Congressional Record: February 5, 2004 (Senate)
Page S608-S610
ACTIVITIES OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE--IRAQ
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I rise today in order to update my
colleagues in this body on the recent activities of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence with respect to Iraq. This is a subject that
has been in the headlines consistently for many different reasons. But
my purpose in rising today is to report to the Senate, for it is an
important day in that the Intelligence Committee members, as of this
afternoon, will be presented the working draft of what the staff has
been working on for better than 7 months.
In June of last year, nearly 8 months ago, the Intelligence Committee
began a formal review of U.S. intelligence into the existence of Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction programs, Iraq's ties to terrorist groups,
Saddam Hussein's threat to regional stability and security in the
Persian Gulf, and his violation--obvious violation--of human rights.
This review was initiated as part of the committee's continuing
oversight of the U.S. intelligence community's activities and programs,
which is always continuing. Our committee staff had, for the previous
several months, already been examining the intelligence activities
regarding Iraq, including the intelligence community's support to the
United Nations weapons inspections in Iraq and the community's analysis
and collection of reporting related to the alleged Niger-Iraq uranium
deal.
On June 20, 2003, however, Vice Chairman Rockefeller and I issued a
press statement. We announced a joint commitment to continue the
committee's thorough review of prewar U.S. intelligence. In that press
statement, Senator Rockefeller and I agreed to examine the following:
the quantity and quality of U.S. intelligence on the Iraqi regime's
weapons of mass destruction programs, its ties to terrorist groups, the
regime's threat to stability and security in the region, and its
repression of its own people.
We also agreed to look at the objectivity and the reasonableness,
independence, and accuracy of the judgments reached by the Intelligence
Community; whether those judgments were properly disseminated to
policymakers in the executive branch and the Congress; whether--and
this is very important--any influence was brought to bear on anyone to
shape their analysis to support policy objectives; finally, other
issues we might mutually identify in the course of the committee's
review.
I laid out three phases of the committee's overall Iraq review.
First, to evaluate the quantity and quality of the intelligence
underlying prewar assessments concerning Iraq; second, to determine
whether the analytical judgments contained in those assessments were
objective, independent, and reasonable; third, to evaluate the accuracy
of those assessments by comparing them with the results of the ongoing
investigative efforts in Iraq.
This afternoon, as I have stated, our committee members will begin
reading and reviewing the staff's draft report, which does contain the
committee's efforts to complete the first and second phases of the
review. The third and final phase will be completed when the Iraq
survey group completes its work in Iraq.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. ROBERTS. I am delighted to yield.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am privileged to serve on the committee
with the Senator. There has been criticism, raising the inference that
we have not in the Senate been addressing this with the depth and
sincerity and interest we should.
I take great umbrage at that. Under the leadership of the chairman
and, indeed, myself, we are the ones who brought David Kay up. We are
the ones who put David Kay on the stand, the Intelligence Committee
first, and before the Armed Services Committee immediately following,
and subjected him to cross-examination after the delivery of his
report. His report is a mixed one in certain ways, in my judgment, but
nevertheless in no way were we not taking the initiative to bring this
to the forefront.
I say also, yesterday the Armed Services Committee heard from the
Secretary of Defense. The distinguished chairman was present. He is a
member of that committee. Again, the first questions on WMD and
precisely the question of whether or not there was any manipulation or
distortion came from the Chair, myself, addressed directly to the
Secretary.
Any objective analysis of the reports out of that hearing this
morning--it was covered by the press--he faced it head on and answered
those questions.
As we are speaking, I just departed the television where Director
Tenet is now addressing the Nation. So I think the President and his
principal deputies are facing square on these complex issues, as is the
Senate.
I commend the chairman, and perhaps he will agree with my
observations.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I fully agree with the distinguished
chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and I am very proud to serve
on that committee, as well as privileged being the chairman of the
Intelligence Committee.
We discussed this at great length. All members of these committees
discussed it at great length. We have a responsibility to the American
people to
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fully investigate this and to publicly, when we can, when we are not
dealing with any classified information, tell the American people what
they should know and have a right to know. We are proceeding in that
fashion. We are taking this very seriously, which is why I am trying to
summarize now for the Senate and for all those who may be interested in
this issue precisely what we have done to date in regard to the
Intelligence Committee.
The Senator is exactly right, he has taken the lead in the Armed
Services Committee with the appropriate people within the military, and
I thank him for his contribution.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, our review in the Intelligence Committee
began in earnest in early June of last year when the intelligence
community did provide our committee with 19 volumes--19 volumes, floor
to ceiling--and they contained approximately 15,000 pages of
intelligence assessments and sources and source reporting underlying
the assessments of the Hussein regime's WMD programs. They also
pertained to ties to terrorist groups, the threat to stability and
security in the region, as I have said before, and the repression of
his own people.
Our committee staff began immediately to read and analyze every
report provided to determine how intelligence analysts reached their
conclusions and whether any assessments were not supported by the
intelligence provided to the committee.
Our committee staff endeavored to the greatest extent possible to
disregard--to disregard--postwar revelations concerning Iraq in order
to replicate the same analytical environment enjoyed by the
intelligence community analysts prior to the war.
In late August and early September of 2003, our committee staff did
request additional intelligence to substantiate the intelligence
community's assessments which staff judged were not sufficiently
supported by the intelligence that had been previously provided. Not
only did we ask for the original information, but when we were not
satisfied, we asked for more; we demanded more.
