Congressional Record: September 21, 2004 (Senate)
Page S9428-S9429
GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR INTELLIGENCE REFORM
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, today our Appropriations Committee held a
hearing and listened to distinguished individuals as to their views on
the recommendations for intelligence reform. At that time, we were
provided a statement which is entitled ``Guiding Principles for
Intelligence Reform'' dated September 21, 2004. It is signed by the
following persons: former Senator David Boren, former Senator Bill
Bradley, former Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, former Secretary
of Defense William Cohen, former CIA Director Robert Gates, former
Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre, former Senator and Presidential
candidate Gary Hart, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, former
Senator Sam Nunn, former Senator Warren Rudman, and former Secretary of
State George Shultz.
I do call it to the attention of all Senators in connection with this
current review of the 9/11 Commission recommendations on intelligence
reform.
I ask unanimous consent that the ``Guiding Principles for
Intelligence Reform'' be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Guiding Principles for Intelligence Reform
America's security depends on strengthening our
intelligence collection and analysis. Debate is under way on
intelligence reform, and harnessing the energy of an election
season is a healthy way to assure the issue receives the
attention it deserves. Racing to implement reforms on an
election timetable is precisely the wrong thing to do.
Intelligence reform is too complex and too important to
undertake at a campaign's breakneck speed. Based on our
experience in both the executive and legislative branches of
the U.S. government and on both sides of the political aisle,
these are the basic principles we believe should guide any
reform effort:
Identify the Problems
Rushing in with solutions before we understand all the
problems is a recipe for failure. Only after a full
appreciation of the Intelligence Community's problems--and
its strengths--can sensible decisions be made about reform,
including whether to restructure. Moreover, reform will have
to be comprehensive to succeed. Addressing this or that
shortcoming--however grave--in isolation will fail to produce
the improvement in intelligence capabilities our nation's
security demands.
Strengthen the Intelligence Community's Leader
The individual responsible for leading the Intelligence
Community must be empowered with authority commensurate with
his or her responsibility. Specifically and crucially, future
leaders must have the ability to align personnel and
resources with national intelligence priorities. Whether we
maintain the Intelligence Community's current structure or
create a new one, we must ensure that the Intelligence
Community's leader has the tools to do his or her job.
Separate Intelligence from Policy
A fundamental principle for Intelligence Community reform
must be that the intelligence community remains independent
from policymakers. Nothing could be more important to a
healthy national security structure. When intelligence and
policy are too closely tied, the demands of policymakers can
distort intelligence and intelligence analysts can hijack the
policy development process. It is crucial to ensuring this
separation that the Intelligence Community leader have no
policy role. Otherwise, an Intelligence Community leader's
voice could overwhelm those of Cabinet secretaries and the
National Security Advisor and deprive the President of the
benefit of robust, informed policy debate. A single
individual with the last word on intelligence and a say in
policy as well could be a dangerously powerful actor in the
national security arena-using intelligence to advocate for
particular policy positions, budget requests, or weapons
systems that others lacked the knowledge to challenge.
For this reason, the leader of the Intelligence Community
should not work inside the White House; he or she should be
at arm's length from the policy process, not at the
President's right hand. Nor should the leader become an
instrument of diplomacy or policy formulation; his or her
role should be to support others in these functions.
Similarly, Intelligence Community reform must not rob Cabinet
secretaries of their own ability to assess intelligence by
centralizing the bulk of assessment resources; the
secretaries must be able to turn to their own analysts for
independent perspective and be able to task the Intelligence
Community leader for input to the policymaking process.
Finally, to protect against an unhealthy mixing of functions,
we believe the person who is chosen to lead the Intelligence
Community should be broadly acceptable to both parties and
chosen for his or her substantive or management expertise.
