Congressional Record: September 22, 2004 (Senate)
Page S9487-S9507
EXECUTIVE SESSION
______
NOMINATION OF PORTER J. GOSS TO BE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now
proceed to executive session to begin consideration of Calendar No.
815, which the clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read the nomination of Porter J. Goss, of
Florida, to be Director of Central Intelligence.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there are 6 hours of
debate on the nomination equally divided between the chairman and vice
[[Page S9488]]
chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence.
The Senator from Kansas.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that any quorum
calls that take place during the consideration of the Goss nomination
be charged equally to both sides.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I rise today to urge my colleagues in the
Senate to confirm Mr. Porter J. Goss, of Florida, to be the next
Director of Intelligence.
On August 10, 2004, President Bush nominated Porter Goss to be the
next Director of Central Intelligence, or the DCI. In doing so, the
President stated that Mr. Goss ``is a leader with strong experience in
intelligence and in the fight against terrorism. He knows the CIA
inside and out. He is the right man to lead this important agency at
this critical moment in our Nation's history.''
The Goss nomination was received in the Senate on September 7. On
September 14 and September 20, the Select Committee on Intelligence
held extraordinary open hearings on this nomination that were televised
and widely covered in the press.
At the September 14 hearing, Mr. Goss was introduced to the committee
by both of Florida's distinguished Senators, Bob Graham, former
chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, and Bill Nelson, who
is well known to the Intelligence Committee as an interested and
informed supporter of our efforts.
That both Florida Senators reached across the aisle to support this
nomination is a testament to the wide bipartisan support that it does
enjoy.
After 2 days of thorough and wide-ranging public hearings, the Goss
nomination was placed before the Intelligence Committee membership for
a vote yesterday morning.
In yet another impressive display of bipartisanship, the committee
approved the Goss nomination and ordered it reported in a vote of 12 to
4. At this time, I would like to congratulate the Intelligence
Committee members of both parties for their sober, penetrating, and
thorough consideration of this nomination. The committee's handling of
this nomination is very much in keeping with the bipartisan spirit that
has animated its work during a very difficult year of challenges in the
global war on terrorism in Iraq and in other areas around the world.
This bipartisan spirit did produce important steps forward, such as
the committee's report on Iraq WMD, in understanding intelligence
problems and gaps and also making recommendations in that regard.
As such, the committee's work will certainly help Mr. Goss as he
strives to make the intelligence community better and to produce the
best possible intelligence product. I want to say I also appreciate Mr.
Goss's efforts during his 2 days of public hearings to respond to
members' concerns and questions. He took these hearings very seriously
and with attention to detail demanded by consideration for a position
that has in the past been part of the Cabinet.
In my opinion, during his confirmation hearings Mr. Goss showed the
qualities we want to see in a good DCI. They are coolness under
pressure, a willingness to look at alternative views and, very
importantly, a willingness to ``take a few licks'' for past judgments.
Most important of all, he demonstrated his ability to put the
lawmaker's so-called partisan hat aside and take up the strictly
nonpartisan duties of this critical executive branch office.
As I noted at Mr. Goss's first public hearing on September 14, the
role of the Director of Central Intelligence is of paramount importance
to the security of this Nation. It is also one of the most challenging
jobs in the executive branch today.
Obviously, this Nation is currently engaged in a war not only in
Iraq, not only in Afghanistan, but elsewhere around the globe. In this
war, for the most part there are no trenches. There is no barbed wire.
There is no well-defined no man's land. On the contrary, in this war of
shadows and darkness, intelligence defines the front line and indicates
its weak points and gaps.
Recently, a distinguished former National Security Adviser remarked
to Senators that during the last 3 years our world has changed
dramatically. In the old world, the threats were posed by nation states
and organized military forces. In our new world, the greatest threats
may be domestic. These threats may come from nation states and their
agents and terrorist groups such as al-Qaida. Organized military
conflict is only one of many threats.
In our new world, we are not fighting against nation states but
against a network of disparate terrorist groups that operate not only
in the shadows but at times right in our own midst. Whether Afghanistan
or Iraq or here at home, defeating this enemy depends primarily upon
the ability of our intelligence services to locate, to penetrate and,
yes, to destroy the terrorist cells. We are involved in a world war
which requires timely and actionable intelligence to ensure victory and
the safety of the American people.
The Director of Central Intelligence is personally responsible for
producing this intelligence. As we fight Islamic terror, other global
threats continue to menace our Nation, and among them are these: The
development of nuclear programs by adversary regimes such as those in
Iran and also North Korea; the steady transformation of the People's
Republic of China into a power capable of challenging our interests
broadly and exercising influence over the region; and the continuing
worldwide expansion of WMD technology.
The Director of Central Intelligence is also responsible for
producing intelligence to keep the President and policymakers informed
about these threats.
And if that were not daunting enough, Mr. Goss has been nominated for
a position which in all probability may not exist for much longer. As
Senators know, the President and many in the Congress now support the
creation of a new national intelligence director. There has been a
great deal of discussion among my colleagues about reform. Above all,
we must ensure that a national intelligence director is something more
than a weak and ineffective figurehead.
Most of the debate outside the Intelligence Committee has centered on
how to grant increased authority to the new national intelligence
director while leaving the structural status quo undisturbed.
Many on the Intelligence Committee believe this is simply unworkable.
In other words, significant structural change is vital to real reform.
I believe strongly that we must create a new structure. This new
structure must accommodate the diverse activities of our intelligence
agency by giving direct responsibility and control of primary
intelligence disciplines and the corresponding agencies to a truly
empowered national intelligence director and his assistants. And true
empowerment includes both budget authority and line authority to direct
and control the activities of the intelligence activities. One without
the other may leave us with an intelligence head who can neither
succeed nor be held accountable, and that would be a most unfortunate
outcome.
We don't know how or when reform will finally be enacted. Until then,
however, we need a strong Director of Central Intelligence with the
necessary skills to manage a community which needs reform. Porter Goss
understands these issues. As chairman of the House Intelligence
Committee he helped create momentum for reform.
Porter Goss will be a good man to have in the intelligence community
driver's seat as Congress, in cooperation with the executive branch,
goes through the consideration of major reform. His unique background
will serve him well as he meets these and other challenges while
directing our intelligence community.
For over 40 years, Porter Goss has been serving his Nation, his
State, and his community. As an Army intelligence officer, a
clandestine CIA case officer, a newspaper man, a county commissioner, a
U.S. Representative, and chairman of the House Intelligence Committee,
Porter Goss has done his duty with skill, with honor, and with
integrity. I believe, and Members on both sides agree, that his
experience makes him uniquely suited to serve as the Director of
Central Intelligence.
I have known Mr. Goss personally for 16 years. I served with him in
the other body, the House of Representatives. I have worked with him on
a weekly
[[Page S9489]]
basis since I joined the Intelligence Committee. I have formed a strong
opinion about his fitness to lead the intelligence community.
One of Porter Goss's most important characteristics is that he does
not ride in a partisan posse. In that sense and in many others, the
President has selected an outstanding public servant to be his
principal adviser on intelligence.
In concluding my opening statement on the Goss nomination, I would
like to underscore an important point. If, as I earnestly hope, the
Senate approves this nomination today, this body will not simply have
performed a routine pro forma duty. On the contrary, Porter Goss's
confirmation as the DCI represents perhaps the most important changing
of the guard for our intelligence community since 1947. This
confirmation represents a fresh start for our Nation's intelligence
community. He will be the first Director of Central Intelligence in a
new and hopefully better intelligence community. It is not the same
entity that George Tenet inherited when he was confirmed by this body 7
years ago.
It is not the same entity that existed on September 10, 2001. The
intelligence community has undergone vitally important changes since
the terrorist attacks of 2001. These changes are the result of many
factors: statutory requirements, Executive orders, and other major
changes in policy. That snapshot that we took of the intelligence
community back on September 10, 2001, and the snapshot today is much
better in terms of improvement. A key factor is the vigilance and
dedication of the intelligence community rank and file, to include
those men and women who, today, as I speak, are putting their lives at
risk in remote and dangerous places to protect our Nation.
Still other changes are on the immediate horizon as Congress
considers major intelligence reform. So let us understand clearly what
we do here today. Porter Goss, as the new DCI, will lead a new
intelligence community into a new chapter. Senate confirmation of
Porter Goss does not mean simply painting a new name on the mailbox at
Langley. It represents the opening of a new era for the intelligence
community. The errors and omissions of Iraq are well known. They must
be corrected.
Steps have been taken and will be taken to ensure that. The errors
and the omissions of 9/11 are very clearly and thoroughly described in
both the joint inquiry that was conducted by the Senate Intelligence
Committee, the House Intelligence Committee, and the 9/11 Commission
Report.
These errors and omissions must and will be corrected. Porter Goss's
task will be to build, inspire, and open a new chapter in our
intelligence activities. We must never forget the errors of the past or
their human cost. Likewise, we should not dwell on them or allow them
to paralyze us. We must grapple with them and overcome them. That is
what is happening now, with structural intelligence community reform.
Porter Goss's task will be to open the new chapter and lead the
intelligence community into that fresh start.
Today, perhaps our highest legislative priority is to repair what is
broken in the intelligence community. We must not let this laudable
desire immobilize us.
John McLaughlin, the Acting Director, has done a professional and
commendable job as the Acting DCI. He, no less than the rank and file
of the intelligence community, needs long-term, permanent leadership,
and we need it now.
One of the concerns voiced by the 9/11 Commission was that it takes
too long to put key intelligence community officials into place. In the
case of this nomination, I believe the Senate definitely got the
message. The watch word for this nomination since the beginning has
been goodwill and bipartisanship. As I stated at the beginning,
Senators Graham and Nelson of Florida introduced and strongly endorsed
this nominee at his first confirmation hearing. We had an impressive
bipartisan vote on this nomination in the Senate Intelligence
Committee. The ranking member of the House Intelligence Committee, the
Honorable Ms. Jane Harman, has pointed with pride to her committee's
involvement in intelligence reform under Mr. Goss's chairmanship.
Expressions of support for this nomination have come from both sides of
the aisle and both sides of Capitol Hill.
This nominee is ready to go to work and he is needed. I urge the
Senate to confirm him as soon as possible. I, personally, and I think I
speak for the members of the Intelligence Committee, look forward to
working with Porter Goss, the next and possibly last DCI.
I understand the vice chair is waiting to speak, but I ask his
indulgence to permit Senator Chambliss to speak first.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Yes.
Mr. ROBERTS. How much time does the Senator request?
Mr. CHAMBLISS. I request 7 minutes.
Mr. ROBERTS. I yield him such time as he would consume.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bunning). The Senator from Georgia.
Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I appreciate the Senator from West
Virginia allowing me to go before him. The leadership that the chairman
and the vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee have
provided has been unparalleled in this difficult time in the history of
our country. Both Senators have conducted themselves in a very
professional way and have brought continued honor and dignity to the
Senate Intelligence Committee in a bipartisan way, and I want to
publicly commend both of them for their leadership.
I rise today in support of the nomination of Porter Goss to be the
Director of Central Intelligence. There is no more important time in
the history of our country, from an intelligence perspective, than we
are in today. Porter Goss has been nominated by the President to be the
chief intelligence officer for the United States. Porter Goss brings to
the office an unparalleled wealth of experience and knowledge relative
to intelligence matters. Porter Goss has been a friend of mine for 10
years, and I bring to this argument and this debate a little bit
different perspective than any other Member of this body because I
served in the House of Representatives for 8 years with Porter Goss,
the last 2 as a member of the House Intelligence Committee under the
chairmanship of Porter Goss.
During the last 2 years as a Member of the Senate and as a member of
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I have continued a
relationship with Porter Goss in the intelligence community. Both
before September 11 and subsequent to September 11, I have seen Porter
Goss in the trenches doing the kind of work that lawmakers have to do
relative to their day-to-day jobs. Nobody has provided stronger
leadership on the issue of intelligence than Porter Goss has, both
before September 11 as well as after September 11, and more
significantly after.
As I think about the arguments that have been brought forth in the
public hearings over the last couple of weeks regarding Mr. Goss, the
primary thrust of the negative arguments have been that he is too
partisan and too political to carry out the job of the DCI.
Well, I will say this about this man for whom I have so much respect:
I have seen him in an atmosphere of committee work. I have seen him in
an atmosphere of social work. I have seen him in an atmosphere of
operating on the floor of the House of Representatives. Certainly,
there is nobody who is a stronger advocate for his position on any
issue than Porter Goss. He is very direct. He is very plain spoken, and
it is pretty obvious which side of the issue he is on. But he always
does his arguing in a very respectful way, and in a way which advocates
his position but does not get into personalities. Unfortunately, that
is where the partisanship occurs in both this body and the body across
the U.S. Capitol.
Porter Goss has conducted himself in a professional and nonpartisan
way as chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, as well
as a member of the Rules Committee and otherwise in the U.S. House. He
is a strong advocate for his positions but he is not a partisan person.
I will discuss very quickly why I feel so strongly about his
background and what it brings to the table relative to his
confirmation. Porter Goss started out early in his career as a military
intelligence officer in the U.S. Army. He then moved into the realm of
the Central Intelligence Agency and was a
[[Page S9490]]
clandestine officer for the CIA in two different overseas posts. He
knows the people within the CIA. A number of individuals who he served
with during his CIA years are still employees at the CIA. He knows not
only the organization, but he knows the personalities, and he knows the
kinds of people who are led, and the kinds of people who need to lead
at the Central Intelligence Agency.
Porter Goss followed his time as an Intelligence Officer in the field
with 8 years as chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence.
He has covered the spectrum from an intelligence perspective. He has
been on the ground as an Army intelligence officer, and the Department
of Defense is the largest customer of the CIA. He has been at the
ground level of the CIA, where the real work is done and where the real
intelligence is gathered, by being a clandestine officer within the
CIA. Then in his years as chairman of the House Select Committee on
Intelligence he has been in a position to provide oversight for the
work that not only he did as an active member of the intelligence
community but following, particularly, post-September 11 he has
provided the oversight and been critical where he needed to be
critical, and yet complimentary where he needed to compliment the
intelligence community relative to the work they were doing.
I don't know of anyone else who has the same diversified background
as a soldier, a clandestine case officer, and a legislator as does
Porter. It is pretty obvious that his background and vast experience
are two of the main reasons why the President selected Mr. Goss to be
the next Director of Central Intelligence.
Porter Goss is a personal friend and he is somebody for whom I have
great respect. I know what kind of family man he is, I know the
strength of his character, and I know his dedication to duty, which is
why he accepted the nomination to become our next DCI. I also know the
wealth of intelligence background he will bring to the table as our
next DCI.
The main point I want to conclude with is the fact that we are in a
very complex world. We are in a world where intelligence matters. We
are in a world where we need to have the cooperation of our allies
around the world to collect intelligence against common enemies and
common threats.
I have been with Porter Goss when he has had meetings with numerous--
too many to detail--heads of the intelligence communities of our
allies, both abroad as well as here in Washington. I have seen the
rapport and the relationship he enjoys with these individuals. I have
been to other countries around the world to meet with the heads of
their intelligence agencies, and the first question they will ask is
not how am I doing but, ``How is my friend Porter Goss doing?'' He has
an unparalleled relationship with the intelligence community around the
world--not because he is just a good guy but because they respect him
for the work he has done and they respect him for the knowledge and the
experience he brings to the table relative to the intelligence
community.
I strongly support the nomination of Porter Goss to be the next
Director of Central Intelligence. I ask my colleagues to review the
record on Mr. Goss, listen to the debates, but at the end of the day I
hope we will send a resounding message to the President, and that is:
You have picked the right man. Let's confirm Porter Goss as Director of
Central Intelligence and move forward.
I yield the floor.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I yield such time as he may use to the
distinguished Senator from Missouri, a member of the Intelligence
Committee.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri.
Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished chairman.
It is a pleasure today to rise in support of Porter Goss to be
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Senate Intelligence
Committee has done its due diligence. It has done its duty with regard
to examining the nominee's fitness and qualification for the post of
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. His nomination should be
approved without delay.
Much of the work that goes on in the Intelligence Committee is
conducted in confidence because of the need to maintain
confidentiality. But I will say that the thorough hearings we had on
Congressman Goss were similar to the thorough hearings we have had on
all of the subjects brought under the jurisdiction and supervision of
our distinguished chairman from Kansas, along with the ranking
Democratic member from West Virginia.
There is no question that there is a lot of important work awaiting
the new Director of Central Intelligence. Somebody has to be in charge.
We are at war with those who seek to destroy us and all freedom-loving
people's way of life.
Whether we have a new national Director of Intelligence, whether we
have a CIA Director with expanded powers or limited powers, the fact
remains that we need to move forward with the nomination of Porter
Goss.
We have a long way to go to hash out what kinds of changes we are
going to make to the organization of the intelligence committee. The
more I hear, the more I watch other committees working, the more
divergence of opinions I see. Whatever structure we have, we need
somebody to control intelligence and make sure we put it on the right
path.
A cornerstone of our fight in the war against terrorists, as well as
other challenges that confront us, is the paramount need for timely and
actionable intelligence to ensure good policy decisions, to ensure
adequate preparation for actions that we may take, and to ensure
victory for our forces that are deployed in the real-life battles
against those who threaten us or threaten national security. Our
national security depends on the ability of intelligence services to
locate, penetrate, identify targets, and/or destroy terrorist cells.
In addition, we need a Director of Central Intelligence who will keep
policymakers informed about other global threats facing our Nation.
And, yes, while we are looking at the war on terrorism, we need to be
concerned about and following developments about the possible nuclear
program advances or missile advances in Iran and North Korea, the
steady growth of troubling developments in other major world powers,
and the continuing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
technology.
The intelligence community needs a leader right now, the support of
the President, and the support of this body who has the experience
coupled with a commitment to reform. I am convinced that Porter Goss
possesses these qualities. He was a former intelligence officer, a
former CIA clandestine officer, and as chairman of the House
Intelligence Committee, where he probably also went in harm's way to
handle that post, Porter Goss clearly knows the intelligence business
and has the experience.
As cochairman of the joint House-Senate inquiry into the 9/11
intelligence failures, he is intimately aware of the problems currently
existing within the intelligence community's ability to counter
terrorists. He is someone who will work with the Congress and the
administration to implement needed reforms.
Mr. Goss has also earned the respect of his colleagues and fellow
policymakers on both sides of the aisle. One of the most, if not the
most important principles that applies to our intelligence community
and our oversight should be our nonpartisanship.
Porter Goss has been praised by his Democratic colleagues year after
year for being nonpartisan on national security.
Senator Graham of Florida said of Porter Goss, in our hearing:
He is uniquely qualified to be here today as the
President's nominee to serve as the Director of Central
Intelligence. . . . He is a man of great character, unusual
intelligence, a tremendous work ethic and an outstanding
personal and professional standard of integrity.
Senator Graham also went on to say:
In addition to those personal qualities, when it comes to
the intelligence community, Congressman Goss has, in my
judgment, a balanced perspective, a perspective gained both
as an insider and then as an outsider. For a decade, early in
his career, Congressman Goss served our Nation in both the
Army and the CIA. He knows firsthand the value and the risk
of clandestine operations.
I could cite many other statements by leaders in both bodies. Senator
Bill Nelson of Florida, last month, said of Representative Goss:
[[Page S9491]]
He's a class act. Goss combines all of those
characteristics, which are kind of somebody I like.
My colleague and friend from Missouri, Representative Ike Skelton,
the minority leader on the Armed Services Committee, said, in 1997,
talking about the work on the intelligence authorization bill:
I salute both the chairman, the gentleman from Florida [Mr.
Goss], and the ranking Democrat, the gentleman from
Washington [Mr. Dicks] for their dedicated and bipartisan
work.
I believe he can work on a bipartisan basis. In addition, Porter Goss
understands the endemic deficiencies within the intelligence community.
There can only be true, meaningful changes if there is a solid
understanding of why change is necessary. Porter Goss understands what
is broken and is determined to work with us to fix what needs to be
fixed and not to mess with what does not need to be fixed.
There are some glaring problems we identified in our report on the
prewar intelligence on Iraq. One of them was the poor state of human
intelligence. That is spies on the ground, HUMINT as it is called in
intel-speak. We did not have any. What a disaster. We also have
problems in collection in general, analysis, and the consistent
problems with information sharing. These are problems that Porter Goss
has, during his tenure as chairman of the House Intelligence Committee,
devoted himself to improving.
As Chairman Roberts mentioned in yesterday's open session, Porter
Goss held over 62 hearings on intelligence community reform issues this
year.
Under Chairman Goss's leadership, the House Intelligence Committee
advocated changes and added resources annually to address the
intelligence community's most pressing problems, especially those
related to HUMINT and analysis.
His commitment to reform forced the CIA to repeal its restrictive
internal guidelines that had a ``chilling effect'' on HUMINT
operations. He attempted to refocus CIA analytic resources toward
longer term, predictive, strategic intelligence, and directed that more
attention be paid to language training, breaking down stovepipes, and
enhancing information sharing.
I can tell you, the stovepipes still exist. We still have
bureaucracies that only want to share information up and down within
their little fiefdoms, and we need somebody in charge who is willing to
break down those barriers and make sure sensitive information is shared
on a need-to-know basis.
Porter Goss was a member of the Aspin-Brown commission which was
formed to assess the future direction, priorities, and structure of the
intelligence community in the post-Cold-War world. The commission made
a number of recommendations, including looking how to streamline the
DCI's responsibilities and give him more flexibility in managing the
intelligence community.
Those who question Porter Goss's commitment to change must remember
that his leadership and dedication to intelligence community reform is
apparent in his work on the ``Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community
Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11,
2001.'' This report contained 19 recommendations. It laid the
foundation for the 9/11 Commission recommendations--the changes that
have been the subject of much discussion in the press over the last
several months.
Those who question Representative Goss's commitment to reform as well
as his commitment to operate independent of the current administration
should recall that Mr. Goss took the initiative to introduce his
intelligence reform legislation on June 16 of this year, H.R. 4584,
which called for significant changes in the intelligence community
structure in addition to providing a DCI or DNI the much needed
personnel and budgetary authority required to be a truly effective
leader. It should be noted that Porter Goss's legislation did not fall
in lockstep with the recent Executive order issued by the President,
thus proving that Mr. Goss will take the necessary bold steps to do
what is right for the community.
