Congressional Record: February 5, 2004 (Senate)
Page S611-S613
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON INTELLIGENCE
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Madam President, I thank the chairman of the
Intelligence Committee for his remarks. I think he well and ably set
out the structure of what we are doing.
I also thank Senator Lott for his remarks, particularly the remarks
that said we should work together. That has been one of the problems. I
want to go into that.
But before I do, I would like particularly to thank the Senator from
Florida, the former chairman of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, for his three speeches. I had the privilege of previewing
these. I think he delivered them eloquently and forcefully. I want him
to know I very much appreciate his careful scholarship and his reasoned
approach, which mark not only his remarks here but also his tenure as
chairman of the Intelligence Committee. He has presided over what
continues to be one of the most difficult chapters in the history of
our intelligence community.
Senator Lott has just said, with considerable spark, that we should
work together. I could not agree more.
Second, the committee has been prevented from examining the use of
intelligence by policymakers. This I believe is a real problem. Our own
resolution sets out that we should be able to examine the use of
intelligence by policymakers and administration officials. To a great
extent this is the reason we are here today creating an independent
commission which will have more authority than the elected officials of
this Government have.
I learned this morning that the independent commission that is
functioning today has access to the President's daily intelligence
briefs. The Intelligence Committee of the Senate does not have access
to the President's daily intelligence briefs, nor have we had, to the
best of my knowledge, through this investigation.
I was very pleased to see that over the past weekend the President
has apparently reversed course, accepting the recommendations from Dr.
Kay, from Members of the Senate, and from a host of experts to the
effect that only a full and outside investigation will be able to be
both credible and acceptable to the world at large.
I did not believe so before. I voted against the Corzine resolution
when it came up before. I changed my mind because if we, the elected
representatives, are not permitted to look into the use of intelligence
as provided by S. Res. 400, and it has to be an outside committee that
will have that right, so be it. But I find it to be really
idiosyncratic, because I believe the full power should be vested in the
officials of our Government, of which the Senate plays a very major
role, not necessarily always an independent committee, as it appears to
be happening.
Such a commission, though, will be able to remove some of the
partisanship that has infected this issue and, I hope, provide a
reasoned, careful, and credible assessment. I am concerned that the
President has let it be known he intends to appoint all of the members
of the commission and carry this out through Executive Order. This I
believe will adversely affect the commission's independence.
Let me give you an example. Many believe the handling of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States--that is a
Commission now functioning--headed by Gov. Thomas Keane and Congressman
Lee Hamilton, is a case in point. There have been many reports that
chronic delays in providing documents and foot dragging in arranging
interviews have frustrated the efforts of this Commission to complete
its work within the timeline the White House insisted upon.
The Commission is asking for an extension of time and Senators McCain
and Lieberman have introduced legislation to do so. I understand the
President yesterday agreed to extend this timetable to July 26 of this
year. I strongly believe the Commission should be given whatever time
it needs to complete its examination and we, in fact, should pass the
McCain-Lieberman bill.
Nevertheless, it is my hope that a commission, whether it is created
by Executive order or by statute, will be able to answer four
questions.
The first is: Were the prewar intelligence assessments of the dangers
posed by Saddam Hussein's regime wrong? This is not as simple a
question as it seems, for in the months prior to the invasion of Iraq
these assessments had two separate, equally important parts. The first
is whether Iraq had the capability to place the United States in such
danger as to warrant the unprecedented step of a unilateral preemptive
invasion of another sovereign nation. Just two days ago Secretary
Powell, asked if he would have recommended an invasion knowing Iraq had
no prohibited weapons, replied: ``I don't know because it was the
stockpile that presented the final little piece that made it more of a
real and present danger and threat to the region and to the world.'' He
added: ``The absence of a stockpile changes the political calculus; it
changes the answer you get.''
Second, was such a threat imminent or was it grave and growing?
Critical to this debate during the Summer and Fall of 2002 was the
immediacy of the threat which supported the argument that we needed to
attack quickly, could not wait to bring traditional allies aboard or to
try other options short of invasion.
The second question is: Whether the intelligence assessments were bad
as well as wrong.
This requires a fine distinction between an intelligence assessment
that is wrong, and one that is bad. Intelligence assessments are often
wrong, for by their nature they are an assessment of the probability
that a future event will take place. But wrong does not always mean
bad. Sometimes an intelligence assessment follows the right logic and
fairly assesses the amount, credibility and meaning of collected data,
and still is wrong. What the independent commission needs to do is to
separate these two different, but related, issues.
The third question is to determine--if the intelligence assessment
was both bad and wrong--to what degree and why?
Did the intelligence community negligently depart from accepted
standards of professional competence in performing its collection and
analytic tasks?
Was the intelligence community subject to pressures, personal or
structural, which caused it to reach a wrong result through bad
analysis?
Were the ordinary internal procedures by which intelligence is
subject to peer review properly carried out?
A commission must delve deeply into the mechanisms of intelligence
analysis to reach these answers.