[[Page S9429]]
Improve the Quality of Analysis
Intellectual conformity and failure of analytical
imagination have been the major culprits in most intelligence
breakdowns, from our failure to predict accurately India and
Pakistan's nuclear tests, to our misjudgment of Saddam
Hussein's weapons of mass destruction programs. Improving the
quality of the analysis on which policy makers rely must
therefore be a top reform priority. The best analysis emerges
from a competitive environment where different perspectives
are welcomed and alternative hypotheses are encouraged.
Intelligence reform must institutionalize these traits in the
analytical process. To preserve their independence, analysts
must be insulated from policy and political pressure.
Finally, we must not only concern ourselves with the
appropriate structure of intelligence analysis, we must also
address the critical shortage of human expertise in critical
fields. Funding for programs to address this deficiency is
dangerously low and the trust funds for the National Security
Education Program will be fully depleted within the next two
years unless Congress acts.
Ensure More Effective Information-Sharing
Intelligence Community players have overwhelming cultural
and bureaucratic incentives not to share their information
with each other or with those outside the community. These
include a natural impulse to hoard information to protect
turf, and a deeply ingrained passion for secrecy. Domestic
agencies and foreign agencies, in particular, traditionally
have resisted sharing information with each other. Yet our
nation has learned with painful clarity that failure to
share, coordinate, and connect available intelligence can
have devastating consequences. The next time an FBI special
agent suspects an Arizona flight trainee is an al Qaeda
terrorist, the Intelligence Community needs to know. Reform
must fundamentally alter agency incentives and culture to
require sharing. This must include addressing the excessive
emphasis on secrecy and classification that inhibits
constructive, timely information flows, while continuing to
respect the need to protect genuine sources and methods.
Protect Civil Liberties
Collection of intelligence is inherently intrusive; spying
on fellow citizens carries with it great potential for abuse.
Even as we merge the domestic and foreign intelligence we
collect, we should not merge responsibility for collecting
it. Intelligence reform might well create a single strategic
coordinator of domestic and overseas collection on cross
border threats like terrorism, but exclusive responsibility
for authorizing and overseeing the act of domestic
intelligence collection should remain with the Attorney
General. This is the only way to protect the rights of the
American people upon whose support a strong intelligence
community depends.
Preserve Situational Awareness for Tactical Military Operations
As we have seen from the skies over Bosnia to the sands and
cities of Afghanistan and Iraq, tactical intelligence and
situational awareness are indispensable to our military's
unparalleled operational success. Any successful intelligence
reform must respect the military's need to maintain a robust,
organic tactical intelligence capability and to have rapid
access to national intelligence assets and information.
Assure Clarity of Authority for Clandestine Operations
The war on terrorism has blurred agency roles for some
critical national security activities. The Department of
Defense now performs more clandestine and intelligence
operations than in the past; meanwhile, the CIA's Directorate
of Operations engages more in traditional military functions,
such as the successful campaign in Afghanistan. Authority for
these newer roles is murky, and there are sometimes
disparities in the type or level of approval needed for an
operation, depending on who performs it. The new challenges
we face mandate a wide range of tools and creative approaches
to intelligence. But establishing absolute clarity of chain
of command, oversight, and accountability for clandestine
operations is essential.
Reform Congressional Oversight Too
Intelligence reform will not succeed unless Congressional
oversight of the Intelligence Community becomes more
effective as well. Rather than relying on review of agency
submissions and after-the-fact investigation of failures or
abuses, Congress should reach out periodically to test and
assure the Community's health. Whether meaningful legislative
oversight demands a major overhaul of committee structure or
merely a change of philosophy, Congressional reform is as
vital as changes affecting the Executive Branch.
Elections are a perfect time for debate, but a terrible
time for decision-making. When it comes to intelligence
reform, Americans should not settle for adjustments that are
driven by the calendar instead of common sense; they deserve
a thoughtful, comprehensive approach to these critical
issues. If, as seems likely, Congress considers it essential
to act now on certain structural reforms, we believe it has
an obligation to return to this issue early next year in the
109th Congress to address these issues more comprehensively.
We hope the principles we've suggested will help shape
serious discussion of reform.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.
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