House Debate on "9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act" (HR 10)

Congressional Record: October 8, 2004 (House)
Page H8863-H8873

9/11 RECOMMENDATIONS IMPLEMENTATION ACT

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827 and rule
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill,
H.R. 10.

{time} 0915

In the Committee of the Whole

Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Kirk

Mr. KIRK. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment No. 4 offered by Mr. Kirk:
Page 60, after line 9, insert the following new section:

SEC. 1018. REPORT ON INTEGRATION OF DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY
INTO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

(a) Report.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report on the
practicality of integrating the Drug Enforcement
Administration into the intelligence community.
(b) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate; and
(2) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives and the Senate.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk) and a Member opposed each will
control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk).
Mr. KIRK. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, this amendment corrects a critical problem with our
intelligence community and adds a needed bipartisan recommendation to
the reforms we have in the underlying legislation. We have known for
quite some time that the sale of elicit narcotics and terrorism go hand
in hand. This link is now firm and is clear with regard to the
terrorist activities and terrorist groups in Colombia. It is also clear
in Peru, but this phenomenon has spread far beyond Latin America and is
evident in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Earlier this year, I traveled to Pakistan and Afghanistan, the key
frontier border area of such concern to the United States, and there I
learned a new fact, that Osama bin Laden's connection to his family
fortune has been reduced. His connection to donations to the United
States and Europe has been reduced, but he has a new source of income.
Osama bin Laden is now becoming one of the world's largest dealers in
heroin. Through just one of his supply organizations, bin Laden's
lieutenants are earning at least $28 million from the sale of narcotics
through Pakistan.
Let us remind ourselves of the conclusion of the 9/11 Commission,
that the attacks against the World Trade Centers, Shanksville, and the
Pentagon cost al Qaeda only $500,000. With an annual income of $28
million coming from the sale of illegal narcotics, we know that one of
the key terrorist financing mechanisms is the sale of illegal
narcotics.
In the 9/11 Commission report, they briefly mentioned this but did
not focus on it. When you are on the front lines in Kandahar or
Peshawar in Pakistan, you see that this link is clear.
Our Drug Enforcement Agency has some of the best financial maps of
terrorist organizations in the world, and the Drug Enforcement Agency
used to be a formal member of the intelligence community. In my
judgment and the judgment of my bipartisan partner, the gentleman from
Washington (Mr. Larsen), on this amendment, we believe that the Drug
Enforcement Agency should become part of the intelligence community
again, that this link between terrorism and illegal narcotics is very
clear.
Roughly half of the 28 terrorist organizations identified by the
State Department in October, 2001, have links to drug activities.
Organizations like the Kurdistan Worker's Party, the National
Liberation Army, ELN, al Qaeda, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia, Shining Path, and the United Self-Defense Forces/Group of
Colombia. All of these in a worldwide phenomenon, depending on violence
and terror, funded by the sale of illegal narcotics.
This bipartisan amendment would help study the integration of the
U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency into the intelligence community. It is
supported by Karen Tandy, the administrator of the DEA. It is supported
by a number

[[Page H8864]]

of minority members. It is supported by the attorney general. I urge
adoption of this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to claim the time in
opposition to the amendment, although I rise in support of the
amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Texas?
There was no objection.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the Kirk amendment to H.R.
10. This amendment requires the President to submit to Congress a
report detailing the best way to incorporate the Drug Enforcement
Administration into the intelligence community.
The El Paso Intelligence Center, or EPIC, is an asset of the Drug
Enforcement Agency. It is located in El Paso, Texas. It is the Nation's
singular, multi-agency, tactical intelligence center for drug, alien,
and weapons trafficking intelligence. Supporting Federal, State, and
local law enforcement officers, EPIC also provides information
regarding homeland security, homeland defense and counterterrorism to
its member agencies. During my 26\1/2\ year tenure with the United
States Border Patrol, I was able to utilize the services of EPIC,
leading to a personal appreciation of the important role that the El
Paso Intelligence Center plays in homeland security defense.
Currently, EPIC accomplishes its mission by processing requests for
information received from Federal, State and local law enforcement
personnel on persons, modes of transportation, organizations or
addresses that are suspected of being engaged or associated with some
type of criminal activity. Officers have 24 hours a day, 7 days a week
access to the information in its database. It gives them the ability to
query and provide simultaneous access to a number of other Federal
databases. The El Paso Intelligence Center provides analysis of drug
movement events, trends and patterns. They also do research on criminal
investigations and communication intercept exploitation in support of
its many different customers.
It is well known that there is a link in my opinion between illegal
narcotics and the funding that it creates for terrorism. The El Paso
Intelligence Center understands this link and is known around the world
for its ability to connect the dots between actions and players.
The DEA plays an important role in this Nation's war on terrorism and
war on drugs, and should be more fully integrated with our intelligence
community. For those reasons, I urge my colleagues to support the Kirk
amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. KIRK. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra), the chairman of the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me
this time and thank the gentleman for his amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I support this amendment and appreciate the efforts of
the gentleman from Illinois on this issue. The intelligence community
looks forward to an opportunity to review this issue further.
The DEA has substantial capabilities around the world that should be
fully utilized in an appropriate fashion. The report that is provided
for in this amendment will assist Congress in its consideration of the
role of the Drug Enforcement Administration and the intelligence
community along with the other important responsibilities that the DEA
undertakes on a daily basis. I look forward to seeing the report and
look forward to the passage of this amendment.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Washington (Mr. Larsen).
Mr. LARSEN of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this
amendment along with my colleague, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr.
Kirk).
We need to consider making the DEA part of our intelligence network.
Before our own eyes, Afghanistan is re-emerging as the international
leader in the heroin trade. As this problem grows, the less control our
Nation will have over the funding sources of international terrorism. A
direct relationship exists between terrorism and the drug trade.
Therefore, a direct relationship is needed between the DEA and our
intelligence agencies. The DEA not only combats the drug trade around
the world but can gather valuable information that can transcend drug
trafficking and reach into the shadowy corners of international
terrorism.
According to the State Department, 12 of the 28 terrorist
organizations listed in the Department of State October, 2001, Report
on Foreign Terrorist Organizations have links to foreign drug
trafficking. One fitting example of this relationship happened in 2003
when a seizure of hashish from a trafficking group included suspected
al Qaeda members and involved drugs worth nearly $30 million at
wholesale.
The drug trade not only has a role in funding terrorists but also
plays a significant destabilizing role in Afghanistan. Just yesterday,
drug smugglers were implicated in a terrorist attack on Hamid Karzai's
vice presidential candidate. Free elections in Afghanistan are a threat
to the drug trade, just as free elections in Afghanistan are a threat
to global terrorism.
According to our Office of National Drug Control Policy, the
challenging security situation in Afghanistan has complicated the task
of fighting the war against drugs and vice versa. As the terrorists
lose ground, the opium poppy growers win, and much of the money from
Afghanistan's opium sales goes right back to the terrorists.
Drug traffickers and terror networks work out of the same rule book.
They both strive to undermine democratic institutions and engage in
widespread violence and corruption. Both groups also depend on money
laundering, forgery and arms deals to implement their deadly goals.
We cannot separate international terrorism from the drug trade. They
are intertwined. This amendment will examine the ways DEA can maintain
its current role while sharing information to help further protect our
Nation. I believe this amendment is in the spirit of the 9/11
Commission recommendations and will help create and consolidate the
whole intelligence picture that a president needs to defend our Nation.
I urge its support.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. KIRK. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
In closing, I thank the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes) and the
gentleman from Washington (Mr. Larsen) for supporting this amendment.
The gentleman from Texas is exactly right. El Paso Intelligence Center
already does this. It is a critical asset but should be a formal part
of the intelligence community, as are combatant commands that do a
number of key tasks with regard to drug profits and terrorism.
We know that half of the Afghan economy is now related to the sale of
illicit narcotics. We know that the Taliban and al Qaeda depend on
terrorist profits. We started winning the battle against narcoterrorism
in Colombia because we took a unified campaign on this approach against
terrorism and the sale of illegal narcotics.
The DEA is the expert on these financial organizations. If the 9/11
Commission said anything, it said we should attack the financial
support for terrorism and that financial support is increasingly
reliant on the sale of illegal narcotics, especially for Osama bin
Laden becoming one of the number one heroin dealers in Central Asia.
For these reasons, I urge adoption of the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by
the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk).
The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. KIRK. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois
(Mr. Kirk) will be postponed.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. It is now in order to consider amendment
No. 5 printed in House Report 108-751.

[[Page H8865]]

Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Sessions

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment No. 5 offered by Mr. Sessions:
At the end of title II of the bill (page 235, after line
21), insert the following new subtitle:

Subtitle J--Prevention of Terrorist Access to Destructive Weapons Act
of 2004

SECTION 2211. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the ``Prevention of Terrorist
Access to Destructive Weapons Act of 2004''.

SEC. 2212. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.

(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The criminal use of man-portable air defense systems
(MANPADS) presents a serious threat to civil aviation
worldwide, especially in the hands of terrorists or foreign
states that harbor them.
(2) Atomic weapons or weapons designed to release radiation
(``dirty bombs'') could be used by terrorists to inflict
enormous loss of life and damage to property and the
environment.
(3) Variola virus is the causative agent of smallpox, an
extremely serious, contagious, and sometimes fatal disease.
Variola virus is classified as a Category A agent by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, meaning that it
is believed to pose the greatest potential threat for adverse
public health impact and has a moderate to high potential for
large-scale dissemination. The last case of smallpox in the
United States was in 1949. The last naturally occurring case
in the world was in Somalia in 1977. Although smallpox has
been officially eradicated after a successful worldwide
vaccination program, there remain two official repositories
of the variola virus for research purposes. Because it is so
dangerous, the variola virus may appeal to terrorists.
(4) The use, or even the threatened use, of MANPADS, atomic
or radiological weapons, or the variola virus, against the
United States, its allies, or its people, poses a grave risk
to the security, foreign policy, economy, and environment of
the United States. Accordingly, the United States has a
compelling national security interest in preventing unlawful
activities that lead to the proliferation or spread of such
items, including their unauthorized production, construction,
acquisition, transfer, possession, import, or export. All of
these activities markedly increase the chances that such
items will be obtained by terrorist organizations or rogue
states, which could use them to attack the United States, its
allies, or United States nationals or corporations.
(5) There is no legitimate reason for a private individual
or company, absent explicit government authorization, to
produce, construct, otherwise acquire, transfer, receive,
possess, import, export, or use MANPADS, atomic or
radiological weapons, or the variola virus.
(b) Purpose.--The purpose of this subtitle is to combat the
potential use of weapons that have the ability to cause
widespread harm to United States persons and the United
States economy (and that have no legitimate private use) and
to threaten or harm the national security or foreign
relations of the United States.

SEC. 2213. MISSILE SYSTEMS DESIGNED TO DESTROY AIRCRAFT.

Chapter 113B of title 18, United States Code, is amended by
adding after section 2332f the following:

``Sec. 2332g. Missile systems designed to destroy aircraft

``(a) Unlawful Conduct.--
``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (3), it
shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly produce,
construct, otherwise acquire, transfer directly or
indirectly, receive, possess, import, export, or use, or
possess and threaten to use--
``(A) an explosive or incendiary rocket or missile that is
guided by any system designed to enable the rocket or missile
to--
``(i) seek or proceed toward energy radiated or reflected
from an aircraft or toward an image locating an aircraft; or
``(ii) otherwise direct or guide the rocket or missile to
an aircraft;
``(B) any device designed or intended to launch or guide a
rocket or missile described in subparagraph (A); or
``(C) any part or combination of parts designed or
redesigned for use in assembling or fabricating a rocket,
missile, or device described in subparagraph (A) or (B).
``(2) Nonweapon.--Paragraph (1)(A) does not apply to any
device that is neither designed nor redesigned for use as a
weapon.
``(3) Excluded conduct.--This subsection does not apply
with respect to--
``(A) conduct by or under the authority of the United
States or any department or agency thereof or of a State or
any department or agency thereof; or
``(B) conduct pursuant to the terms of a contract with the
United States or any department or agency thereof or with a
State or any department or agency thereof.
``(b) Jurisdiction.--Conduct prohibited by subsection (a)
is within the jurisdiction of the United States if--
``(1) the offense occurs in or affects interstate or
foreign commerce;
``(2) the offense occurs outside of the United States and
is committed by a national of the United States;
``(3) the offense is committed against a national of the
United States while the national is outside the United
States;
``(4) the offense is committed against any property that is
owned, leased, or used by the United States or by any
department or agency of the United States, whether the
property is within or outside the United States; or
``(5) an offender aids or abets any person over whom
jurisdiction exists under this subsection in committing an
offense under this section or conspires with any person over
whom jurisdiction exists under this subsection to commit an
offense under this section.
``(c) Criminal Penalties.--
``(1) In general.--Any person who violates, or attempts or
conspires to violate, subsection (a) shall be fined not more
than $2,000,000 and shall be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment not less than 30 years or to imprisonment for
life.
``(2) Life imprisonment.--Any person who, in the course of
a violation of subsection (a), uses, attempts or conspires to
use, or possesses and threatens to use, any item or items
described in subsection (a), shall be fined not more than
$2,000,000 and imprisoned for life.
``(3) Death penalty.--If the death of another results from
a person's violation of subsection (a), the person shall be
fined not more than $2,000,000 and punished by death or
imprisoned for life.
``(d) Definition.--As used in this section, the term
`aircraft' has the definition set forth in section
40102(a)(6) of title 49, United States Code.''.

SEC. 2214. ATOMIC WEAPONS.

(a) Prohibitions.--Section 92 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 (42 U.S.C. 2122) is amended by--
(1) inserting at the beginning ``a.'' before ``It'';
(2) inserting ``knowingly'' after ``for any person to'';
(3) striking ``or'' before ``export'';
(4) striking ``transfer or receive in interstate or foreign
commerce,'' before ``manufacture'';
(5) inserting ``receive,'' after ``acquire,'';
(6) inserting ``, or use, or possess and threaten to use,''
before ``any atomic weapon'';
(7) inserting at the end the following:
``b. Conduct prohibited by subsection a. is within the
jurisdiction of the United States if--
``(1) the offense occurs in or affects interstate or
foreign commerce; the offense occurs outside of the United
States and is committed by a national of the United States;
``(2) the offense is committed against a national of the
United States while the national is outside the United
States;
``(3) the offense is committed against any property that is
owned, leased, or used by the United States or by any
department or agency of the United States, whether the
property is within or outside the United States; or
``(4) an offender aids or abets any person over whom
jurisdiction exists under this subsection in committing an
offense under this section or conspires with any person over
whom jurisdiction exists under this subsection to commit an
offense under this section.''.
(b) Violations.--Section 222 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 (42 U.S.C. 2272) is amended by--
(1) inserting at the beginning ``a.'' before ``Whoever'';
(2) striking ``, 92,''; and
(3) inserting at the end the following:
``b. Any person who violates, or attempts or conspires to
violate, section 92 shall be fined not more than $2,000,000
and sentenced to a term of imprisonment not less than 30
years or to imprisonment for life. Any person who, in the
course of a violation of section 92, uses, attempts or
conspires to use, or possesses and threatens to use, any
atomic weapon shall be fined not more than $2,000,000 and
imprisoned for life. If the death of another results from a
person's violation of section 92, the person shall be fined
not more than $2,000,000 and punished by death or imprisoned
for life.''.

SEC. 2215. RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL DEVICES.

Chapter 113B of title 18, United States Code, is amended by
adding after section 2332g the following:

``Sec. 2332h. Radiological dispersal devices

``(a) Unlawful Conduct.--
``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), it
shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly produce,
construct, otherwise acquire, transfer directly or
indirectly, receive, possess, import, export, or use, or
possess and threaten to use--
``(A) any weapon that is designed or intended to release
radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human
life; or
``(B) or any device or other object that is capable of and
designed or intended to endanger human life through the
release of radiation or radioactivity.
``(2) Exception.--This subsection does not apply with
respect to--
``(A) conduct by or under the authority of the United
States or any department or agency thereof; or
``(B) conduct pursuant to the terms of a contract with the
United States or any department or agency thereof.
``(b) Jurisdiction.--Conduct prohibited by subsection (a)
is within the jurisdiction of the United States if--

[[Page H8866]]

``(1) the offense occurs in or affects interstate or
foreign commerce;
``(2) the offense occurs outside of the United States and
is committed by a national of the United States;
``(3) the offense is committed against a national of the
United States while the national is outside the United
States;
``(4) the offense is committed against any property that is
owned, leased, or used by the United States or by any
department or agency of the United States, whether the
property is within or outside the United States; or
``(5) an offender aids or abets any person over whom
jurisdiction exists under this subsection in committing an
offense under this section or conspires with any person over
whom jurisdiction exists under this subsection to commit an
offense under this section.
``(c) Criminal Penalties.--
``(1) In general.--Any person who violates, or attempts or
conspires to violate, subsection (a) shall be fined not more
than $2,000,000 and shall sentenced to a term of imprisonment
not less than 30 years or to imprisonment for life.
``(2) Life imprisonment.--Any person who, in the course of
a violation of subsection (a), uses, attempts or conspires to
use, or possesses and threatens to use, any item or items
described in subsection (a), shall be fined not more than
$2,000,000 and imprisoned for life.
``(3) Death penalty.--If the death of another results from
a person's violation of subsection (a), the person shall be
fined not more than $2,000,000 and punished by death or
imprisoned for life.''.

SEC. 2216. VARIOLA VIRUS.

Chapter 10 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by
inserting after section 175b the following:

``Sec. 175c. Variola virus

``(a) Unlawful Conduct.--
``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), it
shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly produce,
engineer, synthesize, acquire, transfer directly or
indirectly, receive, possess, import, export, or use, or
possess and threaten to use, variola virus.
``(2) Exception.--This subsection does not apply to conduct
by, or under the authority of, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services.
``(b) Jurisdiction.--Conduct prohibited by subsection (a)
is within the jurisdiction of the United States if--
``(1) the offense occurs in or affects interstate or
foreign commerce;
``(2) the offense occurs outside of the United States and
is committed by a national of the United States;
``(3) the offense is committed against a national of the
United States while the national is outside the United
States;
``(4) the offense is committed against any property that is
owned, leased, or used by the United States or by any
department or agency of the United States, whether the
property is within or outside the United States; or
``(5) an offender aids or abets any person over whom
jurisdiction exists under this subsection in committing an
offense under this section or conspires with any person over
whom jurisdiction exists under this subsection to commit an
offense under this section.
``(c) Criminal Penalties.--
``(1) In general.--Any person who violates, or attempts or
conspires to violate, subsection (a) shall be fined not more
than $2,000,000 and shall be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment not less than 30 years or to imprisonment for
life.
``(2) Life imprisonment.--Any person who, in the course of
a violation of subsection (a), uses, attempts or conspires to
use, or possesses and threatens to use, any item or items
described in subsection (a), shall be fined not more than
$2,000,000 and imprisoned for life.
``(3) Death penalty.--If the death of another results from
a person's violation of subsection (a), the person shall be
fined not more than $2,000,000 and punished by death or
imprisoned for life.
``(d) Definition.--As used in this section, the term
`variola virus' means a virus that can cause human smallpox
or any derivative of the variola major virus that contains
more than 85 percent of the gene sequence of the variola
major virus or the variola minor virus.''.

SEC. 2217. INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS.

Section 2516(1) of title 18, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (a), by inserting ``2122 and'' after
``sections'';
(2) in paragraph (c), by inserting ``section 175c (relating
to variola virus),'' after ``section 175 (relating to
biological weapons),''; and
(3) in paragraph (q), by inserting ``2332g, 2332h,'' after
``2332f,''.

SEC. 2218. AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 2332B(G)(5)(B) OF TITLE 18,
UNITED STATES CODE.

Section 2332b(g)(5)(B) of title 18, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) in clause (i)--
(A) by inserting before ``2339 (relating to harboring
terrorists)'' the following: ``2332g (relating to missile
systems designed to destroy aircraft), 2332h (relating to
radiological dispersal devices),''; and
(B) by inserting ``175c (relating to variola virus),''
after ``175 or 175b (relating to biological weapons),''; and
(2) in clause (ii)--
(A) by striking ``section'' and inserting ``sections 92
(relating to prohibitions governing atomic weapons) or''; and
(B) by inserting ``2122 or'' before ``2284''.

SEC. 2219. AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 1956(C)(7)(D) OF TITLE 18,
UNITED STATES CODE.

Section 1956(c)(7)(D), title 18, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) by inserting after ``section 152 (relating to
concealment of assets; false oaths and claims; bribery),''
the following: ``section 175c (relating to the variola
virus),'';
(2) by inserting after ``section 2332(b) (relating to
international terrorist acts transcending national
boundaries),'' the following: ``section 2332g (relating to
missile systems designed to destroy aircraft), section 2332h
(relating to radiological dispersal devices),''; and
(3) striking ``or'' after ``any felony violation of the
Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938,'' and after ``any
felony violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act'',
striking ``;'' and inserting ``, or section 92 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2122) (relating to prohibitions
governing atomic weapons)''.

SEC. 2220. EXPORT LICENSING PROCESS.

Section 38(g)(1)(A) of the Arms Export Control Act (22
U.S.C. 2778) is amended--
(1) by striking ``or'' before ``(xi)''; and
(2) by inserting after clause (xi) the following: ``or
(xii) section 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the Prevention of Terrorist
Access to Destructive Weapons Act of 2004, relating to
missile systems designed to destroy aircraft (18 U.S.C.
2332g), prohibitions governing atomic weapons (42 U.S.C.
2122), radiological dispersal devices (18 U.S.C. 2332h), and
variola virus (18 U.S.C. 175b);''.

SEC. 2221. CLERICAL AMENDMENTS.

(a) Chapter 113B.--The table of sections for chapter 113B
of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting the
following after the item for section 2332f:

``2332g. Missile systems designed to destroy aircraft.
``2332h. Radiological dispersal devices.''.

(b) Chapter 10.--The table of sections for chapter 10 of
title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting the
following item after the item for section 175b:

``175c. Variola virus.''.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sessions) and the gentleman from Virginia
(Mr. Scott) each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sessions).
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Today, I rise to offer my legislation, Prevention of Terrorist Access
to Destructive Weapons Act, an amendment to H.R. 10. This amendment
will aid the hard-working Federal investigators and agents on the front
line in the war on terror by establishing a zero tolerance policy
towards the illegal importation, possession or transfer of shoulder-
fired missiles, atomic weapons, dirty bombs, and the smallpox virus.

{time} 0930

Mr. SESSIONS. Today, maximum penalties of only 10 years in prison
apply to the unlawful possession of shoulder-fired missiles. The same
weak penalty also currently applies to the unlawful possession of an
atomic weapon. Today, there is no law criminalizing the possession of
dirty bombs with criminal intent, and the unregistered possession of
the smallpox virus carries a maximum penalties of only 5 years in
prison.
Given the terrorist threats that we currently face in the United
States, weak punishments for the possession or use of these weapons is
simply unacceptable in light of the fact that we know that 26 terror
groups already have shoulder-fired missiles in their possession.
My amendment imposes stringent, mandatory minimum criminal penalties
for these heinous crimes similar to the laws that we already use to
prosecute drug kingpins. Specifically, for each of the weapons covered
by the bill, unlawful possession would result in mandatory imprisonment
for up to 30 years to life. Using, attempting, or conspiring to use, or
possessing and threatening to use these weapons would result in
mandatory life in prison. And if one death were to result from the
unlawful possession of one of these weapons, this amendment would allow
the death penalty to be applied to anyone who targets America in a
terrorist attack.
Although tougher penalties may not deter homicidal terrorists
determined to attack the United States, they will help to deter those
middlemen who are

[[Page H8867]]

essential to the transfer of such weapons. Many of these middlemen aid
terrorists purely for financial gain, and significantly tougher
mandatory penalties would dramatically alter their cost-benefit
calculations.
When the middleman is caught importing or hiding these weapons, the
existence of tough penalties will also assist prosecutors and
investigators in obtaining cooperation and moving swiftly to identify
terrorists. Long mandatory sentences, including life without parole,
provide a fast and powerful incentive to cooperate, as has already been
proven in cracking the code of silence for organized crime. In the case
of these dangerous weapons, the speed with which persons choose to
cooperate could also save thousands of lives.
These increased penalties are completely justified in light of the
catastrophic destruction that could be caused by the use of any of
these weapons, and supporting my amendment will send a strong message
of America's resolve to win the war on terrorism.
Mr. Chairman, I encourage my colleagues to join me in supporting and
giving Federal investigators and prosecutors the tools they have asked
for to aid them in their fight against terrorism by supporting this
commonsense, effective amendment.

[From the Associated Press, Aug. 5, 2004]

Two Arrested in Missile Sting Operation

Washington.--Two leaders of a mosque in Albany, New York,
were arrested on charges stemming from an alleged plot to
help a man they thought was a terrorist who wanted to
purchase a shoulder-fired missile, federal authorities said
Thursday.
The men have ties to a group called Ansar al-Islam, which
has been linked to the al Qaeda terror network, according to
two federal law enforcement authorities speaking on condition
of anonymity.
The two arrests came as FBI, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement and other agents executed search warrants at the
Masjid As-Salam mosque and two Albany-area homes, officials
said. The men were identified as Yassin Aref, 34, the imam of
the mosque, and 49-year-old Mohammed Hoosain, one of the
mosque's founders.
According to law enforcement officials, the two are being
charged with providing material support to terrorism by
participating in a conspiracy to help an individual they
believed was a terrorist purchase a shoulder-fired missile.
The individual was an undercover government agent and no
missile ever changed hands. Aref and Hoosain were allegedly
involved in money-laundering aspects of the plot, the
officials said.
The investigation has been going on for a year and is not
related to the Bush administration's decision earlier this
week to raise the terror alert level for certain financial
sector buildings in New York and Washington, the officials
said.
In Albany, some mosque members gathered early Thursday
outside the institution for morning prayers.
More details about the case were expected to be released
later Thursday by the Justice Department.
____

[From the Los Angeles Times, Mar. 4, 2004]

2 Convicted of Seeking Missiles for Al Qaeda Ally

(By Tony Perry)

San Diego.--A Pakistani national and a naturalized American
pleaded guilty Wednesday to a conspiracy to help the Al Qaeda
terrorist group by selling five tons of hashish and a half-
ton of heroin in exchange for money and four Stinger
missiles.
Muhamed Abid Afridi, 30, and a naturalized citizen from
Inida, Ilyas Ali, 56, admitted in U.S. District Court here
that they planned to sell the missiles to the Taliban, an
ally of Al Qaeda.
Afridi, Ali and a second Pakinstani were arrested in Hong
Kong in September 2002 after meeting with undercover FBI
agents posing as arms dealers with Stingers to sell. They
allegedly offered to sell the agents heroin and hashish in
return for missiles and money.
``They both had the will and the means to carry out the
transaction they were negotiating,'' said Assistant U.S.
Atty. Michael Skerlos.
Stingers are shoulder-launched missiles distributed widely
by the CIA to Afghan rebels fighting the Soviet army in the
1980s. Easy to use and deadly accurate at hitting low-flying
aircraft, Stingers were credited with helping the Afghans
demoralize and rout the much stronger Soviets.
``Because of the actions taken in this investigation,
America is safer and our citizens are more secure,'' Atty.
General John Ashcroft said in a statement.
Initial meetings between Ali and the FBI agents occurred in
San Diego, according to court documents. Afridi and Ali are
scheduled to be sentenced June 29 by Judge M. James Lorenz; a
plea bargain recommends that each be sentenced to up to 10
years in prison.
The case against the second Pakistani, Syed Mustajab Shah,
has a court date April 5.
Ali was a grocer in Minneapolis before his arrest.
____

[From Jane's Intelligence Review, Sept. 2001]

The Proliferation of MANPADS

(By Thomas B. Hunter)

Man-portable surface-to-air missiles, also known as
MANPADs, represent a significant potential threat to military
and civilian aircraft.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
proliferation of SA-series MANPADs has increased, and the
diffusion of these weapons now exceeds the infamous spread of
US-made Stinger missiles from Afghanistan during the 1990s.
Today, MANPADs of various types are in the hands of as many
as 27 guerrilla and terrorist groups around the world.
Tracking the proliferation of MANPADs is a difficult
endeavour. Often, the only verification of use by non-state
actors has been post-event in nature--recovery of a used
launcher or fragments from expended missiles. The black
market is the primary source for these weapons. Unlike state-
to-state transfers, usually documented and visible, the
illicit black market MANPAD trade defies accurate tracking.
The inability of governments to correctly identify seized
weapons also contributes to inaccurate reports. In many
cases, soldiers and government officials have identified
rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and other handheld rocket
launchers as MANPADs. Moreover, the word `Stinger' has become
an all-encompassing term for any MANPAD among many civilian,
military, and non-state groups, further complicating efforts
to verify proliferation activity.
In many cases of surface-to-air attacks on aircraft,
misreporting is quite common. Airbursts occurring near low-
flying aircraft have frequently been reported as attacks by
MANPADs, when in fact they are usually RPGs. Attacks on
aircraft at very low altitudes, those occurring under 1,000
feet, are almost exclusively RPGs. Guerrilla and terrorist
forces have successfully adapted the RPG to the anti-aircraft
role. This skill was demonstrated perhaps most clearly when
two US MH-60 Black Hawk helicopters were shot down by Somali
gunmen in October 1993.
One popular misconception is that these missiles become
unusable after several years due to battery or other systems
failures, and are therefore useless after a period of time.
While it is true that all MANPAD batteries have a finite
shelf life, these can be replaced with commercially purchased
batteries available on the open market and technically
proficient terrorist groups might also be able to construct
hybrid batteries to replace used ones.
Other concerns include deterioration of missile propellants
and seeker coolant, and general storage issues. While these
concerns merit attention, the commonly held assumption that
these weapons have short shelf lives is erroneous. Most
missiles are hermetically sealed in launchers designed for
rough handling by soldiers in the field. Temperature extremes
are also factored into the design of these weapons, reducing
the threat of environmental degradation.
Clearly, the shelf life of MANPADs is, in large part,
dependent on the conditions in which the weapon is stored.
However, under ideal (factory specified) conditions, some
versions of these weapons can remain operational for 22 years
or more. So while it can be assumed that some weapons have
not been stored in ideal conditions, many weapons previously
believed to be inoperative, such as the Afghan Stingers, may
indeed be operational.
Furthermore, MANPADs remain a popular commodity on the
global black arms market. With the exception of the Soviet-
Afghan war, these weapons are more widespread today than at
any time since their introduction in the late 1960s.
Guerrilla and terrorist organisations can obtain them with
relative ease, with the primary limitation being money. As
some of these groups increase their profits through drug
trafficking and other activities, the likelihood of further
illicit purchases will also increase.
MANPADs have proliferated to non-state groups throughout
sub-Saharan Africa. These weapons can be found in the hands
of insurgent groups in Angola, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Ethiopia. Rwanda and Somalia.
Of these states, Angola has seen the greatest activity. The
CIA covertly provided FIM-92A Stinger missiles to UNITA
rebels in the late 1980s as part of its effort to assist in
the overthrow of Angola's pro-communist government. As in
Afghanistan, efforts to recover the missiles following the
end of hostilities proved futile. Today UNITA retains an
unknown number of advanced weapons, which may be augmented
with SA-7 (NATO reporting name `Grail,' Russian name Strela-
2) and FIM-43 Redeye missiles captured from government
forces.
UNITA has also shown willingness to use them, sometimes
against civilian aircraft. UNITA fired missiles at three
World Food Programme (WFP) aircraft in June 2001, for
example. One plane was struck but managed to land safely at a
nearby airport. This attack was of particular concern in that
the missile struck the aircraft at an altitude of 15,000
feet--3,500 feet beyond the weapon's published maximum range.
While this is not the first report of Stinger missiles
reaching

[[Page H8868]]

this height, it is clear that aircraft travelling at an
altitude believed to be out of the range of these weapons
should be aware of this proven capability.
During the Soviet-Afghan War, the CIA working in
conjunction with the Pakistani Army's Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI), delivered over 1,000 Stingers to
Mujahideen rebels. While the rebels fired many of the
missiles against Soviet aircraft, hundreds remained after
the fighting ended in 1987. Poor bookkeeping at the CIA,
combined with the dispersal of the weapons to numerous
clans throughout the country, made accounting for and
recovering them impossible. The result was a proliferation
of advanced anti-aircraft weaponry throughout the region.
It is well-known that the rebels did not retain all of the
Stingers left behind after the war. Many found their way onto
the global grey and black arms markets and ended up in
guerrilla arsenals from Sri Lanka to Chechnya. With a
reported black market price of between US$80,000 and
$250,000, Stingers represent a significant profit potential
due in no small part to widespread demand.
Terrorist leader Osama bin Laden also reportedly possesses
a number of MANPADs, including SA-7s and Stingers. As Bin
Laden has both the financial resources and black market
connections to make procurement possible, these reports are
probably accurate. Persistent rumours also indicate that Bin
Laden's personal bodyguards may be equipped with Stingers,
ostensibly to counter an airborne attack.
Regardless of the veracity of the latter information, it is
logical to assume that Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda (`The Base')
network is in possession of additional MANPADs. If this is
true, then Al-Qaeda represents the most significant threat to
international civil aviation. Given Bin Laden's specific
threats against U.S. citizens, this threat is especially
relevant with regard to U.S.-owned airlines.
While the Russian military is certainly not confronted with
the same threat level that it experienced in Afghanistan, the
increased proliferation of MANPADs to Chechen rebels has
dramatically increased the danger to close air support (CAS)
aircraft operating in theatre. A number of aircraft have been
shot down, including Su-25 `Frogfoot' and Su-24 `Pencer'
fighter-bombers. MANPADs have also shot down a number of
military helicopters.
The sources of Chechen MANPADs are varied. However, a large
number of systems have been seized by Russian authorities,
indicating that the rebels have established an effective
pipeline for delivery. For example, three SA-7 missiles were
found in the territory of Ingushetia near the Russian-
Georgian border in September 2000. Just one month later, an
unspecified number of SA-7s were discovered in a building
near Severy airport. The following month a Russian military
operation resulted in the seizure of four SA-7 missiles with
their launchers from a lorry in Dagestan. A rebel spokesman
later announced that the weapons were part of a shipment of
arms destined for use in Chechnya. The shipment reportedly
cost the Chechens $40,000.
Another report indicated that Bin Laden might have
delivered as many as 50 Stinger missiles to the Chechens. The
weapons were to have been transported from either Georgia or
Azerbaijan and delivered in December 1999. Eight Stinger
missiles were reportedly airdropped in the mountains of
Sharoyskiy District on the night of 12-13 June 2001. The
source of these weapons was not reported.
The primary MANPAD threat in the Western Hemisphere is
their possible future use by the two main Colombian insurgent
groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia--FARC) and the National
Liberation Army (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional--ELN).
Complicating analysis of the Colombia MANPAD situation is a
plethora of false of misleading reporting.
Colombian electronic and print press outlets have regularly
reported that both the FARC and ELN possess these missile
systems. Government officials have also fanned this fire by
issuing corroborating statements. These reports, both
military and civilian, cumulatively suggest that the FARC
currently possesses SA-7, SA-14 ``Gremlin'', SA-16 ``Gimlet''
and Redeye missiles. The Redeye missiles were variously
reported to have come from Nicaraguan (former Contra) or
Syrian arsenals and the SA-series weapons from various
sources. There is no definitive evidence, however, to confirm
that any Colombian guerrilla group currently possesses
MANPADs of any type.
This misreporting is usually a matter of an honest mistake
due to lack of familiarity with MANPADs, the Colombian
situation may mask an ulterior motive. While the threat to
the Colombian government from insurgent and narcotics
trafficking groups is quite real, it is well-known that
officials from that government have frequently overstated the
sophistication of rebel groups in an effort to garner greater
financial and political support from the USA. Given this
history, it is possible that MANPAD events have occasionally
been intentionally overstated.
According to Colombia expert Steven Salisbury, FARC
commanders have admitted to possessing MANPADs. ``The FARC
commanders who told me the FARC has shoulder-fired SAMs
[surface-to-air missiles] were field commanders talking
privately to me,'' he said. ``They said, yes, they have
SAMs.'' This information given to Salisbury was corroborated
by two FARC block commanders as well as other guerrillas.
Four additional factors must be highlighted. The first of
these is that FARC commanders have stated that they do indeed
possess MANPADs. The second is that both the FARC and ELN are
known to be aggressively seeking these weapons. The third
factor is that the guerrillas have received training on these
weapons. In one instance, a Colombian government source
stated that 25 guerrillas travelled to Nicaragua to attend an
anti-aircraft course taught by former Sandanista soldiers.
This course reportedly included MANPAD training as well as
gunnery techniques involving 0.50-calibre heavy machine guns
and the use of RPG-7s in the anti-air role. FARC members may
also have travelled to Syria and Libya to receive similar
training. Finally, both the FARC and ELN have the financial
resources to make such a purchase possible.
With these factors in mind, it appears likely that the FARC
will procure at least one type of MANPAD--if it has not done
so already. Colombian guerrilla groups have had very little
difficulty obtaining weapons for use in their war against the
government. Well-established arms transit routes are in place
to facilitate these shipments. The arms pipelines through
which the FARC and ELN may obtain MANPADs run through the
following countries Albania, Belgium, Ecuador, Jordan, North
Korea, Peru, Romania, and Russia. Of specific concern is the
Russian relationship, as the FARC and Russian mafias have a
well-established arms-for-drugs pipeline in place. The
Russian mafias have demonstrated the ability to obtain
virtually any type of weapons system. If the Colombian
guerrillas are to obtain these weapons, and have not been
successful already, they will most likely come from this
black market channel.
It must be noted that when the FARC obtains these weapons,
it will almost certainly use them only in critical
situations, such as the defence of important base camps or
headquarters facilities. They will most likely not be used
against drug-spraying aircraft or other non-threatening
targets due to the high value of MANPADs to the FARC
leadership.
If the FARC does indeed maintain a small inventory of these
weapons, this is the most likely explanation for why they
have not yet been employed. If employed, targets would
most likely include Colombian Air Force CAS aircraft or
possibly high-value civilian flights such as aircraft
transporting senior government officials.
Hizbullah probably took its first delivery of MANPADs in
1982 with the acquisition of a small number of SA-7s.
Reporting since that time indicates that these stocks were
supplemented with PIM-92A Stingers in the mid-1990s, provided
by Islamic Mujahideen rebels in Afghanistan. Most recently,
the group may have received a small number of Chinese-made
Qianwei (`Advanced Guard')--1 (QW-1) systems. If true, the
acquisition of this latter system represents a significant
upgrade in the surface-to-air capabilities of Hizbullah.
The Palestinian Authority also maintains a stock of SA-7
missiles and launchers. Reports also indicates that the
Palestinians may have a small number of Stinger systems as
well. The source of the SA-7 weapons is unclear, but it is
possible some were delivered from Egypt aboard fishing boats,
a common local method of arms smuggling.
For example, on 8 May 2001, Israeli security services
intercepted the Lebanese-flagged vessel Santorini off the
coast between Haifa and Tel Aviv. A search of the ship
revealed a large quantity of arms, including 60 mm mortars,
landmines, grenades, and four SA-7 missiles with launchers.
The shipment was reportedly sent by the Palestinian Front for
the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and intended for
use by Palestinian militants. The MANPADS were confiscated by
the Israelis and probably added to their own arsenal.
Apart from the Afghan Mujahideen, the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have enjoyed the greatest success with
MANPADs. LTTE guerrillas have fired an estimated 20 missiles
at government aircraft since 1996, shooting down three
helicopters and probably two fixed-wing transports. These
attacks killed a total of 179 personnel.
It is estimated that the LTTE possesses SA-7, SA-1a, and
other MANPADs. One Chinese-built Hongying-5 (HN-5A) system
was also discovered during government operations; however,
there is no indication that the LTTE possesses additional
units. It is possible that this weapon was procured from
sources within the Burmese military.
In December 2000 Sri Lankan news carried video of a Tamil
rebel holding what appeared to be a Stinger missile during an
October operation against the Trincomalee naval facility.
However, later analysis indicated this weapon was most
probably a double barrelled 107 mm Katyusha rocket, believed
to be a variant of the Chinese Type 63 107mm launcher, and
not a MANPAD.
The LTTE reportedly acquired these weapons from a variety
of sources. Press reports indicated that the Kurdistan's
Worker's Party (PPK), working with the Greek 17 November
terrorist organisation, sold 11 Stinger missiles to the LTTE
in 1994. These weapons were reportedly built in Greece, which
is a member of European consortium manufacturing PIM-92A/C
Stinger systems under license from the USA. Other Stingers
may have been sold or donated to the Tamils by the Afghan
Taliban during the 1990s. LTTE

[[Page H8869]]

weapons buyers have also been reported in Cambodia and
Thailand, reportedly seeking MANPADs Given the Tamils success
with these weapons, it is likely that procurement efforts
will continue.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 4 minutes.
Mr. Chairman, this did not go through the Committee on the Judiciary
and it is somewhat complicated and it appears to be overlapping and
recreates and reauthorizations present law. For example under title
XVIII, chapter 10 already criminalizes the use of biological weapons;
chapter 11(b) criminalizes chemical weapons; chapter 39 criminalizes
nuclear weapons; chapter 4 criminalizes the use of explosives, and on
and on.
In addition, many of those, all of those offenses are predicates to
18 U.S.C. (a) 2332(b) which provides for the death penalty if death
results from any violation of those statutes.
The only change appears to be a mandatory 30 years for attempts and
conspiracies. There is no differentiation for a role in a conspiracy,
relative knowledge of the crime, or even if death were an accident that
had not been intended. What we have is new mandatory minimums.
We have, in the Committee on the Judiciary, often cited many findings
and recommendations from researchers, sentencing professionals, even
the judicial branch, justices on the Supreme Court, including the chief
justice, citing problems created by mandatory sentences. They have been
found to be a waste of money compared to alternatives such as treatment
or traditional sentencing. They disrupt the ability of the Sentencing
Commission and the courts to apply an orderly, proportional,
nondisparate sentencing system. They discriminate against minorities
and they transfer an inordinate amount of discretion to prosecutors in
an adversarial system.
Mandatory minimum sentences increase disparities in sentencing
because they do not allow distinctions between major players and bit
players in a crime. In a recent letter to the subcommittee, the U.S.
Judicial Conference, headed by the chief justice of the Supreme Court,
noted and I quote: In addition to resulting in unwarranted sentencing
disparities, mandatory minimums often lead to treatment of dissimilar
offenders in a similar manner by requiring courts to impose the same
sentence on offenders, when sound policy and common sense call for
reasonable differences in punishment to reflect differences in the
seriousness of the conduct or danger to society.
In other words, mandatory minimums violate common sense. That is the
chief justice and the U.S. Judicial Conference.
Mr. Chairman, this bill, the underlying bill, is a reorganization
bill. We should not include controversial criminal penalties,
especially when the Judicial Conference headed by the chief justice
tells us that these things violate common sense. We also need to study
the international implications of this, because when we add in the
death penalty, we add in complications of international cooperation.
Most countries around the world do not have the death penalty and we
have had problems where they would not even extradite criminals to the
United States because we have all of these death penalties.
We need to study this, and having a floor amendment is not the
appropriate way to legislate. Mr. Chairman, I would hope that we would
defeat this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, the several very important articles in my added
materials that I have submitted speak not only to the threat to the
United States, but also the reality of the groups who were engaged in
the transfer, the trafficking of shoulder-fired missiles, of weapons of
mass destruction, in terms of viruses that could be placed in the
United States of America.
Mr. Chairman, I respect the gentleman for not liking the minimum
mandatory sentences. I would also say that it is up to this body, Mr.
Chairman, to make sure that we provide the tools necessary to the
Attorney General and other U.S. attorneys who may be prosecuting these
cases, to give to the frontline agents and investigators those
abilities to find and stop those people who are perpetrators of crime,
mass murder against the United States of America.
Most of all, I would remind this body how important it is to make
sure that we keep terrorism away from our doorsteps. I believe in
effective law enforcement, effective use of the laws of this country,
and making sure that we have looked at this from the perspective of the
Attorney General of the United States and U.S. attorneys across this
country who support this important legislation.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my
time.
Mr. Chairman, I would just point out that we already have in the Code
serious penalties for all of these crimes. The appropriate way to
legislate would be to go through the committee so that we could see
exactly how these fit into the present sentencing scheme. I would hope
that we defeat the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that the Members of this body understand that
there is a need to make sure that we protect this country and the laws
of this country. We have consulted with the Attorney General of the
United States and other U.S. attorneys who are asking for this. I
support this amendment. I believe it will help the President of the
United States to ensure the safety of our country.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Kolbe). The question is on the
amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sessions).
The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr.
Sessions) will be postponed.

Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Bonilla

Mr. BONILLA. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment No. 6 offered by Mr. Bonilla:
At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following
(and redesignate provisions and amend the table of contents
accordingly):

SECTION ___. INCREASE IN DETENTION BED SPACE.

Subject to the availability of appropriated funds, the
Secretary of Homeland Security shall increase by not less
than 2,500, in each of fiscal years 2006 and 2007, the number
of beds available for immigration detention and removal
operations of the Department of Homeland Security above the
number for which funds were allotted for the preceding fiscal
year.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Bonilla) and a Member opposed each will
control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Bonilla).
Mr. BONILLA. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
First, let me compliment the committees who put this bill together.
They have done a great job facing very complicated circumstances.
Specifically, they did a very good job about increasing the Border
Patrol staff, that we need to deal with the increased flow of illegal
immigration along the southwest border, along with other Federal agents
that are necessary to do the job.
Unfortunately, there was an oversight in the bill in providing bed
space for the people that we catch. Let me point out as well that the
overwhelming number of them now are categorized as they are by the
Border Patrol as OTMs, ``other than Mexicans,'' people trying to enter
our country that have figured out a different way to come in versus the
ports of entry on either coast or using other means.
Mr. Chairman, in many cases the OTMs, are now arrested, processed,
interrogated and released into communities because the Department of
Homeland Security does not have

[[Page H8870]]

enough bed space. So, believe it or not, in Texas alone, since January,
there have been over 15,000 OTMs released in communities throughout the
State in the neighborhood. They might have been introduced into any
neighborhood in Texas, no matter where one lives.
Mr. Chairman, this is an outrage. Homeland Security claims the
problem is bed space, so in this amendment we deal with that problem,
calling for 2,500 additional bed spaces in 2006 and another 2,500 in
2007.
This is an amendment that is supported by the gentleman from
California (Mr. Cox), Chairman of Homeland Security. It is also
supported by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Ortiz), my good friend, who
represents an area near the Mexican border and the Gulf Coast in Texas
and who has been working very hard on this issue.
Mr. Chairman, this is a nonpartisan issue. We have strong support by
other members of the committees working on this. The gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Smith), my good colleague and friend from San Antonio and
central Texas area, has been working hard on this issue as well. This
is also something that is supported by, again no matter what ethnic
group or political party one belongs to, especially on the southwest
border. There is strong support by the mayors, the county judges, the
county commissioners that are working very hard to deal with this
illegal immigration problem every day.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to just single out the wonderful
Border Patrol agents that are patrolling day and night, sometimes
working with fewer resources than they should have, and doing a great
job of patrolling the border. Help is on the way for them in terms of
manpower and hopefully this amendment, when adopted, will provide the
bed space as well to house the illegal aliens that are coming across
our border and taking advantage of what we now have along the Mexican
border.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. TURNER of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to claim
the time in opposition to the amendment, although I support the
amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Texas?
There was no objection.
The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner) is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. TURNER of Texas. Mr. Chairman, there is no example any better of
the failure of the administration to make America safe than is
illustrated by the amendment offered by my colleague from Texas today.
What the amendment says is that we need 2,500 more bed spaces so that
we can end this deplorable, unacceptable practice of catching illegal
immigrants who come across our borders every day from countries other
than Mexico and seeing them immediately released into our country,
knowing that 80 to 90 percent of them will never show up again for a
deportation hearing.
Mr. Chairman, it is a practice that must end, but our administration
has allowed this to go on for year after year after year. And it is
very unfortunate, even though I appreciate greatly the intent expressed
by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Bonilla), my colleague, it is very
unfortunate that all the amendment does is direct the Department of
Homeland Security to somewhere in their budget find the money for an
additional 2,500 beds so we can end this practice that represents a
serious threat to the security of our country.
The truth of the matter is the gentleman from Texas is on the
Committee on Appropriations, and when we look at what the Committee on
Appropriations did to try to help solve this problem, all they did was
what the President asked for. He asked for 117 additional bed spaces,
when the President knows that even today we have only appropriated
money to hold 1,944 detainees who cross the border illegally every day
and we are holding 22,500. We are stretched to the limit now.
As the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Bonilla) points out, we need at
least 2,500 more and probably 5,000 more beds, which is provided for in
his amendment but not funded.
Nowhere is the gap between the rhetoric of the administration on
protecting America and the reality of the failure to protect America
any clearer than it is right here.
The Democrats on the House Committee on Homeland Security did a 6-
month investigation of the problems of our border. We produced a report
entitled Transforming the Southern Border. It pointed out a lot of
interesting facts, one of which is the one we are discussing. As our
staff traveled along the Rio Grande south of El Paso, we took this
picture. What it shows is a cargo van backed up to a school bus just
across the border inside the United States, along with an 18-wheeler,
another cargo van, and another school bus.
As the staff flew over, nobody was to be seen who would be a part of
our Border Patrol. So they called into the Border Patrol to tell them
about this suspicious-looking activity. When they flew back over, the
bus and the van and all the vehicles were gone. We do not know if they
were exchanging illegal immigrants, illegal goods, narcotics, or
nuclear weapons.
As the 9/11 Commission said, our borders are porous and we must
remedy this problem. But to do so it is going to take more than
rhetoric.
Mr. Chairman, when we look at what we are spending on homeland
security today, we are spending $20 billion more than we did in the
year of 9/11. That is a lot of money, but maybe not in an $850 billion
discretionary budget. But last year alone, while we had increased
homeland security spending, $20 billion, the richest 1 percent of
Americans, those making over a million dollars, got four times the tax
relief, almost $90 billion.
The reality is that we have made the wrong choice. We have failed to
make America safe. And when illegal immigrants can come across our
borders in the numbers that they are coming, last year alone 25,000
illegal immigrants were actually caught coming across our border from
places other than Mexico. Every year there is close to a million that
get across that are caught. No telling how many are not caught. But of
those 25,000, because we did not have the detention space, the jail
space to hold them, 80 to 90 percent of them never showed up because
the 25,000 were given a free pass into America, released on personal
bond.
Mr. Chairman, it does not surprise anybody that 80 to 90 percent of
those 25,000 never show up. They are in our country today. This failure
to protect America is inexcusable. I think we have got to stop it.
Mr. Chairman, I think I will vote for the amendment offered by my
colleague, but I want to point out that we failed to fund the very
issue he raises.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BONILLA. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I would yield to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner)
for a quick question.
Mr. Chairman, did the gentleman acknowledge in the end that he would
vote for the amendment? I wanted to understand that clearly.
Mr. TURNER of Texas. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman would yield, yes,
I will vote for the amendment because I believe it is based on a
sincere intent to solve a serious problem. But I was simply pointing
out that it provides no funding. The gentleman's Committee on
Appropriations only provided funding for 117 beds in next year's budget
and there is no money to do what is provided for in this amendment. To
simply direct the department to take it out of their hide is simply
unrealistic.
Mr. BONILLA. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I thank the gentleman
from Texas for his answer.
I wanted to reiterate that in spite of the rhetoric that was just
heard from the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner), my colleague, he is
supporting the amendment. I am delighted to hear that.
The gentleman makes a lot of good points about problems that the
Department of Homeland Security has faced over the last couple of
years. I agree with the gentleman. That is why I am here trying to do
something about it.
But, again, in spite of the rant that we just heard about how bad the
problem is, and I can assure the gentleman that I have probably
delivered the same remarks in my district, and here in Washington as
well, about the problems that the Department of Homeland Security is
facing, but ultimately we are all here to try to do something about it.

[[Page H8871]]

So I would hope that the gentleman would not only vote for the
amendment, as he has indicated he will, but also tell his friends that
we need this help for our good agents that are patrolling the border
and for all of us who are trying to do something about it.
Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I am proud to rise in support of this
amendment. Congressman Bonilla's amendment seeks to increase alien
detention bed space by 2,500 beds per year for fiscal years 2006 and
2007. It is a very simple provision, but it will have a material impact
on improving the security of our homeland and discouraging illegal
immigration.
In order to have a successful border security strategy, it must be
balanced. That is why this amendment is so important. There are other
provisions in H.R. 10 that will increase staffing levels for the Border
Patrol and ICE investigators. These, too, are important initiatives and
will result in many more illegal aliens and immigration violators being
apprehended. But in order to make the best use of these new assets, we
must have adequate facilities to detain those additional immigration
violators who are caught, especially those considered high-risk or in
mandatory detention categories.
The Department of Homeland Security's Detention and Removal Office,
or DRO, is currently authorized to fund approximately 19,000 detention
beds. However, they consistently hold over 22,000 illegal aliens each
day in facilities around the Nation. In the first year, this amendment
would increase available bed space to meet the minimum demand and then
would go above that in FY 2007 to provide additional detention
resources to meet the expected demand that these other new border
control initiatives will create.
It is a well-known fact that the majority of aliens not detained and
released, pending an immigration hearing, never return for their
scheduled hearing but seek instead to melt into U.S. communities. There
are approximately 300,000 non-citizens in the United States who have
received deportation orders, but who have not left the country. There
is no doubt that more of these individuals would have left the country
if they had been detained in the beginning.
Approximately 50 percent of DRO detainees are Mexicans, but there is
a growing number of individuals from different countries, called
``other than Mexicans'' or OTMs. Less is known about their motivation
for coming to the U.S., and I have serious concerns about individuals
illegally entering America who originally are from countries of
interest with respect to terrorism. We must have the resources to
detain these individuals to guarantee that we have an opportunity to
verify their identity and motives, and that they are deported if
necessary.
In order to monitor more of the individuals that are released, DRO
utilizes alternative methods of detention. This includes release on
recognizance, release on bond, electronic monitoring devices (EMD), and
the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program (ISAP). While these
alternative methods are appropriate and responsible initiatives, it is
essential that we have sufficient detention bed space for high-risk
individuals, those with criminal records, and repeat immigration
violators.
As Chairman of the Select Committee on Homeland Security, I would
like to thank Mr. Bonilla for offering this critical amendment and
request the support of my colleagues in ensuring passage. Thank you,
Mr. Speaker, and I yield back the remainder of my time.
Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Chairman, thousands of illegal aliens pour
over our southern border each day. A significant number of these aliens
are not Mexican, and cannot simply be sent back over the border.
Border Patrol agents must process aliens from countries other than
Mexico and are forced to release them into our communities pending a
hearing. This is because there is not enough bed space in our detention
facilities.
When illegal aliens are released pending a hearing, it is estimated
that 85 percent will never be heard from again.
This process has become known as the ``catch and release'' program,
and it threatens our national security.
The Department of Homeland Security recently reported that from
October through June over 44,000 non-Mexican aliens were apprehended on
the southern border from countries such as Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt,
Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.
The hard work of our Border Patrol agents is wasted when we do not
have enough detention space.
The Bonilla amendment would help correct this problem by authorizing
an increase of 2,500 detention bed spaces for each of the next two
years.
The lack of detention space has reached a crisis.
Every day we are releasing aliens from dozens of countries into our
communities. We don't know if these individuals are criminals or
terrorists.
The Bonilla amendment curtails the catch and release program on our
southern border. It lets the U.S. detain illegal immigrants who enter
our country rather than release them in our communities.
Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment by my
friend from Texas, and the co-chair of the House Border Caucus, Mr.
Bonilla.
Let me begin by thanking the gentleman for his hard work to find a
way to stop the current ``catch and release'' policy propounded by this
government . . . by releasing many of the illegal immigrants we are
catching into the U.S. population. This is frightening for all of us.
Now, the basis for this ``catch and release'' policy is a lack of
beds for the Department of Homeland Security to hold these illegal
immigrants from countries other than Mexico (OTMs). The gentleman's
amendment today specifically addresses this shortcoming and I join him
in advocating it to the House.
We are apprehending an alarming number of OTMs with not enough space
to detain them--forcing us to release them into our community--we need
additional beds. The gentleman's amendment is certainly a good
beginning and I am grateful for his efforts to end this policy.
Mr. BONILLA. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by
the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Bonilla).
The amendment was agreed to.

Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mrs. Capito

Mrs. CAPITO. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment No. 7 offered by Mrs. Capito:
At the end of title II add the following:
Subtitle J--Railroad Carriers and Mass Transportation Protection Act of
20004

SEC. 2111. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the ``Railroad Carriers and
Mass Transportation Protection Act of 2004''.

SEC. 2112. ATTACKS AGAINST RAILROAD CARRIERS AND MASS
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS.

(a) In General.--Chapter 97 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by striking sections 1992 through 1993 and
inserting the following:

``Sec. 1992. Terrorist attacks and other violence against
railroad carriers and against mass transportation systems
on land, on water, or through the air

``(a) General Prohibitions.--Whoever, in a circumstance
described in subsection (c), knowingly--
``(1) wrecks, derails, sets fire to, or disables railroad
on-track equipment or a mass transportation vehicle;
``(2) with intent to endanger the safety of any person, or
with a reckless disregard for the safety of human life, and
without the authorization of the railroad carrier or mass
transportation provider--
``(A) places any biological agent or toxin, destructive
substance, or destructive device in, upon, or near railroad
on-track equipment or a mass transportation vehicle; or
``(B) releases a hazardous material or a biological agent
or toxin on or near any property described in subparagraph
(A) or (B) of paragraph (3);
``(3) sets fire to, undermines, makes unworkable, unusable,
or hazardous to work on or use, or places any biological
agent or toxin, destructive substance, or destructive device
in, upon, or near any--
``(A) tunnel, bridge, viaduct, trestle, track,
electromagnetic guideway, signal, station, depot, warehouse,
terminal, or any other way, structure, property, or
appurtenance used in the operation of, or in support of the
operation of, a railroad carrier, without the authorization
of the railroad carrier, and with intent to, or knowing or
having reason to know such activity would likely, derail,
disable, or wreck railroad on-track equipment;
``(B) garage, terminal, structure, track, electromagnetic
guideway, supply, or facility used in the operation of, or in
support of the operation of, a mass transportation vehicle,
without the authorization of the mass transportation
provider, and with intent to, or knowing or having reason to
know such activity would likely, derail, disable, or wreck a
mass transportation vehicle used, operated, or employed by a
mass transportation provider; or
``(4) removes an appurtenance from, damages, or otherwise
impairs the operation of a railroad signal system or mass
transportation signal or dispatching system, including a
train control system, centralized dispatching system, or
highway-railroad grade crossing warning signal, without
authorization from the railroad carrier or mass
transportation provider;
``(5) with intent to endanger the safety of any person, or
with a reckless disregard for the safety of human life,
interferes with, disables, or incapacitates any dispatcher,
driver, captain, locomotive engineer, railroad conductor, or
other person while the person is employed in dispatching,
operating, or maintaining railroad on-track equipment or a
mass transportation vehicle;

[[Page H8872]]

``(6) commits an act, including the use of a dangerous
weapon, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily
injury to any person who is on property described in
subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (3), except that this
subparagraph shall not apply to rail police officers in
acting the course of their law enforcement duties under
section 28101 of title 49, United States Code;
``(7) conveys false information, knowing the information to
be false, concerning an attempt or alleged attempt that was
made, is being made, or is to be made, to engage in a
violation of this subsection; or
``(8) attempts, threatens, or conspires to engage in any
violation of any of paragraphs (1) through (7);

shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
20 years, or both.
``(b) Aggravated Offense.--Whoever commits an offense under
subsection (a) of this section in a circumstance in which--
``(1) the railroad on-track equipment or mass
transportation vehicle was carrying a passenger or employee
at the time of the offense;
``(2) the railroad on-track equipment or mass
transportation vehicle was carrying high-level radioactive
waste or spent nuclear fuel at the time of the offense;
``(3) the railroad on-track equipment or mass
transportation vehicle was carrying a hazardous material at
the time of the offense that--
``(A) was required to be placarded under subpart F of part
172 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations; and
``(B) is identified as class number 3, 4, 5, 6.1, or 8 and
packing group I or packing group II, or class number 1, 2, or
7 under the hazardous materials table of section 172.101 of
title 49, Code of Federal Regulations; or
``(4) the offense results in the death of any person;

shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of
years or life, or both. In the case of a violation described
in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the term of imprisonment
shall be not less than 30 years; and, in the case of a
violation described in paragraph (4) of this subsection, the
offender shall be fined under this title and imprisoned for
life and be subject to the death penalty.
``(c) Circumstances Required for Offense.--A circumstance
referred to in subsection (a) is any of the following:
``(1) Any of the conduct required for the offense is, or,
in the case of an attempt, threat, or conspiracy to engage in
conduct, the conduct required for the completed offense would
be, engaged in, on, against, or affecting a mass
transportation provider or railroad carrier engaged in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce.
``(2) Any person travels or communicates across a State
line in order to commit the offense, or transports materials
across a State line in aid of the commission of the offense.
``(d) Definitions.--In this section--
``(1) the term `biological agent' has the meaning given to
that term in section 178(1);
``(2) the term `dangerous weapon' means a weapon, device,
instrument, material, or substance, animate or inanimate,
that is used for, or is readily capable of, causing death or
serious bodily injury, including a pocket knife with a blade
of less than 2\1/2\ inches in length and a box cutter;
``(3) the term `destructive device' has the meaning given
to that term in section 921(a)(4);
``(4) the term `destructive substance' means an explosive
substance, flammable material, infernal machine, or other
chemical, mechanical, or radioactive device or material, or
matter of a combustible, contaminative, corrosive, or
explosive nature, except that the term `radioactive device'
does not include any radioactive device or material used
solely for medical, industrial, research, or other peaceful
purposes;
``(5) the term `hazardous material' has the meaning given
to that term in chapter 51 of title 49;
``(6) the term `high-level radioactive waste' has the
meaning given to that term in section 2(12) of the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act of 1982 (42 U.S.C. 10101(12));
``(7) the term `mass transportation' has the meaning given
to that term in section 5302(a)(7) of title 49, except that
the term includes school bus, charter, and sightseeing
transportation;
``(8) the term `on-track equipment' means a carriage or
other contrivance that runs on rails or electromagnetic
guideways;
``(9) the term `railroad on-track equipment' means a train,
locomotive, tender, motor unit, freight or passenger car, or
other on-track equipment used, operated, or employed by a
railroad carrier;
``(10) the term `railroad' has the meaning given to that
term in chapter 201 of title 49;
``(11) the term `railroad carrier' has the meaning given to
that term in chapter 201 of title 49;
``(12) the term `serious bodily injury' has the meaning
given to that term in section 1365;
``(13) the term `spent nuclear fuel' has the meaning given
to that term in section 2(23) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
of 1982 (42 U.S.C. 10101(23));
``(14) the term `State' has the meaning given to that term
in section 2266;
``(15) the term `toxin' has the meaning given to that term
in section 178(2); and
``(16) the term `vehicle' means any carriage or other
contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of
transportation on land, on water, or through the air.''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--
(1) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 97 of
title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(A) by striking ``RAILROADS'' in the chapter heading and
inserting ``RAILROAD CARRIERS AND MASS TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS
ON LAND, ON WATER, OR THROUGH THE AIR'';
(B) by striking the items relating to sections 1992 and
1993; and
(C) by inserting after the item relating to section 1991
the following:

``1992. Terrorist attacks and other violence against railroad carriers
and against mass transportation systems on land, on
water, or through the air.''.

(2) The table of chapters at the beginning of part I of
title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking the item
relating to chapter 97 and inserting the following:

``97. Railroad carriers and mass transportation systems on land, on
water, or through the air...............................1991''.....

(3) Title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(A) in section 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i), by striking ``1992
(relating to wrecking trains), 1993 (relating to terrorist
attacks and other acts of violence against mass
transportation systems),'' and inserting ``1992 (relating to
terrorist attacks and other acts of violence against railroad
carriers and against mass transportation systems on land, on
water, or through the air),'';
(B) in section 2339A, by striking ``1993,''; and
(C) in section 2516(1)(c) by striking ``1992 (relating to
wrecking trains),'' and inserting ``1992 (relating to
terrorist attacks and other acts of violence against railroad
carriers and against mass transportation systems on land, on
water, or through the air),''.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the
gentlewoman from West Virginia (Mrs. Capito) and the gentleman from
Virginia (Mr. Scott) each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from West Virginia (Mrs.
Capito).
Mrs. CAPITO. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin by thanking the gentleman from
Wisconsin (Chairman Sensenbrenner) the Committee on Rules, the
Departments of Justice and Transportation, the Subcommittee on
Railroads of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, and
the many others who are supporting me in this initiative.
Mr. Chairman, in the wake of the September 11th attacks, as well as
the recent bombing of four commuter trains in Madrid, Spain, the need
for stronger criminal laws to deal with terrorists and other violence
has never been stronger. Intelligence reports last spring indicate that
some terrorists might try to bomb U.S. rail lines or buses in major
U.S. cities. We have also heard reports of so-called ``dirty bombs''
that can be easily transported over our extensive mass transportation
system.
Mr. Chairman, I do not have to remind anyone in this body of the
potential loss of life and disruption to our economy and way of life
from this modern new threat.
In order to help meet this threat head on, I have introduced an
amendment that revises, enhances, and consolidates two Federal criminal
law statutes into one comprehensive statute in order to deter and more
effectively punish terrorist acts against railroad carriers and other
mass transportation providers.
Specifically, under current Federal criminal law, terrorist acts
against railroad carriers are prosecuted under the so-called ``Wrecking
Trains'' statute which was enacted in 1940. This statute is in many
ways outdated, full of gaps and inconsistencies, and quite literally
inadequately addresses modern threats like radioactive materials or
biological agents.
Additionally, the September 11 attacks on our homeland gave rise to
the creation of another Federal criminal statute which covers terrorist
acts against mass transportation systems. By combining these two
statutes to cover all forms of transportation and railway carriers, we
can introduce more consistency, predictability, and effectiveness into
Federal prosecutorial powers.
First, it would reduce our criminal law's vulnerability to bogus
legal claims and also prevent prosecutors from having to prosecute for
lesser offenses because of discrepancies or gaps in the current law.
Richard Reid, known as the Shoe Bomber, was actually able to have a
charge against him

[[Page H8873]]

dismissed because the new mass transportation statute did not
explicitly define an airplane as a vehicle for purposes of prosecuting
under the statute. My amendment will prevent oversights like this from
happening.
Secondly, my amendment will bring more consistent and uniform
protections to all modes of railroad carriers and mass transportation
providers.
Third, my amendment will expand the jurisdictional reach of criminal
law to cover more offenses, such as the release of biological agents or
radioactive material, and cover more property if the prohibited conduct
affects interstate commerce or travel, or communicating, or
transporting prohibited materials across State lines.
Fourth, my amendment will make capital punishment an option under
aggravating circumstances that involve terrorist acts that result in
the death of a person. If our jurisdictional system is unable to have
this tool at their disposal in order to meet the new threats that
terrorism has brought upon us, then we will lose a critical opportunity
to deter and prevent more terrorism from happening.
And fifth, my amendment protects all law enforcement, railroad
carriers, and mass transportation providers from criminal liability if
they are performing their duties in the course of lawful and authorized
activities. In other words, my amendment protects conduct that should
be protected, but does not protect conduct that should not be protected
such as terrorist or imposters posing as rail or mass transportation
employees.
Mr. Chairman, overall, Congress has taken dramatic steps in the last
3 years to improve our security here and abroad, but there is more work
to be accomplished. I strongly urge passage of this amendment to H.R.
10.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 3 minutes.
Mr. Chairman, this is a 10-page amendment with mandatory minimum
sentences, mandatory sentences of life imprisonment, and a death
penalty provision. It has not been considered by any subcommittee or
the full Committee on the Judiciary, and I am not sure it has even been
considered by the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. We
have information that the Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure has not considered it and, in fact, may not support it.
It appears to make, but it is not clear whether conspiracies,
attempts and threats are subject to the same penalties as the
underlying offense. Not only have these provisions not been considered
by the appropriate committees of jurisdiction, but because of the
mandatory minimum sentences, neither sentencing experts nor judges on
the U.S. Sentencing Commission who have the responsibility to assure a
rational and proportional sentencing system, nor any Federal judge who
would review all the facts and circumstances of the case, will get to
assess whether or not these sentences make any sense.
Mr. Chairman, I remind my colleagues that the Judicial Conference has
written a letter saying that these mandatory minimums violate common
sense, and yet here we are asked to decide in a 5-minute debate whether
or not they are appropriate in this case.
Mr. Chairman, the author of the amendment indicates that we are
trying to conform one code section to another. I would ask that we do
that when we consider the code sections. We are going to consider the
PATRIOT Act. That is one of the code sections involved. And the time to
consider the PATRIOT Act and amending the PATRIOT Act is when we have
the PATRIOT Act before us; not when we are doing a reorganization bill
without any serious committee of jurisdiction considering the
underlying amendment.
I say again, Mr. Chairman, when we have death penalty, that makes
life complicated from an international point of view. We may have
terrorists who are caught in another country. We cannot get them
extradited because of all of these death penalties and we need to
consider that.
We have heard that the Shoe Bomber was complicated as to which code
section he was under. We have an easy case for attempted murder, plain
and simple. It gives life imprisonment. Certainly the death penalty, if
he had completed the act, would not have made any sense. The death
penalty for a suicide bomber is obviously not going to be much of a
deterrent.
Mr. Chairman, I would hope that we would consider all the
implications and not adopt this amendment at this time.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mrs. CAPITO. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the comments of the gentleman from
Virginia (Mr. Scott). I would like to say that in working through this
amendment, we did work with the Committee on the Judiciary and the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. We are also trying to
reform an act here, the 1940 Wrecking Trains statute, that is sorely
outdated and full of gaps. When it was conceived, there was no
conception of a terrorist bombing on mass transportation. I think we
know, obviously from the events in Spain, that that is a very real
possibility in terms of acts of terrorism.
Mr. Chairman, the purpose of my amendment is to not only pull that
1940s Wrecking Train statute into the modern era, but also to combine
it with other mass transportation sections so that not only the
deterrent but the prosecutorial powers are available to our prosecutors
to be able to use the most stringent and severe punishments that could
possibly be available to try to use as a deterrent to terrorism.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.
Mr. Chairman, in 2001, we considered this provision when we put it in
the PATRIOT Act. It was inconsistent with an older version. We need to
consider whether we want to conform the law to the newer version or to
the older version. That is why we have committees, so we can assess
what the appropriate punishment is.
Mr. Chairman, 5-minute debates on the floor without committee
consideration does not give us that opportunity. I would hope that we
would delay consideration of this by defeating the amendment and
consider the issue when we do the PATRIOT Act.
Mr. Chairman, I would ask the gentlewoman from West Virginia whether
or not conspiracies, attempts, and threats are subject to the same
penalties as the underlying offense.

{time} 1000

Mrs. CAPITO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. I yield to the gentlewoman from West Virginia.
Mrs. CAPITO. I think there is a lot of prosecutorial discretion in
the bill, and I think that would probably be left up to the prosecutor.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Reclaiming my time, I would say again, you
have mandatory minimums in the bill which would not give anybody any
flexibility, and if a conspiracy attempt and threat are subject to the
same mandatory minimums as actually completing the crime, that would be
something that we would want to consider. It is just not clear.
If the gentlewoman wants time to respond, I will give her time.
Mrs. CAPITO. In terms of the death penalty, I think that is
definitely at the discretion of the prosecutor, and there are two sets
of offenses there. One is a 20-year and one is a 30-year minimum, and I
think that is also at the discretion of the prosecutors. That is my
understanding.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Reclaiming my time, I would hope we would
defeat the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Kolbe). All time has expired.
The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from West
Virginia (Mrs. Capito).
The amendment was agreed to.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
The motion was agreed to.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mrs.
Capito) having assumed the chair, Mr. Kolbe, Chairman pro tempore of
the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported
that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 10)
to provide for reform of the intelligence community, terrorism
prevention and prosecution, border security, and international
cooperation and coordination, and for other purposes, had come to no
resolution thereon.

____________________

Congressional Record: October 8, 2004 (House)
Page H8874-H8894

9/11 RECOMMENDATIONS IMPLEMENTATION ACT

{time} 1002

In the Committee of the Whole

Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of
the bill (H.R. 10) to provide for reform of the intelligence community,
terrorism prevention and prosecution, border security, and
international cooperation and coordination, and for other purposes,
with Mr. Kolbe (Chairman pro tempore) in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. When the committee of the whole rose
earlier today, amendment No. 7 printed in House Report 108-751 by the
gentlewoman from West Virginia (Mrs. Capito) had been disposed of.
Pursuant to the order of the House of today, it shall be in order at
any time for the chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence or a designee to offer amendments en bloc consisting of
any of the amendment numbers 9, 16, 18, 20, and 22 printed in House
report 108-751.
The amendments en bloc shall be considered read, shall be debatable
for 10 minutes, equally divided and controlled by the chairman and the
ranking minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence or their designees, shall not be subject to amendment, and
shall not be subject to a demand for a division of the question.
The original proponent of the amendment included in the amendments en
bloc may insert a statement in the Congressional Record immediately
before disposition of the amendments en bloc.
It is now in order to consider amendment No. 8 printed in House
Report 108-751.

Amendment No. 8 Offered by Mr. Carter

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment No. 8 offered by Mr. Carter:
At the end of title II insert the following:

Subtitle J--Terrorist Penalties Enhancement Act of 2004

SEC. 2221. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the ``Terrorist Penalties
Enhancement Act of 2004''.

SEC. 2222. PENALTIES FOR TERRORIST OFFENSES RESULTING IN
DEATH; DENIAL OF FEDERAL BENEFITS TO
TERRORISTS.

(a) In General.--Chapter 113B of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

``Sec. 2339E. Terrorist offenses resulting in death

``(a) Whoever, in the course of committing a terrorist
offense, engages in conduct that results in the death of a
person, shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any term
of years or for life.
``(b) As used in this section, the term `terrorist offense'
means--
``(1) a Federal felony offense that is--
``(A) a Federal crime of terrorism as defined in section
2332b(g) except to the extent such crime is an offense under
section 1363; or
``(B) an offense under this chapter, section 175, 175b,
229, or 831, or section 236 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954;
or
``(2) a Federal offense that is an attempt or conspiracy to
commit an offense described in paragraph (1).

``Sec. 2339F. Denial of Federal benefits to terrorists

``(a) An individual or corporation who is convicted of a
terrorist offense (as defined in section 2339E) shall, as
provided by the court on motion of the Government, be
ineligible for any or all Federal benefits for any term of
years or for life.
``(b) As used in this section, the term `Federal benefit'
has the meaning given that term in section 421(d) of the
Controlled Substances Act, and also includes any assistance
or benefit described in section 115(a) of the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, with the same limitations and to the same extent as
provided in section 115 of that Act with respect to denials
of benefits and assistance to which that section applies.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment to Table of Sections.--The table
of sections at the beginning of the chapter 113B of title 18,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following new items:

``2339E. Terrorist offenses resulting in death.
``2339F. Denial of federal benefits to terrorists.''.

(c) Aggravating Factor in Death Penalty Cases.--Section
3592(c)(1) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by
inserting ``section 2339E (terrorist offenses resulting in
death),'' after ``destruction),''.

SEC. 2223. DEATH PENALTY IN CERTAIN AIR PIRACY CASES
OCCURRING BEFORE ENACTMENT OF THE FEDERAL DEATH
PENALTY ACT OF 1994.

Section 60003 of the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, (Public Law 103-322), is amended, as
of the time of its enactment, by adding at the end the
following:
``(c) Death Penalty Procedures for Certain Previous
Aircraft Piracy Violations.--An individual convicted of
violating section 46502 of title 49, United States Code, or
its predecessor, may be sentenced to death in accordance with
the procedures established in chapter 228 of title 18, United
States Code, if for any offense committed before the
enactment of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994 (Public Law 103-322), but after the enactment of
the Antihijacking Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-366), it is
determined by the finder of fact, before consideration of the
factors set forth in sections 3591(a)(2) and 3592(a) and (c)
of title 18, United States Code, that one or more of the
factors set forth in former section 46503(c)(2) of title 49,
United States Code, or its predecessor, has been proven by
the Government to exist, beyond a reasonable doubt, and that
none of the factors set forth in former section 46503(c)(1)
of title 49, United States Code, or its predecessor, has been
proven by the defendant to exist, by a preponderance of the
information. The meaning of the term `especially heinous,
cruel, or depraved', as used in the factor set forth in
former section 46503(c)(2)(B)(iv) of title 49, United States
Code, or its predecessor, shall be narrowed by adding the
limiting language `in that it involved torture or serious
physical abuse to the victim', and shall be construed as when
that term is used in section 3592(c)(6) of title 18, United
States Code.''
Conform the table of sections accordingly.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Carter) and a Member opposed each will
control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Carter).
Mr. CARTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, today I offer an amendment, the Terrorist Penalties
Enhancements Act, which will provide new and expanded penalties to
those who commit fatal acts of terrorism.
Since September 11, Federal and State officials continue to work hard
to prevent further terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. However, despite
some changes to the law to increase penalties after deadly terrorist
attacks, a jury is still denied the ability to consider a death
sentence or life imprisonment for a terrorist in many cases, even when
the attacks result in death and the court believes it is necessary to
prevent further harm to our citizens.
For example, in the case in which a terrorist causes massive loss of
life by sabotaging a nuclear power plant or a national defense
installation, there would be no possibility of imposing the death
penalty under the statutes defining these offenses because they contain

[[Page H8875]]

no death penalty authorizations. In contrast, dozens of other Federal
violent crime provisions authorize up to life imprisonment or the death
penalty in cases where victims are killed. Because the potential
tragedy here is so great, we must hope that changing this law to allow
a sentence of death or life imprisonment will serve as a deterrent to
would-be terrorists. It is one more tool in our arsenal.
Mr. Chairman, hearings have been held on this straightforward
legislation, and it has been agreed to by the House Committee on the
Judiciary. It will make terrorists who kill eligible for the Federal
death penalty. This legislation will also deny these same terrorists
any Federal benefits they otherwise may have been eligible to receive.
These Federal benefits denied include Social Security, welfare,
unemployment and food stamps.
As a former State District Judge for over 20 years, I have presided
over five capital murders trials, three of which resulted in the death
penalty. I understand the gravity of seeking and imposing the death
penalty. However, from my experience, I believe the death penalty is a
tool that can deter acts of terrorism and can serve as a tool for
prosecutors when negotiating sentences.
I am pleased that President George Bush expressed his support for
this legislation. In a speech to the FBI Academy, President Bush said,
``For the sake of American people, Congress should change the law and
give law enforcement officials the same tools they have to fight terror
that they have to fight other crime.''
In Hershey, Pennsylvania, President Bush reemphasized the inequity in
current law. President Bush said, ``We ought to be sending a strong
signal: If you sabotage a defense installation or a nuclear facility in
a way that takes an innocent life, you ought to get the death penalty,
the Federal death penalty.''
This legislation today puts all would-be terrorists on notice that
they will receive ultimate justice should they decide to plan and
execute a future attack.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 3 minutes.
Mr. Chairman, this bill creates 23 new death penalties, making all
Federal crimes of terrorism punishable by death. We would remind people
that a 23-year study of over 4,500 death penalty cases found reversible
error in 68 percent of the cases. We suspect that approximately 100
people in the last 10 years have been wrongfully executed. This burden
falls disproportionately on minorities.
So when you talk about a strong signal, the signal, I guess, is you
put people to death because, well, they might have been guilty. We know
in the end the death penalty will not deter suicide bombers from
completing their crimes. Furthermore, we have the problem of
international law, the fact that most countries in the world,
particularly our allies, do not have the death penalty and will not
extradite criminals to the United States if they will be subject to the
death penalty.
One of the problems with the Federal crimes of terrorism is that it
is somewhat vague. It could include some kind of a political protest.
The death could occur by accident. It was not even intended. Somebody
got trampled in the protest, for example, and here you are talking
about the death penalty. But because it includes not only completing
the crime and killing somebody, it includes support for someone. You
might want to rename this the ``Put Mama to Death Bill.'' If a mother
harbors her son, lets him stay at home, she would then become and
everybody in the family becomes subject to the death penalty.
Mr. Chairman, this has nothing to do with reorganization of the
intelligence community. I would hope that we would reserve judgment on
this and consider this bill and others when we consider the Patriot
Act.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. CARTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Wisconsin (Mr. Green).
Mr. GREEN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, it is simple. We must do
everything we can to stop terrorists, and that starts with ensuring
that all terrorist acts are punished swiftly and severely. This
amendment sends a clear message that we take terrorism seriously; that
we understand that terrorist acts are not really crimes, they are
combat; that on 9/11 we were not merely assaulted, we were invaded; and
when there is combat, when terrorists invade our soil in deadly
fashion, we will punish those responsible with the heaviest possible
penalties. To do less would be a disservice to those who have lost
their lives and would send a signal of softness to those who still seek
our destruction.
I was proud to work with the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Carter) on
this subject. I commend him for carrying it forward. It is important
work. It is good work that he is doing. I urge my colleagues to support
this amendment.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I would point out that we will be considering the
Patriot Act. I would hope that we would consider this legislation as
part of that.
Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back
the balance of my time.
Mr. CARTER. Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this
amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by
the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Carter).
The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. CARTER. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr.
Carter) will be postponed.

Amendment En Bloc Offered By Mr. Hoekstra

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, pursuant to the unanimous consent
agreement, I offer the amendments en bloc.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendments en
bloc.
The text of the amendments en bloc is as follows:

Amendments en bloc offered by Mr. Hoekstra consisting of
amendments numbered 9, 16, 18, 20 and 22:

Amendment No. 9 Offered by Mr. Castle

At the end of the bill, insert the following new section:

SEC. 5__. REMOVAL OF CIVIL LIABILITY BARRIERS THAT DISCOURAGE
THE DONATION OF FIRE EQUIPMENT TO VOLUNTEER
FIRE COMPANIES.

(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Good
Samaritan Volunteer Firefighter Assistance Act of 2004''.
(b) Liability Protection.--A person who donates fire
control or fire rescue equipment to a volunteer fire company
shall not be liable for civil damages under any State or
Federal law for personal injuries, property damage or loss,
or death proximately caused by the equipment after the
donation.
(c) Exceptions.--Subsection (b) does not apply to a person
if--
(1) the person's act or omission proximately causing the
injury, damage, loss, or death constitutes gross negligence
or intentional misconduct; or
(2) the person is the manufacturer of the fire control or
fire rescue equipment.
(d) Preemption.--This section preempts the laws of any
State to the extent that such laws are inconsistent with this
section, except that notwithstanding subsection (c) this
section shall not preempt any State law that provides
additional protection from liability for a person who donates
fire control or fire rescue equipment to a volunteer fire
company.
(e) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Person.--The term ``person'' includes any governmental
or other entity.
(2) Fire control or rescue equipment.--The term ``fire
control or fire rescue equipment'' includes any fire vehicle,
fire fighting tool, communications equipment, protective
gear, fire hose, or breathing apparatus.
(3) State.--The term ``State'' includes the several States,
the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, American
Samoa, Guam, the Virgin Islands, any other territory or
possession of the United States, and any political
subdivision of any such State, territory, or possession.
(4) Volunteer fire company.--The term ``volunteer fire
company'' means an association of individuals who provide
fire protection and other emergency services, where at least
30 percent of the individuals receive little or no
compensation compared with an entry level full-time paid
individual in that

[[Page H8876]]

association or in the nearest such association with an entry
level full-time paid individual.
(f) Effective Date.--This section applies only to liability
for injury, damage, loss, or death caused by equipment that,
for purposes of subsection (b), is donated on or after the
date that is 30 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act.
(g) Attorney General Review.--
(1) In general.--The Attorney General of the United States
shall conduct a State-by-State review of the donation of
firefighter equipment to volunteer firefighter companies
during the 5-year period ending on the date of the enactment
of this Act.
(2) Report.--Not later than 6 months after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Attorney General of the United
States shall publish and submit to the Congress a report on
the results of the review conducted under paragraph (1). The
report shall include, for each State, the most effective way
to fund firefighter companies, whether first responder
funding is sufficient to respond to the Nation's needs, and
the best method to ensure that the equipment donated to
volunteer firefighter companies is in usable condition.
____

Amendment No. 16 Offered by Mr. Barton of Texas

After section 5010 insert the following new section:

SEC. 5011. DIGITAL TELEVISION CONVERSION DEADLINE.

(a) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:
(1) Congress granted television broadcasters additional 6
MHz blocks of spectrum to transmit digital broadcasts
simultaneously with the analog broadcasts they transmit on
their original 6 megahertz blocks of spectrum.
(2) Section 309(j)(14) of the Communications Act of 1934
requires each television broadcaster to cease analog
transmissions and return 6 megahertz of spectrum by December
31, 2006, or once just over 85 percent of the television
households in that broadcaster's market can view digital
broadcast television channels using a digital television, a
digital-to-analog-converter box, cable service, or satellite
service, whichever is later.
(3) Twenty-four megahertz of spectrum currently occupied by
the television broadcasters has been earmarked for use by
first responders once the television broadcasters return the
spectrum broadcasters currently use to provide analog
transmissions.
(4) This spectrum would be ideal to provide first
responders with interoperable communications channels.
(5) Large parts of the vacated spectrum could be auctioned
for advanced commercial services, such as wireless broadband.
(6) The ``85-percent penetration test'' could delay the
termination of analog television broadcasts and the return of
spectrum well beyond 2007, hindering the use of that spectrum
for these important public-safety and advanced commercial
uses.
(7) Proposals to require broadcasters to return, on a date
certain, just the spectrum earmarked for future public-safety
use would not adequately resolve the identified need for
improved public-safety communications interoperability.
Broadcasters estimate that the public-safety only approach
would dislocate as many as 75 stations, including some in
major markets, airing major network programming, sometimes
even in digital form. Unless broadcasters are required to
return concurrently all the spectrum currently used for
analog transmissions, it will be exceedingly difficult to
relocate these 75 stations, which also serve a critical
public safety function by broadcasting weather, traffic,
disaster, and other safety alerts.
(8) Proposals to require broadcasters to return, on a date
certain, just the spectrum earmarked for future public-safety
use also would neither address the digital television
transition in a comprehensive fashion nor free valuable
spectrum for advanced commercial services.
(b) Sense of Congress.--Now, therefore, it is the sense of
Congress that section 309(j)(14) of the Communications Act of
1934 should be amended to eliminate the 85-percent
penetration test and to require broadcasters to cease analog
transmissions at the close of December 31, 2006, so that the
spectrum can be returned and repurposed for important public-
safety and advanced commercial uses.
____

Amendment No. 18 Offered by Mr. Fossella

Page 606, after line 17, insert the following (and
redesignate the subsequent subsections accordingly):
(d) Multi-Year Interoperability Grants.--
(1) Multi-year commitments.--In awarding grants to any
State, region, local government, or Indian tribe for the
purposes of enhancing interoperable communications
capabilities for emergency response providers, the Secretary
may commit to obligate Federal assistance beyond the current
fiscal year, subject to the limitations and restrictions in
this subsection.
(2) Restrictions.--
(A) Time limit.--No multi-year interoperability commitment
may exceed 3 years in duration.
(B) Amount of committed funds.--The total amount of
assistance the Secretary has committed to obligate for any
future fiscal year under paragraph (1) may not exceed
$150,000,000.
(3) Letters of intent.--
(A) Issuance.--Pursuant to paragraph (1), the Secretary may
issue a letter of intent to an applicant committing to
obligate from future budget authority an amount, not more
than the Federal Government's share of the project's cost,
for an interoperability communications project (including
interest costs and costs of formulating the project).
(B) Schedule.--A letter of intent under this paragraph
shall establish a schedule under which the Secretary will
reimburse the applicant for the Federal Government's share of
the project's costs, as amounts become available, if the
applicant, after the Secretary issues the letter, carries out
the project before receiving amounts under a grant issued by
the Secretary.
(C) Notice to secretary.--An applicant that is issued a
letter of intent under this subsection shall notify the
Secretary of the applicant's intent to carry out a project
pursuant to the letter before the project begins.
(D) Notice to congress.--The Secretary shall transmit a
written notification to the Congress no later than 3 days
before the issuance of a letter of intent under this section.
(E) Limitations.--A letter of intent issued under this
section is not an obligation of the Government under section
1501 of title 31, United States Code, and is not deemed to be
an administrative commitment for financing. An obligation or
administrative commitment may be made only as amounts are
provided in authorization and appropriations laws.
(F) Statutory construction.--Nothing in this subsection
shall be construed--
(i) to prohibit the obligation of amounts pursuant to a
letter of intent under this subsection in the same fiscal
year as the letter of intent is issued; or
(ii) to apply to, or replace, Federal assistance intended
for interoperable communications that is not provided
pursuant to a commitment under this subsection.
(e) Interoperable Communications Plans.--Any applicant
requesting funding assistance from the Secretary for
interoperable communications for emergency response providers
shall submit an Interoperable Communications Plan to the
Secretary for approval. Such a plan shall--
(1) describe the current state of communications
interoperability in the applicable jurisdictions among
Federal, State, and local emergency response providers and
other relevant private resources;
(2) describe the available and planned use of public safety
frequency spectrum and resources for interoperable
communications within such jurisdictions;
(3) describe how the planned use of spectrum and resources
for interoperable communications is compatible with
surrounding capabilities and interoperable communications
plans of Federal, State, and local governmental entities,
military installations, foreign governments, critical
infrastructure, and other relevant entities;
(4) include a 5-year plan for the dedication of Federal,
State, and local government and private resources to achieve
a consistent, secure, and effective interoperable
communications system, including planning, system design and
engineering, testing and technology development, procurement
and installation, training, and operations and maintenance;
and
(5) describe how such 5-year plan meets or exceeds any
applicable standards and grant requirements established by
the Secretary.
____

Amendment No. 20 Offered by Mr. Mica

Page 198, after line 22, insert the following (and
redesignate subsequent subparagraphs of the quoted matter
accordingly):
``(D) Prescreening international passengers.--Not later
than 60 days after date of enactment of this subparagraph,
the Secretary of Homeland Security, or the designee of the
Secretary, shall issue a notice of proposed rulemaking that
will allow the Department of Homeland Security to compare
passenger name records for any international flight to or
from the United States against the consolidated and
integrated terrorist watchlist maintained by the Federal
Government before departure of the flight.
Page 199, strike lines 17 through 22 and insert the
following:
``(F) Appeal procedures.--
``(i) In general.--The Assistant Secretary shall establish
a timely and fair process for individuals identified as a
threat under one or more of subparagraphs (C), (D), and (E)
to appeal to the Transportation Security Administration the
determination and correct any erroneous information.
``(ii) Records.--The process shall include the
establishment of a method by which the Assistant Secretary
will be able to maintain a record of air passengers who have
been misidentified and have corrected erroneous information.
To prevent repeated delays of misidentified passengers, the
Transportation Security Administration record shall contain
information determined by the Assistant Secretary to
authenticate the identity of such a passenger.
Page 203, lines 5 and 6, strike ``explosive detection
systems'' and insert ``explosive detection devices''.
Page 203, line 9, insert ``backscatter x-ray scanners,''
after ``shoe scanners,''.
Page 213, after line 9, insert the following (and conform
the table of contents of the bill accordingly):

[[Page H8877]]

SEC. 2188. IN-LINE CHECKED BAGGAGE SCREENING.

The Secretary of Homeland Security shall take such action
as may be necessary to expedite the installation and use of
advanced in-line baggage-screening equipment at commercial
airports.
Page 213, line 10, redesignate section 2188 of the bill as
section 2189 and conform the table of contents of the bill
accordingly.
____

Amendment No. 22 Offered by Mr. Shadegg

In title V, at the end of chapter 3 of subtitle H (page
609, after line 21) add the following:

SEC. __. PILOT STUDY TO MOVE WARNING SYSTEMS INTO THE MODERN
DIGITAL AGE.

(a) Pilot Study.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, from
funds available for improving the national system to notify
the general public in the event of a terrorist attack, and in
consultation with the Attorney General and the heads of other
appropriate Federal agencies, the National Association of
State Chief Information Officers, and other stakeholders with
respect to public warning systems, shall conduct a pilot
study under which the Secretary may issue public warnings
regarding threats to homeland security using a warning system
that is similar to the AMBER Alert communications network.
(b) Report.--Not later than 9 months after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the
Congress a report regarding the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the pilot study.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the order of the House earlier
today, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) and the gentlewoman
from California (Ms. Harman) or her designee each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra).
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.
This en bloc amendment has been agreed to in a bipartisan fashion
which supports the amendments that have been offered by the gentleman
from Delaware (Mr. Castle), the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Barton), the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Fossella), the gentleman from Florida (Mr.
Mica) and the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Shadegg).
I encourage my colleagues to support this en bloc amendment and move
the process forward.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to claim
the time in opposition to the amendments.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Virginia?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
There is one bill, the firefighters bill, that is in here, we
considered that, and we had a debate on it. I just want to incorporate
by reference the problems with that legislation. It is not necessary
because firefighters can receive gifts, and if they want to immunize
the donor, they can do that under present law.
Furthermore, the answer to giving firefighters more equipment is in
funding first responders equipment, rather than tort reform. So I would
hope that we would consider that as we consider the en bloc amendments.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Delaware (Mr. Castle), a former member of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence.
(Mr. CASTLE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman of the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence for yielding me time.
This is sort of like a deja vu discussion, that the gentleman from
Virginia (Mr. Scott) and I have had this discussion before. I feel this
legislation is necessary. There are some States that have waived the
liability provisions to allow corporations to make donations of
equipment to fire companies without liability, which is very, very
important. A lot of these companies have very good and new equipment,
hardly used because their fire needs are not as great as regular fire
companies. They are willing to make this donation, but they are
reluctant to do so because of the liability issues.

{time} 1015

A few States have waived those provisions but others have not. We
simply would allow this throughout this country. I cannot imagine
anything that is more dutiful or more beneficial to fighting fires in
this country than this.
So he opposed this before, and I said at the time, I hope he is the
only one who is opposing this, and, he almost was. There were three
people who opposed it. It carried by 397 to 3. Obviously, it has to do
with what we are dealing with in this country in terms of terrorism, in
terms of the problems of dealing with security in the United States of
America, intelligence and all those other areas. Quite frankly, it is
something that a lot of people want to get done, but we have got to
find the vehicle for it, and this is a proper vehicle.
It was unopposed and that is the reason it was put in the en bloc
amendment, agreed to by Members on both sides of the aisle. My sense is
this is something that each and every one of us should be supporting so
that both our rural and our urban fire departments can take advantage
of this particular type of law and have emergency vehicles and other
equipment donated to them without that concern of liability.
I would hope that his concerns about that, which he has expressed,
would not lead to opposition to the en bloc amendment and, hopefully,
ultimately, the passage of this, and we will all be protected.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. CASTLE. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, as the gentleman from Delaware
has indicated, we have had this debate before, and I would just point
out that my concerns with parts of the amendment are outweighed by the
support of the other provisions in the other bills in the bloc. So I
will not be opposing the bloc.
Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of my amendment to H.R. 10
which is identical to legislation I introduced, H.R. 1787, the ``Good
Samaritan Volunteer Firefighter Assistance Act.'' On September 14 this
legislation overwhelming passed the U.S. House of Representatives 397
to 3.
My amendment removes a barrier which currently prevents some
organizations from donating surplus fire fighting equipment to fire
departments in need. Under current law, the threat of civil liability
has caused some organizations to destroy fire equipment, rather than
donating it to volunteer, rural and other financially-strapped
departments.
We know that every day, across the United States, firefighters
respond to calls for help. We are grateful that these brave men and
women work to save our lives and protect our homes and businesses. We
may presume that our firefighters work in departments with the latest
and best firefighting and protective equipment. When in reality there
are an estimated 30,000 firefighters who risk their lives daily due to
a lack of basic Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).
In both rural and urban fire departments, limited budgets make it
difficult to purchase more than fuel and minimum maintenance. At the
same time, certain industries are constantly improving and updating the
fire protection equipment to take advantage of new, state-of-the-art
innovation. Sometimes, the surplus equipment has never been used to put
out a single fire. Sadly, the threat of civil liability causes many
organizations to destroy, rather than donate, millions of dollars of
quality fire equipment.
Not only do volunteer fire departments provide an indispensable
service, some estimates indicate that the nearly 800,000 volunteer
firefighters nationwide save state and local governments $36.8 billion
a year. Of the 26,000 fire departments in the United States, more than
19,000 are all volunteers and another 3,800 are mostly volunteer.
Ten states: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Indiana,
Missouri, New York, South Carolina and Texas have passed similar
legislation. In the seven years of the Texas program more than $12
million worth of firefighter equipment has been donated and given to
needy departments--this includes nearly 70 emergency vehicles, more
than 1,500 piece of communications equipment. In total more than 33,000
items have been donated.
Congress can respond to the needs of fire companies by removing civil
liability barriers. Equipping our nation's first responders is
essential as we fight the war on terror and I am

[[Page H8878]]

hopeful the esteemed Chairman of the Judiciary Committee and my
colleagues will again join me in supporting this measure.
Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this amendment
sponsored by the Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee.
This Sense of Congress sets out the right approach for this nation to
move toward the digital television transition and return much-needed
spectrum for public-safety and advanced commercial purposes, such as
wireless broadband. The Congress, the Federal Communications
Commission, as well as the telecommunications industry have spent
valuable time and money for the advancement of the transition. A hard
date will bring certainty to all those involved in this transition.
The Senate, in its just passed National Intelligence Reform bill,
included a 2008 hard deadline for broadcasters to vacate only portions
of the 700 MHz spectrum reserved for public safety. I do not believe
this is the correct approach, nor do I believe that it adequately
solves the public safety issue.
I commend the Chairman for his amendment and I look forward to our
continued work as we move from an analog to a digital world.
Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Amendment offered by
my colleague and good friend, Mr. Shadegg of Arizona.
Mr. Shadegg is a distinguished Member of the Select Committee on
Homeland Security and ably serves as Chairman of its Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness & Response.
Under Chairman Shadegg's leadership, the EP&R Subcommittee recently
held a very informative and eye-opening hearing on the state of our
Nation's warning and alert system.
The Amendment that he is offering today is the product of that
excellent hearing.
I commend Chairman Shadegg for his foresight in recognizing the
importance of emergency warnings and alerts, and for his leadership in
offering this important Amendment.
It is simply imperative that our Nation maintain and operate an
effective emergency communication system. It is our responsibility to
ensure that our citizens receive sufficient and timely warnings to
enable them to take action necessary for their safety--whether the
cause is a terrorist attack or a force of nature.
This Amendment authorizes a pilot study examining whether a system
like the AMBER Alert network should, and can, be used for emergency
warnings and alerts. The AMBER Alert network, which provides actionable
intelligence on a geographic basis to help identify and track missing
children, is a proven success. This Amendment is certainly worthy of
our support.
Let me again commend Chairman Shadegg. And I urge my colleagues to
vote ``yes'' on the Shadegg Amendment.
Mr. GARY G. MILLER of California. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of
the Mica amendment, which will go a long way in making certain our
skies are safe and free of terrorism.
I would like to focus my comments on important provisions in this
amendment that will help ensure the civil liberties of all of America's
citizens are protected during this war on terrorism. I thank Aviation
Subcommittee Chairman Mica for including this language in his
amendment, which I had submitted to the Rules Committee as a separate
amendment.
There is no question that we should be vigilant in our fight against
terrorism or that increased security measures will serve to
inconvenience some of our citizens. However, forcing certain law-
abiding citizens to be repeatedly detained and questioned each time
they travel should not be tolerated.
This amendment will establish a process for the Transportation
Security Administration to ensure those passengers who are erroneously
flagged under its new pre-screening system are not unnecessarily
delayed on future flights.
To illustrate the importance of addressing this issue, I would like
to highlight an example of a family in my district who has been
repeatedly delayed when traveling.
The most recent case occurred this summer, when returning from an
oversees trip. The family was met by officials as they deplaned and
escorted to a holding room at JFK Airport. During their detainment,
officials thoroughly inspected the family's luggage and would not even
allow them to go to the restroom without escort. The family was
extensively questioned about their background and employment.
It took over three hours for the officials to clear and release the
family. Unfortunately, the long delay caused them to miss their
connecting flight to California.
According to Immigration and Customs Enforcement, this family was
delayed due to the nature of our law enforcement databases, which can
give rise to ``near matches'' and ``tentative hits,'' resulting in
misidentification scenarios.
This was not the first time this family was delayed because of the
similarity of their name to names that appear on watch lists.
Unfortunately, according to the Department of Homeland Security, it
will not be the last--the family should expect similar detainment in
the future because of this shortcoming in our law enforcement
databases.
Some of you might say that this is the price American citizens of
Middle-Eastern descent must pay to ensure safety in our skies.
But we must ask ourselves--how do we protect those unfortunate
Americans, who share names that are similar to dangerous people on
terrorist watch lists, from being effectively denied the ability to
fly?
There is no question that we must encourage our security officials to
be vigilant. But, it is reasonable to expect that the Transportation
Security Administration be able to maintain their watch lists to ensure
that the system does not continue to erroneously flag the same law-
abiding citizens every time they try to travel on a plane.
I believe this can be done in a way that maintains aviation security,
improves the effectiveness of watch lists, and demonstrates to our
fellow Americans of Middle-Eastern descent that America affords the
same freedoms and opportunities to all of its law-abiding citizens,
even during this war on terrorism.
Specifically, this amendment will: establish a timely and fair
process for individuals identified as a threat to appeal the
determination and correct any erroneous information; include a method
by which TSA will be able to maintain a record of air passengers who
have been misidentified; and prevent repeated delays of misidentified
passengers by ensuring the record contain information determined by TSA
to authenticate the identity of such a passenger.
As we work toward policies that secure our homeland, we must not
forget that there are U.S. citizens who are of Middle Eastern descent.
They have greatly contributed to American society and are deserving of
equal treatment under the Constitution of the United States.
These various cultures and races became citizens of the United States
just as our ancestors did, and they are our neighbors, co-workers,
friends, and family members. Most of all, they are our fellow
Americans.
It is unfortunate that these Americans have been forced to bear the
brunt of our increased security.
In the past, when American law enforcement confronted challenges to
our safety and security from espionage, drug trafficking and organized
crime, we were able to meet those challenges in ways that preserved our
fundamental freedoms and civil liberties.
We must meet the challenge of terrorism with this same careful regard
for the Constitutional rights of Americans and respect for all human
beings.
Last week, the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee
unanimously approved these provisions and I ask my colleagues to
support this amendment today.
Mr. UPTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Barton Amendment.
Part of the spectrum which the broadcasters are to return at the end
of the DTV transition has been earmarked for public safety
interoperable radio communications. The tragic events of 9/11
underscore the need for this, and that is why we must move with
deliberate speed to complete the transition.
But moving with deliberate speed does not mean moving recklessly, and
it does not mean grasping at well-intentioned half-measures that would
either cause scores of television stations to literally go dark or
would actually set us back in our efforts to get spectrum into the
hands of public safety because they are riddled with ill-defined
exceptions.
Moreover, we need to consider consumers' analog television sets which
could go dark once broadcasters cease analog broadcasts--if we do not
take care to do this right. Helping public safety and minimizing
consumer disruptions need not be mutually goals.
I support the Barton amendment because it says that we should impose
a hard-date for the end of the entire transition as part of a
comprehensive digital television transition bill to be enacted next
Congress. I look forward to working in the Energy and Commerce
Committee next Congress on this and other proposals to minimize
consumer disruptions, focusing on how to get low-cost digital-to-analog
converter boxes into the hands of consumers, not to mention other
policy matters that are relevant to the transition. The Barton
Amendment signs us up to move--not with reckless abandon--but with
deliberate speed to ensure that we really get spectrum into the hands
of public safety in an expeditious fashion.
I urge all of my colleagues to support the Barton Amendment.
Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Fossella-
Stupak amendment. From the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 to
the attacks on September 11, 2001, the inability of our first
responders to communicate adequately and effectively has posed a
serious obstacle to our Nation's ability to respond to acts of
terrorism and other emergencies.
Regrettably, there is no silver bullet or panacea that will enable us
to attain interoperable

[[Page H8879]]

communications overnight. And, contrary to the good intentions of some
of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle, merely throwing more
money at the problem or creating new grant programs is not the answer.
We already have enough programs.
Indeed, since 2002, the Federal government has awarded more than $1.2
billion in grant assistance specifically for the purpose of enhancing
interoperable communications. And, unfortunately, our progress has been
disappointing. The primary reason for this--according to the Government
Accountability Office--is that Federal interoperable communications
grant programs ``present challenges to short- and long-term planning.''
That is why I rise in support of the Fossella-Stupak Amendment. It
does not create a new interoperable communications grant program.
Rather, it gives the Department of Homeland Security much needed
flexibility to support State and local short- and long-term planning
for interoperable communications.

