that the President, when he appointed the
Secretary of Education, had to go through all these forms, and so
forth, and wondered to himself whether he ought to do it. Before they
even begin to work for the Government, however, as I mentioned, they
must first navigate the complex, turbulent, and outdated Presidential
appointment process--an area where reviews and recommendations for
improvement have gone unheeded far too long.
In 1937, a committee issued the first report on improving the
Presidential appointment process. During the 67 years since this
inaugural report, the appointment process has been formally examined 14
additional times. After such extensive reviews, it is disconcerting for
this Senator that we have not been able to enact meaningful reform in
this area.
To capture the essence of the problem, understand first that the
number of politically appointed positions has grown from 286 to 3,361
over the past 4 decades. This increase is straining an already
overburdened system. And the time it takes to complete an appointment
has increased through the years from just over 2 months during the
Kennedy administration to 8 months in the current administration. I
think Secretary Rumsfeld said his team didn't go into place until 6
months after he had been appointed as Secretary of Defense.
Mr. President, 8 months is simply too long to fill an appointed
position. I am afraid that if we do not update the current system for
processing Presidential appointees, we run the risk of driving good
people away from appointed Government service. Progress has been made
on this issue during the last several years.
First, on February 15, the Hart-Rudman commission issued their report
entitled ``The Roadmap for National Security Imperative for Change,''
which in part examined the Presidential appointment process. The
Commission's final report observes: The ordeals to which outside
nominees are subjected are so great, above and beyond whatever
financial or career sacrifice is involved, so as to make it prohibitive
for many individuals of talent and experience to accept public service.
Then on April 4 and 5, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
held 2 days of hearings on the state of the Presidential appointment
process. During those hearings Paul Light from the Brookings
Institution said:
Past and potential Presidential appointees alike view the
process of entering office with disdain, describing it as
embarrassing, confusing, and unfair. They see the process as
far more cumbersome and lengthy than it needs to be.
By the way, I held a hearing a couple weeks ago, and Paul Light was
there,
[[Page S9804]]
and he reiterated that same statement he made in 2001.
On May 16, 2001, the Governmental Affairs Committee passed Senator
Fred Thompson's bipartisan bill to streamline the Presidential
appointments process that I cosponsored with Senators Akaka, Durbin,
Lieberman, and Lugar. Although it passed the Governmental Affairs
Committee in the 107th Congress, it did not pass the full Senate. When
Senator Fred Thompson left the Senate, I promised him I would continue
to push for appointments reform. Therefore, in April of last year, I
reintroduced the Presidential Appointments Improvement Act, and today I
urge my colleagues to pass this important proposal.
What happens is that after the President comes in and he goes through
this line of getting people appointed, they get off on other things,
and they forget about the problems they went through to get all their
appointees. So it kind of goes to the bottom of the stack in terms of
priorities. This 9/11 Commission implementation by the Senate gives us
a wonderful opportunity to do something about this problem that has
lingered for so many years.
I am certain all my colleagues have read the recommendations in the
9/11 Commission report. As you recall, one of the recommendations
underscored the importance of improving the Presidential appointment
process. Specifically on page 422, the report states:
Since a catastrophic attack could occur with little or no
notice, we should minimize as much as possible the disruption
of national security policymaking during the change of
administration by accelerating the process for national
security appointments. We think the process could be improved
significantly so transitions can work more effectively and
allow more new officials to assume their responsibilities as
quickly as possible.
The 9/11 Commission report also noted that in 2001, the new
administration, like others before it, did not have its team on the job
until at least 6 months after it took office. In fact, I commented to
people that after the length it took for the President to finally know
he was President, we lost that period of time once the President was
elected and started building his team; they were just concentrating on
who was going to be the President. Once that was done, then they
started to concentrate on who the people were going to be in the
administration.
They did a great job of taking care of the initial people, but, as
you know, it took a long time for them to start filling in that
organization.
My amendment offers realistic governmentwide solutions to the
problems identified by the 9/11 Commission and the 14 other Commission
studies and reports that have detailed the importance of streamlining
the Presidential appointment process.
The four main provisions of the amendment include streamlining the
financial disclosure forms for executive branch employees. Two,
requiring agencies to examine the number of Presidential-appointed
positions and recommending to Congress which positions could be
eliminated. We are asking them to do it. Three, allowing Presidential
candidates to obtain a list of appointee positions 15 days after they
receive their party's nomination so they will have an idea of the kind
of people they have to look for if they are elected President of the
United States. And four, requiring the Office of Government Ethics to
review the conflict-of-interest laws.