I quoted Senator Nelson of Florida earlier, but he also said of
Porter Goss:
. . . Congressman Goss is someone whose public life has been
illustrative of being nonpartisan, fair and independent.
When Porter Goss was pressed to defend past partisan statements
before our committee, he acknowledged there are times on Capitol Hill
when partisanship will rear its head. That is, unfortunately, part of
the job. However, he told our committee the following:
I well understand that I am leaving one arena and, if
confirmed, heading to another arena that operates completely
differently where partisan politics are not part of the job.
A considerable record has been created, embracing both substantial
comment on Porter Goss on his nomination and several commitments by him
on intelligence matters involving counterterrorism and other important
activities. I stress again the importance of approving Mr. Goss's
nomination at this time of paramount importance in the intelligence
community. I hope my colleagues will join with the chairman, with me,
and other members of the committee in extending him our support.
I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I thank the Presiding Officer.
Mr. President, the nomination of Representative Porter Goss to be the
next Director of the Central Intelligence Agency comes, obviously, at
an absolutely critical time in our Nation's history.
The documented intelligence failures prior to the terrorist attacks
of September 11 and leading up to the war in Iraq have left the
intelligence community's credibility bruised and their image tarnished,
which none of us wants.
The community's objectivity, their independence, and their competency
have been called into question. That is fair in some cases. As a
result, a bipartisan call for reform has steadily grown to the point
where the Congress is on the threshold of passing landmark legislation,
I believe and I hope, to create a stronger, better managed intelligence
community before we adjourn this year. I do not think we should stretch
it out and wait. I think we should do it, and do it now.
The next Director of Central Intelligence will be the most important
person for that position ever confirmed by the Senate. Our decision on
who should lead the Central Intelligence Agency, and the other 14
intelligence agencies, according to the law, should not be a
rubberstamp job.
The importance of this position requires a thorough examination of
the nominee's record and his ability to carry out the weighty
responsibilities of the job.
As I have indicated, never before in the 57-year history of the
intelligence community has there been such a need for a Director of
Central Intelligence with unimpeachable character, proven leadership
and management experience, and strong national security credentials.
The new Director will face, in my judgment, no fewer than four major
challenges: waging an unrelenting offensive clandestine campaign
against al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations around the world;
supporting ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq;
managing an intelligence community in a state of transition; and,
restoring the intelligence community's lost credibility.
The next Director of Central Intelligence must be extraordinarily
qualified in order to successfully carry out these and other national
security tasks.
I simply say all of this to say the stakes are enormous. Perhaps most
importantly, the next Director of Central Intelligence must be
nonpartisan, independent, and objective. This standard is not simply
this Senator's; it is what the law, the National Security Act law,
requires specifically in language.
I know of no other position of importance in Government requiring
that independence, objectivity, and non-partisanship as a requirement
for confirmation. The very first responsibility of the Director of
Central Intelligence under the National Security Act--and these are the
words--says that his advice to the President, the executive branch, the
military, and the Congress must be timely, must be objective, and must
be independent of political considerations, and based upon all sources
available to the intelligence community. That is the law.
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I have reviewed Representative Goss's record closely. I have gone
over his writings and his speeches of the past 10 years. We have just
completed two open hearings, which I thought were good hearings, in the
Intelligence Committee, where Representative Goss was asked questions
about his past record, his commitment to reform the intelligence
community, and his ability to be forthright, objective, and
independent.
Representative Goss is, without question, qualified in many respects.
He is a fine person. I have been able to work with him well over the
past few years--that is not one of the requirements, but it happens to
be true--both in the joint congressional inquiry into 9/11, and also in
House-Senate conferences. His past employment with the Central
Intelligence Agency, doing extremely dangerous work, and his 7-year
tenure as chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, have given him
both an insider's and outsider's perspective of the intelligence
community. There is no doubt that he is an extremely knowledgeable
person with respect to the inner workings of the Central Intelligence
Agency and the other agencies he is nominated to manage.
But Representative Goss's record is troubling in other regards. I
wish to speak about them. He has made a number of statements relative
to intelligence matters--many in the past year--that are, in fact,
highly partisan and displayed a willingness on his part to use
intelligence issues as a political broadsword against members of the
Democratic Party. Again, ordinarily, that is kind of routine around
here, but with respect to the Director of Central Intelligence, that
should not be and cannot be according to the law. When taken
collectively, this list of partisan statements and actions on
intelligence matters raise a serious doubt in my mind as to whether
Porter Goss can be the type of nonpartisan, independent, and objective
national intelligence adviser our country needs.
What is the public record of the person the President has nominated
to be the next director of the CIA? Has he been independent, objective,
and nonpartisan on intelligence issues, again, as required by law?
In March of this year, Representative Goss coauthored an intelligence
op-ed piece entitled ``Need Intelligence? Don't ask John Kerry.'' In
this political attack piece, he made a number of highly charged
political allegations relating to intelligence spending. These are
quotes from the Congressman:
. . . when Democrats controlled the Congress, the cuts were
deep, far-reaching, and devastating to the ability of the CIA
to do its job to keep America safe.
. . . during the Clinton years, the Intelligence Community
was given a clear message that if they failed in politically
risky operations . . . there would be no backing from the
Clinton White House or the Democratic-controlled Congress.
And then Representative Goss targeted Senator Kerry, who he claims
``was leading the way to make deep and devastating cuts in the
intelligence community's budget'' and ``was leading efforts in Congress
to dismantle the Nation's intelligence capabilities.'' Severe
criticism. A few months later, in a June 23, 2004 statement on the
floor of the House, Representative Goss claimed that ``the Democratic
Party did not support the Intelligence Community.'' And in the same
June floor debate, he offered the following justification for his
claim:
My comment is that when there was opposition to
intelligence and, year after year, efforts to cut the
intelligence budget, they did come from the Democratic side
through the period of the 1990s.
I have gone back over the record and determined that Representative
Goss's election year claims mischaracterize the intelligence record of
both the Democratic Party and Senator Kerry, in my judgment. He also
failed to point out his own record as a member, and eventual chairman,
of the House Intelligence Committee during this time. Had he stated the
intelligence record factually, it would have taken the sting out of his
political attacks and created an entirely different picture than the
one he painted.
It is true that during the first two years of the Clinton
administration, the intelligence budgets declined. That is true. This
was a period of deep cuts in almost all areas of Government, as we
tried to grapple with the legacy of the previous 12 years of
uncontrolled deficits. Over the next 6 years, however, the Clinton
administration's budget increased every single year for intelligence.
During that 6-year period, fiscal years 1996 to 2001, Republicans
controlled both Houses of Congress, and the Congress cut the
President's request in 1996, 1997, 1998, and 2001. In 1999, the
Republican-controlled Congress initially cut the intelligence budget,
but then passed a large one-time supplemental appropriation.
In fiscal year 2001, the Republican-controlled Congress returned to
its pattern of cutting intelligence funding. After the 9/11 attacks,
Congress once again passed emergency supplemental funding. By that
point, the Democrats had a majority of the Senate--briefly.
Representative Goss voted for every Intelligence authorization bill
and every Defense appropriation bill during this period. So he must
have thought that the so-called underfunding President Clinton was
requesting was acceptable.
Now, I want to look at exactly what Senator Kerry proposed in 1994,
and I want to contrast that with a bill, H.R. 1923, introduced by
Representative Solomon that had as its first cosponsor Congressman
Goss.
In 1994, Senator Kerry introduced a bill to cut the deficit by $45
billion over 5 years--at a time when Congress was searching for ways to
undo the 12 years of uncontrolled deficits under the Reagan and Bush
administrations. Senator Kerry's proposal would have rescinded $1
billion from the 1994 Intelligence appropriations and then increased
intelligence spending over the next 4 years by the inflation rate.
Representative Goss's proposal in 1995 would have cut not less than 4
percent of the personnel from all intelligence agencies in each of the
following 5 years. After the initial cut in 1994, Senator Kerry's
proposal would have provided significantly more funding for
intelligence than was appropriated by the Congress controlled by the
Republicans, beginning with the fiscal year 1996 budget.
Representative Goss's proposal, on the other hand, would have
resulted in dramatically lower intelligence funding and, in fact John
Kerry's proposal would have resulted in $8.8 billion more for
intelligence than Congressman Goss's lead-cosponsored bill.
And worse, all of the cuts Representative Goss proposed in 1995 would
have been achieved by firing 20 percent, by law, of America's
intelligence officers at the very time the terrorist threat from al-
Qaida was growing. In fact, had the Congress followed the Goss plan,
the intelligence community would have had tens of thousands fewer
intelligence officers in the year 2000: fewer intelligence collectors
in the CIA, NSA, and elsewhere; fewer intelligence analysts across the
community; fewer intelligence officers in the military service; and
fewer counterterrorism officers in the FBI.
The Goss plan would have made, using his own words, in fact, ``deep
and devastating cuts in the intelligence community budget.'' But this
year, an election year, Representative Goss chose to level that charge
against the Democratic Party as a whole and Senator John Kerry by name.
Why? When asked at the nomination hearing to reconcile these facts with
his charge that it was the Democrats who did not support intelligence,
Representative Goss simply said, ``The record is the record,'' about
four or five times. He also refused to admit that his accusations might
have been in error.
When asked whether anyone from the White House or the President's
reelection campaign asked him to write the March editorial and to give
the June floor statement against John Kerry, he said he couldn't
recall.
Representative Goss's unwillingness to be forthright in his answers
on this matter were troubling to me and a number of my colleagues on
the committee. His dismissive answers to tough, but as I said
repeatedly, I thought fair questions lacked candor.
I was left with doubt that as Director of Central Intelligence, he
would have a forceful and independent voice on intelligence assessments
that do not necessarily support a political agenda, if there is one, of
the current President.
There are other instances where Representative Goss, as chairman of
the House Intelligence Committee, played the partisan blame game. It is
against the law for the Director of the CIA to
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be involved in such. That was then. He is being confirmed now. Does
this man's life change completely after 15 years from partisanship to
total nonpartisanship?
In 1999, when it was disclosed that the Chinese espionage efforts
against our Department of Energy weapons laboratories may have resulted
in loss of sensitive nuclear weapons design information, a counter-
investigation was begun, eventually resulting in charges being brought
against Los Alamos scientist Wen Ho Lee.
Representative Goss repeatedly laid the blame for this espionage
activity on the Clinton administration's failure to protect national
security. In the final days of the 2000 Presidential election campaign,
Representative Goss took to the House floor and stated:
We have in the Clinton-Gore administration seen a cultural
disdain for security.
Again, Representative Goss's statements on important intelligence
issues mischaracterized the record in the attempt to score political
points.
The Cox Commission, which Porter Goss served on as vice chairman,
found that the security problems at the Department of Energy weapons
laboratories predated the Clinton administration and that the Chinese
espionage collection program against the weapons lab began in the
1970s.
The Cox Commission report also noted it was the Clinton
administration that issued Presidential Decision Directive 61 requiring
the Department of Energy to improve counterintelligence programs.
Evidently, mentioning these points was not helpful to Representative
Goss when he was making sweeping statements about ``a cultural disdain
for security,'' which is highly offensive to me as a Democrat who is
vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, and I think all
Republicans and all Democrats care desperately, seriously about what
happens in intelligence.
In the rush to assign partisan blame, Representative Goss ignored the
record. In a number of other statements, Representative Goss
erroneously singled out the Clinton administration and congressional
Democrats for cutting human intelligence programs in the 1990s that, in
turn, he said, limited the intelligence community's ability to carry
out its mission.
Yet it was Representative Goss himself who said in 1998 that human
intelligence collection programs needed to be cut by the time the 1990s
began. His comment specifically was:
I am convinced that the U.S. clandestine service, the CIA
Directorate of Operations was in the mid to late 1980s too
large.
When the identity of Valerie Plame, an intelligence officer with the
CIA whose clandestine identity is protected by law from unauthorized
disclosure, was leaked and published by columnist Robert Novak,
Representative Goss was asked whether the disclosure warranted
investigation. His response was stunning. He said:
Someone sends me a blue dress and some DNA, I'll have an
investigation.
The whole basis for the law protecting the identity of covered
intelligence community employees from being disclosed is to protect the
lives of American intelligence officials that are endangered if their
true identity is known to our adversaries.
As a former CIA case officer and chairman of the House Intelligence
Committee, Representative Goss knows this. For him to make such a
statement, with its clearly implied shot at President Clinton, was
wrong, inappropriate, and insensitive to the gravity of the matter. I
hope Representative Goss, if confirmed by the Senate to lead the CIA,
will have a more serious attitude toward the outing of CIA employees
undercover.
When Richard Clarke, the coordinator for counterterrorism for the
National Security Council from 1993 to October 2001, provided testimony
to the 9/11 Commission that was clearly damaging to Bush administration
claims, Representative Goss, and others, questioned his integrity and
claimed he may have lied before the joint congressional inquiry in
closed session, vowing to declassify his testimony to prove it.
These claims were never substantiated, and when the National Security
Council forwarded to Chairman Goss, as requested, a declassified
version of Richard Clarke's testimony on June 25, nearly 3 months ago,
he took no action to publicly release it so that allegations of perjury
and the like could be laid to rest.
While the Senate voted to support the creation of the independent
National 9/11 Commission, which eventually became the Commission led by
Governor Tom Kean and Representative Lee Hamilton, Representative Goss
opposed the measure on the House floor.
When the Senate and House Intelligence Committees met in the fall of
2002 to conference this issue, he continued to oppose the creation of
an independent 9/11 Commission stating that the issue would be decided
``above my pay grade.''
When the Senate Intelligence Committee undertook an investigation
into the use of intelligence--not the collection, analysis, and
production of intelligence, but when you hand it to policymakers--the
use of intelligence by the administration officials prior to the war as
part of our broader Iraq intelligence inquiry, Representative Goss made
disparaging comments about two Democratic Senators in particular who,
like many others in this body, are profoundly concerned about the
veracity of public statements made about the U.S. intelligence agency,
calling them ``two old attack dogs gumming their way through artificial
outrage about something they should know a lot more about and be more
responsible about.''
What makes this particular criticism curious is Representative Goss's
lack of action on the issue of pre-war intelligence. Despite assurances
over a year ago that the House Intelligence Committee was evaluating
the intelligence community's performance on Iraq since the end of the
gulf war, Chairman Goss failed to issue the promised report on the
failures and mistakes leading up to the war.
Chairman Roberts and I, in a thoroughly bipartisan fashion, did so in
a 17-to-0 vote. I think we are both proud of that, and justifiably so,
along with our colleagues on the committee. The House produced nothing.
They produced press releases, but nothing else.
When both the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate
Intelligence Committee, as committees with shared jurisdiction, began
holding difficult but necessary oversight hearings into the improper
treatment and interrogation of prisoners in Iraq, Representative Goss
viewed our actions with disdain, saying:
I am not comfortable with what the Senate is doing . . . I
do honestly question whether or not they have balance over
there on this issue . . . We've got a circus in the Senate,
which is always the likely place to look for this circus.
Porter Goss chose to denigrate the Senate's investigation, while the
House chose to largely ignore the matter and not ask the tough
questions about what happened inside Abu Ghraib prison and at other
detention facilities in Iraq or elsewhere.
All too often, Representative Goss's statements and actions as
chairman of the House Intelligence Committee seemed designed to protect
the administration by avoiding contentious issues which could be
embarrassing to the administration and placing blame on Democrats for
shortcomings in the intelligence community.
Not surprisingly, one thing missing from Representative Goss's
records is any public statements on intelligence critical of Members of
his own party or the administration. During his nomination hearing,
Representative Goss assured the committee that these partisan
inclinations of the past would not prevent him from carrying out his
duties as Director of Central Intelligence. He said he understood the
Director must be an independent adviser to the President and the
Congress, beyond reproach and beyond the reach of politics.
While I appreciate his testimony and commitment to being a
nonpartisan Director of Intelligence, I cannot say with absolute
certainty that he will be exactly that. I must vote on his record. I
cannot vote on his promise, and I do not think the Senate should. His
record is his record. He said it.
The truth is, Chairman Goss and I have a very good working
relationship, one that I expect will continue and improve in the
future. We had a good exchange in recent days, even during difficult
nomination hearings. In contrast to those who wish to gloss over this
issue, Porter Goss himself understands exactly the dilemma that I and
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many of my colleagues face with this nomination. He knows this is one
of only a handful of positions in the entire U.S. Government that
requires by law nonpartisanship and objectivity, and in this case the
demand is all the greater because it is about our national security.
Porter Goss openly acknowledged in his testimony before the committee
this week that he has at times approached national security issues with
excessive partisanship, and he expressed regret about that. And I
respect that. I believe Porter Goss knows that in essence, on this
whole question of independence, he is asking us to take it on faith, so
to speak, that he can make a clean break from the last 10 to 20 years
of his political career.
I hope he is right. I very much want him to be right about that, but
at end of the day I do not think taking it on faith is enough for this
vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee when it comes to such a
critical position of Director of Central Intelligence. It does not meet
the legal standard, and it does not meet my obligation, in my judgment,
as vice chairman.
These are troubled times for the intelligence community in our
country. In so many ways, we are still recovering from the tragedy of
9/11. We are grappling with the tragic impact of flawed and exaggerated
intelligence leading up to the war in Iraq, and we are struggling still
to understand the truth about what is happening in the world.
Just yesterday, our President surprised and shocked many of us by
dismissing outright the highest level of consensus view of the
intelligence community when he said they were ``just guessing'' about
the gravity of the situation in Iraq.
In light of all of this, I believe I owe it to the men and women of
the intelligence community to send a clear and strong signal about the
paramount importance of independence and objectivity. It needs to be
said not only in words but in action. So I will vote against the
nomination of Porter Goss to be the next DCI.
I sincerely hope Porter Goss will prove my vote wrong, and I told him
that. In fact, I intend to work with him in order to help him prove me
wrong. But based on his record of partisanship, based on the dictates
of the law, and based on my own strong conviction against mixing
politics and intelligence at the CIA, I must vote no.
I yield the floor.
I yield such time as he may consume to the Senator from Oregon.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon.
Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, in beginning my comments, I first want to
commend the chairman, Senator Roberts, for the way in which he
conducted the hearing. He was eminently fair. I believe I had five
rounds of questions myself for the nominee, and I want to express my
appreciation to the chairman for the way he conducted the hearings, and
also express my thanks to Senator Rockefeller. His leadership on the
committee has been invaluable to me.
I also want to commend the vice chairman for an excellent statement
this afternoon, much of which I agree with, as he knows.
Porter Goss is a good man and a good Congressman, but his long record
of supporting business-as-usual intelligence policies is not good
enough to warrant his appointment as CIA Director at this dangerous
hour. Mr. Goss showed that on his watch, as chairman of the House
Intelligence Committee, he passed on virtually every opportunity to
move aggressively for reform. His commitment to public service is
unquestioned, but his unwillingness to displease the powerful to force
change in our intelligence community is unfortunate.
In the committee, there were three major areas that came up as we
sought to evaluate the nominee. The first, as the distinguished Senator
from West Virginia has talked about today, has been the issue of
partisanship. The second area at which the senior Senator from
Michigan, Mr. Levin, looked at some length, was the question of the
nominee's ability to objectively analyze intelligence. The third was
the area that I focused on, which was why the nominee has been so slow
to push aggressively for intelligence reform.
I have come to the conclusion that it is possible--and we have all
tried, as the Senator from West Virginia has said, to give one the
benefit of the doubt in these various areas. I have come to the
conclusion that I can give the nominee the benefit of the doubt on the
issue of partisanship. I can give the nominee the benefit of the doubt
with respect to his pledge to be objective in analyzing intelligence.
But I just cannot get over the answers we were given during almost 9
hours of hearings with respect to why the nominee was so slow to be an
agent for change in the intelligence community.
It is really that leadership that I find so central. I have tried, as
a member of the committee, to be as bipartisan as I possibly can. We
understand politics should stop at our borders. We all stand ready to
put in place the policies necessary to protect America's security, but
to do that we need leadership.
I and others try to be bipartisan. Senator Lott, Senator Snowe,
Senator Graham, and others sought, for example, to change the way
Government documents are classified. I think that is an important
issue, to make the right structural changes in intelligence. But if we
do not get the right information, information consistent with national
security and not classified for political purposes, we are still going
to have problems making reforms in the intelligence area.
I want to be bipartisan. I listened carefully to the questions that
were asked in the committee, good questions by Senator Rockefeller, and
I am willing to give the nominee the benefit of the doubt with respect
to the partisanship issue.
But I will tell you, the answers that we were given with respect to
why it took the nominee so long to push for changes in the intelligence
community still leave me unconvinced. For example, at one point in our
hearings the nominee told me it was difficult to get attention to the
issues of intelligence on his watch. He said the reason he had not
introduced legislation is that people were not focused on it; it was
hard to get people's attention.
Let's think about what happened in those years when we evaluate the
nominee's response on that question. Porter Goss was chairman of the
Intelligence Committee in 1998 when al-Qaida bombed our embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania. He was chairman of the Intelligence Committee in
1999 when the United States was investigating allegations of Chinese
theft of our nuclear materials. He was chairman of the Intelligence
Committee when the USS Cole was bombed by al-Qaida in October of 2000.
And, of course, he was chairman of the House Intelligence Committee
when we faced 9/11.
It took him nearly 3 years to introduce reform legislation after 9/
11. I believe that is not good enough. I believe a chairman of a key
committee can get attention when that chairman wants to use that
chairmanship as a bully pulpit to be an agent for change. I believe a
chairman who is committed to intelligence reform has the chance, when
he bangs his gavel, to speak out for why changes are needed.
A leader must lead. We all get election certificates, in the U.S.
Congress, to try to tackle problems, important problems, but chairmen
have a special opportunity. If you look at the long record--and he said
the record is the record--the nominee passed on virtually every
opportunity to use his bully pulpit, to use his gavel, and to work for
the kind of changes that would make this country as safe as necessary.