Specifically, under the Fossella-Stupak Amendment, the Department may
issue Letters of Intent to commit future funding for interoperable
communications for up to three years. These commitments must be made
pursuant to existing grant programs.
States and local governments have been reluctant to invest in
expensive and complicated communication systems due to uncertainty over
the availability of Federal funds from year to year. Providing cash-
strapped States and local governments with reasonable assurance that
multi-year Federal assistance will be available should spur
comprehensive planning and meaningful investments in communications.
The Fossella-Stupak Amendment also requires applicants to develop
multi-year interoperable communication plans. Such plans are essential
for long-term planning, such as coordinating communications strategies
with different agencies and neighboring jurisdictions, and for
preventing funds from being wasted on hastily planned systems.
I understand that numerous fire service and law enforcement groups,
State and local government organizations, and other entities
representing the public safety community played a key role in drafting
this Amendment. They and I support this Amendment, and so should you.
I commend Representatives Fossella and Stupak for their leadership
and vision in offering this important Amendment.
As Chairman of the Select Committee on Homeland Security, I strongly
encourage my colleagues to support this Amendment.
Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I agree with Chairman Barton that the
digital television transition has taken too long and that we need to
quickly get our police officers, firefighters, and other first
responders an additional 24 megahertz of spectrum to help them safely
do their jobs. This spectrum, currently occupied by television channels
63, 64, 68, and 69, is set to be turned over to first responders once
the stations broadcasting on those channels transition to digital. Can
the federal government speed this up?
Some have proposed getting first responders this spectrum more
quickly by requiring certain broadcasters to return their spectrum by
the end of 2006. This suggestion, though well intentioned, is a
simplistic approach to a complex problem. It does not ensure that the
public safety sector will be ready to use this new spectrum. Also, this
suggestion, by supplanting certain broadcasters directly, and shutting
down others to prevent interference, will prevent many consumers from
receiving important programming such as local news and weather.
Finally, it will also disproportionately harm the Hispanic community by
shutting down a number of Spanish-language stations.
Likewise, the amendment before us today does not reflect the
complexity of this issue. Although I agree with Chairman Barton that we
need to speed up the digital transition, the amendment declares that we
should establish a hard deadline of December 31, 2006, when all analog
television broadcasts on all channels would cease. Such an absolute
declaration is premature. It would not allow enough time for affordable
equipment to come to market or to properly educate consumers about the
transition. Moreover, it could result in many consumers losing their
television service. That must not happen.
Congress needs to address the digital transition issue soon in a
comprehensive way, addressing, among others, three major issues. First,
we need to expedite public safety's access to new spectrum and provide
them with certainty so they know when they will be receiving new
spectrum. Certainty will allow first responders time to plan how to use
the spectrum. It will also allow them time to line up the funding
necessary to make use of the spectrum once it becomes available.
Second, we need to implement a far-reaching plan to educate consumers
on what will happen once the digital transition is complete. It is
important that consumers know when the transition will take place, how
it will take place, and what it means for them with regard to their
television viewing.
Third, consumers should not bear unfair cost burdens, and we need to
have a program in place to provide subsidies so that no one is left
behind as the United States transitions to digital television.
I am pleased that Chairman Barton recognizes the need to tackle these
issues in a thoughtful and comprehensive way. Unfortunately, I cannot
support the amendment before us today because it is premature and could
lead to consumers losing their television service.
I am confident, however, that regardless of which party controls the
House next Congress, the Committee on Energy and Commerce will work on
a bipartisan basis to properly address these issues in a way that will
speed up the digital transition, provide certainty to public safety
regarding new spectrum, and protect consumers from losing their
television service.
Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, the amendment I have offered makes several
non-controversial, but important changes:
First, it prevents a repeat of the ``Cat Stevens'' incident.
On September 21st, Yusuf Islam, formerly known as Cat Stevens, was
allowed to board United Flight 919 from London to Washington, DC.
The plane was hundreds of miles over the Atlantic before it was
discovered that Mr. Islam was on the terrorist watchlist. Fortunately,
the plane was diverted to Maine without incident. That plane should
never have left the ground with Mr. Islam on board.
My amendment requires DHS to compare the names of international
passengers to the terrorist watch-lists prior to the flight's
departure, and it ensures that future flights will not take off with
known terrorists on board.
Secondly, my amendment requires TSA to establish an appeal process
for passengers wrongly placed on terror watchlists.
It also establishes a process for DHS to track passengers erroneously
flagged under the Department's new pre-screening system.
The watchlists are incredibly important tools, but they are far from
perfect.
Last week, I learned that several members of Congress, including the
Chairman of the Transportation Committee, have been prevented from
boarding airliners because they shared the first and last name of
someone on the watchlist.
This provision will ensure that they and others are not unnecessarily
delayed on future flights.
Lastly, this amendment directs the Department of Homeland Security to
take all necessary actions to expedite the installation and use of
advanced in-line baggage-screening equipment at commercial airports.
I am disappointed that language to provide innovative non-Federal
financing for these systems was not included in H.R. 10 due to
shortsighted CBO scorekeeping.
However, I do believe the Administration has the authority to pursue
this approach, and hopefully, this section will encourage them to do
so.
We worked closely with members on both sides of the aisle to develop
this amendment. A similar amendment passed the Transportation Committee
unanimously last week and I urge all of my colleagues to vote in favor
of this amendment.
Mr. PICKERING. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to support the Amendment
being offered by Mr. Barton, Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce
Committee. First, I would like to thank Chairman Barton for his
leadership on this issue. I agree with Chairman Barton that H.R. 10 is
not the vehicle by which to effectively transition this precious public
spectrum to public safety and valuable commercial and non-licensed
uses. In order to address all issues and concerns, we must take a
comprehensive approach and develop a comprehensive solution so that our
first responders receive all the tools they need and the American
people receive the unimaginable benefits of digital technology. The
Senate proposal is the wrong approach and I hope we will work to
accomplish our goal in a more all-inclusive process focusing on all
broadcast issues. We cannot effectively address the digital transition
piece by piece. I look forward to working with Chairman Barton on this
very important issue in order to find a date that is appropriate and
achievable in order to effectively transition to that new and exciting
digital age of television that will promote public safety, encourage
innovation, create jobs, and benefit all Americans.
Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, my amendment expresses the sense
of the Congress that the way to get valuable spectrum promptly into the
hands of public safety officials without shutting off consumers'
televisions is to enact comprehensive, hard-deadline digital television
legislation.
The Senate-passed 9/11 bill, however, requires the return of only a
portion of that spectrum, rather than all the spectrum that
broadcasters are currently using for analog broadcasts. Broadcasters
estimate that these provisions would shut off as many as 75 stations.

[[Page H8880]]

Many of these broadcasters carry major networks in major markets.
Because the Senate bill does not require the other broadcasters to
vacate their analog spectrum, there will be nowhere to relocate these
75 stations.
By waiting until the 109th Congress set a date-certain for all
broadcasters to clear the spectrum they use for analog broadcasts, we
can turn spectrum over to public safety sooner, and all broadcasters
will be able to move to their final digital channels. The remaining
spectrum can be auctioned for advanced commercial services, such as
wireless broadband. Some of the billions of dollars generated can then
be used for digital-to-analog converter boxes so that households
relying on over-the-air analog broadcasts can continue to use their
analog televisions.
I urge my colleagues to join me in expressing the Sense of the
Congress that the responsible policy should be to address this issue
comprehensively through regular order, not in a piecemeal fashion on a
bill to implement the 9/11 Commission recommendations. I look forward
next year to working with Ranking Minority Member Dingell, Subcommittee
Chairman Upton, and Subcommittee Ranking Minority Member Markey, along
with all of the Members of the Energy and Commerce Committee, to pass
hard-deadline legislation. I urge my colleagues to vote for this
amendment so that public safety gets its needed spectrum without making
televisions go dark.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, we have no additional speakers, and I
yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Kolbe). The question is on the
amendments en bloc offered by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr.
Hoekstra).
The amendments en bloc were agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. It is now in order to consider amendment
No. 10 printed in House Report 108-751.

Amendment No. 10 Offered by Mr. Foley

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment No. Offered by Mr. Foley:
Page 328, after line 7, insert the following (and amend the
table of contents accordingly)

Subtitle F--Treatment of Aliens Who Commit Acts of Torture,
Extrajudicial Killings, or Other Atrocities Abroad

SEC. 3121. INADMISSIBILITY AND DEPORTABILITY OF ALIENS WHO
HAVE COMMITTED ACTS OF TORTURE OR EXTRAJUDICIAL
KILLINGS ABROAD.

(a) Inadmissibility.--Section 212(a)(3)(E) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(E)) is
amended--
(1) in clause (ii), by striking ``has engaged in conduct
that is defined as genocide for purposes of the International
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide is
inadmissible'' and inserting ``ordered, incited, assisted, or
otherwise participated in conduct outside the United States
that would, if committed in the United States or by a United
States national, be genocide, as defined in section 1091(a)
of title 18, United States Code, is inadmissible'';
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(iii) Commission of acts of torture or extrajudicial
killings.--Any alien who, outside the United States, has
committed, ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise
participated in the commission of--

``(I) any act of torture, as defined in section 2340 of
title 18, United States Code; or
``(II) under color of law of any foreign nation, any
extrajudicial killing, as defined in section 3(a) of the
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (28 U.S.C. 1350 note);

is inadmissible.''; and
(3) in the subparagraph heading, by striking ``Participants
in nazi persecution or genocide'' and inserting
``Participants in nazi persecution, genocide, or the
commission of any act of torture or extrajudicial killing''.
(b) Deportability.--Section 237(a)(4)(D) of such Act (8
U.S.C. 1227(a)(4)(D)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``clause (i) or (ii)'' and inserting
``clause (i), (ii), or (iii)''; and
(2) in the subparagraph heading, by striking ``Assisted in
nazi persecution or engaged in genocide'' and inserting
``Participated in nazi persecution, genocide, or the
commission of any act of torture or extrajudicial killing''.
(c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
shall apply to offenses committed before, on, or after the
date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 3122. INADMISSIBILITY AND DEPORTABILITY OF FOREIGN
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WHO HAVE COMMITTED
PARTICULARLY SEVERE VIOLATIONS OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM.

(a) Ground of Inadmissibility.--Section 212(a)(2)(G) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(G)) is
amended to read as follows:
``(G) Foreign government officials who have committed
particularly severe violations of religious freedom.--Any
alien who, while serving as a foreign government official,
was responsible for or directly carried out, at any time,
particularly severe violations of religious freedom, as
defined in section 3 of the International Religious Freedom
Act of 1998 (22 U.S.C. 6402), is inadmissible.''.
(b) Ground of Deportability.--Section 237(a)(4) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(4)) is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``(E) Participated in the commission of severe violations
of religious freedom.--Any alien described in section
212(a)(2)(G) is deportable.''.

SEC. 3123. WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY.

Section 212(d)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1182(d)(3)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``and 3(E)'' and
inserting ``and clauses (i) and (ii) of paragraph (3)(E)'';
and
(2) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``and 3(E)'' and
inserting ``and clauses (i) and (ii) of paragraph (3)(E)''.

SEC. 3124. BAR TO GOOD MORAL CHARACTER FOR ALIENS WHO HAVE
COMMITTED ACTS OF TORTURE, EXTRAJUDICIAL
KILLINGS, OR SEVERE VIOLATIONS OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM.

Section 101(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1101(f)) is amended--
(1) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (8) and
inserting ``; and''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(9) one who at any time has engaged in conduct described
in section 212(a)(3)(E) (relating to assistance in Nazi
persecution, participation in genocide, or commission of acts
of torture or extrajudicial killings) or 212(a)(2)(G)
(relating to severe violations of religious freedom).''.

SEC. 3125. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL
INVESTIGATIONS.

(a) Amendment of the Immigration and Nationality Act.--
Section 103 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1103) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(h)(1) The Attorney General shall establish within the
Criminal Division of the Department of Justice an Office of
Special Investigations with the authority to detect and
investigate, and, where appropriate, to take legal action to
denaturalize any alien described in section 212(a)(3)(E).
``(2) The Attorney General shall consult with the Secretary
of the Department of Homeland Security in making
determinations concerning the criminal prosecution or
extradition of aliens described in section 212(a)(3)(E).
``(3) In determining the appropriate legal action to take
against an alien described in section 212(a)(3)(E),
consideration shall be given to--
``(A) the availability of criminal prosecution under the
laws of the United States for any conduct that may form the
basis for removal and denaturalization; or
``(B) the availability of extradition of the alien to a
foreign jurisdiction that is prepared to undertake a
prosecution for such conduct.''.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--
(1) In general.--There are authorized to be appropriated to
the Department of Justice such sums as may be necessary to
carry out the additional duties established under section
103(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (as added by
this subtitle) in order to ensure that the Office of Special
Investigations fulfills its continuing obligations regarding
Nazi war criminals.
(2) Availability of funds.--Amounts appropriated pursuant
to paragraph (1) are authorized to remain available until
expended.

SEC. 3126. REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION.

Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this
Act, the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary
of Homeland Security, shall submit to the Committees on the
Judiciary of the Senate and the House of Representatives a
report on implementation of this subtitle that includes a
description of--
(1) the procedures used to refer matters to the Office of
Special Investigations and other components within the
Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security
in a manner consistent with the amendments made by this
subtitle;
(2) the revisions, if any, made to immigration forms to
reflect changes in the Immigration and Nationality Act made
by the amendments contained in this subtitle; and
(3) the procedures developed, with adequate due process
protection, to obtain sufficient evidence to determine
whether an alien may be inadmissible under the terms of the
amendments made by this subtitle.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Foley) and a Member opposed each will
control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Foley).
Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I rise today in support of our amendment, the Foley-Ackerman
amendment to H.R. 10, the Anti-Atrocity Alien Deportation Act that will
help strengthen our Nation's security.
Every year, according to Amnesty International, an estimated 800 to
1,000 war criminals and human rights abusers seek refuge in the United
States.

[[Page H8881]]

Due to loopholes in current law, these criminals could be living in our
States, in our towns, and even in our neighborhoods. There is nothing
in current U.S. law to bar such monsters from the United States or to
legally justify their removal from our country.
This headline, the INS says it cannot deport them. The Justice
Department will not prosecute them. Torturers, death squad leaders, and
human rights criminals who seek refuge in the United States have
nothing to fear except their victims.
Let me be perfectly clear: Torturers are terrorists. Many of us here
today probably think of torturers as domestic terrorists, those just
committing unspeakable crimes in their own Nations, but that cannot be
further from the truth.
Let us look at the facts. North Korea, Iran, Syria, Libya, Cuba,
Sudan, the former regimes in Afghanistan, the Taliban, and Iraq, they
are all State sponsors of terrorism, and all have some of the worst
human rights records in history. They detain people for indefinite
periods of time, commit brutal acts of torture and kill with little
regard for human life. We would be naive to believe that torturers and
terrorists are in many ways not one in the same.
The Anti-Atrocity Alien Deportation amendment, which the gentleman
from New York (Mr. Ackerman) and I have worked on for over 4\1/2\
years, we are offering it today, will give the Federal Government
another weapon in our war on terror. This amendment will, among other
things, make aliens who commit torture or other human rights violations
inadmissible and removable.
This bipartisan and bicameral provision will strengthen H.R. 10 by
adding additional layers to our immigration laws, barring these
criminals with clear ties to terror from even entering our country.
For decades, those who have committed some of the most horrific acts
against humanity have sought sanctuary here with impunity. This
amendment would strip their protection once and for all. We cannot let
these criminals continue to be around our families any longer. They
have committed crimes against their own people. They have committed
crimes against the United States. They have committed crimes against
humanity.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to control the
time in opposition and will be in favor of the legislation.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Without objection, the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Ackerman) is recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
First, I want to say it has been a privilege to work with the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Foley) on a completely nonpartisan basis
for almost half a decade on this particular legislation.
The Foley-Ackerman amendment closes the loophole that currently
allows war criminals who enter the United States to remain in the
United States. This measure enjoys bipartisan support in both the House
and the Senate. A bill sponsored by the chairman and ranking Democrat
on the Senate Judiciary Committee, Orrin Hatch and Patrick Leahy, has
been reported out of the Judiciary Committee in that body.
At this very moment, with our Nation engaged in a conflict in Iraq,
which previously had a regime that committed every kind of grotesque
criminal behavior that our Nation deplores, the U.S. Code provides no,
again, no, assurance that Saddam Hussein's henchmen, Iraqi war
criminals, perpetrators of torture or atrocities from there or other
places could not somehow come into the United States and enjoy the very
benefits that they have so cruelly deprived of others.
It is hard to believe but it is true. Some of Saddam Hussein's most
brutal thugs, if they were able to hide their past and slip past the
INS, they could conceivably apply and receive either U.S. permanent
resident status or even possibly citizenship.
How do we know this? Because war criminals from other conflicts have
been surreptitiously coming to the United States since World War II. We
cannot continue to leave the United States open to monsters who have
committed horrible atrocities against innocent civilians, and we need
to slam that door shut and to shut it tightly. We must also capture
those war criminals who have already entered the United States and show
them the door.
The Foley-Ackerman amendment provides the Justice Department's Office
of Special Investigation, the OSI, with the statutory authority to hunt
down these thugs and criminals and, through the courts, remove them
from our country.
The OSI is currently tasked with finding and expelling Nazi war
criminals seeking to evade the consequences of their unprecedented and
horrific crimes. Since its creation in 1979, this elite team of
prosecutors and investigators has been methodically removing Nazi war
criminals who were able to sneak into the United States. Based on its
terrific past performance, its current readiness, and most critically,
its desire to perform the mission, OSI is the right agency to ensure
that this land remain free from the most vile criminals and violators
of human rights.
Mr. Chairman, the very notion that anyone who has perpetuated
genocide or committed these horrible crimes, these acts of torture,
would be able to get into the United States is shocking enough. The
fact that there is currently no law on the books to find these
criminals and to remove them from our country is even worse. War
criminals should have no safe haven or refuge anywhere, least of all in
this land of liberty, and that is why I am encouraging all of our
colleagues, Mr. Chairman, to vote in support of the Foley-Ackerman
amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Indiana (Mr. Hostettler), the chairman of the Subcommittee on
Immigration, Border Security and Claims.
(Mr. HOSTETTLER asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Foley-
Ackerman amendment to H.R. 10, the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation
Act. This important amendment will close a longstanding gap that has
allowed thousands of aliens who have tortured or otherwise abused the
human rights of untold numbers in their home country to live in the
United States.
They are living here in our country the lives that many of their
victims will never enjoy. As we continue our war on terror, we must do
everything in our power to make sure that our Federal agencies have the
tools they need to ensure our safety.
The Foley-Ackerman amendment will take such a step. This amendment
will keep our country safe by barring admission into the United States
and authorizing the deportation of any foreigner who has committed acts
of torture or other human rights abuses abroad.
These criminals have committed some of the most atrocious acts ever
imagined by mankind. We can no longer be a safe haven for those who
seek to do us harm and have proven this by doing grave harm to others
in the countries they have fled.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to vote for this very important
amendment.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from
Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished
gentleman for the time.
I rise to support this amendment because it spells out that
immigrants who have committed torture or extrajudicial killings abroad
are not eligible to enter the United States, and it changes the
provisions that makes immigrants inadmissible if they have committed
acts of genocide. The amendment also expands an existing bar against
government officials who have committed severe violations of religious
freedom.
I want to thank and commend the two gentlemen, and that is why I
believe it is very important that H.R. 10 is clearly stripped of any
violations of the convention against torture and to make sure that as
we are consistent in

[[Page H8882]]

denying into the United States those who would commit genocide, torture
and other heinous acts, that we accept the responsibility of having the
high moral ground, making sure that no legislation that we pass would
deport any alien to a place where they might be tortured and subjected
to such horrific acts.
This is a very strong amendment. It puts us on the right side of the
column, protecting those who would be subjected to the violence of
those who would be interested in coming to this country, and I support
the gentlemen in this amendment and would ask that we also consider the
elimination of such language in our own H.R. 10. I support this
amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from New York (Mr. Ackerman)
has one-half minute remaining.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have no further speakers, and I yield
our time to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Foley).
Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank my colleague the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Ackerman) and the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Hostettler),
Richard Krieger from my district, who brought this important issue to
our attention who has been diligently tracking and identifying these
criminals.
Let me read a couple of names: Marko Boskic, Bosnia, member of a
group that killed 1,200 Bosnian Muslims in one day; Major General Jean-
Claude Duperval, Haiti, implicated in the massacre at Raboteau, Haiti,
1994; Nikola Vukovic, beat Bosnian Muslims with rifles and metal pipes;
Mohamed Ali Samatar from Somalia, oversaw the killing of more than
50,000 northern Somali Issaks; Abdi Ali Nur from Somalia, assisted in
sham trials and the execution of hundreds of civilians. That is just a
few of them.
I will enter this into the Record at this point so people can see.

TABLE OF INDIVIDUALS ACCUSED OF ATROCITIES
[Arranged by Time of Atrocity Committed]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Name Country Crime Time of atrocities
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thomas Ricardo Anderson Kohatsu.... Peru.................. Implicated in the torture 1997
of Leonor La Rosa and
Mariela Lucy Barreto. La
Rosa was paralyzed,
Barreto was killed.
Marko Boskic....................... Bosnia................ Member of group that killed July 15, 1995
1,200 Bosnian Muslims in
one day.
Major Gen. Jean-Claude Duperval.... Haiti................. Implicated in massacre at 1994
Raboteau, Haiti.
Jean-Marie Vianney Mudahinyuka..... Rwanda................ Part of an elite group that 1994
ordered the killings of
500,000 Tutsis.
Nikola Vukovic..................... Bosnia................ Beat Bosnian Muslims with 1992-1994
rifles and metal pipes.
Carved a religious symbol
into the forehead of one
prisoner.
Emanuel ``Toto'' Constant.......... Haiti................. Created paramilitary 1991-1994
organization that killed
over 3,000 pro-democracy
activists.
Carl Dorelien...................... Haiti................. Oversaw the deaths of 5,000 1991-1994
people.
Zijad Muzic........................ Bosnia................ Ethnic cleansing of Croats 1991-1993
and Bosnian Muslims.
Jackson Joanis..................... Haiti................. Accused of torture and Early 1990s
murder.
Thioun Prasith..................... Cambodia.............. Implicated in the deaths of Late 1970s-1993
thousands of people.
Mohamed Ali Samatar................ Somalia............... Oversaw killing of more 1971-1990
than 50,000 northern
Somali Issaks.
Juan Lopez Grijalba................ Honduras.............. Military chief accused of 1980s
murder and torture of
civilians.
Jaime Ramirez Raudales............. Honduras.............. Charged with political 1980s
murders.
Abdi Ali Nur....................... Somalia............... Assisted in sham trials and Late 1980s
the executions of hundreds
of civilians.
Luis Discua........................ Honduras.............. Killed dozens of leftists 1980s
in Honduras.
Alvaro Rafael Saravia Marino....... Honduras.............. Murdered Salvadoran 1980
archbishop.
Kelbessa Negewo.................... Ethiopia.............. Tortured, beat and raped 1978
Ethiopians.
Armando Fernando Larios............ Chile................. Helped kill Chile's foreign 1976
minister.
Gen. Fernando Vecino Alegret, Vietnam............... Cuban interrogator that 1967
a.k.a. ``Fidel''. tortured American POWs
during Vietnam War.
Helmut Oberlander.................. Ukraine............... Belonged to Nazi death 1941-1943
squad that killed
thousands of Jews.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

General

Iran: Pro-democracy Iranian Students tortured in 1970s.
Iraq: Dissidents against Ba'ath party regime systematically
tortured.
Afghanistan: Taliban.
Sources sorted by name of accused individuals:
1. Kohatsu: ``U.S. Becoming haven for Torturers.'' San
Diego Union Tribune, April 10, 2002.
2. Boskic: Rupert, James. ``Accused killer in Bosnian war
makes a life in U.S.'' New York Newsday, Sep. 13, 2004.
3. Duperval: Daniel, Trenton and Susannah A. Nesmith.
``Abusers back in the streets; Some of Haiti's most notorious
human rights abusers walk the streets openly now.'' The Miami
Herald. March 15, 2004.
4. Mudahinyuka: Korecki, Natasha. ``More charges for Rwanda
suspect.'' Chicago Sun-Times. May 15, 2004.
5.Vukovic: Dart, Bob. ``U.S. is a haven for foreign war
criminals.'' Austin American Statesman. April 11, 2002.
6. Constant: ``Torture suspects find haven in U.S.'' Miami
Herald. Aug. 1, 2001.
7. Dorelien: Wilber, Del Quentin. ``Rights abusers can find
haven.'' Baltimore Sun. Aug. 28, 2000.
8. Muzic: Fainaru, Steve. ``Suspect in `cleansing' by Serbs
living in Vt.'' The Boston Globe. May 3, 1999.
9. Joanis: Benjamin, Jody A. ``Haitian enforcer makes bid
to stay put.'' Ft. Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel. June. 22, 2001.
10. Prasith: Fifield, Adam. ``Apologist in suburbia.'' The
Village Voice. May 5, 1998.
11. Samatar: Ragavan, Chitra. ``A safe haven, but for
whom?'' U.S. News and World Report. Nov. 15, 1999.
12. Grijalba: ``Foley introduces bill to stop influx of
criminals here.'' Sun-Herald.com. April 4, 2003. http://
www.sun-herald.com.
13. Raudales: Valbrun, Marjorie. ``U.S. to pursue torturers
who flee here--Move seeks to address `nexus' between human-
rights abusers and national-security risks.'' The Wall Street
Journal. May 8, 2003.
14. Abdi Ali Nur: Ragavan, Chitra. ``A safe haven, but
whom?'' U.S. News and World Report. Nov. 15, 1999.
15. Discua: ``Foley introduces bill to stop influx of
criminals here.'' Sun-Herald.com. April 4, 2003. http://
www.sun-herald.com
16. Marino: Charvy, Alfonso and Elizabeth Donovan.
``Torture suspects find haven.'' The Miami Herald. July 22,
2001.
17. Negewo: Dart, Bob. ``U.S. is a haven for torturers,
report says; many settle here illegally.'' The Atlanta-
Journal Constitution. April 11, 2002.
18. Larios: Valbrun, Marjorie. ``U.S. to pursue torturers
who flee here--Move seeks to address `nexus' between human-
rights abusers and national-security risks.'' The Wall Street
Journal. May 8, 2003.
19. Alegret a.k.a. ``FIDEL'': Alfonso, Pablo and Sonji
Jacobs. ``Ex-POW identifies Cuban dignitary as his chief
tormentor.'' The Miami Herald. Sep. 9, 1999.
20. Oberlander: Staletovitch, Jenny. ``New law would send
modern war criminals packing.'' The Palm Beach Post. Jan. 18,
2000.

These are articles from papers about criminals living in the United
States.
I urge my colleagues to vote for this very important national
security measure. I thank my legislative counsel and legal director,
Bradley Schreiber, and my staff for working so diligently.
As I mentioned, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Ackerman) and I have
been doing this now for 4\1/2\ plus years. It has finally come to
fruition. We thank our colleagues. We urge adoption of the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by
the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Foley).
The amendment was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. It is now in order to consider amendment
No. 11 printed in House Report 108-751.

Amendment No. 11 Offered by Mr. Goodlatte

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment No. 11 offered by Mr. Goodlatte:
Page 235, after line 21, insert the following:

Subtitle J--Pretrial Detention and Postrelease Supervision of
Terrorists

SEC. 2221. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the ``Pretrial Detention and
Lifetime Supervision of Terrorists Act of 2004''.

SEC. 2222. PRESUMPTION FOR PRETRIAL DETENTION IN CASES
INVOLVING TERRORISM.

Section 3142 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (e)--
(A) by inserting ``or'' before ``the Maritime''; and
(B) by inserting after ``or 2332b of title 18 of the United
States Code'' the following: ``, or

[[Page H8883]]

an offense listed in section 2332b(g)(5)(B) of title 18 of
the United States Code, if the Attorney General certifies
that the offense appears by its nature or context to be
intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion, or to affect the conduct of a government by mass
destruction, assassination, or kidnaping, or an offense
involved in or related to domestic or international terrorism
as defined in section 2331 of title 18 of the United States
Code''; and
(2) in subsections (f)(1)(A) and (g)(1), by inserting after
``violence'' the following: ``, or an offense listed in
section 2332b(g)(5)(B) of title 18 of the United States Code,
if the Attorney General certifies that the offense appears by
its nature or context to be intended to intimidate or coerce
a civilian population, to influence the policy of a
government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the
conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination,
or kidnaping, or an offense involved in or related to
domestic or international terrorism as defined in section
2331 of title 18 of the United States Code''.

SEC. 2223. POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION OF TERRORISTS.

Section 3583(j) of title 18, United States Code, is amended
in subsection (j), by striking ``, the commission'' and all
that follows through ``person,''.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte) and a Member opposed each will
control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte).

{time} 1030

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, this amendment would simply create a rebuttable
presumption that no amount of bail or other conditions would assure the
appearance in court of a defendant when he is charged with a terrorist
offense and there is probable cause that the defendant committed
certain terrorist acts. This bill simply creates a rebuttable
presumption which can be overcome by evidence that the defendant would
appear in court.
This presumption that a defendant would not show up in court already
applies to those who are charged with major drug crimes and certain
violent crimes. If it is good enough for drug dealers and violent
criminals, it should be good enough for terrorists. It is simply too
risky to trust terrorists who have been charged with terrorist offenses
to return to court to be tried. We should not allow these criminals to
roam free in our streets while they await trial.
In addition, this bill would help prevent further terrorist attacks
by giving judges the discretion to impose a term of supervised relief
up to life for terrorists who have been convicted of terrorist
offenses. Currently, the law provides that only those who committed
terrorist offenses which either resulted in or created a foreseeable
risk of death could be supervised for a term of years up to life after
being released. This bill would make clear that post-trial supervision
is available for all victim terrorists, not just those whose terrorist
acts happen to result in death.
This amendment only authorizes a court to impose the supervised
relief of a terrorist. It does not mandate any particular term of
supervised relief for any particular criminal, nor does it mandate that
any supervised release be imposed at all. It leaves that decision up to
the courts based on the facts and circumstances of each individual
case.
In addition, current law already gives courts the authority to modify
or end the period of supervised release if the court determines that
the criminal's conduct and circumstances so warrant. This safeguard is
not changed by this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, this amendment makes simple changes to current Federal
criminal law to ensure that those who have committed terrorist acts
will not attempt to harm our citizens again. I urge my colleagues to
support this important amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I rise to claim the time in
opposition for the minority, and I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, this amendment adds to the list of crimes for which the
presumption of detention occurs. It is an extraneous PATRIOT Act II
provision not sought by the 9/11 Commission. This puts the defendant in
a position where he has to prove the unprovable.
The Department of Justice has a bad record of detaining people who
should not be detained. Brendon Mayfield, a lawyer in Seattle, was
detained as a material witness in the Madrid train bombing. The
Department of Justice was subsequently forced to admit that they had
the wrong person, in that Mr. Mayfield had nothing to do with the
crime, notwithstanding the fact that he had been held on one of these
presumptions of detention.
I would hope we would consider this when we consider PATRIOT Act II.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 15 seconds to say to the
gentleman from Virginia that this is freestanding legislation which I
have introduced. It has nothing to do with the so-called PATRIOT Act II
the gentleman refers to. It is a good measure.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin
(Mr. Green).
Mr. GREEN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for
yielding me this time, and I rise in strong support of this amendment.
This amendment would enhance public safety by denying pretrial release
to individuals accused of committing a terrorism offense. It would also
provide that any individual convicted of a terrorism offense could be
sentenced to supervised release for any term of years up to life.
Defendants in Federal cases who are accused of certain crimes are
presumptively denied pretrial release. For these crimes there is a
rebuttable presumption that no condition or combination of conditions
will reasonably assure the appearance of that person as required for
the safety of the community.
The list of crimes currently includes drug offenses, carrying maximum
prison sentences of 10 years or more, but does not include most
terrorism offenses. Thus, persons accused of many drug offenses are
presumptively to be detained before trial, but no comparable
presumption exists for people accused of most terrorist crimes. This
makes no sense.
The continuing danger posed to national security by those who
materially support terrorism, who are the vital links in the chain of
any terrorist act, may be no less than that posed by the direct
perpetrators, the triggermen, of terrorist violence. And the court
should be afforded the same degree of discretion in prescribing post-
release supervision in all these cases as well.
The standard for every one of these amendments is whether or not this
language enhances the safety and security of this country. Clearly,
this amendment is a step in the right direction. It gives our courts
some of the same tools they have in drug cases. I urge my colleagues to
support this amendment.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as she may
consume to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), the ranking
member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise to discuss three subjects, the first
of which is this amendment. Although I listened carefully to the
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte). I think many of the points he
makes are valid, and I agree with him that we should not be coddling
terrorists, but I think this amendment is ill timed and needs further
consideration by this House.
The gentleman has said that he is not participating in an effort to
expand the PATRIOT Act, but these ideas have been circulated in a
package called PATRIOT Act II. My view of the PATRIOT Act, which I
supported, is that next year is the right time to consider how to
expand or contract it.
I am a cosponsor of the SAFE Act, which would delete some provisions
of the PATRIOT Act that are egregious, but I have an open mind in
looking at some features of the PATRIOT Act which might be fine-tuned
to work more effectively. So for that reason, I oppose this amendment.
I also will oppose the Hostettler amendment, which will be offered in
a few minutes. I think it replaces the worst features of H.R. 10 with
some other bad features. Certainly, the outsourcing of terrorists, as
some of us have called it, which some Members of the majority including
the gentleman

[[Page H8884]]

from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), agree would violate U.S. law and the
International Convention on Torture, is a terrible idea.
But there are other features of the Hostettler amendment that make
asylum much harder to get, and in ways that have nothing whatsoever to
do with finding and prosecuting terrorists, punish innocent immigrants.
That is not the purpose of the debate today.
Finally, I want to comment on the en bloc amendment which was just
offered and agreed to. I think it is a very good amendment, and the
features of it I want to talk about are the Barton amendment, and the
Fossella amendment, both of which have to do with interoperable
communications.
We have done almost nothing since
9/11 effectively to deal with the failure to have communications
equipment and adequate bandwidth with which to communicate, which was a
major problem in New York and a major problem at the Pentagon. This
administration is not even funding initiatives in this fiscal year for
interoperable communications, claiming there is enough money in the
pipeline.
The right answer is to free up some dedicated bandwidth for emergency
communications. There is a pending bill called the HERO Act, introduced
by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) and me, which has been
sadly withering on the vine for a year and a half, opposed by the
broadcasters. These two amendments will help with multiyear funding,
which we need for ports as well as interoperable communications, and
will help convey the sense of the Congress that makes it clear we have
to free up this bandwidth so that our first responders have the tools
that they need.
So as we proceed this morning, Mr. Chairman, I hope we are all paying
close attention to amendments. Some are good, some are less good. I
would like to say to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte),
however, that I think he is an extremely careful legislator and a very
good lawyer, and I hope that next year we can work together to craft
PATRIOT Act amendments both to eliminate provisions that do not work
and to enhance provisions that do work that will keep America safe,
find the bad guys, and protect our civil liberties and our
constitution.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time,
and I say to the gentlewoman that I appreciate her comments, but I
would also point out that we are engaged in the midst of a war against
terror right now and a lot is going to happen in the next year,
including the apprehension of people who, under appropriate
circumstances meet this standard, and we should have the opportunity
for the court, and this is a decision by the judge, not something that
is a mandatory decision, but the judge should have the discretion to
allow that the individual be held pending trial without bond.
Secondly, there will be people who have been convicted of terrorist
acts potentially released during that period of time, and if the court
finds it appropriate to authorize lifetime supervision, we ought to get
that supervision started now to keep track of people who have engaged
in terrorist acts and give the court the authority to undertake that
now, without waiting an additional year and expose our country to
greater risks that will occur during that time.
So I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Kolbe). The question is on the
amendment offered by the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte).
The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The CHAIRMAN pro temore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Virginia
(Mr. Goodlatte) will be postponed.
It is now in order to consider amendment No. 12 printed in House
Report 108-751.

Amendment No. 12 Offered by Mr. Green of Wisconsin

Mr. GREEN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment No. 12 offered by Mr. Green of Wisconsin:
Page 252, line 18, strike ``DEPORTATION'' and insert
``REMOVAL'' (and amend the table of contents accordingly).
Page 258, after line 5, insert the following (and amend the
table of contents accordingly):

SEC. 3034. INADMISSIBILITY DUE TO TERRORIST AND TERRORIST-
RELATED ACTIVITIES.

(a) In General.--Section 212(a)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)) is amended to
read as follows:
``(i) In general.--Any alien who--

``(I) has engaged in a terrorist activity;
``(II) a consular officer, the Attorney General, or the
Secretary of Homeland Security knows, or has reasonable
ground to believe, is engaged in or is likely to engage after
entry in any terrorist activity (as defined in clause (iv));
``(III) has, under circumstances indicating an intention to
cause death or serious bodily harm, incited terrorist
activity;
``(IV) is a representative (as defined in clause (v)) of--

``(aa) a terrorist organization; or
``(bb) a political, social, or other group that endorses or
espouses terrorist activity;

``(V) is a member of a terrorist organization described in
subclause (I) or (II) of clause (vi);
``(VI) is a member of a terrorist organization described in
clause (vi)(III), unless the alien can demonstrate by clear
and convincing evidence that the alien did not know, and
should not reasonably have known, that the organization was a
terrorist organization;
``(VII) endorses or espouses terrorist activity or
persuades others to endorse or espouse terrorist activity or
support a terrorist organization;
``(VIII) has received military-type training (as defined in
section 2339D(c)(1) of title 18, United States Code) from or
on behalf of any organization that, at the time the training
was received, was a terrorist organization under section
212(a)(3)(B)(vi); or
``(IX) is the spouse or child of an alien who is
inadmissible under this subparagraph, if the activity causing
the alien to be found inadmissible occurred within the last 5
years,

is inadmissible. An alien who is an officer, official,
representative, or spokesman of the Palestine Liberation
Organization is considered, for purposes of this Act, to be
engaged in a terrorist activity.''.
(b) Engage in Terrorist Activity Defined.--Section
212(a)(3)(B)(iv) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)) is amended to read as follows:
``(iv) Engage in terrorist activity defined.--As used in
this subparagraph, the term `engage in terrorist activity'
means, in an individual capacity or as a member of an
organization--

``(I) to commit or to incite to commit, under circumstances
indicating an intention to cause death or serious bodily
injury, a terrorist activity;
``(II) to prepare or plan a terrorist activity;
``(III) to gather information on potential targets for
terrorist activity;
``(IV) to solicit funds or other things of value for--

``(aa) a terrorist activity;
``(bb) a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(I)
or (vi)(II); or
``(cc) a terrorist organization described in clause
(vi)(III), unless the solicitor can demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that he did not know, and should not
reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist
organization;

``(V) to solicit any individual--

``(aa) to engage in conduct otherwise described in this
clause;
``(bb) for membership in a terrorist organization described
in clause (vi)(I) or (vi)(II); or
``(cc) for membership in a terrorist organization described
in clause (vi)(III), unless the solicitor can demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence that he did not know, and
should not reasonably have known, that the organization was a
terrorist organization; or

``(VI) to commit an act that the actor knows, or reasonably
should know, affords material support, including a safe
house, transportation, communications, funds, transfer of
funds or other material financial benefit, false
documentation or identification, weapons (including chemical,
biological, or radiological weapons), explosives, or
training--

``(aa) for the commission of a terrorist activity;
``(bb) to any individual who the actor knows, or reasonably
should know, has committed or plans to commit a terrorist
activity;
``(cc) to a terrorist organization described in subclause
(I) or (II) of clause (vi); or
``(dd) to a terrorist organization described in clause
(vi)(III), unless the actor can demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that the actor did not know, and should
not reasonably have known, that the organization was a
terrorist organization.''.
(c) Terrorist Organization Defined.--Section
212(a)(3)(B)(vi) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)) is amended to read as follows:
``(vi) Terrorist organization defined.--As used in this
section, the term `terrorist organization' means an
organization--

``(I) designated under section 219;

[[Page H8885]]

``(II) otherwise designated, upon publication in the
Federal Register, by the Secretary of State in consultation
with or upon the request of the Attorney General or the
Secretary of Homeland Security, as a terrorist organization,
after finding that the organization engages in the activities
described in subclauses (I) through (VI) of clause (iv); or
``(III) that is a group of two or more individuals, whether
organized or not, which engages in, or has a subgroup which
engages in, the activities described in subclauses (I)
through (VI) of clause (iv).''.

(d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act
and shall apply to--
(1) removal proceedings instituted before, on, or after the
date of the enactment of this Act; and
(2) acts and conditions constituting a ground for
inadmissibility occurring or existing before, on, or after
such date.

SEC. 3035. DEPORTABILITY OF TERRORISTS.

(a) In General.--Section 237(a)(4)(B) (8 U.S.C.
1227(a)(4)(B)) is amended to read as follows:
``(B) Terrorist activities.--Any alien who would be
considered inadmissible pursuant to subparagraph (B) or (F)
of section 212(a)(3) is deportable.''.
(b) Deportation of Aliens Who Have Received Military-Type
Training From Terrorist Organizations.--Section 237(a)(4) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(4)) is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``(E) Recipient of military-type training.--Any alien who
has received military-type training (as defined in section
2339D(c)(1) of title 18, United States Code) from or on
behalf of any organization that, at the time the training was
received, was a terrorist organization, as defined in section
212(a)(3)(B)(vi), is deportable.''.
(c) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a)
shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act
and shall apply to acts and conditions constituting a ground
for removal occurring or existing before, on, or after such
date.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the
gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Green) and a Member opposed each will
control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Green).
(Mr. GREEN of Wisconsin asked and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. GREEN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
Mr. Chairman, my time is limited, so I will focus on just two aspects
of this amendment that come largely from my own legislation, H.R. 4942.
First, this amendment recognizes that our enemy is not merely the
terrorist who pulls the trigger or places the bomb or drives that rig
truck, it is also those who through their material support make the
violent act possible. They provide the training, they provide the
shelter, the ID documents, the resources, the intelligence, the many
dirty acts that help the chain of destruction. If we can break these
links in the terrorist chain, then the chain will fall apart.
The second thing these provisions do is common sense. It makes
material support of terrorism, especially those who participate in
military-style training, grounds for being inadmissible into this
country and grounds for deportation.
We are a welcoming country. I am the proud son of immigrants. But we
cannot allow our welcoming arms to be a tool for terrorists who seek
our downfall.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise to seek the time in
opposition, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, no one is opposed to identifying and denying admission
to terrorists, and no one is opposed to deporting terrorists who are
found in the United States. However, we should not exclude or deport
someone as a terrorist who is an innocent person. This amendment would
make that possibility more likely by expanding the already overly broad
provisions for excluding and deporting individuals on terrorism
grounds.
The terrorist removal provisions presently in the Immigration
Nationality Act specify that terrorist organizations must be designated
by the Secretary of the Department of State. This amendment would
eliminate that requirement. This would greatly increase the possibility
that people will be excluded or deported on the basis of involvement
with an organization that has incorrectly been called a terrorist
organization.

{time} 1045

Moreover, I would be surprised if someone removed on that basis would
ever be allowed to return to the United States.
Under current law, involvement with a terrorist organization is not a
ground for removal unless that person knew or should have known that it
was a terrorist organization. We have seen this occur time and time
again, particularly after passage of the PATRIOT Act and, as well, as
it is related to many in the Muslim community. I believe that more
consideration needs to be given to these very important issues.
I ask my colleagues to vote against this amendment.
Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Mr. Chairman, no one is opposed to denying admission
to terrorists, and no one is opposed to deporting terrorists who are
found in the United States. However, we should not exclude or deport
someone as a terrorist who is an innocent person. This amendment would
make that possibility more likely by expanding the already overbroad
provisions for excluding and deporting individuals on terrorism
grounds.
The terrorist removal provisions presently in the Immigration and
Nationality Act specify that terrorist organizations must be designated
by the Secretary of the Department of State. This amendment would
eliminate that requirement. This would greatly increase the possibility
that people will be excluded or deported on the basis of involvement
with an organization that has incorrectly been called a ``terrorist
organization.'' Moreover, I would be surprised if someone removed on
that basis would ever be allowed to return to the United States.
Under current law, involvement with a terrorist organization is not a
ground for removal unless the person knew or should have known that it
was a terrorist organization. The amendment would require the alien to
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he did not know, and
should not reasonably have known that it was a terrorist organization.
This would create a higher standard that would be much more difficult
to prove. In fact, I am not sure that it is possible to establish the
negative proposition that you did not know something.
Finally, the changes that this amendment would make would apply
retroactively, which would increase the likelihood of ensnaring
innocent people. I urge you to vote against this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GREEN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the
gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner), the distinguished
chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary who has produced so many of
the important provisions of this legislation.
Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.
Mr. Chairman, I am puzzled why anybody would oppose this amendment.
The amendment simply states that if you cannot be admitted to the
United States because you are affiliated with a terrorist organization,
then you can be deported if you get in through one way or another. We
have a big problem with illegal aliens crossing both the northern and
the southern border. If you do not go through the passport check and
enter the United States illegally and you could not enter the United
States legally because you were a part of a terrorist organization,
then if this amendment goes down, you cannot kick them out. So it seems
to me that if you cannot get in and it is illegal for you to get in and
you do get in, anyhow, illegally, or by fooling an immigration
inspector, then the government ought to have the power to be able to
deport these people.
The amendment is as simple as that, meaning if they do get in when
they should not, they should be able to be removed and sent out of the
country and make America safer.
I urge support of the amendment.
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
Let me just say that the important part of this is that the amendment
would require the alien to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence
that he did not know and should not reasonably have known that it was a
terrorist organization. This is a higher standard and would be much
more difficult to prove. And might I say we are adding this to a bill
that frankly the White House has indicated that it strongly opposes any
overbroad expansion of expedited removal. This is clearly in that
ballpark.

[[Page H8886]]

The administration has concerns with the overbroad alien
identification standards proposed by the bill and unrelated to security
concerns. All of these amendments that we will be talking about, we
have a clear statement by the White House that they oppose. But also my
understanding is that the chairman of the full Committee on the
Judiciary has indicated that he would not stand for the expansion of
section 411 of the PATRIOT Act. In fact, the chairman said that it will
be done ``over my dead body.'' This is what we are doing here right
now. Even if we do so, we need to do so with far more detailed review
and judicial committee hearings and the understanding of the imbalance
between civil liberties and respect for the judicial system and the
right of someone to go into the courts and prove otherwise than what we
are doing here under H.R. 10 which is supposed to be, as the 9/11
Commission has said, the overhaul of the U.S. intelligence agencies.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GREEN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Hostettler), chairman of the Subcommittee
on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims.
(Mr. HOSTETTLER asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this
amendment and commend my colleague from Wisconsin for his work on this
issue. Currently, terrorists and their supporters can be kept out of
the United States, but as soon as they set foot in the U.S. on tourist
visas, for example, we cannot deport them for many of the very same
offenses. This hinders our ability to protect Americans from those
alien terrorists who have infiltrated the United States. This amendment
makes aliens deportable for terrorist-related offenses to the same
extent that they would not be admitted in the first place to the United
States.
Another deficiency in current law is based on a flawed understanding
of how terrorist organizations operate. The Immigration and Nationality
Act now reads that if an alien provides funding or other material
support to a terrorist organization, the alien can escape deportation
if he can show that he did not know that the funds or support would
further the organization's terrorist activity. That is, his donation
did not immediately go to buying explosives. This notion is based on a
fundamental misunderstanding of how terrorist organizations operate.
As Kenneth McKune, former associate coordinator for counterterrorism
at the State Department explained, ``Given the purposes, organizational
structure and clandestine nature of foreign terrorist organizations, it
is highly likely that any material support to these organizations will
ultimately inure to the benefit of their criminal, terrorist functions,
regardless of whether such support was ostensibly intended to support
nonviolent, nonterrorist activities.''
Money given to terrorist organizations is fungible. Senator Dianne
Feinstein has rightly stated that, ``I simply do not accept that so-
called humanitarian works by terrorist groups can be kept separate from
their other operations.''
I urge my colleagues to support the amendment.
Mr. GREEN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I think what is interesting to listen to today are the
arguments on the other side. Where they cannot win on the merits, they
choose to throw up a smoke screen of process, no matter how far off
point it may be. This amendment stands for a very simple proposition,
those who materially support terrorists, who make the terrorist act
possible by providing training, intelligence, logistics,
transportation, those who materially support terrorism should not be
here. They should not be allowed in this country; and if they are in
this country, they should be deported. We must have this tool. If we
are truly going to make this country safe, if we are truly going to
disrupt terrorism before the trigger is pulled or the bomb is set,
before lives are lost, we must have these tools.
Those who support terrorism intellectually through their training
support and harboring terrorists, those who operate and move in the
shadows of the terrorist operation, they do not belong here. They are
every bit as dangerous as the one who would pull the trigger. I urge my
colleagues to support this amendment. I think it is a vitally important
tool in our overall effort in homeland security.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Kolbe). The gentlewoman from Texas (Ms.
Jackson-Lee) is recognized to close for 2 minutes.
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
We do not want terrorists in this country and we certainly want to be
able to identify the terrorists as everyone might expect we would want
to do. This amendment is particularly overbroad, has an ability to wrap
up innocent individuals, and it goes against what the administration
has said. The administration strongly opposes the overbroad expansion
of expedited removal authority.
Might I remind my colleagues of the unfortunate circumstances, though
they are someone different, of Cat Stevens, Yusuf Islam, who came here
with all innocent purposes. In fact, his last years of work have been
in charitable work. Look what we tried to do with him. So many of our
constituents in the United States have Muslim names and are affiliated
with organizations who have good intentions but may be misconceived and
therefore they are wrapped up in this expedited removal.
This is something that needs to be done in a separate, bipartisan
manner, which is to have hearings, to get testimony, to understand the
depth of the need and how to craft something that works. Our own
chairman has indicated that we cannot by extension extend the PATRIOT
Act without considerable thought and I believe it is important when we
are defending our Nation to have considerable thought.
I would ask my colleagues to deny this amendment, to reject it, and I
ask us to focus on restoring the sense of integrity to our intelligence
system as the 9/11 Commission report argues for and the Maloney-Shays
bill argues for.
I ask for a ``no'' vote on this particular amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by
the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Green).
The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. GREEN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Wisconsin
(Mr. Green) will be postponed.
It is now in order to consider amendment No. 13 printed in House
Report 108-751.

Amendment No. 13 Offered by Mr. Hostettler

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment No. 13 offered by Mr. Hostettler:
Page 243, beginning on line 12, strike ``and the officer
determines that the alien has been physically present in the
United States for less than 1 year''.
Page 244, beginning on line 7, strike ``if the officer
determines that the alien has been physically present in the
United States for less than 1 year''.
Page 245, line 5, strike ``the central motive'' and insert
``a central reason''.
Page 254, strike line 6 and all that follows through line
24 on page 255 and insert the following:

SEC. 3032. DETENTION OF ALIENS BARRED FROM RESTRICTION ON
REMOVAL PENDING REMOVAL.

(a) In General.--Section 241 of Immigration and Nationality
Act (8 U.S.C. 1231) is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``(j) Detention of Aliens Barred From Restriction on
Removal Pending Removal.--
``(1) In general.--In order to protect the United States
from those aliens who would threaten the national security or
endanger the lives and safety of the American people, the
Secretary of Homeland Security may, in the Secretary's
unreviewable discretion, determine that any alien who has
been ordered removed from the United States and who is

[[Page H8887]]

described in subsection (b)(3)(B) is a specially dangerous
alien and should be detained until removed. This
determination shall be reviewed every six months until the
alien is removed. In making this determination, the Secretary
shall consider the length of sentence and severity of the
offense, the loss and injury to the victim, and the future
risk the alien poses to the community.
``(2) Aliens granted protection restricting removal.--Any
alien described in paragraph (1) who has been ordered
removed, and who has been granted any other protection under
the immigration law, as defined in section 101(a)(17),
restricting the alien's removal, shall be detained. The
Secretary of State shall seek diplomatic assurances that such
alien shall be protected if removed from the United
States.''.
(b) Severability.--If any amendment, or part of any
amendment, made by subsection (a), or the application of any
amendment or part of any amendment to any person or
circumstance, is held to be unconstitutional--
(1) the Secretary of Homeland Security shall continue to
seek the removal of any alien described in section 241(j)(1)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by this
Act, consistent with any protection described in section
241(j)(2) of such Act; and
(2) the Secretary of State shall continue to seek
diplomatic assurances that any alien described in section
241(j)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended
by this Act, would be protected upon removal.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Hostettler) and the gentleman from
California (Mr. Berman) each will control 5 minutes.
Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to extend the
debate on this amendment to 20 minutes, equally divided.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Indiana?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Hostettler)
and the gentleman from California (Mr. Berman) each will control 10
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Hostettler).
Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. It is supported by
leadership, including Chairman Henry Hyde, and will protect the
American people from dangerous aliens while continuing our Nation's
proud history of providing refuge to the innocent oppressed. This
amendment will protect the American people in the same way as section
3032, which it replaces, would have. Section 3032 would have barred
aliens who posed a threat to the American public from seeking our
country's protection.
The courts have created a need to defend the American public against
such aliens. You see, the decisions of a few judges have turned what
was a clear congressional mandate authorizing the detention of
dangerous aliens who are facing removal into a confused and unworkable
mess. Congress has authorized the Attorney General to detain all aliens
who pose a risk to the community, including aliens granted protection
under the Convention Against Torture, until they can be removed from
the United States. The Supreme Court has read this provision, however,
to find that any alien who has been ordered deported but who cannot be
removed must be released, no matter how grave a danger the alien poses,
unless some ``special circumstance'' makes the alien especially
dangerous.
Congress' clear standard has eroded to the point that the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals ordered Department of Homeland Security
authorities to release a dangerously insane alien who had accumulated
convictions for assault, harassment and rape. Why? Because the Supreme
Court had released a killer in the same circumstances, and the alien in
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' case had not actually killed
anyone. Under such logic, DHS cannot protect the public against an
alien who has been granted torture convention protection and who
therefore cannot be removed from the United States unless the alien has
done something more serious than killing another person.
This amendment will address the goals of section 3032 by giving the
Secretary of Homeland Security the tools to keep dangerous aliens
granted protection under the torture convention out of our communities,
off of our streets, and away from our children. It will authorize the
Secretary, in his unreviewable discretion, to detain aliens granted
such protection who pose a risk to the American people. In addition,
this amendment will continue our Nation's tradition of providing aliens
the opportunity to request asylum and torture convention relief while
at the same time ensuring that our country's generosity is not abused.
It would also amend section 3007 to reinforce the current burdens
governing asylum, with one exception. Aliens who claim that they need
asylum because they have been accused in connection with terrorist,
militant or guerilla activity must show that race, religion, membership
in a particular social group, nationality or political opinion is a
central reason for any claimed persecution. This amendment will protect
innocent aliens who come to our shores fleeing thugs and dictators,
while undoing an inappropriate burden imposed on our government by,
once again, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Contrary to law and logic, the Ninth Circuit has required the
government to prove that aliens claiming persecution because they have
been tied to terrorism are not eligible for asylum, instead of
requiring the aliens seeking protection to show that they are. My
subcommittee has discovered that Hesham Hedayet, who killed two
innocent bystanders at LAX on July 4, 2002, had tried to exploit this
loophole.
I must underscore again, however, the most important effect of this
amendment which is to give the Secretary of Homeland Security the
discretion to detain aliens who would pose a risk to the American
people if released.
I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 3 minutes.
Mr. Chairman, we are about to embark on the debate on three
amendments dealing with three provisions of this bill that are very
important and I think the House should try to understand the context,
so I would like to use this initial time just to sort of set the table.
The majority in putting forth this bill on the floor used
intelligence reform and the compelling and legitimate concern about
terrorism to insert three obnoxious, overbroad and overreaching
provisions that flagrantly violate our convention against torture,
which the United States has signed and ratified, and threaten to send
people who are likely to be tortured back to their countries that will
torture them; to engage in a process that allows a massive deportation
of people, having nothing to do with terrorism, who are in this country
for less than 5 years, through expedited removal, in a fashion that
will not allow them a hearing, this is section 3006, that will not
allow them a hearing, that will not allow them to contact their
families, that will require them to establish they are either here
legally or have been here for more than 5 years by the documents on
their person, and, if not, to be detained and immediately removed from
this country, in total and in flagrant violation of existing processes,
taking a legitimate idea of expedited removal at our points of entry
and in establishing it to the country in its entirety throughout its
interior and to anyone who is here less than 5 years.

{time} 1100

Then, finally, in section 307 to massively alter the procedures and
tests for getting asylum in such a way as to fundamentally depart from
this country's tradition as a haven for refugees and people fleeing
because of a well-founded fear of persecution, based on their politics,
their gender, their religion, their ethnicity. These are horrible
provisions. They have nothing to do with terrorism.
Now we have an amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana after
the White House counsel wrote the toughest letter we have seen saying
the notion that America is going to send somebody back to a country
where they are likely to be tortured is unconscionable, we do not
support it, we do not ask for this provision. He offers an amendment,
which is a smokescreen, a total smokescreen, that tries to pretend that
we are getting out of this problem by making amendments to three
sections, notwithstanding the fact that if his amendment were to pass
and the Smith amendments that follow his amendment to strike sections
306 and 307 were to lose, every one of these problems would still
exist.

[[Page H8888]]

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Missouri (Mr. Blunt), majority whip.
Mr. BLUNT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Indiana for
yielding me this time.
Because of the strange conflict in current law, terrorists and
criminals who are not citizens of our country but for some reason get
here are, in fact, being released into our society. There are three
amendments, as the gentleman from California (Mr. Berman) pointed out.
I think it is better to debate them one at a time. That is why we do
that. We are going to vote on them one at a time.
This amendment is an important amendment because it deals with that
specific problem. I cannot believe anyone in this House would want
violent criminals from other countries who somehow get here to be able
to be released in our country. This amendment allows that those
criminals would be detained.
There is a great example of a Jordanian who was convicted in Jordan
of conspiracy to bomb a Jordanian school for American children. He is
convicted of a conspiracy where his goal, his target, was to kill
American children. He somehow got to this country.
Under the current interpretation of the courts, we cannot send him
back to Jordan because he might be tortured, but we also cannot detain
him. So in that interpretation this person is likely to be set free in
some community in the United States, a person who is conspiring to kill
American children in Jordan. So we would put him in a community of the
United States that is full of American children, nobody but American
children, to kill in that community? That cannot be allowed.
What the gentleman from Indiana's (Mr. Hostettler) amendment does is
address the concern that we all would have about sending anybody into a
place where they would be punished in a way that we would think was not
appropriate.
I have got to tell my colleagues the appropriateness to this body and
anywhere else and even as we would talk personally of a punishment for
some whose target was to kill American children, it is hard to imagine
how that punishment could be too difficult, but that is not what we are
about in this society. So this amendment would allow that person to be
detained.
If one catches a rattlesnake on one's farm, they do not look at it
and say, this is definitely a rattlesnake, let us go up and release it
in the front yard. What this amendment does is say, if they catch that
rattlesnake and they say we are going to be able detain this
rattlesnake, even though he did not commit his crime in the United
States. We are not going to let this criminal who was, in this case,
targeting American children, in other cases might be a murderer, in
other cases might be a rapist, in other cases might be a pedophile, we
are not going to let this person go and release him in our community
simply because we have no place to send him back to and he did not
commit the crimes that there was an agreement that he committed in the
United States.
This is a good amendment. It improves this bill. But the underlying
bill was designed to deal with the concern that we could not find an
adequate way to deal with until the gentleman from Indiana (Mr.
Hostettler) worked hard to come up with this amendment.
I urge support for this amendment. We are debating these and voting
on them one at a time. I urge that this amendment be adopted.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield for the purpose of making a
unanimous consent request to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers)
(Mr. CONYERS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I reluctantly rise to tell the gentleman
from Indiana (Mr. Hostettler) of the Committee on the Judiciary that
this breaks our deadlock, but it simply does not go far enough; and I
am hoping that he will carefully consider the arguments being made by
his colleagues, particularly on the Committee on the Judiciary, to see
why it is that we think that even the Hostettler amendment can be
approved.
I rise in strong opposition to this amendment. the Hostettler
Amendment allows for some of the broadest and most damaging immigration
changes we will have passed in several decades, and will decimate legal
protections in our laws of expedited removal, asylum, and extraordinary
rendition and torture.
Expedited removal (Section 3006)--The Hostettler Amendment would
amend the immigration laws to permit summary deportations for persons
who cannot prove that have physically been in the U.S. for more than 5
years. While the amendment deletes the provision that would have
applied this summary deportation provision to asylee applicants, it
still suffers from several glaring loopholes that would result in
deserving immigrants facing the legal nightmare of summary deportation.
Groups who would lose legal protections under the Hostettler Amendment
include:
Trafficking victims, and victims of rape, incest, kidnaping, and
domestic violence. Currently, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act
allows these victims to remain in the U.S. so they are not subject to
further violence and abuse. Under the Hostettler amendment, trafficking
victims and other victims of rape, incest and kidnaping would be
subject to mandatory deportation.
Batterred women and children. The Violence Against Women Act provides
that battered immigrant women and children are permitted to remain
here, so they are not forced to face further battering and violence.
Under the Hostettler amendment, these immigrants could be plucked off
the street and subject to mandatory deportation.
Cubans who arrive in the U.S. by sea or by land. Currently, the
Attorney General has only discretionary power to exempt Cubans who
arrive in the U.S. via land or sea from expedited removal. Under the
Hostettler amendment, this discretionary power would again be obviated
by the mandatory requirement of expedited removal. This would mean that
Cubans who arrive at our shores would face automatic summary
deportation
Asylum (Section 3007)--Under the Hostettler amendment, the rights of
all asylum candidates would be impaired, decimating our historic
commitment to refugees and persecuted immigrants. Among other things,
the Hostettler Amendment would:
Require an asylum applicant to prove that a central reason for his or
her being persecuted was race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion; a far more difficult
evidentiary burden than current law.
Permit adjudicators to deny asylum because the applicant is unable to
provide specific corroborating specific, and deny judicial review of
such denials.
Introduce brand new credibility grounds for denying asylum, such as
``demeanor,'' any inconsistency in statements (even if attributable to
fear of retribution), and other subjective grounds that introduce new
cultural barriers to asylum, particularly for traumatized victims of
torture and violence.
Exclude country conditions from human rights organizations,
journalists, and other relevant, reliable and more recent information
than may be obtained from State Department reports.
Extraordinary Rendition/Torture (Section 3032)--The Hostettler
Amendment would also allow immigrants to be returned to countries where
they could be tortured in violation of the Convention Against Torture.
This is because the amended provision would allow our government to
send an individual to a country with a history of human rights
violations even if a U.S. immigration judge has determined he or she
would face torture, as long as the Secretary of State had merely asked
the country if they would agree not to torture the immigrant. In
essence, we would be substituting the judgment of a foreign diplomat
from Syria, China or the Sudan, for that of a judge in the U.S., with
the immigrant facing excruciating torture if the judge was right.
Another problem with the Hostettler Amendment is that it would create
unreviewable authority on the part of the DHS to detain non-citizens
who are found to be at risk of torture or persecution in their home
countries.
The Hostettler amendment is opposed by a wide range of human rights,
civil liberties and immigration groups, including the ACLU, the
American Immigration Lawyers Association, Amnesty International, the
Center for Victims of Torture, the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, Human
Rights Watch, the US Committee for Refugees, the National Council of La
Raza and the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops. I urge No vote.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 15 seconds.
In response to the last speaker, he demonstrated why it is a
smokescreen. The issue of criminal aliens is a serious issue which we
should have to deal with; so they insert that into the Hostettler
amendment. But what they do is leave a gaping loophole whereby a
country that utilizes torture gives assurances to the United States and
therefore gets back the person whom they are going to torture.

[[Page H8889]]

Mr. Chairman, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from
Massachusetts (Mr. Markey).
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time.
I rise in strong opposition to the Hostettler amendment. The
Hostettler amendment amends the ill-considered and counterproductive
torture provisions in H.R. 10 in a way that still allows foreigners to
be subjected to torture.
How does it do this? The Hostettler amendment gives the Secretary of
Homeland Security the power to detain certain foreigners that, ``in the
Secretary's unreviewable discretion,'' the Secretary has determined to
be a specially dangerous alien that should be detained until removed.
Such persons would be held behind bars indefinitely with no recourse to
a court or another independent fact finder empowered to review the
basis for the Secretary's decision. Any foreign person that the
Secretary of Homeland Security decides is ``especially dangerous'' can
just be locked up forever with no trial or just deported.
And the Hostettler amendment stipulates that the ``Secretary of State
shall seek diplomatic assurances that such alien shall be protected if
removed from the United States.'' That means that the State Department
is supposed to seek diplomatic assurances from a country that it will
not torture somebody after a U.S. judge already has found that this
country likely would, in fact, torture that person. Are we really going
to trust the assurances of the countries that our own State Department
says torture detainees?
Mr. Chairman, we should really call this the ``In Syria we trust''
amendment or perhaps the ``In Sudan we trust'' amendment. The
assurances that these countries have provided that they would not
torture have proved completely unreliable in practice.
In 2002, Maher Arar, a Syrian-born citizen, was intercepted at New
York's JFK Airport and deported to Syria, where he was detained and
reportedly tortured. The Washington Post has reported that while Syria
provided ``diplomatic assurances'' that Arar would not be mistreated,
these assurances proved worthless. Maher Arar was tortured anyway.
America should not be outsourcing torture to countries like Syria and
the Sudan. America should be relying not on diplomatic assurances from
countries that we already know practice torture, particularly when a
U.S. judge has already found that it is more likely than not that the
deported person would be tortured if they were sent there.
We as America cannot preach temperance from a bar stool. If we want
to protect our own Marines and soldiers from torture, we must have the
same standard for protecting prisoners that we have under our control
from torture. We cannot build a new generation of nuclear bunker
busters and then tell the Muslim nations they should not want nuclear
weapons, and we cannot tell the Muslim world not to torture American
prisoners at the same time we are sending Muslim detainees to countries
that we know are going to torture those prisoners.
We cannot exist in a world where the United States is not the moral
leader. This amendment must be defeated.
Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner), distinguished chairman of the Committee
on the Judiciary.
Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Hostettler
amendment, which I believe deals with the issue of compliance with the
torture amendment in a humane manner that will safeguard the safety of
the American people.
Let me say why this is necessary. Under current law, as interpreted
by the courts, a criminal who has committed a crime or conspired to
commit a crime in another country, or someone who is on a terrorist
watch list can come to the United States. When they get here, they
claim asylum. It takes a while to adjudicate asylum applications.
They also can say if he is immediately deported, then he would be
tortured if he went back home. So the way it stands now under the
current law, that person would be out in society free to commit crimes,
free to commit terrorist acts until the time comes for the asylum
hearing. And then if the person were found not to be eligible for
asylum, they still could not be deported if they thought that they
would be tortured when they come back home.
So if we cannot send them home under the torture convention, and that
is the case in many Middle Eastern countries, and we cannot detain
them, then they are out on the street posing a danger to society.
What the Hostettler amendment does in this circumstance is say that
they can be detained. And there are procedural safeguards in the
Hostettler amendment that set up standards for detention and require a
review every 6 months. If my colleagues vote against this amendment,
they are going to have these people out on the street.
They should not be out on the street. They should be detained or
deported. If we cannot deport them, then let us give the Department of
Homeland Security the authority to detain them. Pass the amendment.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from
Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee), ranking member of the Immigration, Border
Security, and Claims Subcommittee.
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for
yielding me this time and for his leadership. I thank the chairman of
the subcommittee and the chairman of the full committee for their
comments.
I agree with the chairman of the full committee. Keep them, detain
them here. The problem with this amendment is that it is subjected to
persons who are not terrorists. It is subjected to persons who can
cause harm but are not terrorists. This is the problem.
The White House has already said that the President of the United
States opposes provisions dealing with sending people to places where
torture occurs. The President made it clear that the United States
stands against and will not tolerate torture and that the United States
remains committed to comply with its obligations under the convention
against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment.
The amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana amendment does
not solve the problem. It requires, or asks, the Secretary of State to
simply ask a country not to torture the individual. Do my colleagues
believe that Sudan would comply with that? That is not the case. This
amendment is subjected to mistake.
Let me just read Cat Stevens: ``I am a victim.'' Although the
circumstances are different, he was yanked off a Washington-bound plane
and sent home. The singer, formerly known as Cat Stevens, says he
became the victim of an ``unjust and arbitrary system.'' This is what
we are passing now.
``I was devastated,'' he wrote. ``The unbelievable thing is that only
2 months earlier, I had been having meetings in Washington with top
officials from the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community
Initiatives to talk about my charity work.''
The real key in this amendment is that we should deal with this
question in another separate opportunity to really address this in a
fair manner. This amendment will be a wide, wide, wide net, and what
will happen with this net? Innocent persons will be forced to places
where they will be tortured.
The President is standing up against it. We stand up against it. I
will simply argue that this is not the appropriate vehicle to use. This
goes against the convention against torture, and I ask my colleagues to
consider a high moral ground in this and to vote against the amendment.
We must also support the two Smith of New Jersey amendments to
eliminate the very bad H.R. 10 provisions subjecting deported persons
to possible torture against the convention against torture.
This amendment would make minor changes to the expedited removal
provisions in section 3006, but we need more than minor changes. We
need to eliminate expedited removal proceedings entirely. Expedited
removal proceedings are conducted by immigration officers who are not
even attorneys. There is no hearing before an immigration judge, no
right to counsel, and no appeal. Nevertheless, despite this complete
absence of due process, someone removed from the United States in
expedited removal proceedings is barred for 5 years from returning.
The amendment also would modify section 3032 to specify that people
who have received

[[Page H8890]]

CAT relief or withholding of removal may be detained indefinitely if
they are dangerous. The authority to detain dangerous aliens
indefinitely already exists.
In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the United States Supreme
Court held that the detention provisions in the Immigration and
Nationality Act, read in light of the Constitution's demands, limit an
alien's post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary
to bring about that alien's removal from the United States. The Supreme
Court found further that once removal is no longer reasonably
foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute--
except where special circumstances justify continued detention, such as
when it is necessary to protect the public.
In response to that Supreme Court decision, the former Immigration
and Naturalization Service promulgated regulations for determining the
circumstances under which an alien may be held in custody beyond the
statutory removal period. 8 C.F.R. Sec. 241.4. These regulations
authorize the Government to continue to detain aliens who present
foreign policy concerns or national security and terrorism concerns, as
well as individuals who are especially dangerous due to a mental
condition or personality disorder, even though their removal is not
likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.
If we are going to establish a statutory criterion for deciding when
indefinite detention is warranted, we need to have a hearing first. An
unwise or inadequate criterion will result in people being detained
indefinitely who should be released from custody. We need to proceed
with caution on this matter.
I urge you to vote against this amendment.

{time} 1115

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Kolbe). There is 1 minute remaining on
each side. The gentleman from California (Mr. Berman), as a member of
the Committee on the Judiciary and in opposition, has the right to
close.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Hostettler).
Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to at this time state that
the administration, as a result of the amendment to section 3032, has
said that they favor the change in my amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of the time to the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Lincoln Diaz-Balart).
Mr. LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I think it is
important that we realize that this amendment, while not perfect, it is
extremely important that it pass. I am very supportive of the Smith
amendments that will be debated shortly. But what this amendment does
is it keeps us, the United States of America, in compliance with the
convention against torture, allowing us, obviously, not to, in order to
be in compliance with the convention against torture, not to deport
people to places where they will be tortured. But it also gives
discretion to the Secretary of Homeland Security to detain, to keep
under detention, terrorists, murderers, rapists, child molesters, and a
limited list of other serious criminals.
To comply with the convention against torture, it is important that
we pass this amendment.
I thank the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Hostettler) for his hard
work.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the remaining time.
I am going to vote against the Hostettler amendment because, number
one, it is a smokescreen by pretending to fix 3006 and 3007, the
amendments that will follow this amendment when we come back to the
Committee of the Whole; and, secondly, because it has a glaring
loophole involving assurances from the torturing country that they will
not torture. That means it is still in violation of the Convention
Against Torture. Members will decide how they are going to vote on that
particular amendment.
The point I want to make most of all is do not fall for the trap
which is being set by this amendment that the Smith amendments to 3006
and 3037, that have nothing to do with terrorism and that allow for
mass deportations with no due process and which fundamentally change
our asylum laws, do not fall for the trap that by pasting the
Hostettler amendment you have cured the defects in those provisions. Be
sure to vote for the Smith amendments and against those provisions when
they come up.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by
the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Hostettler).
The amendment was agreed to.

Sequential Votes Postponed in the Committee of the Whole

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII,
proceedings will now resume on those amendments on which further
proceedings were postponed in the following order: Amendment No. 4
offered by Mr. Kirk of Illinois, Amendment No. 5 offered by Mr.
Sessions of Texas, Amendment No. 8 offered by Mr. Carter of Texas,
Amendment No. 11 offered by Mr. Goodlatte of Virginia, Amendment No. 12
offered by Mr. Green of Wisconsin.
The Chair will reduce to 5 minutes the time for any electronic vote
after the first vote in this series.

Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Kirk

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The pending business is the demand for a
recorded vote on Amendment No. 4 offered by the gentleman from Illinois
(Mr. Kirk) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the
ayes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.

Recorded Vote

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 414,
noes 0, not voting 18, as follows:

[Roll No. 512]

AYES--414

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Allen
Andrews
Baca
Bachus
Baird
Baker
Baldwin
Ballenger
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Bass
Beauprez
Becerra
Bell
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Biggert
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blumenauer
Blunt
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Bradley (NH)
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Brown (OH)
Brown (SC)
Brown, Corrine
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Burgess
Burns
Burr
Burton (IN)
Butterfield
Buyer
Calvert
Camp
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Capps
Capuano
Cardin
Cardoza
Carson (IN)
Carson (OK)
Carter
Case
Castle
Chabot
Chandler
Chocola
Clyburn
Coble
Cole
Collins
Cooper
Costello
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crenshaw
Crowley
Cubin
Cummings
Cunningham
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
Davis (TN)
Davis, Jo Ann
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
DeLay
DeMint
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Dooley (CA)
Doolittle
Doyle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Edwards
Ehlers
Emanuel
Emerson
Engel
English
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Everett
Farr
Fattah
Feeney
Ferguson
Flake
Foley
Forbes
Ford
Fossella
Frank (MA)
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gingrey
Gonzalez
Goode
Goodlatte
Gordon
Granger
Graves
Green (TX)
Green (WI)
Greenwood
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Gutknecht
Hall
Harman
Harris
Hart
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Hensarling
Herger
Herseth
Hill
Hinchey
Hobson
Hoeffel
Hoekstra
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley (OR)
Hostettler
Houghton
Hoyer
Hulshof
Hunter
Hyde
Inslee
Isakson
Israel
Issa
Istook
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Jenkins
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kleczka
Kline
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kucinich
LaHood
Lampson
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latham
LaTourette
Leach
Lee
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lofgren
Lowey
Lucas (KY)
Lucas (OK)
Lynch
Maloney
Manzullo
Markey
Marshall
Matheson
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McCotter
McCrery
McDermott
McGovern
McHugh
McInnis
McIntyre
McKeon
McNulty
Meehan
Meeks (NY)
Menendez
Mica
Michaud
Millender-McDonald
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Miller, Gary
Miller, George
Mollohan
Moore
Moran (KS)
Moran (VA)
Murphy
Murtha
Musgrave
Myrick
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Nethercutt
Neugebauer
Ney
Northup
Nunes
Nussle
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Osborne
Ose
Otter
Owens
Oxley

[[Page H8891]]

Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Pearce
Pelosi
Pence
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Pombo
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Quinn
Radanovich
Rahall
Ramstad
Rangel
Regula
Rehberg
Renzi
Reyes
Reynolds
Rodriguez
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Sabo
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sanders
Sandlin
Saxton
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schrock
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherman
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shuster
Simmons
Simpson
Skelton
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Souder
Spratt
Stark
Stearns
Stenholm
Strickland
Stupak
Sullivan
Sweeney
Tancredo
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Tierney
Toomey
Turner (OH)
Turner (TX)
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Upton
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Vitter
Walden (OR)
Walsh
Wamp
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Wexler
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
Young (AK)
Young (FL)

NOT VOTING--18

Boehlert
Clay
Conyers
Culberson
Filner
Gephardt
Hinojosa
Lipinski
Majette
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
Meek (FL)
Norwood
Ortiz
Paul
Slaughter
Tauzin
Towns

Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Aderholt) (during the vote). Members
are advised that there are 2 minutes remaining in this vote.

{time} 1142

So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated for:
Ms. McCARTHY of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 512, I was
unavoidable detained at a doctor's appointment. Had I been present, I
would have voted ``aye.''
Mr. FILNER. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 512, I was in my
Congressional District on official business. Had I been present, I
would have voted ``aye.''

Amendment No. 5 Offered by Sessions

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The pending business is the demand for a
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr.
Sessions) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the
ayes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.

Recorded Vote

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 385,
noes 30, not voting 17, as follows:

[Roll No. 513]

AYES--385

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Allen
Andrews
Baca
Bachus
Baird
Baker
Baldwin
Ballenger
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Bass
Beauprez
Becerra
Bell
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Biggert
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Bradley (NH)
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Brown (OH)
Brown (SC)
Brown, Corrine
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Burgess
Burns
Burr
Burton (IN)
Butterfield
Buyer
Calvert
Camp
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Capps
Capuano
Cardin
Cardoza
Carson (OK)
Carter
Case
Castle
Chabot
Chandler
Chocola
Clay
Clyburn
Coble
Cole
Collins
Conyers
Cooper
Costello
Cramer
Crane
Crenshaw
Crowley
Cubin
Cummings
Cunningham
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
Davis (TN)
Davis, Jo Ann
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
DeLay
DeMint
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Dooley (CA)
Doolittle
Doyle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Edwards
Ehlers
Emanuel
Emerson
Engel
English
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Everett
Fattah
Feeney
Ferguson
Flake
Foley
Forbes
Ford
Fossella
Frank (MA)
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gingrey
Gonzalez
Goode
Goodlatte
Gordon
Granger
Graves
Green (TX)
Green (WI)
Greenwood
Gutierrez
Gutknecht
Hall
Harman
Harris
Hart
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Hensarling
Herger
Herseth
Hill
Hinchey
Hobson
Hoeffel
Hoekstra
Holden
Hooley (OR)
Hostettler
Houghton
Hoyer
Hulshof
Hunter
Hyde
Inslee
Isakson
Israel
Issa
Istook
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Jenkins
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
Kennedy (RI)
Kilpatrick
Kind
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kleczka
Kline
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Lampson
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latham
LaTourette
Leach
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lofgren
Lowey
Lucas (KY)
Lucas (OK)
Lynch
Maloney
Manzullo
Marshall
Matheson
McCarthy (NY)
McCotter
McCrery
McGovern
McHugh
McInnis
McIntyre
McKeon
McNulty
Meehan
Meeks (NY)
Menendez
Mica
Michaud
Millender-McDonald
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Miller, Gary
Miller, George
Moore
Moran (KS)
Moran (VA)
Murphy
Murtha
Musgrave
Myrick
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Nethercutt
Neugebauer
Ney
Northup
Nunes
Nussle
Obey
Osborne
Ose
Otter
Owens
Oxley
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Pearce
Pelosi
Pence
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Pombo
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Quinn
Radanovich
Rahall
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Renzi
Reyes
Reynolds
Rodriguez
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Ross
Rothman
Royce
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sanders
Sandlin
Saxton
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schrock
Scott (GA)
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherman
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shuster
Simmons
Simpson
Skelton
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Souder
Spratt
Stearns
Stenholm
Strickland
Stupak
Sullivan
Sweeney
Tancredo
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Tierney
Toomey
Turner (OH)
Turner (TX)
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Upton
Van Hollen
Visclosky
Vitter
Walden (OR)
Walsh
Wamp
Watson
Waxman
Weiner
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Wexler
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Wu
Wynn
Young (AK)
Young (FL)

NOES--30

Blumenauer
Carson (IN)
Farr
Grijalva
Hastings (FL)
Holt
Honda
Jackson (IL)
Kildee
Kucinich
Lee
Lewis (GA)
Markey
McCarthy (MO)
McCollum
McDermott
Mollohan
Oberstar
Olver
Payne
Rangel
Roybal-Allard
Sabo
Scott (VA)
Solis
Stark
Velazquez
Waters
Watt
Woolsey

NOT VOTING--17

Boehlert
Cox
Culberson
Filner
Gephardt
Hinojosa
Lipinski
Majette
Matsui
Meek (FL)
Norwood
Ortiz
Paul
Ruppersberger
Slaughter
Tauzin
Towns

Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (during the vote). Members are advised there
are 2 minutes remaining in this vote.

{time} 1152

Mr. KUCINICH and Mr. BLUMENAUER changed their vote from ``aye'' to
``no.''
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated for:
Mr. FILNER. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 513, I was in my
Congressional District on official business. Had I been present, I
would have voted ``aye.''

Amendment No. 8 Offered by Mr. Carter

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Aderholt). The pending business is the
demand for a recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman
from Texas (Mr. Carter) on which further proceedings were postponed and
on which the ayes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.

[[Page H8892]]

Recorded Vote

[Roll No. 514]

AYES--344

Ackerman
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Allen
Andrews
Baca
Bachus
Baird
Baker
Ballenger
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Bass
Beauprez
Bell
Berkley
Berry
Biggert
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Bradley (NH)
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Brown (OH)
Brown (SC)
Brown, Corrine
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Burgess
Burns
Burr
Burton (IN)
Butterfield
Buyer
Calvert
Camp
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Capps
Cardin
Cardoza
Carson (OK)
Carter
Case
Castle
Chabot
Chandler
Chocola
Clyburn
Coble
Cole
Collins
Cooper
Costello
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crenshaw
Crowley
Cubin
Cummings
Cunningham
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (FL)
Davis (TN)
Davis, Jo Ann
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
DeFazio
DeLauro
DeLay
DeMint
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Dooley (CA)
Doolittle
Doyle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Edwards
Emanuel
Emerson
Engel
English
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Everett
Feeney
Ferguson
Flake
Foley
Forbes
Ford
Fossella
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gingrey
Gonzalez
Goode
Goodlatte
Gordon
Granger
Graves
Green (TX)
Green (WI)
Greenwood
Gutknecht
Hall
Harman
Harris
Hart
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Hensarling
Herger
Herseth
Hill
Hobson
Hoeffel
Holden
Hooley (OR)
Hostettler
Houghton
Hoyer
Hulshof
Hunter
Hyde
Inslee
Isakson
Israel
Issa
Istook
Jefferson
Jenkins
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
Kennedy (RI)
Kind
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Lampson
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latham
LaTourette
Leach
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lowey
Lucas (KY)
Lucas (OK)
Lynch
Maloney
Manzullo
Marshall
Matheson
McCarthy (NY)
McCotter
McCrery
McHugh
McInnis
McIntyre
McKeon
McNulty
Meehan
Menendez
Mica
Michaud
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Miller, Gary
Moore
Moran (KS)
Moran (VA)
Murphy
Murtha
Musgrave
Myrick
Neal (MA)
Nethercutt
Neugebauer
Ney
Northup
Nunes
Nussle
Osborne
Ose
Otter
Oxley
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Pombo
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Quinn
Radanovich
Rahall
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Renzi
Reyes
Reynolds
Rodriguez
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Ross
Rothman
Royce
Ruppersberger
Ryan (OH)
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Sanchez, Loretta
Sandlin
Saxton
Schiff
Schrock
Scott (GA)
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shuster
Simmons
Simpson
Skelton
Smith (MI)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Souder
Spratt
Stearns
Stenholm
Strickland
Stupak
Sullivan
Sweeney
Tancredo
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Toomey
Turner (OH)
Turner (TX)
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Upton
Visclosky
Vitter
Walden (OR)
Walsh
Wamp
Weiner
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Wexler
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Wu
Wynn
Young (AK)
Young (FL)

NOES--72

Abercrombie
Baldwin
Becerra
Berman
Blumenauer
Capuano
Carson (IN)
Clay
Conyers
Davis (IL)
DeGette
Delahunt
Ehlers
Farr
Fattah
Frank (MA)
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hastings (FL)
Hinchey
Hoekstra
Holt
Honda
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kleczka
Kucinich
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lofgren
Markey
McCarthy (MO)
McCollum
McDermott
McGovern
Meeks (NY)
Millender-McDonald
Miller, George
Mollohan
Nadler
Napolitano
Oberstar
Olver
Owens
Payne
Pelosi
Rangel
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanders
Schakowsky
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sherman
Smith (NJ)
Solis
Stark
Tierney
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Woolsey

NOT VOTING--16

Boehlert
Culberson
Filner
Gephardt
Hinojosa
Lipinski
Majette
Matsui
Meek (FL)
Norwood
Obey
Ortiz
Paul
Slaughter
Tauzin
Towns

Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (during the vote). Members are advised there
are 2 minutes remaining in this vote.

{time} 1202

Mr. RUSH, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Ms. LINDA T. SANCHEZ of
California, Mr. WAXMAN and Mr. SHERMAN changed their vote from ``aye''
to ``no.''
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated for:
Mr. FILNER. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 514, I was in my
Congressional District on official business. Had I been present, I
would have voted ``aye''.

Amendment No. 11 Offered by Mr. Goodlatte

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Aderholt). The pending business is the
demand for a recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman
from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte) on which further proceedings were
postponed and on which the ayes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.

Recorded Vote

[Roll No. 515]

AYES--333

Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Andrews
Baca
Bachus
Baird
Baker
Ballenger
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Bass
Beauprez
Bell
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Biggert
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Bradley (NH)
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Brown, Corrine
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Burgess
Burns
Burr
Burton (IN)
Butterfield
Buyer
Calvert
Camp
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Capuano
Cardin
Cardoza
Carson (OK)
Carter
Case
Castle
Chabot
Chandler
Chocola
Clyburn
Coble
Cole
Collins
Cooper
Costello
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crenshaw
Crowley
Cubin
Cummings
Cunningham
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (FL)
Davis (TN)
Davis, Jo Ann
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
DeFazio
DeLauro
DeLay
DeMint
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Dooley (CA)
Doolittle
Doyle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Edwards
Ehlers
Emanuel
Emerson
Engel
English
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Everett
Feeney
Ferguson
Flake
Foley
Forbes
Ford
Fossella
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gingrey
Gonzalez
Goode
Goodlatte
Gordon
Granger
Graves
Green (TX)
Green (WI)
Greenwood
Gutknecht
Hall
Harris
Hart
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Hensarling
Herger
Herseth
Hill
Hobson
Hoeffel
Hoekstra
Holden
Hooley (OR)
Hostettler
Houghton
Hoyer
Hulshof
Hunter
Hyde
Isakson
Israel
Issa
Istook
Jefferson
Jenkins
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kind
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kleczka
Kline
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Lampson
Langevin
Lantos
Latham
LaTourette
Leach
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lowey
Lucas (KY)
Lucas (OK)
Lynch
Manzullo
Marshall
Matheson
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McCotter
McCrery
McHugh
McInnis
McIntyre
McKeon
McNulty
Menendez
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Miller, Gary
Moore
Moran (KS)
Moran (VA)
Murphy
Murtha
Musgrave
Myrick

[[Page H8893]]

Napolitano
Nethercutt
Neugebauer
Ney
Northup
Nunes
Nussle
Obey
Osborne
Ose
Oxley
Pascrell
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Pombo
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Quinn
Radanovich
Rahall
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Renzi
Reyes
Reynolds
Rodriguez
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Ross
Royce
Ruppersberger
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Sabo
Sandlin
Saxton
Schiff
Schrock
Scott (GA)
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherman
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shuster
Simmons
Simpson
Skelton
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Snyder
Souder
Spratt
Stearns
Stenholm
Stupak
Sullivan
Sweeney
Tancredo
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Toomey
Turner (OH)
Turner (TX)
Udall (CO)
Upton
Van Hollen
Vitter
Walden (OR)
Walsh
Wamp
Weiner
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Wexler
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Wu
Wynn
Young (AK)
Young (FL)

NOES--84

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Baldwin
Becerra
Blumenauer
Brown (OH)
Capps
Carson (IN)
Clay
Conyers
Davis (IL)
DeGette
Delahunt
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Farr
Fattah
Frank (MA)
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Hinchey
Holt
Honda
Inslee
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Johnson (IL)
Jones (OH)
Kilpatrick
Kucinich
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lee
Lewis (GA)
Lofgren
Maloney
Markey
McCarthy (MO)
McDermott
McGovern
Meehan
Meeks (NY)
Michaud
Millender-McDonald
Miller, George
Mollohan
Nadler
Neal (MA)
Oberstar
Olver
Otter
Owens
Pallone
Pastor
Payne
Pelosi
Rangel
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sanders
Schakowsky
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Smith (WA)
Solis
Stark
Strickland
Tierney
Udall (NM)
Velazquez
Visclosky
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Woolsey

NOT VOTING--15

Boehlert
Culberson
Filner
Gephardt
Hinojosa
Lipinski
Majette
Matsui
Meek (FL)
Norwood
Ortiz
Paul
Slaughter
Tauzin
Towns

Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (during the vote). There are 2 minutes
remaining in this vote.

{time} 1212

Mr. RUSH, Mrs. MALONEY, and Mr. DICKS changed their vote from ``aye''
to ``no.''
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated for:
Mr. FILNER. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 515, I was in my
congressional district on official business. Had I been present, I
would have voted ``aye''.

Amendment 12 Offered by Mr. Green of Wisconsin

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The pending business is the demand for a
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Wisconsin
(Mr. Green) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which
the ayes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.

Recorded Vote

[Roll No. 516]

AYES--283

Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Bachus
Baker
Ballenger
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Bass
Beauprez
Berry
Biggert
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Bradley (NH)
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Burgess
Burns
Burr
Burton (IN)
Butterfield
Buyer
Calvert
Camp
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Cardoza
Carson (OK)
Carter
Case
Castle
Chabot
Chandler
Chocola
Clyburn
Coble
Cole
Collins
Cooper
Costello
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crenshaw
Cubin
Cunningham
Davis (AL)
Davis (TN)
Davis, Jo Ann
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
DeFazio
DeLay
DeMint
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Dingell
Doolittle
Doyle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Edwards
Ehlers
Emerson
English
Etheridge
Everett
Feeney
Ferguson
Flake
Foley
Forbes
Ford
Fossella
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gingrey
Goode
Goodlatte
Gordon
Granger
Graves
Green (TX)
Green (WI)
Greenwood
Gutknecht
Hall
Harris
Hart
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Hensarling
Herger
Herseth
Hill
Hobson
Hoekstra
Holden
Hooley (OR)
Hostettler
Houghton
Hulshof
Hunter
Hyde
Isakson
Issa
Istook
Jefferson
Jenkins
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Kaptur
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Lampson
Langevin
Larson (CT)
Latham
LaTourette
Leach
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lucas (KY)
Lucas (OK)
Manzullo
Marshall
Matheson
McCotter
McCrery
McHugh
McInnis
McIntyre
McKeon
McNulty
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Miller, Gary
Moore
Moran (KS)
Murphy
Musgrave
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neugebauer
Ney
Northup
Nunes
Nussle
Osborne
Ose
Otter
Oxley
Pascrell
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Pombo
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Quinn
Radanovich
Rahall
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Renzi
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Ross
Royce
Ruppersberger
Ryan (OH)
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Sandlin
Saxton
Schrock
Scott (GA)
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shuster
Simmons
Simpson
Skelton
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Snyder
Souder
Spratt
Stearns
Stenholm
Sweeney
Tancredo
Tanner
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thompson (MS)
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Toomey
Turner (OH)
Turner (TX)
Udall (NM)
Upton
Visclosky
Vitter
Walden (OR)
Walsh
Wamp
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Wu
Young (AK)
Young (FL)

NOES--132

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Andrews
Baca
Baird
Baldwin
Becerra
Bell
Berkley
Berman
Blumenauer
Brady (PA)
Brown (OH)
Brown, Corrine
Capps
Capuano
Cardin
Carson (IN)
Clay
Conyers
Crowley
Cummings
Davis (CA)
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dicks
Doggett
Dooley (CA)
Emanuel
Engel
Eshoo
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Frank (MA)
Gonzalez
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Hinchey
Hoeffel
Holt
Honda
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
Kleczka
Kucinich
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lofgren
Lowey
Lynch
Maloney
Markey
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McDermott
McGovern
Meehan
Meeks (NY)
Menendez
Michaud
Millender-McDonald
Miller, George
Mollohan
Moran (VA)
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Owens
Pallone
Pastor
Payne
Pelosi
Price (NC)
Rangel
Reyes
Rodriguez
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sanders
Schakowsky
Schiff
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sherman
Smith (WA)
Solis
Stark
Strickland
Stupak
Tauscher
Thompson (CA)
Tierney
Udall (CO)
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Wexler
Wilson (NM)
Woolsey
Wynn

NOT VOTING--17

Boehlert
Culberson
Filner
Gephardt
Hinojosa
Johnson, E. B.
Lipinski
Majette
Matsui
Meek (FL)
Norwood
Ortiz
Paul
Slaughter
Sullivan
Tauzin
Towns

Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Aderholt) (during the vote). Members
are advised that 2 minutes remain in this vote.

{time} 1220

Mr. WYNN changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Mr. SHAYS changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was agreed to.

[[Page H8894]]

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated against:
Mr. FILNER. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 516, I was in my
congressional district on official business. Had I been present, I
would have voted ``no''.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
The motion was agreed to.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
Terry) having assumed the chair, Mr. Aderholt, Chairman pro tempore of
the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported
that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 10)
to provide for reform of the intelligence community, terrorism
prevention and prosecution, border security, and international
cooperation and coordination, and for other purposes, had come to no
resolution thereon.

____________________

Congressional Record: October 8, 2004 (House)
Page H8894-H8978

9/11 RECOMMENDATIONS IMPLEMENTATION ACT

{time} 1222

In the Committee of the Whole

Amendment No. 14 Offered by Mr. Smith of New Jersey

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment No. 14 offered by Mr. Smith of New Jersey:
Strike section 3006 (page 242, line 18 through page 244,
line 9) and redesignate provisions and conform the table of
contents accordingly.

[[Page H8895]]

friend and colleague, the gentleman from California (Mr. Berman).
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, my friend, the chairman of the Committee on
the Judiciary, says this is a matter of security. The Bush
administration and George Bush say this is a massively overbroad
expedited removal expansion. The President of the United States in
January of this year gave a speech where he said the vast majority of
these people ``bring to America the values of faith in God, love of
family, hard work and self-reliance.''
If this amendment does not pass, this bill, because a group of people
in the majority party in a caucus led by the gentleman from Colorado
(Mr. Tancredo) wants to glom their anti-immigration ideas onto a
terrorism and intelligence reform bill, that these people will be
deported, up to a million, without due process, without an
administrative hearing, without a balancing process that deals with
earned adjustment or with guest workers or with anything else. It is
the forcing of an anti-immigration agenda onto an intelligence and
homeland security reform bill.
We are talking here about victims of trafficking, Cubans fleeing
Castro, battered women eligible for VAWA protection. We are talking
about people who are classic refugees who will be picked up in this
process; they will never have a chance to assert their asylum claims,
people who will be subject to torture. You can say you adhere to every
convention in the world on refugees and on torture, but if you
summarily allow low-level enforcement officers in the Immigration and
Customs Enforcement agency or in the Border Patrol to pick people up,
take them out of the country, not let them tell their families they are
being deported, insisting that they prove their credentials by the
documents they have on their body at that time, that means either legal
citizenship or legal residents or being here more than 5 years, you are
subject to deportation, immediately, summarily, without any chance for
judicial review and administrative hearing, any process whatsoever.
Please support the Smith amendment. It is very important.

{time} 1230

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time
to the distinguished gentleman from Florida (Mr. Lincoln Diaz-Balart).
Mr. LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART of Florida. Mr. Chairman, it is really
unfortunate that this provision is in the base bill. It lumps the base
bill, as written, all immigrants who may be accused of being
undocumented who have been here for 5 years or less, with terrorists.
The current law says, if they are a terrorist, there is no limitation
on time. They are picked up, and if they are not arrested, they are
thrown out without a hearing. It also says, if they are an undocumented
immigrant, within 2 years they can be picked up and sent out without a
hearing. That is current.
This expands it to 5 years even though the 2 years of current law is
not being used.
There is a border initiative that has been announced. Many other
initiatives can be announced under current law. But, no, we want to
expand it to 5 years and say that folks who are working in restaurants
or folks that are cutting the grass or folks that are doing something
that is very honorable and has nothing to do with terrorism are now
going to be lumped together to say, even if they have a claim to stay
in this country, they do not even have a hearing. They cannot even have
a hearing and they are going to be thrown out.
And, by the way, it is not even ``may.'' It is ``shall.'' That is
what we are talking about. And it is most unfortunate that in the
context of a terrorism bill we have this language.
Vote for the Smith amendment.
Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, parliamentary inquiry. Has the time
of the gentleman from New Jersey expired?
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Aderholt). The gentleman from New
Jersey's (Mr. Smith) time has expired.
Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to
the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Hostettler), chairman of the
Immigration, Border Security, and Claims Subcommittee.
(Mr. HOSTETTLER asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman of the full
committee for yielding me this time.
I join the gentleman from Wisconsin (Chairman Sensenbrenner) in
opposing this amendment, which would take a vital tool out of the hands
of our Border Patrol in keeping foreign terrorists out of the United
States.
As it is distressingly easy for aliens to illegally cross our
borders, it would also be relatively easy for terrorists to enter. The
Border Patrol recently released data that in just the period from last
October through this June, over 44,000 non-Mexican aliens were caught
trying to cross the northern or southern borders, including eight from
Afghanistan, six from Algeria, 13 from Egypt, 20 from Indonesia, 10
from Iran, 55 from Israel, 122 from Pakistan, six from Saudi Arabia,
six from Syria, 22 from Turkey, and two from Yemen. A South African
woman alleged to be a terrorist on the terrorist watch list recently
indicated that she had crossed the border illegally from Mexico.
What happens to these aliens when they are intercepted? They go
through a ``revolving door'' when we release them because of a lack of
detention space. Then we hold out some desperate hope that they will
appear for their immigration court hearings months afterward. However,
the Department of Justice's Office of the Inspector General found that
the INS was not able to remove 87 percent of aliens with final orders
of removal who were not detained. And, worse yet, 94 percent of
nondetained aliens from state sponsors of terrorism who had final
removal orders could not be located for their deportation. In an age of
terrorism, this is just unacceptable.
There is no good reason not to subject illegal aliens who have
crossed the border illegally to immediate deportation. These aliens, if
they have been in the U.S. less than 10 years, have no right to seek
cancellation of removal unless they are making a claim of asylum. Once
again, unless they are making a claim of asylum and can show a credible
fear of persecution, there is no reason not to subject them to
expedited removal.
And, in fact, the amendment that just recently passed in the House,
previously, removes the 1-year limitation in the base bill for
convention against torture and asylum relief. So those who seek relief
from convention against torture and for asylum will not be harmed by
the bill.
So the amendment must be rejected so that we can allow for the
expedited removal of individuals who would do us harm. I urge my
colleagues to vote against the amendment.
Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise in favor of Mr.
Smith's amendment. This amendment would eliminate section 3006, which
contains the expedited removal provisions of H.R. 10. Expedited removal
proceedings are conducted by immigration officers who are not even
attorneys. There is no hearing before an immigration judge, no right to
counsel, and no appeal. Nevertheless, despite this complete absence of
due process, someone removed from the United States in expedited
removal proceedings is barred for 5 years from returning.
In fact, section 3006 would make expedited removal proceedings even
harsher than they already are. When aliens are placed in expedited
removal proceedings now, they have been in the United States for less
than a year and can apply for asylum if they are able to establish a
credible fear of persecution. Section 3006 would place undocumented
aliens in expedited removal proceedings who have been in the United
States for up to 5 years, and it would deprive them of the right to
apply for asylum if they have been here for more than a year and have
not filed an asylum application yet, even if they can establish a
credible fear of persecution.
It is true that aliens in full due process removal proceedings before
an Immigration Judge also are barred from applying for asylum if they
have been in the United States for a year and have not already filed an
asylum application, but it is not an absolute bar. The alien may still
apply for asylum if he can demonstrate the existence of changed
circumstances which materially affect his eligibility for asylum, or he
can show extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in filing
the application within the one-year period. If people who have been in
the United States for more than a year are going to be subjected to

[[Page H8896]]

expedited removal proceedings, the same exceptions should be available
to them for filing an asylum application after the 1-year period.
The fact that section 3006 would apply the 1-year time limit without
the exception that was enacted with it is a clear indication of the
intention of that section, which is to move people out of the country
as quickly as possible without regard to the consequences. It is a
certainty that this will result in sending people to countries where
they will be persecuted.
I urge you to vote for this amendment to remove section 3006 from
H.R. 10.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Linder). The question is on the
amendment offered by the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith).
The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Wisconsin
(Mr. Sensenbrenner) will be postponed.
It is now in order to consider amendment No. 15 printed in House
report 108-751.