The principles behind this amendment are simple, and given the
bipartisan nature in which the original bill passed the Governmental
Affairs Committee last Congress, I ask my colleagues to adopt this
amendment. Although it will not solve all the problems with the
appointments process outlined in the 9/11 Commission report, the
amendment is an important first step for updating an outdated system.
I urge the Senate to support its adoption. Senator Lugar and I will
be working with Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman to try to obtain
their support for this amendment and to also work out any of the
problems they may have with it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I know the Senator from Kansas is
waiting. I need to make a couple of very brief announcements, with the
Senator's indulgence.
Amendment No. 3731 to Amendment No. 3705
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I have two amendments that have been
cleared on both sides. Both of these amendments are second-degree
amendments to my underlying amendment No. 3705 regarding Homeland
Security grants. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that the Inhofe-
Jeffords second-degree amendment No. 3731, which is at the desk, be
considered and agreed to, with the motion to reconsider laid upon the
table.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment (No. 3731) was agreed to, as follows:
(Purpose: To ensure the participation of the Under Secretary for
Emergency Preparedness and Response in the Threat-Based Homeland
Security Grant Program grant-making process for nonlaw enforcement
related grants)
In section 406 of the amendment, redesignate subsections
(i) and (j) as subsections (j) and (k), respectively.
In section 406 of the amendment, insert after subsection
(h) the following:
(i) Participation of Under Secretary for Emergency
Preparedness and Response.--
(1) Participation.--The Under Secretary for Emergency
Preparedness and Response shall participate in the
grantmaking process for the Threat-Based Homeland Security
Grant Program for nonlaw enforcement-related grants in order
to ensure that preparedness grants where appropriate, are
consistent, and are not in conflict, with the Robert T.
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42
U.S.C. 5121 et seq.).
(2) Reports.--The Under Secretary for Emergency
Preparedness and Response shall submit to the Committee on
Environment and Public Works of the Senate and the Committee
on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of
Representatives an annual report that describes--
(A) the status of the Threat-Based Homeland Security Grant
Program; and
(B) the impact of that program on programs authorized under
the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.).
Amendment No. 3732 to Amendment No. 3705
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I further ask unanimous consent that the
Levin second-degree amendment No. 3732, which is at the desk, now be
considered and agreed to, with the motion to reconsider laid upon the
table.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment (No. 3732) was agreed to, as follows:
(Purpose: To give the Secretary of Homeland Security greater
flexibility in allocating funds for discretionary grants to local
governments)
On page 36, strike lines 3 through 21, and insert the
following:
SEC. 409. CERTIFICATION RELATIVE TO THE SCREENING OF
MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE TRANSPORTED INTO THE
UNITED STATES.
(a) Defined Term.--In this section, the term ``municipal
solid waste'' includes sludge (as defined in section 1004 of
the Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. 6903)).
(b) Reports to Congress.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of enactment of this Act, the Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection of the Department of Homeland Security
shall submit a report to Congress that--
(1) indicates whether the methodologies and technologies
used by the Bureau to screen for and detect the presence of
chemical, nuclear, biological, and radiological weapons in
municipal solid waste are as effective as the methodologies
and technologies used by the Bureau to screen for such
materials in other items of commerce entering into the United
States by commercial motor vehicle transport; and
(2) if the methodologies and technologies used to screen
solid waste are less effective than those used to screen
other commercial items, identifies the actions that the
Bureau will take to achieve the same level of effectiveness
in the screening of solid waste, including the need for
additional screening technologies.
(c) Impact on Commercial Motor Vehicles.--If the Bureau of
Customs and Border Protection fails to fully implement the
actions described in subsection (b)(2) before the earlier of
6 months after the date on which the report is due under
subsection (b) or 6 months after the date on which such
report is submitted, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall
deny entry into the United States of any commercial motor
vehicle (as defined in section 31101(1) of title 49, United
States Code) carrying municipal solid waste until the
Secretary certifies to Congress that the methodologies and
technologies used by the Bureau to screen for and detect the
presence of chemical, nuclear, biological, and radiological
weapons in such waste are as effective as the methodologies
and technologies used by the Bureau to screen for such
materials in other items of commerce entering into the United
States by commercial motor vehicle transport.
(d) Effective Date.--Notwithstanding section 341, this
section shall take effect on the date of enactment of this
Act.