Our committee staff began to receive this additional supporting
intelligence in October of 2003. In late October, the staff requested
any intelligence which had not already been provided that contradicted
the intelligence community's prewar analysis in regard to Iraq.
For example, the committee staff requested intelligence that showed
Iraq had not reconstituted its nuclear program, had not renewed the
production of chemical agents, and had abandoned an offensive
biological weapons program. In early November of 2003, the intelligence
community wrote to the committee that it was working to provide the
contradictory intelligence we requested.
In the same letter, the community stated it had uncovered an
additional six volumes of intelligence material that supported its
assessments on Iraq's WMD programs, and the community did provide the
contradictory intelligence information in late November.
I want my colleagues to realize that this has been an extremely
thorough undertaking. During the 8 months of the committee's review,
our committee staff submitted almost 100 requests for supplemental
intelligence information, received over 30,000 pages of documents in
response to those requests, and reviewed and analyzed each document
that was provided.
Additionally, our committee staff have interviewed more than 200
individuals, including intelligence analysts, senior officials within
the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency,
Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Department of State,
National Ground Intelligence Center, the Air Force, and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
They have also questioned former intelligence analysts, national
intelligence officers, operations officers, collection managers,
signals intelligence collectors, imagery analysts, nuclear experts with
the International Atomic Energy Agency, ambassadors, former United
Nations inspectors, Department of Defense weapons experts, State
Department officials, and staff members of the National Security
Council.
Additionally, the committee has held three hearings on aspects of
United States intelligence on Iraq, a hearing on the Iraq-Niger
connection, a briefing by the CIA and State Department inspectors
general on their review of the Iraq-Niger issue, and a hearing on the
history and the continuity of weapons of mass destruction assessments
that pertain to Iraq.
These efforts have enabled our committee staff to develop a full
understanding of the quantity and quality of intelligence reporting
supporting the intelligence community's prewar assessments.
Our committee staff have also gained an understanding of how
intelligence analysts throughout the community used that intelligence
to develop their assessments on these issues and how those assessments
were actually disseminated to policymakers, and whether those
assessments were reasonable, objective, independent, or if there was
any political consideration and, again, whether any influence was
brought to bear to shape their analysis to support any policy
objective.
The professional bipartisan staff of the Intelligence Committee I
think has done an outstanding job. It is a very complete job. For the
next 3 weeks, however, it will be the members of the committee, our
turn to do our work by reading and reviewing and suggesting any changes
to the report.
I only hope that members will not prejudge the report. Let me repeat
that. I only hope that members will not prejudge the report--there has
been activity in the past indicating plans to do just that; I hope that
does not happen--and that they will take the time to actually read the
information in order to make informed critiques of the material.
This report can have a profound impact--it will have a profound
impact--on the future of our intelligence community as we face the
threats of a new century. However, this can only be done if colleagues
on both sides of the aisle put aside election year politics and review
the facts in an objective and unbiased manner.
Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas has 9 minutes
remaining.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I wish to read a statement by Winston
Churchill which I think has application to the inquiry we are
conducting in the Intelligence Committee and the whole issue in regard
to the credibility and the timeliness of intelligence prior to the war
in Iraq. Sir Winston Churchill said this upon hearing about the attack
on Pearl Harbor:
Silly people, that was the description many gave in
discounting the force of the United States. Some said they
were soft, others that they would never be united--
Let me repeat that.
That they would never be united, that they would never come
to grips. They would never stand bloodletting. Their system
of government and democracy would paralyze their war effort.
Let me repeat that.
Their system of government and democracy would paralyze
their war effort.
Now we will see the weakness of this numerous but remote,
wealthy and talkative people.
Referring to Americans.
But, I have studied the American Civil War fought out to
the last desperate inch. American blood flowed in my veins. I
thought of a remark made to me 30 years before: The United
States is like a gigantic boiler. Once the fire is lighted
under it, there is no limit to the power it can generate. It
is a matter of resolve.
I am concerned in what appears to be almost a blast furnace of
politics at a very early time, in an even-numbered year--and I
understand that. I know politics is not bean bagged, and I know that my
colleagues have very serious differences of opinion, as we will on the
committee, but I hope what Sir Winston said: ``Some said they were
soft, others that they would never be united . . . their system of
government and democracy would paralyze their war effort,'' is not true
in regard to the global war on terrorism. I have some concerns about
that.
I indicated at the first, when I knew it was our responsibility and
obligation, in working with the distinguished vice chairman of the
Intelligence Committee, that we would do our job and that we would do
it just as bipartisan as we possibly could, that it would be
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thorough. It is my view that this draft report, and then what the
Members will agree to, will be the most thorough review of the
intelligence community in the last decade. I also said that we will
make every effort to hold public hearings, because the American people
have a right to know, and we will let any political chips fall any way
they want to fall.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Under the previous order, the
majority leader controls the next 23\1/2\ minutes and the Senator from
California then would control 23\1/2\ minutes. The Senator from
Mississippi.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, with the Senator's agreement I will go ahead
and proceed since we did have, I think, about 27 or so minutes.
Mr. ROBERTS. I yield the floor. May I inquire as to how much time I
have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas has 5 minutes
remaining.
Mr. ROBERTS. I ask unanimous consent that that time be yielded to the
distinguished Senator from Mississippi.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is
so ordered.
The Senator from Mississippi is recognized for 5 minutes.
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