Amendment No. 15 Offered by Mr. Smith of new jersey

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment No. 15 offered by Mr. Smith of New Jersey:
Strike section 3007 (page 244, line 10 through page 247,
line 18) and redesignate provisions and conform the table of
contents accordingly.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith) and the gentleman from Wisconsin
(Mr. Sensenbrenner) each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith).
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes.
Mr. Chairman, section 3007 would make sweeping changes, again, to our
asylum law that the drafters erroneously contend would stop terrorists
from being granted asylum. I think Members should remember that under
the Immigration and Nationality Act, terrorists are ineligible for
asylum. Worse than being unnecessary, Mr. Chairman, this section would
erect a number of brand-new barriers to winning asylum claims that are
likely to prevent bona fide refugees from receiving the protection of
asylum in the United States, and they will result in bona fide refugees
being returned to their persecutors. This stacks the deck against
refugees.
Let me just point out to my colleagues that in section 3007, asylum
officers and immigration judges would be encouraged to deny an asylum
claim simply because the applicant was unable to recall or recount
information later in the process that she did not mention when she
initially encountered an immigration officer. Asylum applicants,
particularly survivors of torture, rape, forced abortion or
sterilization may not be comfortable telling this information to a
uniformed male inspection officer at an airport. Asylum applicants in
that setting may not be provided with appropriate interpreters and may
be understandably fearful of discussing their problems about their home
countries in detail. They are frightened people, especially trafficking
victims.
In section 3007 there is also, amazingly, a demeanor standard which
flies in the face of our American standards. If somebody looks down
during the asylum interview and does not somehow convey honesty, when
one has been tortured, when they have been a victim of trafficking,
when they have been hurt emotionally, psychologically, and physically,
they could be denied asylum. Sometimes, talking to somebody who is a
uniformed member of our service, they may be intimidated.
Also, and this is the central problem with this language, Mr.
Chairman, it changes what is in the Refugee convention. There are five
reasons why people can get asylum: race, nationality, religion, the
Members know what they are. This changes it so that the applicant must
prove it is the central reason. Asking asylum seekers to read the minds
of their persecutors is absurd on its face. This will mean many people
who are true asylum seekers, that should get it, will not get it.
Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, I want to quote from the 9/11 Commission staff report
entitled 9/11 and Terrorist Travel. The staff found that a number of
terrorists have abused the asylum system and that once terrorists have
entered the United States, their next challenge was to find a way to
remain here. The primary method was immigration fraud, concocting bogus
political asylum stories when they arrive.
This amendment strikes a good-faith effort to try to prevent these
people from gaming the system.
The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, which deals with the border States
of Arizona and California, has made it difficult for immigration judges
to deny fraudulent asylum application by terrorists and simply by scam
artists. In their recent decisions, the 9th Circuit has failed to give
deference to the adverse credibility determination of immigration
judges in asylum cases, and as a result, many fraudulent applications
have been approved.
The role of an appeals court is not to make a judgment on the
credibility of the witnesses. That is done by the trial court. And here
the immigration judges have determined that some of these applicants
have no credibility, and yet the 9th Circuit says their determination
really does not mean anything.
Even worse, the 9th Circuit has created a disturbing precedent that
has made it easier for suspected terrorists to receive asylum. The
Circuit has held that punishment inflicted on account of perceived
membership in a terrorist group may constitute persecution on account
of the political opinion of that terrorist group. Aliens who have been
arrested in the United States on suspicion of being members of
terrorist organizations have received asylum because of alleged fear of
persecution if returned because of an affiliation with these groups.
Talk about circular reasoning.
A member of the Board of Immigration Appeals complains that if a
terrorist organization arose in this country aimed at the violent
overthrow of the Federal Government through a program of murder of
government and law enforcement officials and federal judges, it would
appear that government suppression of this organization would be an act
of persecution in the 9th Circuit. Being a guerilla is not a form of
political opinion. Being a guerrilla means being engaged in acts of
violence and illegality.
All the bill does is overturn the precedent of the 9th Circuit and
provide a list of factors that an immigration judge can consider in
assessing the credibility of the applicant, such as the demeanor,
candor, and consistency of the witness.
What the gentleman from New Jersey is proposing to do is to say that
if the witness has bad demeanor, no candor, and no consistency, they
have got to grant the petition for asylum. And that is wrong and the
amendment should be defeated.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Lincoln Diaz-Balart).
Mr. LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART of Florida. Mr. Chairman, with all due
respect to the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, whom I have
great respect for, that is not what the effect of the Smith amendment
would be.
There is a long tradition, based on international and domestic law
and jurisprudence, that establishes the right to seek political asylum
when there is a well-founded fear of persecution. In addition, our laws
are clear that membership in any terrorist organization or activity in
a terrorist organization automatically bars them even if they have a
well-founded fear of persecution.
So what this legislation, the base bill, does is go much farther than
what the opponents of the Smith amendment have portrayed up to now. And
the reality of the matter is that when the law is as clear with regard
to terrorism, and certainly as it has been in recent years, it is
unfortunate to diminish the rights of people who are legitimately
fearing for their lives and seeking political asylum.

[[Page H8897]]

That is why the Smith amendment is so necessary. So I would ask my
colleagues to support it.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the
distinguished gentleman from Hawaii (Mr. Abercrombie).
(Mr. ABERCROMBIE asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, I only have 30 seconds here, and this
is all I ask of all the Members: Let us not confuse trafficking with
terrorism. I understand how they can be concerned about that and why
they are trying to do their best. Nobody gainsays them that. But in the
process, we are destroying the opportunity or standing the chance of
destroying the opportunity to make the necessary differentiations,
especially where trafficking is concerned.
There are over 50,000, by the State Department's estimation, people
who are essentially made slaves today in the United States, who are
trafficked, and they could display exactly the same sense of demeanor
and the other characteristics that the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr.
Smith) has been discussing, and the other persons who are opposed to
it.
Please give the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith) an opportunity
with this amendment so we can make certain that we do not make that
confusion.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, because I have so many
requests for time and will not get to all of them, I ask unanimous
consent to extend this debate by 5 minutes equally divided between the
proponent and opponent.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from New Jersey?
Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I object, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Objection is heard.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I yield 45 seconds to the
gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Cardin), who is the vice chairman of the
Helsinki Commission, on which I serve as well.
Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Chairman, first, I thank the gentleman from New
Jersey (Mr. Smith) for bringing forth this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, let me point out that the adoption of this amendment is
very much consistent with the 9/11 Commission's report. They talk about
the United States winning the battle of ideas. The United States has
stood against persecution of individuals because of race, nationality,
or religion. If we do not adopt this amendment, the underlying bill
will make it much more difficult for people who are legitimately being
persecuted to be able to claim asylum in the United States.

{time} 1245

That is not what this Nation is about. Our Nation is about helping
people and individuals who are being persecuted. This amendment is very
important. I urge my colleagues to support it.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time
to the gentleman from California (Mr. Berman).
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Linder). The gentleman from California
is recognized for 45 seconds.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, it is already law that terrorists cannot
assert asylum. That is the law. A balanced and sensible proposal to fix
our broken immigration system involves better border security, it
involves the U.S. Visit Program, it involves sensible reforms in the
procedures, it involves combining watch lists. It does not require the
gaming of the asylum hearing process in a way that would cause us to
depart from the fundamental precepts this country has always had, that
we are a refuge for true refugees fleeing persecution in other
countries.
The ``fixes'' in this process, in this bill, that the gentleman from
New Jersey (Mr. Smith) seeks to strike, games the system against people
who are true refugees. Please pass the Smith amendment.
Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds.
Mr. Chairman, what this amendment does is it allows liars to get
asylum, because under the Smith amendment, somebody that an immigration
judge determines is lying through his teeth and has no candor cannot
take into consideration in determining the decision the fact that the
judge has determined that the applicant has lied.
That is wrong. An ``aye'' vote protects liars. A ``no'' vote allows
the judge to make a determination on candor.
Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of the time to the gentleman from
Indiana (Mr. Hostettler).
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Indiana is recognized
for 1\1/2\ minutes.
(Mr. HOSTETTLER asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Chairman, I join the gentleman from Wisconsin
(Chairman Sensenbrenner) in opposing this amendment. We must remember
that terrorists continually try to abuse our asylum system. For
example, in 1993, Mir Aimal Kansi murdered two CIA employees at CIA
headquarters and Ramzi Yousef masterminded the first World Trade Center
attack after they were free after applying for asylum. Just weeks ago,
Shahawar Matin Siraj was arrested in New York City for plotting to bomb
a subway station. Siraj was freed after applying for asylum.
As the gentleman from Wisconsin (Chairman Sensenbrenner) stated, the
Ninth Circuit has adopted a body of circuit law that is essentially
preventing immigration judges from finding that asylum applicants are
lying by severely limiting the factors, such as their inconsistencies
and demeanor, that the immigration judge can consider in finding aliens
untruthful.
Given that government attorneys are not allowed to ask the foreign
government about the facts regarding the asylum claimants, about the
only evidence available to the government on which to deny an asylum
application is the perceived truthfulness of the applicant's testimony.
If a criminal jury can sentence a United States citizen who is a
criminal defendant to life imprisonment or execution based on their not
believing the American citizen's defendant's story, certainly an
immigration judge can deny an alien asylum on the same basis.
The bill would overturn this ridiculous precedent used by the Ninth
Circuit. The bill provides a list of factors that an immigration judge
can consider in determining truthfulness.
Oppose the Smith amendment.
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise in favor of Mr.
Smith's amendment. Mr. Smith's amendment would eliminate section 3007.
Section 3007 would create a special eligibility standard for asylum
applicants who claim persecution on account of an accusation of
involvement with a guerilla, militant, or terrorist organization; or on
account of an accusation of engaging in or supporting guerilla,
militant, or terrorist activities. They must establish that race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion was or will be the central motive for their
persecution.
Frankly, this puzzles me. The burden of proof in the Immigration and
Nationality Act now provides that the person must establish that he has
been persecuted or has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion. It seems to me that if the persecution is on
account of one of those enumerated grounds, it necessarily would be the
central motive for the persecution.
Section 3007 also would require Immigration Judges to deny applicants
asylum because they fail to provide corroborating evidence if it is
reasonable to expect corroborating evidence. This is not necessary
either. My immigration counsel, Nolan Rappaport, wrote decisions for
the Board of Immigration Appeals before he left the Justice Department.
In 1989, he wrote Matter of Dass, 20 I&N Dec. 120 (BIA 1989), in which
the Board held that corroborating evidence should be presented in
asylum cases if it is available. That was 15 years ago, and it is still
the rule that immigration judges follow in asylum proceedings. The
thing that is new is the provision in section 3007 which states that,
``No court shall reverse a determination made by an adjudicator with
respect to the availability of corroborating evidence . . . unless the
court finds that a reasonable adjudicator is compelled to conclude that
such corroborating evidence is unavailable.'' That is punitive and
unnecessary. Immigration Judges do not need statutory guidance in
making credibility determinations, and Federal circuit court judges
should not be so severely restricted in their review of credibility
determinations.

[[Page H8898]]

I urge you to vote for Mr. Smith's amendment to eliminate section
3007.

Parliamentary Inquiry

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman will state it.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, what is the procedure by which one can
point out that none of the gentlemen from Indiana received asylum?
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman has not stated a proper
parliamentary inquiry.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by
the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith).
The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New Jersey
(Mr. Smith) will be postponed.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. It is now in order to consider amendment
No. 17 printed in House Report 108-751.

Amendment No. 17 Offered by Mr. Ose

Mr. OSE. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment No. 17 offered by Mr. Ose:
At the end of title III of the bill, insert the following:

Subtitle F--Security Barriers

SEC. 3121. EXPEDITED COMPLETION OF SECURITY BARRIERS.

(a) In General.--In order to construct the physical
barriers and roads described in section 102 of the Omnibus
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997 (Public Law 104-208,
div. C), the tracts of land described in subsection (b) shall
be exempt from the requirements of the provisions listed in
subsection (c).
(b) Legal Description.--The tracts of land referred to in
subsection (a) are as follows:
(1) Zone west.--A tract of land situated within Section 2,
3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11, Township 19 South, Range 2 West
of the San Bernadino Meridian, within the County of San
Diego, State of California, more particularly described as
follows: Beginning at the Southwest corner of Fractional
Section 7, T19S, R2W; said Point-of-Beginning being on the
United States/Mexico International Boundary Line and also
being a point of mean sea level of the Pacific Ocean (at
Borderfield State Park); thence, N 02 deg.31'00'' W, a
distance of approximately 800.00 feet to a point. Thence, N
84 deg.44'08'' E, a distance of approximately 1,845.12 feet
to a point. Said point being on the Section line common to
Section 7 and 8, T19S, R2W. Thence, S 01 deg.05'10'' W, along
said Section line, a distance of approximately 270.62 feet to
a point. Thence, S 89 deg.49'43'' E, a distance of
approximately 1,356.50 feet to a point. Thence, N
45 deg.34'58'' E, a distance of approximately 1,901.75 feet
to a point. Said point being on the Section line common to
Sections 5 and 8, T19S, R2W. Thence, N 00 deg.00'00'' E, a
distance of approximately 300.00 feet to a point. Thence, S
89 deg.54'53'' E, a distance of approximately 1,322.05 feet
to a point. Thence, S 00 deg.25'27'' W, a distance of
approximately 300.00 feet to a point. Said point being on the
Section line common to Sections 5 and 8, T19S, R2W. Thence, S
89 deg.37'09'' E, along the Section line common to Section 4,
5, 8, and 9, T19S, R2W, a distance of approximately 5,361.32
feet to a point. Thence, N 00 deg.12'59'' E, a distance of
approximately 400.00 feet to a point. Thence, N
90 deg.00'00'' E, a distance of approximately 1,349.81 feet
to a point. Said point being on the Section line common to
Sections 3 and 4, T19S, R2W. Thence, S 00 deg.30'02'' W, a
distance of approximately 410.37 feet to a point. Said point
being the Section corner common to Sections 3, 4, 9, and 10,
T19S, R2W. Thence, S 89 deg.36'11'' E, along the Section line
common to Sections 2, 3, 10, and 11, T19S, R2W, a distance of
approximately 6,129.36 feet to a point. Thence, along the arc
of a curve to the left, having a radius of 518.88 feet, and a
distance of 204.96 feet to a point. Thence, S 89 deg.59'41''
E, a distance of approximately 258.66 feet to a point.
Thence, S 00 deg.00'00'' E, a distance of approximately
111.74 feet to a point. Said point being within the NW \1/4\
of fractional section 11, T19S, R2W, on the United States/
Mexico International Boundary. Thence, S 84 deg.41'20'' W,
along said United States/Mexico International Boundary, a
distance of approximately 19,210.48 feet to the Point-of-
Beginning. Said tract of land containing an area of 396.61
acre, more or less.
(2) Zone east.--A tract of land situated within Section 32
and 33, Township 18 South, Range 1 East of the San Bernadino
Meridian, County of San Diego, State of California, and being
described as follows: Beginning at the \1/4\ Section line of
Section 32, T18S, R1E. Said Point-of-Beginning being on the
United States/Mexico International Boundary Line and having a
coordinate value of X = 6360877.25 Y = 1781730.88. Thence, N
00 deg.32'02'' W, a distance of approximately 163.56 feet to
a point. Thence, N 78 deg.33'17'' E, a distance of
approximately 1,388.23 feet to a point. Thence, N
84 deg.37'31'' E, a distance of approximately 1,340.20 feet
to a point. Thence, N 75 deg.00'00'' E, a distance of
approximately 1,000.00 feet to a point. Thence, S
88 deg.06'07'' E, a distance of approximately 1,806.81 feet
to a point. Thence, N 80 deg.00'00'' E, a distance of
approximately 1,050.00 feet to a point. Thence, N
87 deg.00'00'' E, a distance of approximately 1,100.00 feet
to a point. Thence, S 00 deg.00'00'' W, a distance of
approximately 300.00 feet to a point. Said point being on the
United States/Mexico International boundary. Thence, S
84 deg.44'09'' W, along said boundary, a distance of
approximately 7,629.63 to the Point-of-Beginning. Said tract
of land having an area of approximately 56.60 acres more or
less.
(c) Exemption From Certain Requirements.--The provisions
referred to in subsection (a) areas as follows:
(1) Noise Control Act of 1972 (42 U.S.C. 4901 et seq.), as
amended by Quiet Communities of 1978 (P.L. 95-609).
(2) Clean Air Act and amendments of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 7401-
7671q).
(3) Clean Water Act of 1977 (33 U.S.C. 1342).
(4) Executive Order 11988 (Floodplain Management), as
amended by Executive Order 12608.
(5) Executive Order 11990 (Protection of Wetlands), as
amended by Executive Order 12608.
(6) Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (16 U.S.C.
1456(c)).
(7) Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (42
U.S.C. 6901-6992k) as amended by Hazardous and Solid Waste
Amendments of 1984 (P.L. 98-616; 98 Stat. 3221).
(8) Comprehensive, Environmental Response, Compensation,
Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9601-9675), as amended by
Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know-Act of 1986
(42 U.S.C. 11001 et seq.).
(9) Farmland Protection Policy Act of 1981 (7 U.S.C. 4201
et seq.).
(10) Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended (16 U.S.C.
1531-1544).
(11) Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 (16 U.S.C. 703-712).
(12) Bald and Golden Eagle Act of 1940, as amended (16
U.S.C. 688-688d).
(13) National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (16 U.S.C.
470 et seq.), as amended Executive Order 13007--Sacred Sites
Presidential Memorandum regarding government to Government
Relations (April 29, 1994).
(14) Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act
(43 CFR Part 10).
(15) Archeological Resources Protection Act of 1979 (16
U.S.C. 470aa-470ii).
(16) Executive Order 12898 (Federal Actions to Address
Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income
Populations) of 1994.

Modification to Amendment No. 17 Offered by Mr. Ose

Mr. OSE. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that my amendment be
modified in the form at the desk.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will report the modification.
The Clerk read as follows:

Modification to amendment No. 17 offered by Mr. Ose:
On page 5, line 4, strike ``areas as'' and insert ``are
as''.
Add at the end of subsection (c) the following new
paragraph:
``(17) Any other laws or requirements that delay
construction of the barriers and roads described in this
section.''.

Parliamentary Inquiry

Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman will state it.
Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, on the definition of ``any other laws or
requirements,'' does that broaden it to every law in America?
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. That is not a proper parliamentary inquiry.
That is a matter for debate on the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the modification?
Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the right to object.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman is recognized under his
reservation.
Mr. OSE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. FARR. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. OSE. Perhaps I can elucidate. The point of adding that particular
provision is that, given the crush of time, I am a little bit concerned
that we did not cover everything. There is no purpose here to include
Davis-Bacon or employment or employee things. This is strictly an
effort to remove impediments to the construction of this security
fence.
Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, it will not go to
legislative intent. It will go to what you have stated in words here,
and it says ``any other laws or requirements.'' Any.
Mr. OSE. If the gentleman will yield further, as they relate to the
fence, that is my intention.
Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, that delay the
construction

[[Page H8899]]

of barriers, there could be all kinds of other reasons that are
unrelated to just your waiving the environmental requirements.
Mr. DREIER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. FARR. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. DREIER. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend for yielding. Let me
state, I know the intent of our colleague, the gentleman from
California (Mr. Ose), is to ensure that there may not be other
environmental regulations which in any way impinge on the construction
of this fence. I think one of the things that could take place is at
least there would be clear legislative intent established through this
debate process indicating that it would not move into other areas about
which my friend has mentioned as areas of concern for him.
Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I think the intent here
is to waive a lot of laws so you can get this done in an expeditious
manner. I think you are opening up a Pandora's Box. It is going to give
you so many lawsuits that you are never going to get the project done.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Does the gentleman from California (Mr.
Farr) object to the modification?
Mr. FARR. I object.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Objection is heard.
Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the gentleman from California (Mr.
Ose) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Ose).
Mr. OSE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, the purpose of this amendment is to secure our southern
border immediately south of San Diego by completing the security fence
that this Congress authorized and that President Clinton signed back in
September of 1996. The rationale for this is very straightforward.
Construction of this fence reduces illegal immigration. The Border
Patrol has told us that the construction of the fence to date has
reduced illegal immigration in that area by 80 percent.
The gentleman from California (Mr. Berman) just 5 minutes ago talked
about an integrated border security system that accomplishes just that,
and this fence is part of that. Construction of the fence serves to
protect our country from potential terrorist activity.
I have a letter from the Secretary of the Navy here to our good
friend, the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter), that I will enter
into the Record that highlights exactly that point relative to the
naval base 4 miles north of the site in question.
Construction of this fence is part of an integrated border security
system identified in the 9/11 Commission report as a priority. I am not
making this stuff up. This is part of an integrated border security
system that this country has previously authorized that has been bogged
down for 8 years in getting completed.
I regret, I truly do regret, the impact this may have on
environmental or cultural resources, but we need to make a choice. The
votes we post will be clear: Are we for protecting this country by
completing this fence, or are we not?
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Who seeks time in opposition?
Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition to this
amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from California (Mr. Farr) is
recognized for 5 minutes in opposition to the amendment.
Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.
Mr. Chairman, there is no problem that is broken that needs to be
fixed. There is nobody opposed to the process of getting this fence
built. The problem with this amendment is you create a whole ability to
have more lawsuits filed and you give a message that the environmental
laws are not necessary.
The process is working. In 2 weeks, the Homeland Security Office is
meeting with the California Coastal Commission where they have laid out
all of the road map for how to get it done. The fact of the letter that
was just submitted for the Record, the Navy never asked that any of
these environmental laws be waived. We built a fence around the Naval
Postgraduate School in Monterey by abiding by all the laws, including
the Coastal Commission laws.
So this is a made-up issue to try to get a recorded vote to show
that, if you support the environment, you are for terrorism. Nothing in
the 9/11 Commission report recommended this amendment. It is totally
unnecessary.
I would just tell you that the process is working and what you see in
this amendment is trying to subvert it.
Mr. OSE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, before I yield to my good friend from San Diego, I want
to make a point that the exemptions offered in section C of my
amendment shall also incorporate section 102(c) of title I, subtitle A
of the 1997 Omnibus Appropriations Act, that is Public Law 104-208, in
its entirety.
I will say there is a meeting that is going to take place in 2 weeks.
It will be the sixteenth meeting this year alone trying to move this
project forward. I think the meetings now take place so they can
schedule more meetings. We need to get this finished.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 90 seconds to my friend, the gentleman from San
Diego, California (Mr. Hunter).
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, this is the last piece of the border fence. We have 14
miles of the most extensive smugglers' corridor in the United States.
That is where more smugglers move cocaine, undocumented workers and
potentially terrorists through this corridor that lies between San
Diego and Tijuana.
In a bill signed by President Clinton, in fact giving the Attorney
General the right to waive the Endangered Species Act, it was
considered to be so important. We have built now of this 14-mile
stretch, 11 miles. Only 3 miles remain. The Secretary of the Navy has
sent us a letter saying that there are security reasons to have that
last piece of the border fence constructed.
Let me just tell you what is happening in the 6 years that these
slow-roll negotiations have gone on and on and on, and the California
Coastal Commission and other agencies never go along with this thing.
While that has happened, we have had North Koreans coming in the
smugglers' corridor, as documented by the Border Patrol. We have had
Iraqis coming in through that corridor. We have had Iranians coming in
through that corridor.
If you want to come in as a terrorist into the United States, do not
come in through LAX. Come in on the land border between Mexico and the
U.S. If you come through the gap in the fence that we are talking
about, you are right there at one of the most sophisticated American
naval bases in the world.
We need to build this fence. It is in line with national security, in
line with President Clinton's law. Let us get it done.
Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Kildee).
Mr. KILDEE. Mr. Chairman, I strongly urge my colleagues to oppose the
Ose amendment which will exempt the construction of the proposed
security barrier in the San Diego area from most Federal environmental
laws, regulations and executive orders, including four that
specifically and directly impact Indian tribes.
The Ose amendment would waive the requirements of the National
Historic Preservation Act of 1966, the Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990, the 1996 Executive Order 13007
on sacred sites and the Archeological Resources Protection Act of 1979.

{time} 1300

These Federal requirements were enacted by Congress and implemented
by Democratic and Republican administrations to fulfill promises we
made to native Americans that their places of worship, resting places
for the deceased, and religious freedom will not be disturbed or
intruded upon again and, instead, will be protected and preserved.
This amendment undermines those laws by precluding tribal
consultations on Native American burial grounds, religious shrines, and
cultural and historical sites located in the construction area.
I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on the Ose amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I include for the Record the following letter:

[[Page H8900]]

National Congress of

American Indians,

Washington, DC, October 7, 2004.
Hon. Chairman Sensenbrenner,
House Judiciary Chairman.
Honorable James Sensenbrenner: We have become aware that a
proposed amendment to H.R. 10, ``The 9/11 Recommendations
Implementation Act'', would undermine two federal statutes
designed to preserve and protect Native American cultural
heritage.
NCAI is extremely sensitive to the issues of protecting our
homeland. Tribes play a vital role in protecting our borders
with over 200 miles of United States border located on tribal
lands and with 38 tribes on or near international borders.
Additionally, significant numbers of tribes are located near
critical infrastructure, including missile silos, chemical
depots, dams and nuclear power plants.
Native peoples have proven their unwavering commitment to
protecting this country. Currently, 19,761 American Indians
and Alaskan Natives are serving in the military, and as noted
by many members of Congress, Native Americans serve in the
United States military at higher rates than any other ethnic
group.
The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act
of 1990 (NAGPRA), P.L. 101-601, 24 U.S.C. 3002), was enacted
to protect fragile tribal cultures from exploitation. It was
designed to address the flagrant violation of the ``civil
rights of America's first citizens'' 136 C.R. Sec. 17174.
Furthermore, Congress has expressly stated in statue that
it viewed NAGPRA as part part of its trust responsibility to
Indian tribes and people, specifically stating that it
``reflects the unique relationship between the Federal
Government and Indian tribes'' 25 U.S.C.A. Sec. 3010.
The destruction of culturally sensitive sites is
irreversible and unconscionable. The proposed amendment of
Representative Ose would undermine the very foundation of
NAGPRA and the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (16
U.S.C. 470 et seq.). At the very least we would expect that a
consultation process be considered in any legislation that
would affect cultural sites. We urge you oppose any
amendments that would undermine our rights to protect and
preserve our cultural heritage.
Sincerely,
Tex G. Hall.

Mr. OSE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 10 seconds.
The original authorization to build this fence gave the Attorney
General the opportunity to waive all of these things the previous
speaker voted for. You cannot have it both ways. You are either for
protecting this country or you are not.
Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Solis).
Ms. SOLIS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Ose amendment to
H.R. 10, and I refuse to play environmental politics with our national
security.
This amendment is nothing more than an extreme and unnecessary
attempt to circumvent the ongoing approval and construction process and
exempt construction of the fence from 16 public health, cultural
heritage, and environmental regulations.
The U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection and the California
Coastal Commission are currently in negotiations now over the
completion of this security barrier. In fact, they are scheduled to
meet again October 26 of this year.
According to the California Coastal Commission: ``Feasible
alternatives are available that would significantly lessen adverse
impacts to coastal zone resources and still will enable the California
Border Patrol to meet its border patrol needs.''
Supporters of this amendment have shown no evidence to prove that
each of the 16 cultural heritage, public health, and environmental
regulations it seeks to undermine is blocking completion of the
security barrier.
How is the executive order on environmental justice blocking
completion of this security barrier?
Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Oregon
(Mr. Blumenauer).
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Chairman, there are all sorts of problems along
the United States-Mexican border, but to take a sensitive area that, as
my friend, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Kildee), has pointed out,
where there are serious issues relating to native Americans. We are
working on areas here, in terms of the massive amount of fill that
would be involved, twice the size of the Hoover Dam, is something that
people need to take a pause, a deep breath, and take a careful look.
There is a lot of environmental damage that can be done.
We cannot keep people, illegal aliens, from crossing the border. It
is porous, we know it. To move forward with this massive project now,
suspending environmental regulations, extends a precedent that I think
is chilling.
Our Capitol is a monument to our inability to get things right in
terms of things that all of us know are not going to retard terrorists
but make our Capitol into sort of a fortress. We are spending money,
trying to make people feel good. Suspending environmental regulations
in a way that is not going to have any long-term impact. I urge its
rejection.
Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the remaining time.
Look, you have been able to build almost this entire fence without
the waiving of any environmental laws. The record that the gentleman
showed there just a moment ago gave the Attorney General the authority
to waive NEPA and ESEA. You are now going into a whole complicated
series of laws, including the protection of Bald Eagles, Indian rights
and things like that, Superfund issues.
I have been involved with these issues for a long, long time, living
on the coast. And I will tell the gentleman that what he is opening up
is a can of worms for lawsuits and complaints and so on.
This is not the wise way to go with this amendment, and I object to
the amendment and will ask for a recorded vote on it.
Mr. OSE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Two speakers go, we had someone on that side talking about
negotiations, that there are negotiations pending. The fact of the
matter is negotiations have been going on for 6 years, and we are no
closer to a solution. We had a speaker just previous from Oregon stand
up and make an argument for doing nothing. I am sorry, I do not
understand that.
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to extend the debate time on
each side for 1 minute.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Linder). Is there objection to the
request of the gentleman from California?
There was no objection.
Mr. OSE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from San
Diego, California (Mr. Cunningham).
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from California (Mr.
Hunter) and I have been fighting this for the last 20 years. Many of
the same people that tried to stop us from putting up the fence when
there were rapes and murders, there was a single line of barbed wire
and people were coming right and left into the United States with truck
loads of marijuana and cocaine. I resent saying this is a made-up
issue.
I have operated out of that Navy base. Gordon England, Secretary of
the Navy, states that it is imperative, that it is dangerous to leave
that hole open. Bald Eagles in a 4-mile stretch? Give me a break.
We are at war. I sit on the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, and I cannot go into specifics, but do my colleagues know
where these guys are coming up? In Mexico. And do my colleagues know
what? We are vulnerable. We have a base that has nuclear ships right
next door that could blow up the whole waterfront.
It is wrong to oppose this. We need to close the hole in the dike.
Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 50 seconds to the gentleman from
Washington (Mr. Inslee).
(Mr. INSLEE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. INSLEE. Mr. Chairman, well, I have some bad news. After this 3
miles is done, there is about another 4,000 miles unfortunately that
remains at risk.
I would just ask Members to consider what we just did on this floor.
We just extended the time a little bit to get this debate right, and I
appreciate the gentleman's courtesy in doing that.
Do we know why Americans have accepted the Endangered Species Act?
Because they recognize you can take just a bit more time and do it
right.
On October 26, when they have this meeting to get this resolved, we
hope that is going to happen. We have built bridges, we have built
highways, we built the most powerful military machine in world history
with the Endangered Species Act. This is not endangering us. We should
not go back to the

[[Page H8901]]

days of ignoring this problem. Defeat this amendment.
Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the remaining time.
Let me say it straight. Nobody is against building this fence. It is
just, why waive all of these rules? We have built 14 miles of this
fence without having to waive any rules. I do not think it is
necessary. I think it is a guise and a political maneuver.
Mr. OSE. Mr. Chairman, I yield the remainder of my time to the
gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier), the chairman of the Committee
on Rules and the champion in California on immigration issues and
protecting our country.
(Mr. DREIER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. DREIER. Mr. Chairman, we have heard the eloquence of my friends,
the gentleman from San Diego, California (Mr. Cunningham) and the
gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter) and the gentleman from
California (Mr. Ose), obviously, focusing on the national security, the
homeland security, the drug interdiction aspect of this, which is very
important.
Let us talk about the environmental side of not constructing this
fence. The Tijuana Estuary happens to be a very environmentally
sensitive area. The fact that this fence is not being constructed is
jeopardizing the environmental quality in the San Diego sector right
now with the trash and the other disposal that is taking place, really
exacerbating a serious problem.
The pro-environment vote and pro-national security and homeland
security vote is to vote ``yes'' for the Ose amendment.
Mrs. DAVIS of California. Mr. Chairman, I must regretfully rise in
opposition to the Ose amendment, which has been sprung on us this
afternoon without any notice or prior opportunity to discuss the
issues.
As a member of the Armed Services Committee, I have spent hundreds of
hours devoted to the issues surrounding Homeland Security. Situated as
my district is in San Diego, I am concerned to secure not only our
border but also our busy port and ship-building facilities located on
San Diego Bay, which is crossed by a dramatic bridge, our international
airport, and our numerous military installations which are the home
bases for nuclear carriers and nuclear submarine. We have much to be
proud of--and much to protect.
It is challenging to us all to prioritize actions that we can take
with our Homeland Security dollars to provide increased security
against past and likely focal points for terrorists. It is important
that we assure that scarce resources are devoted to the kinds of
actions that will in fact keep our borders safe from known entry points
for terrorists.
The measure before us to expedite the long-proposed triple border
fence overturns years of effort on the part of the local communities
along the border, civic groups, and elected representatives to come to
consensus with the Border Patrol about appropriate means to enhance and
strengthen the existing fence.
Fortunately, during the past ten years since the inauguration of
Operation Gatekeeper, the numbers of illegal border crossers in the
area under consideration has dropped 80 percent.
Nonetheless, I agree that the present quality of the single fence
needs updating at least to the highest quality of fence construction
proposed and already implemented along adjacent border areas. Moreover,
I have been assured by local high tech companies which provide
sophisticated technology for other homeland security needs that much
more could be done with electronic surveillance and detection.
Similar views have been officially expressed by the California
Coastal Commission, which has jurisdiction in this area, and by the
California Coastal Conservancy which has a $6 million road and access
improvement project in this area.
In the past, the California Border Patrol has been unwilling to
pursue any alternative proposals other than the one which has been so
thoroughly rejected by state and local interest groups. Their view has
been ``my way, and it's a highway.''
However, since its February vote to object to the proposal, the
California Coastal Commission has been working with the Department of
Homeland Security's office of Homeland Security, Customs and Border
Protection in charge of construction to resolve this issue. I
understand the parties met in April to discuss their views and that
both parties expected and have planned to continue this effort at a
meeting on October 26, 2004, to continue the ongoing negotiations.
Perhaps the author was unaware of this plan. I believe we must support
this effort.
It is no surprise that the Ose amendment waives all powers of the
Clean Air Act; the Clean Water Act; the Protection of Wetlands; the
Floodplain Management; the Coastal Zone Management Act; the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act; the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, Liability Act as amended by Emergency Planning
and Community Right-To-Know Act; the Farmland Protection Policy Act;
the Endangered Species Act; the Migratory Bird Treaty Act; the National
Historic Preservation Act; the Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act; and the Archeological Resources Protection Act.
That is because this proposal is so overwhelmingly threatening to the
sensitive lands that would be destroyed as to offend all of these acts.
Above all, this wholesale destruction is unnecessary. I would welcome
continued work with the affected parties, most particularly with the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, to find a solution to their
staffing needs that does not destroy millions of dollars of prior
investment by California in these sensitive areas. We must use our
scarce Homeland Security dollars in projects that are focused on major
areas where there are large numbers of border crossers who might become
a threat from terrorists.
San Diego deserves to be protected, but we have many areas in need of
new programs and technology that will address likely targets.
I urge your defeat of this proposal at this time and your willingness
to work together toward a reasoned proposal.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. All time having expired, the question is on
the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. Ose).
The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California
(Mr. Ose) will be postponed.
It is now in order to consider amendment No. 19 printed in House
Report 108-751.

Amendment No. 19 Offered by Mr. Weldon of Pennsylvania

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment No. 19 offered by Mr. Weldon of Pennsylvania:
At the end of chapter 2 of subtitle H of title V (page 602,
after line 16), add the following:

SEC. __. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS COMPACTS.

Section 611(h) of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief
and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5196(h)) is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) as
paragraphs (2), (3), and (4), respectively;
(2) by indenting paragraph (2) (as so redesignated); and
(3) by striking the subsection designation and heading and
inserting the following:
``(h) Emergency Preparedness Compacts.--(1) The Director
shall establish a program supporting the development of
emergency preparedness compacts for acts of terrorism,
disasters, and emergencies throughout the Nation, by--
``(A) identifying and cataloging existing emergency
preparedness compacts for acts of terrorism, disasters, and
emergencies at the State and local levels of government;
``(B) disseminating to State and local governments examples
of best practices in the development of emergency
preparedness compacts and models of existing emergency
preparedness compacts, including agreements involving
interstate jurisdictions; and
``(C) completing an inventory of Federal response
capabilities for acts of terrorism, disasters, and
emergencies, making such inventory available to appropriate
Federal, State, and local government officials, and ensuring
that such inventory is as current and accurate as
practicable.''.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) and a Member opposed each will
control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon.)
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as
I may consume.
I thank my good friend from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews) for cosponsoring
this amendment. The gentleman has been a leader on homeland security
and emergency response issues long before 9/11. In fact, we first met
when he was the solicitor for the Camden County Firefighters
Association and I was county commissioner across the river. We have
worked together on first responder issues since then.

[[Page H8902]]

This amendment is critically important, Mr. Chairman, because it
requires the Federal Government to establish what should have been
established years ago, and that is a process of identifying emergency
preparedness compacts. Many of our regions like the Washington area
region have already established multistate, multicounty jurisdictional
plans to respond to natural and manmade disasters; but that is not the
case around the country.
This bill requires us to inventory those plans that are in place and
do work to encourage and establish models that other jurisdictions can
use. But it goes beyond that, Mr. Chairman, because this bill also
requires an inventory of assets and resources that local emergency
responders can call upon if and when a disaster occurs.
I can recall, Mr. Chairman, during the tenure of my time in Congress,
I have been on site at most disasters personally. I was walking the
freeways of the San Francisco and Oakland area after the earthquake 10
years ago with the chiefs of the San Francisco and Oakland Fire
Departments, and they were looking for people who were allegedly still
trapped in vehicles sandwiched in-between those two levels of the
freeway that had come down on top of each other. I said to the chiefs,
why are you not using thermal imagers, and they said to me, what are
thermal imagers? They had no idea that the Defense Department had
developed that technology 10 years earlier. They could have used that
to very quickly identify people who were still alive.
This bill requires a computerized inventory of those kinds of assets
that are available that are not easily identified.
I think Chief Morris in Oklahoma City, another good friend of mine,
who responded to the terrorist attack on the Federal Building in
Oklahoma City, when the chief arrived he needed structural engineers.
He had children at day care that were trapped. He needed specialized
advice on how to deal with the potential of chemical and biological
agents. He had none of that available to him.
Through this amendment, not only will we do the regional preplanning
and require these compacts to be established, but we will also have an
inventory of the available technologies that first responders can use
that chief officers on the scenes of situations like Oklahoma City or
the World Trade Center or any other incident in America can make
available to them from the Federal or State governments.
It is a good amendment. I think it makes common sense, and I hope all
of our colleagues will support it.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. There being no Member claiming the time in
opposition to the amendment, without objection, the gentleman from New
Jersey (Mr. Andrews) is recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) for offering
this amendment. His wealth of experience on the front lines in the
first responder community shows, once again; and I am honored to join
with him in this amendment.

{time} 1315

I thank the gentleman for his years of dedication to first responders
in this country, long before Members talked about them on this floor.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania and I share a geographic area. Our
districts are separated only by a river. If, God forbid, there were a
terrorist attack, a mass crime, a natural disaster, his constituents
and mine would be responsible for responding to it. We are proud of the
fact that locally in our area there is cooperation. But the fact of the
matter is cooperation now happens by accident, not by design; and our
amendment is to change that. It requires that the director of FEMA do
three things: first, that the director of FEMA catalog examples of
cooperative agreements and compacts around the country.
Second, it requires that the FEMA director issue guidance on best
practices, what is working. We are going to hear from the gentlewoman
from the District of Columbia (Ms. Norton) talk about the capital area
plan that is working very, very well.
Thirdly, it requires an up-to-date accessible inventory of Federal
resources that would be available. In the golden hour that takes place
after such an attack or disaster, we do not have weeks or months to
study a problem. The chiefs on the ground have to decide right there
and then what to do. By making this resource available to them, I think
we will save lives and minimize disaster. I thank the gentleman for
offering this amendment, and I hope Members on both sides of the aisle
will vote a resounding ``yes.''
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance
of my time.
In closing, I thank the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews). This
is a bipartisan amendment. I would just say to Members I am going to
ask for a recorded vote here because I introduced legislation almost a
dozen years ago to require our FEMA agency to establish a computerized
inventory. Twelve years later, it is still not done. As a reinforcement
of this part of the bill, I am going to ask for a show of support from
my colleagues.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as she may consume to
the gentlewoman from the District of Columbia (Ms. Norton), whose
capital area response plan has set the model for how to go about this
regional planning and serves as an example to others.
Ms. NORTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time, and I thank the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews) and the
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) for this amendment.
I have an amendment pending in a package we have not gotten to. My
pending amendment would in fact have relevant regions across the United
States, whether within the same State or not, engage functionally in
what I think this amendment would do. I would have a coordinator and
the coordinator could be chosen by whoever were the various officials,
whether across State lines or within a State.
Yes, it is true that the national capital region is the model for how
it should be done. Here we have three States: Maryland, Virginia and
the District of Columbia. The portions of those States closest to where
the security is of greatest need and where the Federal presence is,
because the Federal presence is as much in Virginia, Maryland and the
District of Columbia, and in some cases more so, witness the Pentagon.
This region has a long history of cooperating.
But after 9/11, even that long history of cooperation was not enough.
Because of the uniqueness of the national capital region, Congress has
said there has to be a paid coordinator for this region. Other regions,
of course, would almost surely not have the Federal Government paying
for the coordinator. The reason that the coordinator is paid for here
is because virtually the entire Federal presence is located here.
But I have worried that what a coordinator would do is not being done
in these regions. I appreciate what these Members have done. They have
leaped over the title and essentially said do it, or at least do some
of it, such as information-sharing. Other areas of their amendment make
it clear that what Congress wants is coordination across State lines if
necessary and certainly across regional lines.
I think minimally what this amendment wants is what the country
needs, and I hope because this is a bipartisan amendment that it will
pass; it will pave the way for the next step which would be of course
coordinators for the various regions. Again, I thank the gentleman from
Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) and the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr.
Andrews) for their amendment.
Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon)
for his efforts. I also thank Mr. Dozor from the gentleman's staff, and
Mr. Knotts from mine for their great effort.
Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Weldon-Andrews
amendment on emergency preparedness compacts.
The terrorist attacks of September 2001 stretched the response
capabilities of our

[[Page H8903]]

local, State, and Federal emergency agencies to the breaking point. The
attacks caused an unprecedented number of deaths, unprecedented
physical destruction, and, at times, utter chaos. The attacks also
presented planning, operational, and logistical problems of new and
different dimensions.
Both the Bush administration and 9/11 Commission have recognized that
no one community can cope with such an unparalleled catastrophe by
itself. Indeed, the President's Homeland Security Directive 5 and the
9/11 Commission's report both stressed the vital importance of ensuring
that all levels of government across the Nation have the capability to
work together efficiently and effectively.
This is precisely why emergency preparedness compacts are so
important. They enable emergency managers from different jurisdictions
and agencies to provide personnel and equipment in the event of acts of
terrorism, disasters, and emergencies. They ensure that no community is
overwhelmed.
And this is also precisely why I urge you to support the Weldon-
Andrews amendment.
Their amendment would require the Director of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, FEMA, to establish a program supporting the
development of emergency preparedness compacts across the Nation.
This program will identify and catalog all existing emergency
preparedness compacts.
This program also will encourage jurisdictions without compacts to
enter into them by disseminating the best examples of such compacts.
Finally, this program will create, and update as necessary, an
inventory of Federal response capabilities and make it available to
State and local government officials.
I commend Representatives Weldon and Andrews for their bipartisan
leadership and vision in offering this important amendment.
As chairman of the Select Committee on Homeland Security, I strongly
encourage my colleagues to support this amendment.
Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Linder). The question is on the
amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon).
The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania
(Mr. Weldon) will be postponed.
It is now in order to consider amendment No. 21 printed in House
Report 108-751.

Amendment No. 21 Offered by Mr. Bartlett of Maryland

Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment No. 21 offered by Mr. Bartlett of Maryland:
Page 478, insert after line 15 the following:

SECTION 5010. STUDY OF EXPANSION OF AREA OF JURISDICTION OF
OFFICE OF NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION COORDINATION.

(a) Study.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, acting
through the Director of the Office of National Capital Region
Coordination, shall conduct a study of the feasibility and
desirability of modifying the definition of ``National
Capital Region'' applicable under section 882 of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 to expand the geographic area under the
jurisdiction of the Office of National Capital Region
Coordination.
(b) Factors.--In conducting the study under subsection (a),
the Secretary shall analyze whether expanding the geographic
area under the jurisdiction of the Office of National Region
Coordination will--
(1) promote coordination among State and local governments
within the Region, including regional governing bodies, and
coordination of the efforts of first responders; and
(2) enhance the ability of such State and local governments
and the Federal Government to prevent and respond to a
terrorist attack within the Region.
(c) Report.--Not later than 6 months after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report to
Congress on the study conducted under subsection (a), and
shall include in the report such recommendations (including
recommendations for legislation to amend section 882 of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002) as the Secretary considers
appropriate.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the
gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Bartlett) and the gentlewoman from the
District of Columbia (Ms. Norton) each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Bartlett).
Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes.
This amendment, which is the text of H.R. 3583, will establish a
study to provide an objective analysis of whether the current
capabilities of the infrastructure in the region around our Nation's
capital are adequate in the event of a mass casualty disaster.
I have worked closely with the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Cardin),
the gentlewoman from Virginia (Mrs. Jo Ann Davis), and I have worked
closely on this legislation; and we are very pleased by the wide
bipartisan support of our colleagues in Maryland, Washington, and
Virginia.
This amendment calls upon the Secretary of Homeland Security to
create a commission to report to Congress its findings. In particular,
I have looked forward to working with the gentlewoman from the District
of Columbia (Ms. Norton) to address her concerns concerning the
implementation of this amendment. I will commit to the gentlewoman to
ensure that the GSA will have major input into the study, that it will
not predispose an alteration of the definition of the national capital
region, and that it will assess existing emergency response
capabilities among the public and private sectors in the District of
Columbia, Maryland and Virginia, what capabilities would be necessary
in the event of a mass casualty incident and recommendations to correct
any shortfalls.
This commission will specifically study the major Federal interstate
highways out of America's capital. Normal rush hour traffic around our
Nation's capital can last as long as 4 hours. In the event of a
terrorist attack or other emergency in Washington, D.C., millions of
people would be unable to evacuate and get home to their families.
In June 2003, the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments
Board urged Congress to analyze whether the current definition of the
national capital region meets current needs. I am pleased that they
support this amendment.
I would also like to recognize an important local health care
provider, Adventist HealthCare. Adventist HealthCare has two hospitals,
Washington Adventist Hospital in Takoma Park and Shady Grove Adventist
in Rockville, along two of the designated evacuation routes developed
by the D.C. Division of Transportation. Adventist HealthCare has
independently committed to invest over $360 million to develop and
begin implementing a comprehensive plan to ensure that they are
prepared for the potential of a mass casualty event.
Cooperation and coordination between relevant Federal Government
agencies, such as the Department of Homeland Security, Health and Human
Services, and private sectors, are very important.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. NORTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I oppose this amendment with regret. I believe every
Member of the national capital region and everyone who cares about the
security of the national capital region should oppose this amendment as
well.
Normally, I would have absolutely no problem with a study. This study
and this amendment, both the original bill and the amendment are called
study of an expansion of area of jurisdiction of Office of National
Capital Region Coordination. That is the special coordinator I just
spoke about in the last amendment.
The amendment itself suggests the conclusion: expansion. This is not
the time to even think about diluting the area defined by law as the
national capital region. It has not happened haphazardly. I did offer
to work with my colleagues from the greater region. I think an
objective study that was done by the region, the agencies that have the
expertise, and the gentleman has indicated that he knows that the GSA
has it, yes homeland security might be useful. I am a member of both
committees. The last thing I want to do is give the Committee on
Homeland Security, which has existing mandates to report back to
Congress, something else to do, something which I think is absolutely
unnecessary.
The expertise exists within the government, and this is something
that

[[Page H8904]]

does not require legislation at all. The resources that protect the
national capital region we need to expand, not think about diluting.
When we talk about this region, understand what we are talking about.
We are talking about the Pentagon, the CIA, NIH, Arlington Cemetery,
Andrews, Fort Belvoir, the FBI Academy, Goddard Space Center, the FDA.
We are not talking about the District of Columbia. It goes without
saying that is going to be protected. The greater Federal presence is
found in nearby Maryland, Northern Virginia, and Montgomery and Prince
George's counties.
What expense we have to go through just to protect this region I do
not want to even talk about, but it includes the flyover, the guards we
have to send out. We have to send them out if there were an agency
somewhere out in the region.
The GSA and the National Capital Planning Commission have
consistently been against sprawl of government agencies. It is already
6,000 square miles. We are talking way out into Maryland and Virginia,
Loudoun, Prince William, Fairfax. They have opposed it because of
security, commuting, taxpayer cost-saving reasons. They have
consistently said we have to keep as many agencies as possible within
this region. It is much harder to protect Federal facilities; and
therefore they say, whether you are talking about embassies or Federal
agencies, they ought to be within this region.
When there is an alert, they have to send them wherever the facility
is. For economies of scale, we want to in fact keep agencies
concentrated. If Members want a study, I am willing to study; but they
do not need to come before this Congress and ask for an expensive study
to be done, distracting the Department of Homeland Security from what
it has already on its plate.
I am willing to work with the gentleman, but I think we do not need a
new study at taxpayers' expense beyond what we already have the ability
to do. The agencies that are within the national capital area, the
coordination that we do now needs far greater focus and far greater
resources. It is clear what the gentleman wants. I oppose this
amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the
gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Cardin).
Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Chairman, the national capital region was established
in 1952 during the 82nd Congress. It includes not only the District of
Columbia; it includes in Maryland, Prince George's and Montgomery
counties. In Virginia, it is Arlington, Fairfax, Loudoun, and Prince
William counties.

{time} 1330

In the south, Mr. Chairman, the region goes about 30 miles. In the
north, it goes about 10 miles. If it went 30 miles to the north, it
would include Baltimore, where I happen to live.
When we adopted the Homeland Security Act in 2002, we made reference
to the national capital region. What we are asking, and I applaud my
friend from Maryland (Mr. Bartlett) is to let the Department of
Homeland Security study the security issues of this region.
If we have a problem in the Nation's capital and people try to leave
this region, they are going to want to be able to get to Crofton and
Annapolis and to Frederick, and there is going to be gridlock if we do
not have a plan that includes beyond that short distance in Maryland.
All this does is ask for a study. It does not diminish resources at
all. In fact, it will allow us to provide a more reasonable plan for
the Nation's capital.
Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the
gentlewoman from Virginia (Mrs. Jo Ann Davis).
Mrs. JO ANN DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I am glad my colleague
from D.C. talked about protecting the FBI Academy in the national
capital region because that, in fact, is located in what the
gentlewoman calls ``way out there in Virginia'' which is my area.
I rise today in strong support of the Bartlett amendment, which
directs the Department of Homeland Security to conduct a study to see
if there is a need to expand the national capital region.
The terrorist attacks of 2001 demonstrated firsthand the need for the
national capital region to be expanded. The I-95 corridor, which
includes the Fredericksburg/Stafford area that I represent, served as
one of the major evacuation routes for D.C. Anybody who drove down that
95 corridor on September 11, 2001, would agree that, as one of the main
evacuation routes, it is necessary to secure sufficient infrastructure
along I-95 to handle any mass evacuation.
The current definition of the national capital region should be
expanded as a result of the new threats to homeland security. I urge
all of my colleagues to support the Bartlett amendment. I urge my
colleague from D.C. to look at where those areas that she says need to
be protected, where they are located.
Ms. NORTON. Mr. Chairman, how much time do I have remaining?
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Linder). The gentlewoman from the
District of Columbia (Ms. Norton) has 30 seconds remaining.
Ms. NORTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from
Virginia (Mr. Moran).
Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I could take much longer than 30
seconds just to list the highest priority targets that are within the
national capital region.
The reality of what this is going to lead to is that you are going to
have to substantially expand the amount of money available for homeland
security or draw from other parts of the country to adequately protect
the Capitol, the White House, the CIA, the Pentagon and the immediate
suburbs of Northern Virginia, Maryland and, particularly, the District
of Columbia; you have got to provide adequate resources. This is where
the terrorists are going to target. This is ground zero. This is where
the money needs to be concentrated.
If we had enough money, we would love to go beyond that area. I do
not think we can afford to.
Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra), the chairman of the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I think this is a good amendment. I
support the amendment. This is an amendment we would like to have in
the en bloc amendment. But having this study available for the national
capital region is helpful. I think it is the right thing to do, but it
is also helpful in determining and developing a case study which could
be used in other areas.
I support the amendment.
Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
Mr. Chairman, on 9/11, our world changed. What used to be adequate
for the greater metropolitan area of Washington, which is defined by
the national capital region, generally, what was adequate then may not
be adequate now.
This is a very simple amendment. It simply asks for a commission to
study; we need to look at what the national capital area represents,
and is the infrastructure here adequate to meet the kind of a terrorist
attack that we might anticipate in the future? It is a very simple
amendment, sir.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by
the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Bartlett).
The amendment was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. It is now in order to consider amendment
No. 23 printed in House Report 108-751.

Amendment No. 23 Offered by Mr. Porter

Mr. PORTER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment No. 23 offered by Mr. Porter:
At the end of subtitle C of title V (page 493, after the
item after line 21) add the following:

SEC. __. UNDER SECRETARY FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND TOURISM.

(a) Establishment of Under Secretary for the Private Sector
and Tourism.--Section 103(a) of the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (6 U.S.C. 113(a)) is further amended by redesignating
paragraphs (2) through (10) in order as paragraphs (3)
through (11), and by inserting after paragraph (1) the
following:
``(2) An Under Secretary for the Private Sector and
Tourism.''.
(b) Functions.--Section 102(f) of such Act (6 U.S.C.
112(f)) is further amended--

[[Page H8905]]

(1) by striking so much as precedes paragraph (1) and
inserting the following:
``(f) Under Secretary for the Private Sector and Tourism.--
The Undersecretary for the Private Sector and Tourism shall
be responsible for--''; and
(2) by striking ``and'' after the semicolon at the end of
paragraph (7), by striking the period at the end of paragraph
(8) and inserting a semicolon, and by adding at the end the
following:
``(9) employing an analytic and economic staff who shall
report directly to the Under Secretary on the commercial and
economic impact of Department polices;
``(10) coordinating with the Office of State and Local
Government on all matters of concern to the private sector,
including the tourism industry; and
``(11) coordinating with the Assistant Secretary for Trade
Development of the Department of Commerce on means of
promoting tourism and travel to the United States.''.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the
gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Porter) and a Member opposed each will
control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Porter).
Mr. PORTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to H.R. 10 that will recognize the
importance of the private sector and the tourism industry in particular
in our Nation's homeland security.
I, like many Members here today in this great body, have read the 9/
11 report and am anxious to act on its findings.
I would like to quote from that report: ``The mandate of the Homeland
Security Department does not end with the government. The Department is
also responsible for working with the private sector to ensure
preparedness.''
It also says, the ``private sector preparedness is not a luxury. It
is a cost of doing business in the post 9/11 world.''
Mr. Chairman, we currently have a Special Assistant to the Secretary
for the Private Sector, before the report was published, and
unfortunately, the report says we still are not helping the private
sector enough.
As an example, the Las Vegas community in the great State of Nevada,
we had applied for the Urban Area Security Initiatives Grants and
determined that, initially, we did not qualify because we are a small
State of approximately 2 million people. With further research, they
realized that we have 38 million tourists that visit the great State of
Nevada annually. That is an example where there are some challenges
with the current law.
We need to promote this position to give it the weight, to make sure
private industry is helped and encouraged in its effort to enhance
homeland security while staying in business, protecting their employees
and their customers.
Again, as I read the 9/11 report, it mentioned how easily the
terrorists mingled with the 500 million people who travel across our
borders every year and with the hundreds of millions more who travel
internally in this country. As I said, Nevada has close to 38 million
visitors a year.
The report has some excellent ideas on how to improve transportation
and border security, and I look forward to passing those suggestions.
But the travel and tourism industry is the number one, number two and
number three industry in every State of the union. It is the common
element of the private sector in every community. Domestic travellers
spend close to $500 billion annually in this country. Foreign tourism
contributes $80 billion to our economy. Tourism generates close to $95
billion in taxes, and tourism in our country supports 7.2 million jobs,
generating $158 billion in payroll.
As a matter of fact, Las Vegas is the bellwether for an ever-changing
and improving economy, creating close to 40,000 new jobs alone in the
last year.
Mr. Chairman, my amendment ensures that the DHS has a senior official
that recognizes the importance of this industry and all industry and
provides liaison with other Federal agencies active on this very
important issues.
Our small businesses, their employees, their customers deserve to
have their needs count when homeland security decisions are made.
It is important to note that this amendment does not cost the Federal
Government in additional dollars or disrupt the operation of any
agencies. Mr. Chairman, I urge the House to pass my amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. TURNER of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition to
the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Porter) offers an
amendment that points to the very important relationships between our
homeland security and what goes on in our private sector.
The 9/11 Commission recognized the critical role that the private
sector plays in protecting our citizens from harm. The commission did
not make the recommendations contained in the gentleman's amendment,
but rather, one of the core recommendations of the 9/11 Commission did
deal with the subject matter of the gentleman's amendment; and that is
the recommendation to enhance preparedness for all disasters and
emergencies, including acts of terrorism in the private sector.
They specifically recommended that the Department of Homeland
Security promote the adoption of private sector preparedness standards
that have been developed by the American National Standards Institute.
Once again, like many of the other recommendations of the 9/11
Commission, H.R. 10 includes no provisions to deal with the need for
standards for private sector preparedness. In the aftermath of the 9/11
attacks, the commission found that many of the tenants of the World
Trade Center were unprepared for the catastrophic events that occurred.
Many businesses did not regularly practice evacuation drills. Few had
alternative communication systems, and many firms lacked the ability to
identify who was working on that particular day.
The Democratic substitute offered by the gentleman from New Jersey
(Mr. Menendez), like the Private Sector Preparedness Act which I
introduced back in July, establishes a program to ensure the safety and
security of citizens while they are at work. It would provide
businesses with the guidance they need to develop evacuation plans to
account for all of their employees and to get back in business as soon
as possible following a disaster.
We understand that 85 percent of all critical infrastructure in our
country is owned and operated by the private sector. It is, therefore,
clear that a national standard is necessary to guarantee the safety of
the American people. Yet, despite this very apparent and critical need,
H.R. 10 fails to adopt in this 9/11 Commission's recommendations and,
therefore, leaves a glaring gap in our Nation's security.
I commend the gentleman for his amendment. I think that it is one
that the department could, under existing law in the Homeland Security
Act, carry out, but the effect of the amendment will be to urge the
department to recognize the critical role of the private sector in our
preparedness for terrorist instances. And it will also, I think, point
out to the department that we must make an even greater effort to
ensure that, as we impose security, we do not jeopardize the movement
of commerce, the movement of trade; we do not jeopardize tourism, which
is so vitally important to this country, particularly to the district
and the State represented by the gentleman who offered the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. PORTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the comments from my colleague. I will
conclude by stating the importance of this is for the safety first of
those visiting and traveling to our communities, providing the
expertise from those individuals that deal with, on a daily basis, the
handling of millions and millions of visitors to our great State and to
our country and to the businesses that do the same.
Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from
Illinois (Mr. Hastert).
Mr. HASTERT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the 9/11
Recommendations Implementation Act. I urge all of my colleagues on both
sides of the aisle to support it. I want to thank those who brought
good ideas to the process to make this country safer.
I want to thank the 9/11 Commission for their recommendations and the
stellar work of both the chairman and the vice chairman of that
committee over a long period of time to take the

[[Page H8906]]

interest of this Nation at heart, to try to craft recommendations that
make this country safer against terrorists.
I want to thank the chairmen and ranking members of the committees of
jurisdiction in this House of Representatives. They have done an
incredible job. They have come together. They have worked hard and, by
and large, on a bipartisan basis to find good answers to tough
problems. They have worked hard to provide us with their best ideas on
how to implement these recommendations.
Some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle complained about
the process, and I must admit that I am baffled by those complaints. We
had countless hearings during the August recess in every committee of
jurisdiction. We had 20-some hearings on this issue in the last couple
of months. We have had an open amendment process at the committee
level, and we carefully considered the ideas of the commission and of
the committees' chairmen, and we came up with a response that will make
this country safer.
Some have complained that we are going too slow. Some have complained
that we are going too fast. Some said our bill was too strong. Others
said this bill is too weak. Some have complained because it is simply
their nature to complain. Despite the complaints, I am proud of this
work product.
This legislation will make this country safer. It will make our
families safer. It will ensure the safety of our children and our
parents. It is comprehensive. It reforms the government to make it more
effective in battling terrorists that want to do harm to this country.
It creates a National Intelligence Director. The new position will have
full budget authority. It creates the National Counterterrorism Center
and a Joint Intelligence Community Council. It improves terrorism
prevention and prosecution so that we can get the terrorists and those
who help them before they get us.

{time} 1345

It improves border security. It makes it harder for terrorists to
travel to America.
One provision that has drawn quite a bit of attention deals with the
convention against torture. We do not condone torture in this country
or any other country, but we do not want known terrorists and criminals
living among us either.
The courts have said criminal aliens and terrorists cannot be held
indefinitely in the United States, but the convention against torture
says we cannot deport some people back to their own country if they ask
for political asylum because of torture.
In 500 cases, the Justice Department has been forced to release alien
terrorists and other international criminals whom they cannot detain
and they cannot deport. I do not think that makes any sense. If you
find a rattlesnake in your backyard, you should not be forced to
release it in your front yard.
We have reached a common-sense solution to this problem by giving the
Justice Department the power to continue to hold those terrorists and
those alien criminals.
These are the kinds of solutions that my colleagues will find in our
bill. They will not find it in the minority's alternative.
Why is this type of provision so controversial? To me, it just makes
sense.
Yes, we disagree with the other body when it comes to making our
intelligence budget public. We believe that telling our enemies how
much we spend on certain intelligence programs diminishes our national
security. Why should we give those who want to do us harm any
information that might help them?
Yesterday, I met with three women who lost loved ones in the 9/11
attacks. I can only imagine the pain that they feel every day, and I
know the passion that they bring to this debate today. We share their
sense of loss. We share their commitment to making this country, this
Nation, safer.
I have a simple message for them. We will get this job done. The
process will work. We will pass a bill today that implements the 9/11
Commission recommendations. We will appoint conferees that will hammer
out a good conference report that will be signed by the President of
the United States.
Yes, at the end of the day, we will enact a law that will make our
country safer, this America, the United States of America, and the
people that live in it proud.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Linder). All time for the majority side
has expired.
Mr. TURNER of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
The distinguished Speaker said he is baffled by some of the
complaints that were heard by those of us who supported the Menendez
substitute. I think our complaints are easy to understand.
We feel very strongly that the 9/11 Commission presented us with a
package of 41 recommendations that the Commission and their cochairs
all said are important. H.R. 10 only fully implements 11 of those
recommendations. The Republican bill only implements 15 of them
partially, and the Republican bill ignores or only mentions in passing
the other 15 recommendations.
The substitute that we offered on this floor implements all of the
recommendations. It does it in an effective way, and it makes the kind
of commitment that Democrats have argued for the last 2 years must be
made to make America safe.
We are investing today $20 billion more on homeland security than we
did prior to 9/11, but in the last fiscal year, when we were investing
that additional $20 billion, we were investing four times that in tax
cuts for American families who make over $1 million a year. That is the
wrong choice, it is the wrong priority, and our bill moves faster, it
moves stronger in protecting the homeland than H.R. 10 offered by the
Republican leadership.
For that reason, we believe that the Senate bill, which passed
yesterday, which reflects the contents of the Menendez substitute that
was on this floor yesterday, is the superior alternative to helping
America stay safe; and we hope that when this bill goes to conference
that the provisions of the Senate bill that are absent in H.R. 10 will
be added to the final product and come back to this floor with a
conference committee report that clearly reflects the wisdom and the
intent of the bipartisan 9/11 Commission and the work that they did so
well.
Ms. BORDALLO. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Porter
amendment.
Throughout this important debate, emphasis has been placed on the
need to ensure information is shared within the intelligence community.
As we conclude this debate, we now have before us an amendment that
would ensure information on the private sector is also made a part of
the process and taken into consideration in the formulation of homeland
security policy.
The facts speak for themselves. The travel and tourism industry has a
considerable impact on the U.S. economy--adding nearly 5 percent to the
GDP, generating more than half a billion dollars in revenues,
supporting more than 17 million jobs, and providing a $14 million trade
surplus for our country. Mr. Chairman, an overwhelming number of the
businesses in travel and tourism are small- to medium-sized
enterprises. Therefore, I believe DHS should be especially cognizant of
its policy and regulatory impact on the travel and tourism industry.
Whether it is our aviation industry, the aircraft designers or the
airline employees on the flight line, the hotel industry, or our
amusement parks, we need homeland security policy that will effectively
provide for the safety of our citizens and the economic vitality of our
most important industries. We should not put ourselves in a position
where in an effort to protect our infrastructure, we shut down the very
use of transportation services we are trying to protect.
In my district, Guam, like Nevada, tourism is a leading industry in
the private sector. Post-September 11 policies have already shown a
major impact on businesses in my district. What this amendment does, is
ensure this impact is assessed and considered inside DHS when
developing policy.
If you believe economic security ultimately underpins our national
security, then you should vote for the Porter amendment.
The vitality and sustainability of the travel and tourism industry is
a national economic necessity. Consumer confidence in travel and in the
economy is needed. Safety and security in travel is key to this
consumer confidence. By elevating the Special Assistant to an Under
Secretary and by encouraging coordination with local governments and
the Commerce Department, the Porter amendment gives DHS the authority
it needs to craft and execute policy to achieve these goals.
I thank the gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Porter) for his leadership, I
urge adoption of

[[Page H8907]]

his amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by
the gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Porter).
The amendment was agreed to.

Sequential Votes Postponed In Committee Of The Whole

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII,
proceedings will now resume on those amendments on which further
proceedings were postponed in the following order: amendment No. 14
offered by Mr. Smith of New Jersey, amendment No. 15 offered by Mr.
Smith of New Jersey, amendment No. 17 offered by Mr. Ose of California,
amendment No. 19 offered by Mr. Weldon of Pennsylvania.
The Chair will reduce to 5 minutes the time for any electronic vote
after the first vote in this series.

Amendment No. 14 Offered by Mr. Smith of New Jersey

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The pending business is the demand for a
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New Jersey
(Mr. Smith) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which
the ayes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.

Recorded Vote

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 212,
noes 203, not voting 17, as follows:

[Roll No. 517]

AYES--212

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Andrews
Baca
Baird
Baldwin
Bartlett (MD)
Becerra
Bell
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Biggert
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Boswell
Boucher
Brady (PA)
Brown (OH)
Brown, Corrine
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cardin
Cardoza
Carson (IN)
Clay
Clyburn
Conyers
Cooper
Costello
Cox
Crowley
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
Davis, Tom
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Dooley (CA)
Doyle
Emanuel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Foley
Ford
Fossella
Frank (MA)
Frost
Gerlach
Gilchrest
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green (TX)
Greenwood
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Herseth
Hill
Hinchey
Hoeffel
Holt
Honda
Hooley (OR)
Houghton
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
King (NY)
Kirk
Kleczka
Kolbe
Kucinich
Lampson
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
LaTourette
Leach
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lofgren
Lowey
Lucas (KY)
Lynch
Maloney
Markey
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McNulty
Meehan
Meeks (NY)
Menendez
Michaud
Millender-McDonald
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mollohan
Moore
Moran (VA)
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Northup
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pomeroy
Porter
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reyes
Rodriguez
Ros-Lehtinen
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Sabo
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sanders
Sandlin
Schakowsky
Schiff
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Shays
Sherman
Simmons
Skelton
Smith (NJ)
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Souder
Spratt
Stark
Strickland
Stupak
Tanner
Tauscher
Terry
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Turner (TX)
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walsh
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Weldon (PA)
Wexler
Wilson (NM)
Wolf
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn

NOES--203

Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Barton (TX)
Bass
Beauprez
Bilirakis
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boyd
Bradley (NH)
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Burgess
Burns
Burr
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Camp
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Carson (OK)
Carter
Case
Castle
Chabot
Chandler
Chocola
Coble
Cole
Collins
Cramer
Crane
Crenshaw
Cubin
Culberson
Cunningham
Davis (TN)
Davis, Jo Ann
Deal (GA)
DeFazio
DeLay
DeMint
Doolittle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Edwards
Ehlers
Emerson
English
Everett
Feeney
Ferguson
Flake
Forbes
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gibbons
Gillmor
Gingrey
Goode
Goodlatte
Granger
Graves
Green (WI)
Gutknecht
Hall
Harris
Hart
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Hensarling
Herger
Hobson
Hoekstra
Holden
Hostettler
Hulshof
Hunter
Hyde
Isakson
Issa
Istook
Jenkins
John
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
King (IA)
Kingston
Kline
Knollenberg
LaHood
Latham
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lucas (OK)
Manzullo
Marshall
Matheson
McCotter
McCrery
McHugh
McInnis
McKeon
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Moran (KS)
Murphy
Musgrave
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neugebauer
Ney
Nunes
Nussle
Osborne
Ose
Otter
Oxley
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (PA)
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Pombo
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Renzi
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Saxton
Schrock
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (MI)
Smith (TX)
Stearns
Stenholm
Sullivan
Sweeney
Tancredo
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Toomey
Turner (OH)
Upton
Vitter
Walden (OR)
Wamp
Weldon (FL)
Weller
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (SC)
Young (AK)
Young (FL)

NOT VOTING--17

Ballenger
Boehlert
Engel
Filner
Gephardt
Hinojosa
Kaptur
Lipinski
Majette
Matsui
Meek (FL)
Norwood
Ortiz
Paul
Slaughter
Tauzin
Towns

Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Linder) (during the vote). There are 2
minutes remaining in this vote.

{time} 1416

Messrs. GARRETT of New Jersey, WAMP, PICKERING, DeFAZIO, MARSHALL,
and COLE changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Messrs. KIRK, VAN HOLLEN, and LUCAS of Kentucky changed their vote
from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated for:
Mr. FILNER. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 517, I was in my
Congressional District on official business. Had I been present, I
would have voted ``aye.''
Stated against:
Ms. NORTHUP. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 517, I inadvertently voted
incorrectly. I had every intention of voting ``no'' on the amendment
but mistakenly pushed the green button. I did not realize my mistake
until the vote was closed.

Amendment No. 15 Offered by Mr. Smith of New Jersey

Recorded Vote

[Roll No. 518]

AYES--197

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Andrews
Baca
Baird
Baldwin
Becerra
Bell
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Boswell
Boucher
Brady (PA)
Brown (OH)
Brown, Corrine
Burr
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cardin
Cardoza
Carson (IN)
Castle
Clay
Clyburn
Conyers
Cooper
Costello
Crowley
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
Davis, Tom
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Deutsch

[[Page H8908]]

Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Dooley (CA)
Doyle
Ehlers
Emanuel
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Ford
Frank (MA)
Frost
Gerlach
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green (TX)
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Herseth
Hinchey
Hoeffel
Holt
Honda
Hooley (OR)
Houghton
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
King (NY)
Kleczka
Kolbe
Kucinich
Lampson
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lofgren
Lowey
Lynch
Maloney
Markey
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McDermott
McGovern
McNulty
Meehan
Meeks (NY)
Menendez
Michaud
Millender-McDonald
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mollohan
Moran (VA)
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Pelosi
Pomeroy
Porter
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reyes
Rodriguez
Ros-Lehtinen
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Sabo
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sanders
Sandlin
Schakowsky
Schiff
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Shays
Sherman
Simmons
Skelton
Smith (NJ)
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Spratt
Stark
Strickland
Stupak
Tanner
Tauscher
Terry
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Turner (TX)
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walsh
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Weldon (PA)
Wexler
Wilson (NM)
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn

NOES--219

Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Bass
Beauprez
Biggert
Bilirakis
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boyd
Bradley (NH)
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Burgess
Burns
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Camp
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Carson (OK)
Carter
Case
Chabot
Chandler
Chocola
Coble
Cole
Collins
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crenshaw
Cubin
Culberson
Cunningham
Davis (TN)
Davis, Jo Ann
Deal (GA)
DeLay
DeMint
Doolittle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Edwards
Emerson
English
Everett
Feeney
Ferguson
Flake
Foley
Forbes
Fossella
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gingrey
Goode
Goodlatte
Granger
Graves
Green (WI)
Greenwood
Gutknecht
Hall
Harris
Hart
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Hensarling
Herger
Hill
Hobson
Hoekstra
Holden
Hostettler
Hulshof
Hunter
Hyde
Isakson
Issa
Istook
Jenkins
John
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
King (IA)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline
Knollenberg
LaHood
Latham
LaTourette
Leach
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lucas (KY)
Lucas (OK)
Manzullo
Marshall
Matheson
McCotter
McCrery
McHugh
McInnis
McIntyre
McKeon
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Moore
Moran (KS)
Murphy
Musgrave
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neugebauer
Ney
Northup
Nunes
Nussle
Osborne
Ose
Otter
Oxley
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Pombo
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Renzi
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Royce
Ruppersberger
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Saxton
Schrock
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (MI)
Smith (TX)
Souder
Stearns
Stenholm
Sullivan
Sweeney
Tancredo
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Toomey
Turner (OH)
Upton
Vitter
Walden (OR)
Wamp
Weldon (FL)
Weller
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)

NOT VOTING--16

Ballenger
Boehlert
Filner
Gephardt
Hinojosa
Kaptur
Lipinski
Majette
Matsui
Meek (FL)
Norwood
Ortiz
Paul
Slaughter
Tauzin
Towns

Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Linder) (during the vote). Members are
advised that 2 minutes remain in this vote.

{time} 1423

So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated for:
Mr. FILNER. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 518, I was in my
Congressional District on official business. Had I been present, I
would have voted ``aye.''

Amendment No. 17 Offered by Mr. Ose

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The pending business is the demand for a
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California
(Mr. Ose) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the
ayes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.

Recorded Vote

[Roll No. 519]

AYES--256

Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Bass
Beauprez
Berry
Biggert
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boucher
Bradley (NH)
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Burgess
Burns
Burr
Burton (IN)
Butterfield
Buyer
Calvert
Camp
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Cardoza
Carson (OK)
Carter
Castle
Chabot
Chandler
Chocola
Coble
Cole
Collins
Cooper
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crenshaw
Cubin
Culberson
Cunningham
Davis (TN)
Davis, Jo Ann
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
DeLay
DeMint
Doolittle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Edwards
Ehlers
Emerson
English
Etheridge
Everett
Feeney
Ferguson
Flake
Foley
Forbes
Ford
Fossella
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gingrey
Goode
Goodlatte
Gordon
Granger
Graves
Green (WI)
Greenwood
Gutknecht
Hall
Harris
Hart
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Hensarling
Herger
Hill
Hobson
Hoekstra
Holden
Hostettler
Houghton
Hulshof
Hunter
Hyde
Isakson
Israel
Issa
Istook
Jenkins
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Kanjorski
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Lampson
Latham
LaTourette
Leach
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lucas (KY)
Lucas (OK)
Lynch
Manzullo
Marshall
Matheson
McCotter
McCrery
McHugh
McInnis
McIntyre
McKeon
Mica
Michaud
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Moore
Moran (KS)
Murphy
Murtha
Musgrave
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neugebauer
Ney
Northup
Nunes
Nussle
Osborne
Ose
Otter
Oxley
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Renzi
Reyes
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Sandlin
Saxton
Schrock
Scott (GA)
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shuster
Simmons
Simpson
Skelton
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Souder
Spratt
Stearns
Stenholm
Sullivan
Sweeney
Tancredo
Tanner
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Toomey
Turner (OH)
Turner (TX)
Upton
Vitter
Walden (OR)
Walsh
Wamp
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)

NOES--160

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Andrews
Baca
Baird
Baldwin
Becerra
Bell
Berkley
Berman
Blumenauer
Boswell
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Brown (OH)
Brown, Corrine
Capps
Capuano
Cardin
Carson (IN)
Case
Clay
Clyburn
Conyers
Costello
Crowley
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Dooley (CA)
Doyle
Emanuel
Engel
Eshoo
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Frank (MA)
Gillmor
Gonzalez
Green (TX)
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Herseth
Hinchey
Hoeffel
Holt
Honda

[[Page H8909]]

Hooley (OR)
Hoyer
Inslee
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
Kleczka
Kucinich
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lofgren
Lowey
Maloney
Markey
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McDermott
McGovern
McNulty
Meehan
Meeks (NY)
Menendez
Millender-McDonald
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mollohan
Moran (VA)
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Pelosi
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Rodriguez
Ros-Lehtinen
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Sabo
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sanders
Schakowsky
Schiff
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Shays
Sherman
Snyder
Solis
Stark
Strickland
Stupak
Tauscher
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Wexler
Wilson (NM)
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn

NOT VOTING--16

Ballenger
Boehlert
Filner
Gephardt
Hinojosa
Kaptur
Lipinski
Majette
Matsui
Meek (FL)
Norwood
Ortiz
Paul
Slaughter
Tauzin
Towns

Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (during the vote). Members are advised that
2 minutes remain in this vote.

{time} 1432

Mr. SHAYS changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated against:
Mr. FILNER. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 519, I was in my
Congressional District on official business. Had I been present, I
would have voted ``nay.''

Amendment No. 19 Offered by Mr. Weldon of Pennsylvania

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The pending business is the demand for a
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from
Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) on which further proceedings were postponed
and on which the ayes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.

Recorded Vote

[Roll No. 520]

AYES--415

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Allen
Andrews
Baca
Bachus
Baird
Baker
Baldwin
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Bass
Beauprez
Becerra
Bell
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Biggert
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blumenauer
Blunt
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Bradley (NH)
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Brown (OH)
Brown (SC)
Brown, Corrine
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Burgess
Burns
Burr
Burton (IN)
Butterfield
Buyer
Calvert
Camp
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Capps
Capuano
Cardin
Cardoza
Carson (IN)
Carson (OK)
Carter
Case
Castle
Chabot
Chandler
Chocola
Clay
Clyburn
Coble
Cole
Collins
Conyers
Cooper
Costello
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crenshaw
Crowley
Cubin
Culberson
Cummings
Cunningham
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
Davis (TN)
Davis, Jo Ann
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
DeLay
DeMint
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Dooley (CA)
Doolittle
Doyle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Edwards
Ehlers
Emanuel
Emerson
Engel
English
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Everett
Farr
Fattah
Feeney
Ferguson
Flake
Foley
Forbes
Ford
Fossella
Frank (MA)
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gingrey
Gonzalez
Goode
Goodlatte
Gordon
Granger
Graves
Green (TX)
Green (WI)
Greenwood
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Gutknecht
Hall
Harman
Harris
Hart
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Hensarling
Herger
Herseth
Hill
Hinchey
Hobson
Hoeffel
Hoekstra
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley (OR)
Hostettler
Houghton
Hoyer
Hulshof
Hunter
Hyde
Inslee
Isakson
Israel
Issa
Istook
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Jenkins
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kleczka
Kline
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kucinich
LaHood
Lampson
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latham
LaTourette
Leach
Lee
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lofgren
Lowey
Lucas (KY)
Lucas (OK)
Lynch
Maloney
Manzullo
Markey
Marshall
Matheson
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McCotter
McCrery
McDermott
McGovern
McHugh
McInnis
McIntyre
McKeon
McNulty
Meehan
Meeks (NY)
Menendez
Mica
Michaud
Millender-McDonald
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Miller, Gary
Miller, George
Mollohan
Moore
Moran (KS)
Moran (VA)
Murphy
Murtha
Musgrave
Myrick
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Nethercutt
Neugebauer
Ney
Northup
Nunes
Nussle
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Osborne
Ose
Otter
Owens
Oxley
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Pearce
Pelosi
Pence
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Quinn
Radanovich
Rahall
Ramstad
Rangel
Regula
Rehberg
Renzi
Reyes
Reynolds
Rodriguez
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Sabo
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sanders
Sandlin
Saxton
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schrock
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherman
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shuster
Simmons
Simpson
Skelton
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Souder
Spratt
Stark
Stearns
Stenholm
Strickland
Stupak
Sullivan
Sweeney
Tancredo
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Tierney
Toomey
Turner (OH)
Turner (TX)
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Upton
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Vitter
Walden (OR)
Walsh
Wamp
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Wexler
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
Young (AK)
Young (FL)

NOT VOTING--17

Ballenger
Boehlert
Filner
Gephardt
Hinojosa
Kaptur
Lipinski
Majette
Matsui
Meek (FL)
Norwood
Ortiz
Paul
Pombo
Slaughter
Tauzin
Towns

Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Linder) (during the vote). Members are
advised there are 2 minutes remaining in this vote.

{time} 1441

So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated for:
Mr. FILNER. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 520, I was in my
Congressional District on official business. Had I been present, I
would have voted ``aye.''
Ms. McCARTHY of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, the 9/11 Commission in July
presented its report to the Congress and to the American people. The
five Republicans and five Democrats on the panel put aside their
partisan differences and made 41 recommendations, which if made law,
would make this country safer. The Senate on Wednesday embraced these
recommendations with the 96-2 passage of the Collins/Lieberman National
Intelligence Reform Act.
I encourage the House to act in the same bipartisan manner as the
Senate. H.R. 10, the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act, was
written behind closed doors and fails to fully implement 30 of the 41
Commission recommendations.
The job of Congress is to work with the Executive Branch to keep
America safe, and work with our allies to make the world safe. H.R. 10
fails to do this, and places the House on a collision course with the
Senate.
Upon passage of the Senate bill, 9/11 Commission Chairman Thomas Kean
and Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton praised the outstanding leadership of
Senators Susan Collins and Joseph Lieberman for their progress

[[Page H8910]]

in implementing the Commission's recommendations. They, along with
families of 9/11 victims, expressed their desire for the House to pass
a counterpart measure.
It is disappointing that the House failed to do its job today. I urge
the Conferees to adopt the 9/11 Commission recommendations. We owe it
to the American people and the families of victims of 9/11.
Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of H.R. 10, the 9/
11 Recommendations Implementation Act. This legislation is vitally
important to overhaul the nation's intelligence system, which has been
in place since World War II.
There are five majors areas of reform in this legislation that will
dramatically alter the way our country approaches national security.
First, this bill establishes a National Director of Intelligence who
will have full budget authority over the nation's intelligence
agencies. For the first time in our Nation's history, we will have one
person whose sole job is to coordinate the activities and information
from all of our Nation's intelligence services.
Second, this bill restructures terrorism prevention and prosecution.
It gives law enforcement agencies and the Department of Justice new
tools to prevent and prosecute potential terrorists and acts of
terrorism. Whether it is strengthening our money laundering laws to
combat terrorists' financial networks or adding additional security
measures to our printed currency, this legislation will make it more
difficult for terrorists to have access to financing and make it more
difficult for those who want to finance terrorist activities.
Third, this legislation dramatically strengthens the security of our
Nation's borders and restricts the ability of terrorists to travel. I
think we can all agree the best way to keep our country safe is keep
the terrorists out of our country. If terrorists do manage to get into
the country, this legislation gives law enforcement officers the tools
they need to make it easier to deport them. also, this legislation
makes sure that our federal air marshals have anonymity on all flights,
both domestic and foreign. We will add more federal air marshals to
foreign flights coming into this country on both U.S. and foreign
carriers. We will add a second layer of protection in cockpits, and
require the use of biometrically-protected crew badges for airline
employees.
Fourth, this bill reaches out to other nations to join us in
combating terrorism. We will require machine-readable passports for
tourists entering our country and also require that all names on
passports be translated and printed in Roman alphabet for international
travel documents and placed into watchlist systems. Also, this bill
makes it a federal crime to give a false claim of citizenship or
nationality.
Finally, this legislation restructures the government in many
important ways. It provides the authorization for the intelligence
community reorganization plans, it restructures the Department of
Homeland Security for faster and smarter funding for first responders,
and it modifies the homeland security advisory system.
Mr. Chairman, this legislation contains many important and necessary
changes to our Nation's laws. I would like to thank all the members who
have worked so hard on a bi-partisan basis to produce such a
comprehensive piece of legislation. This is a positive step in
improving the nation's intelligence system and our national security.
Mr. RYUN of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, Benjamin Franklin once said: The
way to be safe is never to be secure. We must never be content in the
ways things have always been, but consistently look for new ways to
achieve security in our homeland. For this, I am pleased to support
H.R. 10, the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act. I believe this
legislation will provide for the much needed reorganization and new
tools to help our Nation prepare and defend against further terrorist
attacks.
After the horrific attacks of September 11th, it was evident that our
Government needed to be transformed to meet the new challenges of this
dangerous world. Soon after 9/11, and under the leadership of President
Bush, various agencies with homeland security roles throughout the
government were brought under the control and vision of a single
Department, with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security.
The hope was to break down the existing barriers and create more
cooperation and communication in this critical field.
Congress is continuing this effort to improve our homeland security
with the passage of H.R. 10. This legislation clearly recognizes that
the United States can no longer afford to think of defending the
homeland as being the responsibility of just one Department--be it
Homeland Security, Justice or Defense. Many aspects of our government
and society, from the FBI, to DOD's Northern Command, the Intelligence
Community, the Treasury Department, Immigration, local law enforcement,
our corporate partners, and the academic community all have important
roles to play. All of these players must work together, in concert, to
achieve the real results worthy of this great nation.
The 9/11 Commission, which is the basis of this legislation, found
that government institutions failed to adapt to the threat of terrorism
for more than a decade, enabling the terrorists failed to exploit deep
institutional failings within our government. These failures, in part,
stemmed from a strict stove-piped structure.
Our enemy is asymmetrical and unconcerned about such things as the
internal structural uneasiness of sharing information inside the
Intelligence Community and between other organizations. However, our
enemies will certainly do everything they can to benefit from this
ingrained culture--to the detriment of our society.
The 9/11 Commission concluded that: ``the September 11th attacks fell
into the void between the foreign and domestic threats.''
The Report continues: ``Information was not shared, sometimes
inadvertently or because of legal misunderstandings. Analysis was not
pooled. Effective operations were not launched. Often the handoffs of
information were lost across the divide separating the foreign and
domestic agencies of the government. . . . Action officers should have
drawn on all available knowledge in the government. This management
should have ensured that information was shared and duties were clearly
assigned across agencies, and across the foreign-domestic divide.''
Although people have levied fault on the CIA and FBI, I believe we
must not single out individual agencies. Instead, we should use our
energies to focus on the culture and structure of our government. As
the 9/11 Commission report continues:

The problem is nearly intractable because of the way the
government is currently structured. Lines of operational
authority run to the expanding executive departments, and
they are guarded for understandable reasons: the DCI commands
the CIA's personnel overseas; the secretary of defense will
not yield to others in conveying commands to military forces;
the Justice Department will not give up the responsibility of
deciding whether to seek arrest warrants. But the result is
that each agency or department needs its own intelligence
apparatus to support the performance of its duties. It is
hard to break down stovepipes when there are so many stoves
that are legally and political entitled to have cast-iron
pipes of their own.

The problem is clear: stove-piping of resources and responsibilities,
along with not sharing the information or analysis collected is
hindering our Nation's ability to remain secure. Instead of stove-
piping, we must increase the flow of information inside and between
government agencies while still protecting vital sources. If we are
going to achieve a greater level of security in this nation, we need to
break down the barriers to homeland security. We must not be bogged
down in a need-to-know mentality, but most rise to a need-to-share
focus.
The 9/11 Commission Recommendations bears out this solution.
Repeatedly, the Commission calls for unity and the unifying of efforts
across the government. It calls for unifying strategic intelligence and
operational planning against Islamist terrorists across the foreign-
domestic divide with a new National Counterterrorism Center. Unifying
the intelligence community with a new National Intelligence Director.
And, unifying the many participants in the counterterrorism efforts.
The old ways of thinking about and organizing our government have
failed us. We have been confined by a vision of the past. Of local vs.
federal, of domestic vs. foreign intelligence, of national security vs.
law enforcement.
We instead need to focus on unity of purpose and on communication,
collaboration and coordination that transcends our old structure. Only
by working together, as a single unit, can we be secure. And I believe
that H.R. 10 is the right step forward in doing just that.
Ms. KILPATRICK. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to H.R. 10, the 9/
11 Recommendations Implementation Act. I do so not because I disagree
on the urgent need to reform our intelligence infrastructure. On the
contrary, the 9/11 Commission clearly, articulately and convincingly
makes a compelling case that the U.S. intelligence network is in great
need of overhauling.
My reasons for voting against the measure deal less with the concept
of intelligence reform and more with the substance of the bill we are
considering today. The measure before us today is improperly titled.
The ``9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act'' should really be re-
titled as the ``Immigration Reform Act of 2004.''
I am particularly sensitive to issues of homeland security and
intelligence capabilities. My district encompasses the majority of the
City of Detroit, which borders our northern neighbor--Canada. Detroit
is the Motor City capital of the world, and as such, we are
economically dependent on the cross-border auto trade transported
through the Port of Detroit. Securing the critical infrastructure such
as the

[[Page H8911]]

Ambassador Bridge, the Detroit-Windsor Tunnel, and the Port of Detroit
is vital to the economic wellbeing of our city, region, state, and
nation. Protecting the rights of way of these thoroughfares is critical
to the health of the American automobile industry, the largest industry
in the manufacturing sector. Protecting these assets against terrorist
attack is so important that the City of Detroit is one of the few major
cities in the United States that has created an Office of Homeland
Security. Matters of homeland security and enhanced intelligence
capabilities are urgent concerns to my district and they should not be
trivialized. The Republican Leadership in this chamber had the
opportunity to stitch together a bill that would strengthen the
nation's intelligence apparatus, but frankly it has ``pooched'' the
job. The Leadership has confused the 9/11 Commission's urging to
enhance America's security apparatus with its predilection to crackdown
on the nation's immigrants.
The only area where the bill makes its mark on strengthening the
intelligence community is the establishment of a National Intelligence
Director (NID). But all progress at intelligence reform ends there--
with the creation of NID. We create a position but gives the person
occupying it no powers and no authority to implement any significant
changes in the intelligence bureaucracy. For example, the NID has no
budget authority, no hiring authority, and on reprogramming authority.
By establishing a position of power without authority to hire or fire
or to control the budget, we are in fact creating a paper tiger, a
position with a lot of roar and no bite. The members of the 9/11
Commission have expressed their support for a strong NID, but the bill
crafted by the Republican leadership fails to meet their expectations.
This bill does very little in the way of strengthening the
intelligence community. It goes a long way in turning the U.S.
immigration system upside down. I support immigration reform, but we
should not be enacting such sweeping changes under a bill whose purpose
is to reform and reorganize the intelligence community. The Republican
Leadership is confused. It took its eye off the goal of intelligence
reform and moved forward with a bill that cracks down on immigrants.
Let me highlight some of the more egregious provisions of this bill.
The ``Lone Wolf'' provision would remove the requirement that non-
citizen targets of secret intelligence surveillance be connected to a
foreign power. The bill would permit the deportation of individuals to
countries lacking a functioning government--an issue that is currently
before the U.S. Supreme Court. The bill makes asylum claims more
restrictive. The bill restricts the use of internationally accepted
consular identification cards. Immigrants are being used as a wedge
issue in this presidential election year. The bill is designed to
mobilize the base vote of neo-isolationists and not the legitimate
security concerns confronting our country and our countrymen and women.
By using immigration as a wedge issue, we are distracted from taking
a thoughtful approach to improving our intelligence capability. We are
undermining our efforts to combat terrorism. Many on my side of the
aisle will be voting to support this bill in order to move the process
forward in the hope that a final product will be closer to the bill
that was approved in the other chamber. My vote today is based on the
substance and the merit of the provisions contained in this bill before
us today. If a conference agreement can produce a bill that truly
strengthens our intelligence community, it will have my support. Today,
I must cast my vote against the passage of H.R. 10.
Mr. PAUL. Mr. Chairman, the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act
(H.R. 10) is yet another attempt to address the threat of terrorism by
giving more money and power to the federal bureaucracy. Most of the
reforms contained in this bill will not make America safer, though they
definitely will make us less free. H.R. 10 also wastes American
taxpayer money on unconstitutional and ineffective foreign aid
programs. Congress should make America safer by expanding liberty and
refocusing our foreign policy on defending this nation's vital
interests, rather than expanding the welfare state and wasting American
blood and treasure on quixotic crusades to ``democratize'' the world.
Disturbingly, H.R. 10 creates a de facto national ID card by
mandating new federal requirements that standardize state-issued
drivers licenses and birth certificates and even require including
biometric identifiers in such documents. State drivers license
information will be stored in a national database, which will include
information about an individual's driving record!
Nationalizing standards for drivers licenses and birth certificates,
and linking them together via a national database, creates a national
ID system pure and simple. Proponents of the national ID understand
that the public remains wary of the scheme, so they attempt to claim
they're merely creating new standards for existing state IDs. Nonsense!
This legislation imposes federal standards in a federal bill, and it
creates a federalized ID regardless of whether the ID itself is still
stamped with the name of your state. It is just a matter of time until
those who refuse to carry the new licenses will be denied the ability
to drive or board an airplane. Domestic travel restrictions are the
hallmark of authoritarian states, not free republics.
The national ID will be used to track the movements of American
citizens, not just terrorists. Subjecting every citizen to surveillance
actually diverts resources away from tracking and apprehending
terrorist in favor of needless snooping on innocent Americans. This is
what happened with ``suspicious activity reports'' required by the Bank
Secrecy Act. Thanks to BSA mandates, federal officials are forced to
waste countless hours snooping through the private financial
transactions of innocent Americans merely because those transactions
exceeded $10,000.
Furthermore, the Federal Government has no constitutional authority
to require law-abiding Americans to present any form of identification
before engaging in private transactions (e.g. getting a job, opening a
bank account, or seeking medical assistance). Nothing in our
Constitution can reasonably be construed to allow government officials
to demand identification from individuals who are not suspected of any
crime.
H.R. 10 also broadens the definition of terrorism contained in the
PATRIOT Act. H.R. 10 characterizes terrorism as acts intended ``to
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion.''
Under this broad definition, a scuffle at an otherwise peaceful pro-
life demonstration might allow the federal government to label the
sponsoring organization and its members as terrorists. Before
dismissing these concerns, my colleagues should remember the abuse of
Internal Revenue Service power by both Democratic and Republican
administrations to punish political opponents, or the use of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act on anti-
abortion activists. It is entirely possible that a future
administration will use the new surveillance powers granted in this
bill to harm people holding unpopular political views.
Congress could promote both liberty and security by encouraging
private property owners to take more responsibility to protect
themselves and their property. Congress could enhance safety by
removing the roadblocks thrown up by the misnamed Transportation
Security Agency that prevent the full implementation of the armed
pilots program. I cosponsored an amendment with my colleague from
Virginia, Mr. Goode, to do just that, and I am disappointed it was
ruled out of order.
I am also disappointed the Financial Services Committee rejected my
amendment to conform the regulations governing the filing of suspicious
activities reports with the requirements of the U.S. Constitution. This
amendment not only would have ensured greater privacy protection, but
it also would have enabled law enforcement to better focus on people
who truly pose a threat to our safety.
Immediately after the attack on September 11, 2001, I introduced
several pieces of legislation designed to help fight terrorism and
secure the United States, including a bill to allow airline pilots to
carry firearms and a bill that would have expedited the hiring of
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) translators to support
counterterrorism investigations and operations. I also introduced a
bill to authorize the president to issue letters of marque and reprisal
to bring to justice those who committed the attacks of September 11,
2001, and other similar acts of war planned for the future.
The foreign policy provisions of H.R. 10 are similarly objectionable
and should be strongly opposed. I have spoken before about the serious
shortcomings of the 9/11 Commission, upon whose report this legislation
is based. I find it incredible that in the 500-plus page report there
is not one mention of how our interventionist foreign policy creates
enemies abroad who then seek to harm us. Until we consider the root
causes of terrorism, beyond the jingoistic explanations offered thus
far, we will not defeat terrorism and we will not be safer.
Among the most ill-considered foreign policy components of H.R. 10 is
a section providing for the United States to increase support for an
expansion of the United Nations ``Democracy Caucus.'' Worse still, the
bill encourages further integration of that United Nations body into
our State department. The last thing we should do if we hope to make
our country safer from terrorism is expand our involvement in the
United Nations.
This bill contains a provision to train American diplomats to be more
sensitive and attuned to the United Nations, the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)--which will be in the U.S. to
monitor our elections next month--and other international non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). even worse, this legislation
actually will create an ``ambassador-at-large'' position

[[Page H8912]]

solely to work with non-governmental organizations overseas. It hardly
promotes democracy abroad to accord equal status to NGOs, which, after
all, are un-elected foreign pressure groups that, therefore, have no
popular legitimacy whatsoever. Once again, we are saying one thing and
doing the opposite.
This bill also increases our counterproductive practice of sending
United States' taxpayer money abroad to prop up selected foreign media,
which inexplicably are referred to as ``independent media.'' This is an
unconstitutional misuse of tax money. Additionally does anyone believe
that citizens of countries where the U.S. subsidizes certain media
outlets take kindly to, or take seriously, such media? How would
Americans feel if they knew that publications taking a certain
editorial line were financed by foreign governments? We cannot refer to
foreign media funded by the U.S. government as ``independent media.''
The U.S. government should never be in the business of funding the
media, either at home or abroad.
Finally, I am skeptical about the reorganization of the intelligence
community in this legislation. In creating an entire new bureaucracy,
the National Intelligence Director, we are adding yet another layer of
bureaucracy to our already bloated federal government. Yet, we are
supposed to believe that even more of the same kind of government that
failed us on September 11, 2001 will make us safer. At best, this is
wishful thinking. The constitutional function of our intelligence
community is to protect the United States from foreign attack. Ever
since its creation by the National Security Act of 1947, the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been meddling in affairs that have
nothing to do with the security of the United States. Considering the
CIA's overthrow of Iranian leader Mohammed Mossadeq in the 1950s, and
the CIA's training of the Muhajadin jihadists in Afghanistan in the
1980s, it is entirely possible the actions of the CIA abroad have
actually made us less safe and more vulnerable to foreign attack. It
would be best to confine our intelligence community to the defense of
our territory from foreign attack. This may well mean turning
intelligence functions over to the Department of Defense, where they
belong.
For all of these reasons, Mr. Chairman, I vigorously oppose H.R. 10.
It represents the worst approach to combating terrorism--more federal
bureaucracy, more foreign intervention, and less liberty for the
American people.
Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to discuss H.R. 10, the
legislation that ostensibly implements the recommendations made by the
independent commission that investigated the federal government's
failure to prevent the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
Let me say at the outset that this bill is certainly not perfect.
But, I am pleased it includes a number of critical aviation security
improvements I have pushed for.
It also includes the core recommendation made by the 9/11 Commission
to create a National Intelligence Director to centralize coordination
and oversight of the disparate branches of our intelligence community.
Therefore, despite some flaws, I will vote for H.R. 10, with the hope
that its shortcomings can be resolved in the conference with the
Senate.
I want to expand on my comments about the aviation security
provisions in H.R. 10. I am pleased that this bill provides $60 million
over two years for the deployment of checkpoint explosive detection
equipment. The bill also directs the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) to give priority to developing, testing,
improving, and deploying equipment at screening checkpoints that will
be able to detect nonmetallic weapons and explosives on individuals and
in their baggage.
This bill would implement the 9/11 Commission recommendation that TSA
not wait until the issues surrounding a successor to the CAPPS program
are resolved before utilizing all available government terrorist watch
lists to prescreen passengers boarding an aircraft. The air carriers
currently manage the ``no-fly'' and ``automatic selectee'' lists that
they receive from TSA. Because the airlines have access to these lists,
some government agencies are unwilling to give their watch lists to TSA
because they are reluctant to share intelligence information with
private firms. This problem will be resolved when TSA takes over the
passenger pre-screening function, as mandated by this bill.
Perimeter security is still a weak link in aviation security as
evidenced by the recent events at the Orlando airport in which workers
were charged with sneaking drugs and guns aboard commercial aircraft.
Importantly, the bill requires TSA to submit a study to Congress on
airport perimeter security to determine the feasibility of access
control technologies and procedures, as well as an assessment of the
feasibility of physically screening all individuals prior to entry into
secure areas of an airport.
With regard to strategic planning, the bill requires the Department
of Homeland Security to develop a risk-based strategic plan to protect
transportation assets in general, and aviation assets in particular.
The bill would also require the TSA to develop a threat matrix that
outlines each threat to the civil aviation system, and the layers of
security to respond to that threat. A strong strategic planning process
may avert any future ``failures of imagination'' as cited by the
Commission.
The bill also incorporates H.R. 4914, the Aviation Biometic
Technology Utilization Act, which I introduced with Chairman Mica.
Biometric technologies can improve aviation security, and the TSA must
act quickly to promulgate guidelines and standards for biometrics so
that airports can equip with biometric access control technology.
In addition, the bill incorporates H.R. 4056, the Commercial Aviation
MANPADS Defense Act of 2004, which I also introduced with Chairman
Mica. MANPADS have been used against commercial airplanes and we must
do what we can to reduce the threat of MANPADS by working to reduce
their availability and developing plans to secure airports and the
aircrafts arriving and departing from airports against MANPADS attacks.
The bill contains several other important provisions including a
pilot program to determine whether federal flight deck officers can be
permitted to carry weapons on their persons, as well as directing TSA
to: conduct a pilot program for the use of blast resistant cargo
containers; continue its efforts to develop technology to screen cargo;
conduct a study on the viability of technologies that would provide
discreet methods of communication for flight cabin crew to notify
pilots in the event of a security breach, and a study on the costs and
benefits associated with the use of secondary flight deck barriers. In
addition, I am pleased a provision was included to require the Director
of the Federal Air Marshal Service to develop operational procedures
that ensure the anonymity of Federal air marshals.
I am also pleased that this legislation implements the core
recommendation of the 9/11 Commission--creation of a National
Intelligence Director. While the bill may not create quite as robust an
NID as the Senate legislation, it does represent a useful step in
bringing accountability to the intelligence community and improving
coordination.
Despite the aviation security provisions I mentioned previously,
there are shortcomings in the transportation security provisions of
H.R. 10. For example, there is no money to deploy explosive detection
systems to screen checked baggage. In the security bill approved by the
House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, on which I sit, we
included an additional $250 million in mandatory spending to deploy
these critical devices. Unfortunately, this provision was stripped out
of the version of H.R. 10 on the floor today. Further, H.R. 10 does
next to nothing to improve rail, mass transit, or port security. These
shortcomings need to be addressed in the conference with the Senate.
I am also concerned that H.R. 10 is weak on combating the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The bill just requires a
study of how to strengthen our non-proliferation programs. We don't
need another study. We already know what needs to be done. In 2001, a
bipartisan commission recommended tripling funding to $3 billion a year
for programs to help secure nuclear materials around the world from
terrorists. The non-proliferation programs under Nunn-Lugar should also
be expanded beyond the states of the former Soviet Union in order to
secure nuclear materials in other countries, notably Pakistan. The non-
proliferation provisions of H.R. 10 should be strengthened in
conference.
I am opposed to a provision in H.R. 10 that would violate U.S.
obligations under the Convention on Torture by allowing the U.S. to
deport suspects to countries that might torture them. While I supported
an amendment that was adopted during consideration of H.R. 10 to
slightly improve the provision in H.R. 10 authorizing deportation of
suspects to countries with atrocious human rights records so it wasn't
quite as objectionable, I would rather see the provision removed all
together during the conference with the Senate.
I am concerned that the civil liberties protections in H.R. 10 are
too weak. H.R. 10 creates a Civil Liberties Protection Officer that is
appointed by and reports to the NID, which means he or she is not
independent. Under these circumstances, the officer is unlikely to
provide robust protection for civil liberties. By contrast, the 9/11
Commission and the Senate legislation propose an independent Privacy
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. The Senate legislation also
includes an Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties as well as a
Privacy Officer within the National Intelligence Authority. The Board
would continually review legislation, regulations and policies for
their impact on privacy and civil liberties. The Board would be
required to issue reports to Congress at least twice a year and to make
the reports available to the public. I hope that the Senate

[[Page H8913]]

provisions on civil liberties oversight will be included in any final
legislation that emerges from conference.
Finally, I have serious concerns about a number of provisions in H.R.
10 that will expand the law enforcement powers of the federal
government. As one who voted against the so-called USA PATRIOT Act
because of my concerns about its impact on the civil liberties of
average American citizens, I am concerned that H.R. 10 will
unnecessarily expand the reach of the federal government in ways that
are not necessary to defeat terrorists, but will pose a lasting threat
to the rights we are guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution. I would
rather that these provisions be considered carefully by Congress next
year during the debate over whether to renew the PATRIOT Act rather
than having them slipped into H.R. 10 with little debate.
Ms. MILLENDER-McDONALD. Mr. Chairman, I rise to express my concern on
the course our Congress has taken.
We had a clear choice before us to have passed the Menendez
substitute, a bipartisan approach that followed the recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission--a Commission that for three years studied the
vulnerabilities of our national intelligence community and homeland
security and then provided thoughtful, nonpartisan recommendations.
Or pass a partisan House Republican bill that was slapped together in
a matter of months to address immediate political measures.
Unfortunately, this Republican led Congress chose the quick fix.
It is important to note that the Senate took these same nonpartisan
recommendations to heart and passed a bipartisan bill overwhelmingly
96-2.
As legislators and as leaders of this country, our job is incomplete.
We will be revisiting these measures again--and again--until we get it
right.
Because, Mr. Chairman, we cannot afford to get this wrong. At stake
is the safety and security of the American people and the future of our
children.
H.R. 10 implements only eleven of the forty-one 9/11 Commission
recommendations. However, included in this legislation are more than
fifty extraneous provisions not recommended by the 9/11 Commission.
As a senior member on the House Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee, I am appalled that this legislation has not done more to
protect our ports, our national transit systems and our overall
transportation infrastructure.
These are obvious vulnerabilities that are not being addressed! Think
about the not so obvious vulnerabilities that are being overlooked!
It was our transportation vulnerabilities that the 9/11 terrorists
used to attack us on that fateful day and it is likely that it will be
transportation that these terrorists will target again.
Aside from the Aviation Subcommittee, our Full Committee was not
consulted on the drafting of this bill and I believe that some of the
aviation provisions do not go far enough.
For example, H.R. 10 simply states that priority be given to improved
explosive detection. This is disingenuous. As the Menendez substitute
clearly states all high-risk passengers must be screened for explosives
until the explosive detection technology is improved. We must be clear
and we must be direct when we address the security of the American
people.
On that note, I would like to commend one provision that is in this
bill. H.R. 10 took the Commission's recommendation on blast resistant
containers and language that I recently introduced to create a blast
resistant container pilot program that integrates this technology with
our aviation system. This is an important step and one that is long
over due.
Since 9/11, the Transportation and Infrastructure has embraced a
bipartisan approach in reviewing and addressing the transportation
vulnerabilities that face our Nation.
We have accomplished much.
Last week our Committee unanimously reported a bipartisan transit
security bill last week that would provide critically needed funding
for security improvements for our public transit systems.
Unfortunately, these measures will not be included or addressed in
H.R. 10.
Mr. Chairman, it is because of these reasons that we will return to
this Chamber and revisit these vital issues again and again until we
get it right.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, our antiquated federal pay
system does not adequately account for the unique needs of federal law
enforcement officers.
For example, the current salary, including all overtime payments, for
a FBI Special Agent in San Francisco is $56,453. But even a ``low-
income home'' within a 60 to 90 minute commute from San Francisco costs
$300,000, requiring a mandatory income of $86,000. As a result, agents
commonly face four hour daily commutes on top of their regular ten hour
plus shifts. Because staffing decisions are based on the needs of the
nation, today many federal law enforcement officers are being asked to
live beyond their means in order to serve their country.
Mr. Chairman, the 9/11 Commission Report's specific policy
recommendations are underpinned by two important general conclusions.
First, that the FBI is central to the war on terrorism and second, the
need to provide adequate resources to FBI Agents. In fact, on pages
425-426 of their report, the 9/11 Commission says:

A specialized and integrated national security workforce
should be established at the FBI consisting of agents,
analysts, linguist, and surveillance specialists who are
recruited, trained, rewarded, and retained to ensure the
development of an institutional culture imbued with a deep
expertise in intelligence and national security.