The fourth and final question is whether the intelligence assessments
reached by the intelligence community, whether right or wrong, good or
bad, were fairly represented to the Congress and to the American
people. Did administration officials speaking in open and closed
session to members of Congress accurately represent the intelligence
product that they were relying upon? Were public statements, speeches
and press releases, fair and accurate? This is the cauldron boiling
below the surface.
This final question is particularly grave, because it touches upon
the constitutionally critical link between the executive and
legislative branches. The Founders knew what they were doing
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when they developed a shared responsibility for war making--only
Congress can declare war, with the President, as Commander in Chief,
conducting it--and the need is vital for Members of Congress to have
fairly presented, timely and accurate intelligence when they consider
whether to invest the President with the authority as Commander in
Chief to put American lives, as well as those of innocent civilians, at
risk.
My vote, in particular, was based largely on intelligence, and
statements about that intelligence, related to Saddam's certain
possession of chemical and biological weapons and the probability or
likelihood, that he had both weaponized and deployed them. Also, the
fact that he had violated the U.N. missile restrictions and possessed a
delivery system for a chemical or biological warhead, and could deliver
that warhead 600 miles, threatening other Middle Eastern nations or
perhaps, from offshore, the United States.
There were many statements made by the administration that when
combined with the intelligence created an overwhelming case, I think
particularly for me and for many others. I don't think there would have
been 77 votes in the Senate to authorize use of force had these
statements not been made.
Let me give just five examples of such statements:
Secretary of State Powell, on September 8, 2002, said on Fox News
Sunday: ``There is no doubt that he has chemical weapons stocks.'' He
also said: ``With respect to biological weapons, we are confident that
he has some stocks of those weapons, and he is probably continuing to
try to develop more.''
President Bush, on September 12, 2002, said in his address to the
U.N. General Assembly: ``Right now, Iraq is expanding and improving
facilities that were used for the production of biological weapons.''
President Bush, in his October 7, 2002, address also said: ``We know
that the regime has produced thousands of tons of chemical agents,
including mustard gas, sarin nerve gas, and VX nerve gas.''
Secretary Powell, again in his February 5, 2003, address to the U.N.
Security Council, said:
Our conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a
stockpile of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons
agent. That is enough agent to fill 16,000 battlefield
rockets. Even the low end of 100 tons of agent would enable
Saddam Hussein to cause mass casualties across more than 100
square miles of territory, an area nearly 5 times the size of
Manhattan . . . when will we see the rest of the submerged
iceberg? Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons. Saddam Hussein
has used such weapons. And Saddam Hussein has no compunction
about using them again, against his neighbors and against his
own people.
What a strong statement--a statement that has to be backed up with
almost certain facts.
President Bush said, on October 2, 2002, in Cincinnati: ``Facing
clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof, the
smoking gun that may come in the form of a mushroom cloud.''
I remember hearing this speech, which made a deep impression upon me.
The President of the United States said this. Members of the
Intelligence Committee are looking at intelligence. When combined with
the President's statements, the statements of the Secretary of State
and the statements of the Vice President, how can you not believe them?
That is why this committee's investigation into the use of intelligence
which we have been prohibited from entering into is so important that
we do. We are the official people's representatives on this Committee
on Intelligence, and to cut us out from one part of an investigation
that our own resolutions say we should look at, I think, is
unconscionable.
When all of this is combined with the intelligence provided to
Congress, the aerial photographs of what was believed to be chemical
weapons plants, and the National Intelligence Estimate of October 2002,
this information created an overwhelming belief that there was an
imminent threat to our Nation, and a dominant majority of the Senate of
the United States voted for the resolution authorizing the use of
force.
You can imagine my surprise that after more than 1,500 sites--top
priority sites--have been searched and millions of dollars spent on Dr.
Kay's special investigation, no weapons have been found. And Dr. Kay
submits to us that he does not believe any will be found.
So the reality of what has been learned in Iraq versus the
intelligence presented to us causes enormous concern.
Again, I truly believe that had it not been for the strength of the
intelligence and statements made to Congress, including the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, a vote for regime change alone,
without the belief of an imminent threat, would not have had the
majority it did, may well not have passed, and if it did, most likely
would have passed with a bare majority.
These statements and the intelligence upon which they were based now
appear to be unsupported by the available evidence, and have been
contradicted by Dr. Kay's findings. A commission must look closely at
these and other similar statements.
Even as the commission moves forward, I believe Congress should
undertake two related tasks. The first is to carefully review the
implications of the President's so-called preemption doctrine. I have
strongly criticized this policy since its inception. Although, clearly,
the United States will always retain the right to defend itself in
specific circumstances from a real, imminent threat, preemption as a
doctrine departs from core American values. We must be strong in
defense but not allow this country to become an aggressive nation of
conquest.
I also believe the doctrine runs counter to 50 years of bipartisan
American foreign policy, which is based on the belief that
international law, multilateral agreements, and diplomacy are also
effective means to promote and to protect American security.
Finally, and on a more fundamental and practical level, the doctrine
requires a faith in the perfectibility of intelligence analysis that is
simply not attainable. Preemption inherently requires us to be right
every time on the nature and imminence of threats.
