Congressional Record: March 16, 2004 (House)
Page H1103-H1109
Iraq
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, in connection with Iraq, we had the benefit
of the Committee on Government Reform, which has had a study done about
this, which runs some 30 pages, that raises the question of the Bush
administration's public statements on Iraq. It is called ``Iraq on the
Record,'' and there have been questions raised in several areas. I will
include this report in the Record, which was prepared at the request of
the distinguished ranking member of the Committee on Government Reform,
the gentleman from California (Mr. Waxman); but this table of contents,
and this has been released today, special investigations division,
raises the question of the number and timing of misleading statements
on the part of the administration.
Iraq on the Record--The Bush Administration's Public Statements on Iraq
Executive Summary
On March 19, 2003, U.S. forces began military operations in
Iraq. Addressing the nation about the purpose of the war on
the day the bombing began, President Bush stated: ``The
people of the United States and our friends and allies will
not live at the mercy of an outlaw regime that threatens the
peace with weapons of mass murder.''
One year later, many doubts have been raised regarding the
Administration's assertions about the threat posed by Iraq.
Prior to the war in Iraq, the President and his advisors
repeatedly claimed that Iraq possessed weapons of mass
destruction that jeopardized the security of the United
States. The failure to discover these weapons after the war
has led to questions about whether the President and his
advisors were candid in describing Iraq's threat.
This report, which was prepared at the request of Rep.
Henry A. Waxman, is a comprehensive examination of the
statements made by the five Administration officials most
responsible for providing public information and shaping
public opinion on Iraq: President George Bush, Vice President
Richard Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary
of State Colin Powell, and National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice. It finds that the five officials made
misleading statements about the threat posed by Iraq in 125
public appearances. The report and an accompanying database
identify 237 specific misleading statements by the five
officials.
methodology
The Special Investigations Division compiled a database of
statements about Iraq made by President Bush, Vice President
Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, and National
Security Advisor Rice. All of the statements in the database
were drawn from speeches, press conferences and briefings,
interviews, written statements, and testimony by the five
officials.
This Iraq on the Record database contains statements made
by the five officials that were misleading at the time they
were made. The database does not include statements that
appear in hindsight to be erroneous but were accurate
reflections of the views of intelligence officials at the
time they were made. The entire database is accessible to
members of Congress and the public at www.reform.house.gov/
min.
This report is a summary of the Iraq on the Record
database. Because the officials' statements have been
compiled into a searchable database, the report can make new
observations about the topics that were the subject of
misleading claims, the timing of these claims, and the
officials who were responsible. To ensure objectivity, the
report was peer reviewed for fairness and accuracy by two
leading experts: Joseph Cirincione, senior associate and
director of the Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, and Greg Thielmann, former
acting director of the Office of Strategic, Proliferation,
and Military Affairs in the Department of State's Bureau of
Intelligence and Research.
findings
Number of Misleading Statements. The Iraq on the Record
database contains 237 misleading statements about the threat
posed by Iraq that were made by President Bush, Vice
President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, and
National Security Advisor Rice. These statements were made in
125 separate appearances, consisting of 40 speeches, 26 press
conferences and briefings, 53 interviews, 4 written
statements, and 2 congressional testimonies. Most of the
statements in the database were misleading because they
expressed certainty where none existed or failed to
acknowledge the doubts of intelligence officials. Ten of the
statements were simply false.
Timing of the Statements. The statements began at least a
year before the commencement of hostilities in Iraq, when
Vice President Cheney stated on March 17, 2002: ``We know
they have biological and chemical weapons.'' The
Administration's misleading statements continued through
January 22, 2004, when Vice President Cheney insisted:
``There's overwhelming evidence that there was a connection
between al-Qaeda and the Iraqi government.'' Most of the
misleading statements about Iraq--161 statements--were made
prior to the start of the war. But 76 misleading statements
were made by the five Administration officials after the
start of the war to justify the decision to go to war.
The 30-day period with the greatest number of misleading
statements was the period before the congressional vote on
the Iraq war resolution. Congress voted on the measure on
October 10 and October 11, 2002. From September 8 through
October 8, 2002, the five officials made 64 misleading
statements in 16 public appearances. A large number of
misleading statements were also made during the two months
before the war began. Between January 19 and March 19, 2003,
the five officials made 48 misleading statements in 26 public
appearances.
Topics of the Statements. The 237 misleading statements can
be divided into four categories. The five officials made 11
statements that claimed that Iraq posed an urgent threat; 81
statements that exaggerated Iraq's nuclear activities; 84
statements that overstated Iraq's chemical and biological
weapons capabilities; and 61 statements that misrepresented
Iraq's ties to al Qaeda.
Statements by President Bush. Between September 12, 2002,
and July 17, 2003, President Bush made 55 misleading
statements about the threat posed by Iraq in 27 separate
public appearances. On October 7, 2002, three days before
the congressional votes on the Iraqi war resolution,
President Bush gave a speech in Cincinnati, Ohio, with 11
misleading statements, the most by any of the five
officials in a single appearance.
Some of the misleading statements by President Bush include
his statement in the January 28, 2003, State of the Union
address that ``the British government has learned that Saddam
Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium
from Africa''; his statement on October 2, 2002, that ``the
Iraqi regime is a threat of unique urgency''; and his
statement on May 1, 2003, that ``the liberation of Iraq . . .
removed an ally of al Qaeda.''
Statements by Vice President Cheney. Between March 17,
2002, and January 22, 2004, Vice President Cheney made 51
misleading statements about the threat posed by Iraq in 25
separate public appearances.
Some of the misleading statements by Vice President Cheney
include his statement on September 8, 2002, that ``we do
know, with absolute certainty, that he is using his
procurement system to acquire the equipment he needs . . . to
build a nuclear weapon''; his statement on March 16, 2003,
that ``we believe he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear
weapons''; and his statement on October 10, 2003, that Saddam
Hussein ``had an established relationship with al Qaeda.''
Statements by Secretary Rumsfeld. Between May 22, 2002, and
November 2, 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld made 52 misleading
statements about the threat posed by Iraq in 23 separate
public appearances.
Some of the misleading statements by Secretary Rumsfeld
include his statement on November 14, 2002, that within ``a
week, or a month'' Saddam Hussein could give his weapons of
mass destruction to al Qaeda, which could use them to attack
the United States and kill ``30,000, or 100,000 . . . human
beings''; his statement on January 29, 2003, that Saddam
Hussein's regime ``recently was discovered seeking
significant quantities of uranium from Africa''; and his
statement on July 13, 2003, that there ``was never any
debate'' about whether Iraq had a nuclear program.
Statements by Secretary Powell. Between April 3, 2003, and
October 3, 2003, Secretary Powell made 50 misleading
statements about the threat posed by Iraq in 34 separate
public appearances.
Secretary Powell sometimes used caveats and qualifying
language in his public statements. His statements that
contained such cautions or limitations were not included in
the database. Nonetheless, many of Secretary Powell's
statements did not include these qualifiers and were
misleading in their expression of certainty, such as his
statement on May 22, 2003, that ``there is no doubt in our
minds now that those vans were designed for only one purpose,
and that was to make biological weapons.''