Mr. Chairman, developing and maintaining an ``institutional culture
imbued with deep expertise'' is severely undermined by the Bureau's
inability to retain highly skilled agents in high-cost of living areas.
Often, agents will seek to transfer out of high-cost of living areas,
like New York, San Francisco, and Los Angeles, to name a few. The
disincentive to stay in high-cost of living areas makes it more
difficult for the FBI to recruit the best agents to serve in
supervisory positions, and thus creates an obstacle to creating the
type of institutional culture the Report calls for. If the high-cost of
living in certain areas was mitigated, this disincentive could be
removed, and it would be easier to create a more healthy seniority
system that would allow a strong intelligence culture to flourish.
Also on page 426, the 9/11 Commission says ``The FBI should fully
implement a recruiting, hiring, and selection process for agents and
analysts that enhances its ability to target and attract individuals
with educational and professional backgrounds in intelligence,
international relations, language, technology, and other relevant
skills.''
Mr. Chairman, the status quo's inability to fairly compensate FBI
agents in high-cost areas is undermining the Bureau's ability to
recruit and retain highly skilled individuals in crucial locations. For
instance, cities such as New York, Los Angeles, and San Francisco are
uniquely vulnerable to terrorist threats. The Report makes it clear
that Congress must undertake efforts to ensure that the FBI is able to
attract and retain employees possessing high-level skills. These
employees must be fairly compensated with consideration of the cost of
living in these areas in order for the Bureau to retain their services.
Mr. Chairman, H.R. 10 takes a positive first step by providing
recruitment and retention bonuses to federal law enforcement,
particularly the FBI. However, it is imperative that this Congress act
on fundamental pay reform in an expeditious manner.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, the bill before the House today is
intelligence reform more in name than in reality. In fact, the
Republican Leadership's bill, H.R. 10, ignores most of the
recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission. Of the 41 recommendations
made by the Commission, H.R. 10 fully implements only 11 of them.
On October 2, the Family Steering Committee, which is made up of the
families of
9/11 victims, issued a statement that said, ``House of Representatives
bill H.R. 10, drafted in response to the 9/11 Commission
recommendations, is flawed because it does not provide for a strong
National Intelligence Director. It also contains controversial,
divisive provisions which may have merit but warrant separate debate.''
The Family Steering Committee's statement called on the House to adopt
the bipartisan Senate bill, which has been championed in the House by
Representatives Shays, Maloney and Menendez.
It should come as a surprise to no one that the Republican
Leadership, which long opposed the creation of the 9/11 Commission,
turned a deaf ear to the views of the Commission and the 9/11 families.
The more than 50 extraneous provisions that were not recommended by the
9/11 Commission remain in the bill. Some of these provisions are very
controversial. To add insult to injury, the House Leadership restricted
the opportunity of Members to amend and strengthen the bill.
There have been two distinctly different approaches followed in the
House and Senate on the critical issue of implementing the
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. In the Senate, there has been
an open and bipartisan process used to develop a bill that truly
reflects the recommendations of the Commission. The Collins-Lieberman
legislation in the Senate has been endorsed by the 9/11 Commission, the
9/11 Family Steering Committee, and even the White House. The Senate
bill, which was adopted on a vote of 96 to 2, was the product of
extensive deliberation and bipartisan cooperation.
The Republican Leadership in the House took a different road. They
introduced a bill

[[Page H8914]]

that was developed in secret with no meaningful input from Democrats.
This partisan process has produced a weak bill that does not reflect
the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. For all these reasons, I
voted for the Menendez substitute, which is based on the bipartisan
Senate bill and fully implements the reforms recommended by the 9/11
Commission. The Menendez substitute is supported by the 9/11 families.
I regret that the House narrowly defeated this proposal last night.
By supporting the Menendez substitute, and opposing the flawed and
wholly insufficient underlying bill, I hope we can send a clear message
that we stand with the 9/11 Commission and the 9/11 families in
supporting genuine, meaningful intelligence reform. I hope this message
will be heard by the House and Senate conferees as they work to
reconcile the House and Senate bills.
Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in opposition to H.R. 10,
the so-called 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act. At a time when
our national security is at risk and our brave troops are fighting
overseas, it is shameful that the Republican leadership has chosen to
present a partisan bill that does not effectively implement the
recommendations of the bipartisan 9/11 Commission. In fact, of the
Commission's 41 recommendations, H.R. 10 only fully implemented eleven.
Fifteen are not implemented at all, and another 15 are incomplete.
On the other hand, many of the provisions in H.R. 10 go far beyond
the recommendations of the September 11th Commission. This is obviously
an attempt by the Republican leadership to insert previously rejected
proposals into this important bill at the final hour. In fact, the 9/11
Commission's Republican Chairman, Thomas Kean, said that the
contentious provisions were being promoted by ``people who don't want
the intelligence legislation to pass.'' Former Representative Lee
Hamilton, the Commission's vice chairman, said, ``Consideration of
controversial provisions at this late hour can harm our shared
purpose.'' The Family Steering Committee of the victims of September
11th is concerned that if H.R. 10 is passed by the House, ``the hard
work of the Commission and the dedication of the 9/11 families will be
undermined, as will the safety of our nation.''
Many of the controversial and mean-spirited measures included in this
bill are extremely harmful to immigrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees.
These measures have been included although they do not make our nation
any safer. H.R. 10 allows immigration officials to deport foreign
nationals for whatever reason they see fit, devoid of judicial review,
to countries that openly use torture when interrogating prisoners.
Unbelievably, H.R. 10 places an extreme burden of proof on asylum-
seekers, many of whom have been victims of brutality in their native
lands, requiring them to provide evidence that he or she would be
tortured if returned to his or her point of origin. This violates the
current standards established under the U.N. Convention Against Torture
already in place. And what kind of message does it send to our troops
engaged in combat? If the United States is seen by the world as being
willing to outsource torture, how can we be sure that our military men
and women captured overseas will be treated decently?

In addition, H.R. 10 would further undermine the right to basic due
process protections for non-citizens by prohibiting habeas corpus
review of many immigration decisions and by prohibiting federal courts
from granting stays of deportation while cases are pending.
This bill even includes language blocking use of matricula consular
cards, for identification purposes, even though the House voted to
allow their use. This provision has nothing to do with the 9/11
Commission and protecting national security. It is simply an irrelevant
action.
Furthermore, this legislation does not properly refocus our
intelligence efforts on Afghanistan, the nation which harbored the
terrorists who attacked us on September 11, as the 9/11 Commission
recommended. H.R. 10 also does not include Commission recommendations
to provide strong budgetary authority for the newly-created National
Intelligence Director, protect civil liberties through the creation of
an effective and independent civil liberties board, or address the need
for Congressional reform. That is simply unacceptable.
I supported the Menendez amendment which institutes the
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, is a closer reflection of the
bipartisan legislation passed in the Senate, and does not include the
dangerous and extraneous provisions in H.R. 10. Unfortunately, that
amendment was not successful; but fortunately those conferees will have
one more opportunity to get it right. We should now support the Senate
bill and move to protect our nation's safety while preserving the
beliefs and traditions of liberty and freedom we cherish. H.R. 10 does
not make the United States as safe as it can be. I urge my colleagues
to vote no on H.R. 10.
Mr. NETHERCUTT. Mr. Chairman, it is clear that our current
intelligence system has failed us in recent years.
I do not doubt the capacities of individual analysts within our
intelligence agencies and know them to be talented and capable
individuals. But the configuration of the present intelligence system
has denied our leaders the information we need to adequately warn of
and respond to terrorist threat.
Our current intelligence structure dates to the National Security Act
of 1947. It is a structure directed to a threat that no longer exists,
the Soviet Union. We won the Cold War and it is time to reconfigure our
intelligence capabilities to fight the next major threat of our
generation, the threat of international terrorism.
The bill before us, H.R. 10, responds substantively to the broad
range of recommendations offered by the 9/11 Commission. It creates a
strong National Intelligence Director with strengthened budget
authorities and new flexibility to redirect funding to urgent needs.
All management of tasking, collection, analysis and dissemination of
intelligence will be centralized within the office of the NID.
At the same time, the legislation acknowledges the very real
requirements of the largest user of national intelligence products, the
Department of Defense. H.R. 10 maintains full support for DOD during a
time of war--efforts to integrate our national intelligence effort
should not come at the expense of the requirements of warfighters.
Indeed the 9/11 Report recommended that DOD military intelligence
programs should remain part of that Department's responsibility.
We should reject the criticisms we have heard today about the scope
of the House bill. The House shouldn't be a rubber stamp for
legislation considered by the other body, any more than the other body
should be the rubber stamp for the broad recommendations of the 9/11
Commission. Passage of this bill today will allow both chambers to move
to conference to reconcile the differences between the two pieces of
legislation.
Similarly, I disagree with the notion argued here today that because
opponents consider certain provisions to somehow be ``extraneous,'' we
should refuse to consider them. The preface to the 9/11 Report
succinctly describes the mandate of the Commission: ``How did this
happen, and how can we avoid such a tragedy again?'' Such also is our
mandate--and we should not consider our work done with a retooling of
our intelligence apparatus.
The scope of Public Law 107-306, establishing the 9/11 Commission,
was far broader than an examination of the intelligence agencies. It
directed an investigation of the ``facts and circumstances relating to
the terrorists attacks of September 11, 2001, including those relating
to intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies, diplomacy,
immigration issues and border control, the flow of assets to terrorist
organizations, commercial aviation, the role of congressional oversight
and resource allocation, and other areas determined relevant by the
Commission.''
Improvements to our border security, restrictions on terrorist travel
and enhanced authorities to deport illegal aliens all respond to the
concerns raised in the 9/11 Report and all provide substantive
improvements to the security of our nation.
Intelligence reform only matters if we are able to do something with
the information our agencies gather. A strong and effective National
Intelligence Director is only relevant if we give other agencies of the
government the tools they need to act on that improved intelligence.
It would be irresponsible for Congress to take a pass on acting on
the clear security deficiencies described in the 9/11 Report and H.R.
10 answers that challenge.
In my decade of service in this institution, I have taken seriously
my responsibility to cautiously weigh the consequences of our action on
the Constitutional rights of citizens and to carefully evaluate the
expansion of federal powers. I reflect on the perspective of that
service as I consider H.R. 10.
H.R. 10 takes a significant step forward in recognizing this inherent
tension in a democracy by requiring the National Intelligence Director
to appoint a Civil Liberties Protection Officer to be responsible for
ensuring that privacy and civil liberties are protected. All proposed
and final rules would also be subject to an assessment of privacy
rights. I believe this legislation achieves the necessary balance
between protecting our society and protecting individuals.
There will still be more to do--both bodies have a responsibility to
reorganize internally to consolidate congressional oversight. I am
concerned that the other body has adopted a process that is a hollow
semblance of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. Far from
consolidating oversight, amendments adopted by the other body will have
the effect of pretending at consolidation while continuing business as
usual. This should not stand and the House must take the lead in
demonstrating the resolve to actually act upon the

[[Page H8915]]

call of the Commission to streamline oversight by the legislative
branch.
I encourage my colleagues to support this measure so that we may take
the next step of moving this legislation to conference with the other
body and producing a final product that will comprehensively address
the range of recommendations presented by the 9/11 Commission.
Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of efforts
that have been taken to address the concerns of the private security
industry in the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act. Under the wise
guidance of the Judiciary Committee leadership, provisions have been
included in this bill that will have a positive effect on the overall
dependability of private security services. While I would contend that
these provisions do not go far enough, they are a clear improvement,
and I urge my colleagues to support their inclusion in the law.
The relevant provisions, which were included in H.R. 10 with
industry-wide support, allow private security guard companies to have
access to federal background checks unless prohibited by their home
state, and also provide for the creation of a national clearinghouse to
be used in processing these requests. Federal background checks will
ensure a safer, more secure private security industry, and will allow
private security companies to protect themselves against the increased
liability that could come with hiring an individual with a relevant
criminal history. In addition, the realization of the national
clearinghouse is absolutely essential, given the excessive delays that
are often incurred within the varied state systems that are currently
used in processing these background check requests.
While allowing private security companies to receive criminal
background information on prospective employees through a streamlined
process is certainly a positive development, I contend that more should
be done to secure this vital industry. Background checks should be
required for all private security guards, to ensure that dangerous
criminals and terrorists are never employed in positions of such power
and responsibility.
Again, I thank the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Judiciary
Committee for their efforts in addressing this important issue, and I
hope to continue working with them in the future to ensure that all of
our nation's assets are adequately secured.
Mr. STARK. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to H.R. 10, the
Republican's so-called
9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act.
The 9/11 Commission has worked for months in a thoughtful, thorough
and bipartisan manner to recommend concrete ways to reorganize and
restructure Federal counterterrorism efforts to ensure we are better
able to prevent future attacks. Congress should have immediately
adopted those recommendations, but Republicans have blocked that effort
today.
Americans should not be fooled by the House Republicans' cynical
exercise today. They are circumventing real reform of our Nation's
intelligence community. Republicans may say they have listened to the
9/11 Commission. But, make no mistake, the bill before us does not
fully implement the Commission's recommendations--it doesn't even come
close. Instead, it flies in the face of the Commission's sound and
deliberative efforts.
I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on this bill. House Republicans
are simply trying to score political points by passing a bill with the
same title as the 9/11 Commission hoping no one reads the fine print.
If the Republican leadership were serious about reform, they would have
gotten their caucus in line and come forth with a bipartisan bill that
mirrors the Commission recommendations like the bill the Senate has
passed. Republicans chose not to do so.
Let's stand with the families of September 11 and pass real
intelligence reform. Let's put the Republican's election politics aside
and get on with the business of protecting the American people.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment in the
nature of a substitute, as amended.
The amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended, was agreed
to.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
Hastings of Washington) having assumed the chair, Mr. Linder, Chairman
pro tempore of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the
Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the
bill (H.R. 10) to provide for reform of the intelligence community,
terrorism prevention and prosecution, border security, and
international cooperation and coordination, and for other purposes,
pursuant to House Resolution 827, he reported the bill back to the
House with an amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is
ordered.
Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the amendment in the
nature of a substitute adopted by the Committee of the Whole?
Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I demand a separate vote on amendment
No. 14 offered by the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith).
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is a separate vote demanded on any other
amendment?
The Clerk will designate the amendment on which a separate vote has
been demanded.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment:
Strike section 3006 (page 242, line 18 through page 244,
line 9) and redesignate provisions and conform the table of
contents accordingly.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the amendment.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.

Recorded Vote

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 203,
noes 210, not voting 19, as follows:

[Roll No. 521]

AYES--203

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Andrews
Baca
Baird
Baldwin
Bartlett (MD)
Becerra
Bell
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Boswell
Boucher
Brady (PA)
Brown (OH)
Brown, Corrine
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cardin
Cardoza
Carson (IN)
Clay
Clyburn
Conyers
Cooper
Costello
Crowley
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
Davis, Tom
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Dooley (CA)
Doyle
Emanuel
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Ford
Frank (MA)
Frost
Gerlach
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green (TX)
Greenwood
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Herseth
Hill
Hinchey
Hoeffel
Holt
Honda
Hooley (OR)
Houghton
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
King (NY)
Kirk
Kleczka
Kolbe
Kucinich
Lampson
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
LaTourette
Leach
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lofgren
Lowey
Lucas (KY)
Lynch
Maloney
Markey
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McDermott
McGovern
McNulty
Meehan
Meeks (NY)
Menendez
Michaud
Millender-McDonald
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mollohan
Moran (VA)
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Pelosi
Petri
Pomeroy
Porter
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reyes
Rodriguez
Ros-Lehtinen
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Sabo
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sanders
Sandlin
Schakowsky
Schiff
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Shays
Sherman
Simmons
Skelton
Smith (NJ)
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Souder
Spratt
Stark
Strickland
Stupak
Tanner
Tauscher
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Turner (TX)
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walsh
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Weldon (PA)
Wexler
Wilson (NM)
Wolf
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn

NOES--210

Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Barton (TX)
Bass
Beauprez
Biggert
Bilirakis
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boyd
Bradley (NH)
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Burgess
Burns
Burr
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Camp
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Carson (OK)
Carter
Case
Castle
Chabot
Chandler
Chocola
Coble
Cole
Collins
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crenshaw
Cubin
Culberson
Davis (TN)
Davis, Jo Ann
Deal (GA)
DeFazio
DeLay
DeMint
Doolittle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Edwards
Ehlers
Emerson
English
Everett
Feeney
Ferguson
Flake
Foley
Forbes
Fossella
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)

[[Page H8916]]

Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gingrey
Goode
Goodlatte
Granger
Graves
Green (WI)
Gutknecht
Hall
Harris
Hart
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Hensarling
Herger
Hobson
Hoekstra
Holden
Hostettler
Hulshof
Hunter
Hyde
Isakson
Issa
Istook
Jenkins
John
Johnson, Sam
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
King (IA)
Kingston
Kline
Knollenberg
LaHood
Latham
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lucas (OK)
Manzullo
Marshall
Matheson
McCotter
McCrery
McHugh
McInnis
McIntyre
McKeon
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Moore
Moran (KS)
Murphy
Musgrave
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neugebauer
Ney
Northup
Nunes
Nussle
Osborne
Ose
Otter
Oxley
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Pombo
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Renzi
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Saxton
Schrock
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (MI)
Smith (TX)
Stearns
Stenholm
Sullivan
Sweeney
Tancredo
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Toomey
Turner (OH)
Upton
Vitter
Walden (OR)
Wamp
Weldon (FL)
Weller
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (SC)
Young (AK)
Young (FL)

NOT VOTING--19

Ballenger
Boehlert
Cunningham
Filner
Franks (AZ)
Gephardt
Hinojosa
Jones (NC)
Kaptur
Lipinski
Majette
Matsui
Meek (FL)
Norwood
Ortiz
Paul
Slaughter
Tauzin
Towns

Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hastings of Washington) (during the
vote). Members are advised 2 minutes remain in this vote.

{time} 1500

Mr. GILCHREST changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated for:
Mr. FILNER. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 521, I was in my
Congressional District on official business. Had I been present, I
would have voted ``aye.''
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the amendment in the
nature of a substitute, as amended.
The amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended, was agreed
to.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.

Motion to Recommit Offered by Mrs. Maloney

Mrs. MALONEY. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentlewoman opposed to the bill?
Mrs. MALONEY. I am, Mr. Speaker, in its current form.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to
recommit.
The Clerk read as follows:
Mrs. Maloney moves to recommit the bill H.R. 10 to the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence with instructions
to report the same back to the House forthwith with the
following amendment:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert Attachment
1, as modified by the additional attachments:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``National
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.

TITLE I--NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

Subtitle A--National Intelligence Authority

Sec. 101. National Intelligence Authority.
Sec. 102. National Intelligence Director.

Subtitle B--Responsibilities and Authorities of National Intelligence
Director

Sec. 111. Provision of national intelligence.
Sec. 112. Responsibilities of National Intelligence Director.
Sec. 113. Authorities of National Intelligence Director.
Sec. 114. Enhanced personnel management.
Sec. 115. Security clearances.
Sec. 116. National Intelligence Reserve Corps.
Sec. 117. Appointment and termination of certain officials responsible
for intelligence-related activities.
Sec. 118. Reserve for Contingencies of the National Intelligence
Director.

Subtitle C--Office of the National Intelligence Director

Sec. 121. Office of the National Intelligence Director.
Sec. 122. Deputy national intelligence directors.
Sec. 123. National Intelligence Council.
Sec. 124. General Counsel of the National Intelligence Authority.
Sec. 125. Intelligence Comptroller.
Sec. 126. Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the National
Intelligence Authority.
Sec. 127. Privacy Officer of the National Intelligence Authority.
Sec. 128. Chief Information Officer of the National Intelligence
Authority.
Sec. 129. Chief Human Capital Officer of the National Intelligence
Authority.
Sec. 130. Chief Financial Officer of the National Intelligence
Authority.
Sec. 131. National Counterintelligence Executive.

Subtitle D--Additional Elements of National Intelligence Authority

Sec. 141. Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority.
Sec. 142. Ombudsman of the National Intelligence Authority.
Sec. 143. National Counterterrorism Center.
Sec. 144. National intelligence centers.

Subtitle E--Education and Training of Intelligence Community Personnel

Sec. 151. Framework for cross-disciplinary education and training.
Sec. 152. Intelligence Community Scholarship Program.

Subtitle F--Additional Authorities of National Intelligence Authority

Sec. 161. Use of appropriated funds.
Sec. 162. Acquisition and fiscal authorities.
Sec. 163. Personnel matters.
Sec. 164. Ethics matters.

TITLE II--OTHER IMPROVEMENTS OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Subtitle A--Improvements of Intelligence Activities

Sec. 201. Availability to public of certain intelligence funding
information.
Sec. 202. Merger of Homeland Security Council into National Security
Council.
Sec. 203. Joint Intelligence Community Council.
Sec. 204. Improvement of intelligence capabilities of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
Sec. 205. Federal Bureau of Investigation Intelligence Career Service.
Sec. 206. Information sharing.

Subtitle B--Privacy and Civil Liberties

Sec. 211. Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.
Sec. 212. Privacy and civil liberties officers.

Subtitle C--Independence of Intelligence Agencies

Sec. 221. Independence of National Intelligence Director.
Sec. 222. Independence of intelligence.
Sec. 223. Independence of National Counterterrorism Center.
Sec. 224. Access of congressional committees to national intelligence.
Sec. 225. Communications with Congress.

TITLE III--MODIFICATIONS OF LAWS RELATING TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
MANAGEMENT

Subtitle A--Conforming and Other Amendments

Sec. 301. Restatement and modification of basic authority on the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 302. Conforming amendments relating to roles of National
Intelligence Director and Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 303. Other conforming amendments
Sec. 304. Modifications of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence
under National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 305. Elements of intelligence community under National Security
Act of 1947.
Sec. 306. Redesignation of National Foreign Intelligence Program as
National Intelligence Program.
Sec. 307. Conforming amendment on coordination of budgets of elements
of the intelligence community within the Department of
Defense.
Sec. 308. Repeal of superseded authorities.
Sec. 309. Clerical amendments to National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 310. Modification of authorities relating to National
Counterintelligence Executive.
Sec. 311. Conforming amendment to Inspector General Act of 1978.
Sec. 312. Conforming amendment relating to Chief Financial Officer of
the National Intelligence Authority.

Subtitle B--Transfers and Terminations

Sec. 321. Transfer of Office of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
for Community Management.
Sec. 322. Transfer of National Counterterrorism Executive.
Sec. 323. Transfer of Terrorist Threat Integration Center.
Sec. 324. Termination of certain positions within the Central
Intelligence Agency.

[[Page H8917]]

Subtitle C--Other Transition Matters

Sec. 331. Executive Schedule matters.
Sec. 332. Preservation of intelligence capabilities.
Sec. 333. Reorganization.
Sec. 334. National Intelligence Director report on implementation of
intelligence community reform.
Sec. 335. Comptroller General reports on implementation of intelligence
community reform.
Sec. 336. General references.

Subtitle D--Effective Date

Sec. 341. Effective date.

Subtitle E--Other Matters

Sec. 351. Severability.
Sec. 352. Authorization of appropriations.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:
(1) The term ``intelligence'' includes foreign intelligence
and counterintelligence.
(2) The term ``foreign intelligence'' means information
relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of
foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign
organizations, foreign persons, or international terrorists.
(3) The term ``counterintelligence'' means information
gathered, and activities conducted, to protect against
espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or
assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign
governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations,
foreign persons, or international terrorists.
(4) The term ``intelligence community'' includes the
following:
(A) The National Intelligence Authority.
(B) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(C) The National Security Agency.
(D) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(E) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(F) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(G) Other offices within the Department of Defense for the
collection of specialized national intelligence through
reconnaissance programs.
(H) The intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the
Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the Department of Energy.
(I) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the
Department of State.
(J) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the
Department of the Treasury.
(K) The elements of the Department of Homeland Security
concerned with the analysis of intelligence information,
including the Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard.
(L) Such other elements of any department or agency as may
be designated by the President, or designated jointly by the
National Intelligence Director and the head of the department
or agency concerned, as an element of the intelligence
community.
(5) The terms ``national intelligence'' and ``intelligence
related to the national security''--
(A) each refer to intelligence which pertains to the
interests of more than one department or agency of the
Government; and
(B) do not refer to counterintelligence or law enforcement
activities conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
except to the extent provided for in procedures agreed to by
the National Intelligence Director and the Attorney General,
or otherwise as expressly provided for in this title.
(6) The term ``National Intelligence Program''--
(A)(i) refers to all national intelligence programs,
projects, and activities of the elements of the intelligence
community;
(ii) includes all programs, projects, and activities
(whether or not pertaining to national intelligence) of the
National Intelligence Authority, the Central Intelligence
Agency, the National Security Agency, the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance
Office, the Office of Intelligence of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the Office of Information Analysis of the
Department of Homeland Security; and
(iii) includes any other program, project, or activity of a
department, agency, or element of the United States
Government relating to national intelligence unless the
National Intelligence Director and the head of the
department, agency, or element concerned determine otherwise;
but
(B) except as provided in subparagraph (A)(ii), does not
refer to any program, project, or activity of the military
departments, including any program, project, or activity of
the Defense Intelligence Agency that is not part of the
National Foreign Intelligence Program as of the date of the
enactment of this Act, to acquire intelligence principally
for the planning and conduct of joint or tactical military
operations by the United States Armed Forces.
(7) The term ``congressional intelligence committees''
means--
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives.

TITLE I--NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

Subtitle A--National Intelligence Authority

SEC. 101. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY.

(a) Independent Establishment.--There is hereby established
as an independent establishment in the executive branch of
government the National Intelligence Authority.
(b) Composition.--The National Intelligence Authority is
composed of the following:
(1) The Office of the National Intelligence Director.
(2) The elements specified in subtitle D.
(3) Such other elements, offices, agencies, and activities
as may be established by law or by the President or the
National Intelligence Director.
(c) Primary Missions.--The primary missions of the National
Intelligence Authority are as follows:
(1) To unify and strengthen the efforts of the intelligence
community of the United States Government.
(2) To ensure the organization of the efforts of the
intelligence community of the United States Government in a
joint manner relating to intelligence missions rather than
through intelligence collection disciplines.
(3) To provide for the operation of the National
Counterterrorism Center and national intelligence centers
under subtitle D.
(4) To eliminate barriers that impede coordination of the
counterterrorism activities of the United States Government
between foreign intelligence activities located abroad and
foreign intelligence activities located domestically while
ensuring the protection of civil liberties.
(5) To establish clear responsibility and accountability
for counterterrorism and other intelligence matters relating
to the national security of the United States.
(d) Seal.--The National Intelligence Director shall have a
seal for the National Intelligence Authority. The design of
the seal is subject to the approval of the President.
Judicial notice shall be taken of the seal.

SEC. 102. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR.

(a) National Intelligence Director.--There is a National
Intelligence Director who shall be appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(b) Individuals Eligible for Nomination.--Any individual
nominated for appointment as National Intelligence Director
shall have extensive national security expertise.
(c) Prohibition on Simultaneous Service in Other Capacity
in Intelligence Community.--The individual serving as
National Intelligence Director may not, while so serving,
serve in any capacity in any other element of the
intelligence community, except to the extent that the
individual serving as National Intelligence Director does so
in an acting capacity.
(d) Principal Duties and Responsibilities.--The National
Intelligence Director shall--
(1) serve as head of the intelligence community in
accordance with the provisions of this Act, the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.), and other
applicable provisions of law;
(2) act as a principal adviser to the President for
intelligence related to the national security;
(3) serve as the head of the National Intelligence
Authority; and
(4) direct and oversee the National Intelligence Program.
(e) General Responsibilities and Authorities.--In carrying
out the duties and responsibilities set forth in subsection
(c), the National Intelligence Director shall have the
responsibilities set forth in section 112 and the authorities
set forth in section 113 and other applicable provisions of
law.

Subtitle B--Responsibilities and Authorities of National Intelligence
Director

SEC. 111. PROVISION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

(a) In General.--The National Intelligence Director shall
be responsible for providing national intelligence--
(1) to the President;
(2) to the heads of other departments and agencies of the
executive branch;
(3) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior
military commanders;
(4) to the Senate and House of Representatives and the
committees thereof; and
(5) to such other persons or entities as the President
shall direct.
(b) National Intelligence.--Such national intelligence
shall be timely, objective, independent of political
considerations, and based upon all sources available to the
intelligence community.

SEC. 112. RESPONSIBILITIES OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR.

(a) In General.--The National Intelligence Director shall--
(1) determine the annual budget for the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the United States by--
(A) providing to the heads of the departments containing
agencies or elements within the intelligence community and
that have one or more programs, projects, or activities
within the National Intelligence program, and to the heads of
such agencies and elements, guidance for development the
National Intelligence Program budget pertaining to such
agencies or elements;
(B) developing and presenting to the President an annual
budget for the National Intelligence Program after
consultation with the heads of agencies or elements, and the
heads of their respective departments, under subparagraph
(A);
(C) providing budget guidance to each element of the
intelligence community that does not have one or more
program, project, or activity within the National
Intelligence Program regarding the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of such element; and

[[Page H8918]]

(D) participating in the development by the Secretary of
Defense of the annual budgets for the military intelligence
programs, projects, and activities not included in the
National Intelligence Program;
(2) manage and oversee the National Intelligence Program,
including--
(A) the execution of funds within the National Intelligence
Program;
(B) the reprogramming of funds appropriated or otherwise
made available to the National Intelligence Program; and
(C) the transfer of funds and personnel under the National
Intelligence Program;
(3) establish the requirements and priorities to govern the
collection, analysis, and dissemination of national
intelligence by elements of the intelligence community;
(4) establish collection and analysis requirements for the
intelligence community, determine collection and analysis
priorities, issue and manage collection and analysis tasking,
and resolve conflicts in the tasking of elements of the
intelligence community within the National Intelligence
Program, except as otherwise agreed with the Secretary of
Defense pursuant to the direction of the President;
(5) provide advisory tasking on the collection of
intelligence to elements of the United States Government
having information collection capabilities that are not
elements of the intelligence community;
(6) manage and oversee the National Counterterrorism Center
under section 143, and establish, manage, and oversee
national intelligence centers under section 144;
(7) establish requirements and priorities for foreign
intelligence information to be collected under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et
seq.), and provide assistance to the Attorney General to
ensure that information derived from electronic surveillance
or physical searches under that Act is disseminated so it may
be used efficiently and effectively for foreign intelligence
purposes, except that the Director shall have no authority to
direct, manage, or undertake electronic surveillance or
physical search operations pursuant to that Act unless
otherwise authorized by statute or Executive order;
(8) develop and implement, in consultation with the heads
of other agencies or elements of the intelligence community,
and the heads of their respective departments, personnel
policies and programs applicable to the intelligence
community that--
(A) encourage and facilitate assignments and details of
personnel to the National Counterterrorism Center under
section 143, to national intelligence centers under section
144, and between elements of the intelligence community;
(B) set standards for education, training, and career
development of personnel of the intelligence community;
(C) encourage and facilitate the recruitment and retention
by the intelligence community of highly qualified individuals
for the effective conduct of intelligence activities;
(D) ensure that the personnel of the intelligence community
is sufficiently diverse for purposes of the collection and
analysis of intelligence through the recruitment and training
of women, minorities, and individuals with diverse ethnic,
cultural, and linguistic backgrounds;
(E) make service in more than one element of the
intelligence community a condition of promotion to such
positions within the intelligence community as the Director
shall specify;
(F) ensure the effective management of intelligence
community personnel who are responsible for intelligence
community-wide matters;
(G) provide for the effective management of human capital
within the intelligence community, including--
(i) the alignment of human resource policies and programs
of the elements of the intelligence community with the
missions, goals, and organizational objectives of such
elements and of the intelligence community overall;
(ii) the assessment of workforce characteristics and future
needs and the establishment of workforce development
strategies to meet those needs based on relevant
organizational missions and strategic plans;
(iii) the sustainment of a culture that encourages and
allows for the development of a high performing workforce;
and
(iv) the alignment of expectations for personnel
performance with relevant organizational missions and
strategic plans;
(H) are consistent with the public employment principles of
merit and fitness set forth under section 2301 of title 5,
United States Code; and
(I) include the enhancements required under section 114;
(9) promote and evaluate the utility of national
intelligence to consumers within the United States
Government;
(10) ensure that appropriate officials of the United States
Government and other appropriate individuals have access to a
variety of intelligence assessments and analytical views;
(11) protect intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure;
(12) establish requirements and procedures for the
classification of intelligence information and for access to
classified intelligence information;
(13) establish requirements and procedures for the
dissemination of classified information by elements of the
intelligence community;
(14) establish intelligence reporting guidelines that
maximize the dissemination of information while protecting
intelligence sources and methods;
(15) develop, in consultation with the heads of appropriate
departments and agencies of the United States Government, an
integrated communications network that provides interoperable
communications capabilities among all elements of the
intelligence community and such other entities and persons as
the Director considers appropriate;
(16) establish standards for information technology and
communications for the intelligence community;
(17) ensure that the intelligence community makes efficient
and effective use of open-source information and analysis;
(18) ensure compliance by elements of the intelligence
community with the Constitution and all laws, regulations,
Executive orders, and implementing guidelines of the United
States applicable to the intelligence and intelligence-
related activities of the United States Government, including
the provisions of the Constitution and all laws, regulations,
Executive orders, and implementing guidelines of the United
States applicable to the protection of the privacy and civil
liberties of United States persons;
(19) eliminate waste and unnecessary duplication within the
intelligence community; and
(20) perform such other functions as the President may
direct.
(b) Uniform Procedures for Sensitive Compartmented
Information.--The President, acting through the National
Intelligence Director, shall establish uniform standards and
procedures for the grant to sensitive compartmented
information in accordance with section 115.
(c) Performance of Common Services.--(1) The National
Intelligence Director shall, in consultation with the heads
of departments and agencies of the United States Government
containing elements within the intelligence community and
with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, direct
and coordinate the performance by the elements of the
intelligence community within the National Intelligence
Program of such services as are of common concern to the
intelligence community, which services the National
Intelligence Director determines can be more efficiently
accomplished in a consolidated manner.
(2) The services performed under paragraph (1) shall
include research and development on technology for use in
national intelligence missions.
(d) Regulations.--The National Intelligence Director may
prescribe regulations relating to the discharge and
enforcement of the responsibilities of the Director under
this section.

SEC. 113. AUTHORITIES OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR.

(a) Access to Intelligence.--Unless otherwise directed by
the President, the National Intelligence Director shall have
access to all intelligence related to the national security
which is collected by any department, agency, or other
element of the United States Government.
(b) Determination of Budgets for NIP and Other Intelligence
Activities.--The National Intelligence Director shall
determine the annual budget for the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government under section 112(a)(1) by--
(1) providing to the heads of the departments containing
agencies or elements within the intelligence community and
that have one or more programs, projects, or activities
within the National Intelligence program, and to the heads of
such agencies and elements, guidance for development the
National Intelligence Program budget pertaining to such
agencies or elements;
(2) developing and presenting to the President an annual
budget for the National Intelligence Program after
consultation with the heads of agencies or elements, and the
heads of their respective departments, under paragraph (1),
including, in furtherance of such budget, the review,
modification, and approval of budgets of the agencies or
elements of the intelligence community with one or more
programs, projects, or activities within the National
Intelligence Program utilizing the budget authorities in
subsection (c)(1);
(3) providing guidance on the development of annual budgets
for each element of the intelligence community that does not
have any program, project, or activity within the National
Intelligence Program utilizing the budget authorities in
subsection (c)(2);
(4) participating in the development by the Secretary of
Defense of the annual budget for military intelligence
programs and activities outside the National Intelligence
Program;
(4) receiving the appropriations for the National
Intelligence Program as specified in subsection (d) and
allotting and allocating funds to agencies and elements of
the intelligence community; and
(5) managing and overseeing the execution by the agencies
or elements of the intelligence community, and, if necessary,
the modification of the annual budget for the National
Intelligence Program, including directing the reprogramming
and transfer of funds, and the transfer of personnel, among
and between elements of the intelligence community within the
National Intelligence Program utilizing the authorities in
subsections (f) and (g).

[[Page H8919]]

(c) Budget Authorities.--(1)(A) In developing and
presenting an annual budget for the elements of the
intelligence community within the National Intelligence
Program under subsection (b)(1), the National Intelligence
Director shall coordinate, prepare, and present to the
President the annual budgets of those elements, in
consultation with the heads of those elements.
(B) If any portion of the budget for an element of the
intelligence community within the National Intelligence
Program is prepared outside the Office of the National
Intelligence Director, the Director--
(i) shall approve such budget before submission to the
President; and
(ii) may require modifications of such budget to meet the
requirements and priorities of the Director before approving
such budget under clause (i).
(C) The budget of an agency or element of the intelligence
community with one or more programs, projects, or activities
within the National Intelligence Program may not be provided
to the President unless the Director has first approved such
budget.
(2)(A) The Director shall provide guidance for the
development of the annual budgets for each agency or element
of the intelligence community that does not have any program,
project, or activity within the National Intelligence
Program.
(B) The heads of the agencies or elements of the
intelligence community, and the heads of their respective
departments, referred to in subparagraph (A) shall coordinate
closely with the Director in the development of the budgets
of such agencies or elements, before the submission of their
recommendations on such budgets to the President.
(d) Jurisdiction of Funds Under NIP.--(1) Notwithstanding
any other provision of law and consistent with section 504 of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414), any
amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the
National Intelligence Program shall be appropriated to the
National Intelligence Authority and, pursuant to subsection
(e), under the direct jurisdiction of the National
Intelligence Director.
(2) The Director shall manage and oversee the execution by
each element of the intelligence community of any amounts
appropriated or otherwise made available to such element
under the National Intelligence Program.
(e) Accounts for Administration of NIP Funds.--(1) The
Secretary of the Treasury shall, in consultation with the
National Intelligence Director, establish accounts for the
funds under the jurisdiction of the Director under subsection
(d) for purposes of carrying out the responsibilities and
authorities of the Director under this Act with respect to
the National Intelligence Program.
(2) The National Intelligence Director shall--
(A) control and manage the accounts established under
paragraph (1); and
(B) with the concurrence of the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, establish procedures governing the use
(including transfers and reprogrammings) of funds in such
accounts.
(3)(A) To the extent authorized by law, a certifying
official shall follow the procedures established under
paragraph (2)(B) with regard to each account established
under paragraph (1). Disbursements from any such account
shall only be made against a valid obligation of such
account.
(B) In this paragraph, the term ``certifying official',
with respect to an element of the intelligence community,
means an employee of the element who has responsibilities
specified in section 3528(a) of title 31, United States Code.
(4) The National Intelligence Director shall allot funds
deposited in an account established under paragraph (1)
directly to the head of the elements of the intelligence
community concerned in accordance with the procedures
established under paragraph (2)(B).
(5) Each account established under paragraph (1) shall be
subject to chapters 13 and 15 of title 31, United States
Code, other than sections 1503 and 1556 of that title.
(6) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to impair
or otherwise affect the authority granted by subsection
(g)(3) or by section 5 or 8 of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f, 403j).
(f) Role in Reprogramming or Transfer of NIP Funds by
Elements of Intelligence Community.--(1) No funds made
available under the National Intelligence Program may be
reprogrammed or transferred by any agency or element of the
intelligence community without the prior approval of the
National Intelligence Director except in accordance with
procedures issued by the Director.
(2) The head of the department concerned shall consult with
the Director before reprogramming or transferring funds
appropriated or otherwise made available to an agency or
element of the intelligence community that does not have any
program, project, or activity within the National
Intelligence Program.
(3) The Director shall, before reprogramming funds
appropriated or otherwise made available for an element of
the intelligence community within the National Intelligence
Program, consult with the head of the department or agency
having jurisdiction over such element regarding such
reprogramming.
(4)(A) The Director shall consult with the appropriate
committees of Congress regarding modifications of existing
procedures to expedite the reprogramming of funds within the
National Intelligence Program.
(B) Any modification of procedures under subparagraph (A)
shall include procedures for the notification of the
appropriate committees of Congress of any objection raised by
the head of a department or agency to a reprogramming
proposed by the Director as a result of consultations under
paragraph (3).
(g) Transfer or Reprogramming of Funds and Transfer of
Personnel Within NIP.--(1) In addition to any other
authorities available under law for such purposes, the
National Intelligence Director, with the approval of the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget and after
consultation with the heads of the departments containing
agencies or elements within the intelligence community to the
extent their subordinate agencies or elements are affected,
with the heads of such subordinate agencies or elements, and
with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to the
extent the Central Intelligence Agency is affected, may--
(A) transfer or reprogram funds appropriated for a program
within the National Intelligence Program to another such
program;
(B) review, and approve or disapprove, any proposal to
transfer or reprogram funds from appropriations that are not
for the National Intelligence Program to appropriations for
the National Intelligence Program;
(C) in accordance with procedures to be developed by the
National Intelligence Director, transfer personnel of the
intelligence community funded through the National
Intelligence Program from one element of the intelligence
community to another element of the intelligence community;
and
(D) in accordance with procedures to be developed by the
National Intelligence Director and the heads of the
departments and agencies concerned, transfer personnel of the
intelligence community not funded through the National
Intelligence Program from one element of the intelligence
community to another element of the intelligence community.
(2) A transfer of funds or personnel may be made under this
subsection only if--
(A) the funds or personnel are being transferred to an
activity that is a higher priority intelligence activity;
(B) the transfer does not involve a transfer of funds to
the Reserve for Contingencies of the National Intelligence
Director; or
(C) the transfer does not exceed applicable ceilings
established in law for such transfers.
(3) Funds transferred under this subsection shall remain
available for the same period as the appropriations account
to which transferred.
(4) Any transfer of funds under this subsection shall be
carried out in accordance with existing procedures applicable
to reprogramming notifications for the appropriate
congressional committees. Any proposed transfer for which
notice is given to the appropriate congressional committees
shall be accompanied by a report explaining the nature of the
proposed transfer and how it satisfies the requirements of
this subsection. In addition, the congressional intelligence
committees shall be promptly notified of any transfer of
funds made pursuant to this subsection in any case in which
the transfer would not have otherwise required reprogramming
notification under procedures in effect as of October 24,
1992.
(5)(A) The National Intelligence Director shall promptly
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on
any transfer of personnel made pursuant to this subsection.
The Director shall include in any such report an explanation
of the nature of the transfer and how it satisfies the
requirements of this subsection.
(B) In this paragraph, the term ``appropriate committees of
Congress'' means--
(i)(I) the Committee on Appropriations and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(II) the Committee on Appropriations and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives;
(ii) in the case of a transfer of personnel to or from the
Department of Defense--
(I) the committees and select committees referred to in
clause (i);
(II) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and
(III) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives;
(iii) in the case of a transfer of personnel to or from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation--
(I) the committees and select committees referred to in
clause (i);
(II) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate; and
(III) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives; and
(iv) in the case of a transfer of personnel to or from the
Department of Homeland Security--
(I) the committees and select committees referred to in
clause (i);
(II) the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate;
and
(III) the Select Committee on Homeland Security of the
House of Representatives.
(h) Information Technology and Communications.--(1) In
conforming with section 205, in carrying out section
112(a)(16), the National Intelligence Director shall--
(A) establish standards for information technology and
communications across the intelligence community;
(B) develop an integrated information technology network
and enterprise architecture for the intelligence community,
including interface standards for interoperability to enable
automated information-sharing

[[Page H8920]]

among elements of the intelligence community;
(C) maintain an inventory of critical information
technology and communications systems, and eliminate
unnecessary or duplicative systems;
(D) establish contingency plans for the intelligence
community regarding information technology and
communications; and
(E) establish policies, doctrine, training, and other
measures necessary to ensure that the intelligence community
develops an integrated information technology and
communications network that ensures information-sharing.
(2) Consistent with section 205, the Director shall take
any action necessary, including the setting of standards for
information technology and communications across the
intelligence community, to develop an integrated information
technology and communications network that ensures
information-sharing across the intelligence community.
(i) Coordination With Foreign Governments.--In a manner
consistent with section 207 of the Foreign Service Act of
1980 (22 U.S.C. 3927), the National Intelligence Director
shall oversee and direct the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency in coordinating, under section 103(f) of
the National Security Act of 1947, the relationships between
elements of the intelligence community and the intelligence
or security services of foreign governments on all matters
involving intelligence related to the national security or
involving intelligence acquired through clandestine means.
(j) Open Source Information Collection.--The National
Intelligence Director shall establish and maintain within the
intelligence community an effective and efficient open-source
information collection capability.
(k) Access to Information.--Except as otherwise directed by
the President, the head of each element of the intelligence
community shall promptly provide the National Intelligence
Director such information in the possession or under the
control of such element as the Director may request in order
to facilitate the exercise of the authorities and
responsibilities of the Director under this Act.

SEC. 114. ENHANCED PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT.

(a) Rewards for Service in Certain Positions.--(1) The
National Intelligence Director shall prescribe regulations to
provide incentives for service on the staff of the national
intelligence centers, on the staff of the National
Counterterrorism Center, and in other positions in support of
the intelligence community management functions of the
Director.
(2) Incentives under paragraph (1) may include financial
incentives, bonuses, and such other awards and incentives as
the Director considers appropriate.
(b) Enhanced Promotion for Service Under NID.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the National
Intelligence Director shall ensure that personnel of an
element of the intelligence community who are assigned or
detailed to service under the National Intelligence Director
shall be promoted at rates equivalent to or better than
personnel of such element who are not so assigned or
detailed.
(c) Joint Career Matters.--(1) In carrying out section
112(a)(8), the National Intelligence Director shall prescribe
mechanisms to facilitate the rotation of personnel of the
intelligence community through various elements of the
intelligence community in the course of their careers in
order to facilitate the widest possible understanding by such
personnel of the variety of intelligence requirements,
methods, and disciplines.
(2) The mechanisms prescribed under paragraph (1) may
include the following:
(A) The establishment of special occupational categories
involving service, over the course of a career, in more than
one element of the intelligence community.
(B) The provision of rewards for service in positions
undertaking analysis and planning of operations involving two
or more elements of the intelligence community.
(C) The establishment of requirements for education,
training, service, and evaluation that involve service in
more than one element of the intelligence community.
(3) It is the sense of Congress that the mechanisms
prescribed under this subsection should, to the extent
practical, seek to duplicate within the intelligence
community the joint officer management policies established
by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization
Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433) and the amendments on joint
officer management made by that Act.

SEC. 115. SECURITY CLEARANCES.

(a) In General.--The President, in consultation with the
National Intelligence Director, the department, agency, or
element selected under (b), and other appropriate officials
shall--
(1) establish uniform standards and procedures for the
grant of access to classified information for employees and
contractor personnel of the United States Government who
require access to such information;
(2) ensure the consistent implementation of the standards
and procedures established under paragraph (1) throughout the
departments, agencies, and elements of the United States
Government and under contracts entered into by such
departments, agencies, and elements;
(3) ensure that an individual who is granted or continued
eligibility for access to classified information is treated
by each department, agency, or element of the executive
branch as eligible for access to classified information at
that level for all purposes of each such department, agency,
or element, regardless of which department, agency, or
element of the executive branch granted or continued the
eligibility of such individual for access to classified
information;
(4) establish uniform requirements and standards, including
for security questionnaires, financial disclosure
requirements, and standards for administering polygraph
examinations, to be utilized for the performance of security
clearance investigations, including by the contractors
conducting such investigations; and
(5) ensure that the database established under subsection
(b)(2)(B) meets the needs of the intelligence community.
(b) Performance of Security Clearance Investigations.--(1)
Not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the President shall select a single department,
agency, or element of the executive branch to conduct all
security clearance investigations of employees and contractor
personnel of the United States Government who require access
to classified information and to provide and maintain all
security clearances of such employees and contractor
personnel.
(2) The department, agency, or element selected under
paragraph (1) shall--
(A) take all necessary actions to carry out the
requirements of this section, including entering into a
memorandum of understanding with any agency carrying out
responsibilities relating to security clearances or security
clearance investigations before the date of the enactment of
this Act;
(B) as soon as practicable, establish and maintain a single
database for tracking security clearance applications,
security clearance investigations, and determinations of
eligibility for security clearances, which database shall
incorporate applicable elements of similar databases in
existence on the date of the enactment of this Act; and
(C) ensure that security clearance investigations are
conducted in accordance with uniform standards and
requirements established under subsection (a)(4), including
uniform security questionnaires and financial disclosure
requirements.
(c) Adjudication and Grant of Security Clearances.--(1)
Each agency that adjudicates and grants security clearances
as of the date of the enactment of this Act may continue to
adjudicate and grant security clearances after that date.
(2) Each agency that adjudicates and grants security
clearances shall specify to the department, agency, or
element selected under subsection (b) the level of security
clearance investigation required for an individual under its
jurisdiction.
(3) Upon granting or continuing eligibility for access to
classified information to an individual under its
jurisdiction, an agency that adjudicates and grants security
clearances shall submit to the department, agency, or element
selected under subsection (b) notice of that action,
including the level of access to classified information
granted.
(d) Utilization of Personnel.--There shall be transferred
to the department, agency, or element selected under
subsection (b) any personnel of any executive agency whose
sole function as of the date of the enactment of this Act is
the performance of security clearance investigations.
(e) Transition.--The President shall take appropriate
actions to ensure that the performance of security clearance
investigations under this section commences not later than
one year after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 116. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE RESERVE CORPS.

(a) Establishment.--The National Intelligence Director may
provide for the establishment and training of a National
Intelligence Reserve Corps (in this section referred to as
``National Intelligence Reserve Corps'') for the temporary
reemployment on a voluntary basis of former employees of
elements of the intelligence community during periods of
emergency, as determined by the Director.
(b) Eligible Individuals.--An individual may participate in
the National Intelligence Reserve Corps only if the
individual previously served as a full time employee of an
element of the intelligence community.
(c) Limitation on Membership.--The total number of
individuals who are members of the National Intelligence
Reserve Corps at any given time may not exceed 200
individuals.
(d) Terms of Participation.--The National Intelligence
Director shall prescribe the terms and conditions under which
eligible individuals may participate in the National
Intelligence Reserve Corps.
(e) Expenses.--The National Intelligence Director may
provide members of the National Intelligence Reserve Corps
transportation and per diem in lieu of subsistence for
purposes of participating in any training that relates to
service as a member of the Reserve Corps.
(f) Treatment of Annuitants.--(1) If an annuitant receiving
an annuity from the Civil Service Retirement and Disability
Fund becomes temporarily reemployed pursuant to this section,
such annuity shall not be discontinued thereby.
(2) An annuitant so reemployed shall not be considered an
employee for the purposes of chapter 83 or 84 of title 5,
United States Code.

[[Page H8921]]

(g) Treatment Under National Intelligence Authority
Personnel Ceiling.--A member of the National Intelligence
Reserve Corps who is reemployed on a temporary basis pursuant
to this section shall not count against any personnel ceiling
applicable to the National Intelligence Authority.

SEC. 117. APPOINTMENT AND TERMINATION OF CERTAIN OFFICIALS
RESPONSIBLE FOR INTELLIGENCE-RELATED
ACTIVITIES.

(a) Recommendation of NID in Certain Appointment.--In the
event of a vacancy in the position of Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the National Intelligence Director shall
recommend to the President an individual for nomination to
fill the vacancy.
(b) Concurrence of Secretary of Defense in Certain
Appointments Recommended by NID.--(1) In the event of a
vacancy in a position referred to in paragraph (2), the
National Intelligence Director shall obtain the concurrence
of the Secretary of Defense before recommending to the
President an individual for nomination to fill such vacancy.
If the Secretary does not concur in the recommendation, the
Director may make the recommendation to the President without
the concurrence of the Secretary, but shall include in the
recommendation a statement that the Secretary does not concur
in the recommendation.
(2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions:
(A) The Director of the National Security Agency.
(B) The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office.
(C) The Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency.
(c) Concurrence of NID in Certain Appointments.--(1) In the
event of a vacancy in a position referred to in paragraph
(2), the head of the department or agency having jurisdiction
over the position shall obtain the concurrence of the
National Intelligence Director before appointing an
individual to fill the vacancy or recommending to the
President an individual to be nominated to fill the vacancy.
If the Director does not concur in the recommendation, the
head of the department or agency concerned may fill the
vacancy or make the recommendation to the President (as the
case may be) without the concurrence of the Director, but
shall notify the President that the Director does not concur
in appointment or recommendation (as the case may be).
(2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions:
(A) The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
(B) The Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for
Information Analysis.
(C) The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
(D) The Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(d) Recommendation of NID on Termination of Service.--(1)
The National Intelligence Director may recommend to the
President or the head of the department or agency concerned
the termination of service of any individual serving in any
position covered by this section.
(2) In the event the Director intends to recommend to the
President the termination of service of an individual under
paragraph (1), the Director shall seek the concurrence of the
head of the department or agency concerned. If the head of
the department or agency concerned does not concur in the
recommendation, the Director may make the recommendation to
the President without the concurrence of the head of the
department or agency concerned, but shall notify the
President that the head of the department or agency concerned
does not concur in the recommendation.

SEC. 118. RESERVE FOR CONTINGENCIES OF THE NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR.

(a) Establishment.--There is hereby established on the
books of the Treasury an account to be known as the Reserve
for Contingencies of the National Intelligence Director.
(b) Elements.--The Reserve shall consist of the following
elements:
(1) Amounts authorized to be appropriated to the Reserve.
(2) Any amounts authorized to be transferred to or
deposited in the Reserve by law.
(c) Availability.--Amounts in the Reserve shall be
available for such purposes as are provided by law.
(d) Transfer of Funds of Reserve for Contingencies of
CIA.--There shall be transferred to the Reserve for
Contingencies of the National Intelligence Director all
unobligated balances of the Reserve for Contingencies of the
Central Intelligence Agency as of the date of the enactment
of this Act.

Subtitle C--Office of the National Intelligence Director

SEC. 121. OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR.

(a) Office of National Intelligence Director.--There is
within the National Intelligence Authority an Office of the
National Intelligence Director.
(b) Function.--The function of the Office of the National
Intelligence Director is to assist the National Intelligence
Director in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of
the Director under this Act, the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.), and other applicable provisions
of law, and to carry out such other duties as may be
prescribed by the President or by law.
(c) Composition.--The Office of the National Intelligence
Director is composed of the following:
(1) The Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director.
(2) Any Deputy National Intelligence Director appointed
under section 122(b).
(3) The National Intelligence Council.
(4) The General Counsel of the National Intelligence
Authority.
(5) The Intelligence Comptroller.
(6) The Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the
National Intelligence Authority.
(7) The Privacy Officer of the National Intelligence
Authority.
(8) The Chief Information Officer of the National
Intelligence Authority.
(9) The Chief Human Capital Officer of the National
Intelligence Authority.
(10) The Chief Financial Officer of the National
Intelligence Authority.
(11) The National Counterintelligence Executive (including
the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive).
(12) Such other offices and officials as may be established
by law or the Director may establish or designate in the
Office.
(d) Staff.--(1) To assist the National Intelligence
Director in fulfilling the duties and responsibilities of the
Director, the Director shall employ and utilize in the Office
of the National Intelligence Director a professional staff
having an expertise in matters relating to such duties and
responsibilities, and may establish permanent positions and
appropriate rates of pay with respect to that staff.
(2) The staff of the Office of the National Intelligence
Director under paragraph (1) shall include the staff of the
Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for
Community Management that is transferred to the Office of the
National Intelligence Director under section 321.
(e) Prohibition on Co-Location With Other Elements of
Intelligence Community.--Commencing as of October 1, 2006,
the Office of the National Intelligence Director may not be
co-located with any other element of the intelligence
community.

SEC. 122. DEPUTY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORS.

(a) Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director.--(1)
There is a Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director
who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate.
(2) In the event of a vacancy in the position of Principal
Deputy National Intelligence Director, the National
Intelligence Director shall recommend to the President an
individual for appointment as Principal Deputy National
Intelligence Director.
(3) Any individual nominated for appointment as Principal
Deputy National Intelligence Director shall have extensive
national security experience and management expertise.
(4) The individual serving as Principal Deputy National
Intelligence Director may not, while so serving, serve in any
capacity in any other element of the intelligence community,
except to the extent that the individual serving as Principal
Deputy National Intelligence Director is doing so in an
acting capacity.
(5) The Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director
shall assist the National Intelligence Director in carrying
out the duties and responsibilities of the Director.
(6) The Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director
shall act for, and exercise the powers of, the National
Intelligence Director during the absence or disability of the
National Intelligence Director or during a vacancy in the
position of National Director of Intelligence.
(b) Deputy National Intelligence Directors.--(1) There may
be not more than four Deputy National Intelligence Directors
who shall be appointed by the President.
(2) In the event of a vacancy in any position of Deputy
National Intelligence Director established under this
subsection, the National Intelligence Director shall
recommend to the President an individual for appointment to
such position.
(3) Each Deputy National Intelligence Director appointed
under this subsection shall have such duties,
responsibilities, and authorities as the National
Intelligence Director may assign or are specified by law.

SEC. 123. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL.

(a) National Intelligence Council.--There is a National
Intelligence Council.
(b) Composition.--(1) The National Intelligence Council
shall be composed of senior analysts within the intelligence
community and substantive experts from the public and private
sector, who shall be appointed by, report to, and serve at
the pleasure of, the National Intelligence Director.
(2) The Director shall prescribe appropriate security
requirements for personnel appointed from the private sector
as a condition of service on the Council, or as contractors
of the Council or employees of such contractors, to ensure
the protection of intelligence sources and methods while
avoiding, wherever possible, unduly intrusive requirements
which the Director considers to be unnecessary for this
purpose.
(c) Duties and Responsibilities.--(1) The National
Intelligence Council shall--
(A) produce national intelligence estimates for the United
States Government, including alternative views held by
elements of the intelligence community and other information
as specified in paragraph (2);

[[Page H8922]]

(B) evaluate community-wide collection and production of
intelligence by the intelligence community and the
requirements and resources of such collection and production;
and
(C) otherwise assist the National Intelligence Director in
carrying out the responsibilities of the Director under
section 111.
(2) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure that
the Council satisfies the needs of policymakers and other
consumers of intelligence by ensuring that each national
intelligence estimate under paragraph (1)--
(A) states separately, and distinguishes between, the
intelligence underlying such estimate and the assumptions and
judgments of analysts with respect to such intelligence and
such estimate;
(B) describes the quality and reliability of the
intelligence underlying such estimate;
(C) presents and explains alternative conclusions, if any,
with respect to the intelligence underlying such estimate and
such estimate; and
(D) characterizes the uncertainties, if any, and confidence
in such estimate.
(d) Service as Senior Intelligence Advisers.--Within their
respective areas of expertise and under the direction of the
National Intelligence Director, the members of the National
Intelligence Council shall constitute the senior intelligence
advisers of the intelligence community for purposes of
representing the views of the intelligence community within
the United States Government.
(e) Authority To Contract.--Subject to the direction and
control of the National Intelligence Director, the National
Intelligence Council may carry out its responsibilities under
this section by contract, including contracts for substantive
experts necessary to assist the Council with particular
assessments under this section.
(f) Staff.--The National Intelligence Director shall make
available to the National Intelligence Council such staff as
may be necessary to permit the Council to carry out its
responsibilities under this section.
(g) Availability of Council and Staff.--(1) The National
Intelligence Director shall take appropriate measures to
ensure that the National Intelligence Council and its staff
satisfy the needs of policymaking officials and other
consumers of intelligence.
(2) The Council shall be readily accessible to policymaking
officials and other appropriate individuals not otherwise
associated with the intelligence community.
(h) Support.--The heads of the elements of the intelligence
community shall, as appropriate, furnish such support to the
National Intelligence Council, including the preparation of
intelligence analyses, as may be required by the National
Intelligence Director.

SEC. 124. GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
AUTHORITY.

(a) General Counsel of National Intelligence Authority.--
There is a General Counsel of the National Intelligence
Authority who shall be appointed from civilian life by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(b) Prohibition on Dual Service as General Counsel of
Another Agency.--The individual serving in the position of
General Counsel of the National Intelligence Authority may
not, while so serving, also serve as the General Counsel of
any other department, agency, or element of the United States
Government.
(c) Scope of Position.--The General Counsel of the National
Intelligence Authority is the chief legal officer of the
National Intelligence Authority.
(d) Functions.--The General Counsel of the National
Intelligence Authority shall perform such functions as the
National Intelligence Director may prescribe.

SEC. 125. INTELLIGENCE COMPTROLLER.

(a) Intelligence Comptroller.--There is an Intelligence
Comptroller who shall be appointed from civilian life by the
National Intelligence Director.
(b) Supervision.--The Intelligence Comptroller shall report
directly to the National Intelligence Director.
(c) Duties.--The Intelligence Comptroller shall--
(1) assist the National Intelligence Director in the
preparation and execution of the budget of the elements of
the intelligence community within the National Intelligence
Program;
(2) assist the Director in participating in the development
by the Secretary of Defense of the annual budget for military
intelligence programs and activities outside the National
Intelligence Program;
(3) provide unfettered access to the Director to financial
information under the National Intelligence Program;
(4) perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the
Director or specified by law.

SEC. 126. OFFICER FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OF THE
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY.

(a) Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of
National Intelligence Authority.--There is an Officer for
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the National Intelligence
Authority who shall be appointed by the President.
(b) Supervision.--The Officer for Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties of the National Intelligence Authority shall report
directly to the National Intelligence Director.
(c) Duties.--The Officer for Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties of the National Intelligence Authority shall--
(1) assist the National Intelligence Director in ensuring
that the protection of civil rights and civil liberties, as
provided in the Constitution, laws, regulations, and
Executive orders of the United States, is appropriately
incorporated in--
(A) the policies and procedures developed for and
implemented by the National Intelligence Authority;
(B) the policies and procedures regarding the relationships
among the elements of the intelligence community within the
National Intelligence Program; and
(C) the policies and procedures regarding the relationships
between the elements of the intelligence community within the
National Intelligence Program and the other elements of the
intelligence community;
(2) oversee compliance by the Authority, and in the
relationships described in paragraph (1), with requirements
under the Constitution and all laws, regulations, Executive
orders, and implementing guidelines relating to civil rights
and civil liberties;
(3) review, investigate, and assess complaints and other
information indicating possible abuses of civil rights or
civil liberties, as provided in the Constitution, laws,
regulations, and Executive orders of the United States, in
the administration of the programs and operations of the
Authority, and in the relationships described in paragraph
(1), unless, in the determination of the Inspector General of
the National Intelligence Authority, the review,
investigation, or assessment of a particular complaint or
information can better be conducted by the Inspector General;
(4) coordinate with the Privacy Officer of the National
Intelligence Authority to ensure that programs, policies, and
procedures involving civil rights, civil liberties, and
privacy considerations are addressed in an integrated and
comprehensive manner; and
(5) perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the
Director or specified by law.

SEC. 127. PRIVACY OFFICER OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
AUTHORITY.

(a) Privacy Officer of National Intelligence Authority.--
There is a Privacy Officer of the National Intelligence
Authority who shall be appointed by the National Intelligence
Director.
(b) Duties.--(1) The Privacy Officer of the National
Intelligence Authority shall have primary responsibility for
the privacy policy of the National Intelligence Authority
(including in the relationships among the elements of the
intelligence community within the National Intelligence
Program and the relationships between the elements of the
intelligence community within the National Intelligence
Program and the other elements of the intelligence
community).
(2) In discharging the responsibility under paragraph (1),
the Privacy Officer shall--
(A) assure that the use of technologies sustain, and do not
erode, privacy protections relating to the use, collection,
and disclosure of personal information;
(B) assure that personal information contained in Privacy
Act systems of records is handled in full compliance with
fair information practices as set out in the Privacy Act of
1974;
(C) conduct privacy impact assessments when appropriate or
as required by law; and
(D) coordinate with the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties of the National Intelligence Authority to ensure
that programs, policies, and procedures involving civil
rights, civil liberties, and privacy considerations are
addressed in an integrated and comprehensive manner.

SEC. 128. CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY.

(a) Chief Information Officer of National Intelligence
Authority.--There is a Chief Information Officer of the
National Intelligence Authority who shall be appointed by the
National Intelligence Director.
(b) Duties.--The Chief Information Officer of the National
Intelligence Authority shall--
(1) assist the National Intelligence Director in
implementing the responsibilities and executing the
authorities related to information technology under
paragraphs (15) and (16) of section 112(a) and section
113(h); and
(2) perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the
Director or specified by law.

SEC. 129. CHIEF HUMAN CAPITAL OFFICER OF THE NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY.

(a) Chief Human Capital Officer of National Intelligence
Authority.--There is a Chief Human Capital Officer of the
National Intelligence Authority who shall be appointed by the
National Intelligence Director.
(b) Duties.--The Chief Human Capital Officer of the
National Intelligence Authority shall--
(1) have the functions and authorities provided for Chief
Human Capital Officers under sections 1401 and 1402 of title
5, United States Code, with respect to the National
Intelligence Authority; and
(2) advise and assist the National Intelligence Director in
exercising the authorities and responsibilities of the
Director with respect to the workforce of the intelligence
community as a whole.

SEC. 130. CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER OF THE NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY.

(a) Chief Financial Officer of National Intelligence
Authority.--There is a Chief Financial Officer of the
National Intelligence Authority who shall be designated by
the President, in consultation with the National Intelligence
Director.
(b) Designation Requirements.--The designation of an
individual as Chief Financial

[[Page H8923]]

Officer of the National Intelligence Authority shall be
subject to applicable provisions of section 901(a) of title
31, United States Code.
(c) Authorities and Functions.--The Chief Financial Officer
of the National Intelligence Authority shall have such
authorities, and carry out such functions, with respect to
the National Intelligence Authority as are provided for an
agency Chief Financial Officer by section 902 of title 31,
United States Code, and other applicable provisions of law.
(d) Coordination With NIA Comptroller.--(1) The Chief
Financial Officer of the National Intelligence Authority
shall coordinate with the Comptroller of the National
Intelligence Authority in exercising the authorities and
performing the functions provided for the Chief Financial
Officer under this section.
(2) The National Intelligence Director shall take such
actions as are necessary to prevent duplication of effort by
the Chief Financial Officer of the National Intelligence
Authority and the Comptroller of the National Intelligence
Authority.
(e) Integration of Financial Systems.--Subject to the
supervision, direction, and control of the National
Intelligence Director, the Chief Financial Officer of the
National Intelligence Authority shall take appropriate
actions to ensure the timely and effective integration of the
financial systems of the National Intelligence Authority
(including any elements or components transferred to the
Authority by this Act), and of the financial systems of the
Authority with applicable portions of the financial systems
of the other elements of the intelligence community, as soon
as possible after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(f) Protection of Annual Financial Statement From
Disclosure.--The annual financial statement of the National
Intelligence Authority required under section 3515 of title
31, United States Code--
(1) shall be submitted in classified form; and
(2) notwithstanding any other provision of law, shall be
withheld from public disclosure.

SEC. 131. NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE.

(a) National Counterintelligence Executive.--The National
Counterintelligence Executive under section 902 of the
Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of
Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402b et seq.), as amended by
section 309 of this Act, is a component of the Office of the
National Intelligence Director.
(b) Duties.--The National Counterintelligence Executive
shall perform the duties provided in the Counterintelligence
Enhancement Act of 2002, as so amended, and such other duties
as may be prescribed by the National Intelligence Director or
specified by law.

Subtitle D--Additional Elements of National Intelligence Authority

SEC. 141. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
AUTHORITY.

(a) Office of Inspector General of National Intelligence
Authority.--There is within the National Intelligence
Authority an Office of the Inspector General of the National
Intelligence Authority.
(b) Purpose.--The purpose of the Office of the Inspector
General of the National Intelligence Authority is to--
(1) create an objective and effective office, appropriately
accountable to Congress, to initiate and conduct
independently investigations, inspections, and audits
relating to--
(A) the programs and operations of the National
Intelligence Authority;
(B) the relationships among the elements of the
intelligence community within the National Intelligence
Program; and
(C) the relationships between the elements of the
intelligence community within the National Intelligence
Program and the other elements of the intelligence community;
(2) recommend policies designed--
(A) to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in
the administration of such programs and operations, and in
such relationships; and
(B) to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in such programs,
operations, and relationships;
(3) provide a means for keeping the National Intelligence
Director fully and currently informed about--
(A) problems and deficiencies relating to the
administration of such programs and operations, and to such
relationships; and
(C) the necessity for, and the progress of, corrective
actions; and
(4) in the manner prescribed by this section, ensure that
the congressional intelligence committees are kept similarly
informed of--
(A) significant problems and deficiencies relating to the
administration of such programs and operations, and to such
relationships; and
(B) the necessity for, and the progress of, corrective
actions.
(c) Inspector General of National Intelligence Authority.--
(1) There is an Inspector General of the National
Intelligence Authority, who shall be the head of the Office
of the Inspector General of the National Intelligence
Authority, who shall be appointed by the President, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(2) The nomination of an individual for appointment as
Inspector General shall be made--
(A) without regard to political affiliation;
(B) solely on the basis of integrity, compliance with the
security standards of the National Intelligence Authority,
and prior experience in the field of intelligence or national
security; and
(C) on the basis of demonstrated ability in accounting,
financial analysis, law, management analysis, public
administration, or auditing.
(3) The Inspector General shall report directly to and be
under the general supervision of the National Intelligence
Director.
(4) The Inspector General may be removed from office only
by the President. The President shall immediately communicate
in writing to the congressional intelligence committees the
reasons for the removal of any individual from the position
of Inspector General.
(d) Duties and Responsibilities.--It shall be the duty and
responsibility of the Inspector General of the National
Intelligence Authority--
(1) to provide policy direction for, and to plan, conduct,
supervise, and coordinate independently, the investigations,
inspections, and audits relating to the programs and
operations of the National Intelligence Authority, the
relationships among the elements of the intelligence
community within the National Intelligence Program, and the
relationships between the elements of the intelligence
community within the National Intelligence Program and the
other elements of the intelligence community to ensure they
are conducted efficiently and in accordance with applicable
law and regulations;
(2) to keep the National Intelligence Director fully and
currently informed concerning violations of law and
regulations, violations of civil liberties and privacy, and
fraud and other serious problems, abuses, and deficiencies
that may occur in such programs and operations, and in such
relationships, and to report the progress made in
implementing corrective action;
(3) to take due regard for the protection of intelligence
sources and methods in the preparation of all reports issued
by the Inspector General, and, to the extent consistent with
the purpose and objective of such reports, take such measures
as may be appropriate to minimize the disclosure of
intelligence sources and methods described in such reports;
and
(4) in the execution of the duties and responsibilities
under this section, to comply with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
(e) Limitations on Activities.--(1) The National
Intelligence Director may prohibit the Inspector General of
the National Intelligence Authority from initiating, carrying
out, or completing any investigation, inspection, or audit if
the Director determines that such prohibition is necessary to
protect vital national security interests of the United
States.
(2) If the Director exercises the authority under paragraph
(1), the Director shall submit an appropriately classified
statement of the reasons for the exercise of such authority
within seven days to the congressional intelligence
committees.
(3) The Director shall advise the Inspector General at the
time a report under paragraph (1) is submitted, and, to the
extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources
and methods, provide the Inspector General with a copy of
such report.
(4) The Inspector General may submit to the congressional
intelligence committees any comments on a report of which the
Inspector General has notice under paragraph (3) that the
Inspector General considers appropriate.
(f) Authorities.--(1) The Inspector General of the National
Intelligence Authority shall have direct and prompt access to
the National Intelligence Director when necessary for any
purpose pertaining to the performance of the duties of the
Inspector General.
(2)(A) The Inspector General shall have access to any
employee, or any employee of a contractor, of the National
Intelligence Authority, and of any other element of the
intelligence community within the National Intelligence
Program, whose testimony is needed for the performance of the
duties of the Inspector General.
(B) The Inspector General shall have direct access to all
records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers,
recommendations, or other material which relate to the
programs and operations with respect to which the Inspector
General has responsibilities under this section.
(C) The level of classification or compartmentation of
information shall not, in and of itself, provide a sufficient
rationale for denying the Inspector General access to any
materials under subparagraph (B).
(D) Failure on the part of any employee or contractor of
the National Intelligence Authority to cooperate with the
Inspector General shall be grounds for appropriate
administrative actions by the Director, including loss of
employment or the termination of an existing contractual
relationship.
(3) The Inspector General is authorized to receive and
investigate complaints or information from any person
concerning the existence of an activity constituting a
violation of laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement,
gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial
and specific danger to the public health and safety. Once
such complaint or information has been received from an
employee of the Federal government--
(A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the identity
of the employee without the

[[Page H8924]]

consent of the employee, unless the Inspector General
determines that such disclosure is unavoidable during the
course of the investigation or the disclosure is made to an
official of the Department of Justice responsible for
determining whether a prosecution should be undertaken; and
(B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of
reprisal, for making such complaint may be taken by any
employee in a position to take such actions, unless the
complaint was made or the information was disclosed with the
knowledge that it was false or with willful disregard for its
truth or falsity.
(4) The Inspector General shall have authority to
administer to or take from any person an oath, affirmation,
or affidavit, whenever necessary in the performance of the
duties of the Inspector General, which oath, affirmation, or
affidavit when administered or taken by or before an employee
of the Office of the Inspector General of the National
Intelligence Authority designated by the Inspector General
shall have the same force and effect as if administered or
taken by or before an officer having a seal.
(5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the
Inspector General is authorized to require by subpoena the
production of all information, documents, reports, answers,
records, accounts, papers, and other data and documentary
evidence necessary in the performance of the duties and
responsibilities of the Inspector General.
(B) In the case of departments, agencies, and other
elements of the United States Government, the Inspector
General shall obtain information, documents, reports,
answers, records, accounts, papers, and other data and
evidence for the purpose specified in subparagraph (A) using
procedures other than by subpoenas.
(C) The Inspector General may not issue a subpoena for or
on behalf of any other element or component of the Authority.
(D) In the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena
issued under this paragraph, the subpoena shall be
enforceable by order of any appropriate district court of the
United States.
(g) Staff and Other Support.--(1) The Inspector General of
the National Intelligence Authority shall be provided with
appropriate and adequate office space at central and field
office locations, together with such equipment, office
supplies, maintenance services, and communications facilities
and services as may be necessary for the operation of such
offices.
(2)(A) Subject to applicable law and the policies of the
National Intelligence Director, the Inspector General shall
select, appoint and employ such officers and employees as may
be necessary to carry out the functions of the Inspector
General.
(B) In making selections under subparagraph (A), the
Inspector General shall ensure that such officers and
employees have the requisite training and experience to
enable the Inspector General to carry out the duties of the
Inspector General effectively.
(C) In meeting the requirements of this paragraph, the
Inspector General shall create within the Office of the
Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority a
career cadre of sufficient size to provide appropriate
continuity and objectivity needed for the effective
performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
(3)(A) Subject to the concurrence of the Director, the
Inspector General may request such information or assistance
as may be necessary for carrying out the duties and
responsibilities of the Inspector General from any
department, agency, or other element of the United States
Government.
(B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information
or assistance under subparagraph (A), the head of the
department, agency, or element concerned shall, insofar as is
practicable and not in contravention of any existing
statutory restriction or regulation of the department,
agency, or element, furnish to the Inspector General, or to
an authorized designee, such information or assistance.
(h) Reports.--(1)(A) The Inspector General of the National
Intelligence Authority shall, not later than January 31 and
July 31 of each year, prepare and submit to the National
Intelligence Director a classified semiannual report
summarizing the activities of the Office of the Inspector
General of the National Intelligence Authority during the
immediately preceding six-month periods ending December 31
(of the preceding year) and June 30, respectively.
(B) Each report under this paragraph shall include, at a
minimum, the following:
(i) A list of the title or subject of each investigation,
inspection, or audit conducted during the period covered by
such report.
(ii) A description of significant problems, abuses, and
deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and
operations of the National Intelligence Authority identified
by the Inspector General during the period covered by such
report.
(iii) A description of the recommendations for corrective
action made by the Inspector General during the period
covered by such report with respect to significant problems,
abuses, or deficiencies identified in clause (ii).
(iv) A statement whether or not corrective action has been
completed on each significant recommendation described in
previous semiannual reports, and, in a case where corrective
action has been completed, a description of such corrective
action.
(v) An assessment of the effectiveness of all measures in
place in the Authority for the protection of civil liberties
and privacy of United States persons.
(vi) A certification whether or not the Inspector General
has had full and direct access to all information relevant to
the performance of the functions of the Inspector General.
(vii) A description of the exercise of the subpoena
authority under subsection (f)(5) by the Inspector General
during the period covered by such report.
(viii) Such recommendations as the Inspector General
considers appropriate for legislation to promote economy and
efficiency in the administration of programs and operations
undertaken by the Authority, and to detect and eliminate
fraud and abuse in such programs and operations.
(C) Not later than the 30 days after the date of receipt of
a report under subparagraph (A), the Director shall transmit
the report to the congressional intelligence committees
together with any comments the Director considers
appropriate.
(2)(A) The Inspector General shall report immediately to
the Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of
particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or
deficiencies relating to the administration of programs or
operations of the Authority, a relationship between the
elements of the intelligence community within the National
Intelligence Program, or a relationship between an element of
the intelligence community within the National Intelligence
Program and another element of the intelligence community.
(B) The Director shall transmit to the congressional
intelligence committees each report under subparagraph (A)
within seven calendar days of receipt of such report,
together with such comments as the Director considers
appropriate.
(3) In the event that--
(A) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any
differences with the Director affecting the execution of the
duties or responsibilities of the Inspector General;
(B) an investigation, inspection, or audit carried out by
the Inspector General should focus on any current or former
Authority official who holds or held a position in the
Authority that is subject to appointment by the President, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, including such
a position held on an acting basis;
(C) a matter requires a report by the Inspector General to
the Department of Justice on possible criminal conduct by a
current or former official described in subparagraph (B);
(D) the Inspector General receives notice from the
Department of Justice declining or approving prosecution of
possible criminal conduct of any current or former official
described in subparagraph (B); or
(E) the Inspector General, after exhausting all possible
alternatives, is unable to obtain significant documentary
information in the course of an investigation, inspection, or
audit,

the Inspector General shall immediately notify and submit a
report on such matter to the congressional intelligence
committees.
(4) Pursuant to title V of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), the Director shall submit to
the congressional intelligence committees any report or
findings and recommendations of an investigation, inspection,
or audit conducted by the office which has been requested by
the Chairman or Ranking Minority Member of either committee.
(5)(A) An employee of the Authority, an employee of an
entity other than the Authority who is assigned or detailed
to the Authority, or an employee of a contractor to the
Authority who intends to report to Congress a complaint or
information with respect to an urgent concern may report such
complaint or information to the Inspector General.
(B) Not later than the end of the 14-calendar day period
beginning on the date of receipt from an employee of a
complaint or information under subparagraph (A), the
Inspector General shall determine whether the complaint or
information appears credible. Upon making such a
determination, the Inspector General shall transmit to the
Director a notice of that determination, together with the
complaint or information.
(C) Upon receipt of a transmittal from the Inspector
General under subparagraph (B), the Director shall, within
seven calendar days of such receipt, forward such transmittal
to the congressional intelligence committees, together with
any comments the Director considers appropriate.
(D)(i) If the Inspector General does not find credible
under subparagraph (B) a complaint or information submitted
under subparagraph (A), or does not transmit the complaint or
information to the Director in accurate form under
subparagraph (B), the employee (subject to clause (ii)) may
submit the complaint or information to Congress by contacting
either or both of the congressional intelligence committees
directly.
(ii) An employee may contact the intelligence committees
directly as described in clause (i) only if the employee--
(I) before making such a contact, furnishes to the
Director, through the Inspector General, a statement of the
employee's complaint or information and notice of the
employee's intent to contact the congressional intelligence
committees directly; and
(II) obtains and follows from the Director, through the
Inspector General, direction on how to contact the
intelligence committees

[[Page H8925]]

in accordance with appropriate security practices.
(iii) A member or employee of one of the congressional
intelligence committees who receives a complaint or
information under clause (i) does so in that member or
employee's official capacity as a member or employee of such
committee.
(E) The Inspector General shall notify an employee who
reports a complaint or information to the Inspector General
under this paragraph of each action taken under this
paragraph with respect to the complaint or information. Such
notice shall be provided not later than three days after any
such action is taken.
(F) An action taken by the Director or the Inspector
General under this paragraph shall not be subject to judicial
review.
(G) In this paragraph, the term ``urgent concern'' means
any of the following:
(i) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of law
or Executive order, or deficiency relating to the funding,
administration, or operations of an intelligence activity
involving classified information, but does not include
differences of opinions concerning public policy matters.
(ii) A false statement to Congress, or a willful
withholding from Congress, on an issue of material fact
relating to the funding, administration, or operation of an
intelligence activity.
(iii) An action, including a personnel action described in
section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, United States Code,
constituting reprisal or threat of reprisal prohibited under
subsection (f)(3)(B) of this section in response to an
employee's reporting an urgent concern in accordance with
this paragraph.
(H) In support of this paragraph, Congress makes the
findings set forth in paragraphs (1) through (6) of section
701(b) of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection
Act of 1998 (title VII of Public Law 105-272; 5 U.S.C. App.
8H note).
(6) In accordance with section 535 of title 28, United
States Code, the Inspector General shall report to the
Attorney General any information, allegation, or complaint
received by the Inspector General relating to violations of
Federal criminal law that involve a program or operation of
the Authority, consistent with such guidelines as may be
issued by the Attorney General pursuant to subsection (b)(2)
of such section. A copy of each such report shall be
furnished to the Director.
(i) Separate Budget Account.--The National Intelligence
Director shall, in accordance with procedures to be issued by
the Director in consultation with the congressional
intelligence committees, include in the National Intelligence
Program budget a separate account for the Office of Inspector
General of the National Intelligence Authority.

SEC. 142. OMBUDSMAN OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY.

(a) Ombudsman of National Intelligence Authority.--There is
within the National Intelligence Authority an Ombudsman of
the National Intelligence Authority who shall be appointed by
the National Intelligence Director.
(b) Duties.--The Ombudsman of the National Intelligence
Authority shall--
(1) counsel, arbitrate, or offer recommendations on, and
have the authority to initiate inquiries into, real or
perceived problems of politicization, biased reporting, or
lack of objective analysis within the National Intelligence
Authority, or any element of the intelligence community
within the National Intelligence Program, or regarding any
analysis of national intelligence by any element of the
intelligence community;
(2) monitor the effectiveness of measures taken to deal
with real or perceived politicization, biased reporting, or
lack of objective analysis within the Authority, or any
element of the intelligence community within the National
Intelligence Program, or regarding any analysis of national
intelligence by any element of the intelligence community;
and
(3) conduct reviews of the analytic product or products of
the Authority, or any element of the intelligence community
within the National Intelligence Program, or of any analysis
of national intelligence by any element of the intelligence
community, with such reviews to be conducted so as to ensure
that analysis is timely, objective, independent of political
considerations, and based upon all sources available to the
intelligence community.
(c) Analytic Review Unit.--(1) There is within the Office
of the Ombudsman of the National Intelligence Authority an
Analytic Review Unit.
(2) The Analytic Review Unit shall assist the Ombudsman of
the National Intelligence Authority in performing the duties
and responsibilities of the Ombudsman set forth in subsection
(b)(3).
(3) The Ombudsman shall provide the Analytic Review Unit a
staff who possess expertise in intelligence analysis that is
appropriate for the function of the Unit.
(4) In assisting the Ombudsman, the Analytic Review Unit
shall, subject to the direction and control of the Ombudsman,
conduct detailed evaluations of intelligence analysis by the
following:
(A) The National Intelligence Council.
(B) The elements of the intelligence community within the
National Intelligence Program.
(C) To the extent involving the analysis of national
intelligence, other elements of the intelligence community.
(D) The divisions, offices, programs, officers, and
employees of the elements specified in subparagraphs (B) and
(C).
(5) The results of the evaluations under paragraph (4)
shall be provided to the congressional intelligence
committees and, upon request, to appropriate heads of other
departments, agencies, and elements of the executive branch.
(d) Access to Information.--In order to carry out the
duties specified in subsection (c), the Ombudsman of the
National Intelligence Authority shall, unless otherwise
directed by the President, have access to all analytic
products, field reports, and raw intelligence of any element
of the intelligence community, and to any reports or other
material of an Inspector General, that might be pertinent to
a matter under consideration by the Ombudsman.
(e) Annual Reports.--The Ombudsman of the National
Intelligence Authority shall submit to the National
Intelligence Director and the congressional intelligence
committees on an annual basis a report that includes--
(1) the assessment of the Ombudsman of the current level of
politicization, biased reporting, or lack of objective
analysis within the National Intelligence Authority, or any
element of the intelligence community within the National
Intelligence Program, or regarding any analysis of national
intelligence by any element of the intelligence community;
(2) such recommendations for remedial measures as the
Ombudsman considers appropriate; and
(3) an assessment of the effectiveness of remedial measures
previously taken within the intelligence community on matters
addressed by the Ombudsman.
(f) Referral of Certain Matters for Investigation.--In
addition to carrying out activities under this section, the
Ombudsman of the National Intelligence Authority may refer
serious cases of misconduct related to politicization of
intelligence information, biased reporting, or lack of
objective analysis within the intelligence community to the
Inspector General of the National Intelligence Authority for
investigation.

SEC. 143. NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER.

(a) National Counterterrorism Center.--There is within the
National Intelligence Authority a National Counterterrorism
Center.
(b) Director of National Counterterrorism Center.--(1)
There is a Director of the National Counterterrorism Center,
who shall be the head of the National Counterterrorism
Center, and who shall be appointed by the President, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(2) Any individual nominated for appointment as the
Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall have
significant expertise in matters relating to the national
security of the United States and matters relating to
terrorism that threatens the national security of the United
States.
(3) The individual serving as the Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center may not, while so serving, serve in
any capacity in any other element of the intelligence
community, except to the extent that the individual serving
as Director of the National Counterterrorism Center is doing
so in an acting capacity.
(c) Supervision.--(1) The Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center shall report to the National
Intelligence Director on--
(A) the budget and programs of the National
Counterterrorism Center; and
(B) the activities of the Directorate of Intelligence of
the National Counterterrorism Center under subsection (g).
(2) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center
shall report to the President and the National Intelligence
Director on the planning and progress of joint
counterterrorism operations.
(d) Primary Missions.--The primary missions of the National
Counterterrorism Center shall be as follows:
(1) To develop and unify strategy for the civilian and
military counterterrorism efforts of the United States
Government.
(2) To integrate counterterrorism intelligence activities
of the United States Government, both inside and outside the
United States.
(3) To develop interagency counterterrorism plans, which
plans shall--
(A) involve more than one department, agency, or element of
the executive branch (unless otherwise directed by the
President); and
(B) include the mission, objectives to be achieved, courses
of action, parameters for such courses of action,
coordination of agency operational activities,
recommendations for operational plans, and assignment of
departmental or agency responsibilities.
(4) To ensure that the collection of counterterrorism
intelligence, and the conduct of counterterrorism operations,
by the United States Government are informed by the analysis
of all-source intelligence.
(e) Duties and Responsibilities of Director of National
Counterterrorism Center.--Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, at the direction of the President, the National
Security Council, and the National Intelligence Director, the
Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall--
(1) serve as the principal adviser to the President and the
National Intelligence Director on joint operations relating
to counterterrorism;
(2) provide unified strategic direction for the civilian
and military counterterrorism

[[Page H8926]]

efforts of the United States Government and for the effective
integration and deconfliction of counterterrorism
intelligence and operations across agency boundaries, both
inside and outside the United States;
(3) advise the President and the National Intelligence
Director on the extent to which the counterterrorism program
recommendations and budget proposals of the departments,
agencies, and elements of the United States Government
conform to the priorities established by the President and
the National Security Council;
(4) in accordance with subsection (f), concur in, or advise
the President on, the selections of personnel to head the
operating entities of the United States Government with
principal missions relating to counterterrorism; and
(5) perform such other duties as the National Intelligence
Director may prescribe or are prescribed by law.
(f) Role of Director of National Counterterrorism Center in
Certain Appointments.--(1) In the event of a vacancy in a
position referred to in paragraph (2), the head of the
department or agency having jurisdiction over the position
shall obtain the concurrence of the Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center before appointing an individual to
fill the vacancy or recommending to the President an
individual for nomination to fill the vacancy. If the
Director does not concur in the recommendation, the head of
the department or agency concerned may fill the vacancy or
make the recommendation to the President (as the case may be)
without the concurrence of the Director, but shall notify the
President that the Director does not concur in the
appointment or recommendation (as the case may be).
(2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions:
(A) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency's
Counterterrorist Center.
(B) The Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation in charge of the Counterterrorism Division.
(C) The Coordinator for Counterterrorism of the Department
of State.
(D) The head of such other operating entities of the United
States Government having principal missions relating to
counterterrorism as the President may designate for purposes
of this subsection.
(3) The President shall notify Congress of the designation
of an operating entity of the United States Government under
paragraph (2)(D) not later than 30 days after the date of
such designation.
(g) Directorate of Intelligence.--(1) The Director of the
National Counterterrorism Center shall establish and maintain
within the National Counterterrorism Center a Directorate of
Intelligence.
(2) The Directorate shall utilize the capabilities of the
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) transferred to the
Directorate by section 323 and such other capabilities as the
Director of the National Counterterrorism Center considers
appropriate.
(3) The Directorate shall have primary responsibility
within the United States Government for analysis of terrorism
and terrorist organizations from all sources of intelligence,
whether collected inside or outside the United States.
(4) The Directorate shall--
(A) be the principal repository within the United States
Government for all-source information on suspected
terrorists, their organizations, and their capabilities;
(B) propose intelligence collection requirements for action
by elements of the intelligence community inside and outside
the United States;
(C) have primary responsibility within the United States
Government for net assessments and warnings about terrorist
threats, which assessments and warnings shall be based on a
comparison of terrorist intentions and capabilities with
assessed national vulnerabilities and countermeasures; and
(D) perform such other duties and functions as the Director
of the National Counterterrorism Center may prescribe.
(h) Directorate of Planning.--(1) The Director of the
National Counterterrorism Center shall establish and maintain
within the National Counterterrorism Center a Directorate of
Planning.
(2) The Directorate shall have primary responsibility for
developing interagency counterterrorism plans, as described
in subsection (d)(3).
(3) The Directorate shall--
(A) provide guidance, and develop strategy and interagency
plans, to counter terrorist activities based on policy
objectives and priorities established by the National
Security Council;
(B) develop interagency plans under subparagraph (A)
utilizing input from personnel in other departments,
agencies, and elements of the United States Government who
have expertise in the priorities, functions, assets,
programs, capabilities, and operations of such departments,
agencies, and elements with respect to counterterrorism;
(C) assign responsibilities for counterterrorism operations
to the departments and agencies of the United States
Government (including the Department of Defense, the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Department of Homeland Security, and other departments and
agencies of the United States Government), consistent with
the authorities of such departments and agencies;
(D) monitor the implementation of operations assigned under
subparagraph (C) and update interagency plans for such
operations as necessary;
(E) report to the President and the National Intelligence
Director on the compliance of the departments, agencies, and
elements of the United States with the plans developed under
subparagraph (A); and
(F) perform such other duties and functions as the Director
of the National Counterterrorism Center may prescribe.
(4) The Directorate may not direct the execution of
operations assigned under paragraph (3).
(i) Staff.--(1) The National Intelligence Director may
appoint deputy directors of the National Counterterrorism
Center to oversee such portions of the operations of the
Center as the National Intelligence Director considers
appropriate.
(2) To assist the Director of the National Counterterrorism
Center in fulfilling the duties and responsibilities of the
Director of the National Counterterrorism Center under this
section, the National Intelligence Director shall employ in
the National Counterterrorism Center a professional staff
having an expertise in matters relating to such duties and
responsibilities.
(3) In providing for a professional staff for the National
Counterterrorism Center under paragraph (2), the National
Intelligence Director may establish as positions in the
excepted service such positions in the Center as the National
Intelligence Director considers appropriate.
(4) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure that
the analytical staff of the National Counterterrorism Center
is comprised primarily of experts from elements in the
intelligence community and from such other personnel in the
United States Government as the National Intelligence
Director considers appropriate.
(5)(A) In order to meet the requirements in paragraph (4),
the National Intelligence Director shall, from time to time--
(i) specify the transfers, assignments, and details of
personnel funded within the National Intelligence Program to
the National Counterterrorism Center from any other element
of the intelligence community that the National Intelligence
Director considers appropriate; and
(ii) in the case of personnel from a department, agency, or
element of the United States Government and not funded within
the National Intelligence Program, request the transfer,
assignment, or detail of such personnel from the department,
agency, or other element concerned.
(B)(i) The head of an element of the intelligence community
shall promptly effect any transfer, assignment, or detail of
personnel specified by the National Intelligence Director
under subparagraph (A)(i).
(ii) The head of a department, agency, or element of the
United States Government receiving a request for transfer,
assignment, or detail of personnel under subparagraph (A)(ii)
shall, to the extent practicable, approve the request.
(6) Personnel employed in or assigned or detailed to the
National Counterterrorism Center under this subsection shall
be under the authority, direction, and control of the
Director of the National Counterterrorism Center on all
matters for which the Center has been assigned responsibility
and for all matters related to the accomplishment of the
missions of the Center.
(7) Performance evaluations of personnel assigned or
detailed to the National Counterterrorism Center under this
subsection shall be undertaken by the supervisors of such
personnel at the Center.
(8) The supervisors of the staff of the National
Counterterrorism Center may, with the approval of the
National Intelligence Director, reward the staff of the
Center for meritorious performance by the provision of such
performance awards as the National Intelligence Director
shall prescribe.
(9) The National Intelligence Director may delegate to the
Director of the National Counterterrorism Center any
responsibility, power, or authority of the National
Intelligence Director under paragraphs (1) through (8).
(10) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure that
the staff of the National Counterterrorism Center has access
to all databases maintained by the elements of the
intelligence community that are relevant to the duties of the
Center.
(j) Support and Cooperation of Other Agencies.--(1) The
elements of the intelligence community and the other
departments, agencies, and elements of the United States
Government shall support, assist, and cooperate with the
National Counterterrorism Center in carrying out its missions
under this section.
(2) The support, assistance, and cooperation of a
department, agency, or element of the United States
Government under this subsection shall include, but not be
limited to--
(A) the implementation of interagency plans for operations,
whether foreign or domestic, that are developed by the
National Counterterrorism Center in a manner consistent with
the laws and regulations of the United States and consistent
with the limitation in subsection (h)(4);
(B) cooperative work with the Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center to ensure that ongoing operations of
such department, agency, or element do not conflict with
joint operations planned by the Center;
(C) reports, upon request, to the Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center on

[[Page H8927]]

the progress of such department, agency, or element in
implementing responsibilities assigned to such department,
agency, or element through joint operations plans; and
(D) the provision to the analysts of the National
Counterterrorism Center electronic access in real time to
information and intelligence collected by such department,
agency, or element that is relevant to the missions of the
Center.
(3) In the event of a disagreement between the National
Intelligence Director and the head of a department, agency,
or element of the United States Government on a plan
developed or responsibility assigned by the National
Counterterrorism Center under this subsection, the National
Intelligence Director may either accede to the head of the
department, agency, or element concerned or notify the
President of the necessity of resolving the disagreement.

SEC. 144. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CENTERS.

(a) National Intelligence Centers.--(1) The National
Intelligence Director may establish within the National
Intelligence Authority one or more centers (to be known as
``national intelligence centers'') to address intelligence
priorities established by the National Security Council.
(2) Each national intelligence center established under
this section shall be assigned an area of intelligence
responsibility.
(3) National intelligence centers shall be established at
the direction of the President, as prescribed by law, or upon
the initiative of the National Intelligence Director.
(b) Establishment of Centers.--(1) In establishing a
national intelligence center, the National Intelligence
Director shall assign lead responsibility for administrative
support for such center to an element of the intelligence
community selected by the Director for that purpose.
(2) The Director shall determine the structure and size of
each national intelligence center.
(3) The Director shall notify Congress of the establishment
of each national intelligence center before the date of the
establishment of such center.
(c) Directors of Centers.--(1) Each national intelligence
center shall have as its head a Director who shall be
appointed by the National Intelligence Director for that
purpose.
(2) The Director of a national intelligence center shall
serve as the principal adviser to the National Intelligence
Director on intelligence matters with respect to the area of
intelligence responsibility assigned to the center.
(3) In carrying out duties under paragraph (2), the
Director of a national intelligence center shall--
(A) manage the operations of the center;
(B) coordinate the provision of administration and support
by the element of the intelligence community with lead
responsibility for the center under subsection (b)(1);
(C) submit budget and personnel requests for the center to
the National Intelligence Director;
(D) seek such assistance from other departments, agencies,
and elements of the United States Government as is needed to
fulfill the mission of the center; and
(E) advise the National Intelligence Director of the
information technology, personnel, and other requirements of
the center for the performance of its mission.
(4) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure that
the Director of a national intelligence center has sufficient
authority, direction, and control to effectively accomplish
the mission of the center.
(d) Mission of Centers.--Pursuant to the direction of the
National Intelligence Director, each national intelligence
center shall, in the area of intelligence responsibility
assigned to the center by the Director pursuant to
intelligence priorities established by the National Security
Council--
(1) have primary responsibility for providing all-source
analysis of intelligence based upon foreign intelligence
gathered both abroad and domestically;
(2) have primary responsibility for identifying and
proposing to the National Intelligence Director intelligence
collection and analysis requirements;
(3) have primary responsibility for net assessments and
warnings;
(4) ensure that appropriate officials of the United States
Government and other appropriate officials have access to a
variety of intelligence assessments and analytical views; and
(5) perform such other duties as the National Intelligence
Director shall specify.
(e) Information Sharing.--(1) The National Intelligence
Director shall ensure that the Directors of the national
intelligence centers and the other elements of the
intelligence community undertake appropriate sharing of
intelligence analysis and plans for operations in order to
facilitate the activities of the centers.
(2) In order to facilitate information sharing under
paragraph (1), the Directors of the national intelligence
centers shall--
(A) report directly to the National Intelligence Director
regarding their activities under this section; and
(B) coordinate with the Principal Deputy National
Intelligence Director regarding such activities.
(f) Staff.--(1) In providing for a professional staff for a
national intelligence center, the National Intelligence
Director may establish as positions in the excepted service
such positions in the center as the National Intelligence
Director considers appropriate.
(2)(A) The National Intelligence Director shall, from time
to time--
(i) specify the transfers, assignments, and details of
personnel funded within the National Intelligence Program to
a national intelligence center from any other element of the
intelligence community that the National Intelligence
Director considers appropriate; and
(ii) in the case of personnel from a department, agency, or
element of the United States Government not funded within the
National Intelligence Program, request the transfer,
assignment, or detail of such personnel from the department,
agency, or other element concerned.
(B)(i) The head of an element of the intelligence community
shall promptly effect any transfer, assignment, or detail of
personnel specified by the National Intelligence Director
under subparagraph (A)(i).
(ii) The head of a department, agency, or element of the
United States Government receiving a request for transfer,
assignment, or detail of personnel under subparagraph (A)(ii)
shall, to the extent practicable, approve the request.
(3) Personnel employed in or assigned or detailed to a
national intelligence center under this subsection shall be
under the authority, direction, and control of the Director
of the center on all matters for which the center has been
assigned responsibility and for all matters related to the
accomplishment of the mission of the center.
(4) Performance evaluations of personnel assigned or
detailed to a national intelligence center under this
subsection shall be undertaken by the supervisors of such
personnel at the center.
(5) The supervisors of the staff of a national center may,
with the approval of the National Intelligence Director,
reward the staff of the center for meritorious performance by
the provision of such performance awards as the National
Intelligence Director shall prescribe.
(6) The National Intelligence Director may delegate to the
Director of a national intelligence center any
responsibility, power, or authority of the National
Intelligence Director under paragraphs (1) through (6).
(7) The Director of a national intelligence center may
recommend to the National Intelligence Director the
reassignment to the home element concerned of any personnel
previously assigned or detailed to the center from another
element of the intelligence community.
(g) Termination.--(1) The National Intelligence Director
may terminate a national intelligence center if the National
Intelligence Director determines that the center is no longer
required to meet an intelligence priority established by the
National Security Council.
(2) The National Intelligence Director shall notify
Congress of any determination made under paragraph (1) before
carrying out such determination.

Subtitle E--Education and Training of Intelligence Community Personnel

SEC. 151. FRAMEWORK FOR CROSS-DISCIPLINARY EDUCATION AND
TRAINING.

The National Intelligence Director shall establish an
integrated framework that brings together the educational
components of the intelligence community in order to promote
a more effective and productive intelligence community
through cross-disciplinary education and joint training.

SEC. 152. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM.