We, all of us, understand it takes courage to rock the boat. It takes
courage to be an agent for bold change. But if you want an example of
an individual who did it, an individual who is a prominent Republican,
you need look no further than former New Jersey Governor Tom Kean and
his performance as the Chair of the 9/11 Commission. This stalwart
Republican made truth his only goal. He pressed Republicans and
Democrats alike to do the same. He was more successful and has already
begun to engineer more change than hardly anybody thought possible in
this fractured political climate. What a boon it would have been, had
we had the same commitment to change on the issue of intelligence,
intelligence reform, by the current nominee to head the CIA.
The current nominee had a front row seat during all those years, the
years I
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outlined when those terrible acts of terrorism occurred, when he could
have pushed for reform. Yet after weeks of going through the nominee's
record and 2 full days of questioning, I am hard pressed to find
anywhere--in a bill, a vote, or an inquiry--anything that demonstrates
the nominee will hold people accountable, for example, rather than just
going along with the status quo.
The record shows, to me, again and again, the nominee chose to play
it safe rather than take the risks necessary to bring about change in
the intelligence community. When I looked at Mr. Goss's record, the
first question that occurred to me was could he give us some examples,
some concrete examples of when he was willing to stand up, to go
against the popular wisdom and even his own party to bring about
change; whether he was willing to take the far less dangerous risks
that we take as Congressmen and elected officials than lots of other
people do, certainly those wearing the uniform.
Right now, we need somebody to head the CIA who is willing to stand
up, who is willing to help this country come up with policies that
leave the Cold War mentality behind--those are fit for a very different
kind of threat--and to hold himself and others accountable.
Mr. Goss has a long, distinguished career as a Member of Congress. I
know him personally. I served with him in the other body. It would be
hard to find a more decent individual. I will say there are very few
jobs in the Government of our country at which I don't think Porter
Goss would do a good job. But being effective here on Capitol Hill and
in other parts of the Government is not where I set the bar for this
key appointment. The bar ought to be set very high because we know we
have great challenges ahead of us.
For example, I have come to the conclusion that on the intelligence
reform legislation we, hopefully, will be dealing with on the floor of
the Senate shortly, it may not be the structural problems that are our
greatest challenge in improving intelligence and making our country
safer. I think there is more to it than moving the boxes around on an
organizational chart with respect to intelligence. I think this is as
much a people problem as a structural problem. If you are going to
solve those problems, in the area of people, human interaction, you
have to have leadership, you have to have somebody who is willing to
stick his or her neck out.
That is where I set the bar. I think the long record and the
questions I asked established beyond a doubt that Porter Goss is a good
man. He has been a good legislator. But there simply is no evidence
that he is willing to rock the boat in the intelligence community,
which I think is necessary to make this country as safe as it needs to
be.
For that reason I join the distinguished vice chairman of our
committee in opposing the nomination. Like the vice chairman, I am very
hopeful I will be proved wrong. As I said, on the issue of
partisanship, on the issue of objectivity of analysis, I give the
nominee the benefit of the doubt. With respect to his willingness to
fight aggressively for bold change, I remain unconvinced. For that
reason I will oppose the nominee.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hagel). The distinguished Senator from
Kansas.
Mr. ROBERTS. I yield as much time as he may need to a valued member
of the Intelligence Committee, the distinguished Senator from Ohio.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.
Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I believe Porter Goss is the right
man certainly in this crucial time in the history of our intelligence
community.
Porter Goss spent over a decade at the CIA. He had the opportunity to
see it from the inside, to work there in a distinguished career. For
the last few years, he has had the opportunity to serve in the
Congress, to serve on the Intelligence Committee in the House, and then
for the last few years as the chairman. I think it is significant that
he has been the chairman for the last few years at the same time many
of us have served on the Senate Intelligence Committee, when the force
of history has compelled all of us to examine as we have never done
before the role of the intelligence community in the world we live in
today, a world confronted by the failures of the intelligence
community, where we have taken a magnifying glass for the last several
years as Members of the House and Members of the Senate to see exactly
what is wrong with the intelligence community. There has only been a
handful of people who have had that experience. Some of them are in
this room today.
Porter Goss has distinguished himself in that exercise as chairman of
the House Intelligence Committee, as the leader in the House when we
went through the joint Senate-House investigation. I had the chance to
watch him through that endeavor. I had the chance to watch him learn,
as all of us did, about the tragedy of September 11 and how the
intelligence community did not function the way we want it to function.
In Porter Goss we will have someone who knows the community from the
inside, but also has stood back, been on the other side, been on the
outside, and has looked at it to see what is wrong, and has looked at
it in a critical time in our history. I think that is so very important
as we begin the task as a country and he begins the task as the new
Director of the CIA to bring about needed reform.
This is a tough job, but I believe Porter Goss is a tough man. I
believe he is the right man. Some people might say this is an
impossible job. I do not know if it is an impossible job, but it is a
very difficult job. Let us think about it for a moment.
This is the man who walks in to see the President every morning,
walks in to the Oval Office and greets him, gives him the intelligence
report. I think we all understand there has to be a chemistry between
the President and the Director; that if there isn't, that
relationship--and we have seen that in the past with Presidents and
Directors, sometimes there isn't that relationship--if there isn't that
relationship, they do not talk and the country suffers.
There has to be a relationship of trust, of confidence. Yet that same
man who comes in to see the President every morning where there has to
be that relationship, that trust, that rapport, is also a man who has
to tell the President what the President does not want to hear; a man
who has to have the guts to do it; a man who has to look the President
in the eye and have the guts to tell the President of the United
States, the most powerful man in the world, Mr. President, that is not
the way it is; or maybe a more difficult thing to say, Mr. President,
we messed up, we were wrong 6 months ago or 3 months ago, what we told
you was not right; or maybe this is the toughest thing of all to say to
the President, Mr. President, we don't know.
And when we look at some of the problems, some hypothetical, some
factual, some of the things that occurred, those have been some of the
problems. That man has to also be able to look at the President of the
United States and say, Well, here is what we think it is, but also
there are people in the intelligence community who have a minority
view. That man has to have the guts to tell the President that as well.
That is a difficult job.
This man also is the person who protects us every day in this world
because he is the one who has to be in charge of putting together all
of the intelligence. And today it is the intelligence that protects us
just as much as our national defense. The facts he comes up with, our
intelligence community comes up with, are our first line of defense
today. Yet we are telling this man today, if you get this job, at the
same time you are carrying on this war on terrorism and you are
providing these facts, we expect you to go as fast as you can to carry
out reform.
Further, we tell this man that he has to deal with whatever today's
crisis is. What we are focused on, of course, is terrorism today. But
he has to deal with the long-term crises--nuclear proliferation, what
is going on in China, you pick the challenge. He has to be 5 years out,
or 10 or 15 years out, and he had better not get it wrong.
This is a new era for the CIA, a new era for the intelligence
community which came to maturity in the Cold War, the Soviet Union
versus the United States. We sort of understood in those decades when
we developed that
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intelligence community. Official cover worked pretty well. The new head
of the intelligence community has to continue that change, continue to
change away from that. We have to move out from the official cover to a
nonofficial cover. That is just one of the changes that has to take
place. It is a tough job.
I think when you vote on someone's confirmation, a lot of this is
kind of a gut check. You don't know what the exact issues are going to
be in the future. This is an intensely personal job, as I have pointed
out. The person who runs the agency, I suspect we are going to end up
giving a lot more power. If Porter Goss is confirmed, he may end up
with an entirely different job later on. He is going to run a big
intelligence community, but it is also an intensely personal job in
that relationship with the Congress and that relationship with all of
the consumers. And the ultimate consumer, of course, being the
Commander in Chief, the President of the United States.
I think it gets down to a lot of the person. What do you think of
this guy, or woman if that be the case? Can they handle it?
I think it is helpful to talk to some of the persons who know this
person best. I was struck by the testimony of the two Senators from
Florida, Senator Bob Graham, of course, the senior Senator, but also
significantly the chairman of the Select Intelligence Committee of the
Senate, and a pretty harsh critic of the intelligence community and of
the administration. This is what he had to say:
Let me say at the beginning that I am not unbiased. I
believe that Porter Goss is an exceptional human being and
will be an exceptional head of our Central Intelligence.
Senator Graham also said:
Mr. Chairman, I have known Porter Goss for well over two
decades, and I can tell you from personal experience that he
is uniquely qualified to be here today as the President's
nominee to serve as the Director of Central Intelligence. He
is a man of great character, unusual intelligence, a
tremendous work ethic, and an outstanding personal and
professional standard of integrity.
Senator Graham added that as Governor of Florida, when he first met
the nominee:
Party affiliation did not matter then. What was necessary,
good men and women who could carry out a difficult task.
My colleagues, I believe party affiliation does not matter today. The
challenge that Porter Goss, on a much magnified scale, will face as
Director of Central Intelligence is very analogous to the challenge he
faced 20 years ago in restoring integrity to his local community and
completing a very complex project.
As to Porter Goss's fitness to serve as an independent, unbiased DCI,
this is what Senator Graham of Florida said.
. . . when it comes to the intelligence community,
Congressman Goss has, in my judgment, a balanced perspective,
a perspective gained both as an insider and then as an
outsider. For a decade, early in his career, Congressman Goss
served our Nation in both the Army and the CIA. He knows
firsthand the value and the risk of clandestine operations.
Since he has been in Congress, especially as a member and
chair of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, he came to know the agencies from an oversight
capacity.
Senator Graham continued:
Some have said he is too close to the intelligence
agencies, that he would be too protective of the status quo.
Well, most of you served with Porter and myself on the joint
inquiry into the events of 9/11. I believe you would join me
in saying from that experience Porter is a man who will be
independent in his judgments and unflinching in his criticism
where he believes they are necessary.
Senator Graham concluded with these words:
I am confident he will not be a part of the problem but
rather a leader in taking us toward principled, thoughtful
solutions when it comes to reforming the intelligence
community. I strongly recommend the confirmation of Porter
Goss.
Senator Bill Nelson also participated in the September 14 Goss
confirmation hearing. These are some of the things Senator Nelson had
to say:
I think we need intelligence reform. I think we need it
now. And I think Porter Goss is the man to lead the effort.
Senator Nelson also called Porter Goss:
. . . a uniquely gifted individual whose public life has
been illustrative of being nonpartisan, fair, and
independent.
The Senator further pointed out that:
Those characteristics in this town that is so highly
charged with partisanship are sorely needed in a Director of
Central Intelligence.
Those statements are from his two colleagues on the other side of the
aisle from Florida.
I think sometimes it is good to know and talk to people who know
someone best.
Mr. President and Members of the Senate, let me conclude by saying I
have known Porter Goss for a long time. I have dealt with him on issues
not just in the area of intelligence. Sometimes you get to know people
in the Senate and the House working in Congress on a variety of issues.
Porter Goss and I had shared a tragic situation when we had
constituents, hemophiliacs who acquired AIDS because they had to take
massive amounts of blood because of their condition. The blood was
tainted. It is a long story. I will not go into it now. But the blood
was tainted because we thought there was an error made by the Federal
Government, that the Federal Government did not become involved early
enough, that the Federal Government made mistakes.
I had constituents. I listened to their tragic story. Porter Goss
listened to some constituents of his. So we both moved in our
respective bodies to try to bring about some help for these folks. I
saw how compassionate he was and how strongly he felt about the issue
and what he did about it and how he took that passion and feeling he
felt for those folks in wanting to do something about it. I worked with
him. I traveled with him to Haiti, the poorest country in this
hemisphere. I have seen his compassion for the people of Haiti.
I have worked with him on the Intelligence Committee. I will be
honest with you, I have had the occasion, many times, to pick up the
phone and call across the Capitol and ask Porter: What is really going
on in the intelligence community? What is really going on at the CIA? I
will tell you, each time he had an insight that was unrivaled, or
rivaled by very few people I have talked to, of what was really going
on inside the intelligence community. That is an insight that came
about from his years of experience inside the community and his years
of experience of watching the community in the oversight capacity while
being on the committee and of being the chairman.
He has a passion and an understanding of the intelligence community
and of what needs to be done to change it. He understands the
importance of human intelligence. Long before it was fashionable in
this town to be saying, oh, we have to have more human intelligence,
Porter Goss was pushing, pushing, and pushing the intelligence
community for more human intelligence.
It may not have been flashy, it may not have been with a lot of big
speeches, but he was there. He understood it. He understood what the
needs were. This man gets it. If you want someone to lead the reform of
this community, if you want someone who understands what the problems
are, who can do it from the inside, if you want someone who will have
the guts to report to the President of the United States and tell it
like it is, Porter Goss is your man.
So, Mr. President, I am proud to come to the floor today to recommend
to my colleagues, based on my personal experience with this man, what I
have seen over the years, that we vote for his confirmation. He has a
tough job and, yes, it may be almost an impossible job, but I think he
is the right man at the right time at this point in our history.
I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, may I inquire how much time is remaining on
each side?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority has 124 minutes remaining; the
minority has 128 minutes remaining.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I believe the chairman of the committee had
indicated a desire to yield 5 minutes, or what time the Senator may
consume, to Senator Allard of Colorado. It would be my intent to follow
Senator Allard.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
[[Page S9497]]
Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I thank the acting chairman for yielding 5
minutes.
Mr. President, I would like to associate myself with the comments of
the distinguished Senator from Ohio. I, too, proudly claim Porter Goss
as a friend and somebody who I think will do a great job.
There is no doubt that the intelligence community right now is in
somewhat disarray, concerned about their jobs and the job they are
doing and the public perception.
I say, first, there are a lot of good people at the Central
Intelligence Agency. I think Congressman Goss recognizes that. I think
there are some bureaucratic problems over there, too.
I think he has the temperament to deal with some of those problems.
Porter Goss is a strong leader. He is a quiet individual. He doesn't
grandstand. He is a hard worker. He is intelligent and he understands
the intelligence community.
I have had an opportunity to serve on the Intelligence Committee in
the Senate for 4 years, and I even developed a greater appreciation for
the job Mr. Goss did on the House side in his service on the
Intelligence Committee.
For those reasons, I rise to support the President's nomination to
head the Central Intelligence Agency. That nominee is Representative
Porter Goss. I believe he is the right man at the right time for the
job. That has been stated a couple of times already. I truly think that
is the case. I am glad to see other colleagues recognize that fact. I
am asking my colleagues to join me in voting for his confirmation.
The intelligence community is at a critical juncture. It is clear
that after the horrific attacks of September 11, and the problems
involved with uncovering weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the
intelligence community needs firm leadership during a time when reforms
are needed. The President has heeded that call.
President Bush has put into motion, through executive order, most of
the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, and he is committed to
strengthening the budget authority given to the intelligence community
head administrator. The next step in intelligence reform is to bring in
someone who is committed to reforming the Central Intelligence Agency
from the inside out. That man is Porter Goss.
I have had the pleasure of knowing Representative Goss personally and
professionally. I was lucky enough to serve with him in the House of
Representatives, and I value his knowledge of national security issues.
Even then, when I served with him in the House, he was a voice both
Democrats and Republicans turned to when debating important
intelligence issues, and he continues to be a leader in the House
today. More importantly, I got to know Porter Goss on a personal level.
He is someone I trust and have come to call my friend. There is no one
I would rather see as director of the agency.
I am convinced Representative Goss is ready for this challenging
task. Representative Goss will bring a unique perspective to the
Director's office in the Central Intelligence Agency. His perspective
will not only drive the much-needed changes in the CIA, but will also
bring our concerns as a Congress to the agency.
Porter Goss has been an Army intelligence officer. He has served as a
clandestine agent in the CIA and has chaired the House Intelligence
Committee. There is no one better prepared or qualified to be the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. There should be no doubt
that the combination of experience Representative Goss has will serve
the American people well.
I have heard concerns raised that Mr. Goss is too partisan. I simply
have to discount those concerns. This is a man who has served as an
officer in the Army and understands very well his duty to the United
States and to the citizens he will soon swear to defend.
I am pleased to see the bipartisan support Representative Goss has
already received. His nomination was approved by the Senate
Intelligence Committee by a 12-to-4 vote. His colleague from Florida,
Bob Graham, has come out strongly in favor of Mr. Goss.
It is time for the Senate to act on this nomination so we can
continue the reforms to the intelligence community that are badly
needed. Representative Goss is prepared to take the agency in a
direction that will strengthen our collection and analytical
intelligence activities and provide the information we need to keep
America safe. He is a man who is truly interested in the needs of our
country. He is somebody that I feel I can work with on the Armed
Services Committee. I have some of the intelligence programs under my
jurisdiction in the subcommittee which I chair, and they are extremely
important programs. They are programs that are badly needed, they are
expensive programs, and they do have some problems. We need somebody
who has the background in intelligence to tackle those, and somebody I
think I can work with.
I ask my colleagues to support his nomination because I personally
think he is the best man for the job.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi is recognized.
Mr. LOTT. I yield to the chairman.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I will be happy to soon yield to the
distinguished Senator from Mississippi, a valued member of the
Intelligence Committee.
On the issue of the HPSCI activity, the House intelligence activity,
in regard to reform and other intelligence challenges during the last 3
Congresses, which has been brought up, I ask unanimous consent to have
printed in the Record the Survey of Activities of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence During the 107th Congress. I also commend to
my colleagues the Survey of Activities of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence during the 106th Congress and the 105th
Congress.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Survey of Activities of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
During the 107th Congress
Mr. Goss, from the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence submitted the following report.
This report covers the activities of the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence during the One Hundred
Seventh Congress. Porter J. Goss (Republican, Florida) served
as Chairman; Nancy Pelosi (Democrat, California) served as
the Ranking Minority Member.
The stated purpose of H. Res. 658 of the 95th Congress,
which created the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, was to establish a committee ``to oversee and
make continuing studies of the intelligence and intelligence-
related activities and programs of the United States
Government and to submit to the House appropriate proposals
for legislation and report to the House concerning such
intelligence and intelligence-related activities and
programs.''
H. Res. 658 also indicated that the Committee ``shall make
every effort to assure that the appropriate departments and
agencies of the United States provide informed and timely
intelligence necessary for the executive and legislative
branches to make sound decisions affecting the security and
vital interests of the Nation. It is further the purpose of
this resolution to provide vigilant legislative oversight
over the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of
the United States to assure that such activities are in
conformity with the Constitution and the laws of the United
States.''
In carrying out its mandate from the House regarding
oversight of U.S. intelligence and intelligence-related
activities, the Committee created four subcommittees:
Subcommittee on human intelligence, analysis, and counterintelligence
Jim Gibbons (R-NV), Chairman,
Leonard L. Boswell (D-IA), Ranking Member,
Sherwood Boehlert (R-NY),
Alcee L. Hastings (D-FL)*,
Ray LaHood (R-IL),
Silvestre Reyes (D-TX)*,
Randy ``Duke'' Cunningham (R-CA),
Gary Condit (D-CA),
Peter Hoekstra (R-MI),
Collin C. Peterson (D-MN),
Richard M. Burr (R-NC),
Sanford D. Bishop, Jr. (D-GA)*,
Saxby Chambliss (R-GA),
Robert E. (Bud) Cramer, Jr.* (D-AL).
subcommittee on technical and tactical intelligence
Michael N. Castle (R-DE), Chairman,
Sanford D. Bishop, Jr. (D-GA), Ranking Member,
Jim Gibbons (R-NV),
Jane Harman (D-CA),
Sherwood L. Boehlert (R-NY),
Alcee L. Hastings (D-FL)*,
Randy ``Duke'' Cunningham (R-CA),
Silvestre Reyes (D-TX),
Peter Hoekstra (R-MI),
Leonard L. Boswell (D-IA),
Richard M. Burr (R-NC),
Robert E. (Bud) Cramer, Jr.* (D-AL),
Terry Everett (R-AL).
subcommttee on intelligence policy and national security
Douglas K. Bereuter (R-Nebraska), Chairman,
[[Page S9498]]
Gary A. Condit (D-CA), Ranking Member,
Ray LaHood (R-IL),
Sanford D. Bishop, Jr. (D-GA),
Michael N. Castle (R-DE),
Tim Roemer (D-IN),
Saxby Chambliss (R-GA),
Collin C. Peterson (D-MN),
Jim Gibbons (R-NV),
Terry Everett (R-AL).
subcommittee on terrorism and homeland security
Saxby Chambliss (R-GA), Chairman,
Jane Harman (D-CA), Ranking Member,
Peter Hoekstra (R-MI),
Gary A. Condit (D-CA),
Jim Gibbons (R-NV),
Tim Roemer (D-IN),
Ray LaHood (R-IL),
Alcee L. Hastings (D-FL)*,
Richard M. Burr (R-NC),
Silvestre Reyes (D-TX)*,
Terry Everett (R-AL),
Robert E. (Bud) Cramer, Jr.* (D-AL).
*Member served on Subcommittee for only part of 107th
Congress.
scope of committee review
U.S. intelligence and intelligence-related activities under
the jurisdiction of the Committee include the National
Foreign Intelligence Program (NFEP), the Joint Military
Intelligence Program (JMIP), and the Department of Defense
Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA).
The National Foreign Intelligence Program consists of
activities in the following departments, agencies or other
intelligence elements of the government: 1) the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA); 2) the Department of Defense; 3)
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); 4) the National
Security Agency (NSA); 5) the National Reconnaissance Office
(NRO); 6) the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force;
7) the Department of State; 8) the Department of Treasury; 9)
the Department of Energy; 10) the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI); 11) the National Imagery and Mapping
Agency (NIMA); and, 12) the Coast Guard (USCG).
The JMIP was established in 1995 to provide integrated
program management of defense intelligence elements that
support defense-wide or theater-level consumers. Included
within the JMIP are aggregations created for management
efficiency and characterized by similarity, either in
intelligence discipline (e.g., Signals Intelligence and
Imagery Intelligence) or function (e.g., satellite support
and aerial reconnaissance). The programs comprising the JMIP
also fall within the jurisdiction of the House Armed Services
Committee.