Unfortunately, as every senior intelligence official to whom I have
spoken tells me, intelligence is rarely going to be that accurate, for
the very reason I have mentioned earlier it is, at its heart,
probability analysis.
This past weekend, Dr. Kay spoke to this issue, saying, and I quote,
``if you cannot rely on good, accurate intelligence that is credible to
the American people and to others abroad, you certainly can't have a
policy of preemption.''
The preemptive concept bets everything on one roll of the dice and we
had better be right every time.
I spoke about this when the doctrine was announced and offered the
hypothetical of a preemptive attack based on intelligence that was
wrong, that results in destruction and death, and undermines American
credibility and our position around the world. The hypothetical, so
far, at least, is true in Iraq.
I hope the President and his advisers will reconsider the ill-advised
adoption of preemption in light of what we have already learned from
its first exercise.
The second thing the Congress should do, and do now, is begin the
process of restructuring the intelligence community and begin by taking
a single, critical step: Pass legislation creating a Director of
National Intelligence and change from the current situation where a
single man is both head of the entire intelligence community--with its
15 departments and agencies--and the head of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It is an impossible job with insufficient authority.
I have introduced legislation that would accomplish this in both the
107th and 108th Congresses. Each time I stood on this floor to urge its
passage and each time I expressed my belief that the current structure
could result in a colossal intelligence failure.
In June of 2002, I said: ``This legislation creates the Director of
National Intelligence to lead a true intelligence community and to
coordinate our intelligence and anti-terrorism efforts and help assure
the sort of communication problems that prevented the various elements
of our intelligence community from working together effectively before
September 11 never happen again.''
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I fear it has happened again. Once more, I stand in the Senate to
urge the passage of the legislation.
It has to be pointed out that our present intelligence structure for
the most part is based on a post-World War II, cold-war environment. It
is not suited for the new challenges of asymmetric threats and non-
state entities, as well as quite possibly from states also involved in
terrorism. We have a Soviet-era intelligence community in a post-Soviet
world.
We need to have a Director of National Intelligence now more than
ever and we should not wait any longer for the results of another
commission. I remind my colleagues that creating a Director of National
Intelligence was the very first recommendation of the bipartisan Joint
Inquiry into the Attacks on September 11, a recommendation contained in
a report signed by every member of the Intelligence Committees of the
Senate and the House. Senator Graham spoke earlier about this
provision, and I agree with his explanation of the pressing need for
the change.
Such a position, if created today, would provide substantial
improvement in the function and quite possibly the restructuring of the
more than one dozen agencies and departments. It would give one person,
appointed by the President for a 10-year term, the statutory authority
to determine strategies across the board, to set priorities, and to
assign staff and dollars across departments and agencies.
It is my understanding the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
will take up this legislation in 2004, I am told, in April. It is my
hope that working together we can include this legislation as part of
the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2005 and make it law
this Spring.
As I have said earlier, the so-called ``bipartisan'' investigation by
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has had little effective
participation by Democratic Senators, or their staffs. In fact, in many
ways had the Intelligence Committee been able to carry out its
responsibilities, as set for in Senate Resolution 400, much of the
debate on the floor on this issue would be unnecessary. Nonetheless, I
look forward to this afternoon when the report will be made available
to committee members.
I deeply believe that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
should turn its attention to its core responsibilities--conducting
vigorous oversight of the intelligence community, and carefully
considering legislation to make necessary changes. To that end I urge
Chairman Roberts to take up legislation restructuring the Intelligence
Community, including, but not limited to, my bill to create a Director
of National Intelligence, hold comprehensive hearings on these
proposals, and report out legislation in time for inclusion in this
year's Intelligence Authorization bill.
As I have said earlier, my vote in favor of the resolution to
authorize the use of force in Iraq was perhaps the most difficult, and
consequential, vote of my career. It was a decision based on hours of
intelligence briefings from administration and intelligence officials,
plus the classified and unclassified versions of the National
Intelligence Estimates. My decision was in part based on my trust that
this intelligence was the best our Nation's intelligence services could
offer, untainted by bias, and fairly presented. It was a decision made
because I was convinced that the threat from Iraq was not only grave
but imminent.
Because of my vote, and the votes of the 76 other Senators who voted
for the resolution, our troops are stuck in Iraq, under fire, and
taking casualties. Our armed forces are stretched thin; we have
antagonized our enemies and alienated many of our closest allies.
In the post-9/11 world, a world where we confront asymmetric threats
every day, intelligence plays a key role informing the policy-making
process. The administration bears primary responsibility for our
intelligence apparatus--ensuring that it works well, is honest, and is
properly focused. The administration is also responsible for honestly
and fairly presenting the results of the intelligence process to the
Congress, informing, for instance our vote on the resolution to
authorize force.
I now fear that the threat was not imminent, that there were other
policy options, short of war, that would have effectively met the
threat posed by Saddam Hussein.
And that is why a full investigation of the prewar intelligence is so
critical.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Madam President, I would like to be notified when I
have used 10 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
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