(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' means each element of the
intelligence community as determined by the National
Intelligence Director.
(2) Institution of higher education.--The term
``institution of higher education'' has the meaning given
that term under section 101 of the Higher Education Act of
1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001).
(3) Program.--The term ``Program'' means the Intelligence
Community Scholarship Program established under subsection
(b).
(b) Establishment.--
(1) In general.--The National Intelligence Director, in
consultation with the head of each agency, shall establish a
scholarship program (to be known as the ``Intelligence
Community Scholarship Program'') to award scholarships to
individuals that is designed to recruit and prepare students
for civilian careers in the intelligence community to meet
the critical needs of the intelligence community agencies.
(2) Selection of recipients.--
(A) Merit and agency needs.--Individuals shall be selected
to receive scholarships under this section through a
competitive process primarily on the basis of academic merit
and the needs of the agency.
(B) Demonstrated commitment.--Individuals selected under
this section shall have a demonstrated commitment to the
field of study for which the scholarship is awarded.
(3) Contractual agreements.--To carry out the Program the
head of each agency shall enter into contractual agreements
with individuals selected under paragraph (2) under which the
individuals agree to serve as full-time employees of the
agency, for the period described in subsection (h)(1), in
positions needed by the agency and for which the individuals
are qualified, in exchange for receiving a scholarship.
(c) Eligibility.--In order to be eligible to participate in
the Program, an individual shall--

[[Page H8928]]

(1) be enrolled or accepted for enrollment as a full-time
student at an institution of higher education and be pursuing
or intend to pursue undergraduate or graduate education in an
academic field or discipline described in the list made
available under subsection (e);
(2) be a United States citizen; and
(3) at the time of the initial scholarship award, not be an
employee (as defined under section 2105 of title 5, United
States Code).
(d) Application.-- An individual seeking a scholarship
under this section shall submit an application to the
National Intelligence Director at such time, in such manner,
and containing such information, agreements, or assurances as
the Director may require.
(e) Programs and Fields of Study.--The National
Intelligence Director shall--
(1) make publicly available a list of academic programs and
fields of study for which scholarships under the Program may
be used; and
(2) update the list as necessary.
(f) Scholarships.--
(1) In general.--The National Intelligence Director may
provide a scholarship under the Program for an academic year
if the individual applying for the scholarship has submitted
to the Director, as part of the application required under
subsection (d), a proposed academic program leading to a
degree in a program or field of study on the list made
available under subsection (e).
(2) Limitation on years.--An individual may not receive a
scholarship under this section for more than 4 academic
years, unless the National Intelligence Director grants a
waiver.
(3) Student responsibilities.--Scholarship recipients shall
maintain satisfactory academic progress.
(4) Amount.--The dollar amount of a scholarship under this
section for an academic year shall be determined under
regulations issued by the National Intelligence Director, but
shall in no case exceed the cost of tuition, fees, and other
authorized expenses as established by the Director.
(5) Use of scholarships.--A scholarship provided under this
section may be expended for tuition, fees, and other
authorized expenses as established by the National
Intelligence Director by regulation.
(6) Payment to institution of higher education.--The
National Intelligence Director may enter into a contractual
agreement with an institution of higher education under which
the amounts provided for a scholarship under this section for
tuition, fees, and other authorized expenses are paid
directly to the institution with respect to which the
scholarship is provided.
(g) Special Consideration for Current Employees.--
(1) Set aside of scholarships.--Notwithstanding paragraphs
(1) and (3) of subsection (c), 10 percent of the scholarships
awarded under this section shall be set aside for individuals
who are employees of agencies on the date of enactment of
this section to enhance the education of such employees in
areas of critical needs of agencies.
(2) Full- or part-time education.--Employees who are
awarded scholarships under paragraph (1) shall be permitted
to pursue undergraduate or graduate education under the
scholarship on a full-time or part-time basis.
(h) Employee Service.--
(1) Period of service.--Except as provided in subsection
(j)(2), the period of service for which an individual shall
be obligated to serve as an employee of the agency is 24
months for each academic year for which a scholarship under
this section is provided. Under no circumstances shall the
total period of obligated service be more than 8 years.
(2) Beginning of service.--
(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B),
obligated service under paragraph (1) shall begin not later
than 60 days after the individual obtains the educational
degree for which the scholarship was provided.
(B) Deferral.--In accordance with regulations established
by the National Intelligence Director, the Director or
designee may defer the obligation of an individual to provide
a period of service under paragraph (1) if the Director or
designee determines that such a deferral is appropriate.
(i) Repayment.--
(1) In general.--Scholarship recipients who fail to
maintain a high level of academic standing, as defined by the
National Intelligence Director, who are dismissed from their
educational institutions for disciplinary reasons, or who
voluntarily terminate academic training before graduation
from the educational program for which the scholarship was
awarded, shall be in breach of their contractual agreement
and, in lieu of any service obligation arising under such
agreement, shall be liable to the United States for repayment
within 1 year after the date of default of all scholarship
funds paid to them and to the institution of higher education
on their behalf under the agreement, except as provided in
subsection (j)(2). The repayment period may be extended by
the Director when determined to be necessary, as established
by regulation.
(2) Liability.--Scholarship recipients who, for any reason,
fail to begin or complete their service obligation after
completion of academic training, or fail to comply with the
terms and conditions of deferment established by the National
Intelligence Director under subsection (h)(2)(B), shall be in
breach of their contractual agreement. When recipients breach
their agreements for the reasons stated in the preceding
sentence, the recipient shall be liable to the United States
for an amount equal to--
(A) the total amount of scholarships received by such
individual under this section; and
(B) the interest on the amounts of such awards which would
be payable if at the time the awards were received they were
loans bearing interest at the maximum legal prevailing rate,
as determined by the Treasurer of the United States,
multiplied by 3.
(j) Cancellation, Waiver, or Suspension of Obligation.--
(1) Cancellation.--Any obligation of an individual incurred
under the Program (or a contractual agreement thereunder) for
service or payment shall be canceled upon the death of the
individual.
(2) Waiver or suspension.--The National Intelligence
Director shall prescribe regulations to provide for the
partial or total waiver or suspension of any obligation of
service or payment incurred by an individual under the
Program (or a contractual agreement thereunder) whenever
compliance by the individual is impossible or would involve
extreme hardship to the individual, or if enforcement of such
obligation with respect to the individual would be contrary
to the best interests of the Government.
(k) Regulations.--The National Intelligence Director shall
prescribe regulations necessary to carry out this section.

Subtitle F--Additional Authorities of National Intelligence Authority

SEC. 161. USE OF APPROPRIATED FUNDS.

(a) Disposal of Property.--(1) If specifically authorized
to dispose of real property of the National Intelligence
Authority under any law enacted after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the National Intelligence Director
shall, subject to paragraph (2), exercise such authority in
strict compliance with subchapter IV of chapter 5 of title
40, United States Code.
(2) The Director shall deposit the proceeds of any disposal
of property of the National Intelligence Authority into the
miscellaneous receipts of the Treasury in accordance with
section 3302(b) of title 31, United States Code.
(b) Gifts.--Gifts or donations of services or property of
or for the National Intelligence Authority may not be
accepted, used, or disposed of unless specifically permitted
in advance in an appropriations Act and only under the
conditions and for the purposes specified in such
appropriations Act.

SEC. 162. ACQUISITION AND FISCAL AUTHORITIES.

(a) Acquisitions of Major Systems.--(1) For each
intelligence program for the acquisition of a major system,
the National Intelligence Director shall--
(A) require the development and implementation of a program
management plan that includes cost, schedule, and performance
goals and program milestone criteria;
(B) subject to paragraph (4), serve as the exclusive
milestone decision authority; and
(C) periodically--
(i) review and assess the progress made toward the
achievement of the goals and milestones established in such
plan; and
(ii) submit to Congress a report on the results of such
review and assessment.
(2) The National Intelligence Director shall prescribe
guidance for the development and implementation of program
management plans under this subsection. In prescribing such
guidance, the Director shall review Department of Defense
guidance on program management plans for Department of
Defense programs for the acquisition of major systems and, to
the extent feasible, incorporate the principles of the
Department of Defense guidance into the Director's guidance
under this subsection.
(3) Nothing in this subsection may be construed to limit
the authority of the National Intelligence Director to
delegate to any other official any authority to perform the
responsibilities of the Director under this subsection.
(4)(A) The authority conferred by paragraph (1)(B) shall
not apply to Department of Defense programs until the
National Intelligence Director, in consultation with the
Secretary of Defense, determines that the National
Intelligence Authority has the personnel and capability to
fully and effectively carry out such authority.
(B) The National Intelligence Director may assign any
authority under this subsection to the Secretary of Defense.
The assignment of such authority shall be made pursuant to a
memorandum of understanding between the Director and the
Secretary.
(5) In this subsection:
(A) The term ``intelligence program'', with respect to the
acquisition of a major system, means a program that--
(i) is carried out to acquire such major system for an
element of the intelligence community; and
(ii) is funded in whole out of amounts available for the
National Intelligence Program.
(B) The term ``major system'' has the meaning given such
term in section 4(9) of the Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act of 1949 (41 U.S.C. 403(9)).
(b) Availability of Funds.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law (other than the provisions of this Act),
sums appropriated or otherwise made available to the National
Intelligence Authority may be expended for purposes necessary
to carry out

[[Page H8929]]

its functions, including any function performed by the
National Intelligence Authority that is described in section
8(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C. 403j(a)).
(c) Relationship of Director's Authority to Other Laws on
Acquisition and Management of Property and Services.--Section
113(e) of title 40, United States Code, is amended--
(A) by striking ``or'' at the end of paragraph (18);
(B) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (19) and
inserting ``; or''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(20) the National Intelligence Director.''.
(d) National Intelligence Director Report on Enhancement of
NSA and NGIA Acquisition Authorities.--Not later than one
year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
National Intelligence Director shall--
(1) review--
(A) the acquisition authority of the Director of the
National Security Agency; and
(B) the acquisition authority of the Director of the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and
(2) submit to the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the
Senate and the Committee on Government Reform of the House of
Representatives a report setting forth any recommended
enhancements of the acquisition authorities of the Director
of the National Security Agency and the Director of the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency that the National
Intelligence Director considers necessary.
(e) Comptroller General Report on Acquisition Policies and
Procedures.--Not later than two years after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United
States shall submit to Congress a report on the extent to
which the policies and procedures adopted for managing the
acquisition of major systems for national intelligence
purposes, as identified by the National Intelligence
Director, are likely to result in successful cost, schedule,
and performance outcomes.

SEC. 163. PERSONNEL MATTERS.

(a) In General.--In addition to the authorities provided in
section 114, the National Intelligence Director may exercise
with respect to the personnel of the National Intelligence
Authority any authority of the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency with respect to the personnel of the
Central Intelligence Agency under the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.), and other
applicable provisions of law, as of the date of the enactment
of this Act to the same extent, and subject to the same
conditions and limitations, that the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency may exercise such authority with respect
to personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(b) Rights and Protections of Employees and Applicants.--
Employees and applicants for employment of the National
Intelligence Authority shall have the same rights and
protections under the Authority as employees of the Central
Intelligence Agency have under the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949, and other applicable provisions of law,
as of the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 164. ETHICS MATTERS.

(a) Political Service of Personnel.--Section
7323(b)(2)(B)(i) of title 5, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subclause (XII), by striking ``or'' at the end; and
(2) by inserting after subclause (XIII) the following new
subclause:
``(XIV) the National Intelligence Authority; or''.
(b) Deletion of Information About Foreign Gifts.--Section
7342(f)(4) of title 5, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(4)'';
(2) in subparagraph (A), as so designated, by striking
``the Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(B) In transmitting such listings for the National
Intelligence Authority, the National Intelligence Director
may delete the information described in subparagraphs (A) and
(C) of paragraphs (2) and (3) if the Director certifies in
writing to the Secretary of State that the publication of
such information could adversely affect United States
intelligence sources.''.
(c) Exemption from Financial Disclosures.--Section
105(a)(1) of the Ethics in Government Act (5 U.S.C. App.) is
amended by inserting ``the National Intelligence Authority,''
before ``the Central Intelligence Agency''.

TITLE II--OTHER IMPROVEMENTS OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Subtitle A--Improvements of Intelligence Activities

SEC. 201. AVAILABILITY TO PUBLIC OF CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE
FUNDING INFORMATION.

(a) Amounts Requested Each Fiscal Year.--The President
shall disclose to the public for each fiscal year after
fiscal year 2005 the aggregate amount of appropriations
requested in the budget of the President for such fiscal year
for the National Intelligence Program.
(b) Amounts Authorized and Appropriated Each Fiscal Year.--
Congress shall disclose to the public for each fiscal year
after fiscal year 2005 the aggregate amount of funds
authorized to be appropriated, and the aggregate amount of
funds appropriated, by Congress for such fiscal year for the
National Intelligence Program.
(c) Study of Disclosure of Additional Information.--(1) The
National Intelligence Director shall conduct a study to
assess the advisability of disclosing to the public amounts
as follows:
(A) The aggregate amount of appropriations requested in the
budget of the President for each fiscal year for each element
of the intelligence community.
(B) The aggregate amount of funds authorized to be
appropriated, and the aggregate amount of funds appropriated,
by Congress for each fiscal year for each element of the
intelligence community.
(2) The study under paragraph (1) shall--
(A) address whether or not the disclosure to the public of
the information referred to in that paragraph would harm the
national security of the United States; and
(B) take into specific account concerns relating to the
disclosure of such information for each element of the
intelligence community.
(3) Not later than 180 days after the effective date of
this section, the Director shall submit to Congress a report
on the study under paragraph (1).

SEC. 202. MERGER OF HOMELAND SECURITY COUNCIL INTO NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL.

(a) Merger of Homeland Security Council Into National
Security Council.--Section 101 of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402) is amended--
(1) in the fourth undesignated paragraph of subsection (a),
by striking clauses (5) and (6) and inserting the following
new clauses:
``(5) the Attorney General;
``(6) the Secretary of Homeland Security;''; and
(2) in subsection (b)--
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and
inserting a semicolon; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
``(3) assess the objectives, commitments, and risks of the
United States in the interests of homeland security and make
recommendations to the President based on such assessments;
``(4) oversee and review the homeland security policies of
the Federal Government and make recommendations to the
President based on such oversight and review; and
``(5) perform such other functions as the President may
direct.''.
(c) Repeal of Superseded Authority.--(1) Title IX of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 491 et seq.) is
repealed.
(2) The table of contents for that Act is amended by
striking the items relating to title IX.

SEC. 203. JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COUNCIL.

Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401
et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 101 the
following new section:

``joint intelligence community council

``Sec. 101A. (a) Joint Intelligence Community Council.--
There is a Joint Intelligence Community Council.
``(b) Membership.--The Joint Intelligence Community Council
shall consist of the following:
``(1) The National Intelligence Director, who shall chair
the Council.
``(2) The Secretary of State.
``(3) The Secretary of the Treasury.
``(4) The Secretary of Defense.
``(5) The Attorney General.
``(6) The Secretary of Energy.
``(7) The Secretary of Homeland Security.
``(8) Such other officers of the United States Government
as the President may designate from time to time.
``(c) Functions.--The Joint Intelligence Community Council
shall assist the National Intelligence Director to in
developing and implementing a joint, unified national
intelligence effort to protect national security by--
``(1) advising the Director on establishing requirements,
developing budgets, financial management, and monitoring and
evaluating the performance of the intelligence community, and
on such other matters as the Director may request; and
``(2) ensuring the timely execution of programs, policies,
and directives established or developed by the Director.
``(d) Meetings.--The Joint Intelligence Community Council
shall meet upon the request of the National Intelligence
Director.''.

SEC. 204. IMPROVEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States in its final report stated that, under Director
Robert Mueller, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has made
significant progress in improving its intelligence
capabilities.
(2) In the report, the members of the Commission also urged
that the Federal Bureau of Investigation fully
institutionalize the shift of the Bureau to a preventive
counterterrorism posture.
(b) Improvement of Intelligence Capabilities.--The Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall continue efforts
to improve the intelligence capabilities of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and to develop and maintain within
the Bureau a national intelligence workforce.

[[Page H8930]]

(c) National Intelligence Workforce.--(1) In developing and
maintaining a national intelligence workforce under
subsection (b), the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation shall, subject to the direction and control of
the President, develop and maintain a specialized and
integrated national intelligence workforce consisting of
agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists who
are recruited, trained, and rewarded in a manner which
ensures the existence within the Federal Bureau of
Investigation an institutional culture with substantial
expertise in, and commitment to, the intelligence mission of
the Bureau.
(2) Each agent employed by the Bureau after the date of the
enactment of this Act shall receive basic training in both
criminal justice matters and national intelligence matters.
(3) Each agent employed by the Bureau after the date of the
enactment of this Act shall, to the maximum extent
practicable, be given the opportunity to undergo, during such
agent's early service with the Bureau, meaningful assignments
in criminal justice matters and in national intelligence
matters.
(4) The Director shall--
(A) establish career positions in national intelligence
matters for agents and analysts of the Bureau; and
(B) in furtherance of the requirement under subparagraph
(A) and to the maximum extent practicable, afford agents and
analysts of the Bureau the opportunity to work in the career
specialty selected by such agents and analysts over their
entire career with the Bureau.
(5) The Director shall carry out a program to enhance the
capacity of the Bureau to recruit and retain individuals with
backgrounds in intelligence, international relations,
language, technology, and other skills relevant to the
intelligence mission of the Bureau.
(6) The Director shall, to the maximum extent practicable,
afford the analysts of the Bureau training and career
opportunities commensurate with the training and career
opportunities afforded analysts in other elements of the
intelligence community.
(7) Commencing as soon as practicable after the date of the
enactment of this Act, each direct supervisor of a Field
Intelligence Group, and each Bureau Operational Manager at
the Section Chief and Assistant Special Agent in Charge
(ASAC) level and above, shall be a certified intelligence
officer.
(8) The Director shall, to the maximum extent practicable,
ensure that the successful discharge of advanced training
courses, and of one or more assignments to another element of
the intelligence community, is a precondition to advancement
to higher level intelligence assignments within the Bureau.
(d) Field Office Matters.--(1) In improving the
intelligence capabilities of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation under subsection (b), the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation shall ensure that each Field
Intelligence Group reports directly to a field office senior
manager responsible for intelligence matters.
(2) The Director shall provide for such expansion of the
secure facilities in the field offices of the Bureau as is
necessary to ensure the discharge by the field offices of the
intelligence mission of the Bureau.
(3) The Director shall require that each Field Intelligence
Group manager ensures the integration of analysts, agents,
linguists, and surveillance personnel in the field.
(e) Budget Matters.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation shall, in consultation with the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget, modify the budget structure
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in order to organize
the budget according to the four principal missions of the
Bureau as follows:
(1) Intelligence.
(2) Counterterrorism and counterintelligence.
(3) Criminal Enterprises/Federal Crimes.
(4) Criminal justice services.
(f) Reports.--(1) Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation shall submit to Congress a report on the
progress made as of the date of such report in carrying out
the requirements of this section.
(2) The Director shall include in each annual program
review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that is
submitted to Congress a report on the progress made by each
field office of the Bureau during the period covered by such
review in addressing Bureau and national program priorities.
(3) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, and every 12 months thereafter, the Director
shall submit to Congress a report assessing the
qualifications, status, and roles of analysts at Bureau
headquarters and in the field offices of the Bureau.
(4) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, and every 12 months thereafter, the Director
shall submit to Congress a report on the progress of the
Bureau in implementing information-sharing principles.

SEC. 205. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION INTELLIGENCE CAREER
SERVICE.

(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the
``Federal Bureau of Investigation Intelligence Career Service
Authorization Act of 2005''.
(b) Establishment of Federal Bureau of Investigation
Intelligence Career Service.--
(1) In general.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, in consultation with the Director of the
Office of Personnel Management--
(A) may establish positions for intelligence analysts,
without regard to chapter 51 of title 5, United States Code;
(B) shall prescribe standards and procedures for
establishing and classifying such positions; and
(C) may fix the rate of basic pay for such positions,
without regard to subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5,
United States Code, if the rate of pay is not greater than
the rate of basic pay payable for level IV of the Executive
Schedule.
(2) Levels of performance.--Any performance management
system established for intelligence analysts shall have at
least 1 level of performance above a retention standard.
(c) Reporting Requirement.--Not less than 60 days before
the date of the implementation of authorities authorized
under this section, the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation shall submit an operating plan describing the
Director's intended use of the authorities under this section
to--
(1) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the
House of Representatives;
(2) the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Government Reform of the House of
Representatives;
(4) the congressional intelligence committees; and
(5) the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the
House of Representatives.
(d) Annual Report.--Not later than December 31, 2005, and
annually thereafter for 4 years, the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation shall submit an annual report of the
use of the permanent authorities provided under this section
during the preceding fiscal year to--
(1) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the
House of Representatives;
(2) the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Government Reform of the House of
Representatives;
(4) the congressional intelligence committees; and
(5) the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the
House of Representatives.

SEC. 206. INFORMATION SHARING.

(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Advisory board.--The term ``Advisory Board'' means the
Advisory Board on Information Sharing established under
subsection (i).
(2) Executive council.--The term ``Executive Council''
means the Executive Council on Information Sharing
established under subsection (h).
(3) Homeland security information.--The term ``homeland
security information'' means all information, whether
collected, produced, or distributed by intelligence, law
enforcement, military, homeland security, or other activities
relating to--
(A) the existence, organization, capabilities, plans,
intentions, vulnerabilities, means of finance or material
support, or activities of foreign or international terrorist
groups or individuals, or of domestic groups or individuals
involved in transnational terrorism;
(B) threats posed by such groups or individuals to the
United States, United States persons, or United States
interests, or to those of other nations;
(C) communications of or by such groups or individuals; or
(D) groups or individuals reasonably believed to be
assisting or associated with such groups or individuals.
(4) Network.--The term ``Network'' means the Information
Sharing Network described under subsection (c).
(b) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States,
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The effective use of information, from all available
sources, is essential to the fight against terror and the
protection of our homeland. The biggest impediment to all-
source analysis, and to a greater likelihood of ``connecting
the dots'', is resistance to sharing information.
(2) The United States Government has access to a vast
amount of information, including not only traditional
intelligence but also other government databases, such as
those containing customs or immigration information. However,
the United States Government has a weak system for processing
and using the information it has.
(3) In the period preceding September 11, 2001, there were
instances of potentially helpful information that was
available but that no person knew to ask for; information
that was distributed only in compartmented channels, and
information that was requested but could not be shared.
(4) Current security requirements nurture over-
classification and excessive compartmentalization of
information among agencies. Each agency's incentive structure
opposes sharing, with risks, including criminal, civil, and
administrative sanctions, but few rewards for sharing
information.
(5) The current system, in which each intelligence agency
has its own security practices, requires a demonstrated
``need to know'' before sharing. This approach assumes that
it is possible to know, in advance, who will need to use the
information. An outgrowth of the cold war, such a system
implicitly assumes that the risk of inadvertent disclosure
outweighs the benefits of

[[Page H8931]]

wider sharing. Such assumptions are no longer appropriate.
Although counterintelligence concerns are still real, the
costs of not sharing information are also substantial. The
current ``need-to-know'' culture of information protection
needs to be replaced with a ``need-to-share'' culture of
integration.
(6) A new approach to the sharing of intelligence and
homeland security information is urgently needed. An
important conceptual model for a new ``trusted information
network'' is the Systemwide Homeland Analysis and Resource
Exchange (SHARE) Network proposed by a task force of leading
professionals assembled by the Markle Foundation and
described in reports issued in October 2002 and December
2003.
(7) No single agency can create a meaningful information
sharing system on its own. Alone, each agency can only
modernize stovepipes, not replace them. Presidential
leadership is required to bring about governmentwide change.
(c) Information Sharing Network.--
(1) Establishment.--The President shall establish a trusted
information network and secure information sharing
environment to promote sharing of intelligence and homeland
security information in a manner consistent with national
security and the protection of privacy and civil liberties,
and based on clearly defined and consistently applied
policies and procedures, and valid investigative, analytical
or operational requirements.
(2) Attributes.--The Network shall promote coordination,
communication and collaboration of people and information
among all relevant Federal departments and agencies, State,
tribal, and local authorities, and relevant private sector
entities, including owners and operators of critical
infrastructure, by using policy guidelines and technologies
that support--
(A) a decentralized, distributed, and coordinated
environment that connects existing systems where appropriate
and allows users to share information among agencies, between
levels of government, and, as appropriate, with the private
sector;
(B) the sharing of information in a form and manner that
facilitates its use in analysis, investigations and
operations;
(C) building upon existing systems capabilities currently
in use across the Government;
(D) utilizing industry best practices, including minimizing
the centralization of data and seeking to use common tools
and capabilities whenever possible;
(E) employing an information access management approach
that controls access to data rather than to just networks;
(F) facilitating the sharing of information at and across
all levels of security by using policy guidelines and
technologies that support writing information that can be
broadly shared;
(G) providing directory services for locating people and
information;
(H) incorporating protections for individuals' privacy and
civil liberties;
(I) incorporating strong mechanisms for information
security and privacy and civil liberties guideline
enforcement in order to enhance accountability and facilitate
oversight, including--
(i) multifactor authentication and access control;
(ii) strong encryption and data protection;
(iii) immutable audit capabilities;
(iv) automated policy enforcement;
(v) perpetual, automated screening for abuses of network
and intrusions; and
(vi) uniform classification and handling procedures;
(J) compliance with requirements of applicable law and
guidance with regard to the planning, design, acquisition,
operation, and management of information systems; and
(K) permitting continuous system upgrades to benefit from
advances in technology while preserving the integrity of
stored data.
(d) Immediate Actions.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget, in consultation with the Executive
Council, shall--
(1) submit to the President and to Congress a description
of the technological, legal, and policy issues presented by
the creation of the Network described in subsection (c), and
the way in which these issues will be addressed;
(2) establish electronic directory services to assist in
locating in the Federal Government intelligence and homeland
security information and people with relevant knowledge about
intelligence and homeland security information; and
(3) conduct a review of relevant current Federal agency
capabilities, including--
(A) a baseline inventory of current Federal systems that
contain intelligence or homeland security information;
(B) the money currently spent to maintain those systems;
and
(C) identification of other information that should be
included in the Network.
(e) Guidelines and Requirements.--As soon as possible, but
in no event later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall--
(1) in consultation with the Executive Council--
(A) issue guidelines for acquiring, accessing, sharing, and
using information, including guidelines to ensure that
information is provided in its most shareable form, such as
by separating out data from the sources and methods by which
that data are obtained; and
(B) on classification policy and handling procedures across
Federal agencies, including commonly accepted processing and
access controls;
(2) in consultation with the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board established under section 211, issue
guidelines that--
(A) protect privacy and civil liberties in the development
and use of the Network; and
(B) shall be made public, unless, and only to the extent
that, nondisclosure is clearly necessary to protect national
security; and
(3) require the heads of Federal departments and agencies
to promote a culture of information sharing by--
(A) reducing disincentives to information sharing,
including overclassification of information and unnecessary
requirements for originator approval; and
(B) providing affirmative incentives for information
sharing, such as the incorporation of information sharing
performance measures into agency and managerial evaluations,
and employee awards for promoting innovative information
sharing practices.
(f) Enterprise Architecture and Implementation Plan.--Not
later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Director of Management and Budget shall submit to
the President and to Congress an enterprise architecture and
implementation plan for the Network. The enterprise
architecture and implementation plan shall be prepared by the
Director of Management and Budget, in consultation with the
Executive Council, and shall include--
(1) a description of the parameters of the proposed
Network, including functions, capabilities, and resources;
(2) a delineation of the roles of the Federal departments
and agencies that will participate in the development of the
Network, including identification of any agency that will
build the infrastructure needed to operate and manage the
Network (as distinct from the individual agency components
that are to be part of the Network), with the delineation of
roles to be consistent with--
(A) the authority of the National Intelligence Director
under this Act to set standards for information sharing and
information technology throughout the intelligence community;
and
(B) the authority of the Secretary of Homeland Security and
the role of the Department of Homeland Security in
coordinating with State, tribal, and local officials and the
private sector;
(3) a description of the technological requirements to
appropriately link and enhance existing networks and a
description of the system design that will meet these
requirements;
(4) an enterprise architecture that--
(A) is consistent with applicable laws and guidance with
regard to planning, design, acquisition, operation, and
management of information systems;
(B) will be used to guide and define the development and
implementation of the Network; and
(C) addresses the existing and planned enterprise
architectures of the departments and agencies participating
in the Network;
(5) a description of how privacy and civil liberties will
be protected throughout the design and implementation of the
Network;
(6) objective, systemwide performance measures to enable
the assessment of progress toward achieving full
implementation of the Network;
(7) a plan, including a time line, for the development and
phased implementation of the Network;
(8) total budget requirements to develop and implement the
Network, including the estimated annual cost for each of the
5 years following the date of the enactment of this Act; and
(9) proposals for any legislation that the Director of
Management and Budget determines necessary to implement the
Network.
(g) Director of Management and Budget Responsible for
Information Sharing Across the Federal Government.--
(1) Additional duties and responsibilities.--
(A) In general.--The Director of Management and Budget, in
consultation with the Executive Council, shall--
(i) implement and manage the Network;
(ii) develop and implement policies, procedures,
guidelines, rules, and standards as appropriate to foster the
development and proper operation of the Network; and
(iii) assist, monitor, and assess the implementation of the
Network by Federal departments and agencies to ensure
adequate progress, technological consistency and policy
compliance; and regularly report the findings to the
President and to Congress.
(B) Content of policies, procedures, guidelines, rules, and
standards.--The policies, procedures, guidelines, rules, and
standards under subparagraph (A)(ii) shall--
(i) take into account the varying missions and security
requirements of agencies participating in the Network;
(ii) address development, implementation, and oversight of
technical standards and requirements;
(iii) address and facilitate information sharing between
and among departments and agencies of the intelligence
community, the Department of Defense, the Homeland Security
community and the law enforcement community;
(iv) address and facilitate information sharing between
Federal departments and agencies and State, tribal and local
governments;

[[Page H8932]]

(v) address and facilitate, as appropriate, information
sharing between Federal departments and agencies and the
private sector;
(vi) address and facilitate, as appropriate, information
sharing between Federal departments and agencies with foreign
partners and allies; and
(vii) ensure the protection of privacy and civil liberties.
(2) Appointment of principal officer.--Not later than 30
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Director of Management and Budget shall appoint, with
approval of the President, a principal officer in the Office
of Management and Budget whose primary responsibility shall
be to carry out the day-to-day duties of the Director
specified in this section. The officer shall report directly
to the Director of Management and Budget, have the rank of a
Deputy Director and shall be paid at the rate of pay payable
for a position at level III of the Executive Schedule under
section 5314 of title 5, United States Code.
(h) Executive Council on Information Sharing.--
(1) Establishment.--There is established an Executive
Council on Information Sharing that shall assist the Director
of Management and Budget in the execution of the Director's
duties under this Act concerning information sharing.
(2) Membership.--The members of the Executive Council shall
be--
(A) the Director of Management and Budget, who shall serve
as Chairman of the Executive Council;
(B) the Secretary of Homeland Security or his designee;
(C) the Secretary of Defense or his designee;
(D) the Attorney General or his designee;
(E) the Secretary of State or his designee;
(F) the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or
his designee;
(G) the National Intelligence Director or his designee;
(H) such other Federal officials as the President shall
designate;
(I) representatives of State, tribal, and local
governments, to be appointed by the President; and
(J) individuals who are employed in private businesses or
nonprofit organizations that own or operate critical
infrastructure, to be appointed by the President.
(3) Responsibilities.--The Executive Council shall assist
the Director of Management and Budget in--
(A) implementing and managing the Network;
(B) developing policies, procedures, guidelines, rules, and
standards necessary to establish and implement the Network;
(C) ensuring there is coordination among departments and
agencies participating in the Network in the development and
implementation of the Network;
(D) reviewing, on an ongoing basis, policies, procedures,
guidelines, rules, and standards related to the
implementation of the Network;
(E) establishing a dispute resolution process to resolve
disagreements among departments and agencies about whether
particular information should be shared and in what manner;
and
(F) considering such reports as are submitted by the
Advisory Board on Information Sharing under subsection
(i)(2).
(4) Inapplicability of federal advisory committee act.--The
Council shall not be subject to the requirements of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.).
(5) Reports.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Director
of Management and Budget, in the capacity of Chair of the
Executive Council, shall submit a report to the President and
to Congress that shall include--
(A) a description of the activities and accomplishments of
the Council in the preceding year; and
(B) the number and dates of the meetings held by the
Council and a list of attendees at each meeting.
(6) Informing the public.--The Executive Council shall--
(A) make its reports to Congress available to the public to
the greatest extent that is consistent with the protection of
classified information and applicable law; and
(B) otherwise inform the public of its activities, as
appropriate and in a manner consistent with the protection of
classified information and applicable law.
(i) Advisory Board on Information Sharing.--
(1) Establishment.--There is established an Advisory Board
on Information Sharing to advise the President and the
Executive Council on policy, technical, and management issues
related to the design and operation of the Network.
(2) Responsibilities.--The Advisory Board shall advise the
Executive Council on policy, technical, and management issues
related to the design and operation of the Network. At the
request of the Executive Council, or the Director of
Management and Budget in the capacity as Chair of the
Executive Council, or on its own initiative, the Advisory
Board shall submit reports to the Executive Council
concerning the findings and recommendations of the Advisory
Board regarding the design and operation of the Network.
(3) Membership and qualifications.--The Advisory Board
shall be composed of no more than 15 members, to be appointed
by the President from outside the Federal Government. The
members of the Advisory Board shall have significant
experience or expertise in policy, technical and operational
matters, including issues of security, privacy, or civil
liberties, and shall be selected solely on the basis of their
professional qualifications, achievements, public stature and
relevant experience.
(4) Chair.--The President shall designate one of the
members of the Advisory Board to act as chair of the Advisory
Board.
(5) Administrative support.--The Office of Management and
Budget shall provide administrative support for the Advisory
Board.
(j) Reports.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and semiannually thereafter, the
President through the Director of Management and Budget shall
submit a report to Congress on the state of the Network and
of information sharing across the Federal Government.
(2) Content.--Each report under this subsection shall
include--
(A) a progress report on the extent to which the Network
has been implemented, including how the Network has fared on
the government-wide and agency-specific performance measures
and whether the performance goals set in the preceding year
have been met;
(B) objective systemwide performance goals for the
following year;
(C) an accounting of how much was spent on the Network in
the preceding year;
(D) actions taken to ensure that agencies procure new
technology that is consistent with the Network and
information on whether new systems and technology are
consistent with the Network;
(E) the extent to which, in appropriate circumstances, all
terrorism watch lists are available for combined searching in
real time through the Network and whether there are
consistent standards for placing individuals on, and removing
individuals from, the watch lists, including the availability
of processes for correcting errors;
(F) the extent to which unnecessary roadblocks,
impediments, or disincentives to information sharing,
including the inappropriate use of paper-only intelligence
products and requirements for originator approval, have been
eliminated;
(G) the extent to which positive incentives for information
sharing have been implemented;
(H) the extent to which classified information is also made
available through the Network, in whole or in part, in
unclassified form;
(I) the extent to which State, tribal, and local
officials--
(i) are participating in the Network;
(ii) have systems which have become integrated into the
Network;
(iii) are providing as well as receiving information; and
(iv) are using the Network to communicate with each other;
(J) the extent to which--
(i) private sector data, including information from owners
and operators of critical infrastructure, is incorporated in
the Network; and
(ii) the private sector is both providing and receiving
information;
(K) where private sector data has been used by the
Government or has been incorporated into the Network--
(i) the measures taken to protect sensitive business
information; and
(ii) where the data involves information about individuals,
the measures taken to ensure the accuracy of such data;
(L) the measures taken by the Federal Government to ensure
the accuracy of other information on the Network and, in
particular, the accuracy of information about individuals;
(M) an assessment of the Network's privacy and civil
liberties protections, including actions taken in the
preceding year to implement or enforce privacy and civil
liberties protections and a report of complaints received
about interference with an individual's privacy or civil
liberties; and
(N) an assessment of the security protections of the
Network.
(k) Agency Responsibilities.--The head of each department
or agency possessing or using intelligence or homeland
security information or otherwise participating in the
Network shall--
(1) ensure full department or agency compliance with
information sharing policies, procedures, guidelines, rules,
and standards established for the Network under subsections
(c) and (g);
(2) ensure the provision of adequate resources for systems
and activities supporting operation of and participation in
the Network; and
(3) ensure full agency or department cooperation in the
development of the Network and associated enterprise
architecture to implement governmentwide information sharing,
and in the management and acquisition of information
technology consistent with applicable law.
(l) Agency Plans and Reports.--Each Federal department or
agency that possesses or uses intelligence and homeland
security information, operates a system in the Network or
otherwise participates, or expects to participate, in the
Network, shall submit to the Director of Management and
Budget--
(1) not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment
of this Act, a report including--
(A) a strategic plan for implementation of the Network's
requirements within the department or agency;

[[Page H8933]]

(B) objective performance measures to assess the progress
and adequacy of the department or agency's information
sharing efforts; and
(C) budgetary requirements to integrate the agency into the
Network, including projected annual expenditures for each of
the following 5 years following the submission of the report;
and
(2) annually thereafter, reports including--
(A) an assessment of the progress of the department or
agency in complying with the Network's requirements,
including how well the agency has performed on the objective
measures developed under paragraph (1)(B);
(B) the agency's expenditures to implement and comply with
the Network's requirements in the preceding year; and
(C) the agency's or department's plans for further
implementation of the Network in the year following the
submission of the report.
(m) Periodic Assessments.--
(1) Comptroller general.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and periodically thereafter, the
Comptroller General shall evaluate the implementation of the
Network, both generally and, at the discretion of the
Comptroller General, within specific departments and
agencies, to determine the extent of compliance with the
Network's requirements and to assess the effectiveness of the
Network in improving information sharing and collaboration
and in protecting privacy and civil liberties, and shall
report to Congress on the findings of the Comptroller
General.
(B) Information available to the comptroller general.--Upon
request by the Comptroller General, information relevant to
an evaluation under subsection (a) shall be made available to
the Comptroller General under section 716 of title 31, United
States Code.
(C) Consultation with congressional committees.--If a
record is not made available to the Comptroller General
within a reasonable time, before the Comptroller General
files a report under section 716(b)(1) of title 31, United
States Code, the Comptroller General shall consult with the
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives, the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the
Senate, and the Committee on Government Reform of the House
of Representatives concerning the Comptroller's intent to
file a report.
(2) Inspectors general.--The Inspector General in any
Federal department or agency that possesses or uses
intelligence or homeland security information or that
otherwise participates in the Network shall, at the
discretion of the Inspector General--
(A) conduct audits or investigations to--
(i) determine the compliance of that department or agency
with the Network's requirements; and
(ii) assess the effectiveness of that department or agency
in improving information sharing and collaboration and in
protecting privacy and civil liberties; and
(B) issue reports on such audits and investigations.
(n) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated--
(1) $50,000,000 to the Director of Management and Budget to
carry out this section for fiscal year 2005; and
(2) such sums as are necessary to carry out this section in
each fiscal year thereafter, to be disbursed and allocated in
accordance with the Network implementation plan required by
subsection (f).

Subtitle B--Privacy and Civil Liberties

SEC. 211. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD.

(a) In General.--There is established within the Executive
Office of the President a Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board (referred to in this subtitle as the
``Board'').
(b) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) In conducting the war on terrorism, the Government may
need additional powers and may need to enhance the use of its
existing powers.
(2) This shift of power and authority to the Government
calls for an enhanced system of checks and balances to
protect the precious liberties that are vital to our way of
life and to ensure that the Government uses its powers for
the purposes for which the powers were given.
(c) Purpose.--The Board shall--
(1) analyze and review actions the executive branch takes
to protect the Nation from terrorism; and
(2) ensure that liberty concerns are appropriately
considered in the development and implementation of laws,
regulations, and policies related to efforts to protect the
Nation against terrorism.
(d) Functions.--
(1) Advice and counsel on policy development and
implementation.--The Board shall--
(A) review proposed legislation, regulations, and policies
related to efforts to protect the Nation from terrorism,
including the development and adoption of information sharing
guidelines under section 205(g);
(B) review the implementation of new and existing
legislation, regulations, and policies related to efforts to
protect the Nation from terrorism, including the
implementation of information sharing guidelines under
section 205(g);
(C) advise the President and the departments, agencies, and
elements of the executive branch to ensure that privacy and
civil liberties are appropriately considered in the
development and implementation of such legislation,
regulations, policies, and guidelines; and
(D) in providing advice on proposals to retain or enhance a
particular governmental power, consider whether the
department, agency, or element of the executive branch has
explained--
(i) that the power actually materially enhances security;
(ii) that there is adequate supervision of the use by the
executive branch of the power to ensure protection of privacy
and civil liberties; and
(iii) that there are adequate guidelines and oversight to
properly confine its use.
(2) Oversight.--The Board shall continually review--
(A) the regulations, policies, and procedures, and the
implementation of the regulations, policies, and procedures,
of the departments, agencies, and elements of the executive
branch to ensure that privacy and civil liberties are
protected;
(B) the information sharing practices of the departments,
agencies, and elements of the executive branch to determine
whether they appropriately protect privacy and civil
liberties and adhere to the information sharing guidelines
prescribed under section 205(g) and to other governing laws,
regulations, and policies regarding privacy and civil
liberties; and
(C) other actions by the executive branch related to
efforts to protect the Nation from terrorism to determine
whether such actions--
(i) appropriately protect privacy and civil liberties; and
(ii) are consistent with governing laws, regulations, and
policies regarding privacy and civil liberties.
(3) Relationship with privacy and civil liberties
officers.--The Board shall--
(A) review and assess reports and other information from
privacy officers and civil liberties officers described in
section 212;
(B) when appropriate, make recommendations to such privacy
officers and civil liberties officers regarding their
activities; and
(C) when appropriate, coordinate the activities of such
privacy officers and civil liberties officers on relevant
interagency matters.
(4) Testimony.--The Members of the Board shall appear and
testify before Congress upon request.
(e) Reports.--
(1) In general.--The Board shall--
(A) receive and review reports from privacy officers and
civil liberties officers described in section 212; and
(B) periodically submit, not less than semiannually,
reports--
(i)(I) to the appropriate committees of Congress, including
the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House
of Representatives, the Committee on Governmental Affairs of
the Senate, the Committee on Government Reform of the House
of Representatives, the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and
(II) to the President; and
(ii) which shall be in unclassified form to the greatest
extent possible, with a classified annex where necessary.
(2) Contents.--Not less than 2 reports submitted each year
under paragraph (1)(B) shall include--
(A) a description of the major activities of the Board
during the preceding period; and
(B) information on the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Board resulting from its advice and
oversight functions under subsection (d).
(f) Informing the Public.--The Board shall--
(1) make its reports, including its reports to Congress,
available to the public to the greatest extent that is
consistent with the protection of classified information and
applicable law; and
(2) hold public hearings and otherwise inform the public of
its activities, as appropriate and in a manner consistent
with the protection of classified information and applicable
law.
(g) Access to Information.--
(1) Authorization.--If determined by the Board to be
necessary to carry out its responsibilities under this
section, the Board is authorized to--
(A) have access from any department, agency, or element of
the executive branch, or any Federal officer or employee, to
all relevant records, reports, audits, reviews, documents,
papers, recommendations, or other relevant material,
including classified information consistent with applicable
law;
(B) interview, take statements from, or take public
testimony from personnel of any department, agency, or
element of the executive branch, or any Federal officer or
employee;
(C) request information or assistance from any State,
tribal, or local government; and
(D) require, by subpoena issued at the direction of a
majority of the members of the Board, persons (other than
departments, agencies, and elements of the executive branch)
to produce any relevant information,

[[Page H8934]]

documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, papers, and
other documentary or testimonial evidence.
(2) Enforcement of subpoena.--In the case of contumacy or
failure to obey a subpoena issued under paragraph (1)(D), the
United States district court for the judicial district in
which the subpoenaed person resides, is served, or may be
found may issue an order requiring such person to produce the
evidence required by such subpoena.
(3) Agency cooperation.--Whenever information or assistance
requested under subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1) is,
in the judgment of the Board, unreasonably refused or not
provided, the Board shall report the circumstances to the
head of the department, agency, or element concerned without
delay. The head of the department, agency, or element
concerned shall ensure that the Board is given access to the
information, assistance, material, or personnel the Board
determines to be necessary to carry out its functions.
(h) Membership.--
(1) Members.--The Board shall be composed of a full-time
chairman and 4 additional members, who shall be appointed by
the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate.
(2) Qualifications.--Members of the Board shall be selected
solely on the basis of their professional qualifications,
achievements, public stature, expertise in civil liberties
and privacy, and relevant experience, and without regard to
political affiliation, but in no event shall more than 3
members of the Board be members of the same political party.
(3) Incompatible office.--An individual appointed to the
Board may not, while serving on the Board, be an elected
official, officer, or employee of the Federal Government,
other than in the capacity as a member of the Board.
(4) Term.--Each member of the Board shall serve a term of
six years, except that--
(A) a member appointed to a term of office after the
commencement of such term may serve under such appointment
only for the remainder of such term;
(B) upon the expiration of the term of office of a member,
the member shall continue to serve until the member's
successor has been appointed and qualified, except that no
member may serve under this subparagraph--
(i) for more than 60 days when Congress is in session
unless a nomination to fill the vacancy shall have been
submitted to the Senate; or
(ii) after the adjournment sine die of the session of the
Senate in which such nomination is submitted; and
(C) the members initially appointed under this subsection
shall serve terms of two, three, four, five, and six years,
respectively, from the effective date of this Act, with the
term of each such member to be designated by the President.
(5) Quorum and meetings.--After its initial meeting, the
Board shall meet upon the call of the chairman or a majority
of its members. Three members of the Board shall constitute a
quorum.
(i) Compensation and Travel Expenses.--
(1) Compensation.--
(A) Chairman.--The chairman shall be compensated at the
rate of pay payable for a position at level III of the
Executive Schedule under section 5314 of title 5, United
States Code.
(B) Members.--Each member of the Board shall be compensated
at a rate of pay payable for a position at level IV of the
Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United
States Code, for each day during which that member is engaged
in the actual performance of the duties of the Board.
(2) Travel expenses.--Members of the Board shall be allowed
travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence,
at rates authorized for persons employed intermittently by
the Government under section 5703(b) of title 5, United
States Code, while away from their homes or regular places of
business in the performance of services for the Board.
(j) Staff.--
(1) Appointment and compensation.--The Chairman, in
accordance with rules agreed upon by the Board, shall appoint
and fix the compensation of a full-time executive director
and such other personnel as may be necessary to enable the
Board to carry out its functions, without regard to the
provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing
appointments in the competitive service, and without regard
to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter
53 of such title relating to classification and General
Schedule pay rates, except that no rate of pay fixed under
this subsection may exceed the equivalent of that payable for
a position at level V of the Executive Schedule under section
5316 of title 5, United States Code.
(2) Detailees.--Any Federal employee may be detailed to the
Board without reimbursement from the Board, and such detailee
shall retain the rights, status, and privileges of the
detailee's regular employment without interruption.
(3) Consultant services.--The Board may procure the
temporary or intermittent services of experts and consultants
in accordance with section 3109 of title 5, United States
Code, at rates that do not exceed the daily rate paid a
person occupying a position at level IV of the Executive
Schedule under section 5315 of such title.
(k) Security Clearances.--The appropriate departments,
agencies, and elements of the executive branch shall
cooperate with the Board to expeditiously provide the Board
members and staff with appropriate security clearances to the
extent possible under existing procedures and requirements.
(l) Treatment as Agency, Not as Advisory Committee.--The
Board--
(1) is an agency (as defined in section 551(1) of title 5,
United States Code); and
(2) is not an advisory committee (as defined in section
3(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.)).

SEC. 212. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OFFICERS.

(a) Designation and Functions.--The Attorney General, the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary
of the Treasury, the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
the Secretary of Homeland Security, the National Intelligence
Director, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
and the head of any other department, agency, or element of
the executive branch designated by the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board to be appropriate for coverage
under this section shall designate not less than 1 senior
officer to--
(1) assist the head of such department, agency, or element
and other officials of such department, agency, or element in
appropriately considering privacy and civil liberties
concerns when such officials are proposing, developing, or
implementing laws, regulations, policies, procedures, or
guidelines related to efforts to protect the Nation against
terrorism;
(2) periodically investigate and review department, agency,
or element actions, policies, procedures, guidelines, and
related laws and their implementation to ensure that such
department, agency, or element is adequately considering
privacy and civil liberties in its actions;
(3) ensure that such department, agency, or element has
adequate procedures to receive, investigate, respond to, and
redress complaints from individuals who allege such
department, agency, or element has violated their privacy or
civil liberties; and
(4) in providing advice on proposals to retain or enhance a
particular governmental power the officer shall consider
whether such department, agency, or element has explained--
(i) that the power actually materially enhances security;
(ii) that there is adequate supervision of the use by such
department, agency, or element of the power to ensure
protection of privacy and civil liberties; and
(iii) that there are adequate guidelines and oversight to
properly confine its use.
(b) Exception to Designation Authority.--
(1) Privacy officers.--In any department, agency, or
element referred to in subsection (a) or designated by the
Board, which has a statutorily created privacy officer, such
officer shall perform the functions specified in subsection
(a) with respect to privacy.
(2) Civil liberties officers.--In any department, agency,
or element referred to in subsection (a) or designated by the
Board, which has a statutorily created civil liberties
officer, such officer shall perform the functions specified
in subsection (a) with respect to civil liberties.
(c) Supervision and Coordination.--Each privacy officer or
civil liberties officer described in subsection (a) or (b)
shall--
(1) report directly to the head of the department, agency,
or element concerned; and
(2) coordinate their activities with the Inspector General
of such department, agency, or element to avoid duplication
of effort.
(d) Agency Cooperation.--The head of each department,
agency, or element shall ensure that each privacy officer and
civil liberties officer--
(1) has the information, material, and resources necessary
to fulfill the functions of such officer;
(2) is advised of proposed policy changes;
(3) is consulted by decision makers; and
(4) is given access to material and personnel the officer
determines to be necessary to carry out the functions of such
officer.
(e) Reprisal for Making Complaint.--No action constituting
a reprisal, or threat of reprisal, for making a complaint or
for disclosing information to a privacy officer or civil
liberties officer described in subsection (a) or (b), or to
the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, that
indicates a possible violation of privacy protections or
civil liberties in the administration of the programs and
operations of the Federal Government relating to efforts to
protect the Nation from terrorism shall be taken by any
Federal employee in a position to take such action, unless
the complaint was made or the information was disclosed with
the knowledge that it was false or with willful disregard for
its truth or falsity.
(f) Periodic Reports.--
(1) In general.--The privacy officers and civil liberties
officers of each department, agency, or element referred to
or described in subsection (a) or (b) shall periodically, but
not less than quarterly, submit a report on the activities of
such officers--
(A)(i) to the appropriate committees of Congress, including
the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House
of Representatives, the Committee on Governmental Affairs of
the Senate, the Committee on Government Reform of the House
of Representatives, the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives;

[[Page H8935]]

(ii) to the head of such department, agency, or element;
and
(iii) to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board;
and
(B) which shall be in unclassified form to the greatest
extent possible, with a classified annex where necessary.
(2) Contents.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1)
shall include information on the discharge of each of the
functions of the officer concerned, including--
(A) information on the number and types of reviews
undertaken;
(B) the type of advice provided and the response given to
such advice;
(C) the number and nature of the complaints received by the
department, agency, or element concerned for alleged
violations; and
(D) a summary of the disposition of such complaints, the
reviews and inquiries conducted, and the impact of the
activities of such officer.
(g) Informing the Public.--Each privacy officer and civil
liberties officer shall--
(1) make the reports of such officer, including reports to
Congress, available to the public to the greatest extent that
is consistent with the protection of classified information
and applicable law; and
(2) otherwise inform the public of the activities of such
officer, as appropriate and in a manner consistent with the
protection of classified information and applicable law.
(h) Savings Clause.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to limit or otherwise supplant any other
authorities or responsibilities provided by law to privacy
officers or civil liberties officers.

Subtitle C--Independence of Intelligence Agencies

SEC. 221. INDEPENDENCE OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR.

(a) Location Outside Executive Office of the President.--
The National Intelligence Director shall not be located
within the Executive Office of the President.
(b) Provision of National Intelligence.--The National
Intelligence Director shall provide to the President and
Congress national intelligence that is timely, objective, and
independent of political considerations, and has not been
shaped to serve policy goals.

SEC. 222. INDEPENDENCE OF INTELLIGENCE.

(a) Director of National Counterterrorism Center.--The
Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall
provide to the President, Congress, and the National
Intelligence Director national intelligence related to
counterterrorism that is timely, objective, and independent
of political considerations, and has not been shaped to serve
policy goals.
(b) Directors of National Intelligence Centers.--Each
Director of a national intelligence center established under
section 144 shall provide to the President, Congress, and the
National Intelligence Director intelligence information that
is timely, objective, and independent of political
considerations, and has not been shaped to serve policy
goals.
(c) Director of Central Intelligence Agency.--The Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency shall ensure that
intelligence produced by the Central Intelligence Agency is
objective and independent of political considerations, and
has not been shaped to serve policy goals.
(d) National Intelligence Council.--The National
Intelligence Council shall produce national intelligence
estimates for the United States Government that are timely,
objective, and independent of political considerations, and
have not been shaped to serve policy goals.

SEC. 223. INDEPENDENCE OF NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER.

No officer, department, agency, or element of the executive
branch shall have any authority to require the Director of
the National Counterterrorism Center--
(1) to receive permission to testify before Congress; or
(2) to submit testimony, legislative recommendations, or
comments to any officer or agency of the United States for
approval, comments, or review prior to the submission of such
recommendations, testimony, or comments to Congress if such
recommendations, testimony, or comments include a statement
indicating that the views expressed therein are those of the
agency submitting them and do not necessarily represent the
views of the Administration.

SEC. 224. ACCESS OF CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES TO NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE.

(a) Documents Required To Be Provided to Congressional
Committees.--The National Intelligence Director, the Director
of the National Counterterrorism Center, and the Director of
a national intelligence center shall provide to the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives,
and any other committee of Congress with jurisdiction over
the subject matter to which the information relates, all
intelligence assessments, intelligence estimates, sense of
intelligence community memoranda, and daily senior executive
intelligence briefs, other than the Presidential Daily Brief
and those reports prepared exclusively for the President.
(b) Response to Requests From Congress Required.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), in
addition to providing material under subsection (a), the
National Intelligence Director, the Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center, or the Director of a national
intelligence center shall, not later than 15 days after
receiving a request for any intelligence assessment, report,
or estimate or other intelligence information from the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, or
any other committee of Congress with jurisdiction over the
subject matter to which the information relates, make
available to such committee such intelligence assessment,
report, or estimate or other intelligence information.
(2) Certain members.--In addition to requests described in
paragraph (1), the National Intelligence Director shall
respond to requests from the Chairman and Vice Chairman of
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the
Chairman and Ranking Member of the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. Upon making
a request covered by this paragraph, the Chairman, Vice
Chairman, or Ranking Member, as the case may be, of such
committee shall notify the other of the Chairman, Vice
Chairman, or Ranking Member, as the case may be, of such
committee of such request.
(3) Assertions of privilege.--In response to requests
described under paragraph (1) or (2), the National
Intelligence Director, the Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center, or the Director of a national
intelligence center shall provide information, unless the
President certifies that such information is not being
provided because the President is asserting a privilege
pursuant to the United States Constitution.

SEC. 225. COMMUNICATIONS WITH CONGRESS.

(a) Disclosure of Certain Information Authorized.--
(1) In general.--Employees of covered agencies and
employees of contractors carrying out activities under
classified contracts with covered agencies may disclose
information described in paragraph (2) to the individuals
referred to in paragraph (3) without first reporting such
information to the appropriate Inspector General.
(2) Covered information.--Paragraph (1) applies to
information, including classified information, that an
employee reasonably believes provides direct and specific
evidence of a false or inaccurate statement to Congress
contained in, or withheld from Congress, any intelligence
information material to, any intelligence assessment, report,
or estimate, but does not apply to information the disclosure
of which is prohibited by rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
(3) Covered individuals.--
(A) In general.--The individuals to whom information in
paragraph (2) may be disclosed are--
(i) a Member of a committee of Congress having primary
responsibility for oversight of a department, agency, or
element of the United States Government to which the
disclosed information relates and who is authorized to
receive information of the type disclosed;
(ii) any other Member of Congress who is authorized to
receive information of the type disclosed; and
(iii) an employee of Congress who has the appropriate
security clearance and is authorized to receive information
of the type disclosed.
(B) Presumption of need for information.--An individual
described in subparagraph (A) to whom information is
disclosed under paragraph (2) shall be presumed to have a
need to know such information.
(b) Construction With Other Reporting Requirements.--
Nothing in this section may be construed to modify, alter, or
otherwise affect--
(1) any reporting requirement relating to intelligence
activities that arises under this Act, the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.), or any other provision
of law; or
(2) the right of any employee of the United States
Government to disclose to Congress in accordance with
applicable law information not described in this section.
(c) Covered Agencies Defined.--In this section, the term
``covered agencies'' means the following:
(1) The National Intelligence Authority, including the
National Counterterrorism Center.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(5) The National Security Agency.
(6) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(7) Any other Executive agency, or element or unit thereof,
determined by the President under section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii)
of title 5, United States Code, to have as its principal
function the conduct of foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence activities.

TITLE III--MODIFICATIONS OF LAWS RELATING TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
MANAGEMENT

Subtitle A--Conforming and Other Amendments

SEC. 301. RESTATEMENT AND MODIFICATION OF BASIC AUTHORITY ON
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

(a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by striking sections
102 through 104 and inserting the following new sections:

``central intelligence agency

``Sec. 102. (a) Central Intelligence Agency.--There is a
Central Intelligence Agency.

[[Page H8936]]

``(b) Function.--The function of the Central Intelligence
Agency is to assist the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency in carrying out the responsibilities specified in
section 103(d).

``director of the Central Intelligence Agency

``Sec. 103. (a) Director of Central Intelligence Agency.--
There is a Director of the Central Intelligence Agency who
shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate.
``(b) Supervision.--The Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall report to the National Intelligence
Director regarding the activities of the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
``(c) Duties.--The Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency shall--
``(1) serve as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency;
and
``(2) carry out the responsibilities specified in
subsection (d).
``(d) Responsibilities.--The Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall--
``(1) collect intelligence through human sources and by
other appropriate means, except that the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency shall have no police, subpoena,
or law enforcement powers or internal security functions;
``(2) correlate and evaluate intelligence related to the
national security and provide appropriate dissemination of
such intelligence;
``(3) provide overall direction for and coordination of the
collection of national intelligence outside the United States
through human sources by elements of the intelligence
community authorized to undertake such collection and, in
coordination with other departments, agencies, or elements of
the United States Government which are authorized to
undertake such collection, ensure that the most effective use
is made of resources and that appropriate account is taken of
the risks to the United States and those involved in such
collection; and
``(4) perform such other functions and duties pertaining to
intelligence relating to the national security as the
President or the National Intelligence Director may direct.
``(e) Termination of Employment of CIA Employees.--(1)
Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency may, in the discretion of
the Director, terminate the employment of any officer or
employee of the Central Intelligence Agency whenever the
Director considers the termination of employment of such
officer or employee necessary or advisable in the interests
of the United States.
``(2) Any termination of employment of an officer or
employee under paragraph (1) shall not affect the right of
the officer or employee to seek or accept employment in any
other department, agency, or element of the United States
Government if declared eligible for such employment by the
Office of Personnel Management.
``(f) Coordination With Foreign Governments.--Under the
direction of the National Intelligence Director and in a
manner consistent with section 207 of the Foreign Service Act
of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 3927), the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall coordinate the relationships
between elements of the intelligence community and the
intelligence or security services of foreign governments on
all matters involving intelligence related to the national
security or involving intelligence acquired through
clandestine means.''.
(b) Transformation of Central Intelligence Agency.--The
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall, in
accordance with standards developed by the Director in
consultation with the National Intelligence Director--
(1) enhance the analytic, human intelligence, and other
capabilities of the Central Intelligence Agency;
(2) develop and maintain an effective language program
within the Agency;
(3) emphasize the hiring of personnel of diverse
backgrounds for purposes of improving the capabilities of the
Agency;
(4) establish and maintain effective relationships between
human intelligence and signals intelligence within the Agency
at the operational level; and
(5) achieve a more effective balance within the Agency with
respect to unilateral operations and liaison operations.
(c) Reports.--(1) Not later than 180 days after the
effective date of this section, and annually thereafter, the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to
the National Intelligence Director and the congressional
intelligence committees a report setting forth the following:
(A) A strategy for improving the conduct of analysis
(including strategic analysis) by the Central Intelligence
Agency, and the progress of the Agency in implementing the
strategy.
(B) A strategy for improving the human intelligence and
other capabilities of the Agency, and the progress of the
Agency in implementing the strategy, including--
(i) the recruitment, training, equipping, and deployment of
personnel required to address the current and projected
threats to the national security of the United States during
each of the 2-year, 5-year, and 10-year periods beginning on
the date of such report, including personnel with the
backgrounds, education, and experience necessary for ensuring
a human intelligence capability adequate for such projected
threats;
(ii) the achievement of a proper balance between unilateral
operations and liaison operations;
(iii) the development of language capabilities (including
the achievement of high standards in such capabilities by the
use of financial incentives and other mechanisms);
(iv) the sound financial management of the Directorate of
Operations; and
(v) the identification of other capabilities required to
address the current and projected threats to the national
security of the United States during each of the 2-year, 5-
year, and 10-year periods beginning on the date of such
report.
(C) In conjunction with the Director of the National
Security Agency, a strategy for achieving integration between
signals and human intelligence capabilities, and the progress
in implementing the strategy.
(D) Metrics and milestones for measuring progress in the
implementation of each such strategy.
(2)(A) The information in each report under paragraph (1)
on the element of the strategy referred to in paragraph
(1)(B)(i) shall identify the number and types of personnel
required to implement the strategy during each period
addressed in such report, include a plan for the recruitment,
training, equipping, and deployment of such personal, and set
forth an estimate of the costs of such activities.
(B) If as of the date of a report under paragraph (1), a
proper balance does not exist between unilateral operations
and liaison operations, such report shall set forth the steps
to be taken to achieve such balance.
(C) The information in each report under paragraph (1) on
the element of the strategy referred to in paragraph
(1)(B)(v) shall identify the other capabilities required to
implement the strategy during each period addressed in such
report, include a plan for developing such capabilities, and
set forth an estimate of the costs of such activities.

SEC. 302. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS RELATING TO ROLES OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR AND DIRECTOR OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

(a) National Security Act of 1947.--(1) The National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by
striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it
appears in the following provisions and inserting ``National
Intelligence Director'':
(A) Section 3(5)(B) (50 U.S.C. 401a(5)(B)).
(B) Section 101(h)(2)(A) (50 U.S.C. 402(h)(2)(A)).
(C) Section 101(h)(5) (50 U.S.C. 402(h)(5)).
(D) Section 101(i)(2)(A) (50 U.S.C. 402(i)(2)(A)).
(E) Section 101(j) (50 U.S.C. 402(j)).
(F) Section 105(a) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(a)).
(G) Section 105(b)(6)(A) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(b)(6)(A)).
(H) Section 105B(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 403-5b(a)(1)).
(I) Section 105B(b) (50 U.S.C. 403-5b(b)).
(J) Section 110(b) (50 U.S.C. 404e(b)).
(K) Section 110(c) (50 U.S.C. 404e(c)).
(L) Section 112(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404g(a)(1)).
(M) Section 112(d)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404g(d)(1)).
(N) Section 113(b)(2)(A) (50 U.S.C. 404h(b)(2)(A)).
(O) Section 114(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404i(a)(1)).
(P) Section 114(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404i(b)(1)).
(R) Section 115(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404j(a)(1)).
(S) Section 115(b) (50 U.S.C. 404j(b)).
(T) Section 115(c)(1)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404j(c)(1)(B)).
(U) Section 116(a) (50 U.S.C. 404k(a)).
(V) Section 117(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404l(a)(1)).
(W) Section 303(a) (50 U.S.C. 405(a)), both places it
appears.
(X) Section 501(d) (50 U.S.C. 413(d)).
(Y) Section 502(a) (50 U.S.C. 413a(a)).
(Z) Section 502(c) (50 U.S.C. 413a(c)).
(AA) Section 503(b) (50 U.S.C. 413b(b)).
(BB) Section 504(a)(2) (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(2)).
(CC) Section 504(a)(3)(C) (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)(C)).
(DD) Section 504(d)(2) (50 U.S.C. 414(d)(2)).
(EE) Section 506A(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 415a-1(a)(1)).
(FF) Section 603(a) (50 U.S.C. 423(a)).
(GG) Section 702(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432(a)(1)).
(HH) Section 702(a)(6)(B)(viii) (50 U.S.C.
432(a)(6)(B)(viii)).
(II) Section 702(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432(b)(1)), both places
it appears.
(JJ) Section 703(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432a(a)(1)).
(KK) Section 703(a)(6)(B)(viii) (50 U.S.C.
432a(a)(6)(B)(viii)).
(LL) Section 703(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432a(b)(1)), both places
it appears.
(MM) Section 704(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432b(a)(1)).
(NN) Section 704(f)(2)(H) (50 U.S.C. 432b(f)(2)(H)).
(OO) Section 704(g)(1)) (50 U.S.C. 432b(g)(1)), both places
it appears.
(PP) Section 1001(a) (50 U.S.C. 441g(a)).
(QQ) Section 1102(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 442a(a)(1)).
(RR) Section 1102(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 442a(b)(1)).
(SS) Section 1102(c)(1) (50 U.S.C. 442a(c)(1)).
(TT) Section 1102(d) (50 U.S.C. 442a(d)).
(2) That Act is further amended by striking ``of Central
Intelligence'' each place it appears in the following
provisions:
(A) Section 105(a)(2) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(a)(2)).
(B) Section 105B(a)(2) (50 U.S.C. 403-5b(a)(2)).
(C) Section 105B(b) (50 U.S.C. 403-5b(b)), the second place
it appears.
(3) That Act is further amended by striking ``Director''
each place it appears in the following provisions and
inserting ``National Intelligence Director'':
(A) Section 114(c) (50 U.S.C. 404i(c)).
(B) Section 116(b) (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)).

[[Page H8937]]

(C) Section 1001(b) (50 U.S.C. 441g(b)).
(C) Section 1001(c) (50 U.S.C. 441g(c)), the first place it
appears.
(D) Section 1001(d)(1)(B) (50 U.S.C. 441g(d)(1)(B)).
(E) Section 1001(e) (50 U.S.C. 441g(e)), the first place it
appears.
(4) Section 114A of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404i-1) is amended
by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and
inserting ``National Intelligence Director, the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency''
(5) Section 701 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 431) is amended--
(A) in subsection (a), by striking ``Operational files of
the Central Intelligence Agency may be exempted by the
Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``The
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, with the
coordination of the National Intelligence Director, may
exempt operational files of the Central Intelligence
Agency''; and
(B) in subsection (g)(1), by striking ``Director of Central
Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency and the National Intelligence Director''.
(6) The heading for section 114 of that Act (50 U.S.C.
404i) is amended to read as follows:

``additional annual reports from the national intelligence director''.

(b) Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.--(1) Section 1
of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C.
403a) is amended--
(A) by redesignating paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) as
paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), respectively; and
(B) by striking paragraph (2), as so redesignated, and
inserting the following new paragraph (2):
``(2) `Director' means the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency; and''.
(2) That Act (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) is further amended by
striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it
appears in the following provisions and inserting ``National
Intelligence Director'':
(A) Section 6 (50 U.S.C. 403g).
(B) Section 17(f) (50 U.S.C. 403q(f)), both places it
appears.
(3) That Act is further amended by striking ``of Central
Intelligence'' in each of the following provisions:
(A) Section 2 (50 U.S.C. 403b).
(B) Section 16(c)(1)(B) (50 U.S.C. 403p(c)(1)(B)).
(C) Section 17(d)(1) (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)(1)).
(D) Section 20(c) (50 U.S.C. 403t(c)).
(4) That Act is further amended by striking ``Director of
Central Intelligence'' each place it appears in the following
provisions and inserting ``Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency'':
(A) Section 14(b) (50 U.S.C. 403n(b)).
(B) Section 16(b)(2) (50 U.S.C. 403p(b)(2)).
(C) Section 16(b)(3) (50 U.S.C. 403p(b)(3)), both places it
appears.
(D) Section 21(g)(1) (50 U.S.C. 403u(g)(1)).
(E) Section 21(g)(2) (50 U.S.C. 403u(g)(2)).
(c) Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act.--Section
101 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50
U.S.C. 2001) is amended by striking paragraph (2) and
inserting the following new paragraph (2):
``(2) Director.--The term `Director' means the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency.''.
(d) CIA Voluntary Separation Pay Act.--Subsection (a)(1) of
section 2 of the Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary
Separation Pay Act (50 U.S.C. 2001 note) is amended to read
as follows:
``(1) the term `Director' means the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency;''.
(e) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.--(1) The
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801
et seq.) is amended by striking ``Director of Central
Intelligence'' each place it appears and inserting ``National
Intelligence Director''.
(f) Classified Information Procedures Act.--Section 9(a) of
the Classified Information Procedures Act (5 U.S.C. App.) is
amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and
inserting ``National Intelligence Director''.
(g) Intelligence Authorization Acts.--
(1) Public law 103-359.--Section 811(c)(6)(C) of the
Counterintelligence and Security Enhancements Act of 1994
(title VIII of Public Law 103-359) is amended by striking
``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``National
Intelligence Director''.
(2) Public law 107-306.--(A) The Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306) is amended by
striking ``Director of Central Intelligence, acting as the
head of the intelligence community,'' each place it appears
in the following provisions and inserting ``National
Intelligence Director'':
(i) Section 313(a) (50 U.S.C. 404n(a)).
(ii) Section 343(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404n-2(a)(1))
(B) Section 341 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404n-1) is amended
by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence, acting as the
head of the intelligence community, shall establish in the
Central Intelligence Agency'' and inserting ``National
Intelligence Director shall establish within the Central
Intelligence Agency''.
(C) Section 352(b) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404-3 note) is
amended by striking ``Director'' and inserting ``National
Intelligence Director''.
(3) Public law 108-177.--(A) The Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177) is amended by
striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it
appears in the following provisions and inserting ``National
Intelligence Director'':
(i) Section 317(a) (50 U.S.C. 403-3 note).
(ii) Section 317(h)(1).
(iii) Section 318(a) (50 U.S.C. 441g note).
(iv) Section 319(b) (50 U.S.C. 403 note).
(v) Section 341(b) (28 U.S.C. 519 note).
(vi) Section 357(a) (50 U.S.C. 403 note).
(vii) Section 504(a) (117 Stat. 2634), both places it
appears.
(B) Section 319(f)(2) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is
amended by striking ``Director'' the first place it appears
and inserting ``National Intelligence Director''.
(C) Section 404 of that Act (18 U.S.C. 4124 note) is
amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and
inserting ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''.

SEC. 303. OTHER CONFORMING AMENDMENTS

(a) National Security Act of 1947.--(1) Section 101(j) of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402(j)) is
amended by striking ``Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence'' and inserting ``Principal Deputy National
Intelligence Director''.
(2) Section 112(d)(1) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404g(d)(1)) is
amended by striking ``section 103(c)(6) of this Act'' and
inserting ``section 112(a)(11) of the National Intelligence
Reform Act of 2004''.
(3) Section 116(b) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)) is
amended by striking ``to the Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence, or with respect to employees of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Director may delegate such authority
to the Deputy Director for Operations'' and inserting ``to
the Principal Deputy National Intelligence Director, or, with
respect to employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, to
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''.
(4) Section 504(a)(2) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(2)) is
amended by striking ``Reserve for Contingencies of the
Central Intelligence Agency'' and inserting ``Reserve for
Contingencies of the National Intelligence Director''.
(5) Section 506A(b)(1) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 415a-1(b)(1))
is amended by striking ``Office of the Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Office of the National
Intelligence Director''.
(6) Section 701(c)(3) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 431(c)(3)) is
amended by striking ``or the Office of the Director of
Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``the Office of the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, or the Office of
the National Intelligence Director''.
(7) Section 1001(b) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 441g(b)) is
amended by striking ``Assistant Director of Central
Intelligence for Administration'' and inserting ``Office of
the National Intelligence Director''.
(b) Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.--Section 6 of
the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403g)
is amended by striking ``section 103(c)(7) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(7))'' and inserting
``section 112(a)(11) of the National Intelligence Reform Act
of 2004''.
(c) Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act.--Section
201(c) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50
U.S.C. 2011(c)) is amended by striking ``paragraph (6) of
section 103(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 403-3(c)) that the Director of Central Intelligence''
and inserting ``section 112(a)(11) of the National
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 that the National
Intelligence Director''.
(d) Intelligence Authorization Acts.--
(1) Public law 107-306.--Section 343(c) of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306;
50 U.S.C. 404n-2(c)) is amended by striking ``section
103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
403-3((c)(6))'' and inserting ``section 112(a)(11) of the
National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004''.
(2) Public law 108-177.--Section 317 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177;
50 U.S.C. 403-3 note) is amended--
(A) in subsection (g), by striking ``Assistant Director of
Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production'' and
inserting ``Principal Deputy National Intelligence
Director''; and
(B) in subsection (h)(2)(C), by striking ``Assistant
Director'' and inserting ``Principal Deputy National
Intelligence Director''.

SEC. 304. MODIFICATIONS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE UNDER NATIONAL SECURITY ACT
OF 1947.

Section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
401a) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (2), by striking ``or foreign persons, or
international terrorist activities'' and inserting ``foreign
persons, or international terrorists''; and
(2) in paragraph (3), by striking ``or foreign persons, or
international terrorist activities'' and inserting ``foreign
persons, or international terrorists''.

SEC. 305. ELEMENTS OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY UNDER NATIONAL
SECURITY ACT OF 1947.

Paragraph (4) of section 3 of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a) is amended to read as follows:
``(4) The term `intelligence community' includes the
following:
``(A) The National Intelligence Authority.
``(B) The Central Intelligence Agency.
``(C) The National Security Agency.
``(D) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
``(E) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
``(F) The National Reconnaissance Office.

[[Page H8938]]

``(G) Other offices within the Department of Defense for
the collection of specialized national intelligence through
reconnaissance programs.
``(H) The intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the
Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the Department of Energy.
``(I) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the
Department of State.
``(J) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the
Department of the Treasury.
``(K) The elements of the Department of Homeland Security
concerned with the analysis of intelligence information,
including the Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard.
``(L) Such other elements of any department or agency as
may be designated by the President, or designated jointly by
the National Intelligence Director and the head of the
department or agency concerned, as an element of the
intelligence community.''.

SEC. 306. REDESIGNATION OF NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
PROGRAM AS NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.

(a) Redesignation.--Section 3 of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a), as amended by this Act, is further
amended--
(1) by striking paragraph (6); and
(2) by redesignating paragraph (7) as paragraph (6).
(b) Conforming Amendments.--(1) The National Security Act
of 1947, as amended by this Act, is further amended by
striking ``National Foreign Intelligence Program'' each place
it appears in the following provisions and inserting
``National Intelligence Program'':
(A) Section 105(a)(2) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(a)(2)).
(B) Section 105(a)(3) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(a)(3)).
(C) Section 506(a) (50 U.S.C. 415a(a)).
(2) Section 17(f) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(f)) is amended by striking ``National
Foreign Intelligence Program'' and inserting ``National
Intelligence Program''.
(c) Heading Amendments.--(1) The heading of section 105 of
that Act is amended to read as follows:

``responsibilities of the secretary of defense pertaining to the
national intelligence program''.

(2) The heading of section 506 of that Act is amended to
read as follows:

``specificity of national intelligence program budget amounts for
counterterrorism, counterproliferation, counternarcotics, and
counterintelligence''.

SEC. 307. CONFORMING AMENDMENT ON COORDINATION OF BUDGETS OF
ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WITHIN
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

Section 105(a)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 403-5(a)(1)) is amended by striking ``ensure'' and
inserting ``assist the Director in ensuring''.

SEC. 308. REPEAL OF SUPERSEDED AUTHORITIES.

(a) Appointment of Certain Intelligence Officials.--Section
106 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-6) is
repealed.
(b) Collection Tasking Authority.--Section 111 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404f) is repealed.

SEC. 309. CLERICAL AMENDMENTS TO NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF
1947.

The table of contents for the National Security Act of 1947
is amended--
(1) by inserting after the item relating to section 101 the
following new item:

``Sec. 101A. Joint Intelligence Community Council.'';

(2) by striking the items relating to sections 102 through
104 and inserting the following new items:

``Sec. 102. Central Intelligence Agency.
``Sec. 103. Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.'';

(3) by striking the item relating to section 105 and
inserting the following new item:

``Sec 105. Responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense pertaining to
the National Intelligence Program.'';

(4) by striking the item relating to section 114 and
inserting the following new item:

``Sec. 114. Additional annual reports from the National Intelligence
Director.'';

and
(5) by striking the item relating to section 506 and
inserting the following new item:

``Sec. 506. Specificity of National Intelligence Program budget amounts
for counterterrorism, counterproliferation,
counternarcotics, and counterintelligence''.

SEC. 310. MODIFICATION OF AUTHORITIES RELATING TO NATIONAL
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE.

(a) Appointment of National Counterintelligence
Executive.--Subsection (a)(2) of section 902 of the
Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of
Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2432; 50 U.S.C. 402b) is
amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and
inserting ``National Intelligence Director, and Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency''.
(b) Component of Office of National Intelligence
Director.--Such section is further amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections
(c) and (d), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new
subsection (b):
``(b) Component of Office of National Intelligence
Director.--The National Counterintelligence Executive is a
component of the Office of the National Intelligence Director
under subtitle C of the National Intelligence Reform Act of
2004.''.
(c) Duties.--Subsection (d) of such section, as
redesignated by subsection (a)(1) of this section, is amended
by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(5) To perform such other duties as may be provided under
section 131(b) of the National Intelligence Reform Act of
2004.''.
(d) Office of National Counterintelligence Executive.--
Section 904 of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of
2002 (116 Stat. 2434; 50 U.S.C. 402c) is amended--
(1) by striking ``Office of the Director of Central
Intelligence'' each place it appears in subsections (c) and
(l)(1) and inserting ``Office of the National Intelligence
Director'';
(2) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each
place it appears in subsections (e)(4), (e)(5), (h)(1), and
(h)(2) and inserting ``National Intelligence Director''; and
(3) in subsection (m), by striking ``Director of Central
Intelligence'' and inserting ``National Intelligence
Director, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''.

SEC. 311. CONFORMING AMENDMENT TO INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF
1978.

Section 8H(a)(1) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5
U.S.C. App.) is amended by adding at the end the following
new subparagraph:
``(D) An employee of the National Intelligence Authority,
an employee of an entity other than the Authority who is
assigned or detailed to the Authority, or of a contractor of
the Authority, who intends to report to Congress a complaint
or information with respect to an urgent concern may report
the complaint or information to the Inspector General of the
National Intelligence Authority in accordance with section
141(h)(5) of the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004.''.

SEC. 312. CONFORMING AMENDMENT RELATING TO CHIEF FINANCIAL
OFFICER OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY.

Section 901(b)(1) of title 31, United States Code, is
amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(Q) The National Intelligence Authority.''.

Subtitle B--Transfers and Terminations

SEC. 321. TRANSFER OF OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE FOR COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT.

(a) Transfer.--There shall be transferred to the Office of
the National Intelligence Director the staff of the Office of
the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community
Management as of the date of the enactment of this Act,
including all functions and activities discharged by the
Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for
Community Management as of that date.
(b) Administration.--The National Intelligence Director
shall administer the staff of the Office of the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management
after the date of the enactment of this Act as a component of
the Office of the National Intelligence Director under
section 121(d).

SEC. 322. TRANSFER OF NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM EXECUTIVE.

(a) Transfer.--There shall be transferred to the Office of
the National Intelligence Director the National
Counterintelligence Executive and the Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive under the Counterintelligence
Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of Public Law 107-306; 50
U.S.C. 402b et seq.), as amended by section 309 of this Act,
including all functions and activities discharged by the
National Counterintelligence Executive and the Office of the
National Counterintelligence Executive as of the date of the
enactment of this Act.
(b) Administration.--The National Intelligence Director
shall treat the National Counterintelligence Executive, and
administer the Office of the National Counterintelligence
Executive, after the date of the enactment of this Act as
components of the Office of the National Intelligence
Director under section 121(c).

SEC. 323. TRANSFER OF TERRORIST THREAT INTEGRATION CENTER.

(a) Transfer.--There shall be transferred to the National
Counterterrorism Center the Terrorist Threat Integration
Center (TTIC), including all functions and activities
discharged by the Terrorist Threat Integration Center as of
the date of the enactment of this Act.
(b) Administration.--The Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center shall administer the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center after the date of the enactment of this
Act as a component of the Directorate of Intelligence of the
National Counterterrorism Center under section 143(g)(2).

SEC. 324. TERMINATION OF CERTAIN POSITIONS WITHIN THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

(a) Termination.--The positions within the Central
Intelligence Agency referred to in subsection (b) are hereby
abolished.
(b) Covered Positions.--The positions within the Central
Intelligence Agency referred to in this subsection are as
follows:
(1) The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for
Community Management.
(2) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for
Collection.
(3) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for
Analysis and Production.

[[Page H8939]]

(4) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for
Administration.

Subtitle C--Other Transition Matters

SEC. 331. EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE MATTERS.

(a) Executive Schedule Level I.--Section 5312 of title 5,
United States Code, is amended by adding the end the
following new item:
``National Intelligence Director.''.
(b) Executive Schedule Level II.--Section 5313 of title 5,
United States Code, is amended--
(1) by striking the item relating to the Director of
Central Intelligence; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new items:
``Deputy National Intelligence Directors (5).
``Director of the National Counterterrorism Center.''.
(c) Executive Schedule Level III.--Section 5314 of title 5,
United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating
to the Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence and inserting
the following new item:
``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.
(d) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5,
United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating
to the Assistant Directors of Central Intelligence.

SEC. 332. PRESERVATION OF INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES.

The National Intelligence Director, the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, and the Secretary of Defense
shall jointly take such actions as are appropriate to
preserve the intelligence capabilities of the United States
during the establishment of the National Intelligence
Authority under this Act.

SEC. 333. REORGANIZATION.

(a) Reorganization.--The National Intelligence Director
may, with the approval of the President and after
consultation with the department, agency, or element
concerned, allocate or reallocate functions among the
officers of the National Intelligence Program, and may
establish, consolidate, alter, or discontinue organizational
units within the Program, but only after providing notice of
such action to Congress, which shall include an explanation
of the rationale for the action.
(b) Limitation.--The authority under subsection (a) does
not extend to any action inconsistent with law.
(c) Congressional Review.--An action may be taken under the
authority under subsection (a) only with the approval of the
following:
(1) Each of the congressional intelligence committees.
(2) Each of the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the
Senate and the Committee on Government Reform of the House of
Representatives.

SEC. 334. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR REPORT ON
IMPLEMENTATION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
REFORM.

Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the National Intelligence Director shall submit to
Congress a report on the progress made in the implementation
of this Act, including the amendments made by this Act. The
report shall include a comprehensive description of the
progress made, and may include such recommendations for
additional legislative or administrative action as the
Director considers appropriate.

SEC. 335. COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORTS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REFORM.

(a) Reports.--(1) Not later than two years after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the
United States shall submit to Congress a comprehensive report
on the implementation of this Act and the amendments made by
this Act.
(2) The Comptroller General may submit to Congress at any
time during the two-year period beginning on the date of the
enactment of this Act, such reports on the progress made in
the implementation of this Act and the amendments made by
this Act as the Comptroller General considers appropriate.
(b) Report Elements.--Each report under subsection (a)
shall include the following:
(1) The assessment of the Comptroller General of the
progress made in the implementation of this Act (and the
amendments made by this Act) as of the date of such report.
(2) A description of any delays or other shortfalls in the
implementation of this Act that have been identified by the
Comptroller General.
(3) Any recommendations for additional legislative or
administrative action that the Comptroller General considers
appropriate.
(c) Agency Cooperation.--Each department, agency, and
element of the United States Government shall cooperate with
the Comptroller General in the assessment of the
implementation of this Act, and shall provide the Comptroller
General timely and complete access to relevant documents in
accordance with section 716 of title 31, United States Code.

SEC. 336. GENERAL REFERENCES.

(a) Director of Central Intelligence as Head of
Intelligence Community.--Any reference to the Director of
Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency in the Director's capacity as the head of
the intelligence community in any law, regulation, document,
paper, or other record of the United States shall be deemed
to be a reference to the National Intelligence Director.
(b) Director of Central Intelligence as Head of CIA.--Any
reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director's
capacity as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency in
any law, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the
United States shall be deemed to be a reference to the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(c) Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
for Community Management.--Any reference to the Office of the
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community
Management in any law, regulation, document, paper, or other
record of the United States shall be deemed to be a reference
to the staff of such office within the Office of the National
Intelligence Director under section 121.

Subtitle D--Effective Date

SEC. 341. EFFECTIVE DATE.

(a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (b), this
Act, and the amendments made by this Act, shall take effect
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(b) Earlier Effective Date.--In order to ensure the rapid
implementation of this Act while simultaneously ensuring a
smooth transition that will safeguard the national security
of the United States, the President may provide that this Act
(including the amendments made by this Act), or one or more
particular provisions of this Act (including the amendments
made by such provision or provisions), shall take effect on
such date that is earlier than the date otherwise provided
under subsection (a) as the President shall specify.
(c) Notification of Effective Dates.--If the President
exercises the authority in subsection (b), the President
shall--
(1) notify Congress of the exercise of such authority; and
(2) publish in the Federal Register notice of the earlier
effective date or dates involved, including each provision
(and amendment) covered by such earlier effective date.

Subtitle E--Other Matters

SEC. 351. SEVERABILITY.

If any provision of this Act, or an amendment made by this
Act, or the application of such provision to any person or
circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of this Act, or
the application of such provision to persons or circumstances
other than those to which such provision is held invalid,
shall not be affected thereby.

SEC. 352. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There are specifically authorized to be appropriated for
fiscal year 2005 such sums as may be necessary to carry out
this title and titles I and II and the amendments made by
those titles.
TITLE IV--IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES

SEC. 401. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the ``9/11 Commission Report
Implementation Act of 2004''.
Subtitle A--The Role of Diplomacy, Foreign Aid, and the Military in the
War on Terrorism

SEC. 411. FINDINGS.

Consistent with the report of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the
following findings:
(1) Long-term success in the war on terrorism demands the
use of all elements of national power, including diplomacy,
military action, intelligence, covert action, law
enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy,
and homeland defense.
(2) To win the war on terrorism, the United States must
assign to economic and diplomatic capabilities the same
strategic priority that is assigned to military capabilities.
(3) The legislative and executive branches of the
Government of the United States must commit to robust, long-
term investments in all of the tools necessary for the
foreign policy of the United States to successfully
accomplish the goals of the United States.
(4) The investments referred to in paragraph (3) will
require increased funding to United States foreign affairs
programs in general, and to priority areas as described in
this subtitle in particular.

SEC. 412. TERRORIST SANCTUARIES.

(a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Complex terrorist operations require locations that
provide such operations sanctuary from interference by
government or law enforcement personnel.
(2) A terrorist sanctuary existed in Afghanistan before
September 11, 2001.
(3) The terrorist sanctuary in Afghanistan provided direct
and indirect value to members of al Qaeda who participated in
the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11,
2001, and in other terrorist operations.
(4) Terrorist organizations have fled to some of the least
governed and most lawless places in the world to find
sanctuary.
(5) During the 21st century, terrorists are focusing on
remote regions and failing states as locations to seek
sanctuary.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States Government should identify and
prioritize locations that are or that could be used as
terrorist sanctuaries;

[[Page H8940]]

(2) the United States Government should have a realistic
strategy that includes the use of all elements of national
power to keep possible terrorists from using a location as a
sanctuary; and
(3) the United States Government should reach out, listen
to, and work with countries in bilateral and multilateral
fora to prevent locations from becoming sanctuaries and to
prevent terrorists from using locations as sanctuaries.

SEC. 413. ROLE OF PAKISTAN IN COUNTERING TERRORISM.

(a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Government of Pakistan has a critical role to
perform in the struggle against Islamist terrorism.
(2) The endemic poverty, widespread corruption, and
frequent ineffectiveness of government in Pakistan create
opportunities for Islamist recruitment.
(3) The poor quality of education in Pakistan is
particularly worrying, as millions of families send their
children to madrassahs, some of which have been used as
incubators for violent extremism.
(4) The vast unpoliced regions in Pakistan make the country
attractive to extremists seeking refuge and recruits and also
provide a base for operations against coalition forces in
Afghanistan.
(5) A stable Pakistan, with a moderate, responsible
government that serves as a voice of tolerance in the Muslim
world, is critical to stability in the region.
(6) There is a widespread belief among the people of
Pakistan that the United States has long treated them as
allies of convenience.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States should make a long-term commitment to
fostering a stable and secure future in Pakistan, as long as
its leaders remain committed to combatting extremists and
extremism, ending the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, securing its borders, and gaining internal
control of all its territory while pursuing policies that
strengthen civil society, promote moderation and advance
socio-economic progress;
(2) Pakistan should make sincere efforts to transition to
democracy, enhanced rule of law, and robust civil
institutions, and United States policy toward Pakistan should
promote such a transition;
(3) the United States assistance to Pakistan should be
maintained at the overall levels requested by the President
for fiscal year 2005;
(4) the United States should support the Government of
Pakistan with a comprehensive effort that extends from
military aid to support for better education;
(5) the United States Government should devote particular
attention and resources to assisting in the improvement of
the quality of education in Pakistan; and
(6) the Government of Pakistan should devote additional
resources of such Government to expanding and improving
modern public education in Pakistan.

SEC. 414. AID TO AFGHANISTAN.

(a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United States and its allies in the international
community have made progress in promoting economic and
political reform within Afghanistan, including the
establishment of a central government with a democratic
constitution, a new currency, and a new army, the increase of
personal freedom, and the elevation of the standard of living
of many Afghans.
(2) A number of significant obstacles must be overcome if
Afghanistan is to become a secure and prosperous democracy,
and such a transition depends in particular upon--
(A) improving security throughout the country;
(B) disarming and demobilizing militias;
(C) curtailing the rule of the warlords;
(D) promoting equitable economic development;
(E) protecting the human rights of the people of
Afghanistan;
(F) holding elections for public office; and
(G) ending the cultivation and trafficking of narcotics.
(3) The United States and the international community must
make a long-term commitment to addressing the deteriorating
security situation in Afghanistan and the burgeoning
narcotics trade, endemic poverty, and other serious problems
in Afghanistan in order to prevent that country from
relapsing into a sanctuary for international terrorism.
(b) Sense of Congress.--
(1) Actions for afghanistan.--It is the sense of Congress
that the Government of the United States should take, with
respect to Afghanistan, the following actions:
(A) Working with other nations to obtain long-term
security, political, and financial commitments and
fulfillment of pledges to the Government of Afghanistan to
accomplish the objectives of the Afghanistan Freedom Support
Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 7501 et seq.), especially to ensure a
secure, democratic, and prosperous Afghanistan that respects
the rights of its citizens and is free of international
terrorist organizations.
(B) Using the voice and vote of the United States in
relevant international organizations, including the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations Security
Council, to strengthen international commitments to assist
the Government of Afghanistan in enhancing security, building
national police and military forces, increasing counter-
narcotics efforts, and expanding infrastructure and public
services throughout the country.
(C) Taking appropriate steps to increase the assistance
provided under programs of the Department of State and the
United States Agency for International Development throughout
Afghanistan and to increase the number of personnel of those
agencies in Afghanistan as necessary to support the increased
assistance.
(2) Revision of afghanistan freedom support act of 2002.--
It is the sense of Congress that Congress should, in
consultation with the President, update and revise, as
appropriate, the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002.
(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--
(1) In general.--There are authorized to be appropriated to
the President for each of the fiscal years 2005 through 2009
such sums as may be necessary to provide assistance for
Afghanistan, unless otherwise authorized by Congress, for the
following purposes:
(A) For development assistance under sections 103, 105, and
106 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151a,
2151c, and 2151d).
(B) For children's health programs under the Child Survival
and Health Program Fund under section 104 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151b).
(C) For economic assistance under the Economic Support Fund
under chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346 et seq.).
(D) For international narcotics and law enforcement under
section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2291).
(E) For nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, demining, and
related programs.
(F) For international military education and training under
section 541 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2347).
(G) For Foreign Military Financing Program grants under
section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763).
(H) For peacekeeping operations under section 551 of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2348).
(2) Conditions for assistance.--Assistance provided by the
President under this subsection--
(A) shall be consistent with the Afghanistan Freedom
Support Act of 2002; and
(B) shall be provided with reference to the ``Securing
Afghanistan's Future'' document published by the Government
of Afghanistan.

SEC. 415. THE UNITED STATES-SAUDI ARABIA RELATIONSHIP.

(a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Despite a long history of friendly relations with the
United States, Saudi Arabia has been a problematic ally in
combating Islamist extremism.
(2) Cooperation between the Governments of the United
States and Saudi Arabia has traditionally been carried out in
private.
(3) Counterterrorism cooperation between the Governments of
the United States and Saudi Arabia has improved significantly
since the terrorist bombing attacks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia,
on May 12, 2003, especially cooperation to combat terror
groups operating inside Saudi Arabia.
(4) The Government of Saudi Arabia is now pursuing al Qaeda
within Saudi Arabia and has begun to take some modest steps
toward internal reform.
(5) Nonetheless, the Government of Saudi Arabia has been at
times unresponsive to United States requests for assistance
in the global war on Islamist terrorism.
(6) The Government of Saudi Arabia has not done all it can
to prevent nationals of Saudi Arabia from funding and
supporting extremist organizations in Saudi Arabia and other
countries.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the problems in the relationship between the United
States and Saudi Arabia must be confronted openly, and the
opportunities for cooperation between the countries must be
pursued openly by those governments;
(2) both governments must build a relationship that they
can publicly defend and that is based on other national
interests in addition to their national interests in oil;
(3) this relationship should include a shared commitment to
political and economic reform in Saudi Arabia;
(4) this relationship should also include a shared interest
in greater tolerance and respect for other cultures in Saudi
Arabia and a commitment to fight the violent extremists who
foment hatred in the Middle East; and
(5) the Government of Saudi Arabia must do all it can to
prevent nationals of Saudi Arabia from funding and supporting
extremist organizations in Saudi Arabia and other countries.

SEC. 416. EFFORTS TO COMBAT ISLAMIST TERRORISM.

(a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
Congress makes the following findings:

[[Page H8941]]

(1) While support for the United States has plummeted in
the Islamic world, many negative views are uninformed, at
best, and, at worst, are informed by coarse stereotypes and
caricatures.
(2) Local newspapers in Islamic countries and influential
broadcasters who reach Islamic audiences through satellite
television often reinforce the idea that the people and
Government of the United States are anti-Muslim.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Government of the United States should offer an
example of moral leadership in the world that includes a
commitment to treat all people humanely, abide by the rule of
law, and be generous to the people and governments of other
countries;
(2) the United States should cooperate with governments of
Islamic countries to foster agreement on respect for human
dignity and opportunity, and to offer a vision of a better
future that includes stressing life over death, individual
educational and economic opportunity, widespread political
participation, contempt for indiscriminate violence, respect
for the rule of law, openness in discussing differences, and
tolerance for opposing points of view;
(3) the United States should encourage reform, freedom,
democracy, and opportunity for Arabs and Muslims and promote
moderation in the Islamic world; and
(4) the United States should work to defeat extremist
ideology in the Islamic world by providing assistance to
moderate Arabs and Muslims to combat extremist ideas.

SEC. 417. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD DICTATORSHIPS.

(a) Finding.--Consistent with the report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
Congress finds that short-term gains enjoyed by the United
States through cooperation with repressive dictatorships have
often been outweighed by long-term setbacks for the stature
and interests of the United States.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) United States foreign policy should promote the value
of life and the importance of individual educational and
economic opportunity, encourage widespread political
participation, condemn indiscriminate violence, and promote
respect for the rule of law, openness in discussing
differences among people, and tolerance for opposing points
of view; and
(2) the United States Government must prevail upon the
governments of all predominantly Muslim countries, including
those that are friends and allies of the United States, to
condemn indiscriminate violence, promote the value of life,
respect and promote the principles of individual education
and economic opportunity, encourage widespread political
participation, and promote the rule of law, openness in
discussing differences among people, and tolerance for
opposing points of view.

SEC. 418. PROMOTION OF UNITED STATES VALUES THROUGH BROADCAST
MEDIA.

(a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Although the United States has demonstrated and
promoted its values in defending Muslims against tyrants and
criminals in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq,
this message is not always clearly presented and understood
in the Islamic world.
(2) If the United States does not act to vigorously define
its message in the Islamic world, the image of the United
States will be defined by Islamic extremists who seek to
demonize the United States.
(3) Recognizing that many Arab and Muslim audiences rely on
satellite television and radio, the United States Government
has launched promising initiatives in television and radio
broadcasting to the Arab world, Iran, and Afghanistan.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States must do more to defend and promote
its values and ideals to the broadest possible audience in
the Islamic world;
(2) United States efforts to defend and promote these
values and ideals are beginning to ensure that accurate
expressions of these values reach large audiences in the
Islamic world and should be robustly supported;
(3) the United States Government could and should do more
to engage the Muslim world in the struggle of ideas; and
(4) the United States Government should more intensively
employ existing broadcast media in the Islamic world as part
of this engagement.
(c) Authorizations of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to the President for each of the fiscal
years 2005 through 2009 such sums as may be necessary to
carry out United States Government broadcasting activities
under the United States Information and Educational Exchange
Act of 1948 (22 U.S.C. 1431 et seq.), the United States
International Broadcasting Act of 1994 (22 U.S.C. 6201 et
seq.), and the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act
of 1998 (22 U.S.C. 6501 et seq.), and to carry out other
activities under this section consistent with the purposes of
such Acts, unless otherwise authorized by Congress.

SEC. 419. EXPANSION OF UNITED STATES SCHOLARSHIP AND EXCHANGE
PROGRAMS IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD.

(a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Exchange, scholarship, and library programs are
effective ways for the United States Government to promote
internationally the values and ideals of the United States.
(2) Exchange, scholarship, and library programs can expose
young people from other countries to United States values and
offer them knowledge and hope.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the United States should expand its exchange, scholarship,
and library programs, especially those that benefit people in
the Arab and Muslim worlds.
(c) Authority To Expand Educational and Cultural
Exchanges.--The President is authorized to substantially
expand the exchange, scholarship, and library programs of the
United States, especially such programs that benefit people
in the Arab and Muslim worlds.
(d) Availability of Funds.--Of the amounts authorized to be
appropriated for educational and cultural exchange programs
in each of the fiscal years 2005 through 2009, there is
authorized to be made available to the Secretary of State
such sums as may be necessary to carry out programs under
this section, unless otherwise authorized by Congress.

SEC. 420. INTERNATIONAL YOUTH OPPORTUNITY FUND.

(a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Education that teaches tolerance, the dignity and value
of each individual, and respect for different beliefs is a
key element in any global strategy to eliminate Islamist
terrorism.
(2) Education in the Middle East about the world outside
that region is weak.
(3) The United Nations has rightly equated literacy with
freedom.
(4) The international community is moving toward setting a
concrete goal of reducing by half the illiteracy rate in the
Middle East by 2010, through the implementation of education
programs targeting women and girls and programs for adult
literacy, and by other means.
(5) To be effective, efforts to improve education in the
Middle East must also include--
(A) support for the provision of basic education tools,
such as textbooks that translate more of the world's
knowledge into local languages and local libraries to house
such materials; and
(B) more vocational education in trades and business
skills.
(6) The Middle East can benefit from some of the same
programs to bridge the digital divide that already have been
developed for other regions of the world.
(b) International Youth Opportunity Fund.--
(1) Establishment.--The President shall establish an
International Youth Opportunity Fund to provide financial
assistance for the improvement of public education in the
Middle East.
(2) International participation.--The President shall seek
the cooperation of the international community in
establishing and generously supporting the Fund.
(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to the President for the establishment of
the International Youth Opportunity Fund, in addition to any
amounts otherwise available for such purpose, such sums as
may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 2005 through
2009, unless otherwise authorized by Congress.

SEC. 421. THE USE OF ECONOMIC POLICIES TO COMBAT TERRORISM.

(a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) While terrorism is not caused by poverty, breeding
grounds for terrorism are created by backward economic
policies and repressive political regimes.
(2) Policies that support economic development and reform
also have political implications, as economic and political
liberties are often linked.
(3) The United States is working toward creating a Middle
East Free Trade Area by 2013 and implementing a free trade
agreement with Bahrain, and free trade agreements exist
between the United States and Israel and the United States
and Jordan.
(4) Existing and proposed free trade agreements between the
United States and Islamic countries are drawing interest from
other countries in the Middle East region, and Islamic
countries can become full participants in the rules-based
global trading system, as the United States considers
lowering its barriers to trade with the poorest Arab
countries.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) a comprehensive United States strategy to counter
terrorism should include economic policies that encourage
development, open societies, and opportunities for people to
improve the lives of their families and to enhance prospects
for their children's future;
(2) one element of such a strategy should encompass the
lowering of trade barriers with the poorest countries that
have a significant population of Arab or Muslim individuals;

[[Page H8942]]

(3) another element of such a strategy should encompass
United States efforts to promote economic reform in countries
that have a significant population of Arab or Muslim
individuals, including efforts to integrate such countries
into the global trading system; and
(4) given the importance of the rule of law in promoting
economic development and attracting investment, the United
States should devote an increased proportion of its
assistance to countries in the Middle East to the promotion
of the rule of law.

SEC. 422. MIDDLE EAST PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE.

(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for each of the fiscal years 2005 through
2009 such sums as may be necessary for the Middle East
Partnership Initiative, unless otherwise authorized by
Congress.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that,
given the importance of the rule of law and economic reform
to development in the Middle East, a significant portion of
the funds authorized to be appropriated under subsection (a)
should be made available to promote the rule of law in the
Middle East.

SEC. 423. COMPREHENSIVE COALITION STRATEGY FOR FIGHTING
TERRORISM.

(a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Almost every aspect of the counterterrorism strategy of
the United States relies on international cooperation.
(2) Since September 11, 2001, the number and scope of
United States Government contacts with foreign governments
concerning counterterrorism have expanded significantly, but
such contacts have often been ad hoc and not integrated as a
comprehensive and unified approach.
(b) International Contact Group on Counterterrorism.--
(1) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the President--
(A) should seek to engage the leaders of the governments of
other countries in a process of advancing beyond separate and
uncoordinated national counterterrorism strategies to develop
with those other governments a comprehensive coalition
strategy to fight Islamist terrorism; and
(B) to that end, should seek to establish an international
counterterrorism policy contact group with the leaders of
governments providing leadership in global counterterrorism
efforts and governments of countries with sizable Muslim
populations, to be used as a ready and flexible international
means for discussing and coordinating the development of
important counterterrorism policies by the participating
governments.
(2) Authority.--The President is authorized to establish an
international counterterrorism policy contact group with the
leaders of governments referred to in paragraph (1) for
purposes as follows:
(A) To develop in common with such other countries
important policies and a strategy that address the various
components of international prosecution of the war on
terrorism, including policies and a strategy that address
military issues, law enforcement, the collection, analysis,
and dissemination of intelligence, issues relating to
interdiction of travel by terrorists, counterterrorism-
related customs issues, financial issues, and issues relating
to terrorist sanctuaries.
(B) To address, to the extent (if any) that the President
and leaders of other participating governments determine
appropriate, such long-term issues as economic and political
reforms that can contribute to strengthening stability and
security in the Middle East.

SEC. 424. TREATMENT OF FOREIGN PRISONERS.