Statements by National Security Advisor Rice. Between
September 8, 2002, and September 28, 2003, National Security
Advisor Rice made 29 misleading statements about the threat
posed by Iraq in 16 separate public appearances.
Although Ms. Rice had the fewest public appearances and the
fewest misleading statements, she had the highest number of
statements--8--that were false. These false statements
included several categorical assertions that no one in the
White House knew of the intelligence community's doubts about
the President's assertion that Iraq sought to import uranium
from Africa.
I. Introduction
The President and his senior advisors have a special
obligation to describe accurately the national security
threats facing the Nation. This special obligation derives in
part from the nature of the subject. There is no decision
that is more grave than sending our armed forces to battle.
The special obligation also derives in part from the unique
access that the President and his advisors have to classified
information. On matters of national security, only the
President and his advisors have full access to the relevant
classified information. Members of Congress and the public
see only a partial picture based on the information the
President and his advisors decide to release.
[[Page H1104]]
Recently, serious questions have been raised regarding
whether President Bush and his Administration met this
special obligation. Numerous news reports and columns have
questioned the accuracy of specific statements by President
Bush and other Administration officials. The White House
maintains that any misstatements were ``only a small part of
an `overwhelming' case that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein
posed a threat to the United States.'' Other observers,
though, have detected a pattern of consistent
misrepresentation.
The one-year anniversary of the beginning of military
operations in Iraq marks an occasion for comprehensively
assessing whether the President and his senior advisors met
their obligation to accurately present intelligence to the
American public. For this reason, Rep. Waxman asked the
Special Investigations Division to assemble in a single
database any misleading statements made by President Bush,
Vice President Cheney, and other senior Administration
officials about the threat posed by Iraq. This report
summarizes key findings from this Iraq on the Record
database. The database itself is available to members of
Congress and the public at www.reform.house.gov/min.
II. Methodology
The Iraq on the Record database contains statements from
the five Administration officials most responsible for
providing public information and shaping public opinion on
the Iraq war: President George Bush; Vice President Richard
Cheney; Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld; Secretary of
State Colin Powell; and National Security Advisor Condoleezza
Rice.
The statements in the database are drawn from 125 public
statements or appearances in which the five officials
discussed the threat posed by Iraq. The sources of the
statements are 40 speeches, 26 press conferences and
briefings, 53 interviews, 4 written statements and
articles, and 2 appearances before congressional
committees. Quotes from the officials in newspaper
articles or other similar secondary sources were not
included in the database because of the difficulty of
discerning the context of such quotes and ensuring their
accuracy. Statements made by the officials before March
2002, one year before the commencement of hostilities in
Iraq, were also not included.
The database contains statements that were misleading based
on what was known to the Administration at the time the
statements were made. In compiling the database, the Special
Investigations Division did not assess whether
``subjectively'' the officials believed a specific statement
to be misleading. Instead, the investigators used an
``objective'' standard. For purposes of the database, a
statement is considered ``misleading'' if it conflicted with
what intelligence officials knew at the time or involved the
selective use of intelligence or the failure to include
essential qualifiers or caveats.
The database does not include statements that appear
mistaken only in hindsight. If a statement was an accurate
reflection of U.S. intelligence at the time it was made, the
statement is excluded from the database even if it now
appears erroneous.
To determine whether a statement was misleading, the
Special Investigations Division examined the statement in
light of intelligence known to the Administration at the time
of the statement. The primary sources for determining the
intelligence available to the Administration were (1) the
portions of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate
that have been released to the public, (2) the February 5,
2004, statement by Director of Central Intelligence George
Tenet entitled Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction, (3) the
recent report of the nonpartisan Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace entitled WMD in Iraq: Evidence and
Implications, and (4) news and other reports quoting U.S.
officials regarding the intelligence available to the
administration on Iraq.
In general, hypothetical and implied statements about
threats posed by Iraq were not included in the database of
misleading statements. A few such statements were included,
however, where they implied a threat in evocative and
frightening language. These statements were misleading
because the effect was to instill in the public the
perception that the threat actually existed.
To be conservative, the Special Investigations Division
excluded hundreds of statements by the five officials that
many observers would consider misleading. For example, the
five officials made numerous claims that Iraq ``had''
stockpiles of chemical weapons. Many of these statements were
misleading in that they implied that Iraq possessed these
stockpiles currently and did not acknowledge the doubts of
intelligence experts. Nevertheless, these statements were not
included in the database when they were expressed in the past
tense because Iraq did possess chemical weapons at least as
late as the early 1990s and used them during the 1980s.
Investigators also excluded scores of statements of
certainty that Iraq possessed ``weapons of mass destruction''
prior to the war. To many observers, these statements would
be misleading because they implied that Iraq possessed
nuclear weapons without acknowledging the division among
intelligence officials about whether this was the case. The
Special Investigations Division excluded these general
``weapons of mass destruction'' assertions, however, because
of the ambiguity inherent in the phrase.
The Special Investigations Division asked two leading
independent experts to peer review this report for fairness
and accuracy. These two independent experts are: Joseph
Cirincione, senior associate and director of the Non-
Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, and Greg Thielmann, former acting
director of the Office of Strategic, Proliferation, and
Military Affairs in the Department of State's Bureau of
Intelligence and Research. These experts judged that this
report is a fair and accurate depiction of the
administration's statements.
III. Number and Timing of Misleading Statements
President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld,
Secretary Powell, and National Security Advisor Rice
repeatedly made misleading statements about the threat posed
by Iraq. They made these statements in 125 separate public
appearances. The total number of misleading statements made
by the five officials is 237.
The 237 misleading statements were made in a variety of
forums. On 53 occasions, the five officials gave interviews
in which they made claims that were misleading. They also
made misleading statements in 40 speeches, 26 press
conferences and briefings, 4 written statements and articles,
and 2 appearances before Congress.
The misleading statements began at least one year before
the start of the war in Iraq, when Vice President Cheney
stated on March 17, 2002: ``The President's made it clear
that we are concerned about nations such as Iraq developing
weapons of mass destruction. We know the Iraqis have been
engaged in such efforts over the years. We know they
have biological and chemical weapons. . . . And we also
have reason to believe they're pursuing the acquisition of
nuclear weapons.''
These misleading statements have continued through at least
January 2004. On January 22, 2004, Vice President Cheney said
in a National Public Radio interview, ``I think there's
overwhelming evidence that there was a connection between al-
Qaeda and the Iraqi government. . . . I'm very confident that
there was an established relationship there.'' He also said
in the same interview, ``we know . . . that prior to our
going in that he had spent time and effort acquiring mobile
biological weapons labs, and we're quite confident he did, in
fact, have such a program. We've found a couple of semi
trailers at this point which we believe were, in fact, part
of that program.'' As described below, both of these
assertions were misleading in that they failed to disclose
the serious doubts held by intelligence officials.