The TIARA are a diverse array of reconnaissance and target
acquisition programs that are a functional part of the basic
military force structure and provide direct information
support to military operations. TIARA, as defined by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, include
those military intelligence activities outside the defense
intelligence programs that respond to requirements of
military commanders for operational support information, as
well as to national command, control, and intelligence
requirements. The programs comprising TIARA also fall within
the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committee.
oversight activities
During the 107th Congress, the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), under the leadership of
Chairman Porter Goss--
-- Responded effectively to the catastrophic attacks on
September 11, 2001, by the al Qai'da terrorists by conducting
investigations jointly with its sister committee in the
Senate, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, to
determine whether the IC should have been more adept, better
resourced and more capable of thwarting the attacks;
-- Promoted a bipartisan effort to continue rebuilding and
refining the nation's intelligence capabilities to meet
increasingly complex geopolitical and technological
challenges to national security; and
-- Advanced the education of Members of Congress and the
public on matters of vital interest to national security and
the distinct role intelligence plays in its defense.
Although the end of the Cold War warranted a reordering of
national priorities, the steady decline in intelligence
funding since the mid-1990s left the nation with a diminished
ability to address emerging threats--such as global
terrorism--and the technical challenges of the 21st Century.
Further, the IC's lack of a corporate approach to addressing
enduring intelligence problems helped to create a culture
that hindered data collection (especially human
intelligence collection), data sharing, and collaborative
analysis.
The revitalization of the National Security Agency (NSA)
was the Committee's top priority during the 107th Congress.
Although this continues to be one of the Committee's priority
concerns, the focus has turned to information sharing and
cross community analysis. The Committee notes that the
individual intelligence agencies and, moreover, their
extremely talented and dedicated people, labor continuously
to provide the absolute best intelligence products possible
in defense of the Nation. These efforts are, however,
generally conducted in isolation from one another, and, most
disturbingly, existing rules and procedures often restrict
information from the community's depth and breadth of
analytic talent. Therefore, those individual efforts can
usually only piece together fragments of the overall
intelligence puzzle. Crucial in the post-9/11 era is having a
community that is, to the maximum extent possible, liberated
from information sharing restrictions and one that fosters a
culture focused on greater collaborative analysis. The
Authorizations for fiscal years 2002 and 2003 included
detailed language on the need for the IC to breakdown
barriers to information sharing and the need to cease the
practice of allowing agencies to routinely restrict ``their
data'' from other agencies, including law enforcement.
In order to maximize further the IC's analytic
effectiveness and output, we must ensure that the dedicated
professionals of the IC are properly trained and provided the
skills necessary for the tasks that are required to fight the
global war on terrorism and other daunting threats. For a
number of years, the Committee has articulated its specific
concerns about the dearth of language skills throughout the
IC. The lack of depth in the so-called ``low-density'
languages was acutely experienced during operations in
Afghanistan The Committee finds this situation unacceptable
and has emphasized the critical need for a robust effort to
improve foreign language capabilities throughout the
Intelligence Community.
The Committee remains concerned about the viability and
effectiveness of a future overhead architecture, given the
apparent lack of a comprehensive architectural plan for the
overhead system of systems, specifically in the area of
imagery. For example, the Committee believes the
Administration is facing a major challenge in addressing
technical and funding problems with the Future Imagery
Architecture (FIA) program that could force untenable trades
between critical future capabilities and legacy systems. In
the Authorization for fiscal year 2003, the Committee has
addressed the known FIA problems as well as the need to
develop imagery alternatives if developmental problems exist
or persist. The Committee noted, however, that the
Intelligence Community has engaged in a continuing pattern by
which many individual programs have been provided resources
with little or no regard to the entire set of IC collection
capabilities, including space-based and airborne. The
Committee believes that, although individual systems
certainly have specific merit, it would be wiser for the
Intelligence Community to consider whether the overall
collective mix brings the appropriate assets to bear against
the range of threats to U.S. national security. Moreover, the
ability to fund all legacy, developmental, and desired
systems has a finite limit. Therefore, there is a critical
need to review each program mindful of the strategic needs so
that and necessary tradeoffs are made based on substantive
requirements.
Finally, the Committee continued its focus on a number of
enduring IC challenges--the need to improve NSA acquisition
efforts, the need to improve the depth and breadth of Human
Intelligence (HUMINT), and improving research and development
(R&D). With respect to NSA, the Committee has been pleased
with the Director's attempts to baseline current capabilities
so that future needs can be properly identified and resulting
acquisition decisions can be appropriately made. To assist
the Director in completing these efforts, the Committee
included incentives in the Authorization Act for fiscal year
2003. Regarding, HUMINT, the Committee focused on
improvements in training, enhancing technical resources to
operations, and properly funding analytic efforts. All of
these capabilities are supported by R&D efforts. Therefore,
the Committee has supported the Administration's increases in
basic R&D programs. The Committee believes that the IC must
continuously renew itself in this ever-changing world.
Intelligence is the first line of defense against elusive and
unstructured threats and enemies that use asymmetric means to
harm America and her people. Only through providing these
much needed resources and a long-term commitment can the IC
be prepared for the global challenges that confront us.
intelligence authorizations for fiscal years 2002 and 2003
During the 107th Congress, particularly in the aftermath of
the September 11th attacks, the Committee continued to pursue
its objective of rebuilding and revitalizing our national
intelligence capabilities to better meet the threats of the
21st century. Finally, after eight years of congressional
admonition to the executive branch to develop a long term
funding program to correct serious and critical Intelligence
Community (IC) deficiencies, the President's budget requests
provided a down payment on the resources necessary to ensure
that our policymakers and military commanders have timely and
reliable intelligence support that is crucial to our nation's
security.
The Committee reviewed extensively the President's budget
submissions for Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003, fulfilling its
responsibility to closely examine the nation's intelligence
programs and proposed expenditures. These reviews included
substantive and programmatic hearings, Member briefings, and
numerous staff briefings. Testimony on the President's budget
submissions was taken from the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI); the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C31); the
Directors of DIA, NSA, NIMA, NRO, and the FBI; and other
major intelligence program managers.
[[Page S9499]]
The Committee's examination of the President's Fiscal Years
2002 and 2003 intelligence budgets included 13 committee
budget-related hearings principally on a program level.
Additional hearings were held addressing the DCI's overall
budget submission, the state of health of the IC, and the
DCI's views and plans for the future of intelligence and the
IC.
In reviewing the President's budget requests, the Committee
found that the President has begun to aggressively address
the lack of investment and years of neglect that has harmed
our nation's intelligence capabilities. The fiscal year 2002
budget request, submitted before the tragic events of
September 11, 2001, reflected no major improvements or
investment in intelligence capabilities. The fiscal year 2003
budget submitted by the President included the most
substantial increase for programs funded in the National
Foreign Intelligence Program in history, however, the
intelligence authorizations for both fiscal years 2002 and
2003 reiterated the need for renewed investment by focusing
on enhancing programs and information sharing across the
various IC agencies.
In addition to budget-related hearings, the Committee held
over 58 committee hearings and briefings on various issues
vital to our IC and national security. Among the subjects
examined by the Committee were: terrorism, HUMINT, and
developments in Colombia, Southeast Asia, and rogue states.
Given the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the
Committee's immediate priority was, and continues to be, the
effectiveness of our counterterrorism efforts and the
security of our nation. In the last two budget authorization
bills, the Committee addressed critical and immediate
counterterrorism needs as well as long-term intelligence
issues facing the United States.
The ``Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2002'',
(P.L. 107-108), in addition to authorizing generally the
activities of the U.S. IC, directly addressed IC shortfalls
in domestic counterterrorism efforts, intelligence collection
and analysis, threat reporting, aggressive recruitment of
human assets, foreign language capabilities, and sharing of
intelligence information and analysis across the government.
For example, the Congress specifically enacted legislation
that repealed restrictions on human intelligence sources. In
the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks on America, the
House and Senate significantly increased spending
authorizations for intelligence activities well beyond that
level requested by the President. The committee also directed
significant resource allocation to countering terrorism.
The ``Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2003'',
(P L. 107-306), in addition to authorizing the intelligence
activities of the U.S. IC highlighted five priority areas
that must receive significant, sustained attention if
intelligence is to fulfill its role in our national security
strategy. Those areas are: (1) improving information sharing
and all-source analysis; (2) improving IC professional
training with a major emphasis on developing language skills;
(3) ensuring national imagery collection program viability
and effectiveness; (4) correcting enduring systemic problems,
deficiencies in HUMINT, and rebuilding a robust research and
development program; and (5) establishing a budgeting process
that no longer relies so heavily on supplemental
appropriations. For example, the fiscal year 2003 legislation
provided very clear policy direction to the Administration to
improve the cross-community sharing of information from
material seized as part of the global war on terrorism. This
resulted in new processes and procedures being implemented to
improve the access that community analysts have to this
material. Further, the fiscal year 2003 authorization
legislation provided significantly enhanced funding for
skills training in areas such as foreign languages,
analyst-to-analyst technical exchanges and in-area
familiarization travel. And finally, the Committee's
legislation also provided critically needed direction and
funding to ensure the nation's imagery architecture will
be capable of supporting customer needs long into the
future.
committee investigations
Terrorism Review
The Committee, through its THLS Subcommittee at the behest
of the Speaker and Minority Leader as the focal point and
coordinating mechanism in the House of Representatives for
post-9-11 counterterrorism and homeland security oversight
activities.''
Prior to the 9-11 terrorist attacks, the Committee's
Working Group on Terrorism and Homeland Security held
numerous classified hearings and briefings on the terrorist
threat, gaps in the IC's counterterrorism capabilities, the
need for a more focused and better coordinated national
effort on homeland security, and a variety of related
matters.
Following 9-11, the Working Group was converted into a full
subcommittee with expanded powers of jurisdiction to act as
the lead entity in formulating the House's response to the
attacks. The new Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland
Security held what for the Committee was an unprecedented
series of televised hearings culminating in a field hearing
with then-Mayor Rudy Giuliani in New York City. A significant
number of closed hearings and briefings on all aspects of the
attacks followed; along with a report to the Speaker and
Minority Leader on the gaps in counterterrorism capabilities
at CIA, NSA, and the FBI leading up to 9-11. Following
publication of this report, the Committee, in conjunction
with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, established
a Joint Investigative Staff on 9-11 that conducted a thorough
investigation of the Intelligence Community's inability to
prevent the 9-11 attacks. The work of the JIS included a
series of open and closed hearings, and the publication of a
classified report.''
Committee Investigations
At the behest of the Speaker and Minority Leader, the
Committee's Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security
was directed in the immediate aftermath of 9-11 to evaluate
the performance of the CIA, and FBI against the terrorist
target. To this end, the Subcommittee issued a report in July
2002 that offered the fo11owing conclusions:
America's intelligence capability shortfalls prior to 9-11
were significantly affected by resource constraints imposed
during much of the 1990s, but also by a series of
questionable Intelligence Community management decisions on
funding priorities.
As a first step, the USG should adopt a single definition
of terrorism, which it currently does not have at a cost of
significant inefficiencies.
CIA: The availability and allocation of resources,
including the redirection by CIA managers of funds for core
field collection and analysis to headquarters bureaucracy,
hurt CIA's counterterrorism (CT) capabilities prior to 9-11.
Internal human rights guidelines issued in 1995 also had a
``chilling effect'' on CT operations, and these guidelines
were only repealed after the Subcommittee's report was
released in July 2002. CIA chronically lacks foreign language
skills and core CT-specific training, and has become overly
reliant on foreign liaison at a cost to its unilateral
capability.
FBI: Preventing terrorism was less important than solving
crimes prior to 9-11, when FBI decentralized CT information
and investigations. FBI also had insufficient linguists and
analytic capability and an outdated IT infrastructure. It
paid little attention to financial tracking, and did not
share information.
NSA: The CT mission was not given a high enough priority in
the competition for limited resources prior to 9-11, and NSA
must reform program management, systems engineering and
integration, and budget management for new investments to
have a lasting impact. NSA has been chronically short of
linguists, and must better leverage industry for technical
solutions to collection problems.
Congressional oversight of counterterrorism is highly
duplicative and inefficient. A leadership staff mechanism
should be created to streamline the oversight process on both
counterterrorism and homeland security matters.''
joint inquiry investigations
In February, 2002, the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
authorized an investigation, to be conducted as a Joint
Inquiry, into the Intelligence Community's activities before
and after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against
the United States. This bicameral investigation, supported by
a separate, unified, professional staff, sought to identify
what the Community knew or should have known regarding those
attacks prior to September 11th, the nature of any systemic
problems that may have impeded the Community's ability to
prevent those attacks, and recommendations for reform to
improve the Community's ability to uncover and prevent
similar attacks in the future.
In the months that followed, the Inquiry's investigative
staff reviewed massive amounts of information within the
Intelligence Community. This included the review of almost
500,000 pages of relevant documents, 300 interviews, and
participation in numerous briefings and panel discussions,
involving about 600 individuals. Although the inquiry was
primarily focused on the Intelligence Community, the
investigation also considered relevant information from
federal agencies outside the Intelligence Community; from
state and local authorities; from foreign government
authorities; and from private sector individuals and
organizations. Building on the extensive investigative work,
the Committees held nine joint public hearings and, given the
highly classified nature of much of this information,
thirteen joint closed sessions. In December, 2002, both
Committees approved, by separate votes, the classified Final
Report of the Joint Inquiry. The Committees are currently
working with the Intelligence Community in an effort to
declassify, consistent with national security interests, as
much as possible of the Final Report for public release.
The work of the Joint Inquiry confirmed that although the
Intelligence Community had relevant information that was, in
retrospect, significant regarding the September 11th attacks,
the Community too often failed to focus on the information
and to appreciate its collective significance in terms of a
probable terrorist attack. The Inquiry's factual record
identified not only the information that was overlooked but
also a number of systemic weaknesses that contributed to the
Community's inability to detect and prevent the attacks.
These included a lack of sufficient focus on the potential
for a domestic attack, a lack of a comprehensive
counterterrorist strategy, insufficient analytic focus and
quality, a reluctance to develop and implement new technical
capabilities aggressively, and inadequate sharing of
[[Page S9500]]
relevant counterterrorism information. To correct such
deficiencies, the Final Report includes nineteen
recommendations for reform, including such things as the
creation of a Cabinet-level Director of National Intelligence
and prompt consideration of whether the FBI, or a new agency,
should perform the domestic intelligence functions of the
U.S. Government.
open hearings
During the 107th Congress, the Committee held 13 open
hearings on issues of concern to the Intelligence Community
and the American people. While committed to the protection of
sources and methods and ensuring the security of our nation's
secrets, it is the intention of the Committee, whenever
possible, to hold open hearings in an unclassified setting on
issues of vital importance and concern to the public.
The Committee held four open hearings: Defining Terrorism--
September 26, 2001; Asymmetric Threats to Homeland--October
3, 2001; Role of NSC in Current Crisis--October 11, 2001;
Domestic Preparedness & Emergency Response--October 29, 2001.
The Joint Inquiry Committee held nine open hearings: Family
Advocates for September 11 Victims--September 18, 2002 and
September 19, 2002; Intelligence Community Knowledge of
September 11 Hijackers--September 20, 2002; Phoenix Memo--
September 24, 2002 and September 26, 2002; Counterterrorism
Information Sharing--October 1, 2002; Intelligence Community
Reform Proposals--October 3, 2002; Past Terrorist Attacks--
October 8, 2002; Factual Finding of Inquiry--October 17,
2002.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I yield as much time as he may consume to
the distinguished Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I thank the chairman. I also commend the
chairman and the vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee for the
very difficult job they have been performing, leading the Intelligence
Committee. It has to be one of the toughest jobs that I have witnessed
in the Senate. It takes time, it takes experience, and it takes
intellect to be able to deal with the issues that come before this
committee.
I also commend them for the way they have handled this particular
nomination. They were patient. They gave every Senator ample time to
make their points and ask questions, and they have been commended by
Members of both sides of the aisle for the way they handled the
nomination. That is why I think the nomination was approved by the
Intelligence Committee, and why I believe this nomination will be
confirmed by a wide margin.
Before I get into a little more discussion about why I support Porter
Goss to be head of the CIA and director of intelligence, I will talk
about my overall concerns regarding the intelligence area.
As a member of the leadership over the years, I was able to have
briefings and meet with Director Tenet. There are specific requirements
in the law that certain Members have to be notified when particular
actions are taken. I always took those matters very seriously and spent
the time that was necessary to get those briefings. For the last year
and a half, I have been on the Intelligence Committee. I must confess
that when I went on the committee, I thought I would be a big defender
and big supporter of our intelligence community, because I think that
what they do is so important. I do support the men and women who work
in that community.
But I must say, over the last year and a half, I have developed many
concerns about how that job is being done, how the Congress does its
job. I didn't appreciate how important oversight is regarding
intelligence matters, how important it is that a Senator develop
expertise to be able to ask the right questions, do the oversight, and
understand what is going on.
I have come to the conclusion that our intelligence community is not
set up properly and we are not doing our job in the Congress. We can
point fingers and blame somebody else, but a lot of the problem resides
here in this body and in the Congress--not because we don't try to do
our job, but we are not organized properly to do it. We have this
multifaceted process of so many committees claiming jurisdiction, and
with good reason. Armed Services needs to be aware of what's going on,
as do Foreign Relations, Appropriations, and Governmental Affairs. Is
there anybody who doesn't have their finger in this intelligence pie a
little bit? Basically, nobody is doing the oversight job properly,
because the members of the Intelligence Committee are not there
permanently; they come and go and are on the Committee maybe 2 years, 4
years, or 8 years. Once you get to where you know what to ask and what
is going on, you leave the Committee.
Frankly, I think the CIA and the intelligence community's attitude
is: Don't give them anything; give them a little bit of a courtesy, a
brush-off, and we will get what we want from the appropriators in the
end.
I think we have real problems in the intelligence community and in
the Congress, and we need to fix them. I don't have a magic design. I
want to hear what the experts have to say and see what legislation is
proposed. I know this: Something has to be done in the way the
intelligence community operates. You cannot operate under a construct
where you have 15 different agencies and 80 percent of the money going
to the Defense Department, with the director of intelligence having
little or no control over the money or many of those intelligence
agencies.
We need major changes, and we need them now. I am concerned about
concerns that were raised yesterday that if we do not do this right, if
we rush to reorganize the intelligence community, we could do damage
because the job of gathering intelligence has to go on every day. Men
and women are putting their lives on the line to gather intelligence.
We need to be careful, but we need to press forward with change.
I know this body is loath to change anything. Any kind of reform is
looked at suspiciously: Oh, we can't do that; it has always been done
this way. I have taken the time over the years to look at a lot of
these issues, and it has not always been done this way. A lot of what
we do and say around here, which some say is sacrosanct and cannot be
changed, is relatively new. It evolved over the years.
At some point, you have to say there is a higher priority, that there
is something more important than turf or jurisdiction or the way it was
or is being done.
What is most important is how we are going to do the best job for the
men and women in uniform, men and women in intelligence, and for the
American people. So I think we need to make necessary changes.
The important point is that we have to have somebody in charge. We
have good people in the CIA doing the job. We have an Acting Director
who is a good man doing a good job. But we do not need an Acting
Director forever. We need a man or woman in charge making decisions,
making changes that need to be carried out even without legislation
that overhauls the whole operation, and we need it now.
This is a dangerous time we are in. We need to not only confirm this
nominee right away, but we need to do it overwhelmingly. We need to
show him, we need to show the agencies, and we need to show the
departments that he has the confidence of the American people through
their representatives in the Senate. We are dealing with very important
issues, and it is so important that we have leadership at the top. We
need to do it right away.
We have a good man who has been nominated. A lot of thought went into
his selection. I know the President sought out the counsel, advice, and
the thinking of a number of Members of Congress on both sides of the
aisle, in the House and Senate, before he went forward with this
nomination. He has nominated a man who is uniquely qualified to be the
Director of Intelligence.
Porter Goss is the right age. He is in his mid-sixties, still young
enough to do the job, and old enough to know what needs to be done. He
has a background of military experience, where he was in Army
intelligence for 2 years. He worked in the Directorate of Operations of
the CIA for many years. Most of this is in the Record, but I think it
is worth repeating so that my statement will make sense, hopefully, in
its entirety.
When he left the CIA, he continued to be involved in trying to serve
his fellow man and his community. He was a leader in his hometown in
Florida. He served on the city council, was mayor, was a member of the
board of commissioners, and has served in Congress since 1988, which is
a pretty good period of time. He eventually became chairman of the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence where I know he did a
good job.
[[Page S9501]]
I have watched him. I have watched him deal with difficult issues. I
have watched him take a leadership role, and I have watched him work
with the ranking member of that committee and with Democrats, and I
have been impressed with the job he has done on the Intelligence
Committee in the House.
So he knows the CIA. He knows it from having been in Army
intelligence, he knows it from having been in the CIA, and he knows it
from the position he held as chairman of the Intelligence Committee. He
knows where the problems are because he was there, and he knows how to
strengthen the intelligence community and make it better. He is no
stranger to the difficulty and the complexity of foreign intelligence.
When I look back on some of the former heads of the CIA, frankly,
some of them did not have much of a background in that area. But here
is a man who is uniquely qualified. He has been in the intelligence
community. I know that some people say that if you are in the
institution, you are part of the problem. But, my experience leads me
to ask, how can you solve a problem if you do not really understand an
institution? There are some in Washington that say, if you know the
subject, whether it is transportation or oil or intelligence, you
should not be in government because you have been coopted.
I think absolutely the opposite is the case. Practical experience is
invaluable. You have to understand the culture, you have to understand
the people, and anybody who has paid close attention to the
intelligence community in recent months and years knows what changes
should be made and have to be made.
Porter Goss, a Member of Congress, has been critical of the
intelligence community. He does not sugar-coat it. He has called the
human intelligence program dysfunctional. He has spoken the truth about
the way we have funded the CIA, which he says has not been adequate, it
has not been done in the right way, and we have not put enough emphasis
on human intelligence. In fact, Congress stopped this nation from
having the human intelligence we needed, if we go back and look at the
results of the Church Commission some 30 years ago. Once again, we are
part of the problem.
He knows we need to do more in linguistic training, and he has raised
these questions as chairman of the committee and in his communications
with the DCI.
His confirmation would bring stability and experience to the
intelligence community. One thing that worries me, as I have talked to
some of our intelligence personnel, is a certain concern about whether
they are really appreciated, and are the old experienced hands going to
stay, or are they going to leave. I have noticed some of the
intelligence people I see are getting younger, younger, and younger.