(a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Carrying out the global war on terrorism requires the
development of policies with respect to the detention and
treatment of captured international terrorists that are
adhered to by all coalition forces.
(2) Article 3 of the Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST
3316) was specifically designed for cases in which the usual
rules of war do not apply, and the minimum standards of
treatment pursuant to such Article are generally accepted
throughout the world as customary international law.
(b) Policy.--The policy of the United States is as follows:
(1) It is the policy of the United States to treat all
foreign persons captured, detained, interned or otherwise
held in the custody of the United States (hereinafter
``prisoners'') humanely and in accordance with standards that
the United States would consider legal if perpetrated by the
enemy against an American prisoner.
(2) It is the policy of the United States that all
officials of the United States are bound both in wartime and
in peacetime by the legal prohibition against torture, cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment.
(3) If there is any doubt as to whether prisoners are
entitled to the protections afforded by the Geneva
Conventions, such prisoners shall enjoy the protections of
the Geneva Conventions until such time as their status can be
determined pursuant to the procedures authorized by Army
Regulation 190-8, Section 1-6.
(4) It is the policy of the United States to expeditiously
prosecute cases of terrorism or other criminal acts alleged
to have been committed by prisoners in the custody of the
United States Armed Forces at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in order
to avoid the indefinite detention of prisoners, which is
contrary to the legal principles and security interests of
the United States.
(c) Reporting.--The Department of Defense shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees:
(1) A quarterly report providing the number of prisoners
who were denied Prisoner of War (POW) status under the Geneva
Conventions and the basis for denying POW status to each such
prisoner.
(2) A report setting forth--
(A) the proposed schedule for military commissions to be
held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; and
(B) the number of individuals currently held at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, the number of such individuals who are unlikely to
face a military commission in the next six months, and each
reason for not bringing such individuals before a military
commission.
(3) All International Committee of the Red Cross reports,
completed prior to the enactment of this Act, concerning the
treatment of prisoners in United States custody at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Such ICRC reports should be
provided, in classified form, not later than 15 days after
enactment of this Act.
(4) A report setting forth all prisoner interrogation
techniques approved by officials of the United States.
(d) Annual Training Requirement.--The Department of Defense
shall certify that all Federal employees and civilian
contractors engaged in the handling or interrogating of
prisoners have fulfilled an annual training requirement on
the laws of war, the Geneva Conventions and the obligations
of the United States under international humanitarian law.
(e) Prohibition on Torture or Cruel, Inhumane, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment.--
(1) In general.--No prisoner shall be subject to torture or
cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment that is
prohibited by the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.
(2) Relationship to geneva conventions.--Nothing in this
section shall affect the status of any person under the
Geneva Conventions or whether any person is entitled to the
protections of the Geneva Conventions.
(f) Rules, Regulations, and Guidelines.--
(1) Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary and the Director
shall prescribe the rules, regulations, or guidelines
necessary to ensure compliance with the prohibition in
subsection (e)(1) by all personnel of the United States
Government and by any person providing services to the United
States Government on a contract basis.
(2) Report to congress.--The Secretary and the Director
shall submit to Congress the rules, regulations, or
guidelines prescribed under paragraph (1), and any
modifications to such rules, regulations, or guidelines--
(A) not later than 30 days after the effective date of such
rules, regulations, guidelines, or modifications; and
(B) in a manner and form that will protect the national
security interests of the United States.
(g) Reports on Possible Violations.--
(1) Requirement.--The Secretary and the Director shall each
submit, on a timely basis and not less than twice each year,
a report to Congress on the circumstances surrounding any
investigation of a possible violation of the prohibition in
subsection (e)(1) by United States Government personnel or by
a person providing services to the United States Government
on a contract basis.
(2) Form of report.--A report required under paragraph (1)
shall be submitted in a manner and form that--
(A) will protect the national security interests of the
United States; and
(B) will not prejudice any prosecution of an individual
involved in, or responsible for, a violation of the
prohibition in subsection (e)(1).
(h) Report on a Coalition Approach Toward the Detention and
Humane Treatment of Captured Terrorists.--Not later than 180
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
President shall submit to Congress a report describing the
efforts of the United States Government to develop an
approach toward the detention and humane treatment of
captured international terrorists that will be adhered to by
all countries that are members of the coalition against
terrorism.
(i) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or
punishment.--The term ``cruel, inhumane, or degrading
treatment or punishment'' means the cruel, unusual, and
inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the fifth
amendment, eighth amendment, or fourteenth amendment to the
Constitution.
(2) Director.--The term ``Director'' means the National
Intelligence Director.
(3) Geneva conventions.--The term ``Geneva Conventions''
means--

[[Page H8943]]

(A) the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, done at
Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3114);
(B) the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3217);
(C) the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3316); and
(D) the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST
3516).
(4) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary
of Defense.
(5) Torture.--The term ``torture'' has the meaning given
that term in section 2340 of title 18, United States Code.

SEC. 425. PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

(a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Al Qaeda and other terror groups have tried to acquire
or make weapons of mass destruction since 1994 or earlier.
(2) The United States doubtless would be a prime target for
use of any such weapon by al Qaeda.
(3) Although the United States Government has supported the
Cooperative Threat Reduction, Global Threat Reduction
Initiative, and other nonproliferation assistance programs,
nonproliferation experts continue to express deep concern
about the adequacy of such efforts to secure weapons of mass
destruction and related materials that still exist in Russia
other countries of the former Soviet Union, and around the
world.
(4) The cost of increased investment in the prevention of
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related
materials is greatly outweighed by the potentially
catastrophic cost to the United States of the use of such
weapons by terrorists.
(5) The Cooperative Threat Reduction, Global Threat
Reduction Initiative, and other nonproliferation assistance
programs are the United States primary method of preventing
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related
materials from Russia and the states of the former Soviet
Union, but require further expansion, improvement, and
resources.
(6) Better coordination is needed within the executive
branch of government for the budget development, oversight,
and implementation of the Cooperative Threat Reduction,
Global Threat Reduction Initiative, and other
nonproliferation assistance programs, and critical elements
of such programs are operated by the Departments of Defense,
Energy, and State.
(7) The effective implementation of the Cooperative Threat
Reduction, Global Threat Reduction Initiative, and other
nonproliferation assistance programs in the countries of the
former Soviet Union is hampered by Russian behavior and
conditions on the provision of assistance under such programs
that are unrelated to bilateral cooperation on weapons
dismantlement.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) maximum effort to prevent the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction and related materials, wherever such
proliferation may occur, is warranted;
(2) the Cooperative Threat Reduction, Global Threat
Reduction Initiative, and other nonproliferation assistance
programs should be expanded, improved, accelerated, and
better funded to address the global dimensions of the
proliferation threat; and
(3) the Proliferation Security Initiative is an important
counterproliferation program that should be expanded to
include additional partners.
(c) Cooperative Threat Reduction, Global Threat Reduction
Initiative, and other nonproliferation assistance programs.--
In this section, the term ``Cooperative Threat Reduction,
Global Threat Reduction Initiative, and other
nonproliferation assistance programs'' includes--
(1) the programs specified in section 1501(b) of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997
(Public Law 104-201; 50 U.S.C. 2362 note);
(2) the activities for which appropriations are authorized
by section 3101(a)(2) of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-136; 117 Stat.
1742);
(3) the Department of State program of assistance to
science centers;
(4) the Global Threat Reduction Initiative of the
Department of Energy; and
(5) a program of any agency of the Federal Government
having the purpose of assisting any foreign government in
preventing nuclear weapons, plutonium, highly enriched
uranium, or other materials capable of sustaining an
explosive nuclear chain reaction, or nuclear weapons
technology from becoming available to terrorist
organizations.
(d) Strategy and Plan.--
(1) Strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to
Congress--
(A) a comprehensive strategy for expanding and
strengthening the Cooperative Threat Reduction, Global Threat
Reduction Initiative, and other nonproliferation assistance
programs; and
(B) an estimate of the funding necessary to execute such
strategy.
(2) Plan.--The strategy required by paragraph (1) shall
include a plan for securing the nuclear weapons and related
materials that are the most likely to be acquired or sought
by, and susceptible to becoming available to, terrorist
organizations, including--
(A) a prioritized list of the most dangerous and vulnerable
sites;
(B) measurable milestones for improving United States
nonproliferation assistance programs;
(C) a schedule for achieving such milestones; and
(D) initial estimates of the resources necessary to achieve
such milestones under such schedule.

SEC. 426. FINANCING OF TERRORISM.

(a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) While efforts to designate and freeze the assets of
terrorist financiers have been relatively unsuccessful,
efforts to target the relatively small number of al Qaeda
financial facilitators have been valuable and successful.
(2) The death or capture of several important financial
facilitators has decreased the amount of money available to
al Qaeda, and has made it more difficult for al Qaeda to
raise and move money.
(3) The capture of al Qaeda financial facilitators has
provided a windfall of intelligence that can be used to
continue the cycle of disruption.
(4) The United States Government has rightly recognized
that information about terrorist money helps in understanding
terror networks, searching them out, and disrupting their
operations.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) a critical weapon in the effort to stop terrorist
financing should be the targeting of terrorist financial
facilitators by intelligence and law enforcement agencies;
and
(2) efforts to track terrorist financing must be paramount
in United States counter-terrorism efforts.
(c) Report on Terrorist Financing.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to
Congress a report evaluating the effectiveness of United
States efforts to curtail the international financing of
terrorism.
(2) Contents.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall
evaluate and make recommendations on--
(A) the effectiveness of efforts and methods to the
identification and tracking of terrorist financing;
(B) ways to improve multinational and international
governmental cooperation in this effort;
(C) ways to improve the effectiveness of financial
institutions in this effort;
(D) the adequacy of agency coordination, nationally and
internationally, including international treaties and
compacts, in this effort and ways to improve that
coordination; and
(E) recommendations for changes in law and additional
resources required to improve this effort.

SEC. 427. REPORT TO CONGRESS.

(a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than 180 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall
submit to Congress a report on the activities of the
Government of the United States to carry out the provisions
of this subtitle.
(b) Content.--The report required under this section shall
include the following:
(1) Terrorist sanctuaries.--A description of the strategy
of the United States to address and, where possible,
eliminate terrorist sanctuaries, including--
(A) a description of actual and potential terrorist
sanctuaries, together with an assessment of the priorities of
addressing and eliminating such sanctuaries;
(B) an outline of strategies for disrupting or eliminating
the security provided to terrorists by such sanctuaries;
(C) a description of efforts by the United States
Government to work with other countries in bilateral and
multilateral fora to address or eliminate actual or potential
terrorist sanctuaries and disrupt or eliminate the security
provided to terrorists by such sanctuaries; and
(D) a description of long-term goals and actions designed
to reduce the conditions that allow the formation of
terrorist sanctuaries, such as supporting and strengthening
host governments, reducing poverty, increasing economic
development, strengthening civil society, securing borders,
strengthening internal security forces, and disrupting
logistics and communications networks of terrorist groups.
(2) Support for pakistan.--A description of the efforts of
the United States Government to support Pakistan and
encourage moderation in that country, including--
(A) an examination of the desirability of establishing a
Pakistan Education Fund to direct resources toward improving
the quality of secondary schools in Pakistan, and an
examination of the efforts of the Government of Pakistan to
fund modern public education;
(B) recommendations on the funding necessary to provide
various levels of educational support;
(C) an examination of the current composition and levels of
United States military aid to Pakistan, together with any
recommendations for changes in such levels and composition
that the President considers appropriate; and

[[Page H8944]]

(D) an examination of other major types of United States
financial support to Pakistan, together with any
recommendations for changes in the levels and composition of
such support that the President considers appropriate.
(3) Support for afghanistan.--
(A) Specific objectives.--A description of the strategy of
the United States to provide aid to Afghanistan during the 5-
year period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act,
including a description of the resources necessary during the
next 5 years to achieve specific objectives in Afghanistan in
the following areas:
(i) Fostering economic development.
(ii) Curtailing the cultivation of opium.
(iii) Achieving internal security and stability.
(iv) Eliminating terrorist sanctuaries.
(v) Increasing governmental capabilities.
(vi) Improving essential infrastructure and public
services.
(vii) Improving public health services.
(viii) Establishing a broad-based educational system.
(ix) Promoting democracy and the rule of law.
(x) Building national police and military forces.
(B) Progress.--A description of--
(i) the progress made toward achieving the objectives
described in clauses (i) through (x) of subparagraph (A); and
(ii) any shortfalls in meeting such objectives and the
resources needed to fully achieve such objectives.
(4) Collaboration with saudi arabia.--A description of the
strategy of the United States for expanding collaboration
with the Government of Saudi Arabia on subjects of mutual
interest and of importance to the United States, including a
description of--
(A) the utility of the President undertaking a periodic,
formal, and visible high-level dialogue between senior United
States Government officials of cabinet level or higher rank
and their counterparts in the Government of Saudi Arabia to
address challenges in the relationship between the two
governments and to identify areas and mechanisms for
cooperation;
(B) intelligence and security cooperation between the
United States and Saudi Arabia in the fight against Islamist
terrorism;
(C) ways to advance Saudi Arabia's contribution to the
Middle East peace process;
(D) political and economic reform in Saudi Arabia and
throughout the Middle East;
(E) ways to promote greater tolerance and respect for
cultural and religious diversity in Saudi Arabia and
throughout the Middle East; and
(F) ways to assist the Government of Saudi Arabia in
preventing nationals of Saudi Arabia from funding and
supporting extremist groups in Saudi Arabia and other
countries.
(5) Struggle of ideas in the islamic world.--A description
of a cohesive, long-term strategy of the United States to
help win the struggle of ideas in the Islamic world,
including the following:
(A) A description of specific goals related to winning this
struggle of ideas.
(B) A description of the range of tools available to the
United States Government to accomplish such goals and the
manner in which such tools will be employed.
(C) A list of benchmarks for measuring success and a plan
for linking resources to the accomplishment of such goals.
(D) A description of any additional resources that may be
necessary to help win this struggle of ideas.
(E) Any recommendations for the creation of, and United
States participation in, international institutions for the
promotion of democracy and economic diversification in the
Islamic world, and intraregional trade in the Middle East.
(F) An estimate of the level of United States financial
assistance that would be sufficient to convince United States
allies and people in the Islamic world that engaging in the
struggle of ideas in the Islamic world is a top priority of
the United States and that the United States intends to make
a substantial and sustained commitment toward winning this
struggle.
(6) Outreach through broadcast media.--A description of a
cohesive, long-term strategy of the United States to expand
its outreach to foreign Muslim audiences through broadcast
media, including the following:
(A) The initiatives of the Broadcasting Board of Governors
with respect to outreach to foreign Muslim audiences.
(B) An outline of recommended actions that the United
States Government should take to more regularly and
comprehensively present a United States point of view through
indigenous broadcast media in countries with sizable Muslim
populations, including increasing appearances by United
States Government officials, experts, and citizens.
(C) An assessment of potential incentives for, and costs
associated with, encouraging United States broadcasters to
dub or subtitle into Arabic and other relevant languages
their news and public affairs programs broadcast in the
Muslim world in order to present those programs to a much
broader Muslim audience than is currently reached.
(D) Any recommendations the President may have for
additional funding and legislation necessary to achieve the
objectives of the strategy.
(7) Visas for participants in united states programs.--A
description of--
(A) any recommendations for expediting the issuance of
visas to individuals who are entering the United States for
the purpose of participating in a scholarship, exchange, or
visitor program described in subsection (c) of section __09
without compromising the security of the United States; and
(B) a proposed schedule for implementing any
recommendations described in subparagraph (A).
(8) Basic education in muslim countries.--A description of
a strategy, that was developed after consultation with
nongovernmental organizations and individuals involved in
education assistance programs in developing countries, to
promote free universal basic education in the countries of
the Middle East and in other countries with significant
Muslim populations designated by the President. The strategy
shall include the following elements:
(A) A description of the manner in which the resources of
the United States and the international community shall be
used to help achieve free universal basic education in such
countries, including--
(i) efforts of the United states to coordinate an
international effort;
(ii) activities of the United States to leverage
contributions from members of the Group of Eight or other
donors; and
(iii) assistance provided by the United States to leverage
contributions from the private sector and civil society
organizations.
(B) A description of the efforts of the United States to
coordinate with other donors to reduce duplication and waste
at the global and country levels and to ensure efficient
coordination among all relevant departments and agencies of
the Government of the United States.
(C) A description of the strategy of the United States to
assist efforts to overcome challenges to achieving free
universal basic education in such countries, including
strategies to target hard to reach populations to promote
education.
(D) A listing of countries that the President determines
are eligible for assistance under the International Youth
Opportunity Fund described in section 420 and related
programs.
(E) A description of the efforts of the United States to
encourage countries in the Middle East and other countries
with significant Muslim populations designated by the
President to develop and implement a national education plan.
(F) A description of activities carried out as part of the
International Youth Opportunity Fund to help close the
digital divide and expand vocational and business skills in
such countries.
(G) An estimate of the funds needed to achieve free
universal basic education by 2015 in each country described
in subparagraph (D), and an estimate of the amount that has
been expended by the United States and by each such country
during the previous fiscal year.
(H) A description of the United States strategy for
garnering programmatic and financial support from countries
in the Middle East and other countries with significant
Muslim populations designated by the President, international
organizations, and other countries that share the objectives
of the International Youth and Opportunity Fund.
(9) Economic reform.--A description of the efforts of the
United States Government to encourage development and promote
economic reform in countries that have a significant
population of Arab or Muslim individuals, including a
description of--
(A) efforts to integrate countries with significant
populations of Arab or Muslim individuals into the global
trading system; and
(B) actions that the United States Government, acting alone
and in partnership with governments in the Middle East, can
take to promote intraregional trade and the rule of law in
the region.

SEC. 428. EFFECTIVE DATE.

Notwithstanding section 341 or any other provision of this
Act, this subtitle shall take effect on the date of the
enactment of this Act.
Subtitle B--Terrorist Travel and Effective Screening

SEC. 431. COUNTERTERRORIST TRAVEL INTELLIGENCE.

(a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Travel documents are as important to terrorists as
weapons since terrorists must travel clandestinely to meet,
train, plan, case targets, and gain access to attack sites.
(2) International travel is dangerous for terrorists
because they must surface to pass through regulated channels,
present themselves to border security officials, or attempt
to circumvent inspection points.
(3) Terrorists use evasive, but detectable, methods to
travel, such as altered and counterfeit passports and visas,
specific travel methods and routes, liaisons with corrupt
government officials, human smuggling networks, supportive
travel agencies, and immigration and identity fraud.
(4) Before September 11, 2001, no Federal agency
systematically analyzed terrorist travel strategies. If an
agency had done so, the agency could have discovered the ways
in which the terrorist predecessors to al Qaeda had been
systematically, but detectably, exploiting weaknesses in our
border security since the early 1990s.

[[Page H8945]]

(5) Many of the hijackers were potentially vulnerable to
interception by border authorities. Analyzing their
characteristic travel documents and travel patterns could
have allowed authorities to intercept some of the hijackers
and a more effective use of information available in
Government databases could have identified some of the
hijackers.
(6) The routine operations of our immigration laws and the
aspects of those laws not specifically aimed at protecting
against terrorism inevitably shaped al Qaeda's planning and
opportunities.
(7) New insights into terrorist travel gained since
September 11, 2001, have not been adequately integrated into
the front lines of border security.
(8) The small classified terrorist travel intelligence
collection and analysis program currently in place has
produced useful results and should be expanded.
(b) Strategy.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security
shall submit to Congress unclassified and classified versions
of a strategy for combining terrorist travel intelligence,
operations, and law enforcement into a cohesive effort to
intercept terrorists, find terrorist travel facilitators, and
constrain terrorist mobility domestically and
internationally. The report to Congress should include a
description of the actions taken to implement the strategy.
(2) Accountability.--The strategy submitted under paragraph
(1) shall--
(A) describe a program for collecting, analyzing,
disseminating, and utilizing information and intelligence
regarding terrorist travel tactics and methods; and
(B) outline which Federal intelligence, diplomatic, and law
enforcement agencies will be held accountable for
implementing each element of the strategy.
(3) Coordination.--The strategy shall be developed in
coordination with all relevant Federal agencies, including--
(A) the National Counterterrorism Center;
(B) the Department of Transportation;
(C) the Department of State;
(D) the Department of the Treasury;
(E) the Department of Justice;
(F) the Department of Defense;
(G) the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
(H) the Drug Enforcement Agency; and
(I) the agencies that comprise the intelligence community.
(4) Contents.--The strategy shall address--
(A) the intelligence and law enforcement collection,
analysis, operations, and reporting required to identify and
disrupt terrorist travel practices and trends, and the
terrorist travel facilitators, document forgers, human
smugglers, travel agencies, and corrupt border and
transportation officials who assist terrorists;
(B) the initial and ongoing training and training materials
required by consular, border, and immigration officials to
effectively detect and disrupt terrorist travel described
under subsection (c)(3);
(C) the new procedures required and actions to be taken to
integrate existing counterterrorist travel and mobility
intelligence into border security processes, including
consular, port of entry, border patrol, maritime, immigration
benefits, and related law enforcement activities;
(D) the actions required to integrate current terrorist
mobility intelligence into military force protection
measures;
(E) the additional assistance to be given to the
interagency Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center for
purposes of combatting terrorist travel, including further
developing and expanding enforcement and operational
capabilities that address terrorist travel;
(F) the additional resources to be given to the Department
of Homeland Security to aid in the sharing of information
between the frontline border agencies of the Department of
Homeland Security, the Department of State, and classified
and unclassified sources of counterterrorist travel
intelligence and information elsewhere in the Federal
Government, including the Human Smuggling and Trafficking
Center;
(G) the development and implementation of procedures to
enable the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center to timely
receive terrorist travel intelligence and documentation
obtained at consulates and ports of entry, and by law
enforcement officers and military personnel;
(H) the use of foreign and technical assistance to advance
border security measures and law enforcement operations
against terrorist travel facilitators;
(I) the development of a program to provide each consular,
port of entry, and immigration benefits office with a
counterterrorist travel expert trained and authorized to use
the relevant authentication technologies and cleared to
access all appropriate immigration, law enforcement, and
intelligence databases;
(J) the feasibility of digitally transmitting passport
information to a central cadre of specialists until such time
as experts described under subparagraph (I) are available at
consular, port of entry, and immigration benefits offices;
and
(K) granting consular officers and immigration
adjudicators, as appropriate, the security clearances
necessary to access law enforcement sensitive and
intelligence databases.
(c) Frontline Counterterrorist Travel Technology and
Training.--
(1) Technology acquisition and dissemination plan.--Not
later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act,
the Secretary of Homeland Security, in conjunction with the
Secretary of State, shall submit to Congress a plan
describing how the Department of Homeland Security and the
Department of State can acquire and deploy, to all
consulates, ports of entry, and immigration benefits offices,
technologies that facilitate document authentication and the
detection of potential terrorist indicators on travel
documents.
(2) Contents of plan.--The plan submitted under paragraph
(1) shall--
(A) outline the timetable needed to acquire and deploy the
authentication technologies;
(B) identify the resources required to--
(i) fully disseminate these technologies; and
(ii) train personnel on use of these technologies; and
(C) address the feasibility of using these technologies to
screen every passport or other documentation described in
section __04(b) submitted for identification purposes to a
United States consular, border, or immigration official.
(3) Training program.--
(A) In general.--The Secretary of Homeland Security and the
Secretary of State shall develop and implement initial and
ongoing annual training programs for consular, border, and
immigration officials who encounter or work with travel or
immigration documents as part of their duties to teach such
officials how to effectively detect and disrupt terrorist
travel.
(B) Terrorist travel intelligence.--The Secretary may
assist State, local, and tribal governments, and private
industry, in establishing training programs related to
terrorist travel intelligence.
(C) Training topics.--The training developed under this
paragraph shall include training in--
(i) methods for identifying fraudulent documents;
(ii) detecting terrorist indicators on travel documents;
(iii) recognizing travel patterns, tactics, and behaviors
exhibited by terrorists;
(iv) the use of information contained in available
databases and data systems and procedures to maintain the
accuracy and integrity of such systems; and
(v) other topics determined necessary by the Secretary of
Homeland Security and the Secretary of State.
(D) Certification.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
enactment of this Act--
(i) the Secretary of Homeland Security shall certify to
Congress that all border and immigration officials who
encounter or work with travel or immigration documents as
part of their duties have received training under this
paragraph; and
(ii) the Secretary of State shall certify to Congress that
all consular officers who encounter or work with travel or
immigration documents as part of their duties have received
training under this paragraph.
(4) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to the Secretary for each of the fiscal
years 2005 through 2009 such sums as may be necessary to
carry out the provisions of this subsection.
(d) Enhancing Classified Counterterrorist Travel Efforts.--
(1) In general.--The National Intelligence Director shall
significantly increase resources and personnel to the small
classified program that collects and analyzes intelligence on
terrorist travel.
(2) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated for each of the fiscal years 2005 through
2009 such sums as may be necessary to carry out this
subsection.

SEC. 432. INTEGRATED SCREENING SYSTEM.

(a) In General.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall
develop a plan for a comprehensive integrated screening
system.
(b) Design.--The system planned under subsection (a) shall
be designed to--
(1) encompass an integrated network of screening points
that includes the Nation's border security system,
transportation system, and critical infrastructure or
facilities that the Secretary determines need to be protected
against terrorist attack;
(2) build upon existing border enforcement and security
activities, and to the extent practicable, private sector
security initiatives, in a manner that will enable the
utilization of a range of security check points in a
continuous and consistent manner throughout the Nation's
screening system;
(3) allow access to government databases to detect
terrorists; and
(4) utilize biometric identifiers that the Secretary
determines to be appropriate, feasible, and if practicable,
compatible with the biometric entry and exit data system
described in section 433.
(c) Standards for Screening Procedures.--
(1) Authorization.--The Secretary may promulgate standards
for screening procedures for--
(A) entering and leaving the United States;
(B) accessing Federal facilities that the Secretary
determines need to be protected against terrorist attack;
(C) accessing critical infrastructure that the Secretary
determines need to be protected against terrorist attack; and

[[Page H8946]]

(D) accessing modes of transportation that the Secretary
determines need to be protected against terrorist attack.
(2) Scope.--Standards prescribed under this subsection may
address a range of factors, including technologies required
to be used in screening and requirements for secure
identification.
(3) Requirements.--In promulgating standards for screening
procedures, the Secretary shall--
(A) consider and incorporate appropriate civil liberties
and privacy protections;
(B) comply with the Administrative Procedure Act; and
(C) consult with other Federal, State, local, and tribal
governments, private parties, and other interested parties,
as appropriate.
(4) Limitation.--This section does not confer to the
Secretary new statutory authority, or alter existing
authorities, over systems, critical infrastructure, and
facilities.
(5) Notification.--If the Secretary determines that
additional regulatory authority is needed to fully implement
the plan for an integrated screening system, the Secretary
shall immediately notify Congress.
(d) Compliance.--The Secretary may issue regulations to
ensure compliance with the standards promulgated under this
section.
(e) Consultation.--For those systems, critical
infrastructure, and facilities that the Secretary determines
need to be protected against terrorist attack, the Secretary
shall consult with other Federal agencies, State, local, and
tribal governments, and the private sector to ensure the
development of consistent standards and consistent
implementation of the integrated screening system.
(f) Biometric Identifiers.--In carrying out this section,
the Secretary shall continue to review biometric technologies
and existing Federal and State programs using biometric
identifiers. Such review shall consider the accuracy rate of
available technologies.
(g) Maintaining Accuracy and Integrity of the Integrated
Screening System.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary shall establish rules,
guidelines, policies, and operating and auditing procedures
for collecting, removing, and updating data maintained in,
and adding information to, the integrated screening system
that ensure the accuracy and integrity of the data.
(2) Data maintenance procedures.--Each head of a Federal
agency that has databases and data systems linked to the
integrated screening system shall establish rules,
guidelines, policies, and operating and auditing procedures
for collecting, removing, and updating data maintained in,
and adding information to, such databases or data systems
that ensure the accuracy and integrity of the data.
(3) Requirements.--The rules, guidelines, policies, and
procedures established under this subsection shall--
(A) incorporate a simple and timely method for--
(i) correcting errors;
(ii) determining which government agency or entity provided
data so that the accuracy of the data can be ascertained; and
(iii) clarifying information known to cause false hits or
misidentification errors; and
(B) include procedures for individuals to--
(i) seek corrections of data contained in the databases or
data systems; and
(ii) appeal decisions concerning data contained in the
databases or data systems.
(h) Implementation.--
(1) Phase i.--The Secretary shall--
(A) develop plans for, and begin implementation of, a
single program for registered travelers to expedite travel
across the border, as required under section 433(g);
(B) continue the implementation of a biometric exit and
entry data system that links to relevant databases and data
systems, as required by subsections (c) through (f) of
section 433 and other existing authorities;
(C) centralize the ``no-fly'' and ``automatic-selectee''
lists, making use of improved terrorists watch lists, as
required by section 433;
(D) develop plans, in consultation with other relevant
agencies, for the sharing of terrorist information with
trusted governments, as required by section 435;
(E) initiate any other action determined appropriate by the
Secretary to facilitate the implementation of this paragraph;
and
(F) report to Congress on the implementation of phase I,
including--
(i) the effectiveness of actions taken, the efficacy of
resources expended, compliance with statutory provisions, and
safeguards for privacy and civil liberties; and
(ii) plans for the development and implementation of phases
II and III.
(2) Phase ii.--The Secretary shall--
(A) complete the implementation of a single program for
registered travelers to expedite travel across the border, as
required by section 433(g);
(B) complete the implementation of a biometric entry and
exit data system that links to relevant databases and data
systems, as required by subsections (c) through (f) of
section 433, and other existing authorities;
(C) in cooperation with other relevant agencies, engage in
dialogue with foreign governments to develop plans for the
use of common screening standards;
(D) initiate any other action determined appropriate by the
Secretary to facilitate the implementation of this paragraph;
and
(E) report to Congress on the implementation of phase II,
including--
(i) the effectiveness of actions taken, the efficacy of
resources expended, compliance with statutory provisions, and
safeguards for privacy and civil liberties; and
(ii) the plans for the development and implementation of
phase III.
(3) Phase iii.--The Secretary shall--
(A) finalize and deploy the integrated screening system
required by subsection (a);
(B) in cooperation with other relevant agencies, promote
the implementation of common screening standards by foreign
governments; and
(C) report to Congress on the implementation of Phase III,
including--
(i) the effectiveness of actions taken, the efficacy of
resources expended, compliance with statutory provisions, and
safeguards for privacy and civil liberties; and
(ii) the plans for the ongoing operation of the integrated
screening system.
(i) Report.--After phase III has been implemented, the
Secretary shall submit a report to Congress every 3 years
that describes the ongoing operation of the integrated
screening system, including its effectiveness, efficient use
of resources, compliance with statutory provisions, and
safeguards for privacy and civil liberties.
(j) Authorizations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated to the Secretary for each of the fiscal years
2005 through 2009, such sums as may be necessary to carry out
the provisions of this section.

SEC. 433. BIOMETRIC ENTRY AND EXIT DATA SYSTEM.

(a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
Congress finds that completing a biometric entry and exit
data system as expeditiously as possible is an essential
investment in efforts to protect the United States by
preventing the entry of terrorists.
(b) Definition.--In this section, the term ``entry and exit
data system'' means the entry and exit system required by
applicable sections of--
(1) the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-208);
(2) the Immigration and Naturalization Service Data
Management Improvement Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-205);
(3) the Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act (Public Law 106-
396);
(4) the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act
of 2002 (Public Law 107-173); and
(5) the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001 (Public Law 107-56).
(c) Plan and Report.--
(1) Development of plan.--The Secretary of Homeland
Security shall develop a plan to accelerate the full
implementation of an automated biometric entry and exit data
system.
(2) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report to
Congress on the plan developed under paragraph (1), which
shall contain--
(A) a description of the current functionality of the entry
and exit data system, including--
(i) a listing of ports of entry and other Department of
Homeland Security and Department of State locations with
biometric entry data systems in use and whether such
screening systems are located at primary or secondary
inspection areas;
(ii) a listing of ports of entry and other Department of
Homeland Security and Department of State locations with
biometric exit data systems in use;
(iii) a listing of databases and data systems with which
the entry and exit data system are interoperable;
(iv) a description of--

(I) identified deficiencies concerning the accuracy or
integrity of the information contained in the entry and exit
data system;
(II) identified deficiencies concerning technology
associated with processing individuals through the system;
and
(III) programs or policies planned or implemented to
correct problems identified in subclause (I) or (II); and

(v) an assessment of the effectiveness of the entry and
exit data system in fulfilling its intended purposes,
including preventing terrorists from entering the United
States;
(B) a description of factors relevant to the accelerated
implementation of the biometric entry and exit data system,
including--
(i) the earliest date on which the Secretary estimates that
full implementation of the biometric entry and exit data
system can be completed;
(ii) the actions the Secretary will take to accelerate the
full implementation of the biometric entry and exit data
system at all ports of entry through which all aliens must
pass that are legally required to do so; and
(iii) the resources and authorities required to enable the
Secretary to meet the implementation date described in clause
(i);
(C) a description of any improvements needed in the
information technology employed for the biometric entry and
exit data system;
(D) a description of plans for improved or added
interoperability with any other databases or data systems;
and
(E) a description of the manner in which the Department of
Homeland Security's US-VISIT program--
(i) meets the goals of a comprehensive entry and exit
screening system, including both entry and exit biometric;
and

[[Page H8947]]

(ii) fulfills the statutory obligations under subsection
(b).
(d) Collection of Biometric Exit Data.--The entry and exit
data system shall include a requirement for the collection of
biometric exit data for all categories of individuals who are
required to provide biometric entry data, regardless of the
port of entry where such categories of individuals entered
the United States.
(e) Integration and Interoperability.--
(1) Integration of data system.--Not later than 2 years
after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall
fully integrate all databases and data systems that process
or contain information on aliens, which are maintained by--
(A) the Department of Homeland Security, at--
(i) the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
(ii) the United States Customs and Border Protection; and
(iii) the United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services;
(B) the Department of Justice, at the Executive Office for
Immigration Review; and
(C) the Department of State, at the Bureau of Consular
Affairs.
(2) Interoperable component.--The fully integrated data
system under paragraph (1) shall be an interoperable
component of the entry and exit data system.
(3) Interoperable data system.--Not later than 2 years
after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall
fully implement an interoperable electronic data system, as
required by section 202 of the Enhanced Border Security and
Visa Entry Reform Act (8 U.S.C. 1722) to provide current and
immediate access to information in the databases of Federal
law enforcement agencies and the intelligence community that
is relevant to determine--
(A) whether to issue a visa; or
(B) the admissibility or deportability of an alien.
(f) Maintaining Accuracy and Integrity of Entry and Exit
Data System.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary shall establish rules,
guidelines, policies, and operating and auditing procedures
for collecting, removing, and updating data maintained in,
and adding information to, the entry and exit data system
that ensure the accuracy and integrity of the data.
(2) Data maintenance procedures.--Heads of agencies that
have databases or data systems linked to the entry and exit
data system shall establish rules, guidelines, policies, and
operating and auditing procedures for collecting, removing,
and updating data maintained in, and adding information to,
such databases or data systems that ensure the accuracy and
integrity of the data.
(3) Requirements.--The rules, guidelines, policies, and
procedures established under this subsection shall--
(A) incorporate a simple and timely method for--
(i) correcting errors;
(ii) determining which government agency or entity provided
data so that the accuracy of the data can be ascertained; and
(iii) clarifying information known to cause false hits or
misidentification errors; and
(B) include procedures for individuals to--
(i) seek corrections of data contained in the databases or
data systems; and
(ii) appeal decisions concerning data contained in the
databases or data systems.
(g) Expediting Registered Travelers Across International
Borders.--
(1) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
Congress finds that--
(A) expediting the travel of previously screened and known
travelers across the borders of the United States should be a
high priority; and
(B) the process of expediting known travelers across the
borders of the United States can permit inspectors to better
focus on identifying terrorists attempting to enter the
United States.
(2) Definition.--In this subsection, the term ``registered
traveler program'' means any program designed to expedite the
travel of previously screened and known travelers across the
borders of the United States.
(3) Registered travel program.--
(A) In general.--As soon as is practicable, the Secretary
shall develop and implement a registered traveler program to
expedite the processing of registered travelers who enter and
exit the United States.
(B) Participation.--The registered traveler program shall
include as many participants as practicable by--
(i) minimizing the cost of enrollment;
(ii) making program enrollment convenient and easily
accessible; and
(iii) providing applicants with clear and consistent
eligibility guidelines.
(C) Integration.--The registered traveler program shall be
integrated into the automated biometric entry and exit data
system described in this section.
(D) Review and evaluation.--In developing the registered
traveler program, the Secretary shall--
(i) review existing programs or pilot projects designed to
expedite the travel of registered travelers across the
borders of the United States;
(ii) evaluate the effectiveness of the programs described
in clause (i), the costs associated with such programs, and
the costs to travelers to join such programs;
(iii) increase research and development efforts to
accelerate the development and implementation of a single
registered traveler program; and
(iv) review the feasibility of allowing participants to
enroll in the registered traveler program at consular
offices.
(4) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to Congress
a report describing the Department's progress on the
development and implementation of the registered traveler
program.
(h) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to the Secretary, for each of the fiscal
years 2005 through 2009, such sums as may be necessary to
carry out the provisions of this section.

SEC. 434. TRAVEL DOCUMENTS.

(a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
Congress finds that--
(1) existing procedures allow many individuals to enter the
United States by showing minimal identification or without
showing any identification;
(2) the planning for the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, demonstrates that terrorists study and exploit United
States vulnerabilities; and
(3) additional safeguards are needed to ensure that
terrorists cannot enter the United States.
(b) Biometric Passports.--
(1) Development of plan.--The Secretary of State, in
consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall
develop and implement a plan as expeditiously as possible to
require biometric passports or other identification deemed by
the Secretary of State to be at least as secure as a
biometric passport, for all travel into the United States by
United States citizens and by categories of individuals for
whom documentation requirements have previously been waived
under section 212(d)(4)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(4)(B)).
(2) Requirement to produce documentation.--The plan
developed under paragraph (1) shall require all United States
citizens, and categories of individuals for whom
documentation requirements have previously been waived under
section 212(d)(4)(B) of such Act, to carry and produce the
documentation described in paragraph (1) when traveling from
foreign countries into the United States.
(c) Technical and Conforming Amendments.--After the
complete implementation of the plan described in subsection
(b)--
(1) neither the Secretary of State nor the Secretary of
Homeland Security may exercise discretion under section
212(d)(4)(B) of such Act to waive documentary requirements
for travel into the United States; and
(2) the President may not exercise discretion under section
215(b) of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1185(b)) to waive documentary
requirements for United States citizens departing from or
entering, or attempting to depart from or enter, the United
States except--
(A) where the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of Homeland Security, determines that the
alternative documentation that is the basis for the waiver of
the documentary requirement is at least as secure as a
biometric passport;
(B) in the case of an unforeseen emergency in individual
cases; or
(C) in the case of humanitarian or national interest
reasons in individual cases.
(d) Transit Without Visa Program.--The Secretary of State
shall not use any authorities granted under section
212(d)(4)(C) of such Act until the Secretary, in conjunction
with the Secretary of Homeland Security, completely
implements a security plan to fully ensure secure transit
passage areas to prevent aliens proceeding in immediate and
continuous transit through the United States from illegally
entering the United States.

SEC. 435. EXCHANGE OF TERRORIST INFORMATION AND INCREASED
PREINSPECTION AT FOREIGN AIRPORTS.

(a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
Congress finds that--
(1) the exchange of terrorist information with other
countries, consistent with privacy requirements, along with
listings of lost and stolen passports, will have immediate
security benefits; and
(2) the further away from the borders of the United States
that screening occurs, the more security benefits the United
States will gain.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States Government should exchange terrorist
information with trusted allies;
(2) the United States Government should move toward real-
time verification of passports with issuing authorities;
(3) where practicable the United States Government should
conduct screening before a passenger departs on a flight
destined for the United States;
(4) the United States Government should work with other
countries to ensure effective inspection regimes at all
airports;
(5) the United States Government should work with other
countries to improve passport standards and provide foreign
assistance to countries that need help making the transition
to the global standard for identification; and

[[Page H8948]]

(6) the Department of Homeland Security, in coordination
with the Department of State and other agencies, should
implement the initiatives called for in this subsection.
(c) Report Regarding the Exchange of Terrorist
Information.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the
Secretary of Homeland Security, working with other agencies,
shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a
report on Federal efforts to collaborate with allies of the
United States in the exchange of terrorist information.
(2) Contents.--The report shall outline--
(A) strategies for increasing such collaboration and
cooperation;
(B) progress made in screening passengers before their
departure to the United States; and
(C) efforts to work with other countries to accomplish the
goals described under this section.
(d) Preinspection at Foreign Airports.--
(1) In general.--Section 235A(a)(4) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1225a(a)(4)) is amended to read as
follows:
``(4) Subject to paragraph (5), not later than January 1,
2008, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation
with the Secretary of State, shall establish preinspection
stations in at least 25 additional foreign airports, which
the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the
Secretary of State, determines, based on the data compiled
under paragraph (3) and such other information as may be
available, would most effectively facilitate the travel of
admissible aliens and reduce the number of inadmissible
aliens, especially aliens who are potential terrorists, who
arrive from abroad by air at points of entry within the
United States. Such preinspection stations shall be in
addition to those established prior to September 30, 1996, or
pursuant to paragraph (1).''.
(2) Report.--Not later than June 30, 2006, the Secretary of
Homeland Security and the Secretary of State shall submit a
report on the progress being made in implementing the
amendment made by paragraph (1) to--
(A) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;
(B) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives;
(C) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
(D) the Committee on International Relations of the House
of Representatives.

SEC. 436. MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR BIRTH CERTIFICATES.

(a) Definition.--In this section, the term `birth
certificate' means a certificate of birth--
(1) for an individual (regardless of where born)--
(A) who is a citizen or national of the United States at
birth; and
(B) whose birth is registered in the United States; and
(2) that--
(A) is issued by a Federal, State, or local government
agency or authorized custodian of record and produced from
birth records maintained by such agency or custodian of
record; or
(B) is an authenticated copy, issued by a Federal, State,
or local government agency or authorized custodian of record,
of an original certificate of birth issued by such agency or
custodian of record.
(b) Standards for Acceptance by Federal Agencies.--
(1) In general.--Beginning 2 years after the promulgation
of minimum standards under paragraph (3), no Federal agency
may accept a birth certificate for any official purpose
unless the certificate conforms to such standards.
(2) State certification.--
(A) In general.--Each State shall certify to the Secretary
of Health and Human Services that the State is in compliance
with the requirements of this section.
(B) Frequency.--Certifications under subparagraph (A) shall
be made at such intervals and in such a manner as the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, with the concurrence
of the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Commissioner of
Social Security, may prescribe by regulation.
(C) Compliance.--Each State shall ensure that units of
local government and other authorized custodians of records
in the State comply with this section.
(D) Audits.--The Secretary of Health and Human Services may
conduct periodic audits of each State's compliance with the
requirements of this section.
(3) Minimum standards.--Not later than 1 year after the
date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services shall by regulation establish minimum
standards for birth certificates for use by Federal agencies
for official purposes that--
(A) at a minimum, shall require certification of the birth
certificate by the State or local government custodian of
record that issued the certificate, and shall require the use
of safety paper or an alternative, equally secure medium, the
seal of the issuing custodian of record, and other features
designed to prevent tampering, counterfeiting, or otherwise
duplicating the birth certificate for fraudulent purposes;
(B) shall establish requirements for proof and verification
of identity as a condition of issuance of a birth
certificate, with additional security measures for the
issuance of a birth certificate for a person who is not the
applicant;
(C) shall establish standards for the processing of birth
certificate applications to prevent fraud;
(D) may not require a single design to which birth
certificates issued by all States must conform; and
(E) shall accommodate the differences between the States in
the manner and form in which birth records are stored and
birth certificates are produced from such records.
(4) Consultation with government agencies.--In promulgating
the standards required under paragraph (3), the Secretary of
Health and Human Services shall consult with--
(A) the Secretary of Homeland Security;
(B) the Commissioner of Social Security;
(C) State vital statistics offices; and
(D) other appropriate Federal agencies.
(5) Extension of effective date.--The Secretary of Health
and Human Services may extend the date specified under
paragraph (1) for up to 2 years for birth certificates issued
by a State if the Secretary determines that the State made
reasonable efforts to comply with the date under paragraph
(1) but was unable to do so.
(c) Grants to States.--
(1) Assistance in meeting federal standards.--
(A) In general.--Beginning on the date a final regulation
is promulgated under subsection (b)(3), the Secretary of
Health and Human Services shall award grants to States to
assist them in conforming to the minimum standards for birth
certificates set forth in the regulation.
(B) Allocation of grants.--The Secretary shall award grants
to States under this paragraph based on the proportion that
the estimated average annual number of birth certificates
issued by a State applying for a grant bears to the estimated
average annual number of birth certificates issued by all
States.
(C) Minimum allocation.--Notwithstanding subparagraph (B),
each State shall receive not less than 0.5 percent of the
grant funds made available under this paragraph.
(2) Assistance in matching birth and death records.--
(A) In general.--The Secretary of Health and Human
Services, in coordination with the Commissioner of Social
Security and other appropriate Federal agencies, shall award
grants to States, under criteria established by the
Secretary, to assist States in--
(i) computerizing their birth and death records;
(ii) developing the capability to match birth and death
records within each State and among the States; and
(iii) noting the fact of death on the birth certificates of
deceased persons.
(B) Allocation of grants.--The Secretary shall award grants
to qualifying States under this paragraph based on the
proportion that the estimated annual average number of birth
and death records created by a State applying for a grant
bears to the estimated annual average number of birth and
death records originated by all States.
(C) Minimum allocation.--Notwithstanding subparagraph (B),
each State shall receive not less than 0.5 percent of the
grant funds made available under this paragraph.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to the Secretary for each of the fiscal
years 2005 through 2009 such sums as may be necessary to
carry out this section.
(e) Technical and Conforming Amendments.--Section 656 of
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996 (5 U.S.C. 301 note) is repealed.

SEC. 437. DRIVER'S LICENSES AND PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION
CARDS.

(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Driver's license.--The term `driver's license' means a
motor vehicle operator's license as defined in section
30301(5) of title 49, United States Code.
(2) Personal identification card.--The term `personal
identification card' means an identification document (as
defined in section 1028(d)(3) of title 18, United States
Code) issued by a State.
(b) Standards for Acceptance by Federal Agencies.--
(1) In general.--
(A) Limitation on acceptance.--No Federal agency may
accept, for any official purpose, a driver's license or
personal identification card newly issued by a State more
than 2 years after the promulgation of the minimum standards
under paragraph (2) unless the driver's license or personal
identification card conforms to such minimum standards.
(B) Date for conformance.--The Secretary of Transportation,
in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security,
shall establish a date after which no driver's license or
personal identification card shall be accepted by a Federal
agency for any official purpose unless such driver's license
or personal identification card conforms to the minimum
standards established under paragraph (2). The date shall be
as early as the Secretary determines it is practicable for
the States to comply with such date with reasonable efforts.
(C) State certification.--
(i) In general.--Each State shall certify to the Secretary
of Transportation that the State is in compliance with the
requirements of this section.
(ii) Frequency.--Certifications under clause (i) shall be
made at such intervals and

[[Page H8949]]

in such a manner as the Secretary of Transportation, with the
concurrence of the Secretary of Homeland Security, may
prescribe by regulation.
(iii) Audits.--The Secretary of Transportation may conduct
periodic audits of each State's compliance with the
requirements of this section.
(2) Minimum standards.--Not later than 18 months after the
date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
Transportation, in consultation with the Secretary of
Homeland Security, shall by regulation, establish minimum
standards for driver's licenses or personal identification
cards issued by a State for use by Federal agencies for
identification purposes that shall include--
(A) standards for documentation required as proof of
identity of an applicant for a driver's license or personal
identification card;
(B) standards for the verifiability of documents used to
obtain a driver's license or personal identification card;
(C) standards for the processing of applications for
driver's licenses and personal identification cards to
prevent fraud;
(D) security standards to ensure that driver's licenses and
personal identification cards are--
(i) resistant to tampering, alteration, or counterfeiting;
and
(ii) capable of accommodating and ensuring the security of
a digital photograph or other unique identifier; and
(E) a requirement that a State confiscate a driver's
license or personal identification card if any component or
security feature of the license or identification card is
compromised.
(3) Content of regulations.--The regulations required by
paragraph (2)--
(A) shall facilitate communication between the chief driver
licensing official of a State, an appropriate official of a
Federal agency and other relevant officials, to verify the
authenticity of documents, as appropriate, issued by such
Federal agency or entity and presented to prove the identity
of an individual;
(B) may not infringe on a State's power to set criteria
concerning what categories of individuals are eligible to
obtain a driver's license or personal identification card
from that State;
(C) may not require a State to comply with any such
regulation that conflicts with or otherwise interferes with
the full enforcement of State criteria concerning the
categories of individuals that are eligible to obtain a
driver's license or personal identification card from that
State;
(D) may not require a single design to which driver's
licenses or personal identification cards issued by all
States must conform; and
(E) shall include procedures and requirements to protect
the privacy and civil and due process rights of individuals
who apply for and hold driver's licenses and personal
identification cards.
(4) Negotiated rulemaking.--
(A) In general.--Before publishing the proposed regulations
required by paragraph (2) to carry out this subtitle, the
Secretary of Transportation shall establish a negotiated
rulemaking process pursuant to subchapter IV of chapter 5 of
title 5, United States Code (5 U.S.C. 581 et seq.).
(B) Representation on negotiated rulemaking committee.--Any
negotiated rulemaking committee established by the Secretary
of Transportation pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall include
representatives from--
(i) among State offices that issue driver's licenses or
personal identification cards;
(ii) among State elected officials;
(iii) the Department of Homeland Security; and
(iv) among interested parties, including organizations with
technological and operational expertise in document security
and organizations that represent the interests of applicants
for such licenses or identification cards.
(C) Time requirement.--The process described in
subparagraph (A) shall be conducted in a timely manner to
ensure that--
(i) any recommendation for a proposed rule or report is
provided to the Secretary of Transportation not later than 9
months after the date of enactment of this Act; and
(ii) a final rule is promulgated not later than 18 months
after the date of enactment of this Act.
(c) Grants to States.--
(1) Assistance in meeting federal standards.--Beginning on
the date a final regulation is promulgated under subsection
(b)(2), the Secretary of Transportation shall award grants to
States to assist them in conforming to the minimum standards
for driver's licenses and personal identification cards set
forth in the regulation.
(2) Allocation of grants.--The Secretary of Transportation
shall award grants to States under this subsection based on
the proportion that the estimated average annual number of
driver's licenses and personal identification cards issued by
a State applying for a grant bears to the average annual
number of such documents issued by all States.
(3) Minimum allocation.--Notwithstanding paragraph (2),
each State shall receive not less than 0.5 percent of the
grant funds made available under this subsection.
(d) Extension of Effective Date.--The Secretary of
Transportation may extend the date specified under subsection
(b)(1)(A) for up to 2 years for driver's licenses issued by a
State if the Secretary determines that the State made
reasonable efforts to comply with the date under such
subsection but was unable to do so.
(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to the Secretary of Transportation for
each of the fiscal years 2005 through 2009, such sums as may
be necessary to carry out this section.

SEC. 438. SOCIAL SECURITY CARDS.

(a) Security Enhancements.--The Commissioner of Social
Security shall--
(1) not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of
this section, issue regulations to restrict the issuance of
multiple replacement social security cards to any individual
to minimize fraud;
(2) within 1 year after the date of enactment of this
section, require independent verification of all records
provided by an applicant for an original social security
card, other than for purposes of enumeration at birth; and
(3) within 18 months after the date of enactment of this
section, add death, fraud, and work authorization indicators
to the social security number verification system.
(b) Interagency Security Task Force.--The Commissioner of
Social Security, in consultation with the Secretary of
Homeland Security, shall form an interagency task force for
the purpose of further improving the security of social
security cards and numbers. Not later than 1 year after the
date of enactment of this section, the task force shall
establish security requirements, including--
(1) standards for safeguarding social security cards from
counterfeiting, tampering, alteration, and theft;
(2) requirements for verifying documents submitted for the
issuance of replacement cards; and
(3) actions to increase enforcement against the fraudulent
use or issuance of social security numbers and cards.
(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to the Commissioner of Social Security for
each of the fiscal years 2005 through 2009, such sums as may
be necessary to carry out this section.

SEC. 439. EFFECTIVE DATE.

Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, this
subtitle shall take effect on the date of enactment of this
Act.

Subtitle C--Transportation Security

SEC. 441. DEFINITIONS.

In this subtitle, the terms ``air carrier'', ``air
transportation'', ``aircraft'', ``airport'', ``cargo'',
``foreign air carrier'', and ``intrastate air
transportation'' have the meanings given such terms in
section 40102 of title 49, United States Code.

SEC. 442. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR TRANSPORTATION SECURITY.

(a) Requirement for Strategy.--
(1) Responsibilities of secretary of homeland security.--
The Secretary of Homeland Security shall--
(A) develop and implement a National Strategy for
Transportation Security; and
(B) revise such strategy whenever necessary to improve or
to maintain the currency of the strategy or whenever the
Secretary otherwise considers it appropriate to do so.
(2) Consultation with secretary of transportation.--The
Secretary of Homeland Security shall consult with the
Secretary of Transportation in developing and revising the
National Strategy for Transportation Security under this
section.
(b) Content.--The National Strategy for Transportation
Security shall include the following matters:
(1) An identification and evaluation of the transportation
assets within the United States that, in the interests of
national security, must be protected from attack or
disruption by terrorist or other hostile forces, including
aviation, bridge and tunnel, commuter rail and ferry,
highway, maritime, pipeline, rail, urban mass transit, and
other public transportation infrastructure assets that could
be at risk of such an attack or disruption.
(2) The development of the risk-based priorities, and
realistic deadlines, for addressing security needs associated
with those assets.
(3) The most practical and cost-effective means of
defending those assets against threats to their security.
(4) A forward-looking strategic plan that assigns
transportation security roles and missions to departments and
agencies of the Federal Government (including the Armed
Forces), State governments (including the Army National Guard
and Air National Guard), local governments, and public
utilities, and establishes mechanisms for encouraging private
sector cooperation and participation in the implementation of
such plan.
(5) A comprehensive delineation of response and recovery
responsibilities and issues regarding threatened and executed
acts of terrorism within the United States.
(6) A prioritization of research and development objectives
that support transportation security needs, giving a higher
priority to research and development directed toward
protecting vital assets.
(7) A budget and recommendations for appropriate levels and
sources of funding to meet the objectives set forth in the
strategy.
(c) Submissions to Congress.--
(1) The national strategy.--
(A) Initial strategy.--The Secretary of Homeland Security
shall submit the National Strategy for Transportation
Security

[[Page H8950]]

developed under this section to Congress not later than April
1, 2005.
(B) Subsequent versions.--After 2005, the Secretary of
Homeland Security shall submit the National Strategy for
Transportation Security, including any revisions, to Congress
not less frequently than April 1 of each even-numbered year.
(2) Periodic progress report.--
(A) Requirement for report.--Each year, in conjunction with
the submission of the budget to Congress under section
1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, the Secretary of
Homeland Security shall submit to Congress an assessment of
the progress made on implementing the National Strategy for
Transportation Security.
(B) Content.--Each progress report under this paragraph
shall include, at a minimum, the following matters:
(i) An assessment of the adequacy of the resources
committed to meeting the objectives of the National Strategy
for Transportation Security.
(ii) Any recommendations for improving and implementing
that strategy that the Secretary, in consultation with the
Secretary of Transportation, considers appropriate.
(3) Classified material.--Any part of the National Strategy
for Transportation Security that involves information that is
properly classified under criteria established by Executive
order shall be submitted to Congress separately in classified
form.
(d) Priority Status.--
(1) In general.--The National Strategy for Transportation
Security shall be the governing document for Federal
transportation security efforts.
(2) Other plans and reports.--The National Strategy for
Transportation Security shall include, as an integral part or
as an appendix--
(A) the current National Maritime Transportation Security
Plan under section 70103 of title 46, United States Code;
(B) the report required by section 44938 of title 49,
United States Code; and
(C) any other transportation security plan or report that
the Secretary of Homeland Security determines appropriate for
inclusion.

SEC. 443. USE OF WATCHLISTS FOR PASSENGER AIR TRANSPORTATION
SCREENING.

(a) In General.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, acting
through the Transportation Security Administration, as soon
as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act
but in no event later than 180 days after that date, shall--
(1) implement a procedure under which the Transportation
Security Administration compares information about passengers
who are to be carried aboard a passenger aircraft operated by
an air carrier or foreign air carrier in air transportation
or intrastate air transportation for flights and flight
segments originating in the United States with a
comprehensive, consolidated database containing information
about known or suspected terrorists and their associates; and
(2) use the information obtained by comparing the passenger
information with the information in the database to prevent
known or suspected terrorists and their associates from
boarding such flights or flight segments or to subject them
to specific additional security scrutiny, through the use of
``no fly'' and ``automatic selectee'' lists or other means.
(b) Air Carrier Cooperation.--The Secretary of Homeland
Security, in coordination with the Secretary of
Transportation, shall by order require air carriers to
provide the passenger information necessary to implement the
procedure required by subsection (a).
(c) Maintaining the Accuracy and Integrity of the ``No
Fly'' and ``Automatic Selectee'' Lists.--
(1) Watchlist database.--The Secretary of Homeland
Security, in consultation with the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, shall design guidelines, policies,
and operating procedures for the collection, removal, and
updating of data maintained, or to be maintained, in the
watchlist database described in subsection (a)(1) that are
designed to ensure the accuracy and integrity of the
database.
(2) Accuracy of entries.--In developing the ``no fly'' and
``automatic selectee'' lists under subsection (a)(2), the
Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish a simple and
timely method for correcting erroneous entries, for
clarifying information known to cause false hits or
misidentification errors, and for updating relevant
information that is dispositive in the passenger screening
process. The Secretary shall also establish a process to
provide individuals whose names are confused with, or similar
to, names in the database with a means of demonstrating that
they are not a person named in the database.

SEC. 444. ENHANCED PASSENGER AND CARGO SCREENING.

(a) Aircraft Passenger Screening at Checkpoints.--
(1) Detection of explosives.--
(A) Improvement of capabilities.--As soon as practicable
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
Homeland Security shall take such action as is necessary to
improve the capabilities at passenger screening checkpoints,
especially at commercial airports, to detect explosives
carried aboard aircraft by passengers or placed aboard
aircraft by passengers.
(B) Interim action.--Until measures are implemented that
enable the screening of all passengers for explosives, the
Secretary shall take immediate measures to require
Transportation Security Administration or other screeners to
screen for explosives any individual identified for
additional screening before that individual may board an
aircraft.
(2) Implementation report.--
(A) Requirement for report.--Within 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland
Security shall transmit to the Senate and the House of
Representatives a report on how the Secretary intends to
achieve the objectives of the actions required under
paragraph (1). The report shall include an implementation
schedule.
(B) Classified information.--The Secretary may submit
separately in classified form any information in the report
under subparagraph (A) that involves information that is
properly classified under criteria established by Executive
order.
(b) Acceleration of Research and Development on, and
Deployment of, Detection of Explosives.--
(1) Required action.--The Secretary of Homeland Security,
in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, shall
take such action as may be necessary to accelerate research
and development and deployment of technology for screening
aircraft passengers for explosives during or before the
aircraft boarding process.
(2) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to the Secretary such sums as are
necessary to carry out this subsection for each of fiscal
years 2005 through 2009.
(c) Improvement of Screener Job Performance.--
(1) Required action.--The Secretary of Homeland Security
shall take such action as may be necessary to improve the job
performance of airport screening personnel.
(2) Human factors study.--In carrying out this subsection,
the Secretary shall, not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, conduct a human factors study
in order better to understand problems in screener
performance and to set attainable objectives for individual
screeners and screening checkpoints.
(d) Checked Baggage and Cargo.--
(1) In-line baggage screening.--The Secretary of Homeland
Security shall take such action as may be necessary to
expedite the installation and use of advanced in-line
baggage-screening equipment at commercial airports.
(2) Cargo security.--The Secretary shall take such action
as may be necessary to ensure that the Transportation
Security Administration increases and improves its efforts to
screen potentially dangerous cargo.
(e) Blast-resistant Cargo and Baggage Containers.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in
coordination with the Secretary of Transportation--
(A) shall assess the feasibility of requiring the use of
blast-resistant containers for cargo and baggage on passenger
aircraft to minimize the potential effects of detonation of
an explosive device; and
(B) may require their use on some or all flights on
aircraft for which such containers are available.
(2) Pilot program.--Before requiring the use of such
containers on any such flights, the Secretary of Homeland
Security shall conduct a pilot program to evaluate the use of
currently available blast-resistant containers for cargo and
baggage on passenger aircraft. In conducting the pilot
program the Secretary--
(A) shall test the feasibility of using the containers by
deploying them on participating air carrier flights; but
(B) may not disclose to the public the number of blast-
resistant containers being used in the program or publicly
identify the flights on which the containers are used.
(3) Assistance for participation in pilot program.--
(A) In general.--As part of the pilot program, the
Secretary may provide assistance to air carriers to volunteer
to test the use of blast-resistant containers for cargo and
baggage on passenger aircraft.
(B) Applications.--To volunteer to participate in the
incentive program, an air carrier shall submit to the
Secretary an application that is in such form and contains
such information as the Secretary requires.
(C) Types of Assistance.--Assistance provided by the
Secretary to air carriers that volunteer to participate in
the pilot program may include the use of blast-resistant
containers and financial assistance to cover increased costs
to the carriers associated with the use and maintenance of
the containers, including increased fuel costs.
(4) Technological improvements.--The Secretary of Homeland
Security, in cooperation with the Secretary of
Transportation, shall--
(A) support efforts to further the development and
improvement of blast-resistant containers for potential use
on aircraft, including designs that--
(i) will work on a variety of aircraft, including narrow
body aircraft; and
(ii) minimize the weight of such containers without
compromising their effectiveness; and
(B) explore alternative technologies for minimizing the
potential effects of detonation of an explosive device on
cargo and passenger aircraft.
(5) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report to
the Congress

[[Page H8951]]

on the results of the pilot program and on progress made in
developing improved containers and equivalent technologies.
The report may be submitted in classified and redacted
formats.
(6) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to the Secretary of Homeland Security such
sums as are necessary to carry out this section. Such sums
shall remain available until expended.
(f) Cost-Sharing.--Not later than 45 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, in consultation with representatives of air
carriers, airport operators, and other interested parties,
shall submit to the Senate and the House of Representatives--
(1) a proposed formula for cost-sharing, for the advanced
in-line baggage screening equipment required by this
subtitle, between and among the Federal Government, State and
local governments, and the private sector that reflects
proportionate national security benefits and private sector
benefits for such enhancement; and
(2) recommendations, including recommended legislation, for
an equitable, feasible, and expeditious system for defraying
the costs of the advanced in-line baggage screening equipment
required by this subtitle, which may be based on the formula
proposed under paragraph (1).

SEC. 445. EFFECTIVE DATE.

Notwithstanding section 341, this subtitle takes effect on
the date of the enactment of this Act.

Subtitle D--National Preparedness

SEC. 451. THE INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM.

(a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The attacks on September 11, 2001, demonstrated that
even the most robust emergency response capabilities can be
overwhelmed if an attack is large enough.
(2) Teamwork, collaboration, and cooperation at an incident
site are critical to a successful response to a terrorist
attack.
(3) Key decision makers who are represented at the incident
command level help to ensure an effective response, the
efficient use of resources, and responder safety.
(4) Regular joint training at all levels is essential to
ensuring close coordination during an actual incident.
(5) Beginning with fiscal year 2005, the Department of
Homeland Security is requiring that entities adopt the
Incident Command System and other concepts of the National
Incident Management System in order to qualify for funds
distributed by the Office of State and Local Government
Coordination and Preparedness.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) emergency response agencies nationwide should adopt the
Incident Command System;
(2) when multiple agencies or multiple jurisdictions are
involved, they should follow a unified command system; and
(3) the Secretary of Homeland Security should require, as a
further condition of receiving homeland security preparedness
funds from the Office of State and Local Government
Coordination and Preparedness, that grant applicants document
measures taken to fully and aggressively implement the
Incident Command System and unified command procedures.

SEC. 452. NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION MUTUAL AID.

(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Authorized representative of the federal government.--
The term ``authorized representative of the Federal
Government'' means any individual or individuals designated
by the President with respect to the executive branch, the
Chief Justice with respect to the Federal judiciary, or the
President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of
Representatives with respect to Congress, or their designees,
to request assistance under a Mutual Aid Agreement for an
emergency or public service event.
(2) Chief operating officer.--The term ``chief operating
officer'' means the official designated by law to declare an
emergency in and for the locality of that chief operating
officer.
(3) Emergency.--The term ``emergency'' means a major
disaster or emergency declared by the President, or a state
of emergency declared by the Mayor of the District of
Columbia, the Governor of the State of Maryland or the
Commonwealth of Virginia, or the declaration of a local
emergency by the chief operating officer of a locality, or
their designees, that triggers mutual aid under the terms of
a Mutual Aid Agreement.
(4) Employee.--The term ``employee'' means the employees of
the party, including its agents or authorized volunteers, who
are committed in a Mutual Aid Agreement to prepare for or who
respond to an emergency or public service event.
(5) Locality.--The term ``locality'' means a county, city,
or town within the State of Maryland or the Commonwealth of
Virginia and within the National Capital Region.
(6) Mutual aid agreement.--The term ``Mutual Aid
Agreement'' means an agreement, authorized under subsection
(b) for the provision of police, fire, rescue and other
public safety and health or medical services to any party to
the agreement during a public service event, an emergency, or
pre-planned training event.
(7) National capital region or region.--The term ``National
Capital Region'' or ``Region'' means the area defined under
section 2674(f)(2) of title 10, United States Code, and those
counties with a border abutting that area and any
municipalities therein.
(8) Party.--The term ``party'' means the State of Maryland,
the Commonwealth of Virginia, the District of Columbia, and
any of the localities duly executing a Mutual Aid Agreement
under this section.
(9) Public service event.--The term ``public service
event''--
(A) means any undeclared emergency, incident or situation
in preparation for or response to which the Mayor of the
District of Columbia, an authorized representative of the
Federal Government, the Governor of the State of Maryland,
the Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia, or the chief
operating officer of a locality in the National Capital
Region, or their designees, requests or provides assistance
under a Mutual Aid Agreement within the National Capital
Region; and
(B) includes Presidential inaugurations, public gatherings,
demonstrations and protests, and law enforcement, fire,
rescue, emergency health and medical services,
transportation, communications, public works and engineering,
mass care, and other support that require human resources,
equipment, facilities or services supplemental to or greater
than the requesting jurisdiction can provide.
(10) State.--The term ``State'' means the State of
Maryland, the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the District of
Columbia.
(11) Training.--The term ``training'' means emergency and
public service event-related exercises, testing, or other
activities using equipment and personnel to simulate
performance of any aspect of the giving or receiving of aid
by National Capital Region jurisdictions during emergencies
or public service events, such actions occurring outside
actual emergency or public service event periods.
(b) Mutual Aid Authorized.--
(1) In general.--The Mayor of the District of Columbia, any
authorized representative of the Federal Government, the
Governor of the State of Maryland, the Governor of the
Commonwealth of Virginia, or the chief operating officer of a
locality, or their designees, acting within his or her
jurisdictional purview, may, subject to State law, enter
into, request or provide assistance under Mutual Aid
Agreements with localities, the Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority, the Metropolitan Washington Airports
Authority, and any other governmental agency or authority
for--
(A) law enforcement, fire, rescue, emergency health and
medical services, transportation, communications, public
works and engineering, mass care, and resource support in an
emergency or public service event;
(B) preparing for, mitigating, managing, responding to or
recovering from any emergency or public service event; and
(C) training for any of the activities described under
subparagraphs (A) and (B).
(2) Facilitating localities.--The State of Maryland and the
Commonwealth of Virginia are encouraged to facilitate the
ability of localities to enter into interstate Mutual Aid
Agreements in the National Capital Region under this section.
(3) Application and effect.--This section--
(A) does not apply to law enforcement security operations
at special events of national significance under section
3056(e) of title 18, United States Code, or other law
enforcement functions of the United States Secret Service;
(B) does not diminish any authorities, express or implied,
of Federal agencies to enter into Mutual Aid Agreements in
furtherance of their Federal missions; and
(C) does not--
(i) preclude any party from entering into supplementary
Mutual Aid Agreements with fewer than all the parties, or
with another party; or
(ii) affect any other agreement in effect before the date
of enactment of this Act among the States and localities,
including the Emergency Management Assistance Compact.
(4) Rights described.--Other than as described in this
section, the rights and responsibilities of the parties to a
Mutual Aid Agreement entered into under this section shall be
as described in the Mutual Aid Agreement.
(c) District of Columbia.--
(1) In general.--The District of Columbia may purchase
liability and indemnification insurance or become self
insured against claims arising under a Mutual Aid Agreement
authorized under this section.
(2) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out
paragraph (1).
(d) Liability and Actions at Law.--
(1) In general.--Any responding party or its officers or
employees rendering aid or failing to render aid to the
District of Columbia, the Federal Government, the State of
Maryland, the Commonwealth of Virginia, or a locality, under
a Mutual Aid Agreement authorized under this section, and any
party or its officers or employees engaged in training
activities with another party under such a Mutual Aid
Agreement, shall be liable on account of any act or omission
of its officers or employees while so engaged or on account
of the maintenance or use of any related equipment,
facilities, or supplies, but only to

[[Page H8952]]

the extent permitted under the laws and procedures of the
State of the party rendering aid.
(2) Actions.--Any action brought against a party or its
officers or employees on account of an act or omission in the
rendering of aid to the District of Columbia, the Federal
Government, the State of Maryland, the Commonwealth of
Virginia, or a locality, or failure to render such aid or on
account of the maintenance or use of any related equipment,
facilities, or supplies may be brought only under the laws
and procedures of the State of the party rendering aid and
only in the Federal or State courts located therein. Actions
against the United States under this section may be brought
only in Federal courts.
(3) Good faith exception.--
(A) Definition.--In this paragraph, the term ``good faith''
shall not include willful misconduct, gross negligence, or
recklessness.
(B) Exception.--No State or locality, or its officers or
employees, rendering aid to another party, or engaging in
training, under a Mutual Aid Agreement shall be liable under
Federal law on account of any act or omission performed in
good faith while so engaged, or on account of the maintenance
or use of any related equipment, facilities, or supplies
performed in good faith.
(4) Immunities.--This section shall not abrogate any other
immunities from liability that any party has under any other
Federal or State law.
(d) Workers Compensation.--
(1) Compensation.--Each party shall provide for the payment
of compensation and death benefits to injured members of the
emergency forces of that party and representatives of
deceased members of such forces if such members sustain
injuries or are killed while rendering aid to the District of
Columbia, the Federal Government, the State of Maryland, the
Commonwealth of Virginia, or a locality, under a Mutual Aid
Agreement, or engaged in training activities under a Mutual
Aid Agreement, in the same manner and on the same terms as if
the injury or death were sustained within their own
jurisdiction.
(2) Other state law.--No party shall be liable under the
law of any State other than its own for providing for the
payment of compensation and death benefits to injured members
of the emergency forces of that party and representatives of
deceased members of such forces if such members sustain
injuries or are killed while rendering aid to the District of
Columbia, the Federal Government, the State of Maryland, the
Commonwealth of Virginia, or a locality, under a Mutual Aid
Agreement or engaged in training activities under a Mutual
Aid Agreement.
(e) Licenses and Permits.--If any person holds a license,
certificate, or other permit issued by any responding party
evidencing the meeting of qualifications for professional,
mechanical, or other skills and assistance is requested by a
receiving jurisdiction, such person will be deemed licensed,
certified, or permitted by the receiving jurisdiction to
render aid involving such skill to meet a public service
event, emergency or training for any such events.

SEC. 453. URBAN AREA COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES.

(a) In General.--Title V of the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (6 U.S.C. 311 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end
the following:

``SEC. 510. HIGH RISK URBAN AREA COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES.

``The Secretary, in consultation with the Federal
Communications Commission and the Secretary of Defense, and
with appropriate governors, mayors, and other State and local
government officials, shall encourage and support the
establishment of consistent and effective communications
capabilities in the event of an emergency in urban areas
determined by the Secretary to be at consistently high levels
of risk from terrorist attack. Such communications
capabilities shall ensure the ability of all levels of
government agencies, including military authorities, and of
first responders, hospitals, and other organizations with
emergency response capabilities to communicate with each
other in the event of an emergency. Additionally, the
Secretary, in conjunction with the Secretary of Defense,
shall develop plans to provide back-up and additional
communications support in the event of an emergency.''.
(b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--Section 1(b) of
that Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to
section 509 the following:

``Sec. 510. High risk urban area communications capabilities.''.

SEC. 454. PRIVATE SECTOR PREPAREDNESS.

(a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Private sector organizations own 85 percent of the
Nation's critical infrastructure and employ the vast majority
of the Nation's workers.
(2) Unless a terrorist attack targets a military or other
secure government facility, the first people called upon to
respond will likely be civilians.
(3) Despite the exemplary efforts of some private entities,
the private sector remains largely unprepared for a terrorist
attack, due in part to the lack of a widely accepted standard
for private sector preparedness.
(4) Preparedness in the private sector and public sector
for rescue, restart and recovery of operations should
include--
(A) a plan for evacuation;
(B) adequate communications capabilities; and
(C) a plan for continuity of operations.
(5) The American National Standards Institute recommends a
voluntary national preparedness standard for the private
sector based on the existing American National Standard on
Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity
Programs (NFPA 1600), with appropriate modifications. This
standard would establish a common set of criteria and
terminology for preparedness, disaster management, emergency
management, and business continuity programs.
(6) The mandate of the Department of Homeland Security
extends to working with the private sector, as well as
government entities.
(b) Private Sector Preparedness Program.--
(1) In general.--Title V of the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (6 U.S.C. 311 et seq.), as amended by section 453, is
amended by adding at the end the following:

``SEC. 511. PRIVATE SECTOR PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM.

``The Secretary shall establish a program to promote
private sector preparedness for terrorism and other
emergencies, including promoting the adoption of a voluntary
national preparedness standard such as the private sector
preparedness standard developed by the American National
Standards Institute and based on the National Fire Protection
Association 1600 Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management
and Business Continuity Programs.''.
(2) Technical and conforming amendment.--Section 1(b) of
that Act, as amended by section 453, is amended by inserting
after the item relating to section 510 the following:

``Sec. 511. Private sector preparedness program.''.

(c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
insurance and credit-rating industries should consider
compliance with the voluntary national preparedness standard,
the adoption of which is promoted by the Secretary of
Homeland Security under section 511 of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002, as added by subsection (b), in assessing
insurability and credit worthiness.

SEC. 455. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND READINESS ASSESSMENTS.

(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) Under section 201 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002
(6 U.S.C 121), the Department of Homeland Security, through
the Under Secretary for Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection, has the responsibility--
(A) to carry out comprehensive assessments of the
vulnerabilities of the key resources and critical
infrastructure of the United States, including the
performance of risk assessments to determine the risks posed
by particular types of terrorist attacks within the United
States;
(B) to identify priorities for protective and supportive
measures; and
(C) to develop a comprehensive national plan for securing
the key resources and critical infrastructure of the United
States.
(2) Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7,
issued on December 17, 2003, the Secretary of Homeland
Security was given 1 year to develop a comprehensive plan to
identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of
critical infrastructure and key resources.
(3) Consistent with the report of the National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, the Secretary of
Homeland Security should--
(A) identify those elements of the United States'
transportation, energy, communications, financial, and other
institutions that need to be protected;
(B) develop plans to protect that infrastructure; and
(C) exercise mechanisms to enhance preparedness.
(b) Reports on Risk Assessment and Readiness.--Not later
than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act and
annually thereafter, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall
submit a report to Congress on--
(1) the Department of Homeland Security's progress in
completing vulnerability and risk assessments of the Nation's
critical infrastructure;
(2) the adequacy of the Government's plans to protect such
infrastructure; and
(3) the readiness of the Government to respond to threats
against the United States.

SEC. 456. REPORT ON NORTHERN COMMAND AND DEFENSE OF THE
UNITED STATES HOMELAND.

(a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Department of Defense has primary responsibility
for the military defense of the United States.
(2) Prior to September 11, 2001, the North American
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), which had responsibility
for defending United States airspace, focused on threats
coming from outside the borders of the United States.
(3) The United States Northern Command has been established
to assume responsibility for the military defense of the
United

[[Page H8953]]

States, as well as to provide military support to civil
authorities.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the Secretary of Defense should regularly assess the adequacy
of the plans and strategies of the United States Northern
Command with a view to ensuring that the United States
Northern Command is prepared to respond effectively to all
threats within the United States, should it be called upon to
do so by the President.
(c) Annual Report.--
(1) Requirement for report.--The Secretary of Defense shall
submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and
the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives an annual report describing the plans and
strategies of the United States Northern Command to defend
the United States against all threats within the United
States, in the case that it is called upon to do so by the
President.
(2) Submission of report.--The annual report required by
paragraph (1) shall be submitted in conjunction with the
submission of the President's budget request to Congress.

SEC. 457. EFFECTIVE DATE.

Notwithstanding section 341 or any other provision of this
Act, this subtitle takes effect on the date of the enactment
of this Act.

Subtitle E--Privacy and Passenger Identification Verification

SEC. 461. PRIVACY AND PASSENGER IDENTIFICATION VERIFICATION
TECHNOLOGIES.

(a) In General.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall
consult with the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board
in the development of any program to use passenger
identification verification technologies.
(b) Delay of Program for Report.--
(1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, no Federal program for passenger verification
identification technologies shall begin until after the
Secretary of Homeland Security has submitted a report to
Congress and to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board about the program.
(2) Report contents.--The report shall address the privacy
and civil liberty implications of the program, including the
accuracy and reliability of the technologies used, and
whether the program incorporates the necessary architectural,
operational, technological, and procedural safeguards to
protect privacy and civil liberties.

Subtitle F--Homeland Security Grants

SEC. 461. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the ``Homeland Security Grant
Enhancement Act of 2004''.

SEC. 462. DEFINITIONS.

In this subtitle, the following definitions shall apply:
(1) Insular area.--The term ``insular area'' means American
Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands.
(2) Large high-threat state fund.--The term ``Large High-
Threat State Fund'' means the fund containing amounts
authorized to be appropriated for States that elect to
receive Federal financial assistance through a per capita
share of 38.625 percent of the amount appropriated for the
State Homeland Security Grant Program.
(3) Local government.--The term ``local government'' has
the same meaning given that term in section 2 of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101).
(4) State.--The term ``State'' means each of the several
States of the United States and the District of Columbia.
(5) State homeland security grant program.--The term
``State Homeland Security Grant Program'' means the program
receiving 75 percent of the amount appropriated for the
Threat-Based Homeland Security Grant Program.
(6) Threat-based homeland security grant program.--The term
``Threat-Based Homeland Security Grant Program'' means the
program authorized under section 6.
(7) Urban area security initiative grant program.--The term
``Urban Area Security Initiative Grant Program'' means the
program receiving 25 percent of the amount appropriated for
the Threat-Based Homeland Security Grant Program.

SEC. 463. PRESERVATION OF PRE-9/11 GRANT PROGRAMS FOR
TRADITIONAL FIRST RESPONDER MISSIONS.

(a) In General.--This subtitle shall not be construed to
affect any authority to award grants under any Federal grant
program listed under subsection (b), which existed on
September 10, 2001, to enhance traditional missions of State
and local law enforcement, firefighters, ports, emergency
medical services, or public health missions.
(b) Programs Included.--The programs referred to in
subsection (a) are the following:
(1) The Firefighter Assistance Program authorized under
section 33 of the Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act of
1974 (15 U.S.C. 2229).
(2) The Emergency Management Performance Grant Program and
the Urban Search and Rescue Grant program authorized under--
(A) title VI of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5195 et seq.);
(B) the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and
Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations
Act, 2000 (Public Law 106-74; 113 Stat. 1047 et seq.); and
(C) the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977 (42 U.S.C.
7701 et seq.).
(4) The Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law
Enforcement Assistance Programs authorized under part E of
title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968 (42 U.S.C. 3750 et seq.).
(5) The Public Safety and Community Policing (COPS ON THE
BEAT) Grant Program authorized under part Q of title I of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C.
3796dd et seq.).
(6) Grant programs under the Public Health Service Act
regarding preparedness for bioterrorism and other public
health emergencies and the Emergency Response Assistance
Program authorized under section 1412 of the Defense Against
Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 2312).

SEC. 464. INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE TO COORDINATE AND STREAMLINE
HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT PROGRAMS.

(a) In General.--The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6
U.S.C. 101 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 801
the following:

``SEC. 802. INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE TO COORDINATE AND
STREAMLINE HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT PROGRAMS.

``(a) Establishment.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary, in coordination with the
Attorney General, the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
the Secretary of Transportation, the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency, and other agencies providing
assistance for first responder preparedness, as identified by
the President, shall establish the Interagency Committee to
Coordinate and Streamline Homeland Security Grant Programs
(referred to in this subtitle as the `Interagency
Committee').
``(2) Composition.--The Interagency Committee shall be
composed of--
``(A) a representative of the Department;
``(B) a representative of the Department of Health and
Human Services;
``(C) a representative of the Department of Transportation;
``(D) a representative of the Department of Justice;
``(E) a representative of the Environmental Protection
Agency; and
``(F) a representative of any other department or agency
determined to be necessary by the President.
``(3) Responsibilities.--The Interagency Committee shall--
``(A) report on findings to the Information Clearinghouse
established under section 801(d);
``(B) consult with State and local governments and
emergency response providers regarding their homeland
security needs and capabilities;
``(C) advise the Secretary on the development of
performance measures for homeland security grant programs and
the national strategy for homeland security;
``(D) compile a list of homeland security assistance
programs;
``(E) not later than 1 year after the effective date of the
Homeland Security Grant Enhancement Act of 2004--
``(i) develop a proposal to coordinate, to the maximum
extent practicable, the planning, reporting, application, and
other guidance documents contained in homeland security
assistance programs to eliminate all redundant and
duplicative requirements; and
``(ii) submit the proposal developed under clause (i) to
Congress and the President.
``(b) Administration.--The Department shall provide
administrative support to the Interagency Committee, which
shall include--
``(1) scheduling meetings;
``(2) preparing agenda;
``(3) maintaining minutes and records; and
``(4) producing reports.
``(c) Chairperson.--The Secretary shall designate a
chairperson of the Interagency Committee.
``(d) Meetings.--The Interagency Committee shall meet--
``(1) at the call of the Secretary; or
``(2) not less frequently than once every 1 month.''.
(b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The table of
contents for the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101
et seq.) is amended by inserting after the item relating to
section 801 the following:

``Sec. 802. Interagency Committee to Coordinate and Streamline Homeland
Security Grant Programs.''.

SEC. 465. STREAMLINING FEDERAL HOMELAND SECURITY GRANTS.

(a) Director of State and Local Government Coordination and
Preparedness.--Section 801(a) of the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (6 U.S.C. 361(a)) is amended to read as follows:
``(a) Establishment.--
``(1) In general.--There is established within the Office
of the Secretary the Office for State and Local Government
Coordination and Preparedness, which shall oversee and
coordinate departmental programs for, and relationships with,
State and local governments.
``(2) Executive director.--The Office established under
paragraph (1) shall be headed by the Executive Director of
State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, who
shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate.''.
(b) Office for Domestic Preparedness.--The Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.) is amended--

[[Page H8954]]

(1) by redesignating section 430 as section 803 and
transferring that section to the end of subtitle A of title
VIII, as amended by section 4; and
(2) in section 803, as redesignated by paragraph (1)--
(A) in subsection (a), by striking ``the Directorate of
Border and Transportation Security'' and inserting ``the
Office for State and Local Government Coordination and
Preparedness'';
(B) in subsection (b), by striking ``who shall be appointed
by the President'' and all that follows and inserting ``who
shall report directly to the Executive Director of State and
Local Government Coordination and Preparedness.'';
(C) in subsection (c)--
(i) in paragraph (7)--

(I) by striking ``other'' and inserting ``the'';
(II) by striking ``consistent with the mission and
functions of the Directorate''; and
(III) by striking ``and'' at the end; and

(ii) in paragraph (8)--

(I) by inserting ``carrying out'' before ``those
elements'';
(II) by striking the period at the end and inserting ``;
and'' ; and

(iii) by adding at the end the following:
``(9) managing the Homeland Security Information
Clearinghouse established under section 801(d).'';
(D) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and
(E) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:
``(d) Training and Exercises Office Within the Office for
Domestic Preparedness.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary shall create within the
Office for Domestic Preparedness an internal office that
shall be the proponent for all national domestic
preparedness, training, education, and exercises within the
Office for State and Local Government Coordination.
``(2) Office head.--The Secretary shall select an
individual with recognized expertise in first-responder
training and exercises to head the office, and such person
shall report directly to the Director of the Office of
Domestic Preparedness.''.
(c) Technical and Conforming Amendments.--The table of
contents for the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101
et seq.) is amended--
(1) by striking the item relating to section 430;
(2) by amending section 801 to read as follows:

``Sec. 801. Office of State and Local Government Coordination and
Preparedness.''; and

(3) by inserting after the item relating to section 802, as
added by this Act, the following:

``Sec. 803. Office for Domestic Preparedness.''.

(d) Establishment of Homeland Security Information
Clearinghouse.--Section 801 of the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.), as amended by subsection (a), is
further amended by adding at the end the following:
``(d) Homeland Security Information Clearinghouse.--
``(1) Establishment.--There is established within the
Office for State and Local Government Coordination a Homeland
Security Information Clearinghouse (referred to in this
section as the `Clearinghouse'), which shall assist States,
local governments, and first responders in accordance with
paragraphs (2) through (5).
``(2) Homeland security grant information.--The
Clearinghouse shall create a new website or enhance an
existing website, establish a toll-free number, and produce a
single publication that each contain information regarding
the homeland security grant programs identified under section
802(a)(4).
``(3) Technical assistance.--The Clearinghouse, in
consultation with the Interagency Committee established under
section 802, shall provide information regarding--
``(A) technical assistance provided by any Federal agency
to States and local governments to conduct threat analyses
and vulnerability assessments; and
``(B) templates for conducting threat analyses and
vulnerability assessments.
``(4) Best practices.--The Clearinghouse shall work with
States, local governments, emergency response providers and
the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium, and private
organizations to gather, validate, and disseminate
information regarding successful State and local homeland
security programs and practices.
``(5) Use of federal funds.--The Clearinghouse shall
compile information regarding equipment, training, and other
services purchased with Federal funds provided under the
homeland security grant programs identified under section
802(a)(4), and make such information, and information
regarding voluntary standards of training, equipment, and
exercises, available to States, local governments, and first
responders.
``(6) Other information.--The Clearinghouse shall provide
States, local governments, and first responders with any
other information that the Secretary determines necessary.''.

SEC. 466. THREAT-BASED HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM.

(a) Grants Authorized.--The Secretary of Homeland Security
(referred to in this section as the ``Secretary'') may award
grants to States and local governments to enhance homeland
security.
(b) Use of Funds.--
(1) In general.--Grants awarded under subsection (a)--
(A) shall be used to address homeland security matters
related to acts of terrorism or major disasters and related
capacity building; and
(B) shall not be used to supplant ongoing first responder
expenses or general protective measures.
(2) Allowable uses.--Grants awarded under subsection (a)
may be used to--
(A) develop State plans or risk assessments (including the
development of the homeland security plan) to respond to
terrorist attacks and strengthen all hazards emergency
planning and communitywide plans for responding to terrorist
or all hazards emergency events that are coordinated with the
capacities of applicable Federal, State, and local
governments, first responders, and State and local government
health agencies;
(B) develop State, regional, or local mutual aid
agreements;
(C) purchase or upgrade equipment based on State and local
needs as identified under a State homeland security plan;
(D) conduct exercises to strengthen emergency preparedness
of State and local first responders including law
enforcement, firefighting personnel, and emergency medical
service workers, and other emergency responders identified in
a State homeland security plan;
(E) pay for overtime expenses relating to--
(i) training activities consistent with the goals outlined
in a State homeland security plan;
(ii) as determined by the Secretary, activities relating to
an increase in the threat level under the Homeland Security
Advisory System; and
(iii) any other activity relating to the State Homeland
Security Strategy, and approved by the Secretary;
(F) promote training regarding homeland security
preparedness including--
(i) emergency preparedness responses to a use or threatened
use of a weapon of mass destruction; and
(ii) training in the use of equipment, including detection,
monitoring, and decontamination equipment, and personal
protective gear; and
(G) conduct any activity permitted under the Law
Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Grant Program.
(3) Prohibited uses.--
(A) Construction.--Grants awarded under subsection (a) may
not be used to construct buildings or other physical
facilities, except those described in section 611 of the
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
Act (42 U.S.C. 5196) and approved by the Secretary in the
homeland security plan certified under subsection (d), or to
acquire land.
(B) Cost sharing.--Grant funds provided under this section
shall not be used for any State or local government cost
sharing contribution request under this section.
(c) Application.--
(1) Submission.--A State may apply for a grant under this
section by submitting to the Secretary an application at such
time, and in such manner, and containing such information the
Secretary may reasonably require.
(2) Revisions.--A State may revise a homeland security plan
certified under subsection (d) at the time an application is
submitted under paragraph (1) after receiving approval from
the Secretary.
(3) Approval.--The Secretary shall not award a grant under
this section unless the application submitted by the State
includes a homeland security plan meeting the requirements of
subsection (d).
(4) Release of funds.--The Secretary shall release grant
funds to States with approved plans after the approval of an
application submitted under this subsection.
(d) Homeland Security Plan.--
(1) In general.--An application submitted under subsection
(c) shall include a certification that the State has prepared
a 3-year State homeland security plan (referred to in this
subsection as the ``plan'') to respond to terrorist attacks
and strengthen all hazards emergency planning that has been
approved by the Secretary.
(2) Contents.--The plan shall contain measurable goals and
objectives that--
(A) establish a 3-year strategy to set priorities for the
allocation of funding to political subdivisions based on the
risk, capabilities, and needs described under paragraph
(3)(C);
(B) provide for interoperable communications;
(C) provide for local coordination of response and recovery
efforts, including procedures for effective incident command
in conformance with the National Incident Management System;
(D) ensure that first responders and other emergency
personnel have adequate training and appropriate equipment
for the threats that may occur;
(E) provide for improved coordination and collaboration
among police, fire, and public health authorities at State
and local levels;
(F) coordinate emergency response and public health plans;
(G) mitigate risks to critical infrastructure that may be
vulnerable to terrorist attacks;
(H) promote regional coordination among contiguous local
governments;
(I) identify necessary protective measures by private
owners of critical infrastructure;

[[Page H8955]]

(J) promote orderly evacuation procedures when necessary;
(K) ensure support from the public health community for
measures needed to prevent, detect and treat bioterrorism,
and radiological and chemical incidents;
(L) increase the number of local jurisdictions
participating in local and statewide exercises;
(M) meet preparedness goals as determined by the Secretary;
and
(N) include a report from the relevant advisory committee
established under paragraph (3)(D) that documents the areas
of support, disagreement, or recommended changes to the plan
before its submission to the Secretary.
(3) Development process.--
(A) In general.--In preparing the plan under this section,
a State shall--
(i) provide for the consideration of all homeland security
needs;
(ii) follow a process that is continuing, inclusive,
cooperative, and comprehensive, as appropriate; and
(iii) coordinate the development of the plan with the
homeland security planning activities of local governments.
(B) Coordination with local planning activities.--The
coordination under subparagraph (A)(iii) shall contain input
from local stakeholders, including--
(i) local officials, including representatives of rural,
high-population, and high-threat jurisdictions;
(ii) first responders and emergency response providers; and
(iii) private sector companies, such as railroads and
chemical manufacturers.
(C) Scope of planning.--Each State preparing a plan under
this section shall, in conjunction with the local
stakeholders under subparagraph (B), address all the
information requested by the Secretary, and complete a
comprehensive assessment of--
(i) risk, including a--

(I) vulnerability assessment;
(II) threat assessment; and
(III) public health assessment, in coordination with the
State bioterrorism plan; and

(ii) capabilities and needs, including--

(I) an evaluation of current preparedness, mitigation, and
response capabilities based on such assessment mechanisms as
shall be determined by the Secretary;
(II) an evaluation of capabilities needed to address the
risks described under clause (i); and
(III) an assessment of the shortfall between the
capabilities described under subclause (I) and the required
capabilities described under subclause (II).

(D) Advisory committee.--
(i) In general.--Each State preparing a plan under this
section shall establish an advisory committee to receive
comments from the public and the local stakeholders
identified under subparagraph (B).
(ii) Composition.--The Advisory Committee shall include
local officials, local first responders, and emergency
response providers that are representative of the counties,
cities, and towns within the State, and which shall include
representatives of rural, high-population, and high-threat
jurisdictions.
(4) Plan approval.--The Secretary shall approve a plan upon
finding that the plan meets the requirements of--
(A) paragraphs (2) and (3);
(B) the interim performance measurements under subsection
(g)(1), or the national performance standards under
subsection (g)(2); and
(C) any other criteria the Secretary determines necessary
to the approval of a State plan.
(5) Review of advisory committee report.--The Secretary
shall review the recommendations of the advisory committee
report incorporated into a plan under subsection (d)(2)(N),
including any dissenting views submitted by advisory
committee members, to ensure cooperation and coordination
between local and State jurisdictions in planning the use of
grant funds under this section.
(e) Tentative Allocation.--
(1) Urban area security initiative grant program.--
(A) In general.--The Secretary shall allocate 25 percent of
the funds appropriated under the Threat-Based Homeland
Security Grant Program for discretionary grants to be
provided directly to local governments, including multistate
entities established by a compact between 2 or more States,
in high threat areas, as determined by the Secretary based on
the criteria under subparagraph (B).
(B) Criteria.--The Secretary shall ensure that each local
government receiving a grant under this paragraph--
(i) has a large population or high population density;
(ii) has a high degree of threat, risk, and vulnerability
related to critical infrastructure or not less than 1 key
asset identified by the Secretary or State homeland security
plan;
(iii) has an international border with Canada or Mexico, or
coastline bordering international waters of Canada, Mexico,
or bordering the Atlantic Ocean, the Pacific Ocean, or the
Gulf of Mexico; or
(iv) are subject to other threat factors specified in
writing by the Secretary.
(C) Consistency.--Any grant awarded under this paragraph
shall be used to supplement and support, in a consistent and
coordinated manner, those activities and objectives described
under subsection (b) or a State homeland security plan.
(D) Coordination.--The Secretary shall ensure that any
grants made under this paragraph encourage multiple
contiguous units of local government and mutual aid partners
to coordinate any homeland security activities.
(2) State homeland security grant program.--
(A) States.--Each State whose application is approved under
subsection (c) shall receive, for each fiscal year, the
greater of--
(i) 0.75 percent of the amounts appropriated for the State
Homeland Security Grant Program; or
(ii) the State's per capita share, as defined by the 2002
census population estimate, of 38.625 percent of the State
Homeland Security Grant Program.
(B) Insular areas.--Each insular area shall receive, for
each fiscal year, the greater of--
(i) 0.075 percent of the amounts appropriated for the State
Homeland Security Grant Program; or
(ii) the insular area's per capita share, as defined by the
2002 census population estimate, of 38.625 percent of the
State Homeland Security Grant Program.
(3) Secondary distribution.--After the distribution of
funds under paragraph (2), the Secretary shall, from the
remaining funds for the State Homeland Security Grant Program
and 10.8 percent of the amount appropriated for the Threat-
Based Homeland Security Grant Program pursuant to subsection
(j)(1), distribute amounts to each State that--
(A) has a substantial percentage of its population residing
in Metropolitan Statistical Areas, as defined by the Office
of Management and Budget;
(B) has a high degree of threat, risk, and vulnerability
related to critical infrastructure or not less than 1 key
asset identified by the Secretary or State homeland security
plan;
(C) has an international border with Canada or Mexico, or
coastline bordering international waters of Canada, Mexico,
or bordering the Atlantic Ocean, the Pacific Ocean, or the
Gulf of Mexico; or
(D) are subject to other threat factors specified in
writing by the Secretary.
(4) Distribution of funds.--If the amounts tentatively
allocated under paragraphs (1) through (3) equal the sum of
the amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (j), the
Secretary shall distribute the appropriated amounts based on
the tentative allocation.
(5) Proportional reduction.--If the amount appropriated for
the Large High-Threat State Fund pursuant to subsection
(j)(2) is less than 10.8 percent of the amount appropriated
for the Threat-Based Homeland Security Grant Program pursuant
to subsection (j)(1), the Secretary shall proportionately
reduce the amounts tentatively allocated under paragraphs (1)
through (3) so that the amount distributed is equal to the
sum of the amounts appropriated for such programs.
(6) Funding for local entities and first responders.--The
Secretary shall require recipients of the State Homeland
Security Grant to provide local governments and first
responders, consistent with the applicable State homeland
security plan, with not less than 80 percent of the grant
funds, the resources purchased with such grant funds, or a
combination thereof, not later than 60 days after receiving
grant funding.
(7) Supplement not supplant.--Amounts appropriated for
grants under this subsection shall be used to supplement and
not supplant other State and local public funds obligated for
the purposes provided under this Act.
(8) Law enforcement terrorism prevention program.--
(A) In general.--The Secretary shall designate not more
than 25 percent of the amounts allocated through the State
Homeland Security Grant Program to be used for the Law
Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program to provide grants to
law enforcement agencies to enhance capabilities for
terrorism prevention.
(B) Use of funds.--Grants awarded under this paragraph may
be used for--
(i) information sharing to preempt terrorist attacks;
(ii) target hardening to reduce the vulnerability of
selected high value targets;
(iii) threat recognition to recognize the potential or
development of a threat;
(iv) intervention activities to interdict terrorists before
they can execute a threat;
(v) interoperable communication systems;
(vi) overtime expenses related to the State Homeland
Security Strategy approved by the Secretary; and
(vii) any other terrorism prevention activity authorized by
the Secretary.
(f) Report on Homeland Security Spending.--Each recipient
of a grant under this section shall annually submit a report
to the Secretary that contains--
(A) an accounting of the amount of State and local funds
spent on homeland security activities under the applicable
State homeland security plan; and
(B) information regarding the use of grant funds by units
of local government as required by the Secretary.
(g) Accountability.--
(1) Interim performance measures.--
(A) In general.--Before establishing performance standards
under paragraph (2), the Secretary shall assist each State in
establishing interim performance measures based upon--

[[Page H8956]]

(i) the goals and objectives under subsection (d)(2); and
(ii) any other factors determined by the Secretary.
(B) Annual report.--Before establishing performance
measures under paragraph (2), each State with an approved
State plan shall submit to the Secretary a report detailing
the progress the State has made in meeting the interim
performance measures established under subparagraph (A).
(2) National performance standards.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall set national
performance standards based in part on the goals and
objectives under subsection (d)(2) and any other factors the
Secretary determines relevant.
(B) Compliance.--The Secretary shall ensure that State
plans are in conformance with the standards set under
subparagraph (A).
(C) Annual report.--After the establishment of performance
standards under subparagraph (A), each State with an approved
State homeland security plan shall submit to the Secretary a
report on the progress the State has made in meeting such
standards.
(3) General accounting office access to information.--Each
recipient of a grant under this section and the Department of
Homeland Security shall provide the General Accounting Office
with full access to information regarding the activities
carried out under this section.
(4) Audit.--Grant recipients that expend $500,000 or more
in Federal funds during any fiscal year shall submit to the
Secretary an organization wide financial and compliance audit
report in conformance with the requirements of chapter 75 of
title 31, United States Code.
(h) Remedies for Non-Compliance.--
(1) In general.--If the Secretary finds, after reasonable
notice and an opportunity for a hearing, that a recipient of
a grant under this section has failed to substantially comply
with any provision of this section, the Secretary shall--
(A) terminate any payment of grant funds to be made to the
recipient under this section;
(B) reduce the amount of payment of grant funds to the
recipient by an amount equal to the amount of grants funds
that were not expended by the recipient in accordance with
this section; or
(C) limit the use of grant funds received under this
section to programs, projects, or activities not affected by
the failure to comply.
(2) Duration of penalty.--The Secretary shall apply an
appropriate penalty under paragraph (1) until such time as
the Secretary determines that the grant recipient is in full
compliance with this section.
(3) Direct funding.--If a State fails to substantially
comply with any provision of this section, including failing
to provide local governments with grant funds or resources
purchased with grant funds in a timely fashion, a local
government entitled to receive such grant funds or resources
may petition the Secretary, at such time and in such manner
as determined by the Secretary, to request that grant funds
or resources be provided directly to the local government.
(i) Reports to Congress.--The Secretary shall submit an
annual report to Congress that provides--
(1) findings relating to the performance standards
established under subsection (g);
(2) the status of preparedness goals and objectives;
(3) an evaluation of how States and local governments are
meeting preparedness goals and objectives;
(4) the total amount of resources provided to the States;
(5) the total amount of resources provided to units of
local government; and
(6) a list of how these resources were expended.
(j) Authorization of Appropriations.--
(1) Threat-based homeland security grant program.--There
are authorized to be appropriated such sums as are necessary
to carry out this section.
(2) Large high-threat state fund.--There are authorized to
be appropriated 10.8 percent of the funds appropriated in any
fiscal year pursuant to paragraph (1), which shall be used to
carry out the Large High-Threat State Fund.

SEC. 467. ELIMINATING HOMELAND SECURITY FRAUD, WASTE, AND
ABUSE.

(a) Annual General Accounting Office Audit and Report.--
(1) Audit.--The Comptroller General shall conduct an annual
audit of the Threat Based Homeland Security Grant Program.
(2) Report.--The Comptroller General shall provide a report
to Congress on the results of the audit conducted under
paragraph (1), which includes--
(A) an analysis of whether the grant recipients allocated
funding consistent with the State homeland security plan and
the guidelines established by the Department of Homeland
Security; and
(B) the amount of funding devoted to overtime and
administrative expenses.
(b) Reviews of Threat-Based Homeland Security Funding.--The
Secretary, through the appropriate agency, shall conduct
periodic reviews of grants made through the Threat Based
Homeland Security Grant Program to ensure that recipients
allocate funds consistent with the guidelines established by
the Department of Homeland Security.
(c) Remedies for Non-Compliance.--If the Secretary
determines, after reasonable notice and an opportunity for a
hearing, that a recipient of a Threat Based Homeland Security
Grant has failed to substantially comply with any regulations
or guidelines issues by the Department regarding eligible
expenditures, the Secretary shall--
(1) terminate any payment of grant funds scheduled to be
made to the recipient;
(2) reduce the amount of payment of grant finds to the
recipient by an amount equal to the amount of grant funds
that were not expended by the recipient in accordance with
such guidelines; or
(3) limit the use of grant funds received under the Threat
Based Homeland Security Grant Program to programs, projects,
or activities not affected by the failure to comply.
(d) Duration of Penalty.--The Secretary shall apply an
appropriate penalty under subsection (c) until such time as
the Secretary determines that the grant recipient is in full
compliance with the guidelines established by the Department
of Homeland Security.

SEC. 468. FLEXIBILITY IN UNSPENT HOMELAND SECURITY FUNDS.

(a) Reallocation of Funds.--The Director of the Office for
Domestic Preparedness, Department of Homeland Security, shall
allow any State to request approval to reallocate funds
received pursuant to appropriations for the State Homeland
Security Grant Program under Public Laws 105-277 (112 Stat.
2681 et seq.), 106-113 (113 Stat. 1501A-3 et seq.), 106-553
(114 Stat. 2762A-3 et seq.), 107-77 (115 Stat. 78 et seq.),
or the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution of 2003 (Public
Law 108-7), among the 4 categories of equipment, training,
exercises, and planning.
(b) Approval of Reallocation Requests.--The Director shall
approve reallocation requests under subsection (a) in
accordance with the State plan and any other relevant factors
that the Secretary of Homeland Security determines to be
necessary.
(c) Limitation.--A waiver under this section shall not
affect the obligation of a State to pass through 80 percent
of the amount appropriated for equipment to units of local
government.

SEC. 469. CERTIFICATION RELATIVE TO THE SCREENING OF
MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE TRANSPORTED INTO THE
UNITED STATES.

(a) In General.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall
deny entry into the United States of any commercial motor
vehicle (as defined in section 31101(1) of title 49, United
States Code) carrying municipal solid waste unless and until
the Secretary certifies to Congress that the methodologies
and technologies used by the Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection of the Department of Homeland Security to screen
for and detect the presence of chemical, nuclear, biological,
and radiological weapons in such waste are as effective as
the methodologies and technologies used by the Bureau to
screen for such materials in other items of commerce entering
into the United States by commercial motor vehicle transport.
(b) Defined Term.--In this section, the term ``municipal
solid waste'' includes sludge (as defined in section 1004 of
the Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. 6903)).

