Congressional Record: March 26, 2004 (Senate)
Page S3207-S3210
OUTRAGEOUS CHARGES BY RICHARD CLARKE
Mr. FRIST. Madam President, in about 30 minutes or so, we will be
closing. Before doing that, I want to spend a few minutes talking about
an occurrence and a series of events over the course of the past week
stemming from comments and testimony by a former State Department civil
servant named Richard Clarke.
In a book that is scheduled to be released for sale by the parent
company of the CBS network, Mr. Clarke makes the outrageous charge that
the Bush administration, in its first 7 months in office, failed to
adequately address the threat of Osama bin Laden. There has been a
fulminating in the media and by some Senators about this book. I want
to take this opportunity to reflect a bit on this, because I am deeply
disturbed by the charges that have been made by Mr. Clarke. I am
disturbed, in part, by the way it has been handled by some of our
colleagues and by the media itself.
I am troubled by the charges. I am equally troubled someone would
sell a book that trades on their former service as a Government insider
with access to classified information, our Nation's most valuable
intelligence, in order to profit from the suffering surrounding what
this Nation endured on September 11, 2001.
I am troubled that Senators on the other side of the aisle are so
quick to accept such claims. I am troubled that Mr. Clarke has had a
hard time keeping his own story straight. I don't personally know Mr.
Clarke--I have met him--although I take it from press accounts that he
has been involved in the fight against terrorism for the past decade.
As 9/11 demonstrates, that decade was a period of growing peril, a
period of unanswered attacks against the United States. It is self-
serving, I believe, that Mr. Clarke asserts that the United States
could have stopped terrorism if only the three Presidents he served had
listened to Mr. Clarke. In fact, when Mr. Clarke was at the height of
his influence as the terrorism czar for President Clinton, the United
States saw the first attack on the World Trade Center, saw the attack
on the U.S. Air Force barracks in Saudi Arabia, the attacks on the two
U.S. embassies in Africa, the attack on the USS Cole, and the planning
and implementation for the 9/11 attacks.
The only common denominator throughout those 10 years of unanswered
attacks was Mr. Clarke himself, a consideration that is clearly driving
his effort to point fingers and to shift blame. He was the only common
denominator throughout that period.
This pointing fingers, this shifting blame I will come back to
because if we look at all the data and all the evidence, it becomes the
common theme.
While the reasons may be open to debate and discussion, the previous
administration's response to these repeated attacks by al-Qaida was
clearly inadequate--a few cruise missiles lobbed at some, at best,
questionable targets. Al-Qaida could only have been encouraged by their
record of success in the absence of a serious and a sustained response
by the United States during that period.
After 10 years of policies that failed to decisively confront and to
eliminate that threat from al-Qaida, Clarke now suggests that those
first 7 months of the Bush administration is where the blame should
lie. Again, after 10 years of attack after attack with an inadequate
response, with Mr. Clarke being the common denominator, to put the
blame almost entirely on the first 7 months of the Bush administration
to me is shifting blame and finger-pointing.
What is interesting is that what we heard this week has not always
been Mr. Clarke's view of the events leading up to September 11. This
week, a transcript was released of a press interview that Mr. Clarke
gave in August of 2002, not that long ago. I will submit for the Record
the full transcript, but I do want to cite a portion of this interview
reviewing in glowing terms the policies of the Bush administration in
fighting terrorism. I will be quoting exactly from the interview:
Richard Clarke:
Actually, I've got about seven points. Let me just go
through them quickly.
Again, these are Mr. Clarke's words:
[[Page S3208]]
The first point, I think the overall point is, there was no
plan on Al Qaeda that was passed from the Clinton
administration to the Bush administration.
No plan.
Mr. Clarke's words:
Second point is that the Clinton administration had a
strategy in place, effectively dating from 1998. And there
were a number of issues on the table since 1998. And they
remained on the table when that administration went out of
office--issues like aiding the Northern Alliance in
Afghanistan, changing our Pakistan policy, changing our
policy towards Uzbekistan. And in January 2001, the incoming
Bush administration was briefed on the existing strategy.
They were also briefed on these series of issues that had not
been decided on in a couple of years.