They need a firm and experienced leader. They need a person who has
been there with them, understands their needs, and appreciates the job
they do, and Porter Goss would do that.
He does support what Congress is about to do. We are going to create
a national intelligence director position, and we are going to pass
legislation that is going to reorganize the intelligence community at
some point, maybe sooner than later.
Again, he has the right attitude and supports the position I believe
that Congress is going to be taking.
There are those who have questioned his independence. Is he a
partisan? Is he a politician? Whatever happened to congressional
courtesy? Over the years, I have supported Members of the other party
from this body and the other body, even though they have sometimes been
very partisan politicians, very aggressive in their speeches on the
floor of the House and Senate, but I knew them to be good men and
women, and I knew when they took on a different role. When you are in
Congress, when you are in politics, you are a politician. That is not a
damnation. That is somebody involved in the art of government. When you
are a member of a party, sometimes members of the other party get under
your skin, and you speak out.
I noticed over the years, Porter Goss has not been one of those rabid
partisans. He has been very calm and very stable. Sometimes he gets a
little upset. Maybe he thought perhaps the Senate was getting carried
away with some of our hearings recently. On occasion, I have thought we
did a little grandstanding in the Senate, and I said so even though it
was sometimes directed at my own party.
I know he is an independent thinker, and I know he will put his job
as head of the CIA, uppermost. He will put his political past and his
partisanship behind him. He also will be a man, I believe, who can go
in and meet with the President at those early morning meetings and say:
Mr. President, this is what we know, this is the truth about the
situation, and if you go this way, you are going to have certain
problems.
He has that stature, he has that credibility, and he will have the
independence to do that.
I think having served so many years, having been on the Intelligence
Committee, and having the record he built at the Intelligence
Committee, is proof that he will be independent to do that job for the
American people. I believe he will be more candid with the Congress.
Quite often when we had testimony before the Intelligence Committee,
I felt as if I did not get a complete story. Frequently, testimony was
less than fully satisfactory or sufficient. Porter Goss is going to be
able to speak to us on a level basis, not from the perspective of a
former staff member. He was one of us, and he will not try to fool us.
I think he will tell us the truth.
By the way, I think we will be very comfortable telling him: Mr.
Director, we don't believe that. We will be able to be very candid with
him. I believe he will show flexibility as we move from where we are to
where we need to be.
He has been questioned about the positions he has taken, but he
satisfied the members of the Intelligence Committee by a vote of 12 to
4 with several Democrats voting for his confirmation. They asked him
the tough questions. They had their reservations, and those
reservations have been satisfied.
I cite one point of how he dealt with the former Director. On
September of 2003, he wrote a letter to DCI Tenet pointing out concerns
he had with intelligence. He joined with the ranking member of the
Intelligence Committee in the House, Congresswoman Harman, and
indicated there were significant deficiencies with respect to the
intelligence community's collection activities concerning Iraq's WMD
programs and ties to al-Qaida prior to the commencement of hostilities
there.
So he did not wait until after the fact; he raised concerns when they
needed to be raised. If my colleagues have taken a look at that letter,
it certainly shows independence and it was the kind of thing that the
DCI needed to hear at that particular time.
So I can attest from experience, from observation, and from a written
record that this Congressman will be an independent, thoughtful, strong
voice at the CIA.
I urge my colleagues, let us have our discussion but let us have a
vote and let us make it overwhelming. Let us do it now because we need
strong leadership and we have the right man to do this job. Porter Goss
will provide leadership for the intelligence community. He will be able
to work with Congress and he will help give the intelligence community
the ability to do an even better job.
I thank the chairman for yielding me this time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
Mr. ROBERTS. I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished
Senator from Utah and thank him for his service on the Intelligence
Committee.
Also, I thank the Senator from Mississippi for his excellent
commentary, more especially highlighting Mr. Goss's independence and
the fact he will be a nonpartisan DCI.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I thank my colleague and I certainly
appreciate the leadership Senators on the Intelligence Committee, in
particular the Senator from Kansas. He has done a great job. I think
Senator Rockefeller has worked with him very well for the most part.
I associate myself with the remarks of the distinguished Senator from
Mississippi. There are very few people around here who have had to deal
with
[[Page S9502]]
the personalities of so many people as Senator Lott has. He has done a
terrific job throughout both his House and Senate career, and I think
we ought to listen to the wise people like that with regard to whether
we should vote for Porter Goss.
There is no doubt in my mind that Porter Goss is worthy of this
position and, in my mind, he will do it in an effective way. I
compliment the distinguished Senator from Mississippi for his cogent
remarks and his very practical remarks to which we ought to all be
paying attention.
I remember when George Tenet was nominated, and George Tenet was a
Democrat. He was a staffer to Senator Boren. Senator Boren, George
Tenet, and I traveled all over the world together. There was not any
question that we were going to support George Tenet when he came up for
CIA Director, and I think he did a much better job than all of his
critics are saying. A lot of that was because he worked very hard for
Senator Boren and for the committee and knew an awful lot about
intelligence to begin with. This is a tough job. It is almost an
impossible job to do. In fact, I think it is an impossible job to do in
every way, in every respect, totally right.
The fact is, we supported Mr. Tenet and he was a member of our
family. I believe Porter Goss is a member of our family, too, and a
person who is worthy of this position. We should not politicize this
appointment.
The next person to head the Central Intelligence Agency will lead the
organization at its most demanding time in history. The next Director
of Central Intelligence will have to provide leadership in shepherding
that organization through a much needed reform while continuing to play
a major role on the ongoing global war on terror. The next person to
hold this post will require much more than a passing experience with
the workings of the intelligence community. He will need to understand
the role of the executive in conducting our foreign policy at war, and
the essential role of congressional oversight and support in ensuring
that our intelligence community is flexible enough to address threats
that have never before been the primary focus of our foreign policy.
President Bush made the right call when he chose Porter Goss to fill
this role. I am happy to note that an overwhelming majority of my
colleagues on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence have also
recognized this, having approved his nomination yesterday. I commend
Chairman Roberts for his leadership and I thank our majority and
minority leaders for bringing this nomination to the floor today. It is
important.
I have had the opportunity to work closely with the chairman of the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. In the months of
collaboration between our two committees which produced the joint
inquiry, I had the opportunity to take the measure of Porter Goss's
mind, as well as his experience and his commitment to the intelligence
community. I totally support this nomination.
As we all recognize, the intelligence community will be undergoing a
major reform, a process that can only succeed if there is close
cooperation between the White House and all the relevant executive
agencies, the Congress--and that includes Democrats and Republicans--
and especially this committee, and the intelligence community.
The reform that will be promoted should not be a mere bureaucratic
reshuffling; it should be a reform of our intelligence community that
enhances and strengthens our ability to understand, penetrate, co-opt,
and neutralize the threat of armed groups to our national security. The
success of the next Director of the Central Intelligence Agency must
understand this to be successful.
The next Director of Central Intelligence must understand that the
new initiatives we are debating in draft legislation this month,
legislation we are referring to as an intelligence community reform,
will be the beginning, not the end, of reform. In fact, I fear that
once we pass a reform package some of us will believe we will have
accomplished reform. In fact, we will have only begun.
Everyone agrees that we need better results from our intelligence
community. I suppose that is always going to be the case. Most of us, I
hope, also agree that the efforts of the intelligence community, from
the Director on down, have been admirable, brave, selfless, and
intense. I believe former Director Tenet worked hard to revitalize
capabilities that devolved after the end of the Cold War. I know he
worked hard. He inherited an agency that needed a lot of improvement,
and to the extent that he could, he did his best to do so.
The next Director of Central Intelligence must recognize that our
goal should not be to rebuild a capability but to build a new
capability. We need better results and we need a strategy for achieving
them.
Director Tenet was candid in speaking before the 9/11 Commission in
saying that our human intelligence capabilities would take at least 5
years to rebuild. Porter Goss, when confirmed, must recognize that this
will be the issue I will address in our first closed hearing. I will
ask: How do you intend to rebuild the capability? What is your
strategy? To what standards of measurement will you hold yourself?
The American intelligence community of the 21st century will face
traditional geopolitical threats, as we did in the past. We will need
intelligence to address the question of rising powers, such as China,
and remilitarizing states, such as Russia. We will need intelligence to
deal with the failing States of North Korea and Cuba.
As we all know, we will also need to develop intelligence
capabilities to gain a strategic advantage against the threat we face
now and will face for some time to come: the threat of armed groups--
terrorists, if you will.
I strongly believe al-Qaida will be defeated in the coming years. It
is not going to be easy, but we will defeat them. On the other hand, I
think a somber analysis of the world we live in today should remind us
that, even when al-Qaida is defeated, we will face the threat of other
armed groups. Nations that have developed a strategic advantage to
understand, penetrate, co-opt and, when necessary, destroy armed groups
will enhance their national security.
We rely on our intelligence community for that strategic advantage.
Porter Goss understands these requirements. He has worked within the
intelligence community, and he has performed years of congressional
oversight over that community. He respects the community and he knows
what is expected of it. If we do our jobs, I can assure Porter Goss,
when he is confirmed, he will be the Director made most accountable to
Congress in the history of intelligence community oversight.
As I said, when the next director comes before our committee, we
should not settle for reports. We must demand strategy for achieving
reform and measurement standards. Our legislative initiatives can only
do so much. Our oversight, and the stewardship of a responsible and
experienced director, will be what advances reform.
There is no doubt in my mind that this man can do the job and can do
it well. There is no doubt in my mind that as a Member of Congress he
has occasionally made statements that have irritated the other side of
this aisle. That is probably true of everyone on both sides of the
floor. I have to admit I have been irritated from time to time by
statements made by my colleagues on the other side--and even by some of
my colleagues on our side--and I am sure I have made statements from
time to time that have irritated colleagues on the other side as well.
I have not wanted to, but I am sure I have. It is just the nature of
being in this political arena. But to then presume a person is an
indecent partisan because occasionally they find fault with the other
side, I think shows a degree of immaturity, of political and
professional immaturity that is unworthy of the nomination process.
Nobody is going to come before us who is perfect in every way. But I
have to say, there are very few people who have served as much as
Porter Goss has and who have as much knowledge of the intelligence
community as he has, who have ever been members of the top echelon of
the CIA.
I have every confidence in him. I am going to support him. I hope all
my colleagues also will support him. He is worthy of it. He is a Member
of Congress. He is a person who deserves our support. I hope we all get
together and
[[Page S9503]]
support him and continue to support him as he serves in this job which
almost nobody can completely fulfill. This is a job that takes immense
capabilities and, I might add, commitment. He has both and we should
support him.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Brownback). The Senator from West
Virginia.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I yield such time as the Senator from New Jersey
wishes to express his views. I yield him that amount of time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey is recognized.
Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, we are discussing the nomination of
Representative Porter Goss to be Director of Central Intelligence. This
nomination comes to the floor at a critical time for our Nation's
intelligence community. With Chairman Collins's leadership and Senator
Lieberman's ranking membership, the Governmental Affairs Committee is
in the process this very day of marking up legislation to reform the
intelligence community. It is a task that all of us on the committee
are taking very seriously. After all, it was the failures of
intelligence that led to the horrors of 9/11 and the loss of almost
3,000 lives. Seven hundred of them came from my home State of New
Jersey. It was a painful moment in American history.
It was failures of intelligence that led to our false premises for
invading Iraq. I thought everyone from the President on down had agreed
that we needed to take intelligence data more seriously. That is why it
was so shocking to hear President Bush's odd statement yesterday about
our Nation's intelligence data on Iraq. A few hours after the President
spoke at the United Nations about why we went it alone in Iraq,
President Bush was asked by a reporter about the CIA report that he had
received in July, regarding the deteriorating situation in Iraq, which
could even lead to a full-blown civil war.
The President at that moment dismissed the CIA report by saying that
the CIA might have been ``just guessing.'' Just guessing? The Central
Intelligence Agency just guessing? That is quite a way to describe
their activities.
On this placard we see what President Bush actually said.
The CIA laid out a--several scenarios that said, life could
be lousy, life could be OK, life could be better. And they
were just guessing as to what the conditions might be like.
That is quite a description, on September 21, yesterday, at the
Waldorf-Astoria in New York. If the President thinks our Nation's
intelligence system is just guessing, then we are really in trouble.
Casual statements.
I remind President Bush that when you pronounced ``mission
accomplished'' on the deck of that aircraft carrier, we had lost 138
American citizens. But since then, since the mission was accomplished--
``mission accomplished'' means job done--almost 900 people, 900
Americans have perished.
How do we treat subjects so casually, statements like this? Does
President Bush believe Congressman Goss will simply direct the guessing
game at the CIA? Is that all he expects from our main intelligence
agency?
As we now know, in July the CIA sent the President a report that laid
out three scenarios for Iraq, with the rosiest scenario being the
continuation of the disastrous status quo. Under this scenario, we see
an average of 87 attacks a day against our troops, and 1,037 dead to
date. That is a horrible situation.
The CIA report to the President identified the worst scenario as an
all-out civil war, with our troops in the crossfire. This is not what
the President wanted to hear. So what did he do? He ignored it. And now
when asked how the information came to him, he said: The CIA--just
guessing.
President Bush's comments are a frightening sign he is not dealing
with reality, in that he continues to ignore the truth about what is
happening on the ground in Iraq. That is why I am so concerned about
the nomination of Porter Goss to head the CIA.
I know Mr. Goss only casually. Certainly he seems like a nice enough,
intelligent fellow. But what the President needs more than ever is an
intelligence chief who will tell it like it is, and not revamp
intelligence to meet the President's expectations.
Congressman Goss has not shown himself to be a person who will
deliver nonpartisan, objective information to the President.
At a time when the independence and the objectivity of the CIA is
more crucial than ever before, President Bush has nominated a
politician who has been particularly partisan. In a PBS ``Frontline''
interview after 9/11, Representative Goss refused to characterize what
happened as an intelligence failure. How could one argue that 9/11 was
not an intelligence failure? He also opposed the creation of the 9/11
Commission.
Congressman Goss attacked Senator Kerry claiming that Senator Kerry
tried to cut the Nation's intelligence budget during the Clinton
administration. But Congressman Goss made the attack against Senator
Kerry while not revealing that he cosponsored a bill during the same
period that would have made even deeper budget cuts.
Here is what Mr. Goss called the Senate Armed Services Committee in
recent hearings on the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. I quote him. He said:
We've got a circus in the Senate which is always a likely
place to look for the circus.
Quite a commentary about what Mr. Goss thinks of our Government.
First of all, the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib--he thinks the
Senate is a circus in hearings, and then he describes this place as a
big circus tent. Is that what he thinks of us? I hardly think that is
the kind of person who ought to be taking this serious job.
When asked whether he would investigate the disclosure of covert CIA
agent Valerie Plame's identity, he dismissed the scandal, saying,
``There's a much larger dose of partisan politics going on right now
than there is worry about national security.''
Then he added flippantly, ``Somebody sends me a blue dress and some
DNA and I will have an investigation.''
What kind of an insulting comment is that intended to be? Do you want
to trust this individual with a bipartisan responsibility to the entire
Nation who can be so casual, so insulting, so sarcastic in his view of
what takes place here? Do we honestly expect someone who has been a
partisan attack dog for President Bush's reelection efforts to be
independent and nonpartisan? It is just not realistic.
It is time for the President and this administration to return to
reality--the reality of Iraq, the sadness of the loss of life, the
ruination of families, the emotional disturbances that occur. We have
some reservists from the State of New Jersey on active duty in Iraq. We
just had our 33rd death of service people from New Jersey in Iraq. The
disturbances that go to normal life, the daddies missing, mommies
missing in the household--it is terrible. We have to get back to
reality, the reality of Iraq, the reality that our Nation's
intelligence is not just guessing, and the reality is that we need an
objective, nonpartisan intelligence chief in this Nation.
I say with regret that we cannot accept turning responsibility over
for managing this Nation's intelligence gathering to someone who first
looks at which side of the political aisle someone is on before he
makes decisions about the responsibility for the CIA.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from the great State of Kansas.
Mr. ROBERTS. Thank you, Mr. President.
I now yield as much time as the distinguished Senator from Maryland
may use. I thank the distinguished Senator for her service on this
committee as she always provides the committee with very candid,
independent, and right-on views. I am delighted to yield time to her at
this time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland is recognized.
Ms. MIKULSKI. I thank the chairman of the Intelligence Committee for
his words. I also thank him for the process he provided for us to
evaluate the suitability of Porter Goss to be the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency. He gave us a lot of time to be able to
interview Mr. Goss directly. His staff has been quite collegial and
quite cooperative, and we want to thank him for providing us with that
type of environment in which to make a wise and prudent decision.
Indeed, deciding on this nomination is vitally important. The
Director of the CIA needs to be up to the job.
[[Page S9504]]
These are very dangerous times, and it is vitally important that we
make the right choice. Now more than ever, the security of our Nation
depends on timely, reliable intelligence to detect, disrupt, and deter
terrorist attacks on the United States of America and to also make sure
attacks don't happen to treasured allies, and to help policymakers,
from the President and his Cabinet to Members of Congress, to make the
right decisions about what we need to do related to diplomacy and the
deployment of our troops.
The next Director of the CIA will have to do all of this and even
more. The next Director will also have to push through the much needed
reform at the CIA and to cooperate in the reforming of other
intelligence agencies. We want to make sure there are no more 9/11's
and no more wars based on dated and dubious evidence.
The constitutional duty of the Senate is to review the nominations of
the President. I take that very seriously. When a nominee comes,
regardless for what position or from whatever party is in power, for an
important position like this, I ask four questions: Is that person
competent? Do they bring integrity to the job? Are they committed to
the core mission of the agency? And will they function in an
independent way?
As I said at our hearings, I know Porter Goss, and I have worked with
him over the years. I have no doubt that Congressman Goss is competent
based on his years of service, both as an agent at the CIA as well as
in the House of Representatives chairing the House Intelligence
Committee. From my knowledge, he has been a man of integrity. And yes,
he is committed to the mission of the CIA and the importance of
intelligence to help protect the United States of America. The great
big caution yellow light I have is the one about independence--the
willingness to speak truth to power, committed to reform, to be
nonpartisan, and also never to sugarcoat, dilute, or twist the
information going to the President of the United States and top
policymakers.
During the last year, I have become very concerned about Mr. Goss's
partisan activities. He has unfairly attacked Democrats. He has been
strident in other statements in terms of the political campaign for the
Presidency.
My questions are, Who is this Porter Goss? Is he the one I served
with in the House who was a moderate conservative, straightforward, and
also someone who said we have to think out of the box so we don't end
up in a box? Or is he a rather an aggressively partisan person? My
question about Porter Goss is, Would he be an independent voice in the
administration as well as a strong advocate for real and deep reform?
Would he present the President with the best information based on facts
and sound analysis without regard to ideology or conventional wisdom?
Would he tell the President what he should hear, not what the President
would like to hear? That is what speaking truth to power means.
Speaking truth to power is not easy. It is very difficult. Yet for
the Director of the CIA it is important that he speak the whole truth
and nothing but the truth, without sugarcoating, no matter how
difficult. The President must receive the best judgment and
information. That is what I am looking at.
Now, having had those questions when Mr. Goss was before the
committee, in my usual way I asked very direct questions. I raised
those issues. I even raised the issue the previous Senator, the Senator
from New Jersey, Mr. Lautenberg raised. What about this investigation,
the blue dress, and the DNA? Well, I put it to him. And his answer back
was, yes, he would be nonpartisan. That he understood the role of the
Director of the CIA is different from being a Congressman. That it is
not a political job, it is a job that is both policy and operational.
He said he would speak truth to power to both the President and to
the Congress. And if anyone knows the importance of congressional
oversight, it is Porter Goss. He agreed to work with the Congress to
reform our intelligence agencies.
As you can see, at the hearing, in response to both my questioning
and questioning by the chairman and other members, particularly on this
independence issue, he said he would raise these issues.
So when I have to think about, is this the Porter Goss who is
moderate, straightforward, willing to work across the aisle, or is this
the aggressively partisan and even intemperate person, I take him at
his word. However, in the words of Ronald Reagan, who said ``trust but
verify,'' that is the way I feel about the Porter Goss nomination. I
accept him at his word, which he not only gave to me but he gave to the
entire committee in a public format, that he would be nonpartisan,
committed to the truth, a leader for independence and reform, and would
always speak truth to power. So I accept him at his word, but I also
believe we must engage in vigorous congressional oversight to make sure
Porter Goss does the job he is to do, and to make sure he does what he
has committed to do.
So when my name is called, I will vote for Porter Goss. But I want to
make it very clear that in voting for Porter Goss to be the Director of
the CIA, I am not voting for him to be the future NID. As you know, we
are not clear on what is the framework for reform we will adopt. There
are ideas coming forth that I know we will be debating and voting on
next week and in the weeks ahead. So we want to be sure whatever
framework we create, and if we do create the National Intelligence
Director, a position I have supported for many months, that person's
nomination come to us separately. In voting for Porter Goss, I am
voting for him to be the head of CIA, but I am not using this vote for
him to be the NID by proxy.
Again, let me conclude by thanking the chairman and the vice chairman
for their hard work on this committee. It is a committee with great
responsibility. We take it seriously. But at the end of the day, my
analysis concludes that I will vote for Porter Goss. I will trust, but
I will use congressional oversight to verify.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I thank Senator Mikulski for her very
forthright statement. Like the Senator, I understand the point raised
by Senator Lautenberg and would only make two points about the notion
of Porter Goss's alleged lack of independence from the administration.
First, Mr. Goss sent a very candid letter to DCI Tenet, along with
Congresswoman Jane Harman, who is the ranking member of the House
Intelligence Committee, expressing deep concern about our intelligence
on Iraq. That letter is not the work of a shrinking violet, I can
assure you.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that letter be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the material was orderd to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
U.S, House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence,
Washington, DC, September 25, 2003.
Hon. George J. Tenet,
Director of Central Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Tenet: At the outset, we reaffirm our support for
the dedicated men and women working in the Intelligence
Community (IC). Their deep commitment to our country and to
their profession is evident. The nation owes these
professional men and women its gratitude for their tireless
efforts to provide policymakers with the intelligence they
need to make informed decisions about the security of
Americans at home and in places like Iraq.