The majority of the misleading statements--161--were made
in the buildup to the war in Iraq. The volume of misleading
statements by the five officials peaked before key decision
points in the buildup to the war. Congress began debate on
the Iraq war resolution in early October 2002 and voted on
the measure on October 10 and October 11, 2002. During the 30
days between September 8 and October 8, 2002, the five
officials made 64 misleading statements in 16 public
appearances. This was the highest number of misleading
statements for any 30-day period.
There were also a large number of misleading statements in
the two months before hostilities began on March 19, 2003,
when the five officials made 48 misleading statements in 26
public appearances.
Most of the misleading statements in the Iraq on the Record
database involve the selective use of intelligence or the
failure to include essential qualifiers or caveats. For
example, statements of certainty that Iraq was close to
possessing nuclear weapons were misleading because they
ignored significant doubts and disagreement in the U.S.
intelligence community regarding whether Iraq was actively
pursuing a nuclear program.
In 10 instances, however, the statements included in the
database were false statements that directly contradicted
facts known at the time by the Administration. For example,
on July 11, 2003, Ms. Rice stated with respect to the claim
that Iraq was seeking uranium in Africa: ``Now, if there were
doubts about the underlying intelligence . . . those doubts
were not communicated to the President, to the Vice
President, or to me.'' This statement is false because, as
Ms. Rice's deputy Stephen Hadley subsequently acknowledged,
the CIA sent Ms. Rice and Mr. Hadley memos in October 2002
warning against the use of this claim.
IV. Categories of Misleading Statements
The misleading statements by President Bush, Vice President
Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, and National
Security Advisor Rice fall into four general categories: (1)
statements suggesting that Iraq posed an urgent threat, (2)
statements regarding Iraq's nuclear activities, (3)
statements regarding Iraq's biological and chemical weapons
capabilities, and (4) statements regarding Iraq's support of
al Qaeda.
a. statements that iraq posed an urgent threat
On February 5, 2004, Director of Central Intelligence
George Tenet categorically stated that the U.S. intelligence
community ``never said there was an `imminent' threat.'' Yet
this was not the impression conveyed by President Bush, Vice
President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, and
National Security Advisor Rice in their public statements on
Iraq. In 10 different appearances, these five officials made
11 statements claiming that Iraq posed an urgent threat.
For example: President Bush stated on October 2, 2002:
``The Iraqi regime is a threat of
[[Page H1105]]
unique urgency. . . . [I[t has developed weapons of mass
death.'' President Bush stated on November 20, 2002:
``Today the world is . . . uniting to answer the unique
and urgent threat posed by Iraq.'' Vice President Cheney
stated on August 26, 2002: ``Simply stated, there is no
doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass
destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use
against our friends, against our allies, and against us.''
In one instance, Secretary Rumsfeld said that Iraq could
give weapons of mass destruction to al Qaeda in ``a week, or
a month,'' resulting in the deaths of up to 100,000 people.
On November 14, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld stated: ``Now,
transport yourself forward a year, two years, or a week, or a
month, and if Saddam Hussein were to take his weapons of mass
destruction and transfer them, either use them himself, or
transfer them to the Al-Qaeda, and somehow the Al-Qaeda, and
somehow the Al-Qaeda were to engage in an attack on the
United States, or an attack on U.S. forces overseas, with a
weapon of mass destruction you're not talking about 300, or
3,000 people potentially being killed, but 30,000, or 100,000
. . . human beings.''
b. statements about iraq's nuclear capabilities
In their potential for destruction and their ability to
evoke horror, nuclear weapons are in a class by themselves.
As Dr. David Kay, former special advisor to the Iraq Survey
Group, testified on January 28, 2004: ``All of us have and
would continue to put the nuclear weapons in a different
category. It's a single weapon that can do tremendous damage,
as opposed to multiple weapons that can do the same order of
damage. . . . I think we should politically treat nuclear as
a difference.''
For precisely this reason, the Administration's statements
about Iraq's nuclear capabilities had a large impact on
congressional and public perceptions about the threat posed
by Iraq. Many members of Congress were more influenced by the
Administration's nuclear assertions than by any other piece
of evidence. Rep. Waxman, for example, wrote to President
Bush in June 2003 that in voting for the Iraq war resolution:
``Like other members, I was particularly influenced by your
views about Iraq's nuclear intentions. Although chemical and
biological weapons can inflict casualties, no threat is
greater than the threat of nuclear weapons.'' Numerous
members of Congress stressed Iraq's nuclear threat in their
floor statements explaining their support of the resolution.
Despite the significance of the nuclear issue, President
Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Powell, Secretary
Rumsfeld, and National Security Advisor Rice repeatedly
misrepresented the nuclear threat posed by Iraq. The five
officials made 49 separate public appearances in which they
made misleading statements about Iraq's nuclear threat. In
these appearances, they made a total of 81 misleading
statements regarding Iraq's nuclear activities.
These misleading statements generally fall into one of
three categories: (1) misleading statements about the status
of Iraq's nuclear program, (2) misleading statements about
the purpose of aluminum tubes sought by Iraq, and (3)
misleading statements about Iraq's attempts to obtain uranium
from Africa.
1. Claims about the Status of Iraq's Nuclear Program
Prior to the war, there were significant divisions within
the intelligence community about whether Iraq had resumed
efforts to make nuclear weapons. In his speech on February 5,
2004, Mr. Tenet explained that there was not unanimity on
whether Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear program and that
these differences were described in the National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE): ``Let me be clear, where there were
differences, the Estimate laid out the disputes clearly.'' In
particular, the State department's Bureau of Intelligence and
Research (INR) concluded in the NIE that ``[t]he activities
we have detected do not, however, add up to a compelling case
that Iraq is currently pursuing what INR would consider to be
an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear
weapons.'' INR added: ``Lacking persuasive evidence that
Baghdad has launched a coherent effort to reconstitute its
nuclear weapons program, INR is unwilling to speculate that
such an effort began soon after the departure of UN
inspectors.'' The INR position was similar to the
conclusions of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), which concluded that there was ``no indication of
resumed nuclear activities . . . nor any indication of
nuclear-related prohibited activities.''
These doubts and qualifications, however, were not
communicated to the public. Instead, the five Administration
officials repeatedly made unequivocal comments about Iraq's
nuclear program. For example, President Bush said in October
2002 that ``[t]he regime has the scientists and facilities to
build nuclear weapons and is seeking the materials required
to do so.'' Several days later, President Bush asserted that
Saddam Hussein ``is moving ever closer to developing a
nuclear weapon.''
Vice President Cheney made perhaps the single most
egregious statement about Iraq's nuclear capabilities,
claiming: ``we know he has been absolutely devoted to trying
to acquire nuclear weapons. And we believe he has, in fact,
reconstituted nuclear weapons.'' He made this statement just
three days before the war. He did not admit until September
14, 2003, that his statement was wrong and that he ``did
misspeak.''
President Bush and others portrayed the threat of Saddam
Hussein waging nuclear war against the United States or its
allies as one of the most urgent reasons for preemptively
attacking Iraq. Administration officials used evocative
language and images. On the eve of congressional votes on the
Iraq war resolution, for example, President Bush stated:
``Knowing these realities, America must not ignore the threat
gathering against us. Facing clear evidence or peril, we
cannot wait for the final proof--the smoking gun--that could
come in the form of a mushroom cloud.''