Mr. Clarke continues, using his exact words:
And the third point is the Bush administration decided
then, you know, mid-January, to do two things. One,
vigorously pursue the existing policy, including all of the
lethal covert action findings, which we've now made public to
some extent.
And the point is, while this big review was going on, there
were still in effect, the lethal findings were still in
effect. The second thing the administration decided to do is
to initiate a process to look at those issues which had been
on the table for a couple of years and get them decided.
So, point five, that process which was initiated in the
first week in February, decided in principle, in the spring
to add to the existing Clinton strategy and to increase CIA
resources, for example, for covert action, five-fold, to go
after Al Qaeda.
The sixth point, the newly-appointed deputies--and you had
to remember, the deputies didn't get into office until late
March, early April. The deputies then tasked the development
of the implementation details of these new decisions that
they were endorsing, and sending out to the principals.
I am still reading verbatim through the interview. His words:
Over the course of the summer--last point--they developed
implementation details, the principals met at the end of the
summer, approved them in their first meeting, changed the
strategy by authorizing the increase in funding five-fold,
changing the policy on Pakistan, changing the policy on
Uzbekistan, changing the policy on the Northern Alliance
assistance.
And then changed the strategy from one of rollback with Al
Qaeda over the course [of] five years, which it had been, to
a new strategy that called for the rapid elimination of Al
Qaeda. This is in fact the time line.
Those are the words of Richard Clarke during a series of questions I
will make a part of the Record. I will take the final question, in the
interest of time, to Mr. Clarke. Question:
You're saying that the Bush administration did not stop
anything that the Clinton administration was doing while it
was making the decisions, and by the end of the summer had
increased money for covert action five-fold. Is that correct?
Mr. Clarke's answer:
All of that's correct.
Madam President, I went through the interview in detail like that
because you can see clearly how out of sync it is. It is almost just
the opposite of what he said this week, and it is important for us to
understand, if we are going to look at Mr. Clarke's credibility, this
juxtaposition, this contrast, how dissimilar to what comes out of his
mouth it actually is.
Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed
in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. FRIST. This is not the only account in which Mr. Clarke changes
his story. In lengthy testimony before the congressional joint inquiry
that reviewed the events surrounding the September 11 attacks, Mr.
Clarke is equally effusive in his praise for his actions of the Bush
administration. It is my hope we will be able to get that testimony
declassified. That request has been made so all Senators may review it
and discuss it as well. But it is effusive praise under oath.
I do not know what Mr. Clarke's motive is. I have no earthly idea
what his motive for these charges is. Is it personal gain? Is it
partisan gain? Is it in some way personal profit? Is it animus because
of his failure to win a promotion with the Bush administration? I just
do not know. None of us is going to ever know. But one thing is clear,
and that is his motive could not possibly be to bring clarity or true
understanding of how we avoid future September 11 attacks.
There are five points I would like to make, five points that I find
absolutely inexplicable about Mr. Clarke's performance this past week.
I have waited to come to the floor until the end of the week because I
couldn't really believe what Mr. Clarke was saying, based on what we
know of his past performance and his participation in the former
administration. I wanted to have time, and I will make these five
points in a quick fashion.
Point No. 1: In an e-mail to the National Security Adviser 4 days
after the September 11 attacks, Mr. Clarke expressed alarm that ``when
the era of national unity begins to crack'' an effort to assign
responsibility for the 9/11 attacks will begin.
Mr. Clarke, in the e-mail, then proceeds to lay out in detail a
defense of his own personal actions before the attack and those of the
entire administration, all of that spelled out in the e-mail.
Mr. Clarke clearly, when we look at his e-mail, was consumed by the
desire to dodge any blame for the 9/11 attacks; while at the very same
moment rescuers were still searching the rubble at the site of the
World Trade Center looking for survivors, he was looking for some way
to dodge blame for himself. In my mind, this offers some insight, maybe
even perfect insight, as to what drove him to write his book.
The second point, in August 2002, the interview I read, Mr. Clarke
gave a thorough account of the Bush administration's very proactive
policy against al-Qaida. When presented with that interview, Mr. Clarke
tries to explain away that media performance, the interview itself, by
suggesting, well, I just gave the interview in that way as a loyal
servant to the administration.