Thank you, again, for promptly responding to the
Committee's request for all intelligence information related
to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities, as
well as any ties to terrorist organizations, including al
Qa'ida. The Committee has reviewed all 9 volumes of material
that you provided, Additionally, it has held several closed
hearings and an open hearing, conducted a number of
interviews, made several oversight trips to Iraq, and
reviewed additional materials over the last four months.
Although the Committee's work continues, we have some
preliminary views that we offer so that the IC can begin to
consider necessary improvements. In addition, we offer these
views to provide you a chance to answer questions or clarify
any issues that will assist us in concluding our review.
At this point, several months into our review, we believe
there were significant deficiencies with respect to the IC's
intelligence collection activides concerning Iraq's WMD
programs and ties to al-Qa'ida prior to the commencement of
hostilities there.
We have a fundamental disagreement generally on whether the
National Intelligence
[[Page S9505]]
Estimate on Iraq's WMD programs and the intelligence on
Iraq's ties to al-Qa'ida were deficient with regard to the
analysis and presentation, especially in the certainty of the
IC's judgments. The Ranking Member believes it was. The
Chairman believes it was not.
Additionally, the Committee is also reviewing the
intelligence assessments that existed pre-March 2003
regarding the nature and level of resistance that U.S. troops
could expect in Iraq and the health of Iraq's civilian
infrastructure.
iraq's wmd
In October 2002, the Intelligence Community produced a
National Intelligence Estimate that included statements that
``We judge that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and
restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons . .
.'' and ``in the view of most agencies, Baghdad is
reconstituting its nuclear weapons programs.'' (Iraq's
Continuing Programs of Weapons of Mass Destruction at p. 5
(hereafter ``NIE'')). The Committee thoroughly reviewed the
underlying intelligence supporting these conclusions, that
you have provided, as well as the reporting from the early
efforts to locate WMD after the cessation of major military
action in Iraq. Thus far, it appears that these judgments
were based on too many uncertainties.
iraq's possession of chemical and biological weapons
The U.S. and the U.K. took limited air strikes in 1998
(Operation Desert Fox), based on Iraq's lack of cooperation
and violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions
regarding weapons of mass destruction. In early 1998, while
the UN inspectors were still in Iraq and providing some
amount of solid information about the WMD programs, the IC's
judgments were based, in substantial part, on circumstantial
information. Such information--among other things--
identified: gaps and inconsistencies in Iraq's WMD
declarations to the UN; Iraq's obstruction of United Nations
Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspections and monitoring
activities; Saddam's efforts to declare certain sites exempt
from inspections; and Saddam's efforts to end inspections
entirely.
After the departure of UN weapons inspectors and Operation
Desert Fox, in 1998, some new information continued to be
developed on Iraq's capabilities, but access to ``ground
truth'' corroboration was lost. The IC was also faced with
the daunting challenge of trying to interpret snippets of
information in an environment where the regime was engaged in
massive denial and deception efforts. Based on past
assessments and some new ``piecemeal'' intelligence, which
was otherwise seemingly valid, the Community's analysis of
Iraq's WMD programs and capabilities reflected an assumption
that these long-standing judgments on the issue were still
valid. The absence of proof that chemical and biological
weapons and their related development programs had been
destroyed was considered as proof that they continued to
exist.
The dearth of post-1998 underlying intelligence reflects a
weakness in intelligence collection, The Committee on a
number of occasions in the past expressed its concern that
the IC was facing serious shortfalls in specific areas of
intelligence collection--to include intelligence from human
sources (HUMINT) and from technologies designed to tell us
about weapons development (Measurement and Signatures
Intelligence, or MASINT). The issues presented with respect
to Iraq's WMD programs and capabilities appear to be a case
in point. Lack of specific intelligence on regime plans and
intentions, WMD, and Iraq's support to terrorist groups
appears to have hampered the IC's ability to provide a better
assessment to the policymakers from 1998 through 2003.
Iraq has held a place of priority in U.S. foreign policy
and national security during successive Administrations. For
instance, in 1998 U.S. policy toward Iraq was clarified by
Congress and the President to reflect an unequivocal policy
to seek regime change, See Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (P.L.
105-338 Oct. 31, 1998). Given the high priority placed on
Iraq policy, we believe greater efforts should have been made
to acquire more and better sources of information--
particularly well-targeted, close-in HUMINT.
reconstitution of iraq's nuclear weapons program
In October 2002, the NIE on Iraq's WMD programs made a
statement about Iraq's nuclear program, ``. . . in the view
of most agencies, Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear
weapons program.'' (NIE at page 5.) The NIE cited six factors
in making this judgment:
Iraq's aggressive pursuit of high-strength aluminum tubes;
Iraq's attempts to obtain permanent magnet production
capability;
Iraq's attempts to obtain high-speed balancing machines;
Iraq's attempts to obtain computer-controlled machine
tools;
Iraq's efforts to re-establish and enhance its cadre of
weapons personnel, which included appearances by Saddam on
Iraqi TV exhorting his nuclear scientists; and
Activities at suspected nuclear sites.
Our examination has identified the relatively fragile
nature of this information. With respect to the aluminum
tubes, as was stated in the NIE, the Bureau of Intelligence
and Research (INR), citing the Department of Energy (DoE)
analysis, disagreed with the view that these tubes were
intended for Iraq's nuclear program. The other items that
Iraq was seeking (permanent magnet production capability,
high-speed balancing machines, and computer-controlled
machine tools), in addition to having utility in a nuclear
weapons program, also have civilian uses. Other elements of
information available to the IC on the topic of nuclear
reconstitution may have been susceptible to Iraqi denial and
deception efforts. These included trying to determine the
nature of Iraqi activities at suspected nuclear sites or the
purpose of Saddam's TV appearances exhorting his nuclear
scientists. We have not found any information in the
assessments that are still classified that was any more
definitive.
iraq's ties to terrorists including al-qa'ida
The Committee has reviewed the three volumes of information
provided by you on Iraq's ties to terrorism, most of which
remains classified. We have found no reason to question the
State Department's decision to designate Iraq as a state
sponsor of terrorism for at least a decade.
On the issue of Iraq's ties to al-Qa'ida, however, we
believe substantial gaps in collection--particularly HUMINT--
contributed to the Intelligence Community's inability to give
policymakers a clear understanding of the nature of the
relationship.
In place of an assessment characterizing the relationship
between Saddam and al-Qa'ida, the Intelligence Community
reported on possible contacts between al-Qa'ida associates
and Iraq. As in other cases of IC reporting on terrorism
generally, we believe that there was either a ``low
threshold'' or ``no threshold'' for disseminating information
on ties between Iraq and al-Qa'ida. As a result, intelligence
reports that might have been screened out by a more rigorous
vetting process made their way to the analysts' desks,
providing ample room for vagary to intrude. Although the
Intelligence Community often noted that the reports were
``from sources of varying reliability,'' these reports did
not make clear which of them were from sources that were
credible and which were from sources that would otherwise be
dismissed in the absence of any other corroborating
intelligence.
nature of iraqi resistance and the state of iraq's infrastructure
In addition to these two issues, we are concerned whether
the policymakers were warned adequately about the nature and
level of resistance our troops would face in Iraq, or about
the dilapidated state of Iraq's civilian infrastructure. The
Committee will be reviewing the intelligence available to
policymakers prior to the commencement of hostilities to
determine if there were shortcomings in the support provided
on these issues. The Committee will seek to understand what
requirements were levied on the IC prior to the invasion,
what assessments were made, whether the assessments were
completed in a timely manner, and, with the benefit of
hindsight, how well the assessments match what has been found
in Iraq since the cessation of major hostilities.
policymakers statements on iraq
The Committee has reviewed extensively allegations that
there was a disconnect between public statements by
Administration officials and the underlying intelligence, The
Committee's purview does not extend to the formulation or
articulation of foreign policy. We do believe, however, that
if public officials cite intelligence incorrectly, the IC has
a responsibility to go back to that policymaker and make
clear that the public statement mischaracterized the
available intelligence. The IC exists to inform policymakers
on matters of foreign intelligence. It does not make policy.
The IC is one of many sources of information available to
policymakers. Policymakers are under no obligation to believe
or adhere to the IC's judgments. Nor should the IC dictate
U.S. foreign policy.
summary
The assessment that Iraq continued to pursue chemical and
biological, weapons remained constant and static over the
past ten years. The U.S. understanding of Iraq's ties to
terror groups was also longstanding. We note, however, that
there was insufficient specific information regarding the
following:
Saddam's plans and intentions,
the status of Iraq's WMD programs and capabilities, and
Iraq's links to al-Qa'ida, specifically.
The intelligence available to the U.S. on Iraq's possession
of WMD and its programs and capabilities relating to such
weapons after 1998, and its links to al-Qa'ida, was
fragmentary and sporadic. These assessments and longstanding
judgments were not challenged as a routine matter within the
IC. Saddam Hussein, for his part, apparently made no effort
to dispel the conclusions that he possessed weapons of mass
destruction, had programs in place to produce them and had
the capabilities to deliver them, or that he had links to
terrorist groups.
Underlying these problem areas were serious deficiencies in
our HUMINT collection capabilities against this target. HPSCI
has consistently recommended greater management attention and
allocation of resources to core intelligence mission areas--
such as HUMINT and analysis. We believe Iraq is, in many
ways, a case study for improvements in these areas.
We would appreciate your response to the issues raised in
this letter. In addition, we
[[Page S9506]]
seek your assurance that the shortcomings identified will be
promptly addressed. Finally, we intend to have additional
hearings, open and closed, as appropriate.
Sincerely,
Porter J. Goss,
Chairman.
Jane Harman,
Ranking Democrat.
Mr. ROBERTS. Second, the independence issue was thoroughly explored
at Mr. Goss's confirmation hearing as of this week. Mr. Goss has
assured the committee--and I do believe him, knowing him for 16 years
in the Congress--that he has the integrity, as Senator Mikulski put it,
to look the President in the eye and say no.
Mr. President, at present, it does not appear either side has a
Member requesting time, so I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that
the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I yield such time to the distinguished
Senator from Florida as he might consume and thank him for his
contributions, not only with his strong interest in the Intelligence
Committee and the leading intelligence issues and challenges we face
today, but for his service on the Armed Services Committee as well, for
working with me with regard to Captain Spiker and other issues. I look
forward to his comments.
Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, we are at ``no fooling time''
with regard to our intelligence activities. Because the only thing that
is going to prevent another terrorist attack, of which there are many
attempts, is the accuracy and quality and the timeliness of the
intelligence information we get. In dealing with a secretive nation
such as North Korea, which in this Senator's opinion is one of the
gravest threats to the interests of the United States because of their
outspoken attempt to acquire nuclear capability, we simply have to
penetrate a secret society such as that with our intelligence apparatus
more than we have been doing.
Therefore, who is going to lead this administrative apparatus on
intelligence gathering and intelligence analysis and intelligence
coordination, with the multitude of agencies all dealing with
intelligence, is extremely important. That is why I am standing here
speaking on behalf of my fellow Floridian and my friend Porter Goss.
This Congress will have a monumental task before it very shortly on
the reorganization of the intelligence apparatus as well as the
reorganization of putting our own house in order as we exercise that
oversight or give direction to the executive branch of government. And
that needs to be done better than we have in the past.
But the task before us right now is to exercise our constitutional
duty in confirming or rejecting an appointment by the President to lead
the intelligence apparatus, right now as symbolized by the Director of
the Central Intelligence. That is why I am here to speak on behalf of
Porter Goss.
It has already been said before many times that he started in 1960 as
an Army intelligence officer, right out of school. Having gone into the
CIA from that, with a distinguished career, he ended up back being a
city councilman and a mayor in a little town on the southwest coast of
Florida. Then-Governor Graham, now my senior colleague in the Senate,
when three vacancies occurred on the Lee County Commission--they had
occurred for whatever reason, but they were there--then--Governor
Graham chose Porter Goss to fill one of those vacancies. Then his
public service expanded, and he later ran and won a seat in the U.S.
House of Representatives. We have known of his public service through
his capacity as the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee.
Now, has Porter said some things he probably wishes he would not have
said? Yes. But who among us has not made those kinds of mistakes? This
Senator knows him to be, in this political cauldron of highly charged
partisan politics, one of the most bipartisan of all Members of
Congress that I have had the pleasure of knowing. It is my
understanding that he made a commitment to the Intelligence Committee,
and specifically to questions propounded by the vice chairman of that
committee, the distinguished Senator from West Virginia, Mr.
Rockefeller, that he would not engage in a partisan manner, which is
the least that can be expected of the Director of the CIA. The stakes
are too high for this country for any of that kind of nonsense.
I believe Porter is a man of his word to the Senate Intelligence
Committee. I believe, given the circumstances of where we are now, with
so much at stake and having to have the right kind of leader, this is
the leader the President has nominated. We are now in the process of
advising and probably consenting, and with the admonitions he has
received, with the exceptional educational background he has had, with
the breadth of his experience, not only as an agent but as the chairman
of the committee, I think it is the constitutional duty of the Senate
to render a verdict. I think that verdict ought to be for the approval
of Porter Goss as Director of Central Intelligence.
Mr. President, that is my effort to lend to this debate. It is short
and sweet. This Senator, as well as my senior colleague from Florida,
will be voting in favor of Porter Goss.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas is recognized.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, seeing no other Senators requesting time
now, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, following Senator Dorgan's remarks, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess until 4 o'clock, and
that the time during the 4 o'clock period be equally charged against
both sides.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. ROBERTS. Reserving the right to object, and I shall not object,
it is my understanding, or I can ask the distinguished Senator--
Mr. REID. He said he has a short statement.
Mr. ROBERTS. He would be able to finish his remarks at 3, in time for
the meeting?
Mr. REID. Especially if we didn't talk more.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. ROBERTS. No.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The
Senator from North Dakota.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I do not have a long presentation. My
guess is the 3 o'clock briefing is one most Senators want to attend. I
do want to, however, visit a bit about this issue of the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency.
We have been through pretty tough times with respect to intelligence
in this country, and this is a critically important position. The
President's choice is an important choice, especially given what we
have been through. Let me make a couple of comments.
First of all, I am going to vote for this nomination, but I do so
without great enthusiasm, and I would like to explain why.
Porter Goss, I think, is qualified to assume this role. There is
little in his record that suggests he is a reformer, and there is some
piece of that record that suggests there is some partisanship, which
bothers me. But I know Porter Goss. I have known him for a long while.
When I served in the House of Representatives, I knew him.
While I would not have made this choice had I been President, the
President has the opportunity to make the selection and deserves, in
this case, his own team. My hope is the questions asked of Mr. Goss at
his hearings will make certain he will run the CIA with a reformist
attitude, with an understanding that things need to change, with an
understanding that this cannot, under any circumstance, be a position
from which partisanship flows, and that we have to get straight
answers, as does the President, from the Central Intelligence Agency.
[[Page S9507]]
Over the years, we have had many, many failures in intelligence. For
those of us who have been through top secret briefings in room 407 of
the Capitol Building, it is nearly unbelievable what they told us they
knew from all their different kinds of intelligence-gathering devices
and their analysis, and what we subsequently learned were the facts or
the truth of the matter.
I am telling you because we need a good intelligence system to
protect our country and protect our homeland. I worry about all of
this, knowing that the intelligence system was deeply flawed. In candid
moments, most Members of the Senate would tell you that which was told
them as top secret intelligence information has often turned out to be
fundamentally wrong.
We now read, for example--and I am not now discussing that which
comes from top secret briefings; I am discussing things that come from
the periodicals--we read, for example, that the intelligence we were
given in briefings about the issue of mobile chemical weapons
laboratories, it turns out came from one source, a source they call
``Curve Ball.'' I am describing this from Newsweek and Time magazine,
not from top secret briefings. One source turns out to apparently have
been a drunk and a fabricator and, as a result of that source, we
get top secret briefings and the Secretary of State makes a
presentation at the United Nations about something that apparently we
now know was untrue. What kind of intelligence system is that?
We learned that Germans provide the name and information of a
terrorist to the CIA here in the United States and the telephone number
and nobody checks on him, nobody follows up at all. Our intelligence
folks cannot find a couple of alleged terrorists living in San Diego
when their names and telephone numbers are in the phonebook? What on
earth is this? I suppose it is Keystone Kops, except this is about the
security of the United States of America.
I want the CIA and the Intelligence Community to succeed. Our country
depends on it being able to succeed in gathering good intelligence and
protecting this country.
There is so much that is wrong here. Hans Blix, the U.N. weapons
inspector, said he was ``not impressed'' by the intelligence presented
by the administration regarding Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. The
Blix team checked every site where U.S. intelligence indicated weapons
of mass destruction would be found in Iraq, and there was nothing.
It goes on and on.
David Kay, the CIA chief weapons hunter, said the intelligence
community failed.
On the 9/11 issue, the intelligence community failed to connect the
dots. I am not talking here just about the CIA; I am talking about the
FBI. The list goes on.
When we are talking about 9/11, we also ought to talk about a report
that was done by the Joint Intelligence Committee in December of 2002
that was published with 28 pages missing. Those 28 pages are about the
Saudis. Fifteen of the 19 who attacked this country were Saudi
citizens. But when the report was published for the public to read, the
White House redacted or eliminated the 28 pages that dealt with Saudi
Arabia.
On October 29 of last year, I offered an amendment to the Foreign
Operations appropriations bill, a sense-of-the-Senate resolution,
calling on the administration to declassify those 28 pages. If one is
talking about 9/11, and talking about intelligence, I believe the
American people and every Member of this Senate and the Congress need
to understand what is in those 28 pages dealing with Saudi Arabia.
It is interesting, even the Saudi Ambassador and the Saudi Foreign
Minister, publicly insisted that this information be declassified.
Senator Shelby, the top Republican Senator on the 9/11 inquiry, said
that 95 percent of the classified pages of these 28 pages could be
released without jeopardizing our national security.
I say once again to the administration and to my colleagues that the
28 pages dealing with Saudi Arabia and 9/11 needs to be released to the
American people. This Congress and the American people should not be
evaluating 9/11 and our intelligence without releasing those 28 pages,
so that the American people see what was deemed required to be
classified. It should not have been classified.
Whether we are talking about Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, or
back even further, Libya or the old Soviet Union, there have been
intelligence failures. We spend a great deal of money on U.S.
intelligence. We want it to work. I do not want our intelligence system
to fail our country, because our country requires a good intelligence
system to prevent the next terrorist attack and to attack terrorists
where they live.
The attack on Iraq was a preemptive strike that the President said
was necessary to protect our country. Well, it is very important when
talking about preemption, which is a doctrine that has been foreign to
this country's interests in the past, to have good intelligence.
Preemption can never occur based on what one thinks. Preemption could
only occur based on what one knows. What one knows must come from good
intelligence.
We have discovered, since the time preemption was discussed by this
administration, that the intelligence was just plain horrible on major
points delivered in top secret briefings to Members of this Congress.
Our intelligence community was just flat wrong. So we all need to fix
it.
There is no Republican or Democratic way to deal with intelligence.
We need to fix this system in the interests of this country. Our safety
depends on it.
I am going to vote for Mr. Goss. I think he is qualified to do this
job. As I indicated, I am concerned about some things he has done in
the past. I hope that is over. I am concerned about the intelligence
agencies themselves. I believe they are in desperate need of reform. I
hope Mr. Goss will be a reformer. Most importantly, our country, all of
us, each of us, needs to work together to create an intelligence system
that works for the safety of this country and works in a way that a
President, a Congress, a Director of the CIA can rely on good
intelligence from all around the world.
My understanding is that we will be in recess for 1 hour until the
hour of 4 p.m.
I yield the floor.
____________________
Congressional Record: September 22, 2004 (Senate)
Page S9507-S9518
NOMINATION OF PORTER J. GOSS TO BE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE--
Continued
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
Mr. DURBIN. What is the pending business before the Senate?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business is the nomination of
Porter Goss.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I rise to speak in reference to that
nomination.
Mr. President, I will vote against the nomination of Congressman
Porter Goss to serve as the next Director of Central Intelligence. I do
so reluctantly. I have known Congressman Goss for a number of years,
and I consider him a good person and a good public servant. But we are
on the verge of enacting significant, historic, and much needed reform
of the U.S. intelligence community. It is more important than ever that
the next leader of the intelligence community be nonpartisan and firmly
committed to meaningful intelligence reform.
Based on his record and his public statements, and on the
confirmation hearings before the Intelligence Committee on which I
serve, I do not believe Mr. Goss is the right person at this moment in
time for this vitally important national security position.
Mr. Goss has served as chairman of the House Intelligence Committee
for almost 8 years, the second longest tenure in that position in the
almost 30 years since its creation. The chairman of a congressional
committee has considerable power in determining on which issues the
committee will focus,
[[Page S9508]]
and the manner in which they will conduct their oversight. I believe
this oversight record is a reasonable measure of Mr. Goss's likely
effectiveness in managing the intelligence community during this highly
challenging transitional period.
Despite having served on the Aspin-Brown-Rudman commission on the
roles and capabilities of the U.S. intelligence community in 1996, 8
years ago, and cochairing, along with Senator Bob Graham, a joint
inquiry into the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and serving on the House
Permanent Subcommittee on Intelligence for almost 10 years, Congressman
Goss's record demonstrates that he has been more a protector of the
status quo than an agent of meaningful reform. Only a few months ago
did Congressman Goss introduce, for the first time, legislation to
reform the intelligence community. It should be noted that on July 25,
2002, Mr. Goss voted against the amendment of Congressman Tim Roemer of
Indiana on the House floor creating the independent National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, commonly known as the 9/11
Commission. That is an incredible fact that must be taken into
consideration.
The man who is seeking to be head of the Central Intelligence Agency,
at this moment, when significant reform is about to take place, voted
against the creation of the 9/11 Commission, which has inspired both
parties and the President to our current state.
This 9/11 Commission Report is the foundation upon which current
intelligence reform efforts are being undertaken. I met personally with
Congressman Goss because I do respect him, and I wanted to hear his
explanation. How can he ask to be head of the CIA, when he voted
against the creation of the 9/11 Commission?