Following the commencement of military operations in Iraq,
Administration officials continued to make misleading
statements regarding Iraq's nuclear program. For example,
Secretary Rumsfeld denied on July 13, 2003, that there was
``any debate'' about Iraq's nuclear capabilities within the
Administration, stating: ``We said they had a nuclear
program. That was never any debate.''
Since the war ended, the Iraq Survey Group has been unable
to find evidence of the nuclear program described by the five
officials. On October 2, 2003, David Kay reported that ``we
have not uncovered evidence that Iraq undertook significant
post-1998 steps to actually build nuclear weapons or produce
fissile material.'' In his January 28, 2004, testimony, Dr.
Kay reported that ``[i]t was not a reconstituted, full-blown
nuclear program.'' He added, ``As best as has been determined
. . . in 2000 they had decided that their nuclear
establishment had deteriorated to such point that it was
totally useless.'' His conclusion was that there was ``no
doubt at all'' that Iraq had less of an ability to produce
fissile material in 2001 than in 1991. According to Dr. Kay,
the nuclear program had been ``seriously degraded'' and the
``activities of the inspectors in the early '90s did a
tremendous amount.''
2. Claims about the Aluminum Tubes
In 2001 and 2002, shipments of aluminum tubes to Iraq were
intercepted. This discovery led to an active debate within
intelligence agencies about the intended use of the tubes.
Numerous experts believed the tubes were for conventional
rockets rather than a nuclear development program. In his
February 5, 2004, speech, Mr. Tenet explained that
disagreement over the purpose of the aluminum tubes was
``a debate laid out extensively in the estimate and one
that experts still argue over.'' The agency with the most
technical expertise in this area, the Department of
Energy, believed that the tubes likely were not part of a
nuclear enrichment program, stating in the NIE that ``the
tubes probably are not part of the program.'' The
International Atomic Energy Agency agreed, concluding:
``There is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import
aluminum tubes for use in centrifuge enrichment.''
In addition to dissent from the Energy Department and
international inspectors, the State Department also expressed
formal reservations, stating in the NIE that ``INR is not
persuaded that the tubes in question are intended for use as
centrifuge rotors.'' Instead, the State Department accepted
the ``judgment of technical experts at the U.S. Department of
Energy (DOE) who have concluded that the tubes Iraq seeks to
acquire are poorly suited for use in gas centrifuges.'' The
State Department explained its position in detail: The very
large quantities being sought, the way the tubes were tested
by the Iraqis, and the atypical lack of attention to
operational security in the procurement efforts are among the
factors, in addition to the DOE assessment, that led INR to
conclude that the tubes are not intended for use in Iraq's
nuclear weapon program.
According to the NIE, ``INR considers it far more likely
that the tubes are intended for another purpose, most likely
the production of artillery rockets.''
These doubts about the use of the aluminum tubes were not
conveyed by Administration officials, however. Instead, the
aluminum tubes became one of the two principal pieces of
information cited by the Administration to support the claim
that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.
President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Powell, and
National Security Advisor Rice made 10 misleading statements
in 9 public appearances about the significance of the
aluminum tubes.
For example, Ms. Rice stated on September 8, 2002: ``We do
know that there have been shipments going into . . . Iraq . .
. of aluminum tubes that . . . are only really suited for
nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs.'' Similarly,
Vice President Cheney said on September 8, 2002: ``[Saddam
Hussein] now is trying, through his illicit procurement
network, to acquire the equipment he needs to be able to
enrich uranium to make the bombs . . . [s]pecifically
aluminum tubes.'' These statements were misleading because
they did not present the possibility that the tubes were
suitable or intended for another purpose, or acknowledge that
key U.S. experts doubted that the tubes were intended to make
nuclear bombs.
In one instance, Secretary Powell did acknowledge that some
experts disputed that the aluminum tubes were intended for
nuclear uses. In his February 5, 2003, address before the
United Nations, Secretary Powell stated, ``By now, just about
everyone has heard of these tubes and we all know that there
are differences of opinion. There is
[[Page H1106]]
controversy about what these tubes are for. Most U.S. experts
think they are intended to serve as rotors in centrifuges
used to enrich uranium.'' Even in that statement, however,
Secretary Powell did not make clear that experts from the
Department of Energy and the State Department's own
intelligence division played a significant role in the
analysis of this issue and in formal and deliberate dissents
had disputed the view that the tubes would likely be used to
enrich uranium.
On another occasion, Secretary Powell cited the tubes as
evidence of pursuit of nuclear weapons, without noting that
the intended use of the tubes was under dispute, asserting:
``We also know that Iraq has tried to obtain high-strength
aluminum tubes, which can be used to enrich uranium in
centrifuges for a nuclear weapons program.''
By January 27, 2003, the International Atomic Energy Agency
had reached the tentative conclusion that the aluminum tubes
``would be consistent with the purpose stated by Iraq and,
unless modified, would not be suitable for manufacturing
centrifuges.'' Following the occupation of Iraq, the Iraq
Survey Group did not find evidence indicating that the tubes
were intended for nuclear use. In his January 28, 2004,
testimony, Dr. Kay announced: ``It is my judgment, based
on the evidence that was collected . . . that it's more
probable that those tubes were intended for use in a
conventional missile program, rather than in a centrifuge
program.''
3. Claims about Uranium from Africa
Another significant component of the Administration's
nuclear claims was the assertion that Iraq had sought to
import uranium from Africa. As one of few new pieces of
intelligence, this claim was repeated multiple times by
Administration officials as proof that Iraq had reconstituted
its nuclear weapons program. In total, the five
Administration officials made misleading assertions about
Iraq's attempts to obtain uranium from Africa in 7 statements
in 6 public appearances.
In his State of the Union address on January 28, 2003,
President Bush stated: ``The British government has learned
that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of
uranium from Africa. . . . Saddam Hussein has not credibly
explained these activities. He clearly has much to hide.''
Other officials echoed this statement. In a January 23,
2003, New York Times op-ed piece, Ms. Rice argued that Iraq
had lied in its December 2002 declaration, noting: ``the
declaration fails to account for or explain Iraq's efforts to
get uranium from abroad.'' In his opening remarks in his
televised press conference on January 29, 2003, Secretary
Rumsfeld stated, ``[Saddam Hussein's] regime . . . recently
was discovered seeking significant quantities of uranium from
Africa.''
These claims that Iraq was seeking to import uranium were
misleading. The documentary evidence behind the assertions
was declared to be ``not authentic'' by the International
Atomic Energy Agency. An envoy, former Ambassador Joseph
Wilson, was sent by the CIA to investigate the alleged
purchase. Ambassador Wilson concluded that it was ``highly
doubtful that any such transaction had ever taken place,''
and on his return, he provided detailed briefings to the CIA
and to the State Department African Affairs Bureau.