A loyal administration official? Does Mr. Clarke understand the
gravity of the issues this body, we in the Congress, the United States,
is facing as we review through that 9/11 Commission the gravity of the
charges that have been made by him?
If in the summer of 2001 he saw the threat from al-Qaida as grave as
he now says it was, and if he found the response of the administration
so inadequate, as he now says it was, why did he wait until Sunday,
March 21 of 2004 to make his concerns known? It simply does not make
sense.
There is not a single public record of Mr. Clarke making any
objection whatsoever in the period leading up to or following the 9/11
attacks. There is nothing in the public record. There is no threat from
him to resign. There is no public protest. There is no plea to the
President, to the Congress, to the public to heed the advice he now
says was ignored.
If Mr. Clarke held his tongue because he was loyal, then shame on him
for putting policies above principle, but if he is manufacturing these
charges for some sort of personal profit or some sort of political
gain, he is a shame to this Government. Fortunately, I have not had the
opportunity to work with such an individual who would write solicitous
and self-defending e-mails to his supervisor, the national security
adviser, and then by his own admission lie to the press out of some
self-conceived notion of loyalty, to reverse himself on all accounts
for the sale of a book, a book which obviously is very popular. It is
selling now as I speak.
The third point I would like to make is Mr. Clarke told two entirely
different stories under oath. In July 2002, in front of the
congressional joint inquiry on the September 11 attacks, Mr. Clarke
said under oath the administration actively sought to address the
threat posed by al-Qaida during its first 7 months in office.
It is one thing for Mr. Clarke to dissemble in front of the media, in
front of the press, but if he lied under oath to the Congress, it is a
far more serious matter. As I mentioned, the Intelligence Committee is
seeking to have Mr. Clarke's previous testimony declassified so as to
permit an examination of Mr. Clarke on the two differing accounts.
Loyalty to any administration will be no defense if it is found he has
lied before Congress.
Fourth, notwithstanding Mr. Clarke's efforts to use his book first
and foremost to redirect, to shift blame, to shift attention from
himself, it is also clear Mr. Clarke and his publisher did adjust the
release date of his book in order to make maximum gain from the
publicity around the 9/11 hearings.
Assuming the controversy around this series of events does, in fact,
drive
[[Page S3209]]
the sales of his book, Mr. Clarke will make a lot of money for exactly
what he has done.
I personally find this to be an appalling act of profiteering, of
trading on insider access to highly classified information and
capitalizing upon the tragedy that befell this Nation on September 11,
2001.
Mr. Clarke must renounce any plan to personally profit from this
book.
Finally, it is understandable why some of the families who lost loved
ones on that tragic and horrible day, September 11, find Mr. Clarke's
performance this week appealing. The simple answers to a terrible
tragedy, to the very human desire to find an answer of why, to help
explain why on that beautiful fall day 2\1/2\ years ago a series of
events shattered their lives forever.
In his appearance before the 9/11 Commission, Mr. Clarke's theatrical
apology on behalf of the Nation was not his right, was not his
privilege, and was not his responsibility. In my view, it was not an
act of humility but it was an act of arrogance and manipulation.
Mr. Clarke can and will answer for his own conduct, but that is all.
Regardless of Mr. Clarke's motive or what he says or implies in his new
book, the fact remains this terrible attack was not caused by the
Government of the United States of America. No administration was
responsible for the attack. Our Nation did not invite the attack. The
attack on 9/11 was the evil design of a determined and hate-filled few
who slipped through the defenses of a nation, a nation that treasures
its freedoms, that treasures its openness, that treasures its
convenience. That our defenses failed is cause enough to review the
sequence of events leading up to that awful day, and we must and will
understand how to do better, balancing our determination to protect our
Nation with that equal resolve to protect our liberties.
The answer to Mr. Clarke's--and I clearly feel they are self-
serving--charges is that, in fact, we all bear that responsibility, and
we recognize that. Every one of us who served in Government before and
at the time of the 9/11 attacks also has the responsibility to do our
best to avoid such tragedy in the future. If we are to learn lasting
lessons from the examination of the 9/11 attacks, it must be toward
this end, not an exercise in finger pointing, not an exercise in blame
shifting, not an exercise in political score settling.