His argument was not convincing. He argued it was a matter of timing;
that while he was undertaking a joint inquiry about 9/11, the creation
of a separate commission might, in fact, lead to the executive branch
stalling information or refusing to cooperate. That was hardly a
satisfying answer.
In addition, it appears that as chairman of the House Intelligence
Oversight Committee, Congressman Goss has been reluctant to conduct
aggressive oversight of Intelligence Committee issues, particularly
when they appear to deal with issues that may be embarrassing to the
current administration. For example, although the Senate Intelligence
Committee completed the first phase of its inquiry into the
intelligence community's performance regarding prewar intelligence
related to Iraq, and issued a public report, the House Intelligence
Committee, under Mr. Goss's leadership, has yet to complete a similar
thorough investigation, despite starting it last year.
As another example, in June of this year during the House
Intelligence Committee's markup of the fiscal year 2005 Intelligence
Authorization Act, Mr. Goss led a party-line vote to reject an
amendment that would have required the Department of Defense to provide
an accounting of the nature and extent of its contacts with the Iraqi
exile leader, Ahmed Chalabi.
Why is that significant? I hope that people who are following this
debate remember Ahmed Chalabi. He was the self-proclaimed leader of an
Iraqi national congress. He was the one you couldn't miss on talk shows
before the invasion of Iraq. He was the one spreading the information
far and wide across America and around the world about the threats of
Saddam Hussein. He was the person who was the favored and trusted ally
of our Department of Defense when they made critical decisions about
committing thousands of American soldiers and their lives to the cause
of Iraq.
What do we know of Ahmed Chalabi? We know that some 5 years ago, the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State stopped dealing
with Mr. Chalabi because they did not believe he was credible. They
didn't trust his judgment. They wouldn't bring him into the councils to
make important decisions.
But Department of Defense Under Secretary Rumsfeld and his special
assistant, Mr. Douglas Feith, thought Chalabi was just what the doctor
ordered. He was there to confirm the fears that they spread across
America about Saddam Hussein. He was there to confirm the presence of
weapons of mass destruction, which became the clarion call of this
administration, drawing us into an invasion of Iraq. He was the one
constantly suggesting that there was a connection between the 9/11
terrorism in the United States and Saddam Hussein.
What happened to Ahmed Chalabi? Those who follow news know what
happened. He went to Iraq, became a somewhat controversial figure in
the provisional government, returned to the United States, and was
treated by some in the administration as a conquering hero.
In fact, at one moment in time, to the embarrassment, I am sure, of
everyone involved today, Ahmed Chalabi was positioned behind the First
Lady at one of President Bush's State of the Union Addresses so that he
would be on camera, showcased before the American people.
Fast forward just a few months. Ahmed Chalabi has now been the
subject of extensive searches by the American Government because of our
suspicion that he has not only misled us about information on Iraq but
has had some connection with Iran of an entirely dubious nature. Ahmed
Chalabi is persona non grata in this country. We are no longer sending
him some $350,000 to $360,000 a month to subsidize his lifestyle. He
virtually has been banished from his role as prime adviser to the
United States.
When Mr. Goss was confronted with this and asked by his own committee
for an investigation as to how Mr. Chalabi, discredited by the CIA,
discredited by the State Department, became the darling and favorite of
the Department of Defense, peddled bad information to the United States
and the American people, and may have betrayed us to Iran--when he was
asked to investigate this, he declined. He refused. You have to ask
yourself: If Mr. Goss was unable or unwilling to ask the most basic
questions about Ahmed Chalabi, how aggressive, how objective will he be
as Director of the CIA?
That is not the only thing. One of the most important issues we have
to keep in mind is that the men and women of our intelligence community
are dedicated, patriotic, hard-working people committed to the security
of our Nation. Occasionally, there will be those who will disappoint
us, but that is true of virtually every institution in America. But
remembering their patriotism and the fact that many of them put their
lives on the line, there came a moment in time when columnist Robert
Novak outed the identity of a CIA agent, Valerie Plame. This is not
only disgraceful, it is dangerous. It meant that her life and her
career were in danger. It sent ripples through the intelligence
community of men and women in similar positions wondering who would
step forward in Washington to stand up for the integrity of our agents
in the intelligence community. Mr. Goss was then chairman of the House
Select Committee on Intelligence. He was asked in October 2003 whether
he would investigate the purposeful identification of covert CIA agent
Valerie Plame. Mr. Goss responded, ``If somebody sends me a blue dress
and some DNA, I'll have an investigation.''
Mr. Goss apologized publicly and privately for that statement, but
the fact remains that he was loathe to challenge any intelligence-
related decision of this administration.
That is not at all reassuring when we consider the well-documented
intelligence failures leading up to 9/11 and prior to the invasion of
Iraq.
This is not a routine appointment. This is not a routine position.
Intelligence is the first line of defense in our war against terrorism.
It is the first line of defense for the American people and our
national security. Having the best intelligence network and the best
intelligence agency will be critical if we want our children to live in
peace and safety. That is why it is so essential that we bring a person
to this job who understands what we have lived through during the past
4 years.
Lengthy reports by the 9/11 Commission, as well as the Joint
Intelligence Committee's inquiry, have come to the conclusion that our
intelligence agency failed us before the 9/11 attack. We know now that
they should have gathered more information, shared more information,
drawn obvious conclusions, and done something proactive to protect
America. They did not and 3,000
[[Page S9509]]
innocent Americans died in Pennsylvania, Virginia, and New York.
Similarly, there came a point in time when we had to make a critical
decision in America whether to launch a preemptive attack against
Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the first such preemptive attack in our
history. We were told it was essential that we do so. We were told by
the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Defense, the head of the CIA, and virtually every
spokesman of the Government that it was essential we attack Saddam
Hussein because he had arsenals of weapons of mass destruction which
could be used against the Middle East, other countries in the region
and the United States, that he was developing nuclear weapons that
would be a danger to the world, that he possessed unmanned aerial
vehicles that could even strike the United States, that he was linked
with the al-Qaida attacks of 9/11, and the list goes on and on. Today,
a year and a half after the invasion, we have found that intelligence
information was wrong, just plain wrong.
Think of it. Depending on the intelligence community as our first
line of defense, it failed. It failed to alert us of the danger of 9/
11, it failed to accurately assess the state of one nation, Iraq,
before we launched an invasion which has cost us over 1,000 American
soldiers' lives, over 7,000 seriously wounded, and literally billions
of dollars.
Can the intelligence community continue with business as usual? No.
If there was ever a time in our history when we needed someone clearly
nonpartisan, someone who would stand up to a President of either
political party and tell them the sober, cold truth, even if it wasn't
popular, if there was ever a time that we needed a Director of the
CIA determined to reform that agency and the other intelligence
agencies under his supervision, that time is today. This is not a
routine nomination. This is a nomination as important as any to be
considered by the Senate.
I will not go into the lengthy partisan statements made by Mr. Goss
so many times in the past where he has taken to task my political
party, members of it, suggesting that we were weak on defense, weak on
intelligence. In fact, he was drawn into this Presidential campaign in
a role now which he has neither explained nor given us much to work
with.
When we went to Mr. Goss and said, You have criticized Senator Kerry
and Democrats for intelligence spending but back in 1995 you were the
cosponsor of a budget proposal that would have had a minimum 20-percent
cut in our intelligence community personnel, he wouldn't answer the
question. When confronted by Senator Rockefeller with his obvious
contradiction between his accusations and his actions, Mr. Goss refused
to acknowledge the obvious. The best he could tell us was, ``The record
is the record.'' I don't know what that means. I have never before
heard it from another witness nor nominee. But it basically told the
Intelligence Committee he wasn't about to discuss the issue with us.
I am sorry. I think Mr. Goss should have been open and candid and
told us exactly what he meant, and if he made a mistake to concede that
point. It would have put him in a much better position to be a credible
agent for nonpartisan leadership and for change as Director of the CIA.
Because I have serious doubts about Mr. Goss's commitment to reform,
his ability to be independent and nonpartisan, I do not believe he is
the right person to be serving at the helm of the intelligence
community during this extraordinarily challenging time and I will
oppose his nomination.
I concede the outcome of the vote on this nomination. I assume he
will be comfortably confirmed by the Senate.
I sincerely hope Mr. Goss will take my comments and the comments of
those who vote against him as a challenge to him in his new role at the
CIA. I hope he proves me wrong. I hope that I stand before this Chamber
in the future and say he was nonpartisan, he was committed to reform,
he was prepared to tell this administration and any administration he
served the truth, even if it was politically painful. I hope that day
will come.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida.
Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. Mr. President, I have listened with interest
to the comments of my good friend from Illinois, as I did earlier today
by my friend from West Virginia. I respect their analysis of this
nomination. I hope they respect my disagreement with that analysis.
I rise today to support the nomination of a friend, a man with whom I
have worked for over 25 years, a fellow Floridian whose judgment and
integrity I highly regard.
I support the confirmation of Porter Goss as the next Director of the
CIA. I have known Congressman Goss and his wonderful family for more
than two decades. I commend them for their willingness to delay the
well-earned retirement which they thought would lie before them at the
end of this session of Congress to take on this very difficult and
important responsibility.
My colleagues know that I have been extremely critical of this
administration for, among other things, its failure to hold anyone
accountable for the intelligence failures that allowed terrorists to
strike our Nation on September 11, 2001, and for the failure that led
us into the war in Iraq.
I have been extremely critical of the President and the Vice
President for allowing America to be distracted from the real war
against terror in Afghanistan and to call upon us to retreat from that
real war against the real terrorists who had killed 3,000 Americans and
using fabricated intelligence to draw us into the war in Iraq.
I have repeatedly questioned why the President has waited more than 3
years since September 11 to begin a serious discussion of
restructuring, reorienting, and reforming our intelligence
capabilities.
I am here today to support the nomination of Porter Goss precisely
because of these concerns. From my personal experience, I can tell you
that Porter Goss is the right man for this job. He is uniquely
qualified to serve as America's Director of Central Intelligence. He is
a man of great character, exceptional intelligence, a tremendous work
ethic, and outstanding personal and professional integrity.
Let me share a story.
As Governor of Florida, I had known of Porter Goss as he served as a
distinguished mayor of the town of Sanibel Island, FL. In the early
1980s, the county in which Sanibel is located, Lee County, FL, was in
the midst of probably the largest public works project in the history
of that county, a major new airport which is now known as the
Southwestern Florida International Airport.
In the midst of that, three of the five members of the county
commission were indicted for corruption, largely relating to activities
involving the construction of the airport. The county government was in
disarray. Public confidence in the county government had sunk to a new
low, and this major, critically important project to the future of the
citizens of southwest Florida had come into question. It was my
responsibility as Governor of Florida to first suspend from office
those individuals who had been indicted, and then to look for three
citizens of Lee County who could assume the important responsibility of
restoring the integrity of county government and completing the
important airport project.
Although I am a Democrat, and had just been reelected as a Democrat,
and Porter is a Republican, it was my feeling that his personal
characteristics were more important than his party label, and so I
appointed him to one of those three positions. And from that
appointment, he quickly became the chair of the Lee County commission.
Party affiliation did not matter then. I do not believe party
affiliation should matter today in determining who should be the next
Director of our Central Intelligence operation. What mattered then was
the fact that Porter, with his clear commitment to public service, his
integrity and his leadership skills, at a time when his community
desperately needed all of them, was able to recapture the confidence of
the people, was able to restart this important airport project, which
now is one of the most important economic assets of the community.
When it comes to the intelligence community, Congressman Goss has the
balanced perspective of having been
[[Page S9510]]
both an insider and an outsider. For a decade early in his career, he
served the Nation both in Army Intelligence and the CIA. He knows from
personal, firsthand experience the value and the risks of clandestine
operations.
Since he has been in Congress--elected in 1988--and especially as a
member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, he has
come to know the agencies from an oversight capacity.
Now, some have said he is too close to the intelligence agencies,
that he is too protective of the status quo. But from my partnership
with him as cochairmen of the congressional joint inquiry into the
events of September 11, it is my firm belief, and my assurance to my
colleagues, that Porter Goss can and will be independent in his
judgments. Porter Goss will also be clear and tough minded in
determining where there are needed reforms and leading us to those
reforms.
If any of my colleagues or citizens of this great Nation wish to have
an indication of where those reforms are likely to take us, I would
direct you to the 19 reforms recommended by that congressional joint
inquiry, upon which our Presiding Officer participated with great
distinction.
As we move to implement much-needed reforms in our intelligence
community, I am confident Porter Goss will not be part of the problem
but will be a leader in taking us toward principled and effective
solutions which will make Americans safer.
This time the President got it right. I strongly urge the
confirmation of his nominee to be the Director of Central Intelligence,
Porter Goss.
Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I intend to vote today to confirm the
nomination of Representative Porter Goss to be the Director of Central
Intelligence. I recognize the deep experience that Representative Goss
brings to this position as the recent Chairman of the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, and as a former CIA officer and Army
intelligence officer. I also understand the unique role the DCI plays
in providing the President with intelligence and advising him on
intelligence matters. Thus, I believe that on balance Mr. Goss's
qualifications are sufficient to confirm the President's choice for
this position.
However, I want to express concerns about Porter Goss and the very
partisan way in which he has conducted himself. His statements
mischaracterizing Democratic presidential nominee Senator John Kerry's
positions on intelligence and accusing Congressional Democrats of being
weak on intelligence are not the sort of rhetoric we want associated
with the leader of our intelligence community. As former Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger testified in the Appropriations Committee
yesterday, the ideal leader for our Nation's intelligence community
should be as non-partisan as possible. Mr. Goss has acknowledged that
as DCI he will need to be non-partisan and objective if he is to
provide the President with independent judgments about the intelligence
he provides, and during his nomination hearings, he made a commitment
to do just that. We must hold him to his commitment.
Many of my colleagues have come to the floor today to speak of Porter
Goss's integrity and his strong qualifications. He will no doubt be
confirmed and will take on one of the most critical jobs in our
government at a time of uncertainty about how his very job will be
structured. The 9/11 Commission has made a compelling case for making
major changes to the organization of our intelligence community. The
new threats which confront us require a more cohesive intelligence
effort that emphasizes shared intelligence over turf battles. To meet
this challenge, we need a leader at the helm of the intelligence
community who embraces the spirit of reform--even if not all the
specifics of the 9/11 Commission recommendations--and who is willing to
implement the reforms that all agree are sorely needed. I have no doubt
that Porter Goss is capable of managing the changes that need to take
place and I am hopeful that he will dedicate himself to these efforts.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the most important quality I am looking for
in a Director of Central Intelligence is someone who can be relied upon
to provide objective intelligence assessments independent of the policy
and political agenda of the White House. Too often we haven't had that.
The massive intelligence failures before the Iraq war were, to a
significant degree, the result of the CIA shaping intelligence to
support administration policy. The CIA's errors were all in one
direction, making the Iraqi threat clearer, sharper and more imminent,
thereby promoting the administration's decision to remove Saddam
Hussein from power. Nuances, qualifications and caveats were dropped; a
``slam-dunk'' was the assessment. The CIA was saying to the
administration, to the Congress, and to the American people what it
thought the administration wanted to hear.
The problem of intelligence being manipulated and politicized is not
new. Forty years ago, Secretary of Defense McNamara used classified
communications intercepts, later proved to be very dubious, to push for
passage of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, which was then used by
President Johnson as the legislative foundation to expand the war in
Vietnam.
Intelligence was manipulated by then-DCI William Casey during the
Iran Contra period. The bipartisan Iran-Contra report cited evidence
that Director Casey ``misrepresented or selectively used available
intelligence to support the policy he was promoting.''
We need a different kind of DCI, one who is not going to be
influenced by the policy choices or politics of whatever administration
is in power. After reviewing Congressman Goss's record, I am not
convinced that he would be that kind of DCI. For example, the
Washington Post reported that in 2002, when asked about intelligence
failures in Iraq, Congressman Goss said ``I don't like to see the left-
wingers splattering mud on an agency that's done some very fine work.''
The Senate Intelligence Committee produced a unanimous 500-page report
on the massive CIA failures leading up to the Iraq war. I would not
characterize the committee as ``a bunch of left wingers.'' We need
someone who is committed to independence and reform, not an ideology.
During his nomination hearing, Congressman Goss was very reluctant to
admit there had been intelligence failures on the part of the
intelligence community during the most recent Iraq War. And, when asked
questions about some of his partisan comments, Congressman Goss
answered many of them by simply saying ``the record is the record.''
Whatever that means, it is not an acceptable answer from a nominee for
Director of Central Intelligence.
I will vote against Congressman Goss. I hope that, if confirmed, he
will prove me wrong.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise today to speak about the nomination
of Porter Goss to be the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
CIA. Yesterday the Senate Intelligence Committee voted 12-to-4 to send
Representative Goss' nomination to the Senate floor. I welcome the
opportunity to say a few words about this important nomination and
about the state of our Nation's intelligence community.
As my colleagues know, in 1947, President Harry Truman signed
legislation which provided for the establishment of the CIA. This
important agency supports the President, the National Security Council,
and American officials who play a role in shaping or executing the
national security policy of the United States. The CIA engages in
research and analysis of information, as well as a host of other
activities related to foreign intelligence and national security.
However, as every American knows all too well, times have changed
since 1947. We are now engaged in new battles. We are facing new
threats. The Soviet Union is no longer our arch enemy. Instead we face
an enemy that is dispersed throughout the world in small cells--
sometimes connected, sometimes acting independently. The new threat--
terrorism--is an asymmetrical one.
Nonetheless, we must remember that terrorism alone is not our enemy.
It is a tactic used by our enemies. Therefore, our task is twofold.
First, we must defeat soundly those who would attack our country and
endanger the security of Americans. But secondly, we must also defeat
the murderous ideology of terrorism. That is because terrorism is the
enemy of all humankind.
[[Page S9511]]
It knows no faces, names, or nationalities. And I am confident that a
strong America, which is respected by our friends and allies, can
defeat this scourge.
Indeed, one thing we can all agree upon in this body is that a strong
and capable intelligence effort has never been more important to the
security of our Nation. That brings me to the nomination before us
today. At the best of times the job of Director of Central Intelligence
is a difficult one. And we all know that these are not the best of
times. Our intelligence infrastructure failed this Nation when we
needed it most.
There are two important traits that the next Director of the CIA
needs to possess in order to be successful in restoring the
effectiveness of our intelligence capabilities.
First, it is of the utmost importance that the Director of the CIA be
nonpartisan. The safety of the American people is not a matter of
political parties. National security is an issue that must unite us in
a common cause. To that end, I share the deep concerns of several of my
colleagues that some of Representative Goss's comments during his
tenure as chairman of the House Intelligence Committee were overly
partisan and blindly supportive of the Bush administration.
Moreover it is critical to recognize that he chose to become involved
in the political process. That decision was not forced on him. He chose
it freely. And I believe that it has undermined his ability to be a
nonpartisan Director of Central Intelligence, DCI. There is no question
that intelligence has been politicized in this administration. I know
it. The American people know it. And the civil servants who work at the
CIA know it. To rush to confirm an individual who has played a role in
politicizing intelligence is extremely unwise and only serves to
further demoralize the individuals who are working so hard to protect
our national security.
Second, he or she must have the knowledge and experience necessary to
lead some of our most critical intelligence efforts. We cannot ignore
the fact that the most egregious lapses in history by our Nation's
intelligence community happened while Mr. Goss was chairman of the
House Intelligence Committee--the committee responsible for ensuring
that US intelligence agencies function effectively. If he failed in his
oversight responsibilities, as I believe he has, how then can we have
any confidence that he is capable of accomplishing an even more
difficult task--the fundamental reform of the entire intelligence
apparatus? I do not believe that we can.
We all know that the 9/11 Commission has recommended a major overhaul
of our intelligence operations. Much of that will have to be done at
the CIA. It is going to take an individual with very strong management
skills to carry out the restructuring of that agency. He will have to
have credibility within the institution of the CIA if he is to be
successful. Institutions resist change. Based upon Mr. Goss' weak
oversight of the agency, I am not confident that he has the wherewithal
to overcome the resistance he will confront to the fundamental reforms
being contemplated.
Actions always speak louder than words. Unfortunately, we don't know
what Mr. Goss's actions will be as director, but we do know what his
actions have been as chairman of the House Intelligence Committee. In
my opinion, to confirm Mr. Goss with such uncertainty about his ability
to get the job done would be irresponsible.
This position is too critical to leave to chance. The agency is
currently being led by a very able career intelligence director. He is
already working with the committees of Congress to devise a plan to
restore the effectiveness and credibility of the US intelligence
community. In the immediate future, he will continue to do so.
For those reasons, I will oppose this nomination when the Senate
votes today.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I intend to vote against the nomination
of Porter Goss to serve as Director of Central Intelligence.
The American people have learned much since 9/11 about the vital role
of objective, nonpolitical intelligence in keeping us safe at home and
in protecting American interests abroad. We also have witnessed the
disastrous consequences of the administration's manipulation of
intelligence in its rush to war in Iraq--disastrous for our brave
troops on the ground, for their families, for our country, and for our
standing in the world.
When it comes to intelligence, this is no time for politics. As we
reorganize and strengthen our intelligence structures, we need a leader
of the CIA whose only loyalty is speaking truth to power.
We need an unbiased advisor to the President, not a partisan--someone
who will deliver the good news and the bad with candor, foresight, and
authority. With Porter Goss, however, we get not only a partisan, but a
cheerleader for the Bush campaign.
What is most disturbing about the Porter Goss nomination is that he
has offered no explanation for his partisan behavior as chairman of the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
He has made partisan attacks on John Kerry for cutting intelligence
budgets, when Mr. Goss himself voted 7 out of 10 years to scale back
intelligence appropriations.
He was initially unwilling to pursue the administration's vengeful
leak of the name of CIA agent Valerie Plame to the press, which ended
her career as a covert CIA officer and endangered her life.
He rushed to discredit former counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke
after Mr. Clarke's testimony to the 9/11 Commission became so
embarrassing to the White House.
He did not support an inquiry into Ahmad Chalabi, even after
allegations that Chalabi had leaked American secrets to Iran, because
the Chalabi affair was embarrassing to White House and the Pentagon.