When evidence emerged that the importation claim was false,
Ms. Rice claimed that the White House had no knowledge of
these doubts. She asserted unequivocally that no senior White
House officials were informed about questions about the
uranium claim prior to its use in the State of the Union
address. She stated that ``[t]he intelligence community did
not know at that time, or at levels that got to us . . . that
there was serious questions about this report.'' As she put
it on another occasion: ``[H]ad there been even a peep that
the agency did not want that sentence in or that George Tenet
did not want that sentence in, that the Director of Central
Intelligence did not want it in, it would have been gone.''
Ms. Rice's claims were simply false. The CIA sent two memos
to the National Security Council--one of which was addressed
to Ms. Rice personally--warning against including the claim
in a speech by the President. Director of Central
Intelligence George Tenet also ``argued personally'' to Ms.
Rice's deputy national security adviser, Stephen Hadley,
``that the allegation should not be used'' by the President.
Further, in the October 2002 NIE provided to top White House
officials, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and
Research had stated that claims that Iraq sought to acquire
uranium in Africa were ``highly dubious.''
Ultimately, the White House was forced to admit its error.
On July 9, 2003, White House spokesperson Ari Fleischer said
that the statement about importing uranium from Africa
``should not have risen to the level of a presidential
speech.'' The White House minimized the significance of the
Administration's use of the Niger claim, arguing that it was
``only a small part of an `overwhelming' case that Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein posed a threat to the United
States.''
C. STATEMENTS ABOUT IRAQ's CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAMS
President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld,
Secretary Powell, and National Security Advisor Rice made
misleading statements regarding Iraq's chemical and
biological weapons programs in 61 public appearances. In
these appearances, the five officials made 84 different
misleading statements. These statements addressed three
general topics: (1) Iraq's chemical and biological weapons,
(2) Iraq's efforts to build unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),
and (3) Iraq's mobile biological laboratories.
1. Claims about Chemical and Biological Weapons
Prior to the war, there were questions within the
intelligence community about whether Iraq in fact possessed
stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons. Because Iraq
previously had such stockpiles, had used them in the past,
and had not adequately demonstrated that all previously
produced stockpiles had been destroyed, the intelligence
community made an assessment in the October NIE that it was
likely that Iraq continued to possess them. Because
intelligence agencies had no direct evidence of such
stockpiles, however, the conclusions in the October NIE were
cast in the context of an intelligence ``estimate.'' The NIE
began its sections on chemical and biological weapons with
the phrases ``we assess'' and ``we judge.'' The NIE concluded
that Iraq ``probably'' had stockpiled chemicals and
``probably'' had genetically engineered biological agents.
The NIE also included major qualifiers, such as: ``We lack
specific information on many key aspects of Iraq's WMD
programs.''
Other intelligence assessments specifically cited the
uncertainty surrounding Iraq's possession of such stockpiles.
In September 2002, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
issued a report that concluded: ``There is no reliable
information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling
chemical weapons or where Iraq has--or will--establish its
chemical warfare agent production facilities.'' The report
also observed that ``[a] substantial amount of Iraq's
chemical warfare agents, precursors, munitions, and
production equipment were destroyed between 1991 and 1998 as
a result of Operation Desert Storm and UNSCOM (United Nations
Special Commission) actions.'' While the report assessed that
Iraq ``probably'' retained some ``CW agents,'' it warned that
``we lack any direct information.''
Despite these uncertainties among the intelligence
officials, the five Administration officials made 45
misleading statements in 35 appearances about Iraq's
possession of chemical or biological weapons. Often these
statements were misleading because they projected certainty
about their claims. Secretary Powell, for example, claimed,
``there is no doubt in our mind that he still has chemical
weapons stocks.'' Secretary Rumsfeld stated: ``He has at this
moment stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons.'' Vice
President Cheney asserted: ``We know they have biological and
chemical weapons.'' And President Bush said bluntly, ``He's
got them.''
Administration officials sometimes claimed to have specific
details about stockpile locations and movements. In his
speech to the United Nations, for example, Secretary Powell
showed photographs of supposed Iraqi chemical stockpiles,
stating: ``How do I know that? How can I say that? Let me
give you a closer look. Look at the image on the left. On the
left is a close-up of one of the four chemical bunkers. The
two arrows indicate the presence of sure signs that the
bunkers are storing chemical munitions.''
Secretary Rumsfeld was even more specific, claiming that
the Iraqis were ``moving them to different locations as often
as every 12 to 24 hours and placing them in residential
neighborhoods.'' He also made this statement: ``We know where
they are. They're in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad and
east, west, south, and north somewhat.''
The five officials also drew selectively from individual
intelligence sources. In 1995, Hussein Kamel, the Iraqi
official who had been in charge of Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction programs, defected and described how Iraq had
violated U.N. resolutions in the early 1990s. Administration
officials cited these claims repeatedly. For example,
President Bush said: ``In 1995, after several years of deceit
by the Iraqi regime, the head of Iraq's military industries
defected. It was then that the regime was forced to admit
that it had produced more than 30,000 liters of anthrax and
other deadly biological agents. . . . This is a massive
stockpile of biological weapons that has never been accounted
for, and capable of killing millions.''
President Bush failed to disclose, however, that this same
defector reported to U.N. inspectors that Iraq had destroyed
all of its chemical and biological weapons stocks.
Since the war ended, the Iraq Survey Group has reported
that it is unlikely that chemical or biological stockpiles
existed prior to the war. As Dr. Kay concluded: ``I'm
personally convinced that there were not large stockpiles of
newly produced weapons of mass destruction. We don't find the
people, the documents or the physical plants that you would
expect to find if the production was going on.'' Dr. Kay
reported in October 2003 that ``Iraq's large-scale capability
to develop, produce, and fill new CW munitions was reduced--
if not entirely destroyed--during Operation Desert Storm and
Desert Fox, 13 years of UN sanctions and UN inspections.''
Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet echoed these
findings: ``It also appears that Iraq had the infrastructure
and talent to resume production--but we have yet to
[[Page H1107]]
find that it actually did so, nor have we found weapons.''
His bottom line was that ``we do not know if production took
place--and just as clearly--we have not yet found biological
weapons.''
2. Claims about Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Prior to the war, Administration officials raised the
specter of Iraq using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to
distribute chemical or biological weapons directly over the
United States. Although there was agreement within the
intelligence community that Iraq had a UAV program, there was
a sharp split over whether these UAVs were designed to
deliver chemical or biological weapons. The October NIE
concluded that the UAV program was ``probably'' intended to
deliver biological weapons. However, the government entity
most knowledgeable about UAVs and their potential
applications, the Air Force's National Air and Space
Intelligence Center, disagreed with this conclusion.
According to the NIE, the U.S. Air Force ``does not agree
that Iraq is developing UAVs primarily intended to be
delivery platforms for chemical and biological (CBW)
agents.'' Instead, the Air Force experts asserted that
``[t]he small size of Iraq's new UAV strongly suggests a
primary role of reconnaissance.''
The five Administration officials did not acknowledge these
doubts in their public statements, however. Instead, they
made misleading assertions regarding the purpose of the UAVs
in 5 statements in 5 public appearances.