Exhibit 1
Transcript: Clarke Praises Bush Team in '02
(Washington.--The following transcript documents a
background briefing in early August 2002 by President Bush's
former counterterrorism coordinator Richard A. Clarke to a
handful of reporters, including Fox News' Jim Angle. In the
conversation, cleared by the White House on Wednesday for
distribution, Clarke describes the handover of intelligence
from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration
and the latter's decision to revise the U.S. approach to Al
Qaeda. Clarke was named special adviser to the president for
cyberspace security in October 2001. He resigned from his
post in January 2003.)
Richard Clarke. Actually, I've got about seven points, let
me just go through them quickly. Um, the first point, I think
the overall point is, there was no plan on Al Qaeda that was
passed from the Clinton administration to the Bush
Administration.
Second point is that the Clinton administration had a
strategy in place, effectively dating from 1998. And there
were a number of issues on the table since 1998. And they
remained on the table when that administration went out of
office--issues like aiding the Northern Alliance in
Afghanistan, changing our Pakistan policy--uh, changing our
policy toward Uzbekistan. And in January 2001, the incoming
Bush administration was briefed on the existing strategy.
They were also briefed on these series of issues that had not
been decided on in a couple of years.
And the third point is the Bush administration decided
then, you know, in late January, to do two things. One,
vigorously pursue the existing policy, including all of the
lethal covert action findings, which we've now made public to
some extent.
And the point is, while this big review was going on, there
were still in effect, the lethal findings were still in
effect. The second thing the administration decided to do is
to initiate a process to look at those issues which had been
on the table for a couple of years and get them decided.
So, point five, that process which was initiated in the
first week in February, uh, decided in principle, uh in the
spring to add to the existing Clinton strategy and to in
crease CIA resources, for example, for covert action, five-
fold, to go after Al Qaeda.
The sixth point, the newly-appointed deputies--and you had
to remember, the deputies didn't get into office until late
Mach, early April. The deputies then tasked the development
of the implementation details, uh, of these new decisions
that they were endorsing, and sending out to the principals.
Over the course of the summer--last point--they developed
implementation details, the principals met at the end of the
summer, approved them in their first meeting, changed the
strategy by authorizing the increase in funding five-fold,
changing the policy on Pakistan, changing the policy on
Uzbekistan, changing the policy on the Northern Alliance
assistance.
And then changed the strategy from one of rollback with Al
Qaeda over the course of five years, which it had been, to a
new strategy that called for the rapid elimination of Al
Qaeda. That is in fact the timeline.
Question. When was that presented to the president?
Clarke. Well, the president was briefed throughout this
process.
Question. But when was the final September 4 document?
(Interrupted.) Was that presented to the president?
Clarke. The document went to the president on September 10,
I think.
Question. What is your response to the suggestion in the
[Aug. 12, 2002] Time [magazine] article that the Bush
administration was unwilling to take on board the suggestion
made in the Clinton administration because of animus against
the--general animus against the foreign policy?
Clarke. I think if there was a general animus that clouded
their vision, they might not have kept the same guy dealing
with terrorism issue. This is the one issue where the
National Security Council leadership decided continuity was
important and kept the same guy around, the same team in
place. That doesn't sound like animus against uh the previous
team to me.
Jim Angle. You're saying that the Bush administration did
not stop anything that the Clinton administration was doing
while it was making these decisions, and by the end of the
summer had increased money for covert action five-fold. Is
that correct?
Clarke. All of that's correct.
Angle. OK.
Question. Are you saying now that there was not only a plan
per se, presented by the transition team, but that it was
nothing proactive that they had suggested?
Clarke. Well, what I'm saying is, there are two things
presented. One, what the existing strategy had been. And two,
a series of issues--like aiding the Northern Alliance,
changing Pakistan policy, changing Uzbek policy--that they
had been unable to come to um, any new conclusions, um, from
'98 on.
Question. Was all of that from '98 on or was some of it----
Clarke. All of those issues were on the table from '98 on.
Angle. When in '98 were those presented?
Clarke. In October of '98.
Question. In response to the Embassy bombing?
Clarke. Right, which was in September.
Question. Were all of those issues part of alleged plan
that was late December and the Clinton team decided not to
pursue because it was too close to----
Clarke. There was never a plan, Andrea. What there was was
these two things: One, a description of the existing
strategy, which included a description of the threat. And
two, those things which had been looked at over the course of
two years, and which were still on the table.