Subtitle G--Public Safety Spectrum

SEC. 471. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the ``Spectrum Availability
for Emergency-Response and Law-Enforcement To Improve Vital
Emergency Services Act'' or the ``SAVE LIVES Act''.

SEC. 472. FINDINGS.

[[Page H8957]]

other crisis, such as a hurricane, tornado, flood, or
earthquake.
(5) In the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Congress set a date
of December 31, 2006, for the termination of the digital
television transition. Under current law, however, the
deadline will be extended if fewer than 85 percent of the
television households in a market are able to continue
receiving local television broadcast signals.
(6) Federal Communications Commission Chairman Michael K.
Powell testified at a hearing before the Senate Commerce,
Science, and Transportation Committee on September 8, 2004,
that, absent government action, this extension may allow the
digital television transition to continue for ``decades'' or
``multiples of decades''.
(7) The Nation's public safety and welfare cannot be put
off for ``decades'' or ``multiples of decades''. The Federal
government should ensure that this spectrum is available for
use by public safety organizations by January 1, 2009.
(8) Any plan to end the digital television transition would
be incomplete if it did not ensure that consumers would be
able to continue to enjoy over-the-air broadcast television
with minimal disruption. If broadcasters air only a digital
signal, some consumers may be unable to view digital
transmissions using their analog-only television set. Local
broadcasters are truly an important part of our homeland
security and often an important communications vehicle in the
event of a national emergency. Therefore, consumers who rely
on over-the-air television, particularly those of limited
economic means, should be assisted.
(9) The New America Foundation has testified before
Congress that the cost to assist these 17.4 million
exclusively over-the-air households to continue to view
television is less than $1 billion dollars for equipment,
which equates to roughly 3 percent of the Federal revenue
likely from the auction of the analog television spectrum.
(10) Specifically, the New America Foundation has estimated
that the Federal Government's auction of this spectrum could
yield $30-to-$40 billion in revenue to the Treasury. Chairman
Powell stated at the September 8, 2004, hearing that
``estimates of the value of that spectrum run anywhere from
$30 billion to $70 billion''.
(11) Additionally, there will be societal benefits with the
return of the analog broadcast spectrum. Former FCC Chairman
Reed F. Hundt, at an April 28, 2004, hearing before the
Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee,
testified that this spectrum ``should be the fit and proper
home of wireless broadband''. Mr. Hundt continued, ``Quite
literally, [with this spectrum] the more millions of people
in rural America will be able to afford Big Broadband
Internet access, the more hundreds of millions of people in
the world will be able to afford joining the Internet
community.''.
(12) Due to the benefits that would flow to the Nation's
citizens from the Federal Government reclaiming this analog
television spectrum--including the safety of our Nation's
first responders and those protected by first responders,
additional revenues to the Federal treasury, millions of new
jobs in the telecommunications sector of the economy, and
increased wireless broadband availability to our Nation's
rural citizens--Congress finds it necessary to set January 1,
2009, as a firm date for the return of this analog television
spectrum.

SEC. 473. SETTING A SPECIFIC DATE FOR THE AVAILABILITY OF
SPECTRUM FOR PUBLIC SAFETY ORGANIZATIONS AND
CREATING A DEADLINE FOR THE TRANSITION TO
DIGITAL TELEVISION.

(a) In General.--Section 309(j)(14) of the Communications
Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 309(j)(14)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``2006.'' in subparagraph (A) and inserting
``2008.'';
(2) by striking subparagraph (B) and redesignating
subparagraphs (C) and (D) as subparagraphs (B) and (C);
(3) by striking ``subparagraph (A) or (B),'' in
subparagraph (B), as redesignated, and inserting
``subparagraph (A),'';
(4) by striking ``subparagraph (C)(i),'' in subparagraph
(C), as redesignated, and inserting ``subparagraph (B)(i),'';
and
(5) by adding at the end the following:
``(D) Acceleration of deadline for public safety use.--
``(i) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), the Commission
shall take all action necessary to complete by December 31,
2007--

``(I) the return of television station licenses operating
on channels between 764 and 776 megaHertz and between 794 and
806 megaHertz; and
``(II) assignment of the electromagnetic spectrum between
764 and 776 megahertz, and between 794 and 806 megahertz, for
public safety services.

``(ii) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), the Commission may
modify, reassign, or require the return of, the television
station licenses assigned to frequencies between 758 and 764
megahertz, 776 and 782 megahertz, and 788 and 794 megahertz
as necessary to permit operations by public safety services
on frequencies between 764 and 776 megahertz and between 794
and 806 megahertz, after the date of enactment of the SAVES
LIVES Act, but such modifications, reassignments, or returns
may not take effect until after December 31, 2007.''.
(b) Certain Commercial Use Spectrum.--The Commission shall
assign the spectrum described in section 337(a)(2) of the
Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 337(a)(2)) allocated
for commercial use by competitive bidding pursuant to section
309(j) of that Act (47 U.S.C. 309(j)) no later than 1 year
after the Commission transmits the report required by section
474(a) to the Congress.

SEC. 474. STUDIES OF COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES AND NEEDS.

(a) In General.--The Commission, in consultation with the
Secretary of Homeland Security, shall conduct a study to
assess strategies that may be used to meet public safety
communications needs, including--
(1) the short-term and long-term need for additional
spectrum allocation for Federal, State, and local first
responders, including an additional allocation of spectrum in
the 700 megaHertz band;
(2) the need for a nationwide interoperable broadband
mobile communications network;
(3) the ability of public safety entities to utilize
wireless broadband applications; and
(4) the communications capabilities of first receivers such
as hospitals and health care workers, and current efforts to
promote communications coordination and training among the
first responders and the first receivers.
(b) Reallocation Study.--The Commission shall conduct a
study to assess the advisability of reallocating any amount
of spectrum in the 700 megaHertz band for unlicensed
broadband uses. In the study, the Commission shall consider
all other possible users of this spectrum, including public
safety.
(c) Report.--The Commission shall report the results of the
studies, together with any recommendations it may have, to
the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
and the House of Representatives Committee on Energy and
Commerce within 1 year after the date of enactment of this
Act.

SEC. 475. STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY'S ``SAFECOM'' PROGRAM.

Section 302 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.
182) is amended--
(1) by inserting ``(a) In General.--'' before ``The''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(b) SAFECOM Authorized.--
``(1) In general.--In carrying out subsection (a), the
Under Secretary shall establish a program to address the
interoperability of communications devices used by Federal,
State, tribal, and local first responders, to be known as the
Wireless Public Safety Interoperability Communications
Program, or `SAFECOM'. The Under Secretary shall coordinate
the program with the Director of the Department of Justice's
Office of Science and Technology and all other Federal
programs engaging in communications interoperability
research, development, and funding activities to ensure that
the program takes into account, and does not duplicate, those
programs or activities.
``(2) Components.--The program established under paragraph
(1) shall be designed--
``(A) to provide research on the development of a
communications system architecture that would ensure the
interoperability of communications devices among Federal,
State, tribal, and local officials that would enhance the
potential for a coordinated response to a national emergency;
``(B) to support the completion and promote the adoption of
mutually compatible voluntary consensus standards developed
by a standards development organization accredited by the
American National Standards Institute to ensure such
interoperability; and
``(C) to provide for the development of a model strategic
plan that could be used by any State or region in developing
its communications interoperability plan.
``(3) Authorization of appropriations.--There are
authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary to carry out
this subsection--
``(A) $22,105,000 for fiscal year 2005;
``(B) $22,768,000 for fiscal year 2006;
``(C) $23,451,000 for fiscal year 2007;
``(D) $24,155,000 for fiscal year 2008; and
``(E) $24,879,000 for fiscal year 2009.
``(c) National Baseline Study of Public Safety
Communications Interoperability.--By December 31, 2005, the
Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Science and
Technology shall complete a study to develop a national
baseline for communications interoperability and develop
common grant guidance for all Federal grant programs that
provide communications-related resources or assistance to
State and local agencies, any Federal programs conducting
demonstration projects, providing technical assistance,
providing outreach services, providing standards development
assistance, or conducting research and development with the
public safety community with respect to wireless
communications. The Under Secretary shall transmit a report
to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee on
Energy and Commerce containing the Under Secretary's
findings, conclusions, and recommendations from the study.''.

[[Page H8958]]

SEC. 476. GRANT PROGRAM TO PROVIDE ENHANCED INTEROPERABILITY
OF COMMUNICATIONS FOR FIRST RESPONDERS.

(a) In General.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall
establish a program to help State, local, tribal, and
regional first responders acquire and deploy interoperable
communications equipment, purchase such equipment, and train
personnel in the use of such equipment. The Secretary, in
cooperation with the heads of other Federal departments and
agencies who administer programs that provide communications-
related assistance programs to State, local, and tribal
public safety organizations, shall develop and implement
common standards to the greatest extent practicable.
(b) Applications.--To be eligible for assistance under the
program, a State, local, tribal, or regional first responder
agency shall submit an application, at such time, in such
form, and containing such information as the Under Secretary
of Homeland Security for Science and Technology may require,
including--
(1) a detailed explanation of how assistance received under
the program would be used to improve local communications
interoperability and ensure interoperability with other
appropriate Federal, State, local, tribal, and regional
agencies in a regional or national emergency;
(2) assurance that the equipment and system would--
(A) not be incompatible with the communications
architecture developed under section 302(b)(2)(A) of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002;
(B) would meet any voluntary consensus standards developed
under section 302(b)(2)(B) of that Act; and
(C) be consistent with the common grant guidance
established under section 302(b)(3) of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002.
(c) Grants.--The Under Secretary shall review applications
submitted under subsection (b). The Secretary, pursuant to an
application approved by the Under Secretary, may make the
assistance provided under the program available in the form
of a single grant for a period of not more than 3 years.

SEC. 477. DIGITAL TRANSITION PUBLIC SAFETY COMMUNICATIONS
GRANT AND CONSUMER ASSISTANCE FUND.

(a) In General.--There is established on the books of the
Treasury a separate fund to be known as the ``Digital
Transition Consumer Assistance Fund'', which shall be
administered by the Secretary, in consultation with the
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and
Information.
(b) Crediting of Receipts.--The Fund shall be credited with
the amount specified in section 309(j)(8)(D) of the
Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 309(j)(8)(D)).
(c) Fund Availability.--
(1) Appropriations.--
(A) Consumer assistance program.--There are appropriated to
the Secretary from the Fund such sums, not to exceed
$1,000,000,000, as are required to carry out the program
established under section 478.
(B) PSO grant program.--To the extent that amounts
available in the Fund exceed the amount required to carry out
that program, there are authorized to be appropriated to the
Secretary of Homeland Security, such sums as are required to
carry out the program established under section 476, not to
exceed an amount, determined by the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, on the basis of the findings of the
National Baseline Interoperability study conducted by the
SAFECOM Office of the Department of Homeland Security.
(2) Reversion of unused funds.--Any auction proceeds in the
Fund that are remaining after the date on which the programs
under section 476 and 478 terminate, as determined by the
Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of Commerce
respectively, shall revert to and be deposited in the general
fund of the Treasury.
(d) Deposit of Auction Proceeds.--Paragraph (8) of section
309(j) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 309(j))
is amended--
(1) by inserting ``or subparagraph (D)'' in subparagraph
(A) after ``subparagraph (B)''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(D) Disposition of cash proceeds from auction of channels
52 through 69.--Cash proceeds attributable to the auction of
any eligible frequencies between 698 and 806 megaHertz on the
electromagnetic spectrum conducted after the date of
enactment of the SAVE LIVES Act shall be deposited in the
Digital Transition Consumer Assistance Fund established under
section 477 of that Act.''.

SEC. 478. DIGITAL TRANSITION PROGRAM.

(a) In General.--The Secretary, in consultation with the
Commission and the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget, shall establish a program to assist households--
(1) in the purchase or other acquisition of digital-to-
analog converter devices that will enable television sets
that operate only with analog signal processing to continue
to operate when receiving a digital signal;
(2) in the payment of a one-time installation fee (not in
excess of the industry average fee for the date, locale, and
structure involved, as determined by the Secretary) for
installing the equipment required for residential reception
of services provided by a multichannel video programming
distributor (as defined in section 602(13) of the
Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 602(13)); or
(3) in the purchase of any other device that will enable
the household to receive over-the-air digital television
broadcast signals, but in an amount not in excess of the
average per-household assistance provided under paragraphs
(1) and (2).
(b) Program Criteria.--The Secretary shall ensure that the
program established under subsection (a)--
(1) becomes publicly available no later than January 1,
2008;
(2) gives first priority to assisting lower income
households (as determined by the Director of the Bureau of
the Census for statistical reporting purposes) who rely
exclusively on over-the-air television broadcasts;
(3) gives second priority to assisting other households who
rely exclusively on over-the-air television broadcasts;
(4) is technologically neutral; and
(5) is conducted at the lowest feasible administrative
cost.

SEC. 479. LABEL REQUIREMENT FOR ANALOG TELEVISION SETS.

(a) In General.--Section 303 of the Communications Act of
1934 (47 U.S.C. 303) is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``(z) Require that any apparatus described in paragraph (s)
sold or offered for sale in or affecting interstate commerce
after September 30, 2005, that is incapable of receiving and
displaying a digital television broadcast signal without the
use of an external device that translates digital television
broadcast signals into analog television broadcast signals
have affixed to it and, if it is sold or offered for sale in
a container, affixed to that container, a label that states
that the apparatus will be incapable of displaying over-the-
air television broadcast signals received after December 31,
2008, without the purchase of additional equipment.''.
(b) Shipment Prohibited.--Section 330 of the Communications
Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 330) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:
``(d) Shipment of Unlabeled Obsolescent Television Sets.--
No person shall ship in interstate commerce or manufacture in
the United States any apparatus described in section 303(s)
of this Act except in accordance with rules prescribed by the
Commission under section 303(z) of this Act.''.
(c) Point of Sale Warning.--The Commission, in consultation
with the Federal Trade Commission, shall require the display
at, or in close proximity to, any commercial retail sales
display of television sets described in section 303(z) of the
Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 303(z)) sold or offered
for sale in or affecting interstate commerce after September
30, 2005, of a printed notice that clearly and conspicuously
states that the sets will be incapable of displaying over-
the-air television broadcast signals received after December
31, 2008, without the purchase or lease of additional
equipment.

SEC. 480. REPORT ON CONSUMER EDUCATION PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.

Within 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and
Information, after consultation with the Commission, shall
transmit a report to the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation and the House of Representatives
Committee on Energy and Commerce containing recommendations
with respect to--
(1) an effective program to educate consumers about the
transition to digital television broadcast signals and the
impact of that transition on consumers' choices of equipment
to receive such signals;
(2) the need, if any, for Federal funding for such a
program;
(3) the date of commencement and duration of such a
program; and
(4) what department or agency should have the lead
responsibility for conducting such a program.

SEC. 481. FCC TO ISSUE DECISION IN CERTAIN PROCEEDINGS.

The Commission shall issue a final decision before--
(1) January 1, 2005, in the Matter of Carriage of Digital
Television Broadcast Signals; Amendments to Part 76 of the
Commission's Rules, CS Docket No. 98-120;
(2) January 1, 2005, in the Matter of Public Interest
Obligations of TV Broadcast Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360;
and
(3) January 1, 2006, in the Implementation of the Satellite
Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999; Local Broadcast Signal
Carriage Issues, CS Docket No. 00-96.

SEC. 482. DEFINITIONS.

In this subtitle:
(1) Commission.--The term ``Commission'' means the Federal
Communications Commission.
(2) Fund.--The term ``Fund'' means the Digital Transition
Consumer Assistance Fund established by section 477.
(3) Secretary.--Except where otherwise expressly provided,
the term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of Commerce.

SEC. 483. EFFECTIVE DATE.

Notwithstanding section 341, this subtitle takes effect on
the date of enactment of this Act.
On page 134, line 14, insert ``issue guidelines'' before
``on classification''
On page 134, strike lines 16 and 17 and insert the
following:
commonly accepted processing and access controls, in the
course of which review, the

[[Page H8959]]

President may consider any comments submitted by the Select
Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services,
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Committee on International Relations
of the House of Representatives regarding--
(i) the scope of the review the President should undertake
in formulating the guidelines under this subparagraph; and
(ii) the substance of what guidelines should be issued.
On page 177, after line 17, add the following:

SEC. 226. CONGRESSIONAL APPEALS OF CLASSIFICATION DECISIONS.

(a) Redesignation of Public Interest Declassification Board
as Independent National Security Classification Board.--(1)
Subsection (a) of section 703 of the Public Interest
Declassification Act of 2000 (title VII of Public Law 10-567;
50 U.S.C. 435 note) is amended by striking `` `Public
Interest Declassification Board' '' and inserting ``
`Independent National Security Classification Board' ''.
(2) The heading of such section is amended to read as
follows:

``SEC. 703. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
BOARD.''.

(b) Review of Classification Decisions.--
(1) In general.--The Independent National Security
Classification Board shall, pursuant to a request under
paragraph (3), review any classification decision made by an
executive agency with respect to national security
information.
(2) Access.--The Board shall have access to all documents
or other materials that are classified on the basis of
containing national security information.
(3) Requests for review.--The Board shall review, in a
timely manner, the existing or proposed classification of any
document or other material the review of which is requested
by the chairman or ranking member of--
(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Relations, or the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate; or
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
International Relations, or the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(4) Recommendations.--
(A) In general.--The Board may make recommendations to the
President regarding decisions to classify all or portions of
documents or other material for national security purposes or
to declassify all or portions of documents or other material
classified for such purposes.
(B) Implementation.--Upon receiving a recommendation from
the Board under subparagraph (A), the President shall
either--
(i) accept and implement such recommendation; or
(ii) not later than 60 days after receiving the
recommendation if the President does not accept and implement
such recommendation, transmit in writing to Congress
justification for the President's decision not to implement
such recommendation.
(5) Regulations.--The Board shall prescribe regulations to
carry out this subsection.
(6) Executive agency defined.--In this section, the term
``Executive agency'' has the meaning given that term in
section 105 of title 5, United States Code .
On page 39, strike lines 8 through 11 and insert the
following:
(c) Personnel Strength Level.--Congress shall authorize the
personnel strength level for the National Intelligence
Reserve Corps for each fiscal year.
At the end of subtitle A of title II, add the following:

SEC. __. USE OF UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL REMOTE SENSING SPACE
CAPABILITIES FOR IMAGERY AND GEOSPATIAL
INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS.

(a) In General.--The National Intelligence Director shall
take actions to ensure, to the extent practicable, the
utilization of United States commercial remote sensing space
capabilities to fulfill the imagery and geospatial
information requirements of the intelligence community.
(b) Procedures for Utilization.--The National Intelligence
Director may prescribe procedures for the purpose of meeting
the requirement in subsection (a).
(c) Definitions.--In this section, the terms ``imagery''
and ``geospatial information'' have the meanings given such
terms in section 467 of title 10, United States Code.
On page 9, line 13, strike ``counterterrorism'' and insert
``intelligence, including counterterrorism,''.
On page 23, line 1, strike ``may require modifications''
and insert ``may modify, or may require modifications,''.
On page 28, line 17, strike ``or'' and insert ``and''.
On page 112, beginning on line 12, strike ``Committee on
Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on
Government Reform of the House of Representatives'' and
insert ``Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee
on Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on
Government Reform of the House of Representatives''.
On page 200, strike lines 5 through 11 and insert the
following:

SEC. 307. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PERTAINING TO NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.

Section 105(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 403-5(a)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``ensure'' and inserting
``assist the Director in ensuring''; and
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``appropriate''.
On page 78, line 19, insert ``regular and detailed'' before
``reviews''.
On page 79, strike lines 1 and 2 and insert the following
political considerations, based upon all sources available to
the intelligence community, and performed in a manner
consistent with sound analytic methods and tradecraft,
including reviews for purposes of determining whether or
not--
(A) such product or products state separately, and
distinguish between, the intelligence underlying such product
or products and the assumptions and judgments of analysts
with respect to the intelligence and such product or
products;
(B) such product or products describe the quality and
reliability of the intelligence underlying such product or
products;
(C) such product or products present and explain
alternative conclusions, if any, with respect to the
intelligence underlying such product or products;
(D) such product or products characterizes the
uncertainties, if any, and the confidence in such product or
products; and
(E) the analyst or analysts responsible for such product or
products had appropriate access to intelligence information
from all sources, regardless of the source of the
information, the method of collection of the information, the
elements of the intelligence community that collected the
information, or the location of such collection.
On page 80, line 1, insert ``(A)'' after ``(5)''.
On page 80, line 3, strike ``, upon request,''.
On page 80, between lines 5 and 6, insert the following:
(B) The results of the evaluations under paragraph (4)
shall also be distributed as appropriate throughout the
intelligence community as a method for training intelligence
community analysts and promoting the development of sound
analytic methods and tradecraft. To ensure the widest
possible distribution of the evaluations, the Analytic Review
Unit shall, when appropriate, produce evaluations at multiple
classification levels.
(6) Upon completion of the evaluations under paragraph (4),
the Analytic Review Unit may make such recommendations to the
National Intelligence Director and to appropriate heads of
the elements of the intelligence community for awards,
commendations, additional training, or disciplinary or other
actions concerning personnel as the Analytic Review Unit
considers appropriate in light of such evaluations. Any
recommendation of the Analytic Review Unit under this
paragraph shall not be considered binding on the official
receiving such recommendation.
On page 80, line 6, strike ``Information.--'' and insert
``Information and Personnel.--(1)''.
On page 80, line 8, insert ``, the Analytic Review Unit,
and other staff of the Office of the Ombudsman of the
National Intelligence Authority'' after ``Authority''.
On page 80 line 10, insert ``operational and'' before
``field reports''.
On page 80, between lines 13 and 14, insert the following:
(2) The Ombudsman, the Analytic Review Unit, and other
staff of the Office shall have access to any employee, or any
employee of a contractor, of the intelligence community whose
testimony is needed for the performance of the duties of the
Ombudsman.
On page 108, between lines 8 and 9, insert the following:

SEC. 153. ADDITIONAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS.

(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Foreign language education is essential for the
development of a highly-skilled workforce for the
intelligence community.
(2) Since September 11, 2001, the need for language
proficiency levels to meet required national security
functions has been raised, and the ability to comprehend and
articulate technical and scientific information in foreign
languages has become critical.
(b) Linguistic Requirements.--(1) The National Intelligence
Director shall--
(A) identify the linguistic requirements for the National
Intelligence Authority;
(B) identify specific requirements for the range of
linguistic skills necessary for the intelligence community,
including proficiency in scientific and technical
vocabularies of critical foreign languages; and
(C) develop a comprehensive plan for the Authority to meet
such requirements through the education, recruitment, and
training of linguists.
(2) In carrying out activities under paragraph (1), the
Director shall take into account education grant programs of
the Department of Defense and the Department of Education
that are in existence as of the date of the enactment of this
Act.
(3) Not later than one year after the date of the enactment
of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Director shall
submit to Congress a report on the requirements identified
under paragraph (1), including the success of the Authority
in meeting such requirements. Each report shall notify
Congress of any additional resources determined by the
Director to be required to meet such requirements.

[[Page H8960]]

(4) Each report under paragraph (3) shall be in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(c) Professional Intelligence Training.--The National
Intelligence Director shall require the head of each element
and component within the National Intelligence Authority who
has responsibility for professional intelligence training to
periodically review and revise the curriculum for the
professional intelligence training of the senior and
intermediate level personnel of such element or component in
order to--
(1) strengthen the focus of such curriculum on the
integration of intelligence collection and analysis
throughout the Authority; and
(2) prepare such personnel for duty with other departments,
agencies, and element of the intelligence community.
On page 97, line 10, insert before the period the
following: ``, including through the establishment of
mechanisms for the sharing of information and analysis among
and between national intelligence centers having adjacent or
significantly interrelated geographic regions or functional
areas of intelligence responsibility''.
On page 91, between lines 12 and 13, insert the following:
(C) Employees of Federally Funded Research and Development
Centers (as that term is defined in part 2 of the Federal
Acquisition Regulation), including employees of the
Department of Energy national laboratories who are associated
with field intelligence elements of the Department of Energy,
shall be eligible to serve under contract or other mechanism
with the National Counterterrorism Center under this
paragraph.
On page 98, between lines 21 and 22, insert the following:
(C) employees of Federally Funded Research and Development
Centers (as that term is defined in part 2 of the Federal
Acquisition Regulation), including employees of the
Department of Energy national laboratories who are associated
with field intelligence elements of the Department of Energy,
shall be eligible to serve under contract or other mechanism
with a national intelligence center under this paragraph.
On page 45, between lines 10 and 11, insert the following:
(11) The Chief Scientist of the National Intelligence
Authority.
On page 45, line 11, strike ``(11)'' and insert ``(12)''.
On page 45, line 14, strike ``(12)'' and insert ``(13)''.
On page 59, between lines 14 and 15, insert the following:

SEC. 131. CHIEF SCIENTIST OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
AUTHORITY.

(a) Chief Scientist of National Intelligence Authority.--
There is a Chief Scientist of the National Intelligence
Authority who shall be appointed by the National Intelligence
Director.
(b) Requirement Relating to Appointment.--An individual
appointed as Chief Scientist of the National Intelligence
Authority shall have a professional background and experience
appropriate for the duties of the Chief Scientist.
(c) Duties.--The Chief Scientist of the National
Intelligence Authority shall--
(1) act as the chief representative of the National
Intelligence Director for science and technology;
(2) chair the National Intelligence Authority Science and
Technology Committee under subsection (d);
(3) assist the Director in formulating a long-term strategy
for scientific advances in the field of intelligence;
(4) assist the Director on the science and technology
elements of the budget of the National Intelligence
Authority; and
(5) perform other such duties as may be prescribed by
Director or by law.
(d) National Intelligence Authority Science and Technology
Committee.--(1) There is within the Office of the Chief
Scientist of the National Intelligence Authority a National
Intelligence Authority Science and Technology Committee.
(2) The Committee shall be composed of composed of the
principal science officers of the National Intelligence
Program.
(3) The Committee shall--
(A) coordinate advances in research and development related
to intelligence; and
(B) perform such other functions as the Chief Scientist of
the National Intelligence Authority shall prescribe.
On page 59, line 15, strike ``131.'' and insert ``132.''.
On page 202, line 16, strike ``131(b)'' and insert
``132(b)''.
On page 113, between lines 17 and 18, insert the following:
(b) Termination of Employees.--(1) Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, the National Intelligence Director
may, in the discretion of the Director, terminate the
employment of any officer or employee of the National
Intelligence Authority whenever the Director considers the
termination of employment of such officer or employee
necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States.
(2) Any termination of employment of an officer or employee
under paragraph (1) shall not affect the right of the officer
or employee to seek or accept employment in any other
department, agency, or element of the United States
Government if declared eligible for such employment by the
Office of Personnel Management.
On page 113, line 18, strike ``(b) Rights and Protections''
and insert ``(c) Other Rights and Protections''.
On page 113, after line 24, add the following:
At the appropriate place, insert the follows:
(d) Regulations.--The National Intelligence Director shall
prescribe regulations on the application of the authorities,
rights, and protections in and made applicable by subsection
(a), (b), and (c), to the personnel of the National
Intelligence Authority.
On page 119, strike lines 16 through 18 and insert: ``The
National Intelligence Director shall convene regular meetings
of the Joint Intelligence Community Council.''
``(e) Advice and Opinions of Members Other Than Chairman.--
(1) A member of the Joint Intelligence Community Council
(other than the Chairman) may submit to the Chairman advice
or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an opinion
in addition to, the advice presented by the National
Intelligence Director to the President or the National
Security Council, in the role of the Chairman as Chairman of
the Joint Intelligence Community Council. If a member submits
such advice or opinion, the Chairman shall present the advice
or opinion of such member at the same time the Chairman
presents the advice of the Chairman to the President or the
National Security Council, as the case may be.
``(2) The Chairman shall establish procedures to ensure
that the presentation of the advice of the Chairman to the
President or the National Security Council is not unduly
delayed by reason of the submission of the individual advice
or opinion of another member of the Council.
``(f) Recommendations to Congress.--Any member of the Joint
Intelligence Community Council may make such recommendations
to Congress relating to the intelligence community as such
member considers appropriate.''.
On page 84, beginning on line 8, strike ``joint operations
relating to counterterrorism'' and insert ``interagency
counterterrorism planning and activities''.
On page 126, strike lines 23 through 25.
On page 127, line 1, strike ``(2)'' and insert ``(1)''.
On page 127, line 4, strike ``(3)'' and insert ``(2)''.
On page 128, strike lines 1 through 3 and insert following:
(3) Environment.--The term ``Environment'' means the
Information Sharing Environment as described under subsection
(c).
On page 130, strike line 10 and insert the following:
(c) Information Sharing Environment.--
On page 130, line 20, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 133, lines 5 and 6, delete. ``Director of the
Office of Management and Budget'' and insert ``principal
officer as designated in subsection 206(g)''
On page 133, line 10, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 134, line 2, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 134, line 22, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 135, beginning on line 16, strike ``the Director of
Management and Budget shall submit to the President and'' and
insert ``the President shall submit''.
On page 135 strike lines 19 through 22 and insert
``Environment. The enterprise architecture and implementation
plan shall be prepared by the principal officer in
consultation with the Executive council and shall include--''
On page 135, line 24, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 136, line 3, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 136, line 5, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 136, line 7, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 137, beginning on line 4, strike ``Network'' and
insert ``Environment''.
On page 137, line 8, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 137, line 11, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 137, line 14, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 137, line 16, strike ``Network;'' and insert
``Environment; and''.
On page 137, line 18, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 137, line 21, strike ``that the Director of
Management and Budget determines'' and insert ``determined''
and insert a period.
On page 138, strike lines 1 through 3 and insert the
following:
(g) Responsibilities of Executive Council for Information
Sharing Environment.--
On page 138, beginning on line 4, insert ``(1) Not later
than 120 days after the date of enactment with notification
to Congress, the President shall designate an individual as
the principal officer responsible for information sharing
across the Federal government. That individual shall have and
exercise government wide authority and have management
expertise in enterprise architecture, information sharing and
interoperability.
On page 138, beginning on line 6, strike ``The Director of
Management and Budget'' and insert ``The principal officer
designated under this subsection''
On page 138, beginning on line 9, strike ``Network'' and
insert ``Environment''.
On page 138, line 14, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 138, line 17, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 138, line 21, strike ``to the President and''.

[[Page H8961]]

On page 139, line 5, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 140, strike lines 5 through 17.
On page 140, strike lines 18 and 19 and insert the
following:
(h) Establishment of Executive Council.--
On page 140, beginning on line 22, strike ``line 20 through
line 24'' and insert ``There is established an Executive
Council on information sharing that shall assist the
principal officer as designated under subsection 206(g) in
the execution of the duties under this Act concerning
information sharing.''.
On page 141, line 1, insert ``The Executive Council shall
be chaired by the principal officer designated in subsection
206(g).
On page 141, beginning on line 4, strike ``, who shall
serve as the Chairman of the Executive Council''.
On page 142, beginning on line 2, strike ``assist the
Director of Management and Budget in--'' and insert ``assist
the President in--''.
On page 142, beginning on line 4, strike ``Network'' and
insert ``Environment''.
On page 142, line 8, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 142, line 11, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 142, line 12, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 142, beginning on line 15, strike ``Network;'' and
insert ``Environment; and''.
On page 142, strike lines 22 through 24, and insert (F)
considering input provided by persons from outside the
federal government with significant experience and expertise
in policy technical, and operational matters, including
issues of security, privacy, or civil liberties.
On page 143, beginning on line 7, strike ``the Director of
Management and Budget, in the capacity as Chair of the
Executive Council,'' and insert ``the principal officer as
designated in section 206(g)''.
On page 144, strike line 3 and all that follows through
page 145, line 10.
On page 145 line 11, strike ``(j)'' and insert ``(i)''.
On page 145, beginning on line 14, strike ``through the
Director of Management and Budget'' and insert ``principal
officer as designated in section 206(g).''
On page 145, line 16, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 145, line 21, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 145, line 22, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 146, line 4, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 146, line 7, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 146, line 9, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 146, line 13, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 147, line 2, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 147, line 6, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 147, line 8, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 147, line 11, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 147, line 17, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 147, line 22, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 148, line 6, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 148, line 8, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 148, line 16, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 148, line 17, strike ``(k)'' and insert ``(j)''.
On page 148, line 20, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 148, line 24, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 149, line 3, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 149, line 5, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 149, line 10, strike ``(l)'' and insert ``(k)''.
On page 149, line 13, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 149, line 14, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 149, beginning on line 14, strike ``the Director of
Management and Budget'' and insert ``the principal officer as
designated in section 206(g)''.
On page 149, line 19, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 150, line 2, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 150, line 9, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 150, line 13, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 150, line 16, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 150, line 18, strike ``(m)'' and insert ``(l)''.
On page 150, beginning on line 23, strike ``Network'' and
insert ``Environment''.
On page 151, line 2, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 151, line 3, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 152, line 7, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 152, line 11, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 152, line 19, strike ``(n)'' and insert ``(m)''.
On page 152, beginning on line 21, strike ``to the Director
of Management and Budget''.
On page 153, line 1, strike ``Network'' and insert
``Environment''.
On page 133, line 4, strike ``90 days'' and insert ``180
days''.
On page 134, line 4, strike ``180 days'' and insert ``270
days''.
On page 135, line 15, strike ``270 days'' and insert ``1
year''.
On page 140, line 6, strike ``30 days'' and insert ``90
days''.
On page 145, line 12, strike ``1 year'' and insert ``15
months''.
On page 149, line 16, strike ``1 year'' and insert ``15
months''.
On page 150, line 20, strike ``1 year'' and insert ``15
months''.
On page 212, beginning on line 3, strike ``subsection (b),
this Act, and the amendments made by this Act,'' and insert
``subsections (b), (c), and (d), titles I through III of this
Act, and the amendments made by such titles,''
On page 212, between lines 6 and 7, insert the following:
(b) Specified Effective Dates.--(1) The provisions of
section 206 shall take effect as provided in such provisions.
(2) The provisions of sections 211 and 212 shall take
effect 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
On page 212, line 7, strike ``(b)'' and all that follows
through ``United States'' on line 10 and insert ``(c) Earlier
Effective Date.--In order to safeguard the national security
of the United States through rapid implementation of titles I
through III of this Act while also ensuring a smooth
transition in the implementation of such titles,''.
On page 212, beginning on line 11, strike ``Act (including
the amendments made by this Act), or one or more particular
provisions of this Act'' and insert ``titles I through III of
this Act (including the amendments made by such titles), or
one or more particular provisions of such titles''.
On page 212, between lines 16 and 17, insert the following:
(d) Delayed Effective Date.--(1) Except with respect to a
provision specified in subsection (b), the President may
extend the effective date of a provision of titles I through
III of this Act (including the amendments made by such
provision) for any period up to 180 days after the effective
date otherwise provided by this section for such provision.
(2) The President may extend the effective date of a
provision under paragraph (1) only if the President
determines that the extension is necessary to safeguard the
national security of the United States and after balancing
the need for a smooth transition in the implementation of
titles I through III of this Act against the need for a rapid
implementation of such titles.
On page 212, line 17, strike ``(c)'' and insert ``(e)''.
On page 212, line 18, strike ``(b)'' and insert ``(c) or
(d)''.
On page 212, line 23, strike ``earlier'' and insert
``earlier or delayed''.
On page 212, line 25, strike ``earlier'' and insert
``earlier or delayed''.
On page 28, beginning on line 16, strike ``of the National
Intelligence Director''.
On page 43, beginning on line 1, strike ``OF THE NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR''.
On page 43, beginning on line 5, strike ``of the National
Intelligence Director'' and insert ``for the National
Intelligence Director and the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency''.
On page 43, line 14, add at the end the following: ``Any
use of funds from the Reserve shall be subject to the
direction and approval of the National Intelligence Director
and in accordance with procedures issued by the Director.''.
On page 43, beginning on line 17, strike ``of the National
Intelligence Director''.
On page 141, between lines 15 and 16, insert the following:
(H) the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency or his
designee;
On page 141, line 16, strike ``(H)'' and insert ``(I)''.
On page 141, line 18, strike ``(I)'' and insert ``(J)''.
On page 141, line 21, strike ``(J)'' and insert ``(K)''.
On page 194, beginning on line 23, strike ``of the National
Intelligence Director''.
On page 153, between lines 2 and 3, insert the following:

SEC. 207. REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF
DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD ON PREVENTING AND
DEFENDING AGAINST CLANDESTINE NUCLEAR ATTACK.

(a) Finding.--Congress finds that the June 2004 report of
the Defense Science Board Task Force on Preventing and
Defending Against Clandestine Nuclear Attack--
(1) found that it would be easy for adversaries to
introduce and detonate a nuclear explosive clandestinely in
the United States;
(2) found that clandestine nuclear attack and defense
against such attack should be treated as an emerging aspect
of strategic warfare and that those matters warrant national
and Department of Defense attention; and
(3) called for a serious national commitment to a
multidepartment program to create a multi-element, layered,
global, civil/military complex of systems and capabilities
that can greatly reduce the likelihood of a successful
clandestine attack, achieving levels of protection effective
enough to warrant the effort.
(b) Report.--Not later than 6 months after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the

[[Page H8962]]

Secretary of Defense shall, in consultation with the
Secretary of Energy, submit to the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a
report on the actions proposed to be taken to address the
recommendations of the Defense Science Board Task Force on
Preventing and Defending Against Clandestine Nuclear Attack.
On page 109, line 6, insert the words ``within the National
Intelligence Program'' after the words ``for each
intelligence program''
On page 109, strike lines 12 and 13 and insert the
following:
(B) serve as exclusive milestone decision authority, except
that with respect to Department of Defense programs the
Director shall serve as milestone decision authority jointly
with the Secretary of Defense or the designee of the
Secretary; and
On page 110, strike lines 8 through 18 and insert the
following:
(4) If the National Intelligence Director and the Secretary
of Defense are unable to reach agreement on a milestone
decision under this subsection, the Director shall assume
milestone decision authority subject to review by the
President at the request of the Secretary.
On page 94, between lines 14 and 15, insert the following:
(3) There may be established under this subsection one or
more national intelligence centers having intelligence
responsibility for the following:
(A) The nuclear terrorism threats confronting the United
States.
(B) The chemical terrorism threats confronting the United
States.
(C) The biological terrorism threats confronting the United
States.
On page 94, line 15, strike ``(3)'' and insert ``(4)''.
At the appropriate place, insert the following:

SEC. __. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY USE OF NISAC CAPABILITIES.

The National Intelligence Director shall establish a formal
relationship, including information sharing, between the
intelligence community and the National Infrastructure
Simulation and Analysis Center. Through this relationship,
the intelligence community shall take full advantage of the
capabilities of the National Infrastructure Simulation and
Analysis Center, particularly vulnerability and consequence
analysis, for real time response to reported threats and long
term planning for projected threats.
On page 60, strike line 5 and all that follows through page
77, line 18, and insert the following:

SEC. 141. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
AUTHORITY.

(a) Inspector General of National Intelligence Authority.--
There is an Inspector General of the National Intelligence
Authority. The Inspector General of the National Intelligence
Authority and the Office of the Inspector General of the
National Intelligence Authority shall be subject to the
provisions of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C.
App.).
(b) Amendments to Inspector General Act of 1978 Relating
to Inspector General of National Intelligence Authority.--The
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended--
(1) by redesignating section 8J as section 8K; and
(2) by inserting after section 8I the following new
section:

``special provisions concerning the national intelligence authority

``Sec. 8J. (a)(1) Notwithstanding the last 2 sentences of
section 3(a), the Inspector General of the National
Intelligence Authority (in this section referred to as the
`Inspector General') shall be under the authority, direction,
and control of the National Intelligence Director (in this
section referred to as the `Director') with respect to audits
or investigations, or the issuance of subpoenas, which
require access to information concerning intelligence or
counterintelligence matters the disclosure of which would
constitute a serious threat to national security.
``(2) With respect to information described in paragraph
(1), the Director may prohibit the Inspector General from
initiating, carrying out, or completing any investigation,
inspection, or audit, or from issuing any subpoena, if the
Director determines that such prohibition is necessary to
preserve the vital national security interests of the United
States.
``(3) If the Director exercises the authority under
paragraph (1) or (2), the Director shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees an appropriately
classified statement of the reasons for the exercise of such
authority within 7 days.
``(4) The Director shall advise the Inspector General at
the time a report under paragraph (3) is submitted, and, to
the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence
sources and methods, provide the Inspector General with a
copy of such report.
``(5) The Inspector General may submit to the congressional
intelligence committees any comments on a report of which the
Inspector General has notice under paragraph (4) that the
Inspector General considers appropriate.
``(b) In addition to the qualifications for the appointment
of the Inspector General under section 3(a), the Inspector
General shall be appointed on the basis of prior experience
in the field of intelligence or national security.
``(c)(1)(A) In addition to the duties and responsibilities
of the Inspector General specified elsewhere in this Act, the
Inspector General shall, for the purpose stated in
subparagraph (B), provide policy direction for, and conduct,
supervise, and coordinate audits and investigations relating
to--
``(i) the coordination and collaboration among elements of
the intelligence community within the National Intelligence
Program; and
``(ii) the coordination and collaboration between elements
of the intelligence community within the National
Intelligence Program and other elements of the intelligence
community.
``(B) The Inspector General shall conduct the activities
described in subparagraph (A) to ensure that the coordination
and collaboration referred to in that paragraph is conducted
efficiently and in accordance with applicable law and
regulation.
``(C) Before undertaking any investigation, inspection, or
audit under subparagraph (A), the Inspector General shall
consult with any other inspector general having
responsibilities regarding an element of the intelligence
community whose activities are involved in the investigation,
inspection, or audit for the purpose of avoiding duplication
of effort and ensuring effective coordination and
cooperation.
``(2) In addition to the matters of which the Inspector
General is required to keep the Director and Congress fully
and currently informed under section 4(a), the Inspector
General shall--
``(A) keep the Director and Congress fully and currently
informed concerning--
``(i) violations of civil liberties and privacy that may
occur in the programs and operations of the National
Intelligence Authority; and
``(ii) violations of law and regulations, violations of
civil liberties and privacy, and fraud and other serious
problems, abuses, and deficiencies that may occur in the
coordination and collaboration referred to in clauses (i) and
(ii) of paragraph (1)(A); and
``(B) report the progress made in implementing corrective
action with respect to the matters referred to in
subparagraph (A).
``(3) To enable the Inspector General to fully and
effectively carry out the duties and responsibilities
specified in this Act, the Inspector General and the
inspectors general of the other elements of the intelligence
community shall coordinate their internal audit, inspection,
and investigative activities to avoid duplication and ensure
effective coordination and cooperation.
``(4) The Inspector General shall take due regard for the
protection of intelligence sources and methods in the
preparation of all reports issued by the Inspector General,
and, to the extent consistent with the purpose and objective
of such reports, take such measures as may be appropriate to
minimize the disclosure of intelligence sources and methods
described in such reports.
``(d)(1) Each semiannual report prepared by the Inspector
General under section 5(a) shall--
``(A) include an assessment of the effectiveness of all
measures in place in the National Intelligence Authority for
the protection of civil liberties and privacy of United
States persons; and
``(B) be transmitted by the Director to the congressional
intelligence committees.
``(2) In addition the duties of the Inspector General and
the Director under section 5(d)--
``(A) the Inspector General shall report immediately to the
Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of
particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or
deficiencies relating to--
``(i) the coordination and collaboration among elements of
the intelligence community within the National Intelligence
Program; and
``(ii) the coordination and collaboration between elements
of the intelligence community within the National
Intelligence Program and other elements of the intelligence
community; and
``(B) the Director shall transmit to the congressional
intelligence committees each report under subparagraph (A)
within 7 calendar days of receipt of such report, together
with such comments as the Director considers appropriate.
``(3) Any report required to be transmitted by the Director
to the appropriate committees or subcommittees of Congress
under section 5(d) shall also be transmitted, within the 7-
day period specified in that section, to the congressional
intelligence committees.
``(4) In the event that--
``(A) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any
differences with the Director affecting the execution of the
duties or responsibilities of the Inspector General;
``(B) an investigation, inspection, or audit carried out by
the Inspector General should focus on any current or former
National Intelligence Authority official who holds or held a
position in the Authority that is subject to appointment by
the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, including such a position held on an acting basis;
``(C) a matter requires a report by the Inspector General
to the Department of Justice on possible criminal conduct by
a current or former official described in subparagraph (B);
``(D) the Inspector General receives notice from the
Department of Justice declining or approving prosecution of
possible criminal conduct of any current or former official
described in subparagraph (B); or
``(E) the Inspector General, after exhausting all possible
alternatives, is unable to obtain significant documentary
information in

[[Page H8963]]

the course of an investigation, inspection, or audit,
the Inspector General shall immediately notify and submit a
report on such matter to the congressional intelligence
committees.
``(5) Pursuant to title V of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), the Director shall submit to
the congressional intelligence committees any report or
findings and recommendations of an investigation, inspection,
or audit conducted by the office which has been requested by
the Chairman or Ranking Minority Member of either committee.
``(e)(1) In addition to the other authorities of the
Inspector General under this Act, the Inspector General shall
have access to any personnel of the National Intelligence
Authority, or any employee of a contractor of the Authority,
whose testimony is needed for the performance of the duties
of the Inspector General. Whenever such access is, in the
judgment of the Inspector General, unreasonably refused or
not provided, the Inspector General shall report the
circumstances to the Director without delay.
``(2) Failure on the part of any employee or contractor of
the National Intelligence Authority to cooperate with the
Inspector General shall be grounds for appropriate
administrative actions by the Director, including loss of
employment or termination of an existing contractual
relationship.
``(3) Whenever, in the judgment of the Director, an element
of the intelligence community that is part of the National
Intelligence Program has unreasonably refused or not provided
information or assistance requested by the Inspector General
under paragraph (1) or (3) of section 6(a), the Director
shall so inform the head of the element, who shall promptly
provide such information or assistance to the Inspector
General.
``(4) The level of classification or compartmentalization
of information shall not, in and of itself, provide a
sufficient rationale for denying the Inspector General access
to any materials under section 6(a).
``(f) In addition to the authorities and requirements in
section 7 regarding the receipt of complaints by the
Inspector General--
``(1) the Inspector General is authorized to receive and
investigate complaints or information from any person
concerning the existence of an activity constituting a
violation of laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement,
gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial
and specific danger to the public health and safety; and
``(2) once such complaint or information has been received
from an employee of the Federal Government--
``(A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the identity
of the employee without the consent of the employee, unless
the Inspector General determines that such disclosure is
unavoidable during the course of the investigation or the
disclosure is made to an official of the Department of
Justice responsible for determining whether a prosecution
should be undertaken; and
``(B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of
reprisal, for making such complaint may be taken by any
employee in a position to take such actions, unless the
complaint was made or the information was disclosed with the
knowledge that it was false or with willful disregard for its
truth or falsity.
``(g) In this section, the terms `congressional
intelligence committees', `intelligence community', and
`National Intelligence Program' have the meanings given such
terms in section 2 of the National Intelligence Reform Act of
2004.''.
(c) Technical and Conforming Amendments to Inspector
General Act of 1978.--(1)(A) Section 8H(a)(1) of the
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is further
amended--
(i) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (D);
and
(ii) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following new
subparagraph (C):
``(C) An employee of the National Intelligence Authority,
of an entity other than the Authority who is assigned or
detailed to the Authority, or of a contractor of the
Authority who intends to report to Congress a complaint or
information with respect to an urgent concern may report the
complaint or information to the Inspector General of the
National Intelligence Authority.''.
(B) In support of this paragraph, Congress makes the
findings set forth in paragraphs (1) through (6) of section
701(b) of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection
Act of 1998 (title VII of Public Law 105-272; 5 U.S.C. App.
8H note).
(2) The Inspector General Act of 1978 is further amended--
(A) in section 8K, as redesignated by subsection (b)(1) of
this section, by striking ``8F or 8H'' and inserting ``8F,
8H, 8I, or 8J''; and
(B) in section 11--
(i) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``the National
Intelligence Director;'' after ``the Attorney General;''; and
(ii) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``the National
Intelligence Authority,'' after ``the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration,''.
(d) Separate Budget Account.--The National Intelligence
Director shall, in accordance with procedures to be issued by
the Director in consultation with congressional intelligence
committees, include in the National Intelligence Program
budget a separate account for the Office of Inspector General
of the National Intelligence Authority.
(e) Sense of Congress On Adoption of Standards of Review.--
It is the sense of Congress that the Inspector General of the
National Intelligence Authority, in consultation with other
Inspectors General of the intelligence community and the
President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency, should adopt
standards for review and related precedent that are generally
used by the intelligence community for reviewing
whistleblower reprisal complaints made under sections 7 and
8J(f) of the Inspector General Act of 1978.
On page 203, strike lines 9 through 22.
On page 203, line 1, strike ``312.'' and insert ``311.''.
On page 210, between lines 22 and 23, insert the following:

SEC. 336. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL REPORT ON
METHODOLOGIES UTILIZED FOR NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES.

(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the National Intelligence Council
shall submit to Congress a report that includes the
following:
(1) The methodologies utilized for the initiation,
drafting, publication, coordination, and dissemination of the
results of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs).
(2) Such recommendations as the Council considers
appropriate regarding improvements of the methodologies
utilized for National Intelligence Estimates in order to
ensure the timeliness of such Estimates and ensure that such
Estimates address the national security and intelligence
priorities and objectives of the President and the National
Intelligence Director.
(b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in an unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
On page 210, line 23, strike ``336.'' and insert ``337.''.
On page 210, between lines 22 and 23, insert the following:

SEC. 336. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR REPORT ON NATIONAL
COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER.

(a) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the
establishment of the National Counterterrorism Center under
section 143, the NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR shall submit
to Congress a report evaluating the effectiveness of the
Center in achieving its primary missions under subsection (d)
of that section.
(b) Elements.--The report under subsection (a) shall
include the following:
(1) An assessment of the effectiveness of the National
Counterterrorism Center in achieving its primary missions.
(2) An assessment of the effectiveness of the authorities
of the Center in contributing to the achievement of its
primary missions, including authorities relating to personnel
and staffing, funding, information sharing, and technology.
(3) An assessment of the relationships between the Center
and the other elements and components of the intelligence
community.
(4) An assessment of the extent to which the Center
provides an appropriate model for the establishment of
national intelligence centers under section 144.
(c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in an unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
On page 153, between lines 2 and 3, insert the following:

SEC. 207. ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES OF INTELLIGENCE BY THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the National Intelligence Director should consider the
advisability of establishing for each element of the
intelligence community an element, office, or component whose
purpose is the alternative analysis (commonly referred to as
a ``red-team analysis'') of the information and conclusions
in the intelligence products of such element of the
intelligence community.
(b) Report.--(1) Not later than one year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the National Intelligence Director
shall submit to Congress a report on the actions taken to
establish for each element of the intelligence community an
element, office, or component described in subsection (a).
(2) The report shall be submitted in an unclassified form,
but may include a classified annex.
At the appropriate place, insert the following:

SEC. __. BIOMETRIC STANDARD FOR VISA APPLICATIONS.

(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the
``Biometric Visa Standard Distant Borders Act''.
(b) Technology Standard for Visa Waiver Participants.--
Section 303(c) of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry
Reform Act of 2002 (8 U.S.C. 1732(c)) is amended to read as
follows:
``(c) Technology Standard for Visa Waiver Participants.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than October 26, 2006, the
Secretary of State shall certify to Congress which of the
countries designated to participate in the visa waiver
program established under section 217 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1187) are developing a program to
issue to individuals seeking to enter that country pursuant
to a visa issued by that country, a machine readable visa
document that is tamper-resistant and incorporates biometric
identification information that is verifiable at its port of
entry.
``(2) Savings clause.--This subsection shall not be
construed to rescind the requirement of section 217(a)(3) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1187(a)(3)).''.

[[Page H8964]]

On page 121, line 13, strike ``and analysts'' and insert
``, analysts, and related personnel''.
On page 121, line 17, strike ``and analysts'' and insert
``, analysts, and related personnel''.
On page 121, line 19, strike ``and analysts'' and insert
``, analysts, and related personnel''.
On page 123, beginning on line 8, strike ``, in
consultation with the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget, modify the'' and insert ``establish a''.
On page 123, line 11, strike ``in order to organize the
budget according to'' and insert ``to reflect''.
On page 5, beginning on line 15, strike ``and the
Department of Energy'' and insert ``the Department of Energy,
and the Coast Guard''.
On page 5, beginning on line 23, strike ``including the
Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard''.
On page 6, line 10, insert ``, as determined consistent
with any guidelines issued by the President,'' before ``to
the interests''.
On page 9, beginning on line 13, strike
``counterterrorism'' and all that follows through ``foreign
intelligence'' on line 15 and insert ``counterterrorism
activities of the United States Government between
intelligence activities located abroad and intelligence''.
On page 10, line 23, strike ``a principal'' and insert
``the principal''.
On page 12, line 18, insert ``of'' before ``the National
Intelligence Program''.
On page 13, line 12, insert ``appropriations for'' after
``oversee''.
On page 20, beginning on line 12, strike ``related to the
national security which is''.
On page 21, line 23, strike ``(4)'' and insert ``(5)''.
On page 22, line 3, strike ``(5)'' and insert ``(6)''.
On page 25, line 10, strike ``head of the''.
On page 28, line 17, strike ``or'' and insert ``and''.
On page 30, line 24, strike ``205'' and insert ``206''.
On page 31, line 23, strike ``205'' and insert ``206 and
the Clinger-Cohen Act (divisions D and E of Public Law 104-
106; 110 Stat. 642)''.
On page 32, beginning on line 13, strike ``on all matters''
and all that follows through line 15 and insert ``or
international organizations on all matters involving
intelligence related to the national security.''.
On page 32, beginning on line 21, strike ``head of each
element of the intelligence community'' and insert ``head of
any department, agency, or other element of the United States
Government''.
On page 59, line 20, strike ``309'' and insert ``310''.
On page 87, line 8, insert ``and analytic'' after
``intelligence collection''.
On page 93, line 17, insert ``of'' before ``electronic
access''.
On page 96, beginning on line 13, strike ``National
Security Council'' and insert ``President''.
On page 99, line 25, strike ``National Security Council''
and insert ``President''.
On page 134, strike lines 6 through 9 and insert the
following:
(1) in consultation with the Executive Council, issue
guidelines--
(A) for acquiring, accessing, sharing, and using
information, including
On page 153, between lines 2 and 3, insert the following:

SEC. 207. PERMANENT AUTHORITY FOR PUBLIC INTEREST
DECLASSIFICATION BOARD.

(a) In General.--Section 710 of the Public Interest
Declassification Act of 2000 (title VII of Public Law 106-
567; 50 U.S.C. 435 note) is amended--
(1) by striking ``(a) Effective Date.--''; and
(2) by striking subsection (b).
(b) Conforming Amendment.--The head of such section is
amended by striking ``; SUNSET''.
On page 154, line 16, strike ``section 205(g)'' and insert
``subsections (e) and (g) of section 205''.
On page 154, line 21, strike ``section 205(g)'' and insert
``subsections (e) and (g) of section 205''.
On page 156, line 4, strike ``section 205(g)'' and insert
``subsections (e) and (g) of section 205''.
On page 170, line 19, strike ``and independent'' and insert
``independent''.
On page 171, beginning on line 1, strike ``and
independent'' and insert ``independent''.
On page 171, beginning on line 8, strike ``and
independent'' and insert ``independent''.
On page 171, line 14, strike ``objective and independent''
and insert ``timely, objective, independent''.
On page 171, line 20, strike ``and independent'' and insert
``independent''.
On page 175, strike lines 8 through 17 and insert the
following:
(2) Covered information.--
(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B),
paragraph (1) applies to information, including classified
information, that an employee reasonably believes provides
direct and specific evidence of--
(i) a false or inaccurate statement to Congress contained
in any intelligence assessment, report, or estimate; or
(ii) the withholding from Congress of any intelligence
information material to any intelligence assessment, report,
or estimate.
(B) Exception.--Paragraph (1) does not apply to information
the disclosure of which is prohibited by rule 6(e) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
On page 177, after line 17, add the following:

Subtitle D--Homeland Security Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Protection

SEC. 231. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the ``Homeland Security Civil
Rights and Civil Liberties Protection Act of 2004''.

SEC. 232. MISSION OF DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY.

Section 101(b)(1) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6
U.S.C. 111(b)(1)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (F), by striking ``and'' after the
semicolon;
(2) by redesignating subparagraph (G) as subparagraph (H);
and
(3) by inserting after subparagraph (F) the following:
``(G) ensure that the civil rights and civil liberties of
persons are not diminished by efforts, activities, and
programs aimed at securing the homeland; and''.

SEC. 233. OFFICER FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES.

Section 705(a) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6
U.S.C. 345(a)) is amended--
(1) by amending the matter preceding paragraph (1) to read
as follows:
``(a) In General.--The Officer for Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties, who shall report directly to the Secretary,
shall--'';
(2) by amending paragraph (1) to read as follows:
``(1) review and assess information concerning abuses of
civil rights, civil liberties, and profiling on the basis of
race, ethnicity, or religion, by employees and officials of
the Department;'';
(3) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and
inserting a semicolon; and
(4) by adding at the end the following:
``(3) assist the Secretary, directorates, and offices of
the Department to develop, implement, and periodically review
Department policies and procedures to ensure that the
protection of civil rights and civil liberties is
appropriately incorporated into Department programs and
activities;
``(4) oversee compliance with constitutional, statutory,
regulatory, policy, and other requirements relating to the
civil rights and civil liberties of individuals affected by
the programs and activities of the Department;
``(5) coordinate with the Privacy Officer to ensure that--
``(A) programs, policies, and procedures involving civil
rights, civil liberties, and privacy considerations are
addressed in an integrated and comprehensive manner; and
``(B) Congress receives appropriate reports regarding such
programs, policies, and procedures; and
``(6) investigate complaints and information indicating
possible abuses of civil rights or civil liberties, unless
the Inspector General of the Department determines that any
such complaint or information should be investigated by the
Inspector General.''.

SEC. 234. PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES BY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL.

Section 8I of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C.
App.) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(f)(1) The Inspector General of the Department of
Homeland Security shall designate a senior official within
the Office of Inspector General, who shall be a career member
of the civil service at the equivalent to the GS-15 level or
a career member of the Senior Executive Service, to perform
the functions described in paragraph (2).
``(2) The senior official designated under paragraph (1)
shall--
``(A) coordinate the activities of the Office of Inspector
General with respect to investigations of abuses of civil
rights or civil liberties;
``(B) receive and review complaints and information from
any source alleging abuses of civil rights and civil
liberties by employees or officials of the Department and
employees or officials of independent contractors or grantees
of the Department;
``(C) initiate investigations of alleged abuses of civil
rights or civil liberties by employees or officials of the
Department and employees or officials of independent
contractors or grantees of the Department;
``(D) ensure that personnel within the Office of Inspector
General receive sufficient training to conduct effective
civil rights and civil liberties investigations;
``(E) consult with the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties regarding--
``(i) alleged abuses of civil rights or civil liberties;
and
``(ii) any policy recommendations regarding civil rights
and civil liberties that may be founded upon an investigation
by the Office of Inspector General;
``(F) provide the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties with information regarding the outcome of
investigations of alleged abuses of civil rights and civil
liberties;
``(G) refer civil rights and civil liberties matters that
the Inspector General decides not to investigate to the
Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties;
``(H) ensure that the Office of the Inspector General
publicizes and provides convenient public access to
information regarding--
``(i) the procedure to file complaints or comments
concerning civil rights and civil liberties matters; and
``(ii) the status of corrective actions taken by the
Department in response to Office of the Inspector General
reports; and

[[Page H8965]]

``(I) inform the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties of any weaknesses, problems, and deficiencies
within the Department relating to civil rights or civil
liberties.''.

SEC. 235. PRIVACY OFFICER.

Section 222 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.
142) is amended--
(1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by inserting ``,
who shall report directly to the Secretary,'' after ``in the
Department'';
(2) in paragraph (4), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(3) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (6); and
(4) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following:
``(5) coordinating with the Officer for Civil Rights and
Civil Liberties to ensure that--
``(A) programs, policies, and procedures involving civil
rights, civil liberties, and privacy considerations are
addressed in an integrated and comprehensive manner; and
``(B) Congress receives appropriate reports on such
programs, policies, and procedures; and''.
On page 180, line 8, strike ``pertaining to intelligence
relating to'' and insert ``related to intelligence
affecting''.
On page 181, beginning on line 8, strike ``on all matters''
and all that follows through line 10 and insert ``or
international organizations on all matters involving
intelligence related to the national security.'.''.
On page 201, strike line 14 through 20 and insert the
following:
(a) Appointment of National Counterintelligence
Executive.--Section 902(a) of the Counterintelligence
Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of Public Law 107-306; 116
Stat. 2432; 50 U.S.C. 402b) is amended--
(1) by striking ``President'' and inserting ``National
Intelligence Director''; and
(2) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and
inserting ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''.
On page 205, line 1, strike ``COUNTERTERRORISM'' and insert
``COUNTERINTELLIGENCE''.
On page 207, between lines 13 and 14, insert the following:
``The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
On page 207, line 21, insert ``Deputy'' before
``Director''.
At the appropriate place, insert the following:

SEC. __. COMMUNICATIONS INTEROPERABILITY.

(a) Definition.--As used in this section, the term
``equipment interoperability'' means the devices that support
the ability of public safety service and support providers to
talk with each other via voice and data on demand, in real
time, when needed, and when authorized.
(b) National Guidelines for Equipment Interoperability.--
Not later than one year after the date of enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, after consultation
with the Federal Communications Commission and the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration, and other
appropriate representatives of Federal, Sate, and local
government and first responders, shall adopt, by regulation,
national goals and guidelined for equipment interoperability
and related issues that--
(1) set short-term, mid-term, and long-term means and
minimum equipment performance guidelines for Federal
agencies, Sates, and local governments;
(2) recognize--
(A) the value, life cycle, and technical capabilities of
existing communications infrastructure;
(B) the need for cross-border interoperability between
States and nations;
(C) the unique needs of small, rural communities; and
(D) the interoperability needs for daily operations and
catastrophic events.
(c) National Equipment Interoperability Implementation
Plan.--
(1) Development.--Not later than 180 days of the completion
of the development of goals and guidelines under subsection
(b), the Secretary of Homeland Security shall develop an
implementation plan that--
(A) outlines the responsibilities of the Department of
Homeland Security; and
(B) focuses on providing technical and financial assistance
to States and local governments for interoperability planning
and implementation.
(2) Execution.--The Secretary shall execute the plan
developed under this subsection as soon as practicable.
(3) Reports.--
(A) Initial Report.--Upon the completion of the plan under
subsection (c), the Secretary shall submit a report that
describes such plan to--
(i) the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate;
(ii) the Committee on Environment and Public Works of the
Senate;
(iii) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation of the Senate;
(iv) the Select Committee on Homeland Security of the House
of Representatives; and
(v) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of
Representatives.
(B) Annual report.--Not later than 1 year after the
submission of the report under subparagraph (A), and annually
thereafter, the Secretary shall submit a report to the
committees referred to in subparagraph (A) that describes the
progress made in implementing the plan developed under this
subsection.
(d) International Interoperability.--Not later than 1 year
after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall
establish a mechanism for coordinating cross-border
interoperability issues between--
(1) the United States and Canada; and
(2) the United States and Mexico.
(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated for each of the fiscal years 2005 through
2009--
(1) such sums as may be necessary to carry out subsection
(c);
(2) such sums as may be necessary to carry out subsection
(c); and
(3) such sums as may be necessary to carry out subsection
(d).
On page 44, strike line 24.
On page 45, line 1, strike ``(6)'' and insert ``(5)''.
On page 45, line 3, strike ``(7)'' and insert ``(6)''.
On page 45, line 5, strike ``(8)'' and insert ``(7)''.
On page 45, line 7, strike ``(9)'' and insert ``(8)''.
On page 45, line 9, strike ``(10)'' and insert ``(9)''.
On page 45, line 11, strike ``(11)'' and insert ``(10)''.
On page 45, line 14, strike ``(12)'' and insert ``(11)''.
On page 52, strike lines 1 through 20.
On page 52, line 21, strike ``126.'' and insert ``125.''.
On page 55, line 1, strike ``127.'' and insert ``126.''.
On page 56, line 9, strike ``128.'' and insert ``127.''.
On page 57, line 1, strike ``129.'' and insert ``128.''.
On page 57, line 17, strike ``130.'' and insert ``129.''.
On page 58, strike lines 3 through 9 and insert the
following:
(c) Authorities and Functions.--The Chief Financial Officer
of the National Intelligence Authority shall--
(1) have such authorities, and carry out such functions,
with respect to the National Intelligence Authority as are
provided for an agency Chief Financial Officer by section 902
of title 31, United States Code, and other applicable
provisions of law;
(2) assist the National Intelligence Director in the
preparation and execution of the budget of the elements of
the intelligence community within the National Intelligence
Program;
(3) assist the Director in participating in the development
by the Secretary of Defense of the annual budget for military
intelligence programs and activities outside the National
Intelligence Program;
(4) provide unfettered access to the Director to financial
information under the National Intelligence Program; and
(5) perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the
Director or specified by law.
On page 59, line 15, strike ``131.'' and insert ``130.''.
On page 202, line 16, strike ``131(b)'' and insert
``130(b)''.
On page 19, line 12, insert ``of access'' after ``grant''.
On page 20, line 25, insert ``of'' after ``development''.
On page 53, line 2 strike ``President'' and insert
``National Intelligence Director''.
On page 173, line 11, strike ``2'' and insert ``3''.
At the appropriate place, insert the following:

SEC. ------. DEADLINE FOR COMPLETION OF CERTAIN PLANS,
REPORTS, AND ASSESSMENTS.

(a) Strategic Plan Reports.--Within 90 days after the date
of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security
shall transmit to the Congress--
(1) a report on the status of the National Maritime
Transportation Security Plan required by section 70103(a) of
title 46, United States Code, which may be submitted in
classified and redacted format;
(2) a comprehensive program management plan that identifies
specific tasks to be completed and deadlines for completion
for the transportation security card program under section
70105 of title 46, United States Code that incorporates best
practices for communicating, coordinating, and collaborating
with the relevant stakeholders to resolve relevant issues,
such as background checks;
(3) a report on the status of negotiations under section
103 of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (46
U.S.C. 70111 note);
(4) the report required by section 107(b) of the Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002 (33 U.S.C. 1226 note);
and
(5) a report on the status of the development of the system
and program mandated by section 111 of the Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002 (46 U.S.C. 70116 note).
(b) Other Reports.--Within 90 days after the date of
enactment of this Act--
(1) the Secretary of Homeland Security shall transmit to
the Congress--
(A) a report on the establishment of the National Maritime
Security Advisory Committee appointed under section 70112 of
title 46, United States Code; and
(B) a report on the status of the program established under
section 70116 of title 46, United States Code, to evaluate
and certify secure systems of international intermodal
transportation;
(2) the Secretary of Transportation shall transmit to the
Congress the annual report required by section 905 of the
International Maritime and Port Security Act (46 U.S.C. App.
1802) that includes information that

[[Page H8966]]

should have been included in the last preceding annual report
that was due under that section; and
(3) the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard shall
transmit to Congress the report required by section 110(b) of
the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (46 U.S.C.
70101 note).
(d) Effective Date.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
this Act, this section takes effect on the date of enactment
of this Act.
At the appropriate place, insert the following:

SEC. ------. TSA FIELD OFFICE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REPORT.

Within 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of Homeland Security shall transmit a report to the
Congress, which may be transmitted in classified and redacted
formats, setting forth--
(1) a descriptive list of each administrative and airport
site of the Transportation Security Administration, including
its location, staffing, and facilities;
(2) an analysis of the information technology and
telecommunications capabilities, equipment, and support
available at each such site, including--
(A) whether the site has access to broadband
telecommunications;
(B) whether the site has the ability to access
Transportation Security Administration databases directly;
(C) the means available to the site for communicating and
sharing information and other data on a real time basis with
the Transportation Security Administration's national,
regional, and State offices as well as with other
Transportation Security Administration sites;
(D) the means available to the site for communicating with
other Federal, State, and local government sites with
transportation security related responsibilities; and
(E) whether and to what extent computers in the site are
linked through a local area network or otherwise, and whether
the information technology resources available to the site
are adequate to enable it to carry out its functions and
purposes; and
(3) an assessment of current and future needs of the
Transportation Security Administration to provide adequate
information technology and telecommunications facilities,
equipment, and support to its sites, and an estimate of the
costs of meeting those needs.
At the appropriate place, insert the following:

TITLE --AVIATION SECURITY

SEC. --01. IMPROVED PILOT LICENSES.

(a) In General.--Within 90 days after the date of enactment
of this Act, the Federal Aviation Administrator may develop a
system for the issuance of any pilot's license issued more
than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act that--
(1) are resistant to tampering, alteration, and
counterfeiting;
(2) include a photograph of the individual to whom the
license is issued; and
(3) are capable of accommodating a digital photograph, a
biometric measure, or other unique identifier that provides a
means of--
(A) ensuring its validity; and
(B) revealing whether any component or security feature of
the license has been compromised.
(b) Use of Designees.--The Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Administration may use designees to carry out
subsection (a) to the extent feasible in order to minimize
the burden of such requirements on pilots.
(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to the Administrator for fiscal year 2005,
$50,000,000 to carry out subsection (a).

SEC. --02. AIRCRAFT CHARTER CUSTOMER PRESCREENING.

(a) In General.--Within 1 year after the date of enactment
of this Act, or as soon as practicable thereafter, the
Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish a process by
which operators of charter aircraft with a maximum takeoff
weight of greater than 12,500 pounds may--
(1) request the Transportation Security Administration to
compare information about any individual seeking to charter
an aircraft, and any passengers proposed to be transported
aboard the aircraft, with a comprehensive, consolidated
database or watchlist containing information about known or
suspected terrorists and their associates; and
(2) refuse to charter an aircraft to or transport aboard
such aircraft any persons identified on such database or
watchlist.
(b) Privacy Safeguards.--The Secretary shall take
appropriate measures to ensure that--
(1) the Transportation Security Administration does not
disclose information to any person engaged in the business of
chartering aircraft other than whether an individual compared
against government watchlists constitutes a flight security
or terrorism risk; and
(2) an individual denied access to an aircraft is given an
opportunity to consult the Transportation Security
Administration for the purpose of correcting mis-
identification errors, resolve confusion resulting from names
that are the same as or similar to names on available
government watchlists, and address other information that is
alleged to be erroneous, that may have resulted in the
denial.
(c) Transfer.--The Secretary shall assess procedures to
transfer responsibility for conducting reviews of any
appropriate government watchlists under this section from
persons engaged in the business of chartering air carriers to
the public to the Secretary.
(d) Authority of the Secretary.--Nothing in this section
precludes the Secretary from requiring operators of charter
aircraft to comply with security procedures, including those
established under subsection (a), if the Secretary determines
that such a requirement is necessary based on threat
conditions.
(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to the Secretary such sums as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of this section.

SEC. --03. AIRCRAFT RENTAL CUSTOMER PRESCREENING.

(a) In General.--Within 1 year after the date of enactment
of this Act, or as soon as practicable thereafter, the
Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish a process by
which operators of rental aircraft with a maximum takeoff
weight of greater than 12,500 pounds may--
(1) request the Transportation Security Administration to
compare information about any individual seeking to rent an
aircraft, and any passengers proposed to be transported
aboard the aircraft, with a comprehensive, consolidated
database or watchlist containing information about known or
suspected terrorists and their associates; and
(2) refuse to rent an aircraft to or transport aboard such
aircraft any persons identified on such database or
watchlist.
(b) Privacy Safeguards.--The Secretary shall take
appropriate measures to ensure that--
(1) the Transportation Security Administration does not
disclose information to any person engaged in the business of
renting aircraft other than whether an individual compared
against government watchlists constitutes a flight security
or terrorism risk; and
(2) an individual denied access to an aircraft is given an
opportunity to consult the Transportation Security
Administration for the purpose of correcting mis-
identification errors, resolve confusion resulting from names
that are the same as or similar to names on available
government watchlists, and address other information that is
alleged to be erroneous, that may have resulted in the
denial.
(c) Transfer.--The Secretary shall assess procedures to
transfer responsibility for conducting reviews of any
appropriate government watchlists under this section from
persons engaged in the business of renting aircraft to the
public to the Secretary.
(d) Authority of the Secretary.--Nothing in this section
precludes the Secretary from requiring operators of rental
aircraft to comply with security procedures, including those
established under subsection (a), if the Secretary determines
that such a requirement is necessary based on threat
conditions.
(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to the Secretary such sums as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of this section.

SEC. --04. REPORT ON RENTAL AND CHARTER CUSTOMER PRESCREENING
PROCEDURES.

(a) In General.--Within 12 months after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security
shall transmit a report to Congress on the feasibility of
extending the requirements of section --02, section --03, or
both sections to apply to aircraft with a maximum
certificated takeoff weight of 12,500 pounds or less.
(b) Issues Addressed.--The report shall--
(1) examine the technology and communications systems
needed to carry out such procedures;
(2) provide an analysis of the risks posed by such
aircraft; and
(3) examine the operational impact of proposed procedures
on the commercial viability of that segment of charter and
rental aviation operations.

SEC. --05. AVIATION SECURITY STAFFING.

(a) Staffing Level Standards.--
(1) Development of standards.--Within 90 days after the
date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, in consultation with the Secretary of
Transportation and Federal Security Directors, shall develop
standards for determining the appropriate aviation security
staffing standards for all commercial airports in the United
States necessary--
(A) to provide necessary levels of aviation security; and
(B) to ensure that the average aviation security-related
delay experienced by airline passengers is minimized.
(2) GAO analysis.--The Comptroller General shall, as soon
as practicable after the date on which the Secretary of
Homeland Security has developed standards under paragraph
(1), conduct an expedited analysis of the standards for
effectiveness, administrability, ease of compliance, and
consistency with the requirements of existing law.
(3) Report to congress.--Within 120 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security and
the Comptroller General shall transmit a report to the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the
House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure on the standards

[[Page H8967]]

developed under paragraph (1), together with recommendations
for further improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the
screening process, including the use of maximum time delay
goals of no more than 10 minutes on the average.
(b) Integration of Federal Airport Workforce and Aviation
Security.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall conduct a
study of the feasibility of combining operations of Federal
employees involved in screening at commercial airports and
aviation security related functions under the aegis of the
Department of Homeland Security in order to coordinate
security-related activities, increase the efficiency and
effectiveness of those activities, and increase commercial
air transportation security.

SEC. --06. IMPROVED AIR CARGO AND AIRPORT SECURITY.

(a) In General.--There are authorized to be appropriated to
the Secretary of Homeland Security for the use of the
Transportation Security Administration, in addition to any
amounts otherwise authorized by law, for the purpose of
improving aviation security related to the transportation of
cargo on both passenger aircraft and all-cargo aircraft--
(1) $200,000,000 for fiscal year 2005;
(2) $200,000,000 for fiscal year 2006; and
(3) $200,000,000 for fiscal year 2007.
(b) Next-Generation Cargo Security Grant Program.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary shall establish and carry
out a grant program to facilitate the development, testing,
purchase, and deployment of next-generation air cargo
security technology. The Secretary shall establish such
eligibility criteria, establish such application and
administrative procedures, and provide for such matching
funding requirements, if any, as may be necessary and
appropriate to ensure that the technology is deployed as
fully and as rapidly as practicable.
(2) Research and development; deployment.--To carry out
paragraph (1), there are authorized to be appropriated to the
Secretary for research and development related to next-
generation air cargo security technology as well as for
deployment and installation of next-generation air cargo
security technology, such sums are to remain available until
expended--
(A) $100,000,000 for fiscal year 2005;
(B) $100,000,000 for fiscal year 2006; and
(C) $100,000,000 for fiscal year 2007.
(c) Authorization for Expiring and New LOIs.--
(1) In general.--There are authorized to be appropriated to
the Secretary $150,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2005
through 2007 to fund projects and activities for which
letters of intent are issued under section 44923 of title 49,
United States Code, after the date of enactment of this Act.
(2) Period of reimbursement.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the Secretary may provide that the period
of reimbursement under any letter of intent may extend for a
period not to exceed 10 years after the date that the
Secretary issues such letter, subject to the availability of
appropriations. This paragraph applies to letters of intent
issued under section 44923 of title 49, United States Code,
or section 367 of the Department of Transportation and
Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 2003 (49 U.S.C. 47110
note).
(d) Reports.--The Secretary shall transmit an annual report
for fiscal year 2005, fiscal year 2006, and fiscal year 2007
to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure on--
(1) the progress being made toward, and the status of,
deployment and installation of next-generation air cargo
security technology under subsection (b); and
(2) the amount and purpose of grants under subsection (b)
and the locations of projects funded by such grants.

SEC. --07. AIR CARGO SECURITY MEASURES.

(a) Enhancement of Air Cargo Security.--The Secretary of
Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of
Transportation, shall develop and implement a plan to enhance
air cargo security at airports for commercial passenger and
cargo aircraft that incorporates the recommendations made by
the Cargo Security Working Group of the Aviation Security
Advisory Committee.
(b) Supply Chain Security.--The Administrator of the
Transportation Security Administration shall--
(1) promulgate regulations requiring the evaluation of
indirect air carriers and ground handling agents, including
background checks and checks against all Administration watch
lists; and
(2) evaluate the potential efficacy of increased use of
canine detection teams to inspect air cargo on passenger and
all-cargo aircraft, including targeted inspections of high
risk items.
(c) Increased Cargo Inspections.--Within 1 year after the
date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland
Security shall require that the percentage of cargo screened
or inspected is at least two-fold the percentage that is
screened or inspected as of September 30, 2004.
(c) All-Cargo Aircraft Security.--Subchapter I of chapter
449, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following:

``Sec. 44925. All-cargo aircraft security

``(a) Access to Flight Deck.--Within 180 days after the
date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the
Transportation Security Administration, in coordination with
the Federal Aviation Administrator, shall--
``(1) issue an order (without regard to the provisions of
chapter 5 of title 5)--
``(A) requiring, to the extent consistent with engineering
and safety standards, that all-cargo aircraft operators
engaged in air transportation or intrastate air
transportation maintain a barrier, which may include the use
of a hardened cockpit door, between the aircraft flight deck
and the aircraft cargo compartment sufficient to prevent
unauthorized access to the flight deck from the cargo
compartment, in accordance with the terms of a plan presented
to and accepted by the Administrator of the Transportation
Security Administration in consultation with the Federal
Aviation Administrator; and
``(B) prohibiting the possession of a key to a flight deck
door by any member of the flight crew who is not assigned to
the flight deck; and
``(2) take such other action, including modification of
safety and security procedures and flight deck redesign, as
may be necessary to ensure the safety and security of the
flight deck.
``(b) Screening and Other Measures.--Within 1 year after
the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the
Transportation Security Administration, in coordination with
the Federal Aviation Administrator, shall issue an order
(without regard to the provisions of chapter 5 of title 5)
requiring--
``(1) all-cargo aircraft operators engaged in air
transportation or intrastate air transportation to physically
screen each person, and that person's baggage and personal
effects, to be transported on an all-cargo aircraft engaged
in air transportation or intrastate air transportation;
``(2) each such aircraft to be physically searched before
the first leg of the first flight of the aircraft each day,
or, for inbound international operations, at aircraft
operator's option prior to the departure of any such flight
for a point in the United States; and
``(3) each such aircraft that is unattended overnight to be
secured or sealed or to have access stairs, if any, removed
from the aircraft.
``(c) Alternative Measures.--The Administrator of the
Transportation Security Administration, in coordination with
the Federal Aviation Administrator, may authorize alternative
means of compliance with any requirement imposed under this
section.''.
(d) Conforming Amendment.--The subchapter analysis for
subchapter I of chapter 449, United States Code, is amended
by adding at the end the following:

``44925. All-cargo aircraft security.''.

SEC. --08. EXPLOSIVE DETECTION SYSTEMS.

(a) In-Line Placement of Explosive-Detection Equipment.--
Within 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish a schedule for
replacing trace-detection equipment used for in-line
baggage screening purposes as soon as practicable where
appropriate with explosive detection system equipment. The
Secretary shall notify the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation and the House of
Representatives Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure of the schedule and provide an estimate of
the impact of replacing such equipment, facility
modification and baggage conveyor placement, on aviation
security-related staffing needs and levels.
(b) Next Generation EDS.--There are authorized to be
appropriated to the Secretary of Homeland Security for the
use of the Transportation Security Administration
$100,000,000, in addition to any amounts otherwise authorized
by law, for the purpose of research and development of next
generation explosive detection systems for aviation security
under section 44913 of title 49, United States Code. The
Secretary shall develop a plan and guidelines for
implementing improved explosive detection system equipment.
(c) Portal Detection Systems.--There are authorized to be
appropriated to the Secretary of Homeland Security for the
use of the Transportation Security Administration
$250,000,000, in addition to any amounts otherwise authorized
by law, for research and development and installation of
portal detection systems or similar devices for the detection
of biological, radiological, and explosive materials. The
Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish a pilot
program at not more than 10 commercial service airports to
evaluate the use of such systems.
(d) Reports.--The Secretary shall transmit an annual report
to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure on research and development
projects funded under subsection (b) or (c), and the pilot
program established under subsection (c), including cost
estimates for each phase of such projects and total project
costs.

SEC. --09. AIR MARSHAL PROGRAM.

(a) Cross-Training.--The Secretary of Homeland Security
shall transmit to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee
on Transportation and Infrastructure a report on the
potential for cross-training of individuals who serve as air
marshals and on the need for providing contingency funding
for air marshal operations.

[[Page H8968]]

(b) Authorization of Additional Appropriations.--There are
authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of Homeland
Security for the use of Inspections and Customs Enforcement,
in addition to any amounts otherwise authorized by law, for
the deployment of Federal Air Marshals under section 44917 of
title 49, United States Code, $83,000,000 for the 3 fiscal
year period beginning with fiscal year 2005, such sums to
remain available until expended.

SEC. --10. TSA-RELATED BAGGAGE CLAIM ISSUES STUDY.

Within 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the
Secretary of Transportation, shall transmit to the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the
House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure a report on the present system for addressing
lost, stolen, damaged, or pilfered baggage claims relating to
air transportation security screening procedures. The report
shall include--
(1) information concerning the time it takes to settle such
claims under the present system;
(2) a comparison and analysis of the number, frequency, and
nature of such claims before and after enactment of the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act using data provided
by the major United States airlines; and
(3) recommendations on how to improve the involvement and
participation of the airlines in the baggage screening and
handling processes and better coordinate the activities of
Federal baggage screeners with airline operations.

SEC. --11. REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF GAO HOMELAND SECURITY
INFORMATION SHARING RECOMMENDATIONS.

Within 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, after consultation with the
heads of Federal departments and agencies concerned, shall
transmit to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure a report on implementation
of recommendations contained in the General Accounting
Office's report titled ``Homeland Security: Efforts To
Improve Information Sharing Need To Be Strengthened'' (GAO-
03-760), August, 2003.

SEC. --12. AVIATION SECURITY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.

(a) Biometrics.--There are authorized to be appropriated to
the Secretary of Homeland Security for the use of the
Transportation Security Administration $20,000,000, in
addition to any amounts otherwise authorized by law, for
research and development of biometric technology applications
to aviation security.
(b) Biometrics Centers of Excellence.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to the Secretary of Homeland Security for
the use of the Transportation Security Administration
$1,000,000, in addition to any amounts otherwise authorized
by law, for the establishment of competitive centers of
excellence at the national laboratories.

SEC. --13. PERIMETER ACCESS TECHNOLOGY.

There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of
Homeland Security $100,000,000 for airport perimeter security
technology, fencing, security contracts, vehicle tagging, and
other perimeter security related operations, facilities, and
equipment, such sums to remain available until expended.

SEC. --14. BEREAVEMENT FARES.

(a) In General.--Chapter 415 of title 49, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

``Sec. 41512. Bereavement fares

``Air carriers shall offer, with appropriate documentation,
bereavement fares to the public for air transportation in
connection with the death of a relative or other relationship
(as determined by the air carrier) and shall make such fares
available, to the greatest extent practicable, at the lowest
fare offered by the air carrier for the flight for which the
bereavement fare is requested.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--The chapter analysis for chapter
415 is amended by inserting after the item relating to
section 41511 the following:

``41512. Bereavement fares''.

SEC. --15. REVIEW AND REVISION OF PROHIBITED ITEMS LIST.

Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this
Act, the Transportation Security Administration shall
complete a review of its Prohibited Items List, set forth in
49 C.F.R. 1540, and release a revised list that--
(1) prohibits passengers from carrying butane lighters
onboard passenger aircraft; and
(2) modifies the Prohibited Items List in such other ways
as the agency may deem appropriate.

SEC. --16. REPORT ON PROTECTING COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT FROM THE
THREAT OF MAN-PORTABLE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS.

(a) Requirement.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in
coordination with the head of the Transportation Security
Administration and the Under Secretary for Science and
Technology, shall prepare a report on protecting commercial
aircraft from the threat of man-portable air defense systems
(referred to in this section as ``MANPADS'').
(b) Content.--The report required by subsection (a) shall
include the following:
(1) An estimate of the number of organizations, including
terrorist organizations, that have access to MANPADS and a
description of the risk posed by each organization.
(2) A description of the programs carried out by the
Secretary of Homeland Security to protect commercial aircraft
from the threat posed by MANPADS.
(3) An assessment of the effectiveness and feasibility of
the systems to protect commercial aircraft under
consideration by the Under Secretary for Science and
Technology for use in phase II of the counter-MANPADS
development and demonstration program.
(4) A justification for the schedule of the implementation
of phase II of the counter-MANPADS development and
demonstration program.
(5) An assessment of the effectiveness of other technology
that could be employed on commercial aircraft to address the
threat posed by MANPADS, including such technology that is--
(A) either active or passive;
(B) employed by the Armed Forces; or
(C) being assessed or employed by other countries.
(6) An assessment of alternate technological approaches to
address such threat, including ground-based systems.
(7) A discussion of issues related to any contractor
liability associated with the installation or use of
technology or systems on commercial aircraft to address such
threat.
(8) A description of the strategies that the Secretary may
employ to acquire any technology or systems selected for use
on commercial aircraft at the conclusion of phase II of the
counter-MANPADS development and demonstration program,
including--
(A) a schedule for purchasing and installing such
technology or systems on commercial aircraft; and
(B) a description of--
(i) the priority in which commercial aircraft will be
equipped with such technology or systems;
(ii) any efforts to coordinate the schedules for installing
such technology or system with private airlines;
(iii) any efforts to ensure that aircraft manufacturers
integrate such technology or systems into new aircraft; and
(iv) the cost to operate and support such technology or
systems on a commercial aircraft.
(9) A description of the plan to expedite the use of
technology or systems on commercial aircraft to address the
threat posed by MANPADS if intelligence or events indicate
that the schedule for the use of such technology or systems,
including the schedule for carrying out development and
demonstration programs by the Secretary, should be expedited.
(10) A description of the efforts of the Secretary to
survey and identify the areas at domestic and foreign
airports where commercial aircraft are most vulnerable to
attack by MANPADS.
(11) A description of the cooperation between the Secretary
and the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration
to certify the airworthiness and safety of technology and
systems to protect commercial aircraft from the risk posed by
MANPADS in an expeditious manner.
(c) Transmission to Congress.--The report required by
subsection (a) shall be transmitted to Congress along with
the budget for fiscal year 2006 submitted by the President
pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code.

SEC. --17. SCREENING DEVICES TO DETECT CHEMICAL AND PLASTIC
EXPLOSIVES.

Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide to the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation a
report on the current status of efforts, and the additional
needs, regarding passenger and carry-on baggage screening
equipment at United States airports to detect explosives,
including in chemical and plastic forms. The report shall
include the cost of and timetable for installing such
equipment and any recommended legislative actions.

SEC. --18. REPORTS ON THE FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS PROGRAM.

Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this
Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the Secretary of Homeland
Security shall provide to the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation a classified report on the number
of individuals serving only as sworn Federal air marshals.
Such report shall include the number of Federal air marshals
who are women, minorities, or employees of departments or
agencies of the United States Government other than the
Department of Homeland Security, the percentage of domestic
and international flights that have a Federal air marshal
aboard, and the rate at which individuals are leaving service
as Federal air marshals.

SEC. --19. SECURITY OF AIR MARSHAL IDENTITY.

(a) In General.--The Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security shall designate individuals and parties to
whom Federal air marshals shall be required to identify
themselves.
(b) Prohibition.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, no procedure, guideline, rule, regulation, or other
policy shall expose the identity of an air marshal to anyone
other than those designated by the Secretary under subsection
(a).

[[Page H8969]]

SEC. --20. SECURITY MONITORING CAMERAS FOR AIRPORT BAGGAGE
HANDLING AREAS.

(a) In General.--The Under Secretary of Homeland Security
for Border Transportation and Security shall provide
assistance, subject to the availability of funds, to public
airports that have baggage handling areas that are not open
to public view in the acquisition and installation of
security monitoring cameras for surveillance of such areas in
order to deter theft from checked baggage and to aid in the
speedy resolution of liability claims against the
Transportation Security Administration.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to the Secretary of Homeland Security for
fiscal year 2005 such sums as may be necessary to carry out
this section, such sums to remain available until expended.

SEC. --21. EFFECTIVE DATE.

Notwithstanding any other provision of this act, this title
takes effect on the date of enactment of this Act.
At the end, add the following:

TITLE --PUBLIC SAFETY SPECTRUM

SEC. --01. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) Short Title.--This title may be cited as the ``Spectrum
Availability for Emergency-Response and Law-Enforcement To
Improve Vital Emergency Services Act'' or the ``SAVE LIVES
Act''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this
title is as follows:
Sec. --01, Short title; table of contents.
Sec. --02. Findings.
Sec. --03. Setting a specific date for the availability of
spectrum for public safety organizations and creating a
deadline for the transition to digital television.
Sec. --04. Studies of communications capabilities and
needs.
Sec. --05. Statutory, authority for the Department of
Homeland Security's ``SAFECOM'' program.
Sec. --06. Grant program to provide enhanced
interoperability of communications for first responders.
Sec. --07. Digital transition public safety conununications
grant and consumer assistance fund.
Sec. --08. Digital transition program.
Sec. --09. FCC authority to require label requirement for
analog television sets.
Sec. --10. Report on consumer education program
requirements.
Sec. --11. FCC to issue decision in certain proceedings.
Sec. --12. Definitions.
Sec. --13. Effective date.

SEC. --02. FINDINGS.

The Congress finds the following:
(1) In its final report, the 9-11 Commission advocated that
Congress pass legislation providing for the expedited and
increased assignment of radio spectrum for public safety
purposes. The 9-11 Commission stated that this spectrum was
necessary to improve communications between local, State and
Federal public safety organizations and public safety
organizations operating in neighboring jurisdictions that,
may respond to an emergency in unison.
(2) Specifically, the 9-11 Commission report stated ``The
inability to communicate was a critical element at the World
Trade Center, Pentagon and Somerset County, Pennsylvania,
crash sites, where multiple agencies and multiple
jurisdictions responded. The occurrence of this problem at
three very different sites is strong evidence that,
compatible and adequate communications among public safety
organizations at the local, State, and Federal levels remains
an important problem.''.
(3) In the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, the Congress
directed the FCC to allocate spectrum currently being used by
television broadcasters to public safety agencies to use for
emergency communications. This spectrum has specific
characteristics that make it an outstanding choice for
emergency communications because signals sent over these
frequencies are able to penetrate walls and travel great
distances, and can assist multiple jurisdictions in deploying
interoperable communications systems.
(4) This spectrum will not be fully available to public
safety agencies until the completion of the digital
television transition. The need for this spectrum is greater
than ever. The nation cannot risk further loss of life due to
public safety agencies' first, responders' inability to
communicate effectively in the event of another terrorist act
or other crisis, such as a hurricane, tornado, flood, or
earthquake.
(5) In the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Congress set a date
of December 31, 2006, for the termination of the digital
television transition. Under current, law, however, the
deadline will be extended if fewer than 85 percent of the
television households in a market are able to continue
receiving local television broadcast signals.
(6) Federal Communications Commission Chairman Michael K.
Powell testified at a hearing before the Senate Commerce,
Science, and Transportation Committee on September 8, 2004,
that, absent government action, this extension may allow the
digital television transition to continue for ``decades'' or
``multiples of decades''.
(7) The Nation's public safety and welfare cannot be put,
off for ``decades'' or ``multiples of decades''. The Federal
government should ensure that this spectrum is available for
use by public safety organizations by January 1, 2009.
(8) Any plan to end the digital television transition would
be incomplete if it did not ensure that consumers would be
able to continue to enjoy over-the-air broadcast television
with minimal disruption. If broadcasters air only a digital
signal, some consumers may be unable to view digital
transmissions using their analog-only television set. Local
broad-casters are truly an important part of our homeland
security and often an important communications vehicle in the
event of a national emergency. Therefore, consumers who rely
on over-the-air television, particularly those of limited
economic means, should be assisted.
(9) The New America Foundation has testified before
Congress that the cost to assist these 17.4 million
exclusively over-the-air households to continue to view
television is less than $1 billion dollars for equipment,
which equates to roughly 3 percent of the Federal revenue
likely from the auction of the analog television spectrum.
(10) Specifically, the New America Foundation as estimated
that the Federal Government's auction of this spectrum could
yield $30-to-$40 billion in revenue to the Treasury. Chairman
Powell stated at the September 8, 2004, hearing that
``estimates of the value of that spectrum run anywhere from
$30 billion to $70 billion''.
(11) Additionally, there will be societal benefits with the
return of the analog broadcast spectrum. Former FCC Chairman
Reed F. Hundt, at an April 28, 2004, hearing before the
Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee,
testified that this spectrum ``should be the fit and proper
home of wireless broadband''. Mr. Hundt continued, ``Quite
literally, [with this spectrum] the more millions of people
in rural America, will be able to afford Big Broadband
Internet access, the more hundreds of millions of people in
the world will be able to afford joining the Internet
community.''.
(12) Due to the benefits that would flow to the Nation's
citizens from the Federal Government reclaiming this analog
television spectrum--including the safety of our Nation's
first responders and those protected by first responders,
additional revenues to the Federal treasury, millions of new
jobs in the telecommunications sector of the economy, and
increased wireless broadband availability to our Nation's
rural citizens--Congress finds it necessary to set January l,
2009, as a firm date for the return of this analog television
spectrum.

SEC. --03. SETTING A SPECIFIC DATE FOR THE AVAILABILITY OF
SPECTRUM FOR PUBLIC SAFETY ORGANIZATIONS AND
CREATING A DEADLINE FOR THE TRANSITION TO
DIGITAL TELEVISION.

(a) In General.--Section 3090(j)(14) of the Communications
Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 309)(j)(14)) is amended by adding at
the end the following:
``(E) Acceleration of deadline for public safety use.--
``(i) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A) and (B), the
Commission shall take all action necessary to complete by
December 31, 2007--
``(I) the return of television station licenses operating
on channels between 764 and 776 megaHertz and between 794 and
806 megaHertz; and
``(II) assignment of the electro-magnetic spectrum between
764 and 776 megahertz, and between 794 and 806 megahertz, for
public safety services.
``(ii) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A) and (B), the
Commission shall have the authority to modify, reassign, or
require the return of, the television station licenses
assigned to frequencies between 758 and 764 megahertz, 776
and 782 megahertz, and 788 and 794 megahertz as necessary to
permit operations by public safety services on frequencies
between 764 and 776 megahertz and between 794 and 806
megahertz, after the date of enactment of this section, but
such modifications, reassignments, or returns may not take
effect until after December 31, 2007.''.
(b) The FCC may waive the requirements of sections (i) and
(ii) and such other rules as necessary:
(A) in the absence of a bona fide request from relevant
first responders in the affected designated market area, and;
(B) to the extent necessary to avoid consumer disruption
but only if all relevant public safety entities are able to
use such frequencies free of interference by December 31,
2004 or are otherwise able to resolve interference issues
with relevant broadcast licensee by mutual agreement.''

SEC. --04. STUDIES OF COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES AND NEEDS.

(a) In General.--The Commission, in consultation with the
Secretary of Homeland Security, shall conduct a study to
assess strategies that may be used to meet public safety
communications needs, including--
(1) the short-term and long-term need for additional
spectrum allocation for Federal, State, and local first
responders, including an additional allocation of spectrum in
the 700 megaHertz band;
(2) the need for a nationwide interoperable broadband
mobile communications network;
(3) the ability of public safety entities to utilize
wireless broadband applications; and
(4) the communications capabilities of first receivers such
as hospitals and health care workers, and current, efforts to
promote communications co ordination and training among the
first responders and the first receivers.
(b) Reallocation Study.--The Commission shall conduct a
study to assess the advisability of reallocating my amount of
spectrum in the 700 megaHertz band for inlieensed broadband
uses. In the study, the Commission shall consider all other
possible

[[Page H8970]]

users of this spectrum, including public safety.
(c) Report.--The Commission shall report the results of the
studies, together with any recommendations may have, to the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and
the House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce
within 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act.

SEC. --05. STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY'S ``SAFECOM'' PROGRAM.

Section 302 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.
182) is amended--
(1) by inserting ``(a.) In General.-'' before ``The''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(b) SAFECOM Authorized.--
``(1) In general.--In carrying out subsection (a), the
Under Secretary shall establish a program to address the
interoperability of communications devices used by Federal,
State, tribal, and local first responders, to be known as the
Wireless Public Safety Interoperability Communications
Program, or `SAFECOM'. The Under Secretary shall coordinate
the program with the Director of the Department of Justice's
Office of Science and Technology and all other Federal
programs engaging in communications interoperability
research, development, and funding activities to ensure that
the program takes into account, and does not duplicate, those
programs or activities.
``(2) Components.--The program established under paragraph
(1) shall be designed--
``(A) to provide research on the development of a
communications system architecture that would ensure the
interoperability of communications devices among Federal,
State, tribal, and local officials that would enhance the
potential for a coordinated response to a national emergency;
``(B) to support the completion and promote the adoption of
mutually compatible voluntary consensus standards developed
by a standards development organization accredited by the
American National Standards Institute to ensure such
interoperability; and
``(C) to provide for the development of a model strategic
plan that could be used by any State or region in developing
its communications interoperability plan.
``(3) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are
authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary to carry out
this subsection--
``(A) $22,105,000 for fiscal year 2005;
``(B) $22,768,000 for fiscal year 2006;
``(C) $23,451,000 for fiscal year 2007;
``(D) $24,155,000 for fiscal year 2008; and
``(E) $24,879,000 for fiscal year 2009.
``(c) National Baseline Study of Public Safety
Communications Interoperability.--By December 31, 2005, the
Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Science and
Technology shall complete a study to develop a national
baseline for communications interoperability and develop
common grant guidance for all Federal grant programs that
provide communications related resources or assistance to
State and local agencies, any Federal programs conducting
demonstration projects, providing technical assistance,
providing outreach services, providing standards development
assistance, or conducting research and development with the
public safety community with respect to wireless
communications. The Under Secretary shall transmit a report
to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee on
Energy and Commerce containing the Under Secretary's
findings, conclusions, and recommendations from the study.''.

SEC. --06. GRANT PROGRAM TO PROVIDE ENHANCED INTEROPERABILITY
OF COMMUNICATIONS FOR FIRST RESPONDERS.

(a) In General.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall
establish a program to help State, local, tribal, and
regional first responders acquire and deploy interoperable
communications equipment, purchase such equipment, and train
personnel in the use of such equipment. The Secretary, in
cooperation with the heads of other Federal departments and
agencies who administer programs that provide communications-
related assistance programs to State, local, and tribal
public safety organizations, shall develop and implement
common standards to the greatest extent practicable.
(b) Applications.--To be eligible for assistance under the
program, a State, local, tribal, or regional first responder
agency shall submit an application, at such time, in such
form, and containing such information as the Under Secretary
of Homeland Security for Science and Technology may require,
including--
(1) a detailed explanation of how assistance received under
the program would be used to improve local communications
interoperability and ensure interoperability with other
appropriate Federal, State, local, tribal, and regional
agencies in a regional or national emergency;
(2) assurance that the equipment and system would--
(A) not be incompatible with the communications
architecture developed under section 302(b)(2)(A) of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002;
(B) would meet any voluntary consensus standards developed
under section 302(b) (2) (B) of that Act; and
(C) be consistent with the common grant guidance
established under section 302(b)(3) of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002.
(c) Grants.--The Under Secretary shall review applications
submitted under subsection (b). The Secretary, pursuant to an
application approved by the Under Secretary, may make the
assistance provided under the program available in the form
of a single grant for a period of not more than 3 years.

SEC. --07. DIGITAL TRANSITION PUBLIC SAFETY COMMUNICATIONS
GRANT AND CONSUMER ASSISTANCE FUND.

(a) In General.--There is established on the books of the
Treasury a separate fiend to be known as the ``Digital
Transition Consumer Assistance Fund'', which shall be
administered by the Secretary, in consultation with the
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and
Information.
(b) Crediting of Receipts.--The Fund shall be credited with
the amount specified in section 309(j)(8)(D) of the
Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 309(j)(8)(D)(j).
(c) Fund Availability.--
(1) Appropriations.--
(A) Consumer assistance program.-- There are appropriated
to the Secretary from the Fund such sums, not to exceed
$1,000,000,000, as are required to carry out the program
established under section 8 of this Act.
(B) PSO grant program.--To the extent that amounts
available in the Fund exceed the amount required to carry out
that program, there are authorized to be appropriated to the
Secretary of Homeland Security, such sums as are required to
carry out the program established under section 6 of this
Act, not to exceed an amount, determined by the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, on the basis of the
findings of the National Baseline Interoperability study
conducted by the SAFECOM Office of the Department of Homeland
Security.
(2) Reversion of unused funds.--Any auction proceeds in the
Fund that are remaining after the date on which the programs
under section 6 and 8 of this Act terminate, as determined by
the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of
Commerce respectively, shall revert, to and be deposited in
the general fund of the Treasury.
(d) Deposit of Auction Proceeds.--Paragraph (8) of section
309(j) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 309(j))
is amended--
(1) by inserting ``or subparagraph (D)'' in subparagraph
(A) after ``subparagraph (B)''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(D) Disposition of cash proceeds from auction of channels
52 through 69.--Cash proceeds attributable to the auction of
any eligible frequencies between 698 and 806 megaHertz on the
electromagnetic spectrum conducted after the date of
enactment of the SAVE LIVES Act shall be deposited in the
Digital Transition Consumer Assistance Fund established under
section 7 of that Act.''.

SEC. --08. DIGITAL TRANSITION PROGRAM.

(a) In General.--The Secretary, in consultation with the
Commission and the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget, shall establish a program to assist households--
(1) in the purchase or other acquisition of digital-to-
analog converter devices that will enable television sets
that operate only with analog signal processing to continue
to operate when receiving a digital signal;
(2) in the payment of a one-time installation fee (not in
excess of the industry average fee for the date, locale, and
structure involved, as determined by the Secretary) for
installing the equipment required for residential reception
of services provided by a multichannel video programming
distributor (as defined in section 602(13) of the
Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 602(13)); or
(3) in the purchase of any other device that will enable
the household to receive over-the-air digital television
broadcast signals, but in an amount not in excess of the
average per-household assistance provided under paragraphs
(1) and (2).
(b) Program Criteria.--The Secretary shall ensure that the
program established under subsection (a)--
(1) becomes publicly available no later than January 1,
2003;
(2) gives first priority to assisting lower income
households (as determined by the Director of the Bureau of
the Census for statistical reporting purposes) who rely
exclusively on over-the-air television broadcasts;
(3) gives second priority to assisting other households who
rely exclusively on over-the-air television broadcasts;
(4) is technologically neutral; and
(5) is conducted at the lowest feasible administrative
cost.

SEC. --09. FCC AUTHORITY TO REQUIRE LABEL REQUIREMENT FOR
ANALOG TELEVISION SETS.