For example, on October 7, 2002, just days before the
October 10 and October 11, 2002, congressional votes on the
Iraqi war resolution, President Bush claimed that ``Iraq has
a growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that
could be used to disperse chemical or biological weapons.''
He did not disclose that experts at the Air Force found such
a use improbable. Instead, he highlighted the fear of Iraq's
UAVs being used ``for missions targeting the United States.''
Such statements had an impact on members of Congress. For
example, Senator Bill Nelson voted for the Iraq war
resolution ``precisely because of the administration's UAV
evidence.'' He explained: ``I was told not only that [Hussein
had weapons of mass destruction] and that he had the means to
deliver them through unmanned aerial vehicles, but that he
had the capability of transporting those UAVs outside of
Iraq and threatening the homeland here in America,
specifically by putting them on ships off the eastern
seaboard. . . . I thought there was an imminent threat.''
In his address to the United Nations, Secretary Powell
asserted: ``UAVs are well suited for dispensing chemical and
biological weapons. There is ample evidence that Iraq has
dedicated much effort to developing and testing spray devices
that could be adapted for UAVs.'' In making his presentation
to the U.N., Secretary Powell showed a photo of an
``illustrative'' UAV, which he suggested was well-suited for
spraying chemical or biological weapons over the United
States. This presentation affected members of Congress.
Senator Dianne Feinstein stated that of the various pieces of
evidence presented by Secretary Powell, ``The most compelling
to me was the unmanned aerial vehicle and the development of
that with spray tanks. And he kind of laid down the fact that
this could be in our country and there was a possibility that
this might be used against the United States.''
President Bush later highlighted Secretary Powell's
presentation, claiming: ``All the world has now seen the
footage of an Iraqi Mirage aircraft with a fuel tank modified
to spray biological agents over wide areas. . . . A UAV
launched from a vessel off the American coast could reach
hundreds of miles inland.''
The Iraq Survey Group found little to substantiate these
claims. According to Dr. Kay's January 28, testimony, Iraq's
UAV program ``was not a strong point'' because it was only
``theoretically possible'' to have ``snuck one of those on a
ship off the East Coast of the United States that might have
been able to deliver a small amount someplace.'' He found
only that ``at least one of those families of UAVs'' was a
``descendent'' of another model that once had a ``spray tank
on it.'' In his assessment, there was no ``existing
deployment capability at that point for any sort of
systematic military attack.''
3. Claims about Mobile Biological Laboratories
In April and early May 2003, military forces found mobile
trailers in Iraq. Although intelligence experts disputed the
purpose of the trailers, Administration officials repeatedly
asserted that they were mobile biological weapons
laboratories. In total, President Bush, Vice President
Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, and National
Security Advisor Rice made 34 misleading statements about the
trailers in 27 separate public appearances.
Shortly after the trailers were found, the CIA and DIA
issued an unclassified white paper evaluating the trailers.
The white paper was released without coordination with other
members of the intelligence community, however. It was
disclosed later that engineers from DIA who examined the
trailers concluded that they were most likely used to produce
hydrogen for artillery weather balloons. A former senior
intelligence official reported that ``only one of 15
intelligence analysts assembled from three agencies to
discuss the issue in June endorsed the white paper
conclusion.''
Despite these doubts within the intelligence community, the
five officials repeatedly misled Congress and the public
about the trailers by asserting without qualification that
they were proof of Iraq's biological weapons program.
President Bush made perhaps the most prominent misleading
statement on this matter when he proclaimed: ``We found the
weapons of mass destruction. We found biological
laboratories. You remember when Colin Powell stood up in
front of the world, and he said, Iraq has got laboratories,
mobile labs to build biological weapons. They're illegal.
They're against the United Nations resolutions, and we've so
far discovered two. And we'll find more weapons as time goes
on. But for those who say we haven't found the banned
manufacturing devices or banned weapons, they're wrong, we
found them.''
Similarly, Secretary Powell's comments about the trailers
frequently asserted with certainty that the trailers were
biological weapons laboratories. For example:
On May 21, 2003, Secretary Powell said: ``The intelligence
community has really looked hard at these vans, and we can
find no other purpose for them. Although you can't find
actual germs on them, they have been cleaned and we don't
know whether they have been used for that purpose or not, but
they were certainly designed and constructed for that
purpose. And we have taken our time on this one because we
wanted to make sure we got it right. And the intelligence
community, I think, is convinced now that that's the purpose
they served.''
On May 22, 2003, Secretary Powell said, ``So far, we have
found the biological weapons vans that I spoke about when I
presented the case to the United Nations on the 5th of
February, and there is no doubt in our minds now that those
vans were designed for only one purpose, and that was to make
biological weapons.''
The doubts about the trailers were confirmed by the work of
the Iraq Survey Group. According to Dr. Kay's January 28,
2004, testimony, ``the consensus opinion is that when you
look at those two trailers, while [they] had capabilities in
many areas, their actual intended use was not for the
production of biological weapons.'' In a separate interview,
Dr. Kay explained that the trailers ``were actually designed
to produce hydrogen for weather balloons, or perhaps to
produce rocket fuel.''
d. statements about Iraq's support of al qaeda
Another key component of the case for going to war against
Iraq was the claim that Iraq was supporting al Qaeda. As was
the case with other featured claims the al Qaeda claims were
disputed by intelligence officials within the Administration.
Yet President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary
Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, and National Security Advisor
Rice regularly failed to acknowledge these doubts or the
weaknesses in the case linking Iraq and al Qaeda. They made
61 misleading statements about the strength of the Iraq-al
Qaeda alliance in 52 public appearances.
Well before the war of Iraq, the October 2002 National
Intelligence Estimate made clear that the U.S. intelligence
community had serious doubts about the threat of Iraq arming
al Qaeda. In its section on ``Confidence Levels for Selected
Key Judgements in This Estimate,'' the NIE gave a ``Low
Confidence'' rating to the notion of ``Whether in desperation
Saddam would share chemical or biological weapons with Al
Qa'ida.'' The discussion of this possibility in the NIE
contained highly qualified language: ``Saddam, if
sufficiently desperate, might decide that only an
organization such as al Qa'ida . . . could perpetuate the
type of terrorist attack that he would hope to conduct.'' The
NIE also reported that ``Baghdad for now appears to be
drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with
conventional or CBW against the United States, fearing that
exposure of Iraqi involvement would provide Washington a
stronger cause for making war.''
Director of Central Intelligence Tenet stated in an October
2002 letter that there were intelligence reports of contacts
between al Qaeda and Iraq. At the same time, however, he
asserted clear qualifiers for this information: ``Our
understanding of the relationship between Iraq and al- Qa'ida
is evolving and is based on sources of varying reliability.''
Senators who were briefed by intelligence officials in the
fall of 2002 expressed skepticism about the significance of
the link. For example, Senator Jeffords on October 8, 2002,
stated, ``While there is talk of cooperation between Iraq and
al-Qaeda, and I don't doubt that there has been some
cooperation, I have not seen any hard evidence of close
cooperation.'' According to another account, Sen. Richard J.