[[Page S9805]]
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I hope we can continue to work on the
underlying amendment with the goal of having a vote on it shortly. I
also want to announce to all of my colleagues that we do intend to vote
on Senator Specter's amendment tomorrow. I recognize there are a few
Senators who have not been heard on it who desire to be heard, but we
do intend to conclude the debate and vote on Senator Specter's
amendment tomorrow.
I thank the Chair.
amendment no. 3731
Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I will never forget my visit to Ground
Zero. I hope that September 11 is an event that will never be repeated,
on any scale, in our country or anywhere in the world.
I share the goal of all my colleagues that our Nation be as prepared
as possible, should such an event occur. However, in seeking to improve
our capability to respond to terrorism, it is critical that we do not
lose our capability to respond to natural disasters, which happen much
more frequently than terrorist events.
The Inhofe-Jeffords second degree amendment to the Collins' amendment
will ensure that as we seek to enhance our ability to respond to
terrorist events, we do not lose our ability to respond to natural
disasters.
I thank my colleagues, the chair and ranking member of the Government
Affairs Committee and Senator Carper, a cosponsor of the Collins
amendment for agreeing to accept this amendment.
The role of a first responder, whether responding to a terrorist
event or a natural disaster is, for the most part, the same. For
decades, the Federal, State, and local governments in this Nation have
partnered together to plan, prepare, respond, and recover from both
minor and major natural disasters.
We have a robust system for responding to these events, authorized
through the Stafford Act and executed through FEMA. My home State of
Vermont has a long history with emergency management.
My colleague and friend, Senator Bob Stafford of Vermont, served as
chairman of the Environment and Public Works Committee for many years
and ushered the Stafford Act through Congress in 1974. The Stafford Act
is the authorizing statute for emergency response activities at the
Federal level, and it forms the basis for the emergency management
system in this Nation. The Stafford Act gave structure to an emergency
response process where virtually none existed in the past.
FEMA, which was formed in 1979 and incorporated into the Department
of Homeland Security in the Homeland Security Act, is a robust agency,
with extensive experience in all-hazards planning, preparing, response,
and recovery. It has a tradition of providing quick response to people
in immediate need.
As Chairman of the Environment and Public Works Committee during the
107th Congress, I recognized the need to provide assistance to our
first responders. I was struck during my visits to the Pentagon and the
World Trade Center in particular at the inability of first responders
to communicate with each other. To combat this and the other
shortcomings we observed, I introduced S. 2664, the Emergency
Preparedness and Response Act of 2003 with my colleague Senator Bob
Smith. The EPW Committee reported that bill on June 27, 2002.
During this Congress, Senator Inhofe and I worked together to
introduce S. 930, the Emergency Preparedness and Response Act of 2003.
The EPW Committee reported that bill favorably on July 30, 2003, by
voice vote.
Before the formation of the Department of Homeland Security, I
expressed grave concerns about the proposal to incorporate FEMA into
the Department of Homeland Security. I was concerned at that time that
the robust agency we saw jumping every hurdle after September 11, 2001
to provide assistance to World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and to
hundreds of natural disasters each year, would give way under the
pressure of the enormous bureaucracy of the Department of Homeland
Security and lose its ability to respond quickly and effectively to
disasters.
I remain concerned today. However, the administration prevailed and
incorporated FEMA in DHS with the enactment of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002.
Since the formation of DHS, FEMA has administered aid for 169 major
disasters, 29 emergency declarations, and 172 fire management
assistance declarations--all natural disasters. That is 370 communities
that have received emergency assistance from the Federal Government and
our Nation's first responders for natural disasters.
Over the last several weeks, we have seen record-breaking hurricanes
rip through the southeast bringing high winds, flooding, tornadoes, and
beach erosion. In my home State of Vermont, we recently had a disaster
declared for extensive flooding throughout the State.
The Inhofe-Jeffords second degree amendment ensures that FEMA, the
agency responsible for administering our Nation's disaster response
programs, is involved in the distribution of funds to first responders
and that grants made are consistent with the Stafford Act. This ensures
that we will not lose the level of preparedness and response that we
have seen at work in States like Florida over the last few weeks.
We obviously need to be prepared for the small percentage of the time
when a terrorist event may occur, but we cannot ignore the day-to-day
operations, which affect so many lives.
I thank my colleagues, the distinguished chair and ranking member of
the subcommittee as well as Senator Carper, a cosponsor of the Collins
amendment, for working with us to incorporate our second degree into
the underlying amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
____________________