(a) In General.--Section 303 of the Communications, Act of
1934 (47 U.S.C. 303) is amended by adding end the following.
``(z) The Commission acts to set a hard deadline for the
return of analog spectrum pursuant to section 309(j)(14), it
shall have the authority to require that any apparatus
described in paragraph (s) sold or offered for sale in or
affecting interstate commerce, that is incapable of receiving
and displaying a digital television broadcast signal without
the use of an external device that translates digital
television broadcast signals into analog television broadcast
signals have affixed to it, and, if it is sold or offered for
sale in

[[Page H8971]]

a container, affixed to that container, a label that states
that the apparatus will be incapable of displaying over-the-
air television broadcast signals received after a date
determined by the FCC, without the purchase of additional
equipment.''.
(c) Point of Sale Warning.-- If the Commission acts to set
a hard deadline for the return of analog spectrum pursuant to
section 309(j)(14), then the Commission in consultation with
the Federal Trade Commission, shall require the display at,
or in close proximity to, any commercial retail sales display
of television sets described in section 303(z) of the
Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 303(z) sold or offered
for sale in or affecting interstate commerce after a date
determined by the Commission, of a printed notice that,
clearly and conspicuously states that the sets will be
incapable of displaying over-the-air telvision broadcast
signals received after the hard deadline established by the
Commission, without the purchase or lease of additional
equipment.

SEC. --10. REPORT ON CONSUMER EDUCATION PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.

Within 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and
Information, after consultation with the Commission, shall
transmit a report to the the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation and the House of Representatives
Committee on Energy and Commerce containing recommendations
with respect to--
(1) an effective program to educate consumers about the
transition to digital television broadcast signals and the
impact of that transition on consumers' choices of equipment
to receive such signals;
(2) the need, if any, for Federal funding for such a
program;
(3) the date of commencement and duration of such a
program; and
(4) what department or agency should have the lead
responsibility for conducting such a program.

SEC. --11. FCC TO ISSUE DECISION IN CERTAIN PROCEEDINGS.

The Commission shall issue a final decision before--
(1) January 1, 2005, in the Matter of Carriage of Digital
Television Broadcast Signals; Amendments to Part 76 of the
Commission's Rules, CS Docket, No. 98-120;
(2) January 1, 2005, in the Matter of Public Interest
Obligations of TV Broadcast Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360;
and
(3) January 1, 2006, in the Implementation of the Satellite
Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999; Local Broadcast Signal
Carriage Issues, CS Docket No. 00-96.

SEC. --12. DEFINITIONS.

In this title:
(1) Commission.--The term ``Commission'' means the Federal
Communications Commission.
(2) Fund.--The term ``Fund'' means the Digital Transition
Consumer Assistance Fund established by section 7.
(3) Secretary.--Except where otherwise expressly pro-rided,
the term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of Commerce.

SEC. --13. EFFECTIVE DATE.

This title takes effect on the date of enactment of this
Act.
On page 170, between lines 8 and 9, insert the following:
(i) Protections for Human Research Subjects.--The Secretary
of Homeland Security shall ensure that the Department of
Homeland Security complies with the protections for human
research subjects, as described in part 46 of title 45, Code
of Federal Regulations, or in equivalent regulations as
promulgated by such Secretary, with respect to research that
is conducted or supported by such Department.
On page 154, strike lines 1 through 3 and insert the
following:
(1) analyze and review actions the executive branch takes
to protect the Nation from terrorism, ensuring that the need
for such actions is balanced with the need to protect privacy
and civil liberties; and
On page 155, line 6 strike beginning with ``has'' through
line 9 and insert the following: ``has established--
``(i) that the need for the power is balanced with the need
to protect privacy and civil liberties;''.
On page 166, strike lines 4 through 6 and insert the
following: ``element has established--
``(i) that the need for the power is balanced with the need
to protect privacy and civil liberties;''.
On page 132, line 23, strike ``and''.
On page 133, line 3, strike the period and insert ``;
and''.
On page 133, between lines 3 and 4, insert the following:
(L) utilizing privacy-enhancing technologies that minimize
the inappropriate dissemination and disclosure of personally
identifiable information.
On page 153, between lines 2 and 3, insert the following:
(o) Limitation on Funds.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of this section, none of the funds provided
pursuant to subsection (n) may be obligated for deployment or
implementation of the Network unless the guidelines and
requirements under subsection (e) are submitted to Congress;
At the appropriate place, insert the following:

SEC. __. TERRORIST WATCH LISTS.

(a) Criteria for Watch List.--The National Intelligence
Director of the United States, in consultation with the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, and
the Attorney General, shall report to Congress on the
criteria for placing individuals on the Terrorist Screening
Center consolidated screening watch list, including minimum
standards for reliability and accuracy of identifying
information, the degree of information certainty and the
range of threat levels that the individual poses, and the
range of applicable consequences that apply to the person if
located. To the greatest extent consistent with the
protection of law enforcement sensitive information,
classified information and applicable law, the report shall
be in unclassified form and available to the public, with a
classified annex where necessary.
(b) Safeguards Against Erroneous Listings.--The Secretary
of Homeland Security shall establish a process for
individuals to challenge ``Automatic Selectee'' or ``No Fly''
designations on the applicable lists as maintain by the
Transportation Security Administration and have their names
removed from such lists, if erroneously present.
(c) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Department of Homeland Security
Privacy Officer shall submit a report assessing the impact of
the ``No Fly'' and ``Automatic Selectee'' lists on privacy
and civil liberties to the Committee on the Judiciary, the
Committee on Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on
Commerce, Science and Transportation of the Senate, and the
Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Government
Reform, the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
and the Select Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives. The report shall include any recommendations
for practices, procedures, regulations, or legislation to
eliminate or minimize adverse effects of such lists on
privacy, discrimination, due process and other civil
liberties, as well as the implications of applying those
lists to other modes of transportation. In its analysis, the
report shall also consider the effect these recommendations
would have on the ability of such lists to protect the United
States against terrorist attacks. To the greatest extent
consistent with the protection of law enforcement sensitive
information, classified information and applicable law, the
report shall be in unclassified form and available to the
public, with a classified annex where necessary.
(d) Effective Date.--Notwithstanding section 341 or any
other provision of this Act, this section shall become
effective on the date of enactment of this Act.
At the appropriate place, insert the following:

SEC. __. REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL AIR CARGO THREATS.

(a) Report.--Within 180 days after the date of enactment of
this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination
with the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of the
Federal Aviation Administration, shall submit a report to the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the
Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and the Select
Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives that contains the following:
(1) A description of the current procedures in place to
address the threat of an inbound all-cargo aircraft from
outside the United States that intelligence sources indicate
could carry explosive, incendiary, chemical, biological or
nuclear devices.
(2) An analysis of the potential for establishing secure
facilities along established international aviation routes
for the purposes of diverting and securing aircraft described
in paragraph (1).
(b) Report Format.--The Secretary may submit all, or part,
of the report required by this section in classified and
redacted form if the Secretary determines that it is
appropriate or necessary.
At the appropriate place, insert the following:

SEC. __. TERRORISM FINANCING.

(a) Report on Terrorist Financing.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the President, acting through the
Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit to Congress a report
evaluating the current state of United States efforts to
curtail the international financing of terrorism.
(2) Contents.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall
evaluate and make recommendations on--
(A) the effectiveness and efficiency of current United
States governmental efforts and methods to detect, track,
disrupt, and stop terrorist financing;
(B) the relationship between terrorist financing and money
laundering, including how the laundering of proceeds related
to illegal narcotics or foreign political corruption may
contribute to terrorism or terrorist financing;
(C) the nature, effectiveness, and efficiency of current
efforts to coordinate intelligence and agency operations
within the United States Government to detect, track,
disrupt, and stop terrorist financing, including identifying
who, if anyone, has primary responsibility for developing
priorities, assigning tasks to agencies, and monitoring the
implementation of policy and operations;
(D) the effectiveness and efficiency of efforts to protect
the critical infrastructure of the United States financial
system, and ways to improve the effectiveness of financial
institutions;

[[Page H8972]]

(E) ways to improve multilateral and international
governmental cooperation on terrorist financing, including
the adequacy of agency coordination within the United States
related to participating in international cooperative efforts
and implementing international treaties and compacts; and
(F) ways to improve the setting of priorities and
coordination of United States efforts to detect, track,
disrupt, and stop terrorist financing, including
recommendations for changes in executive branch organization
or procedures, legislative reforms, additional resources, or
use of appropriated funds.
(b) Postemployment Restriction for Certain Bank and Thrift
Examiners.--Section 10 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act
(12 U.S.C. 1820) is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``(k) One-year Restrictions on Federal Examiners of
Financial Institutions.--
``(1) In general.--In addition to other applicable
restrictions set forth in title 18, United States Code, the
penalties set forth in paragraph (6) of this subsection shall
apply to any person who--
``(A) was an officer or employee (including any special
Government employee) of a Federal banking agency or a Federal
reserve bank;
``(B) served 2 or more months during the final 12 months of
his or her employment with such agency or entity as the
senior examiner (or a functionally equivalent position) of a
depository institution or depository institution holding
company with continuing, broad responsibility for the
examination (or inspection) of that depository institution or
depository institution holding company on behalf of the
relevant agency or Federal reserve bank; and
``(C) within 1 year after the termination date of his or
her service or employment with such agency or entity,
knowingly accepts compensation as an employee, officer,
director, or consultant from--
``(i) such depository institution, any depository
institution holding company that controls such depository
institution, or any other company that controls such
depository institution; or
``(ii) such depository institution holding company or any
depository institution that is controlled by such depository
institution holding company.
``(2) Definitions.--For purposes of this subsection--
``(A) the term `depository institution' includes an
uninsured branch or agency of a foreign bank, if such branch
or agency is located in any State; and
``(B) the term `depository institution holding company'
includes any foreign bank or company described in section
8(a) of the International Banking Act of 1978.
``(3) Rules of construction.--For purposes of this
subsection, a foreign bank shall be deemed to control any
branch or agency of the foreign bank, and a person shall be
deemed to act as a consultant for a depository institution,
depository institution holding company, or other company,
only if such person directly works on matters for, or on
behalf of, such depository institution, depository
institution holding company, or other company.
``(4) Regulations.--
``(A) In general.--Each Federal banking agency shall
prescribe rules or regulations to administer and carry out
this subsection, including rules, regulations, or guidelines
to define the scope of persons referred to in paragraph
(1)(B).
``(B) Consultation required.--The Federal banking agencies
shall consult with each other for the purpose of assuring
that the rules and regulations issued by the agencies under
subparagraph (A) are, to the extent possible, consistent and
comparable and practicable, taking into account any
differences in the supervisory programs utilized by the
agencies for the supervision of depository institutions and
depository institution holding companies.
``(5) Waiver.--
``(A) Agency authority.--A Federal banking agency may grant
a waiver, on a case by case basis, of the restriction imposed
by this subsection to any officer or employee (including any
special Government employee) of that agency, and the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System may grant a waiver of
the restriction imposed by this subsection to any officer or
employee of a Federal reserve bank, if the head of such
agency certifies in writing that granting the waiver would
not affect the integrity of the supervisory program of the
relevant Federal banking agency.
``(B) Definition.--For purposes of this paragraph, the head
of an agency is--
``(i) the Comptroller of the Currency, in the case of the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency;
``(ii) the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, in the case of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System;
``(iii) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, in the
case of the Corporation; and
``(iv) the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, in
the case of the Office of Thrift Supervision.
``(6) Penalties.--
``(A) In general.--In addition to any other administrative,
civil, or criminal remedy or penalty that may otherwise
apply, whenever a Federal banking agency determines that a
person subject to paragraph (1) has become associated, in the
manner described in paragraph (1)(C), with a depository
institution, depository institution holding company, or other
company for which such agency serves as the appropriate
Federal banking agency, the agency shall impose upon such
person one or more of the following penalties:
``(i) Industry-wide prohibition order.--The Federal banking
agency shall serve a written notice or order in accordance
with and subject to the provisions of section 8(e)(4) for
written notices or orders under paragraphs (1) or (2) of
section 8(e), upon such person of the intention of the
agency--

``(I) to remove such person from office or to prohibit such
person from further participation in the conduct of the
affairs of the depository institution, depository institution
holding company, or other company for a period of up to 5
years; and
``(II) to prohibit any further participation by such
person, in any manner, in the conduct of the affairs of any
insured depository institution for a period of up to 5 years.

``(ii) Civil monetary fine.--The Federal banking agency
may, in an administrative proceeding or civil action in an
appropriate United States district court, impose on such
person a civil monetary penalty of not more than $250,000. In
lieu of an action by the Federal banking agency under this
clause, the Attorney General of the United States may bring a
civil action under this clause in the appropriate United
States district court. Any administrative proceeding under
this clause shall be conducted in accordance with section
8(i).
``(B) Scope of prohibition order.--Any person subject to an
order issued under subparagraph (A)(i) shall be subject to
paragraphs (6) and (7) of section 8(e) in the same manner and
to the same extent as a person subject to an order issued
under such section.
``(C) Definitions.--Solely for purposes of this paragraph,
the `appropriate Federal banking agency' for a company that
is not a depository institution or depository institution
holding company shall be the Federal banking agency on whose
behalf the person described in paragraph (1) performed the
functions described in paragraph (1)(B).''.
(c) Postemployment Restriction for Certain Credit Union
Examiners.--Section 206 of the Federal Credit Union Act (12
U.S.C. 1786) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(w) One-year Restrictions on Federal Examiners of Insured
Credit Unions.--
``(1) In general.--In addition to other applicable
restrictions set forth in title 18, United States Code, the
penalties set forth in paragraph (5) of this subsection shall
apply to any person who--
``(A) was an officer or employee (including any special
Government employee) of the Administration;
``(B) served 2 or more months during the final 12 months of
his or her employment with the Administration as the senior
examiner (or a functionally equivalent position) of an
insured credit union with continuing, broad responsibility
for the examination (or inspection) of that insured credit
union on behalf of the Administration; and
``(C) within 1 year after the termination date of his or
her service or employment with the Administration, knowingly
accepts compensation as an employee, officer, director, or
consultant from such insured credit union.
``(2) Rule of construction.--For purposes of this
subsection, a person shall be deemed to act as a consultant
for an insured credit union only if such person directly
works on matters for, or on behalf of, such insured credit
union.
``(3) Regulations.--
``(A) In general.--The Board shall prescribe rules or
regulations to administer and carry out this subsection,
including rules, regulations, or guidelines to define the
scope of persons referred to in paragraph (1)(B).
``(B) Consultation.--In prescribing rules or regulations
under this paragraph, the Board shall, to the extent it deems
necessary, consult with the Federal banking agencies (as
defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act) on
regulations issued by such agencies in carrying out section
10(k) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.
``(4) Waiver.--
``(A) Agency authority.--The Board may grant a waiver, on a
case by case basis, of the restriction imposed by this
subsection to any officer or employee (including any special
Government employee) of the Administration if the Chairman
certifies in writing that granting the waiver would not
affect the integrity of the supervisory program of the
Administration.
``(5) Penalties.--
``(A) In general.--In addition to any other administrative,
civil, or criminal remedy or penalty that may otherwise
apply, whenever the Board determines that a person subject to
paragraph (1) has become associated, in the manner described
in paragraph (1)(C), with an insured credit union, the Board
shall impose upon such person one or more of the following
penalties:
``(i) Industry-wide prohibition order.--The Board shall
serve a written notice or order in accordance with and
subject to the provisions of subsection (g)(4) for written
notices or orders under paragraphs (1) or (2) of subsection
(g), upon such person of the intention of the Board--

``(I) to remove such person from office or to prohibit such
person from further participation in the conduct of the
affairs of the insured credit union for a period of up to 5
years; and

[[Page H8973]]

``(II) to prohibit any further participation by such
person, in any manner, in the conduct of the affairs of any
insured credit union for a period of up to 5 years.

``(ii) Civil monetary fine.--The Board may, in an
administrative proceeding or civil action in an appropriate
United States district court, impose on such person a civil
monetary penalty of not more than $250,000. In lieu of an
action by the Board under this clause, the Attorney General
of the United States may bring a civil action under this
clause in the appropriate United States district court. Any
administrative proceeding under this clause shall be
conducted in accordance with subsection (k).
``(B) Scope of prohibition order.--Any person subject to an
order issued under this subparagraph (A)(i) shall be subject
to paragraphs (5) and (7) of subsection (g) in the same
manner and to the same extent as a person subject to an order
issued under subsection (g).''.
(d) Effective Date.--Notwithstanding section 341,
subsection (a) shall become effective on the date of
enactment of this Act, and the amendments made by subsections
(b) and (c) shall become effective at the end of the 12-month
period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act,
whether or not final regulations are issued in accordance
with the amendments made by this section as of that date of
enactment.
(e) Repeal of Duplicative Provision.--Section __16(c) of
this Act, entitled ``Report on Terrorist Financing'' is
repealed, and shall have no force or effect, effective on the
date of enactment of this Act.
At the end, insert the following new title:

TITLE IV--TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

SEC. 401. WATCHLISTS FOR PASSENGERS ABOARD VESSELS.

(a) In General.--As soon as practicable but not later than
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of Homeland Security shall--
(1) implement a procedure under which the Department of
Homeland Security compares information about passengers and
crew who are to be carried aboard a cruise ship with a
comprehensive, consolidated database containing information
about known or suspected terrorists and their associates; and
(2) use the information obtained by comparing the passenger
and crew information with the information in the database to
prevent known or suspected terrorists and their associates
from boarding such vessels or to subject them to specific
additional security scrutiny, through the use of ``no
transport'' and ``automatic selectee'' lists or other means.
* * * * * *
(b) Cooperation from Operators of Passenger Vessels.--The
Secretary of Homeland Security shall by rulemaking require
operators of cruise ships to provide the passenger and crew
information necessary to implement the procedure required by
subsection (a).
(c) Maintaining the Accuracy and Integrity of the ``No
Transport'' and ``Automatic Selectee'' Lists.--
(1) Watchlist database.--The Secretary of Homeland
Security, in consultation with the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigations, shall design guidelines, policies,
and operating procedures for the collection, removal, and
updating of data maintained, or to be maintained, in the
watchlist database described in subsection (a)(1) that are
designed to ensure the accuracy and integrity of the
databases.
(2) Accuracy of Entries.--In developing the ``no
transport'' and ``automatic selectee'' lists under subsection
(a)(1), the Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish a
simple and timely method for correcting erroneous entries,
for clarifying information known to cause false hits or
misidentification errors, and for updating relevant
information that is dispositive in the passenger and crew
screening process. The Secretary shall also establish a
process to provide an individual whose name is confused with,
or similar to, a name in the watchlist database with a means
of demonstrating that such individual is not the person named
in the database.
(d) Cruise Ship Defined.--In this section, the term
``cruise ship'' shall be as defined in 33 CFR 104.105(a)(5)
and (6) on the date of enactment of this act.
At the appropriate place, insert the following:

SEC. __. COMMUNICATION SYSTEM GRANTS.

(a) In General.--The Secretary of Homeland Security may
award grants, on a competitive basis, to States, local
governments, local law enforcement agencies, and local fire
departments to--
(1) improve communication systems to allow for real time,
interoperable communication between State and local first
responders; or
(2) purchase communication systems that allow for real
time, interoperable communication between State and local
first responders.
(b) Application.--Any State, local government, local law
enforcement agency, or local fire department desiring a grant
under this section shall submit an application to the
Secretary at such time, in such manner, and containing such
information as the Secretary may reasonably require.
(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated such sums as necessary for each of the
fiscal years 2005 through 2009 to carry out the provisions of
this section.
On page 158, between lines 9 and 10 insert the following:
(C) the minority views on any findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Board resulting from its advice and
oversight functions under subsection (d).
At the appropriate place, insert the following:

SEC. __. PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICER EMPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION
ACT OF 2004.

(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the
``Private Security Officer Employment Authorization Act of
2004''.
(b) Findings.--Congress finds that--
(1) employment of private security officers in the United
States is growing rapidly;
(2) private security officers function as an adjunct to,
but not a replacement for, public law enforcement by, among
other things, helping to protect critical infrastructure,
including hospitals, manufacturing facilities, defense and
aerospace contractors, nuclear power plants, chemical
companies, oil and gas refineries, airports, communication
facilities and operations, and others;
(3) the 9-11 Commission Report says that ``Private sector
preparedness is not a luxury; it is a cost of doing business
in the post-9/11 world. It is ignored at a tremendous
potential cost in lives, money, and national security'' and
endorsed adoption of the American National Standards
Institute's standard for private preparedness;
(4) part of improving private sector preparedness is
mitigating the risks of terrorist attack on critical
infrastructure by ensuring that private security officers who
protect those facilities are properly screened to determine
their suitability;
(5) the American public deserves the employment of
qualified, well-trained private security personnel as an
adjunct to sworn law enforcement officers; and
(6) private security officers and applicants for private
security officer positions should be thoroughly screened and
trained.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Employee.--The term ``employee'' includes both a
current employee and an applicant for employment as a private
security officer.
(2) Authorized employer.--The term ``authorized employer''
means any person that--
(A) employs private security officers; and
(B) is authorized by regulations promulgated by the
Attorney General to request a criminal history record
information search of an employee through a State
identification bureau pursuant to this section.
(3) Private security officer.-- The term ``private security
officer''--
(A) means an individual other than an employee of a
Federal, State, or local government, whose primary duty is to
perform security services, full- or part-time, for
consideration, whether armed or unarmed and in uniform or
plain clothes (except for services excluded from coverage
under this section if the Attorney General determines by
regulation that such exclusion would serve the public
interest); but
(B) does not include--
(i) employees whose duties are primarily internal audit or
credit functions;
(ii) employees of electronic security system companies
acting as technicians or monitors; or
(iii) employees whose duties primarily involve the secure
movement of prisoners.
(4) Security services.--The term ``security services''
means acts to protect people or property as defined by
regulations promulgated by the Attorney General.
(5) State identification bureau.--The term ``State
identification bureau'' means the State entity designated by
the Attorney General for the submission and receipt of
criminal history record information.
(d) Criminal History Record Information Search.--
(1) In general.--
(A) Submission of fingerprints.--An authorized employer may
submit to the State identification bureau of a participating
State, fingerprints or other means of positive
identification, as determined by the Attorney General, of an
employee of such employer for purposes of a criminal history
record information search pursuant to this section.
(B) Employee rights.--
(i) Permission.--An authorized employer shall obtain
written consent from an employee to submit to the State
identification bureau of a participating State the request to
search the criminal history record information of the
employee under this section.
(ii) Access.--An authorized employer shall provide to the
employee confidential access to any information relating to
the employee received by the authorized employer pursuant to
this section.
(C) Providing information to the state identification
bureau.--Upon receipt of a request for a criminal history
record information search from an authorized employer
pursuant to this section, submitted through the State
identification bureau of a participating State, the Attorney
General shall--
(i) search the appropriate records of the Criminal Justice
Information Services Division of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation; and

[[Page H8974]]

(ii) promptly provide any resulting identification and
criminal history record information to the submitting State
identification bureau requesting the information.
(D) Use of information.--
(i) In general.--Upon receipt of the criminal history
record information from the Attorney General by the State
identification bureau, the information shall be used only as
provided in clause (ii).
(ii) Terms.--In the case of--

(I) a participating State that has no State standards for
qualification to be a private security officer, the State
shall notify an authorized employer as to the fact of whether
an employee has been--

(aa) convicted of a felony, an offense involving dishonesty
or a false statement if the conviction occurred during the
previous 10 years, or an offense involving the use or
attempted use of physical force against the person of another
if the conviction occurred during the previous 10 years; or
(bb) charged with a criminal felony for which there has
been no resolution during the preceding 365 days; or

(II) a participating State that has State standards for
qualification to be a private security officer, the State
shall use the information received pursuant to this section
in applying the State standards and shall only notify the
employer of the results of the application of the State
standards.

(E) Frequency of requests.--An authorized employer may
request a criminal history record information search for an
employee only once every 12 months of continuous employment
by that employee unless the authorized employer has good
cause to submit additional requests.
(2) Regulations.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall issue such
final or interim final regulations as may be necessary to
carry out this section, including--
(A) measures relating to the security, confidentiality,
accuracy, use, submission, dissemination, destruction of
information and audits, and recordkeeping;
(B) standards for qualification as an authorized employer;
and
(C) the imposition of reasonable fees necessary for
conducting the background checks.
(3) Criminal penalties for use of information.--Whoever
knowingly and intentionally uses any information obtained
pursuant to this section other than for the purpose of
determining the suitability of an individual for employment
as a private security officer shall be fined under title 18,
United States Code, or imprisoned for not more than 2 years,
or both.
(4) User fees.--
(A) In general.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation may--
(i) collect fees to process background checks provided for
by this section; and
(ii) establish such fees at a level to include an
additional amount to defray expenses for the automation of
fingerprint identification and criminal justice information
services and associated costs.
(B) Limitations.--Any fee collected under this subsection--
(i) shall, consistent with Public Law 101-515 and Public
Law 104-99, be credited to the appropriation to be used for
salaries and other expenses incurred through providing the
services described in such Public Laws and in subparagraph
(A);
(ii) shall be available for expenditure only to pay the
costs of such activities and services; and
(iii) shall remain available until expended.
(C) State costs.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed as restricting the right of a State to assess a
reasonable fee on an authorized employer for the costs to the
State of administering this section.
(5) State opt out.--A State may decline to participate in
the background check system authorized by this section by
enacting a law or issuing an order by the Governor (if
consistent with State law) providing that the State is
declining to participate pursuant to this paragraph.
On page 4, after line 12, of the agreed to language of
amendment No. 3942, insert the following:
(4) regions of specific concern where United States foreign
assistance should be targeted to assist governments in
efforts to prevent the use of such regions as terrorist
sanctuaries are South Asia, Southeast Asia, West Africa, the
Horn of Africa, North and North Central Africa, the Arabian
peninsula, Central and Eastern Europe, and South America;
At the appropriate place insert the following:
(1) The United States needs to implement the
recommendations of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States to adopt a unified incident
command system and significantly enhance communications
connectivity between and among civilian authorities, local
first responders, and the National Guard. The unified
incident command system should enable emergency managers and
first responders to manage, generate, receive, evaluate,
share, and use information in the event of a terrorist attack
or a significant national disaster.
At the appropriate place, insert the following:

SEC. __. LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS MARINE TERMINALS.

Congress finds that plans developed by the Department of
Homeland Security to protect critical energy infrastructure
should include risk assessments and protective measures for
existing and proposed liquefied natural gas marine terminals.
At the appropriate place, insert the following:

SEC. __. URBAN AREA COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES.

Section 510 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added
by this Act, is amended by inserting ``, and shall have
appropriate and timely access to the Information Sharing
Network described in section 206(c) of the National
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004'' after ``each other in the
event of an emergency''.
On page 137, line 20, strike ``and'' and all that follows
through ``(9)'' on line 21, and insert the following:
(9) an estimate of training requirements needed to ensure
that the Network will be adequately implemented and property
utilized;
(10) an analysis of the cost to State, tribal, and local
governments and private sector entities for equipment and
training needed to effectively utilize the Network; and
(11)
At the appropriate place, insert the following new section:

SEC. __. ANNUAL REPORT ON THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES WITHIN
THE OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL.

(a) Requirement for Annual Report.--Not later than 180 days
after the date of enactment of this Act, and annually
thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to
Congress a report on the allocation of resources within the
Office of Foreign Assets Control.
(b) Content of Annual Report.--An annual report required by
subsection (a) shall include--
(1) a description of--
(A) the allocation of resources within the Office of
Foreign Assets Control to enforce the economic and trade
sanctions of the United States against terrorist
organizations and targeted foreign countries during the
fiscal year prior to the fiscal year in which such report is
submitted; and
(B) the criteria on which such allocation is based;
(2) a description of any proposed modifications to such
allocation; and
(3) an explanation for any such allocation that is not
based on prioritization of threats determined using
appropriate criteria, including the likelihood that--
(A) a terrorist organization or targeted foreign country--
(i) will sponsor or plan a direct attack against the United
States or the interests of the United States; or
(ii) is participating in or maintaining a nuclear,
biological, or chemical weapons development program; or
(B) a targeted foreign country--
(i) is financing, or allowing the financing, of a terrorist
organization within such country; or
(ii) is providing safe haven to a terrorist organization
within such country.
(c) Effective Date.--Notwithstanding section 341 or any
other provision of this Act, this section shall take effect
on the date of the enactment of this Act.
At the appropriate place, insert the following:

SEC. __. HOMELAND SECURITY GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION.

(a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
(1) geographic technologies and geographic data improve
government capabilities to detect, plan, prepare, and respond
to disasters in order to save lives and protect property;
(2) geographic data improves the ability of information
technology applications and systems to enhance public
security in a cost-effective manner; and
(3) geographic information preparedness in the United
States, and specifically in the Department of Homeland
Security, is insufficient because of--
(A) inadequate geographic data compatibility;
(B) insufficient geographic data sharing; and
(C) technology interoperability barriers.
(b) Homeland Security Geographic Information.--Section 703
of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 343) is
amended--
(1) by inserting ``(a) In General.--'' before ``The Chief
Information''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(b) Geographic Information Functions.--
``(1) Definition.--In this subsection, the term `geographic
information' means the information systems that involve
locational data, such as maps or other geospatial information
resources.
``(2) Office of geospatial management.--
``(A) Establishment.--The Office of Geospatial Management
is established within the Office of the Chief Information
Officer.
``(B) Geospatial information officer.--
``(i) Appointment.--The Office of Geospatial Management
shall be administered by the Geospatial Information Officer,
who shall be appointed by the Secretary and serve under the
direction of the Chief Information Officer.
``(ii) Functions.--The Geospatial Information Officer shall
assist the Chief Information Officer in carrying out all
functions under this section and in coordinating the
geographic information needs of the Department.
``(C) Coordination of geographic information.--The Chief
Information Officer shall establish and carry out a program
to provide

[[Page H8975]]

for the efficient use of geographic information, which shall
include--
``(i) providing such geographic information as may be
necessary to implement the critical infrastructure protection
programs;
``(ii) providing leadership and coordination in meeting the
geographic information requirements of those responsible for
planning, prevention, mitigation, assessment and response to
emergencies, critical infrastructure protection, and other
functions of the Department; and
``(iii) coordinating with users of geographic information
within the Department to assure interoperability and prevent
unnecessary duplication.
``(D) Responsibilities.--In carrying out this subsection,
the responsibilities of the Chief Information Officer shall
include--
``(i) coordinating the geographic information needs and
activities of the Department;
``(ii) implementing standards, as adopted by the Director
of the Office of Management and Budget under the processes
established under section 216 of the E-Government Act of 2002
(44 U.S.C. 3501 note), to facilitate the interoperability of
geographic information pertaining to homeland security among
all users of such information within--

``(I) the Department;
``(II) State and local government; and
``(III) the private sector;

``(iii) coordinating with the Federal Geographic Data
Committee and carrying out the responsibilities of the
Department pursuant to Office of Management and Budget
Circular A-16 and Executive Order 12906; and
``(iv) making recommendations to the Secretary and the
Executive Director of the Office for State and Local
Government Coordination and Preparedness on awarding grants
to--

``(I) fund the creation of geographic data; and
``(II) execute information sharing agreements regarding
geographic data with State, local, and tribal governments.

``(3) Authorization of appropriations.--There are
authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary
to carry out this subsection for each fiscal year.''.
At the appropriate place, insert the following:

SEC. 409. CERTIFICATION RELATIVE TO THE SCREENING OF
MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE TRANSPORTED INTO THE
UNITED STATES.

(a) Defined Term.--In this section, the term ``municipal
solid waste'' includes sludge (as defined in section 1004 of
the Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. 6903)).
(b) Reports to Congress.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of enactment of this Act, the Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection of the Department of Homeland Security
shall submit a report to Congress that--
(1) indicates whether the methodologies and technologies
used by the Bureau to screen for and detect the presence of
chemical, nuclear, biological, and radiological weapons in
municipal solid waste are as effective as the methodologies
and technologies used by the Bureau to screen for such
materials in other items of commerce entering into the United
States by commercial motor vehicle transport; and
(2) if the methodologies and technologies used to screen
solid waste are less effective than those used to screen
other commercial items, identifies the actions that the
Bureau will take to achieve the same level of effectiveness
in the screening of solid waste, including the need for
additional screening technologies.
(c) Impact on Commercial Motor Vehicles.--If the Bureau of
Customs and Border Protection fails to fully implement the
actions described in subsection (b)(2) before the earlier of
6 months after the date on which the report is due under
subsection (b) or 6 months after the date on which such
report is submitted, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall
deny entry into the United States of any commercial motor
vehicle (as defined in section 31101(1) of title 49, United
States Code) carrying municipal solid waste until the
Secretary certifies to Congress that the methodologies and
technologies used by the Bureau to screen for and detect the
presence of chemical, nuclear, biological, and radiological
weapons in such waste are as effective as the methodologies
and technologies used by the Bureau to screen for such
materials in other items of commerce entering into the United
States by commercial motor vehicle transport.
(d) Effective Date.--Notwithstanding section 341, this
section shall take effect on the date of enactment of this
Act.
At the appropriate place, insert the following:
(i) Participation of under secretary for emergency
preparedness and response.--
(1) Participation.--The Under Secretary for Emergency
Preparedness and Response shall participate in the
grantmaking process for the Threat-Based Homeland Security
Grant Program for nonlaw enforcement-related grants in order
to ensure that preparedness grants, where appropriate, are
consistent, and are not in conflict, with the Robert T.
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42
U.S.C. 5121 et seq.).
(2) Reports.--The Under Secretary for Emergency
Preparedness and Response shall submit to the Committee on
Environment and Public Works of the Senate and the Committee
on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of
Representatives an annual report that describes--
(A) the status of the Threat-Based Homeland Security Grant
Program; and
(B) the impact of that program on programs authorized under
the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.).

SEC. __. NATIONAL INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK.

(a) In General.--Within one year of enactment, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the
Federal Communications Commission and the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration, shall
complete a study assessing potential technical and
operational standards and protocols for a nationwide
interoperable communications network (referred to in this
section as the ``Network'') that may be used by Federal,
State, and local governmental and non-governmental public
safety, homeland security, and other first responder
personnel. The assessment shall be consistent with the
SAFECOM national strategy as developed by the public safety
community in cooperation with SAFECOM and the DHS
Interoperability Office. The Secretary shall report the
results of the study to the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, the House of Representatives Committee
on Energy and Commerce, and the House of Representatives
Select Committee on Homeland Security.
(b) Consultation and Use of Commercial Technologies.--In
assessing standards and protocols pursuant to paragraph (a),
the Secretary of Homeland Security shall--
(1) seek input from representatives of the user communities
regarding the operation and administration of the Network;
and
(2) consider use of commercial wireless technologies to the
greatest extent practicable.
At the appropriate place insert the following:
Section 145(c) of the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act (49 U.S.C. 40101 note) is amended by striking ``more
than'' and all that follows through ``after'' and inserting
``More than 48 months after''.

Mrs. MALONEY (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous
consent that the motion be considered as read and printed in the
Record.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentlewoman from New York?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Maloney)
is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mrs. MALONEY. Mr. Speaker, this is a very simple motion to recommit.
It replaces the House language with the language that passed the Senate
on an overwhelming vote of 96 to 2.

Parliamentary Inquiry

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hastings of Washington). The gentleman
will state it.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, is there a motion, or is there a copy of
the motion available at the desk?
Mrs. MALONEY. Yes, there is.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Could we have a copy, please?
Mrs. MALONEY. Yes. It is at the desk.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Maloney)
may proceed.
Mrs. MALONEY. Mr. Speaker, this motion to recommit replaces the House
language with the language that passed the Senate in an overwhelming
vote of 96 to 2.
As we have debated the merits of H.R. 10, it has become clear that
the bill is fundamentally flawed, and it will certainly take a
conference to work out major differences. We do not need to take that
path.
After the attacks of September 11, Congress created a bipartisan
commission to examine the causes of the attack and make recommendations
for reform. This commission put aside partisan differences to make 41
unanimous recommendations for making our country safer. The other body
acted, largely in a bipartisan manner, and the bipartisan 9/11
Commission Caucus in the House has been working with the 9/11 families
and the commission since the recommendations were released.
Our job should be to enact these recommendations. The only question
we should ask is what can we do to make America safer, and the only
answer is to enact the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.
Unfortunately, H.R. 10 does not do this. There are 41 recommendations
made by the 9/11 Commission. H.R. 10 fully implements only 11 of the 41
recommendations.
At the Presidential debates last week, President Bush and Senator
Kerry were asked what was the greatest threat facing the Nation. They
gave the same answer: nuclear proliferation.

[[Page H8976]]

Yet, incredibly, H.R. 10 does not implement the 9/11 Commission's
recommendations for stopping nuclear proliferation; and the bill falls
short in other key areas, such as border security, aviation security,
and emergency response.
It is not hard to see what is going on. Some say that the real goal
of the Republican leadership is to pass a bill that cannot be
reconciled with the Senate bill before the election. The Republican
leadership knows that after the elections, when the political pressure
is off, the prospects for reform will vanish.
This is our moment. We need to act now. We have this window of
opportunity and we must take it; and that is exactly what this motion
to recommit does. It is the same language that passed the Senate 96 to
2. Every single Republican Senator voted for the bill and virtually
every single Democratic Senator. The motion implements all of the
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, and it includes no poison
pills.
If we pass this motion, there will be no difference between the House
and the Senate language. This legislation can go right to the
President's desk for signature. We can be in the Rose Garden tomorrow
for a signing ceremony.
If there are other provisions that the House wants to enact, they
will have every opportunity they want to put them on separate pieces of
legislation before this House.
This past week, our offices have all been visited by the 9/11
families. The 9/11 families have been through a terrible ordeal, but
they have turned their grief into action and their personal tragedy
into public service. More than 3 years after 9/11, it is time to honor
their commitment to ensuring that other American families never have to
walk in their shoes.
This motion to recommit is our best hope for a solution right now.
All we have to do is vote ``yes'' and vote to make our Nation safer.
Vote to support the motion to recommit.
Mr. Speaker, I yield the remaining time to my distinguished
colleague, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman).
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me this
time to say how proud New Yorkers, two of whom are my children, are of
her leadership and her service to New York City.
This has been a long and difficult debate. Last night, in my view,
was not our finest hour in this House, and the re-vote on the Smith
amendment just moments ago was an unnecessary rebuke to a bipartisan
group who tried to make this bill better.
I urge an ``aye'' vote on this motion to recommit, not to polarize
us, but to unite us. The goal is to make us safer; and to do so, we
need to change the way our intelligence community is organized.
Good people who try their best to protect us need better tools. A
good organization cannot assure success, but a bad organization makes
success much more difficult. Every Republican Senator voted for this
bill, and eight Republicans voted for it in the House last night. I
urge an ``aye'' vote on this motion to recommit.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the motion to
recommit.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra)
is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the motion to
recommit with instructions to strike the text of H.R. 10, as amended,
and insert the text of the Maloney substitute.
We have heard much about the efforts in the other body which resulted
in the passage of the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 by a
vote of 96 to 2. I have congratulated the sponsors of the bill, Senator
Collins, the Chair of the Committee on Government Affairs, and Senator
Joe Lieberman, the committee's ranking Democrat member, for their
accomplishments.
Over 6 days of debate, the other body placed its mark on the Collins-
Lieberman bill. As I predicted, that bill has grown in size with the
inclusion of scores of amendments becoming more like H.R. 10, not in
just title I, but throughout the bill. The House has now spent the
better part of 2 days considering H.R. 10. We have put our imprint on
the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. We will soon have the
opportunity to reconcile the two bills in conference.
Lee Hamilton, the 9/11 Commission's vice chairman and a former
distinguished chairman of both the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Committee on International Relations, also stated
what should be obvious: that as the Senate and House conduct the normal
legislative process, each body would refine and put their imprint on
the commission's recommendations. He said that at the September 28
press conference, and it is what he is reported to have said on other
occasions. The commission's recommendations are not set in stone. That
is what the other body has done during its many days of consideration
of S. 2845, and it is exactly what the House has done.
The motion to recommit represents another attempt to legislate by
playing ``follow the other body.'' This process began weeks ago when
some said the House should pass the Collins-Lieberman bill, as
introduced. Then it was, the House should pass the Collins-Lieberman
bill as reported by committee. Yesterday it was, the House should pass
a little bit of Collins-Lieberman and a little bit of Lieberman-McCain.
And today, what the House should pass is what may be the Senate bill,
but this is what it looks like: 300 pages, 400 pages of stuff that has
been blacked out, hand-written in, with Senators' names on it. Will
those be part of the bill?
The House is better than that. While some may have been busy watching
the other body, our committees and Members have methodically held
hearings, introduced legislation, and amended and improved H.R. 10.
Mr. Speaker, H.R. 10 is a comprehensive bill. H.R. 10 effectively
implements the framework of recommendations contained in the report of
the 9/11 Commission, especially its core recommendations regarding
restructuring the intelligence community. H.R. 10 is the work of the
House, not following the other body.
Mr. Speaker, for these reasons, for the integrity of the House, I
urge my colleagues to join me in opposing the motion to recommit and
pass H.R. 10.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time has expired.
Without objection, the previous question is ordered on the motion to
recommit.
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.

Recorded Vote

Mrs. MALONEY. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XX, the Chair
will reduce to 5 minutes the minimum time for any electronic vote on
the question of passage.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 193,
noes 223, not voting 17, as follows:

[Roll No. 522]

AYES--193

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Andrews
Baca
Baird
Baldwin
Becerra
Bell
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Brown (OH)
Brown, Corrine
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cardin
Cardoza
Carson (IN)
Carson (OK)
Case
Castle
Chandler
Clay
Clyburn
Conyers
Cooper
Costello
Cramer
Crowley
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
Davis (TN)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Deutsch
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Dooley (CA)
Doyle
Edwards
Emanuel
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Ford
Frank (MA)
Frost
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green (TX)
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Herseth
Hill
Hinchey
Hoeffel
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley (OR)
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
John
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
Kleczka
Kucinich
Lampson
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Leach
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lofgren
Lowey
Lucas (KY)
Lynch
Maloney
Markey
Matheson
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McNulty
Meehan
Meeks (NY)
Menendez
Michaud
Millender-McDonald

[[Page H8977]]

Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mollohan
Moore
Moran (VA)
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Oberstar
Olver
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reyes
Rodriguez
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sanders
Sandlin
Schakowsky
Schiff
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sherman
Skelton
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Spratt
Stark
Stenholm
Strickland
Stupak
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor (MS)
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Turner (TX)
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Wexler
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn

NOES--223

Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Bass
Beauprez
Biggert
Bilirakis
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Bradley (NH)
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Burgess
Burns
Burr
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Camp
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Carter
Chabot
Chocola
Coble
Cole
Collins
Cox
Crane
Crenshaw
Cubin
Culberson
Cunningham
Davis, Jo Ann
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
DeLay
DeMint
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Doolittle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Ehlers
Emerson
English
Everett
Feeney
Ferguson
Flake
Foley
Forbes
Fossella
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gingrey
Goode
Goodlatte
Granger
Graves
Green (WI)
Greenwood
Gutknecht
Hall
Harris
Hart
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Hensarling
Herger
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hostettler
Houghton
Hulshof
Hunter
Hyde
Isakson
Issa
Istook
Jenkins
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, Sam
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Latham
LaTourette
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lucas (OK)
Manzullo
Marshall
McCotter
McCrery
McHugh
McInnis
McKeon
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Moran (KS)
Murphy
Murtha
Musgrave
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neugebauer
Ney
Northup
Nunes
Nussle
Obey
Osborne
Ose
Otter
Oxley
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Renzi
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Sabo
Saxton
Schrock
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shuster
Simmons
Simpson
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Souder
Stearns
Sullivan
Sweeney
Tancredo
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Toomey
Turner (OH)
Upton
Vitter
Walden (OR)
Walsh
Wamp
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)

NOT VOTING--17

Ballenger
Boehlert
Filner
Gephardt
Hinojosa
Jones (NC)
Kaptur
Lipinski
Majette
Matsui
Meek (FL)
Norwood
Ortiz
Paul
Slaughter
Tauzin
Towns

Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hastings of Washington) (during the
vote). Members are advised 2 minutes remain in this vote.

{time} 1532

So the motion to recommit was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated for:
Mr. FILNER. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 522, I was in my
Congressional District on official business. Had I been present, I
would have voted ``aye.''
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.

Recorded Vote

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 282,
noes 134, not voting 17, as follows:

[Roll No. 523]

AYES--282

Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Andrews
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Bass
Beauprez
Bell
Berry
Biggert
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Bradley (NH)
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Brown, Corrine
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Burgess
Burns
Burr
Burton (IN)
Butterfield
Buyer
Calvert
Camp
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Cardin
Cardoza
Carson (OK)
Carter
Case
Castle
Chabot
Chandler
Chocola
Clay
Clyburn
Coble
Cole
Collins
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crenshaw
Cubin
Culberson
Cunningham
Davis (AL)
Davis (FL)
Davis (TN)
Davis, Jo Ann
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
DeFazio
DeLay
DeMint
Deutsch
Dooley (CA)
Doolittle
Dreier
Dunn
Edwards
Ehlers
Emerson
English
Etheridge
Everett
Feeney
Ferguson
Flake
Foley
Forbes
Fossella
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gingrey
Goode
Goodlatte
Gordon
Granger
Graves
Green (WI)
Greenwood
Gutknecht
Hall
Harris
Hart
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Hensarling
Herger
Herseth
Hill
Hobson
Hoeffel
Hoekstra
Holden
Hooley (OR)
Hostettler
Houghton
Hoyer
Hulshof
Hunter
Hyde
Isakson
Israel
Issa
Istook
Jenkins
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, Sam
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
Kennedy (RI)
Kind
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Lampson
Langevin
Latham
LaTourette
Leach
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lowey
Lucas (KY)
Lucas (OK)
Manzullo
Marshall
Matheson
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McCotter
McCrery
McHugh
McInnis
McIntyre
McKeon
Mica
Michaud
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Miller, Gary
Moore
Moran (KS)
Murphy
Musgrave
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neugebauer
Ney
Northup
Nunes
Nussle
Osborne
Ose
Otter
Oxley
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Pombo
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Renzi
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ross
Rothman
Royce
Ruppersberger
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Sandlin
Saxton
Schiff
Schrock
Scott (GA)
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shuster
Simmons
Simpson
Skelton
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Snyder
Souder
Spratt
Stearns
Stenholm
Sullivan
Sweeney
Tancredo
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thompson (MS)
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Toomey
Turner (OH)
Turner (TX)
Udall (CO)
Upton
Vitter
Walden (OR)
Walsh
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Wexler
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Wu
Young (FL)

NOES--134

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Baca
Baird
Baldwin
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Blumenauer
Brady (PA)
Brown (OH)
Capps
Capuano
Carson (IN)
Conyers
Cooper
Costello
Crowley
Cummings
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Doyle
Duncan
Emanuel
Engel
Eshoo
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Ford
Frank (MA)
Gonzalez
Green (TX)
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Hinchey
Holt
Honda
Inslee
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kleczka
Kucinich
LaHood
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lofgren
Lynch
Maloney
Markey
McCollum
McDermott
McGovern
McNulty
Meehan
Meeks (NY)
Menendez
Millender-McDonald
Miller, George
Mollohan
Moran (VA)
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Pelosi
Rahall
Rangel
Reyes
Rodriguez
Ros-Lehtinen
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Sabo
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sanders
Schakowsky
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sherman
Smith (WA)
Solis
Stark
Strickland
Stupak
Tanner
Tauscher
Thompson (CA)
Tierney
Udall (NM)
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Wamp
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Wilson (NM)
Woolsey
Wynn
Young (AK)

[[Page H8978]]

NOT VOTING--17

Ballenger
Boehlert
Filner
Gephardt
Hinojosa
Jones (NC)
Kaptur
Lipinski
Majette
Matsui
Meek (FL)
Norwood
Ortiz
Paul
Slaughter
Tauzin
Towns

Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hastings of Washington) (during the
vote). Members are advised that 2 minutes remain in the vote.

{time} 1551

So the bill was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
Stated against:
Mr. FILNER. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 523, I was in my
congressional district on official business. Had I been present, I
would have voted ``nay.''

____________________

Congressional Record: October 8, 2004 (House)
Page H8978-H8986

MOTION TO INSTRUCT CONFEREES ON S. 2845, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REFORM
ACT OF 2004

Mr. GUTIERREZ. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to instruct.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion.
The Clerk read as follows:
Mr. Gutierrez moves that the managers on the part of the
House at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two
Houses on the House amendment to the bill S. 2845 be
instructed to recede from its amendment to the bill
(particularly sections 3005, 3006, 3007, 3008, 3009, 3032,
3051, 3052, 3053, 3054, 3055, and 3056 of its amendment) and
concur therein.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 7 of rule XXII, the
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Gutierrez) and the gentleman from Indiana
(Mr. Hostettler) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Gutierrez).
Mr. GUTIERREZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise to offer a motion to instruct the conferees on
H.R. 10 with instructions that the House recede to the Senate and
strike provisions 3005, 3007, 3009 and 3032 from the bill. These
provisions are poison pills that will slow the process of reforming our
Nation's intelligence agencies and do nothing to make us safer.
My motion further instructs House conferees to recede to the Senate
by striking sections 3051 through 3056 from H.R. 10 relating to
driver's licenses, identification cards and accepting the corresponding
driver's licenses provisions from the Senate-passed bill.
Mr. Speaker, instead of making us safer, enactment of these
provisions would impose severe hardship on aliens by subjecting at
least 1 million immigrants to deportation without any administrative
hearing or due process, no review; permit the United States to
outsource torture by sending an individual to a country where he or she
is likely to be tortured; install a number of new barriers to winning
asylum claims that are likely to prevent bona fide refugees from
receiving the protection of asylum in the United States; and prohibit
habeas corpus review.
Mr. Speaker, once again, let me remind my colleagues of the very
relevant details. None of these provisions were included in the
recommendations made by the bipartisan 9/11 Commission, and they are
extremely divisive. Insistence on these provisions could greatly
complicate the task of conferencing with the Senate and producing a
bill implementing the 9/11 Commission recommendations. I urge my
colleagues to support this motion to instruct.
Speaking on section 3005, it is very problematic, Mr. Speaker. Among
other things, it would bar the use of matricula consular identification
cards, a policy that the Bush administration has opposed. Not only
would this affect undocumented immigrants, it would also affect
Canadians. Section 3005 makes it impossible for Canadians, who
currently do not have a passport to be legally in the United States, to
establish their identity when encountered by Federal employees.
Last month, this Chamber, Mr. Speaker, overwhelmingly rejected an
attempt to overturn the Department of Treasury regulations that permit
matricula consular identification cards to be used in banking
transactions. The House stripped the provision from the bill by
adopting an amendment to H.R. 5025 that was offered by the gentleman
from Ohio (Mr. Oxley), the House Committee on Financial Services
chairman. The House adopted the Oxley amendment on September 14 by a
vote of 222 to 177. Clearly, we should not revisit this. It has been
visited not once, but at least on three occasions.
Section 3006. This section greatly expands the use of expedited
removal in the United States. It would be especially harmful for women
and children who are escaping a range of gender-related persecutions
such as rape, sexual slavery, trafficking, honor killings, since
persons scarred by such trauma often require time before they can step
forward to express their claim.
I would like to think that most people in this Chamber would agree
that this would cause untold grief to women and children who will no
longer be able to obtain the relief to which Congress believes they are
entitled, victimizing them once they are raped, victimizing them once
again. This amendment in the Committee of the Whole was carried on the
Smith amendment, and then we unfortunately had to revisit it for
political purposes where it was defeated or it would not even be in my
motion.
Furthermore, this section would reverse several decades of policy
with respect to persons fleeing the tyranny in Cuba, eviscerating
protections that currently are available to Cubans arriving in the
United States. Section 3006 would mean that any Cuban who sets foot on
United States soil would have to be placed in expedited removal. Like
all others, they would be subject to mandatory detention and swift
removal from the United States. This will mean that many Cubans would
be returned to the dictatorship of Fidel Castro without so much as a
hearing.
Section 3007 is nothing short of an assault on asylum. It would make
sweeping changes to asylum law that the drafters erroneously contend
would stop terrorists from being granted asylum. Section 3007 would
create new barriers to winning asylum claims that are likely to prevent
bona fide refugees from receiving the protection of asylum in the
United States. This, in turn, would result in bona fide refugees being
returned to their persecutors.
It ignores the fact that asylum applicants, particularly survivors of
torture, rape or forced abortion or sterilization, may not be
comfortable telling this information to a uniformed male inspector
officer at an airport.
Section 3009 is particularly disturbing, Mr. Speaker. If this section
is enacted, the constitutionally compelled remedy of habeas corpus will
be eliminated, and a plainly inadequate

[[Page H8979]]

court of appeals review will be substituted that will leave many
noncitizens without any forum to raise legitimate claims of
governmental error and misconduct. At the same time, the section
creates an extremely high burden for obtaining a stay of deportation,
inviting government to race to deport noncitizens before a Federal
court can rule on the merits of the case.
Section 3032. Supporters of section 3032 falsely contend that it
would prevent the United States from deporting persons to countries
where they are likely to be tortured. However, nothing could be further
from the truth. In fact, under this section, as it was amended in the
Committee of the Whole by the Hostettler amendment, the United States
still could outsource torture by sending individuals to countries where
they are likely to be tortured.
It merely provides that in order to do so the United States
Government would be required to seek what amounts to a note from the
torturing government, that torturing government to promise us that they
will not torture that individual anymore before we send them back.
Who among our colleagues will be willing to stake their lives or the
lives of their loved ones on the promise of the Government of Sudan or
the Government of Syria or the People's Republic of China or North
Korea or Cuba or Saudi Arabia that they will not torture someone if we
send them back after they try to get asylum here?
Mr. Speaker, our country is far better than this. This provision is
unacceptable. The administration expressed the President's opposition
to permitting the government to outsource torture to foreign
governments in the administration's statement of administration policy
on H.R. 10. The President of the United States is against this
provision. Members should know that a vote against this motion to
instruct would be a vote against the very wishes of the President of
the United States.
Mr. Speaker, I, at this point, would like to end my comments.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
(Mr. HOSTETTLER asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks, and include extraneous material.)
Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Speaker, there has been much discussion on H.R.
10, the legislation that has been considered by the House over the last
several days, and this motion to instruct would strike several
provisions in the legislation that are vitally important to securing
the American people. But, Mr. Speaker, I would offer into the Record a
letter by a group called the 9/11 Families for a Secure America.
The letter was written to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Chairman
Sensenbrenner) of the Committee on the Judiciary, and it is made up of
a group of families who lost loved ones or were victimized on September
11 as a result of the attacks on our country. No one could speak more
eloquently than they about the need for change to our immigration
policy in that they write:
``We are writing to express the support and thanks of 9/11 Families
for a Secure America for the provisions in title 3 of H.R. 10, the 9/11
Recommendations Implementation Act,'' and those are the provisions that
this motion to instruct would seek to eliminate.
Reading further, ``These provisions would go a long way toward
closing the loopholes that allowed 19 terrorists, all of whom had
violated our immigration laws in one way or another, to enter and move
freely around our country while they honed their plot to murder our
loved ones.
``We are heartened by the inclusion in the bill of provisions that
require both U.S. citizens and aliens to prove their identity upon
entry with secure, verifiable documents, preclude acceptance by Federal
employees of consular ID cards, insist that DHS, Department of Homeland
Security, expand its use of expedited removal and prevent illegal
aliens from abusing our judicial process to delay deportation and
increase the number of the Border Patrol and ICE, or Immigrations and
Customs Enforcement, agents.

{time} 1600

``All of these provisions fall well within the scope of the 9/11
Commission's recommendations and so should be enacted and implemented
as quickly as possible.
``Our efforts over the past 3 years to get elected officials to
recognize and address the current immigration crisis have taught us
that even the most reasonable and sensible immigration reform proposals
languish in Congress because our elected leaders are either blinded by
special interests or afraid of being vilified by them. We commend you
and the House Republican leadership for your willingness to address
immigration reform in H.R. 10 while the sponsors of every other so-
called 9/11 bill completely ignored it.
``It is incomprehensible to us that any reasonable person could
believe that immigration reform plays no legitimate role in our
response to the attacks. We are outraged that terrorists and murderers
are able to frustrate efforts to deport them by claiming that they will
be tortured upon being returned home. Even worse, when they have
committed their heinous crimes overseas and are thus not easily
prosecutable here in America, their use of the Convention Against
Torture allows them to escape justice.
``We are strongly supportive of section 3031 and section 3032 of H.R.
10, which would end this intolerable abuse of our immigration laws.
Members of Congress have promised us repeatedly over the last 3 years
that they would honor our loved ones who were murdered 3 years ago by
enacting reforms to ensure that Americans will never again face the
same horror. We hope you will honor those promises by supporting the
immigration provisions already in the bill and by opposing any efforts
to protect a status quo that aided the murderers who tore apart our
families on September 11, 2001.
``Sincerely, the Board of Directors of 9/11 Families For a Secure
America.''
Mr. Speaker, I do not know of anyone who can more eloquently speak to
the importance of maintaining these provisions in the House bill in
H.R. 10, when in other proposals, as the families would say themselves,
that every other so-called 9/11 bill has completely ignored the central
focus of the 9/11 tragedy, which is that individuals from outside our
country came into our country, abused the process, and murdered our
citizens.
Mr. Speaker, I submit the letter I read earlier for the Record.
9/11 Families for a

Secure America,

New York, NY, September 28, 2004.
Hon. James Sensenbrenner,
Chairman, Judiciary Committee, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Sensenbrenner: We are writing to express the
support and thanks of 9/11 Families for a Secure America for
the provisions in Title III of H.R. 10, the 9/11
Recommendations Implementation Act. These provisions would go
a long way toward closing the loopholes that allowed 19
terrorists--all of whom had violated our immigration laws in
one way or another--to enter and move freely around our
country while they honed their plot to murder our loved ones.
We strongly urge the Members of the Judiciary Committee to
retain the immigration provisions included in H.R. 10. We
believe that implementation of Title III would improve
homeland security dramatically and help to ensure that no
other American families have to experience the devastating
grief, the debilitating loss, and the overwhelming rage that
we have known every day for more than three years now.
We are heartened by the inclusion in the bill of provisions
that: require both U.S. citizens and aliens to prove their
identity upon entry with secure, verifiable documents;
preclude acceptance by Federal employees of consular ID
cards; insist that DHS expand its use of expedited removal
and prevent illegal aliens from abusing our judicial process
to delay deportation; and increase the numbers of Border
Patrol and ICE agents.
All of these provisions fall well within the scope of the
9/11 Commission's recommendations, and so should be enacted
and implemented as quickly as possible. Our efforts over the
past three years to get elected officials to recognize and
address the current immigration crisis have taught us that
even the most reasonable and sensible immigration reform
proposals languish in Congress because our elected leaders
are either blinded by special interests or afraid of being
vilified by them. We commend you and the House Republican
Leadership for your willingness to address immigration reform
in H.R. 10, while the sponsors of every other so-called ``9/
11 bill'' completely ignored it. It is incomprehensible to us
that any reasonable person could believe that immigration
reform plays no legitimate role in our response to the
attacks.
We are outraged that terrorists and murderers are able to
frustrate efforts to deport

[[Page H8980]]

them by claiming that they will be tortured upon being
returned home. Even worse, when they have committed their
heinous crimes overseas and are thus not easily prosecutable
here in America, their use of the Convention Against Torture
allows them to escape justice. We are strongly supportive of
sections 3031 and sections 3032 of H.R. 10, which would end
this intolerable abuse of our immigration laws.
There is, however, one glaring omission in H.R. 10. The 9/
11 Commission specifically recommended enhanced cooperation
with and training of state and local law enforcement officers
on immigration law, yet H.R. 10 includes no mention of this
recommendation. We hope you will bring up the CLEAR Act, H.R.
2671, for a full committee markup as soon as possible in
order to complete the 9/11 Commission's work.
Members of Congress have promised us repeatedly over the
last three years that they would honor our loved ones who
were murdered three years ago by enacting reforms to ensure
that Americans will never again face the same horror. We hope
you will honor those promises by supporting the immigration
provisions already in the bill and by opposing any effort to
protect a status quo that aided the murderers who tore apart
our families on September 11, 2001.
Sincerely,
Board of Directors,
9/11 Families for a Secure America.
Peter Gadiel & Jan Gadiel, Kent, CT, Parents of James, age
23, WTC, North Tower, 103rd Floor.
Monica Gabrielle, North Haven, CT, Wife of Rich Gabrielle,
WTC, South Tower.
Will Sekzer, Detective Sergeant (retired) NYPD, Sunnyside,
NY, Father of Jason, age 31, WTC, North Tower, 105th Floor.
Diana Stewart, New Jersey, only wife of Michael Stewart.
Bill Doyle, Staten Island, NY, Father of Joseph.
Sally Regenhard, Al Regenhard (Detective Sergeant, NYPD,
Retired), Parents of Firefighter Christian Regenhard, Bronx,
NY.
Bruce DeCell, Staten Island, NY, Father in law of Mark
Petrocelli, age 29, WTC, North Tower, 105th Floor.
Grace Godshalk, Yardley, PA, Mother of William R. Godshalk,
age 35, WTC, South Tower, 89th Floor.
April D. Gallop, Virginia, Pentagon Survivor.
Lynn Faulkner, Ohio, Husband of Wendy Faulkner, South
Tower.
Joan Molinaro, Staten Island, NY, Mother of Firefighter
Carl Molinaro.
Colette Lafuente, Poughkeepsie, NY, Wife of Juan LaFuente,
WTC visitor.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GUTIERREZ. Mr. Speaker, how much time do the proponents have?
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hastings of Washington). The gentleman
from Illinois has 22\1/2\ minutes remaining.
Mr. GUTIERREZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Harman).
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, instead of passing one strong bill to make
our country safer, the House bill has two divergent parts: the first
part is the core bill, which includes a watered-down version of the
intelligence reform provisions in the 9/11 Commission report. The
second part is a campaign bill, which has some useful features, but
also contains partisan controversial provisions, such as expanded
deportation, unlimited detention, unnecessary environmental waivers,
and unchecked databases designed to paint Democrats as weak on
terrorism in the weeks before an election.
Several of these egregious provisions were eliminated on the House
floor, but the re-vote on the Smith amendment persuaded me that the
bill's sponsors were not seeking common ground, but were making 30-
second attack ads. I voted in committee to report the bill in order to
move the process forward, and I will work my heart out in conference to
strengthen the intelligence reform provisions and conform the other
provisions to what the 9/11 Commission recommended.
Let me focus on what strengthening the intelligence provisions means.
Our first priority in the conference report should be to strengthen the
National Intelligence Director, called the NID. I agree with the
statement of administration policy on H.R. 10 that ``H.R. 10 does not
provide the NID sufficient authorities to manage the intelligence
community effectively.''
H.R. 10's budget authorities are weaker than S. 2845; and,
stunningly, they are weaker than current statutes and executive orders
which allow for the transfer and reprogramming of funds by the Director
of Central Intelligence. Under H.R. 10, money is simply passed through
the NID to the various intelligence agencies. Unless the NID has the
power to manage and control the budgets of these agencies, he or she
will not be able to integrate our intelligence capabilities
effectively.
Moreover, the President is not the NID's only customer. We must
ensure that the NID addresses the needs of the Departments of Defense,
State, Homeland Security, and the war fighters when budgets are built
and executed. Our efforts must not lead to the dismemberment of the
National Foreign Intelligence Program, the NFIP, or we will end up with
less integration than we presently have.
To be crystal clear, Mr. Speaker, neither bill, let me underscore
this, neither bill includes the budgets for tactical intelligence. And
no one is recommending that they be included. To repeat: no one has
recommended that the budgets of our tactical intelligence agencies be
included in the structure we are building under this legislation.
The NID also needs greater personnel management authorities. S. 2845
provides this authority, but H.R. 10 does not. The leaders of the
intelligence community must believe they work for the NID in addition
to their Department Secretaries. Consultation on appointments, which is
what H.R. 10 includes, is insufficient. The NID must at least have the
power to concur in key appointments. To enable the NID to create a
joint culture, he or she must also be able to transfer people to
centers and other multidisciplinary teams.
Congress solved the problem of a weak Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff 20 years ago by mandating joint assignments for promotion and
creating a joint career track. The same must be done for the NID. After
all, the NID is our attempt to create Goldwater-Nichols jointness for
the intelligence community, just as we have done for the military.
Third, the director of the NCTC, the National Counterterrorism
Center, must have significant stature. Presidential appointment and
Senate confirmation of the NCTC director is critical to give that post
the stature and accountability that it requires. The President and the
Senate overwhelmingly support this.
Fourth, the conference report should include the provision of S. 2845
to create a trusted information-sharing network so government agencies
can connect the dots about the terrorists. Simply declaring the need,
as H.R. 10 does, is woefully insufficient.
And finally, it is imperative to develop mechanisms to ensure that
actions of the NID and NCTC do not encroach upon our civil liberties.
We must create an independent privacy and civil liberties board, which
was supported on a bipartisan basis in the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence and then stripped in the Committee on Rules,
recommended by the 9/11 Commission and included in S. 2845. These
intelligence provisions began here in the House with H.R. 4104, but
they stalled here because our leadership pursued a partisan path and
because the President's endorsement of S. 2845 was not followed up with
constructive effort in the House.
We know how to do this right, Mr. Speaker, and we must. We can never
replace the loved ones we lost on September 11, but we can honor them
and the bravery of those who came to their rescue by uniting in this
conference in the next several weeks to enact real reform. I pledge to
do my part.
Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Missouri (Mr. Blunt), the majority whip of the House.
Mr. BLUNT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Indiana for
yielding me this time. I also want to thank all my colleagues, many of
whom voted for this bill just moments ago on both sides of the aisle,
for the work they put into this, to the time they have spent on this,
to the important discussion of how we secure our borders more
carefully, how we maintain our security in a greater way, and how we
look at intelligence-gathering and -sharing differently than we needed
two generations ago, in the late 1940s, when this was done the last
time. This makes our work very important as we move forward.
The work of the conferees will be challenging. We have given them a
strong product with a strong vote. I think this motion to reinstruct in
several areas just simply reaches too far. I spoke earlier today about
the importance of what do we do, what do we do with people who come to
this country

[[Page H8981]]

and have criminal backgrounds from another country.
These are not people we think are criminals or might have been
criminals. These are people who we know are criminals or we know are
terrorists. These people may come from countries that are not very
great countries. What we did today was change the bill so that we would
not be forced to send them back to that country, if in fact we can
figure out how to detain them in an appropriate way here.
I gave the example this morning of a person, and this is an absolute
case of someone who, in Jordan, was convicted of conspiring to bomb an
American school. That person came to America. He then sought sanctuary
on the basis that he should not be sent back to Jordan because they use
punishments we would find inappropriate. And we all agree on that. But
under our current law, the only thing to do was to let him then go to
an American community to live.
Well, an American community is full of American schools. So here we
have someone who is guilty of conspiring to kill American kids in a
school in Jordan, and our only current remedy appears to be, according
to the courts, to send him to a community in America to live, which is
full of schools that have American kids.
This motion to instruct says we should eliminate that language and go
back to the current environment, where the only choice is for that
person to go into the American community. In this case, that was a
terrorist, Mr. Speaker. In other cases we know of someone who was a
murderer, or a pedophile, or a rapist. We need better ways to deal with
people who abuse the open arms that America has traditionally had.
That is just one area of many that this motion to instruct
specifically addresses. So if in fact you vote for this motion, you are
voting to maintain the status quo. And I think my friends would almost
all agree the status quo, in that instance, as I described it, is not
an acceptable alternative for us to have.
We are searching for alternatives here that work better. I hope we
let this process go on. I hope we let our conferees work on this hard
job in the best way they can. I hope we defeat this motion to instruct.
Mr. GUTIERREZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentlewoman from
Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I first want to thank the
distinguished gentleman from Illinois for yielding me this time and for
his leadership.
I am delighted the majority whip was just on the floor, because I
really want to make the point that when we look at the questions of
immigration, and I think a lot of these points on the motion to
instruct the gentleman has offered refer to immigration issues, but
they also refer to issues of asylum and refugees. When we sit with our
constituents and we explain what America has stood for over the years,
its principles based upon not only immigration but the questions of
allowing people to come and seek refuge and allowing people to seek
asylum in the course of running away from persecution and torture and
the devastation of a despotic government, you find commonality.
That is, I think, what we are trying to do with the motion to
instruct as the conferees move forward. We are trying to find the kind
of commonality that, frankly, the White House has asked us to find, and
I might be very straightforward and say the families of the 9/11
victims have asked us to state and to find. We know that immigration
concerns raise their ugly head all the time. H.R. 10 is, frankly, not
the vehicle to engage in that discussion without the proper hearings
and understanding what would work best.
I just want to refer again to the administration's position on H.R.
10. It clearly says that the administration strongly opposes the
overbroad expansion of expedited removal authorities. The
administration has concerns with the overbroad alien identification
standards that are proposed by the bill and believes they are unrelated
to security concerns.

{time} 1615

This is the same administration that signed into law the Department
of Homeland Security and has as its head Secretary Tommy Ridge. The
President goes on to say, signed by my good friend Alberto Gonzalez,
the counsel to the President as relates to the issue of torture.
Unfortunately, the two Smith amendments did not succeed. And so I think
it is important for the conferees to hear again what the President said
and the President said in this letter by way of his counsel, ``The
President did not propose and does not support this provision and a
provision that would permit the deportation of certain foreign
nationals to countries where they are likely to be tortured.''
Some would say that that has been corrected. It has not. Because what
the Hostettler language says, with all due respect to my good friend,
is that we will ask the countries not to torture this individual, but
it is to be asked by the Secretary of State when, in fact, that is not
a true protection because we know that we have asked many things, and
we have received none.
I frankly believe that we are losing the focus that the 9/11 families
would offer to us. As I look at the language in the 9/11 Commission
report on the immigration and law enforcement issues, they have
indicated that this is an important concept and that we should begin
looking at securing identification in the United States. But the
fundamental question that was asked by the families on H.R. 10 to be
adopted by this commission, by a bipartisan commission, Chairman Kean
and Vice Chairman Hamilton, was to fix the intelligence system to give
us one director of intelligence with budgetary authority.
I would only say that some of the provisions that the gentleman is
asking us to consider striking or a motion to instruct in order for
intelligent decisions to be made really go to the full understanding of
the American public, their compassion, their sensitivity, their belief
in the Statue of Liberty's principles of people coming over. This is
not to say that we do not deport terrorists. It is not to say that we
do not detain them. It simply suggests that we should not water down
the protections that we have that undermine the values of this
particular Nation as well as the legal principles that we have of
judicial review and as well as the protections we have had for those
seeking asylum and those who are seeking to be a refugee.
The expedited procedures, Mr. Speaker, are not procedures that
provide any security. I will say this as I close. All of these
provisions are subject to mistake, a mistake that can cost someone
their liberty, can cost someone their possible life, and certainly
mistaken identity is rampant as we try to fix this security system. I
need not speak about Yusuf Islam, Cat Stevens, who came to this country
just a few months ago and met with White House officials on the faith-
based initiative. Lo and behold, he was deplaned in Maine, his daughter
sent on, he was sent back because of a mistake.
I would ask my colleagues to look seriously at this motion to
instruct. It will not undermine the conferees. It will give them
guidance for what may be a consensus position on H.R. 10 for all of us
to vote on.
Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume to talk specifically about one of the sections that are being
considered for removal as a result of the motion to instruct, section
3005, which addresses the importance of verifiable documentation for
aliens and their identification.
First of all, we need to understand what the section does not do. It
does not prevent aliens from presenting other foreign documents to open
bank accounts in this country. And it does not prevent aliens from
presenting other documents in addition to the documents listed. Thus,
an alien could also present a driver's license so long as the alien
presents a designated document.
What the section does do, however, it requires aliens to present
secure documents. It prevents the aliens from using consular
identification cards, as we have heard about earlier, issued by foreign
agents to aliens present in the United States.
Mr. Speaker, I would like to say that those foreign agents in the
United States issue them only to their nationals, but we will learn
later that that is in fact not the case, and that they will issue them
for purposes of getting into

[[Page H8982]]

the secure sections of airports or onto Federal facilities. Those
documents should be secure, and they should be safe from fraud.
The FBI has told our Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security,
and Claims that the most commonly issued of those documents is the
Mexican matricula consular. The matricula consular has been accepted in
this country for over 100 years, documentation that would allow a
Mexican citizen while legally present in the United States to have
contact information with their government, namely, a consular office in
the United States. That has happened for, as I said, a long time in
this country.
But the concern that we have is the newly issued Mexican matricula
consular is not reliable. It is vulnerable to forgery and, most
significantly, poses a terrorist threat. We had then Assistant Director
of the FBI's Office of Intelligence Steve McCraw testify before our
committee. He concluded that domestic acceptance of the matricula cards
in the United States poses a law enforcement and national security
risk. He stated that the criminal threat stems from the fact that the
matriculas can be a perfect breeder document for establishing a false
identity which can facilitate a wide range of crimes, including money
laundering. He told of individuals who were arrested with multiple
matriculas, each with the same photo but different names, and some of
whom had matching driver's licenses to go with the identities proposed
on the matricula cards. He concluded that the terrorist threat posed by
these cards is the ``most worrisome'' to the FBI.
He went on to say, ``The ability of foreign nationals to use foreign
cards to create a well-documented but fictitious identity in the United
States provides an opportunity for terrorists to move freely within the
United States without triggering name-based watch lists, those watch
lists that we think are going to save us from the next round of 9/11
attacks. But these kind of cards will actually keep individuals from
being cross-referenced on these lists. These lists are disseminated to
local police officers.'' Nor is the danger posed by those documents
only as breeder documents. For other documentation, notwithstanding
their vulnerability to fraud and abuse, consular ID cards can be
presented to board an airliner. We know of cases like that.
I said earlier, Mr. Speaker, that it is suggested that these cards,
especially the matricula consular, they are the most prevalent of the
consular ID cards, but quite honestly, there are several foreign
governments who are witnessing, observing the success of the issuance
and acceptance of these consular identification cards by Mexico, the
matricula consular, and they seek to follow them in issuing their own.
They are supposed to go to individuals who are nationals of these
particular respective foreign governments. But we know that these cards
have been issued to non-Mexican nationals in the United States,
including at least one Iranian.
Mr. Speaker, at the U.S. Air Force Academy, during a particular set
of arrests, employees with matricula cards were found to be employees
of the Air Force Academy, but they were not Mexican nationals. They
were Guatemalans. The Mexican government had either issued a matricula
consular to a non-national or these cards had been so easily created by
fraudulent means that they were able to obtain cards very similar to
the real cards.
It is critical, Mr. Speaker, that these insecure documents not be
accepted for identification purposes to enter secure areas, such as
boarding an airplane. That is why we cannot strip out any of the
provisions in title III and especially section 3005.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GUTIERREZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from
Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I heard the distinguished
gentleman reading and listing a litany of speculative uses of the
matricula card that he is speaking of. Let me just say that one of the
things that he also said is that the card has been used for 100 years,
and there has been no evidence over the 100 years of that kind of use.
But we are not in disagreement over the underlying principle that we
can ultimately provide ways of securing and standardizing any card. I
have spoken to law enforcement officers in my own community that have
not seen any abuse of the use of such cards, and I think the opposition
of the White House for these extraneous immigration provisions is just
that. We have seen no evidence, we have had no hearings and we have no
standards that can be set by adding these provisions on without more
study.
I would just simply ask my colleagues to support the motion to
instruct.
Mr. GUTIERREZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Let me, first of all, read from the 9/11 Commission because I think
it is pertinent at this point. In section 3051 through 3056, in
paragraph 3, it says, ``Far from calling for sweeping anti-immigration
legislation, the commission understood that we should reach out to
immigrant communities. Good immigration services are one way of doing
so that is valuable in every way, including intelligence-gathering.
Congress needs to pass meaningful reforms proposed by the 9/11
Commission and not insist,'' and I hope the gentleman from Indiana read
the 9/11 report; it says ``not insist on a divisive anti-immigrant
agenda that the commission rejected and has nothing to do with
preventing another attack.''
Not one of those individuals that committed the heinous act on 9/11
had a matricula consular. As a matter of fact, they were issued by the
government of the United States of America, and they either entered
this country illegally through borders, not south of here but through
the Canadian border, and through other means, legally and illegally,
into this country. So let us stop trying to confuse one thing with the
other.
Anyone listening to the gentleman from Indiana would think that the
government of Mexico issues a matricula consular, and all of a sudden
you skip and jump and you are in the United States of America, and you
get a Social Security card, you get all of the benefits of being here,
and you have got a passport, and you are free. If an INS agent, and I
would like the gentleman from Indiana to answer that, if an INS agent
stops someone with a matricula consular and says, I want identification
from you, prove you are legally here in the United States of America,
and gives them a matricula consular, answer the question, will that
person not or will that person be deported? He knows that person will
be immediately deported from the United States of America because we do
not recognize that as a legal means of staying in the United States. It
is not a passport. It is not a visa. It does not entitle that person to
legally be in the United States of America, and the gentleman from
Indiana knows that. He is too smart. He knows too much about this issue
to be fuzzy or wary on this issue. You cannot stay in this country with
a matricula consular.
What does it allow us to do? It allows an immigrant to open up a bank
account so they can send money back, hopefully in a good way, back to
their loved ones in their countries. That is what it allows them to do.
It allows them to take their American citizen children and enroll them
in school. It allows them to communicate.
Anybody listening to the gentleman from Indiana would think the Los
Angeles Police Department have lost their minds, the New York Police
Department have lost their minds, the Chicago Police Department have
lost their minds. They like the matricula consular, as do hundreds of
police departments across this country, because it ensures the safety
and allows them to gather intelligence and information and allows
people to cooperate with them. That is safety on our streets and
intelligence-gathering. Let me just say, because this matricula
consular, anybody thinks you get one, and it is magic. I go to a job, I
say: Here, I have got my matricula consular, give me a job. You know,
you cannot get a job with a matricula consular.
Lastly, let me say this. He skips over one important part. You have
got to be in the United States of America to have a matricula consular,
so you must have evaded something. Why do you want a matricula consular
if you are already legally in the United States of America? To open up
a banking account. That is the purpose. Let me just

[[Page H8983]]

say that people, hundreds, and the gentleman knows this, hundreds of
people die crossing the border between Mexico and the United States.
They drown in the Rio Grande, or they die in the desert. The terrorists
know, come through Canada. If we put 90 percent of our resources, that
is why they are not going to come through. They are going to find other
means. We should look for every possible way to stop them, but this is
not going to stop them.
As the commission says in their own report, don't use a divisive,
anti-immigrant agenda the commission rejected and has nothing to do
with preventing. This is the 9/11 Commission report. We should not do
that, because it has nothing to do with preventing.
Lastly, you want to deal with the issue of undocumented workers. You
and I will both agree and sign on a piece of paper, and we will have
the Justice Department notarize it. There are 10 million undocumented
workers in the United States of America. This Congress has not shown
the political will nor has it put forward the requisite resources to
deport them, nor will it ever.

{time} 1630

This country needs and thrives on their work, and we all know it. So
if we really want to deal with the immigration problem, then let us get
an immigration bill, at least start with what the President, George
Bush, said on January 7. Let us begin a national debate and an honest
discussion of the undocumented workers that live in this country and
let us integrate them so that the FBI, the CIA, our police departments
have their fingerprints where they work, where they bank. And then,
after we have eliminated those 10 million, because we know who they are
and where they work and where they bank and where their children go to
school and where they live, then we can reduce the number of people
down to maybe the real terrorists that hide among them.
Let us do that honestly. But let us not use another anti-immigrant
attack within a bill, H.R. 10, which does such a disservice to the
families of the lost ones of 9/11.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
If I can just speak briefly about the gentleman's comments with
regard to an individual who is in this country that presents only a
matricula consular card for identification, according to former
intelligence director for the FBI, Steve McCraw, his testimony before
our subcommittee said that really the only people that need to use a
matricula consular exclusively for identification purposes are illegal
aliens, simply because those that are in the country, that are present
in the country legally, have other forms of secured documentation such
as a passport or a visa or the like.
But the gentleman suggested in his comments that if a person supplies
exclusively a matricula consular card to a law enforcement agent that
they will be immediately deported. Mr. Speaker, they will not be
immediately deported if the gentleman's other provisions in this motion
to instruct are taken out, and that is portion 3006, which calls for
expedited removal.
If the gentleman is saying that he wants those people immediately
deported that only supply a matricula consular card for identification,
I would accept, under unanimous consent, to have section 3006 stripped
out of his motion to instruct. I do not think that is going to happen
because the gentleman does wish to remove expedited removal provision
from the bill.
Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman
from Wisconsin (Mr. Green), a member of the Committee on the Judiciary.
Mr. GREEN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for
yielding me this time.
I would like to step back for a moment and just talk briefly about
the situation we find ourselves in. In the months after 9/11, in fact,
in the days after 9/11, we instantly heard certain names of terrorists,
Osama bin Laden, obviously, and a few others. And I think we were
misled into believing that somehow these were the only problems that we
had, that these individuals were the extent of our terrorist problem.
What we have learned in the months since then and what we have
learned through the 9/11 Commission's work and its predecessor, the
Joint Committee of Inquiry here in Congress, is that any terrorist
operation is built upon a network. It is not one individual or even a
couple of individuals, but there is a whole network of individuals who
each plays a specific role, has a specific job, whether it be identity
documents or scoping out buildings or providing training or providing
intelligence or recruiting or whatever it may be.
What we have learned, I think, in these months since the tragic days
of September 11 is that if we are going to be successful in protecting
this Nation, we cannot focus solely on the trigger man or the guy who
plants the bomb or the guy who drives that rigged truck, because we can
remove those individuals and more may pop up.
Instead, we have to go over every link in the chain. We have to go
after those who provide material support, who provide the shadows in
which terrorists hide, who scope out the building and provide the
intelligence and the diagrams, who provide the transportation, who
provide the forged documents, who put the trigger men in place to do
their terrible deeds.
The 9/11 Commission was very clear in saying that its report was not
legislation. It understood that its report would need to go through the
legislative process, and it has. And I believe the legislation that
this body produced, H.R. 10, not only carries the spirit and concepts
of the 9/11 report, but based upon the experience that we have all had
and all that we have learned, I think it adds a lot to it.
It is only the House version of this bill that goes after every part
in that network. It is only the House version of the bill and, in
particular, the provisions that came out of the Committee on the
Judiciary that are aimed at breaking each of the links in making sure
that we go after the recruiters of terrorists, those who provide the
military training, those who recruit and, as well, the ranks of
terrorist organizations.
We have to go after them as surely as we go after those who have
placed that bomb. If we do not, we cannot win.
And I think we also recognize that by the very nature of terrorist
operations, we cannot wait until after the terrible act has occurred.
We have to disrupt it. We have to prevent it. We have to break that
chain. We have to disrupt that network. We have to find those who give
material support to terrorism, whether it be the military training or
the logistics. We have to remove them. Unless we remove those
individuals, we cannot succeed.
So the question I think we have before us today with this motion to
instruct is whether or not we are going to take a very narrow approach,
which is what some would suggest, and I would argue the Senate bill
would do, which is incomplete, which does not get after every link in
the chain, which does not really go after the network, which does not
have the material support provisions in it; or whether or not we are
going to be serious, whether or not we are going to take that
comprehensive approach that I can, as a young father, be proud of
because I know that it makes this country a safer place for my kids to
grow up in.
Make no mistake, when this legislation is signed by the President,
there will be some time that passes before we are able to take up some
of the new steps that the other side would have us remove. The clock is
ticking. We have heard a number of terrorism experts refer to this as a
race against time. I agree, it is. We have to get this right. We have
to be bold. We have to go after that network. We have to go after every
link in the chain. We have to remove them. We have to prevent them from
coming into place.
We have to send a signal to those who would recruit terrorists. We
have to send a signal to those who would become recruits. They are our
enemy just as surely as the man or the woman that pulls the trigger.
That is the experience, I think, that this world has had in the sad
months since September 11.
I urge my colleagues to avoid the motion to instruct because it falls
short. It does not do the job. It does not go after the network. It
will not break the links in the chain.

[[Page H8984]]

I have said it before. I think, as we all look back on the years
leading up to 9/11, I think we have to agree that a storm was gathering
in the terrorist world and too many of our leaders, and this is not a
partisan comment, too many of our leaders looked the other way. The
question is now whether, 10 years from now, 15 years from now, whether
or not our successors will look back at this Congress and say either
they did the right thing, they took a bold comprehensive approach, or,
let us hope not, they looked the other way and they fell short.
I urge my colleagues to vote against this motion to instruct.
Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to
the gentlewoman from Tennessee (Mrs. Blackburn).
Mrs. BLACKBURN. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank our chairman for the
excellent work he has done this session as we have looked at
immigration issues and have worked hard to be certain that we address
the things that are of great concern to the American people and to our
constituents.
And it is of concern that we have this motion to instruct to strip
apart H.R. 10. And, of course, our opponents of H.R. 10 and our
colleagues across the aisle are using impassioned talk to generate
emotion on this issue, but what we have contained in H.R. 10 and in the
provisions that they are wanting to lift out of that bill, wanting to
move away, are just good, solid, common-sense legislation.
I disagree with my colleague across the aisle. He was talking about
law enforcement officials and asking if they had lost their minds. I do
not think they have. The ones in my district definitely have not.
They are very concerned about this, and I have been working with them
since my days in the Tennessee Senate, working to address the driver's
license issue and how that affects the American people. And they would
choose to remove that from H.R. 10, and it is important.
We have got to be certain, as we look at our Nation's security, that
we take very careful steps not to reward individuals who are going to
choose to break the law to get here. We have to have great respect for
the rule of law and be certain that we continue to have policies that
require and reward those that respect the law.
Section 3052 that they are wanting to pull out does address the
driver's license situation, having legal documents for driver's
licenses. It is not a mandate. It does not set up a national database,
and this section has been worked on very carefully. The gentleman from
Virginia (Mr. Tom Davis) out of the Committee on Government Reform, and
the gentlewoman from Michigan (Mrs. Miller), who was secretary of
state, have worked diligently on this issue to be certain that we know
that the people who are getting a driver's license, a valid government
I.D., are here in this country lawfully, that they have an official
passport to be here lawfully. And it gives guidance to our States so
that States can continue to have reciprocity for the use of those
driver's licenses.
The provisions that are contained in 3052 are good, solid, common-
sense provisions. It is something that our States, every single State
in this great Nation, will know that they can depend on, that other
citizens will know that they can depend on, that the individuals that
work the TSA, that are looking at driver's licenses, that are allowing
people to get on planes, they will know that this is a valid document
and that the person who holds that document in their hand is who they
say they are and that they are here and having presence in this country
legally.
I would encourage my colleagues to oppose the motion to instruct. I
would encourage my colleagues to support H.R. 10, the provisions that
have been worked on, the provisions we have worked on with our State
legislators so that we help them, help them to have the assurance that
the documentation that is before them is real, it is valid; and so that
the immigrant community knows that we are honoring those that choose to
obey our laws, to work hard and to come here seeking hope, opportunity,
and freedom.
Mr. GUTIERREZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.
First of all, I will insert into the Record, since obviously the
majority has not read it, a statement of administration policy dated
October 7, 2004, from the White House, George Bush's White House. In
it, it says on page 2, paragraph 3: ``The administration strongly
opposes the overbroad expansion of expedited removal . . . The
administration has concerns with the overbroad alien identification
standards proposed by the bill that are unrelated to security
concerns.''

{time} 1645

This is the President of the United States of America, the leader of
your party that you went to New York and nominated, who is going to
debate Senator John Kerry tonight.
So if you are right, Senator John Kerry could say tonight to
President Bush, You have standards that are less secure because you
believe that people should be expedited and should not be expedited.
You believe they should not be, that the matricula consular somehow
allows illegal criminals, murderers, rapists and others to roam around
our country; that you oppose their quick and immediate deportation;
that you are giving harbor to terrorists in the United States of
America.
If we are to believe what the Republican majority has just said, and
President Bush has contradicted your position in his letter of official
policy, then somebody is wrong and somebody is right here. But I do not
think your colleague, the President of the United States, is weak on
national defense. I do not think the Republican majority is saying to
the President of the United States that he thinks it is a good idea to
have murderers and rapists and other criminal elements freely being
able to roam the United States of America. Yet, indeed, if you are
right, that is what the President supports, because we have his
official document of the administration policy, and he says remove this
kind of language from the document, that we support it.
Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman's comments from Illinois with
regard to his support of the President. It looks like Illinois this
year may be in fact in play, the electoral college.
But I do want to remind the gentleman that we do have three branches
of government, and we have all been sent here to represent our various
constituencies with regard to these very important issues of national
security.
Going back to the letter that I have submitted for the Record from
the 9/11 Families for a Secure America, I know that the gentleman is
very impassioned about his support for immigration, and I very much
appreciate it. We are a Nation of immigrants. But I think it is
important for us to refocus on what actually took place on 9/11 and
what the American people are asking us to do.
The 9/11 Families for a Secure America said, ``Our efforts over the
past 3 years to get elected officials to recognize and to address the
current immigration crisis have taught us that even the most reasonable
and sensible immigration reform proposals languish in Congress.'' They
do not languish in the House of Representatives, after we defeat this
motion to instruct ``because our elected leaders are either blinded by
special interests or afraid of being vilified by them.''
Mr. Speaker, if 9/11 repeats itself, and I have said this to our
neighbors to the north in Canada who have had representatives from
their government, from their legislative bodies, come and speak to us
about issues important to immigration, issues important to both of our
countries, if the tragedy of 9/11 repeats itself in this country, then
my colleague from Illinois and others from Canada and Mexico will long
for, will yearn for, the good-old-days when we considered what will
then be considered minimalist reforms to our immigration policy.
To not require that anyone receive relief under the Convention
Against Torture, the gentleman talks about expedited removal and the
concern that he has with regard for that. Our amendment changed the
underlying bill to allow for Convention Against Torture and asylum
claims to go ahead unimpeded by the new provision that calls for
expedited removal. So we will not be sending individuals who have a
very reasonable fear of being tortured

[[Page H8985]]

and abused in their home countries if they are returned. Those that
really do have a reason to fear for their safety in another country and
for their abuse there will be able to obtain relief in this country.
But for those that abuse the immigration process, as the 19 did who
perpetrated 9/11, we must maintain these immigration provisions in the
bill so that we deal with that very important problem and we do not
allow 9/11 to repeat itself and do not come to a point in the future
where the American people require us to do much more difficult things,
make much more difficult decisions, and cause us to greatly restrict
the influx of immigrants into our country.
In the words of families affected most directly by 9/11, these are
reasonable and sensible immigration reform proposals. They should not
be stripped out. I beg my colleagues not to vote for the motion to
instruct, but in fact vote against the motion to instruct.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. GUTIERREZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, let me just say the following. In the same letter from
the George Bush administration, it states: ``The administration has
concerns with overbroad alien identification standards proposed by the
bill and unrelated security concerns, and believes that the States, as
in the Senate bill, should work these things out.'' So there are
provisions for securing driver's licenses and making sure that they are
secure. We have that in the Senate bill.
The gentleman keeps speaking about the 9/11 families. I have an open
letter from the 9/11 families, the same families that came to testify
before the Congress of the United States, in which they say
``recommendations.'' ``We have heard that the House bill to implement
9/11 Commission recommendations also includes provisions to expand the
U.S. PATRIOT Act and reform immigration law in ways not recommended by
the commission and which we are against.'' This is the 9/11 families.
Look, anybody listening to this debate would think that if tomorrow
somebody who works in Washington State picking apples, and I think the
gentleman from Indiana and I would agree that most of the workers in
the field of agriculture in Washington State are undocumented here in
this country, without legal documentation, picking our apples, let us
use that as one example, do you think if you do not give them a
driver's license, they are going to stop coming? Do you think if you
take away the matricula consular and they cannot get a bank account,
they are not coming? Do you think if we pass every other kind of ID
requirement, they will stop coming?
They are going to keep coming, as long as in this country there are
apple growers who need their work and Americans like you and I that
were born here who will not do the work. So let us face it, these are
obscuring the real issues we have before us.
I would suggest to the gentleman that he says that maybe the State of
Illinois is in play in the electoral college. We just elected a
Democratic Governor in the State of Illinois and the former Republican,
how ironic, the former Republican Governor of the State of Illinois is
currently under indictment by the Federal Government. Do you want to
know why? For issuing bogus driver's licenses and taking bribes for
them. That is a fact.
Unfortunately, let us have a debate on immigration policy that is
really about immigration and security concerns that are really about
security.
Mr. Speaker, for the Record I include the statement of administration
policy.

Statement of Administration Policy

The Administration supports House passage of H.R. 10 and
appreciates the efforts of the House Leadership and
Committees to bring this legislation quickly to the Floor.
The Administration looks forward to working with the House
and Senate in conference as they resolve their differences on
intelligence reform legislation so that it can be enacted as
soon as possible The Administration looks forward to working
with Congress to address its concerns with the bill,
including those described below, and to ensure prompt
enactment of necessary legislation to create a strong
National Intelligence Director (NID) with full budget
authority and other authorities to manage the Intelligence
Community, and to provide statutory authority for the newly
created National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).
The Administration appreciates that H.R. 10 has been
revised to clarify the authorities of the NCTC and the
definition of national intelligence. The Administration is
also pleased that H.R. 10 would prevent disclosure of
sensitive information about the intelligence budget.
Disclosing to the Nation's enemies, especially during
wartime, the amounts requested by the President, and provide
by the Congress, for the conduct of the Nation's intelligence
activities would be a mistake.
Legislation proposed by the President provides the NID with
full budget authority, including clear authority to determine
the national intelligence budget, strong transfer and
reprogramming authorities, explicit authority to allocate
appropriations, and the ability to influence the execution of
funds by national intelligence agencies. The Administration
is concerned that H.R. 10 does not provide the NID sufficient
authorities to manage the Intelligence Community effectively.
The Administration looks forward to working with the House
to improve a number of provisions relating to appointments.
In particular, the Director of the NCTC should be appointed
by the President, and the appointment of certain other
officers as proposed in H.R. 10 may raise constitutional
issues.
The Administration remains concerned about other provisions
that create new bureaucratic structures and layers in the
office of the NID and elsewhere that would hinder, not help,
the effort to strengthen U.S. intelligence capabilities and
preserve constitutional rights.
The Administration commends and supports provisions of H.R.
10 that promote the development of a secure information
sharing environment under the direction of the NID while also
providing flexibility concerning its design and
implementation. We look forward to working with Congress to
address some concerns with the degree of specificity of
provisions concerning interoperable law enforcement and
intelligence data systems.
In addition to provisions concerning the NID, the NCTC, and
other core issues responsive to the Administration's
proposal, H.R. 10 contains a number of additional provisions,
some of which are discussed below.
The Administration strongly supports those provisions of
Title II that ensure the Intelligence Community and others in
the war on terror have all the necessary tools to prevent
terrorist attacks--including provisions to prevent attack by
``lone wolf'' terrorists and enhanced provisions to deny
material support to terrorists, prevent attacks using weapons
of mass destruction, and further dry up sources of terrorist
financing. These and other additional antiterrorism tools
would help keep America safer.
The Administration also supports those provisions of Titles
II and III that will better protect our borders from
terrorists, while still maintaining our traditions as a
welcoming Nation. In particular, the Administration supports
efforts to allow visa revocations as a basis for deportation
and provisions concerning the judicial review of immigration
orders, as in Section 3009. The Administration strongly
opposes the overbroad expansion of expedited removal
authorities. The Administration has concerns with the
overboard alien identification standards proposed by the bill
that are unrelated to security concerns. The Administration
welcomes efforts in Congress to address the 9/11 Commission's
recommendations concerning uniform standards for preventing
counterfeiting of and tampering with drivers licenses and
birth certificates, but believes that additional consultation
with the States is necessary to address important concerns
about flexibility, privacy, and unfunded mandates.
Section 3001 acts to close a security gap by eliminating
the Western Hemisphere exception for U.S. citizens. The
Administration intends to work with the Congress to ensure
that these new requirements are implemented in a way that
does not create unintended, adverse consequences.
The Administration strongly opposes section 3032 of the
bill. The Administration remains committed to upholding the
United States' obligations under the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment. Consistent with that treaty, the United States
does not expel, return, or extradite individuals to countries
where the United States believes it is more likely than not
they will be tortured. The Administration is willing to work
with the Congress on ways to address the Supreme Court's
decision in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), insofar
as it may constrain the detention of criminal aliens, while
they are awaiting removal, or limit the government's
authority to detain dangerous aliens who would be removed
from the United States but for the fact that they are
afforded protection under the Convention Against Torture.
Title IV contains a number of provisions that purport to
establish the policy of the United States on foreign policy
issues, require the Executive branch to negotiate certain
international agreements, direct how the President will use
the voice and vote of the United States in international
institutions, direct the content of diplomatic communications
with foreign governments, direct the make-up of U.S.
delegations to multilateral meetings and negotiations, and
require that plans and strategies to achieve specified
foreign policy objectives be submitted to the Congress. These
provisions are

[[Page H8986]]

inconsistent with the President's constitutional authority
with respect to foreign relations, diplomacy, and
international negotiations. Therefore, these provisions
should be eliminated or cast in precatory rather than
mandatory terms.
In Title V, the Administration commends the provisions that
add to the Secretary of Homeland Security's flexibility in
providing first responder grant funds to certain high-risk
areas, but has concerns about border state funding mandates
which reduce that flexibility. The Administration opposes
provisions in Title V that would create inequities in
personnel policy between the FBI and other law enforcement
agencies, and looks forward to working with the Congress on a
separate and comprehensive reform of law enforcement pay and
benefits. The Administration also opposes provisions that
would encumber the Federal rulemaking process with
duplicative and burdensome new requirements.
The Administration opposes Section 5043 of the bill, which
would eliminate the level playing field established for all
three branches of government by the Government-Wide Ethics
Reform Act of 1989, creating a new regime of non-uniform
ethics laws. The financial disclosure process should be
modernized to reflect changed circumstances. The
Administration urges Congress to adopt the bill to modernize
government-wide financial disclosure submitted by the Office
of Government Ethics to the Speaker on July 16, 2003.
The Administration is also very concerned about the dozens
of new reporting requirements contained in the bill. The
Administration will continue to work with the Congress to
eliminate or reduce the burden created by unnecessary or
duplicative statutory reporting requirements, while
respecting the responsibilities of the Congress.
The Administration is also concerned about provisions in
Title V that would, taken together, construct a cumbersome
new bureaucracy, duplicate existing legal requirements, and
risk unnecessary litigation. The Administration urges the
House to delete or significantly revise these problematic
provisions.
The Administration notes that the Committee bill did not
include Section 6 (``Preservation of Authority and
Accountability'') of the Administration's proposal; the
Administration strongly supports inclusion of this provision
in the House bill. The Administration's proposal also
provides necessary additional authorities for the NID to be
able to effectively operate the Office of NID; however, H.R.
10 does not provide the NID with these additional
authorities. The legislation should also recognize that its
provisions would be executed to the extent consistent with
the constitutional authority of the President: to conduct the
foreign affairs of the United States; to withhold information
the disclosure of which could impair the foreign relations,
the national security, deliberative processes of the
Executive, or the performance of the Executive's
constitutional duties; to recommend for congressional
consideration such measures as the President may judge
necessary or expedient; and to supervise the unitary
executive.
Finally, the Administration has concerns with a number of
other provisions in the bill and looks forward to working
with Congress to address them as the bill proceeds.

Mr. LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to
speak about Representative Gutierrez's motion to instruct on H.R. 10, I
must oppose this motion to instruct.
This motion specifically instructs the conferees to remove sections
3005, 3006, 3007, 3008, 3009, 3032, 3051, 3052, 3053, 3054, 3055, and
3056, something I agree with. However, his motion to instruct also
calls conferees to recede from the entire House amendment and thus
accept Senate bill, S. 2845, which has some very unacceptable
provisions. One such provision exposes the funds we spend on the
intelligence community.
Even though he references immigration provisions, which forced me to
vote against the House bill, his motion to instruct has the purpose of
accepting the entire Senate bill. This is something I cannot agree to.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). Without objection, the
previous question is ordered on the motion to instruct.
There was no objection.
The question is on the motion to instruct offered by the gentleman
from Illinois (Mr. Gutierrez).
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.
Mr. GUTIERREZ. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on this motion are postponed.

____________________

[Congressional Record: October 8, 2004 (House)]
[Page H8993]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:cr08oc04-60]

MOTION TO INSTRUCT CONFEREES ON S. 2845, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REFORM
ACT OF 2004

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The pending business is the question on the
motion to instruct conferees on S. 2845, on which further proceedings
were postponed earlier today.
The Clerk will designate the motion.
The Clerk designated the motion.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Gutierrez) on which the yeas and nays are
ordered.
This is a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 169,
nays 229, not voting 34, as follows:

[Roll No. 525]

YEAS--169

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Andrews
Baca
Baird
Baldwin
Becerra
Bell
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Boswell
Brady (PA)
Brown (OH)
Brown, Corrine
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cardin
Cardoza
Carson (IN)
Clyburn
Conyers
Cooper
Crowley
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Deutsch
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Dooley (CA)
Doyle
Emanuel
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Frost
Gonzalez
Green (TX)
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Herseth
Hinchey
Hoeffel
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley (OR)
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
Kleczka
Kolbe
Kucinich
Lampson
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Leach
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lofgren
Lowey
Lynch
Maloney
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McDermott
McGovern
McNulty
Meehan
Menendez
Michaud
Millender-McDonald
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mollohan
Moran (VA)
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Pelosi
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reyes
Rodriguez
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Sabo
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sanders
Sandlin
Schakowsky
Schiff
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sherman
Skelton
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Spratt
Stark
Strickland
Stupak
Tauscher
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Wexler
Wilson (NM)
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn

NAYS--229

Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Beauprez
Biggert
Bilirakis
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boucher
Boyd
Bradley (NH)
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Burgess
Burns
Burr
Buyer
Calvert
Camp
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Carson (OK)
Carter
Case
Castle
Chabot
Chandler
Chocola
Coble
Cole
Costello
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crenshaw
Cubin
Culberson
Cunningham
Davis (TN)
Davis, Jo Ann
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
DeLay
DeMint
Diaz-Balart, M.
Doolittle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Edwards
Ehlers
Emerson
English
Everett
Feeney
Ferguson
Flake
Foley
Forbes
Fossella
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gingrey
Goode
Goodlatte
Gordon
Granger
Graves
Green (WI)
Gutknecht
Hall
Harris
Hart
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Hensarling
Herger
Hill
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hostettler
Houghton
Hulshof
Hunter
Hyde
Isakson
Istook
Jenkins
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, Sam
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline
Knollenberg
Latham
LaTourette
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lucas (KY)
Lucas (OK)
Manzullo
Marshall
Matheson
McCotter
McCrery
McHugh
McInnis
McIntyre
McKeon
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Moore
Moran (KS)
Murphy
Musgrave
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neugebauer
Ney
Northup
Nunes
Nussle
Osborne
Ose
Otter
Oxley
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Quinn
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Renzi
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Saxton
Schrock
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shuster
Simmons
Simpson
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Souder
Stearns
Stenholm
Sullivan
Sweeney
Tancredo
Tanner
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Toomey
Turner (OH)
Turner (TX)
Upton
Vitter
Walden (OR)
Walsh
Wamp
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)

NOT VOTING--34

Ballenger
Bass
Boehlert
Burton (IN)
Clay
Collins
DeFazio
Diaz-Balart, L.
Filner
Ford
Frank (MA)
Gallegly
Gephardt
Greenwood
Hinojosa
Issa
Jones (NC)
Kaptur
LaHood
Lipinski
Majette
Markey
Matsui
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Miller, Gary
Norwood
Ortiz
Paul
Radanovich
Slaughter
Tauzin
Towns
Waters

{time} 1835

So the motion to instruct was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
Stated for:
Mr. FILNER. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 525, I was in my
congressional district on official business. Had I been present, I
would have voted ``yea.''
Stated against:
Mr. BASS. Mr. Speaker, on Friday, October 8, 2004, I regrettably
missed recorded vote numbered 525, Had I been present, I would have
voted ``nay.''

____________________