Durbin . . . said some classified information he had seen
did not support the administration's portrayal of the Iraqi
threat. ``It's troubling to have classified information that
contradicts statements made by the administration,'' Durbin
said. ``There's more they should share with the public.''
Durbin would not be more specific, but he did say the
committee had received the views of some analysts who do
not share the administration's conclusion that Iraq was an
urgent threat with important links to al-Qaeda terrorists.
Journalists also reported that many intelligence officials
within the Administration doubted the significance of
reported contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda. According to one
report: ``[A]nalysts at the C.I.A. . . . believed that the
evidence showed some contacts between Baghdad and the
terrorist organization, but not an operational alliance. . .
. [A]t the C.I.A., many analysts believed that
[[Page H1108]]
Mr. bin Laden saw Mr. Hussein as one of the corrupt secular
Arab leaders who should be toppled.''
Despite the doubts of many intelligence analysts, the five
Administration officials regularly asserted that there was a
close relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda. For example:
In a November 7, 2002, speech, President Bush stated:
Saddam Hussein is ``a threat because he is dealing with al
Qaeda. . . . [A] true threat facing our country is that an Al
Qaeda-type network trained and armed by Saddam could attack
America and not leave one fingerprint.''
In his January 28, 2003, State of the Union address,
President Bush stated: ``Evidence from intelligence sources,
secret communications, and statements by people now in
custody reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects
terrorists, including members of al Qaeda. Secretly, and
without fingerprints, he could provide one of his hidden
weapons to terrorists, or help them develop their own.''
In his February 5, 2003, remarks to the United Nations,
Secretary of State Colin Powell stated: ``what I want to
bring to your attention today is the potentially much more
sinister nexus between Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist
network, a nexus that combines classic terrorist
organizations and modern methods of murder. Iraq today
harbors a deadly terrorist network headed by Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi, an associate and collaborator of Usama bin Laden and
his al-Qaeda lieutenants.''
In his remarks on May 1, 2003, announcing the end of major
combat operations in Iraq, President Bush stated: ``The
battle of Iraq is one victory in a war on terror that began
on September the 11, 2001--and still goes on. . . . [T]he
liberation of Iraq . . . removed an ally of al Qaeda.''
Vice President Cheney's statements on this topic repeatedly
cited reports of a specific alleged Iraq-al Qaeda contact: A
meeting between Mohammed Atta, one of the September 11
hijackers, and a senior Iraqi official in Prague a few months
before September 11, 2001. For example, Vice President Cheney
stated on September 14, 2003: ``With respect to 9/11, of
course, we've had the story that's been public out there. The
Czechs alleged that Mohammed Atta, the lead attacker, met in
Prague with a senior Iraqi intelligence official five months
before the attack, but we've never been able to develop any
more of that yet either in terms of confirming it or
discrediting it. We just don't know.''
The Vice President's assertions about this meeting omitted
key information. He did not acknowledge that the CIA and FBI
had concluded before the war in Iraq that ``the meeting
probably did not take place''; and Czech government officials
had developed doubts regarding whether this meeting occurred;
or that American records indicate that Mr. Atta was in
Virginia Beach, Virginia, at the time of the purported
meeting.
Assessments following the war further highlighted the
tenuous nature of the Administration's assertions about an
Iraq-al Qaeda alliance. According to the New York Times,
``Since American forces toppled the Hussein government and
the United States gained access to captured Iraqi officials
and Iraqi files, the C.I.A. has not yet uncovered evidence
that has altered its prewar assessment concerning the
connections between Mr. Hussein and Osama bin Laden, the
leader of al Qaeda, officials said.''
Consistent with this view, during Dr. Kay's testimony
before the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 28,
2004, the following exchange occurred between Senator Warner
and Dr. Kay. Senator Warner: Any evidence with regard to
participation by either Saddam Hussein or his principal
henchmen in the WMD-sharing with al Qaeda or any other
terrorist organizations? Dr. Kay: Senator Levin--Senator
Warner, there is no evidence that I can think of that I know
of.
V. Misleading Statements by Individual Officials
a. president bush
President Bush made 55 misleading statements about the
threat posed by Iraq in 27 separate public statements or
appearances.
Of the 55 misleading statements by President Bush, 4
claimed that Iraq posed an urgent threat; 14 exaggerated
Iraq's efforts to develop nuclear weapons; 18 overstated
Iraq's chemical or biological weapons capacity; and 19
misrepresented Iraq's links to al Qaeda.
On October 7, 2002, just days before the October 10 and
October 11, 2002 congressional votes on the Iraq war
resolution, President Bush gave an address in Cincinnati,
Ohio, about the threat posed by Iraq. In this speech,
President Bush made 11 misleading statements about Iraq, the
highest number of misleading statements in any single
appearance by any of the five officials. In this single
appearance, President Bush made misleading statements about
Iraq's nuclear capabilities, Iraq's efforts to procure
aluminum tubes, Iraq's chemical and biological capabilities,
and Iraq's connection to al Qaeda.
Some of the misleading statements made by President Bush
included the following: ``On its present course, the Iraqi
regime is a threat of unique urgency. . . . It has developed
weapons of mass death.'' ``The British government has learned
that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of
uranium from Africa.'' ``The liberation of Iraq . . . removed
an ally of al Qaeda.'' ``We found the weapons of mass
destruction. . . . [F]or those who say we haven't found the
banned manufacturing devices or banned weapons, they're
wrong, we found them.''
b. vice president cheney
Vice President Cheney made 51 misleading statements about
the threat posed by Iraq in 25 separate public statements or
appearances.
Of the 51 misleading statements by Vice President Cheney, 1
claimed that Iraq posed an urgent threat; 22 exaggerated
Iraq's efforts to develop nuclear weapons; 7 overstated
Iraq's chemical or biological weapons capacity; and 21
misrepresented Iraq's links to al Qaeda.
Some of the misleading statements made by Vice President
Cheney included the following: ``[W]e do know, with absolute
certainty, that he is using his procurement system to
acquire the equipment he needs in order to enrich uranium
to build a nuclear weapon.'' Saddam Hussein ``had an
established relationship with al Qaeda.'' ``[W]e believe
he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons.''
c. secretary rumsfeld
Secretary Rumsfeld made 52 misleading statements about the
threat posed by Iraq in 23 separate public statements or
appearances.
Of the 52 misleading statements by Secretary Rumsfeld; 5
claimed that Iraq posed an urgent threat; 18 exaggerated
Iraq's efforts to develop nuclear weapons; 21 overstated
Iraq's chemical or biological weapons capacity; and 8
misrepresented Iraq's links to al Qaeda.
Some of the misleading statements made by Secretary
Rumsfeld included the following:
``Now transport yourself forward a year, two years, or a
week, or a month, and if Saddam Hussein were to take his
weapons of mass destruction and transfer them, either use
himself, or transfer them to the Al-Qaeda, and somehow the
Al-Qaeda were to engage in an attack on the United States . .