Question. So there was nothing that developed, no documents
or new plan of any sort?
Clarke. There was no new plan.
Question. No new strategy--I mean, I don't want to get into
a semantics----
Clarke. Plan, strategy--there was no, nothing new.
Question. 'Til late December, developing----
Clarke. What happened at the end of December was that the
Clinton administration NSC principles committee met and once
again looked at the strategy, and once again looked at the
issues that they had brought, decided in the past to add to
the strategy. But they did not at that point make any
recommendations.
Question. Had those issues evolved at all from October of
'98 'til December of 2000?
Clarke. Had they evolved? Um, not appreciably.
Angle. What was the problem? Why was it so difficult for
the Clinton administration to make decisions on those issues?
Clarke. Because they were tough issues. You know, take, for
example, aiding the Northern Alliance. Um, people in the
Northern Alliance had a, sort of bad track record. There were
questions about the government, there were questions about
drug-running, there was questions about whether or not in
fact they would use the additional aid to go after Al Qaeda
or not. Uh, and how would you stage a major new push in
Uzbekistan or somebody else or Pakistan to cooperate?
One of the big problems was that Pakistan at the time was
aiding the other side, was aiding the Taliban. And so, this
would put, if we started aiding the Northern Alliance against
the Taliban, this would have put us directly in opposition to
the Pakistani government. These are not easy decisions.
Angle. And none of that really changed until we were
attacked and then it was----
Clarke. No, that's not true. In the spring, the Bush
administration changed--began to change Pakistani policy, um,
by a dialogue that said we would be willing to lift
sanctions. So we began to offer carrots, which
[[Page S3210]]
made it possible for the Pakistanis, I think, to begin to
realize that they could go down another path, which was to
join us and to break away from the Taliban. So that's really
how it started.
Question. Had the Clinton administration in any of its work
on this issue, in any of the findings or anything else,
prepared for a call for the use of ground forces, special
operations forces in any way? What did the Bush
administration do with that if they had?
Clarke. There was never a plan in the Clinton
administration to use ground forces. The military was asked
at a couple of points in the Clinton administration to think
about it. Um, and they always came back and said it was not a
good idea. There was never a plan to do that.
(Break in briefing details as reporters and Clarke go back
and forth on how to source quotes from this backgrounder.)
Angle. So, just to finish up if we could then, so what
you're saying is that there was no--one, there was no plan;
two, there was no delay; and that actually the first changes
since October of '98 were made in the spring months just
after the administration came into office?
Clarke. You got it. That's right.
Question. It was not put into an action plan until
September 4, signed off by the principals?
Clarke. That's right.
Question. I want to add though, that NSPD--the actual work
on it began in early April.
Clarke. There was a lot of in the first three NSPDs that
were being worked in parallel.
Angle. Now the five-fold increase for the money in covert
operations against Al Qaeda--did that actually go into effect
when it was decided or was that a decision that happened in
the next budget year or something?
Clarke. Well, it was gonna go into effect in October, which
was the next budget year, so it was a month away.
Question. That actually got into the intelligence budget?
Clarke. Yes it did.
Question. Just to clarify, did that come up in April or
later?
Clarke. No, it came up in April and it was approved in
principle and then went through the summer. And you know, the
other thing to bear in mind is the shift from the rollback
strategy to the elimination strategy. When President Bush
told us in March to stop swatting at flies and just solve
this problem, then that was the strategic direction that
changed the NSPD from one of rollback to one of elimination.
Question. Well can you clarify something? I've been told
that he gave that direction at the end of May. Is that not
correct?
Clarke. No, it was March.
Question. The elimination of Al Qaeda, get back to ground
troops--now we haven't completely done that even with a
substantial number of ground troops in Afghanistan. Was
there, was the Bush administration contemplating without the
provocation of September 11th moving troops into Afghanistan
prior to that to go after Al Qaeda?
Clarke. I can not try to speculate on that point. I don't
know what we would have done.
Question. In you judgment, is it possible to eliminate Al
Qaeda without putting troops on the ground?
Clarke. Uh, yeah, I think it was. If we'd had Pakistani,
Uzbek and Northern Alliance assistance.
____________________