. with a weapon of mass destruction you're now talking about
300, or 3,000 people potentially being killed, but 30,000, or
100,000 . . . human beings.''
``[Saddam Hussein's] regime . . . recently was discovered
seeking significant quantities of uranium from Africa.''
``We said they had a nuclear program. That was never any
debate.''
d. secretary powell
Secretary Powell made 50 misleading statements about the
threat posed by Iraq in 34 separate public statements or
appearances.
Of the 50 misleading statements by Secretary Powell, 1
claimed that Iraq posed an urgent threat; 10 exaggerated
Iraq's efforts to develop nuclear weapons; 32 overstated
Iraq's chemical or biological weapons capacity; and 7
misrepresented Iraq's links to al Qaeda.
Sometimes Secretary Powell used caveats and qualifying
language in his public statements. For example, on March 9,
2003, he said, ``Well with respect to the aluminum tubes, we
still believe the case is out. The CIA has done a great deal
of analysis on those tubes. They are not persuaded they were
just for rockets. And, in fact, another nation this week, a
European nation, came forward with some additional
information that still, I think, leaves it an open question
as to what the purpose of those tubes was.'' Secretary
Powell's acknowledgement of differences in this example was
not an unqualified statement that only mentioned one side of
an intelligence debate.
On numerous other occasions, however, Secretary Powell made
unconditional statements about the threats posed by Iraq
without disclosing the doubts of intelligence officials. Some
of the misleading statements he made included the following:
``Iraq is now concentrating . . . on developing and testing
smaller UAVs. . . . UAVs are well suited for dispensing
chemical and biological weapons.''
``The more we wait, the more chance there is for this
dictator with clear ties to terrorist groups, including al-
Qaida, more time for him to pass a weapon, share a
technology, or use these weapons again.''
``So far, we have found the biological weapons vans that I
spoke about when I presented the case to the United Nations
on the 5th of February, and there is no doubt in our minds
that those vans were designed for only one purpose, and that
was to make biological weapons.''
E. National Security Advisor Rice
Ms. Rice made 29 misleading statements about the threat
posed by Iraq in 16 separate public statements or
appearances.
Of the 29 misleading statements by Ms. Rice, 17 concerned
Iraq's efforts to develop nuclear weapons; 6 overstated
Iraq's chemical or biological weapons capacity; and 6
misrepresented Iraq's links to al Qaeda.
Some of the misleading statements made by Ms. Rice included
the following:
``We do know that [Saddam Hussein] is actively pursuing a
nuclear weapon.''
``We do know that there have been shipments going into . .
. Iraq, for instance, of aluminum tubes that really are only
suited to--high quality aluminum tools that are only really
suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs.''
``[T]he declaration fails to account for or explain Iraq's
efforts to get uranium from abroad.''
Ms. Rice made significantly more statements that were
false--8--than any of the other four officials. Many of these
statements came in June and July 2003 when questions were
being raised about why President
[[Page H1109]]
Bush asserted in his State of the Union address that Iraq was
seeking to import uranium from Africa. Ms. Rice repeatedly
stated during this period that no one in the White House was
informed of the doubts about this uranium claim. For example,
she stated:
``We did not know at the time--no one knew at the time, in
our circles--maybe someone knew down in the bowels of the
agency, but no one in our circles knew that there were doubts
and suspicions that this might be a forgery.''
``[H]ad there been even a peep that the agency did not want
that sentence in or that George Tenet did not want that
sentence in, that the director of Central Intelligence did
not want it in, it would have been gone.''
These statements were simply false. As explained above, the
CIA had repeatedly communicated its objections to White House
officials, including Ms. Rice.
VI. Conclusion
Because of the gravity of the subject and the President's
unique access to classified information, members of Congress
and the public expect the President and his senior officials
to take special care to be balanced and accurate in
describing national security threats. It does not appear,
however, that President Bush, Vice President Cheney,
Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, and National Security
Advisor Rice met this standard in the case of Iraq. To the
contrary, these five officials repeatedly made misleading
statements about the threat posed by Iraq. In 125 separate
appearances, they made 11 misleading statements about the
urgency of Iraq's threat, 81 misleading statements about
Iraq's nuclear activities, 84 misleading statements about
Iraq's chemical and biological capabilities, and 61
misleading statements about Iraq's relationship with al
Qaeda.
Some of the categories of the misleading statements: A, a statement
that Iraq posed an urgent threat; B, statements about Iraq's nuclear
capabilities, including the claims about the status of the Iraqi
nuclear program; the claims about the aluminum tubes; the claims about
uranium from Africa.
Then there is another category, statements about Iraq's chemical and
biological weapons programs, claims about chemical and biological
weapons, about unmanned aerial vehicles, about mobile biological
laboratories; and then there is a special part in this study about
Iraq's statements about Iraq's support of al Qaeda.
Then just to be fair to the four other members in the White House
that work on these matters, there are misleading statements by
individual officials. The first official is the President of the United
States. The second official is the Vice President of the United States.
The third official is the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld. The
fourth category is the Secretary of State, Colin Powell, and the fifth
category is reserved for the National Security Adviser, Condoleezza
Rice.
I recommend these items and this study to each and every Member of
the House; and I would be happy to discuss it, along with the ranking
member of the Committee on Government Reform, with any of the Members
of the Congress on or off the record.
Haiti
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I turn now to a subject that I consider to
be very important, and that is, Haiti, a beleaguered tiny nation in the
western hemisphere that has been subject to a succession of activities
that have caused President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, his wife, and
children to flee from the country.
I would like to commend the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee),
the vice chair of the Progressive Caucus, who has introduced a truth
bill to discover and uncover the truth about Haiti. It is a bill that
would establish an independent commission and has been cosponsored by
more than two dozen other Members, in which she calls for in this
measure that we create an independent commission to investigate the
circumstances that surround a democratically elected president being
forcibly driven from his office and forced to leave the country, which
is, incidentally, the second time this has happened during the election
of President Aristide.
{time} 2030
This last time raises some quite ambiguous questions that we need to
resolve. Did the United States Government impede democracy and in any
way contribute to the overthrow of the Aristide government? What were
the circumstances that the President issued a resignation? To what
extent did the United States impede efforts by the international
community to prevent the overthrow of the democratically elected
Government of Haiti? What was the role of the United States in
influencing decisions regarding Haiti at the United Nations Security
Council in discussions between Haiti and other countries that were
apparently willing to assist in the preservation of the democratically
elected Government of Haiti by sending security forces there? Was our
assistance provided or were U.S. personnel involved in supporting
indirectly the forces opposed to the President of Haiti? And, finally,
was there bilateral assistance from the United States channeled through
nongovernmental organizations that were directly or indirectly
associated with political groups actively involved in creating
hostilities, and in some instances violence, toward the government of
President Aristide and citizens who supported the President of that
country?
And so we have referred that House Resolution 2625 to the appropriate
Committee on Government Reform to be acted upon. We think this is a
very important, very timely activity, and we are hoping that there can
be a perfectly candid impartial commission formed to study these vexing
questions that have been propounded in the proposal of the gentlewoman
from California (Ms. Lee).
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