Mr. Goss waited until June of this year to introduce legislation to
reform our intelligence community a full 18 months after the initial
joint congressional inquiry that he helped lead uncovered massive
structural problems the resulted in the intelligence failures before 9/
11. That is not leadership. That is not vision.
In his confirmation hearing, when asked repeatedly about his partisan
statements and actions, he offered no explanation. He repeatedly
offered the same unsatisfactory response: ``the record is the record.''
If the record is the record for Mr. Goss, then it is a record that
puts politics above the national interest. If the record is the record,
then it is one that places partisan gain ahead of the facts. If the
record is the record, then Mr. Goss is the wrong person to serve as our
Nation's Director of Central Intelligence.
Mr. Goss cannot, even now, cite a single instance in which public
statements of Bush administration policymakers mischaracterized the
available intelligence prior to the Iraq war. If he can't speak the
plain truth about such an obvious fact, how can the American people
have any confidence in him as the head of our intelligence community?
The challenges of 9/11 and the administration's misuse of
intelligence in rushing to war in Iraq demand that any reforms to our
intelligence community be rooted firmly in the principle that
intelligence must be completely insulated from partisan politics and
ideology. The confirmation of Porter Goss as Director of Central
Intelligence violates that principle in the most fundamental sense.
We owe it to our fellow citizens to do better. I oppose the
nomination of Porter Goss.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I will vote for the nomination of Porter
Goss to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
I served with Porter Goss during my time in the House of
Representatives. He is a good, intelligent man with a tremendous work
ethic. He has served his country honorably in the Army, as a CIA
officer, and as a congressman from Florida.
He is the President's choice and I am willing to give the benefit of
the doubt. However, the two days of nomination hearings held by the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence highlighted several areas of
concern, and my vote today should not be seen as support for
Congressman Goss to become the National Intelligence Director.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, Congressman Porter Goss will become
Director
[[Page S9512]]
of Central Intelligence at a difficult and important time for the U.S.
Intelligence Community. In the coming months, he must help both
Congress and the administration to take sensible steps on intelligence
reform. In the years to come, if he remains in office, Mr. Goss must
lead our intelligence agencies into a new era of flexibility, skill,
and inter-agency cooperation.
I will vote in favor of confirming Mr. Goss to this position,
although not without some misgivings. I will support his confirmation
in part because I know him to be a gentleman and a man with a deep and
sincere interest in intelligence, as well as substantial background in
the field. I will support him because many others who know him well,
including our colleagues from Florida and others whose views I respect,
have contacted me and testified to his integrity and capabilities.
And I will support Mr. Goss because the President wants him. A CIA
Director cannot succeed unless the President likes and respects him
enough to take seriously the facts and warnings the Director conveys to
him. The President must be willing to accept advice when the Director
says that something is not ``a slam dunk,'' and I hope that this
President will be willing to accept such advice from this nominee.
As a matter of general policy, however, I have real concerns about
appointing a partisan politician to such sensitive positions as
Director of Central Intelligence or Director of the FBI. In 1976, I
voted against George H. W. Bush as Director of Central Intelligence for
precisely that reason. I suggested: ``The chances for forceful
integrity will be infinitely greater if the Director of Central
Intelligence is a highly respected nonpolitical figure.''
The need for a DCI to transcend partisan politics is crystal clear.
He is the person who must be able to tell the President that the world
is not as the President might wish it, that a cherished policy proposal
will not work, or that some unforeseen development poses a threat to
our national security. As we remove the walls between domestic and
foreign intelligence, moreover, the DCI--like the FBI Director--will be
handling and presenting sensitive information on American citizens.
The next DCI will preside, moreover, over great and perhaps wrenching
transition in U.S. intelligence. The report of the 9/11 Commission
highlighted a series of long-standing shortfalls in our intelligence
agencies. Although the particulars regarding the fight against al-Qaida
may have been new, the challenges facing U.S. intelligence are ones
that go back many years:
We need to provide instant and accurate intelligence to our military
forces, and this drives much of our intelligence collection and
analysis today. At the same time, however, we need to provide a wide
range of so-called ``national'' intelligence to the rest of the
national security community. Balancing those needs is a continuing
challenge, especially as the funds for intelligence will often compete
against other defense priorities.
We need intelligence collectors and analysts with a wider range of
linguistic and cultural skills than ever before. Once we fought a
communist enemy that was worldwide, but centrally directed. Now we must
vanquish the twin perils of radical Islamic terrorism and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, both of which are nearly
world-wide, but no longer controlled by a central, well-defined enemy.
And we need technical intelligence collection systems that are ever
more powerful, that provide more real-time information, and that will
be effective in a world where technology often favors secrecy over
transparency.
We need seamless sharing of very sensitive intelligence information--
between agencies, between countries, and between Washington and the
State and local forces that guard us from terrorism on a daily basis.
``Stovepipes'' and ``rice bowls'' are outmoded and in need of a real
make-over to meet the needs of the 21st century.
At the same time, however, we need strong protections for our civil
liberties, which are the very foundation of our society. When the most
recognizable member of this Senate is denied an airline ticket in his
home town because his name shows up on some Government list, we know
that the intelligence feeding into our homeland security programs
leaves a lot to be desired.
That is quite a menu of challenges, and they must all be addressed.
There is no ``pick one from column A'' option in heading U.S.
intelligence.
In addition to all that, the Director must be willing and able to
``speak truth to power.'' He must have the stature and Presidential
trust that leads top officials to accept his warnings and advice. And
he must be an able defender of the independence of intelligence
analysis, while still insuring that it is relevant to the needs and
concerns of policy-makers.
I will support the confirmation of Mr. Goss in the hope that he will
transition successfully from a serious congressman and a leading
partisan figure to a clear-eyed, independent Director of Central
Intelligence who is able to rally his troops, to make them as effective
as possible, and to keep policy-makers from misusing or ignoring the
work of the thousands of skilled and patriotic men and women who work
in U.S. intelligence today. The perilous times in which we live demand
nothing less than complete dedication to those objectives.
Mr. CORZINE. Mr. President, after much deliberation, I have decided
to vote against the confirmation of Porter Goss to be Director of
Central Intelligence. The conclusions of the 9/11 Commission, as well
as the failures of our pre-war intelligence on Iraq, have demonstrated
the enormous challenges we face in restructuring, reforming and
improving our intelligence capabilities. At this critical moment, we
should be focusing our efforts on enacting into law the recommendations
of the commission, including the creation of the position of National
Intelligence Director. The confirmation of a new Director of Central
Intelligence, when the role of the DCI has yet to even be defined, does
not advance the hard reform work yet to be done. Nor does the
appointment of Porter Goss, whose objectivity, capacity to work across
party lines, and openness to reform are subject to serious question.
The National Intelligence Director envisioned by the 9/11 Commission
will oversee our intelligence community, including the DCI. It is
critical that we clarify, in law, the relationship between these two
positions. Unfortunately, the administration, by prioritizing the
nomination of the DCI over the restructuring of our intelligence
community, seems to be signaling an attachment to the status quo.
Congressman Goss's record, in which he has repeatedly rejected
independent efforts to improve our intelligence whenever those efforts
were perceived to be contrary to the interests of the Bush
administration, is also cause for concern. He opposed the establishment
of the 9/11 Commission, he attacked the integrity of Richard Clarke,
the former coordinator for counter-terrorism at the National Security
Council, he opposed an investigation into the disclosure of the
identity of a CIA operative, and he referred to the bipartisan Senate
investigation into the abuse of Iraqi detainees as a ``circus.''
Congressman Goss has also opposed investigations into intelligence on
Iraq, in particular the use of intelligence by the administration. He
dismissed Senators who called for an examination of the circumstances
that led us to war as ``attack dogs'' and charged that they were
expressing ``artificial outrage.'' He has also implied that open
discussions of the challenges facing our intelligence damage the morale
of our armed forces and aid our enemies. These are not the statements
of someone who appears prepared to undertake the difficult work of
reform, without regard to political considerations.
This reform will require cooperation between the administration and
the Congress and between Republicans and Democrats. Unfortunately,
Congressman Goss has made repeated, incendiary charges, including
allegations that the Democratic Party does not support the intelligence
community and that Senator Kerry seeks to ``dismantle the nation's
intelligence capabilities.'' These charges are not only flat wrong,
they are completely counterproductive to the bipartisan effort that is
urgently needed at this moment.
Repairing our intelligence capabilities is critical to fighting the
war on
[[Page S9513]]
terrorism and is an urgent priority. We must enact into law the
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. We must examine the failures of
our intelligence related to Iraq. We must begin the work of
restructuring our intelligence community so that it is more effective
and less politicized. These challenges require the utmost objectivity,
independence, and nonpartisanship from the Director of Central
Intelligence. Any reluctance on the part of the DCI to fully engage in
the reform process, for whatever reason, could set us back at a moment
when we can least afford it.
Mr. BUNNING. Mr. President, I speak today in support of the
nomination of Representative Porter J. Goss to the Director of Central
Intelligence. He is a good man and a good friend. President Bush could
not have selected a more capable and qualified man for the job. He
brings to the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence
community what they have needed for years--intelligence experience,
political experience, an open mind, and forward thinking.
I first met Representative Goss shortly after he was elected to the
House of Representatives in 1988. We served together for 10 years
before I was elected to this body. Representative Goss and his wife,
Mariel, are personal friends of my wife and myself to this day. I know
his personal character and I am confident he will bring integrity,
honesty, and forthrightness to his new job.
The Director of Central Intelligence holds one of the most important
and unforgiving jobs in our Government. All his actions and decisions
are analyzed and criticized by politicians, the press, and the public.
And the pressures on the intelligence community are immense. They must
be right 100 percent of the time, while the terrorists only have to be
right once. That is a heavy burden for one man to bear, but I believe
Representative Goss is up to the challenge.
I cannot think of anyone with more experience for this job.
Representative Goss has extensive experience in intelligence, on both
the practical and policy sides. He knows firsthand the importance of
human intelligence, serving as an intelligence officer in the Army and
as a case officer in the agency he will now lead. At that time the
United States was promoting freedom and fighting the evil of communism.
Though the evil we now face takes a different form, the value of
information and power of knowledge remain the same.
We are in the midst of a review and reform of our intelligence
organizations, and, going forward, one of the most important jobs for
the Director of Central Intelligence will be working with Congress.
Again, Representative Goss's experiences will be an asset to the
intelligence community and the Congress. For the last 8 years he has
been chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
In that position he has worked fairly with both parties and both bodies
of Congress without compromising his beliefs. I am confident he will
continue to work honestly and fairly with Representatives and Senators
of both parties in his new job.
Representative Goss's practical and political experience will also
pay dividends as the entire intelligence community is reformed in the
coming weeks and months. He has proven his openmindedness in constantly
seeking to improve our intelligence capabilities and structures during
his tenure in Congress. He has held dozens of hearings on problems in
the intelligence community and how to fix them. He was a member of the
Aspin-Brown Commission, which took a deep look at our intelligence
community and provided some of the recommendations that we are
currently reviewing. He also cochaired the bicameral investigation on
intelligence issues surrounding the 9/11 terrorist attacks. His open
mind and willingness to think critically about the status quo will
serve us all well.
I have seen firsthand his dedication, integrity, and character, and I
support Representative Goss's nomination without reservation. I wish
him well in that extremely important job and I look forward to seeing
him in briefings and hearings in the coming months.
Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise to discuss the nomination of Porter
Goss to be Director of Central Intelligence. I served with Porter Goss
in the House of Representatives and I respect him. However, I do not
believe he is the best choice for the position in these times.
On September 11, 2001, our country suffered a devastating attack. Now
our country is in the midst of a war on terror and a war in Iraq. There
have been many examinations of our intelligence leading up to September
11, leading up to the war in Iraq, and as we continue to wage the war
on terror. There are many unanswered questions about whether the
intelligence was accurate, whether it was manipulated, whether our
soldiers and leaders can rely on it each and every day as they make
difficult decisions.
I recognize that members of the President's Cabinet, like the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State, must weigh political
considerations as they develop policy. However, the Director of Central
Intelligence is a unique position. It should stand above politics. The
citizens of the United States have the right to assume that the
Director of Central Intelligence is providing objective information and
analysis to allow the President to make the best possible decisions.
When Director Tenet resigned, the President had an opportunity to
appoint a nominee who was nonpartisan, nonpolitical. He did not do so.
Instead he chose Mr. Goss, who clearly knows the intelligence community
well, but is also clearly partisan and political.
The CIA is in turmoil. The hardworking men and women of the Agency
need a strong leader who will reform the system to make sure that the
information they offer is used in a proper and timely fashion. The
people of this country need to know that the U.S. intelligence
community is doing its best to protect and serve U.S. national
interests.
I do not believe that Mr. Goss is the best candidate to lead the
intelligence community through a difficult task of reform and restoring
confidence in the midst of a war.
It is important that our intelligence not be partisan, yet Mr. Goss
has been partisan in his comments over the past year. He has been
fiercely critical of former President Clinton, our colleague Senator
Kerry, and the Democratic Party. His comments do not lead me to believe
that he will now abandon his partisanship or his political approach as
the Director of CIA.
No greater task lies before us today than to reform the intelligence
community so that it is effective as the leading weapon in the war on
terrorism. Mr. Goss certainly knows the CIA and the intelligence
community, but in these times, experience is simply not enough. A
leader committed to reform without regard to politics is also critical.
Those attributes, I fear, Mr. Goss does not have, and therefore I
oppose his nomination.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I rise to express my support for the swift
confirmation of Congressman Porter Goss as Director of Central
Intelligence. I have been privileged to know Mr. Goss for a number of
years, and I can attest that he is a leader, a man of personal
intelligence and integrity, and a true patriot. He is also extremely
well qualified for the position to which he has been nominated.
I do not believe I am divulging any state secrets when I mention that
Porter Goss knows the intelligence community from the ground up--
beginning with his service as a young case officer and most recently as
chairman of the House Intelligence Committee. His 10-year career with
the Central Intelligence Agency gave him a thorough understanding of
how that large organization operates--invaluable background as the
Congress and the executive branch proceed with various plans for
reorganizing the intelligence community. His experience on the CIA
staff, combined with his oversight responsibilities in the House, makes
him perhaps uniquely qualified to understand the challenges and
opportunities facing the community today. Congressman Goss has
demonstrated time and again his commitment to the needs and goals of
the intelligence community in its service to our Nation and the
American people. He is not merely qualified. He was meant for this
position.
When he takes up his duties, he will do so at a time of great change
in the intelligence community. Reeling from the intelligence failures
of 9/11 and
[[Page S9514]]
Iraq, and faced with comprehensive reorganization, the community's
leadership has rarely been so important. I am confident that Mr. Goss
will lead the CIA in an independent and nonpolitical manner as he has
committed to do, ensuring that policymakers receive the best
intelligence and analysis that our government can provide. I am also
confident that he will be helpful as the Congress reorganizes itself in
order to better conduct oversight over the intelligence community. We
in the Congress sometimes forget that intelligence failures the Nation
has experienced are not limited to the agencies alone. Congressional
oversight has been, as the
9/11 Commission put it, ``dysfunctional,'' and must be changed.
As we face the national security challenges that are so evident to
all of us, the Nation will be privileged to have Porter Goss at the
helm of the CIA. America needs an individual who will help lead our
intelligence agencies into a new era. I wholeheartedly support his
confirmation.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I rise today in strong support of the
nomination of Porter Goss to be Director of Central Intelligence. Few
people are as eminently qualified as he to lead the CIA at this
critical time in our Nation's history.
Porter Goss combines experience as both a U.S. Army Intelligence and
CIA officer with 15 years as a Member of the U.S. House of
Representatives. During his time in Congress he has used his knowledge
and experience to serve as chairman of the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence. He is a public servant who has earned our
confidence and that of the President to lead the dedicated men and
women of the CIA who work tirelessly to preserve our Nation's security.
Now at this time when Congress is working hard to reshape our
intelligence services, I applaud the President for nominating a man
like Porter Goss who understands what is working with intelligence and
that which needs to be improved. And based on his experience, he will
undoubtedly be as well prepared as any DCI to communicate with Congress
concerning the needs of the CIA, and to understand the oversight
responsibilities of the legislative branch as it pertains to the
intelligence community.
The challenges we face in defeating global terrorism remain great.
Porter Goss understands where we have made mistakes in both
intelligence operations and assessment. He understands that we need
improved human intelligence capabilities, as well as a culture of
competition among intelligence analysts, to ensure that policymakers
have objective information and a range of options to choose from in
meeting the terrorist challenge. Porter Goss is committed to making
these changes on behalf of the American people.
In conclusion, I believe the President has chosen the right man to
lead the CIA in its very important work, and I strongly support the
nomination of Porter Goss.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, we have two speakers. I inform the
distinguished leader, the minority whip, a man from Searchlight, that
we have two speakers.
If I could ask Senator Snowe how much time she would like to have.
Ms. SNOWE. About 12 minutes. And I would like to yield 2 minutes to
the Senator from Oklahoma.
Mr. ROBERTS. All right. So a total of what, 15 or 20 minutes?
Ms. SNOWE. Yes.
Mr. ROBERTS. I am assuming by about 4:45--I am not anticipating any
further speakers on our side. That could change.
Mr. REID. If my friend will yield?
Mr. ROBERTS. I am delighted to yield.
Mr. REID. We could not have a vote before 5 o'clock.
Mr. ROBERTS. Right.
Mr. REID. We have a couple people off campus doing other things.
Mr. ROBERTS. Could we agree to have a UC request in regard to a vote
certain at 5 o'clock?
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I would be happy to agree to having a vote
at 5 o'clock and having the time between now and then evenly divided. I
frankly don't think we are going to be using any more time, so if you
need more time on your side, you could have part of ours.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote occur at 5
o'clock and that the time between now and then be evenly divided.
Mr. ROBERTS. I have no objection. I think that is an excellent
suggestion.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I yield whatever time she may consume to
the Senator from Maine.
Ms. SNOWE. Fifteen minutes.
Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Kansas, and I am glad to
yield to the Senator from Oklahoma.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Maine.
Let me make a couple comments about this man.
First of all, before he leaves the Chamber, I want to thank the
Senator from Florida for his comments and for his efforts in this
nomination. I also thank the chairman of our select committee in the
Senate, the Senator from Kansas.
Two years after I was elected to the House--I believe it was 2 years
afterward--Porter Goss was elected to the House from Florida. It took
us no time at all to figure out this guy was one of the foremost
authorities on the intelligence community. He had experience with the
CIA, with Army Intelligence. We relied on him. I am talking about way
back 16 years ago.
When I went from the House to the Senate in 1994, I took the place of
Senator David Boren, who is now the president of Oklahoma University.
He is a very close friend of mine. He was my predecessor in this Senate
seat. He was also chairman of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence. The thing he warned me of when I first came in was: You
are going to have to do something about this mess we have in
intelligence. He said: You have the DIA and the CIA and the FBI and the
NSA, and nobody is talking to each other.
I found out before too long that was the case. He said he had been
working on this for about 6 or 7 years and had not been able to achieve
it. It became a turf battle. On one occasion I found there was a
listening device the NSA had that they would not even share with the
FBI for some of their investigations. This was wrong.
We have come a long way since that time. It has been my experience in
both Kosovo and Bosnia that you have a lot of these agencies around the
table sharing information and working together that did not do so
before. So I believe we have come a long way.
One of the reasons I have been resisting a lot of changes within our
intelligence system is I wanted to wait until Porter Goss came on
board. I believe Porter Goss has more knowledge on intelligence than
anybody else who could have been nominated.
I think the President made an excellent nomination. I think we see by
this bipartisan support that we are going to be able to overcome the
obstacles and move ahead aggressively in achieving quality intelligence
to protect the American people.
I thank the Senator from Maine for yielding to me.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise today regarding the nomination of
Porter Goss as our next Director of Central Intelligence. I commend the
President for his timely submission of this nomination as Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency. Given our war on terror and the
missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, now is not the time to leave a vacuum
in leadership for our Nation's intelligence.
On that note, I also commend our chairman, Senator Roberts, for his
leadership in conducting the hearings and shepherding the entire
process so we can complete this confirmation and ensure our
intelligence apparatus has the direction it deserves and the leadership
it must have in order to move forward.
As we all know, this nomination arrived during a time in which we are
compelled to undertake the most profound, sweeping reform of our entire
intelligence community in nearly 60 years, 3 years after the worst
attack ever on American soil. Indeed, there is no longer a question
whether we are at the threshold of the single most comprehensive and
critical restructuring of
[[Page S9515]]
the manner in which intelligence is gathered, analyzed, and
disseminated in at least a generation. The questions are: What shape
will this reform take? How will the leadership of the intelligence
community implement and execute these changes? And how will the
nominee, Porter Goss, synthesize and translate his knowledge and depth
of experience into specific, tangible changes in how the intelligence
community performs? Because the person who is asked to implement this
type of reform must be firm, bold, visionary, and lay the foundation
for our intelligence community for the 21st century.
Many of us who serve on the Intelligence Committee--indeed,
throughout the Senate--have been advocating for comprehensive
improvements in the intelligence community structures and methods.
Shortly, the Senate will have the opportunity to deliberate with
respect to overall and fundamental reform. It is absolutely the type of
change and reform not only this Senate, this Congress, and the
President must embrace; this permanent reform is essential to address
the grave failures in communication, coordination, and cooperation that
certainly the 9/11 Joint Inquiry, the Senate Intelligence Committee,
the 9/11 Commission, and others have found with respect to the attacks
on September 11, 2001, as well as the pre-Iraq-war assessment of
weapons of mass destruction that failed to reconcile with the realities
in the postwar chapter. Indeed, with the new reality in which we live,
delaying reforming the intelligence community is no longer an option.
As a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, this last year we
have undertaken a major review of the prewar intelligence of Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction, the regime's ties to terrorism, Saddam
Hussein's human rights abuses, and his regime's impact on regional
stability. That report was a detailed, comprehensive cataloguing not
only of the facts but also a stunning revelation of systemic, pervasive
flaws in our intelligence community that coalesced to produce broad
failures in intelligence gathering and analysis. It revealed a
pervasive complacency as well as a lack of accountability throughout
the chain of command that allowed outdated assumptions about
intelligence to be carried forward for years unquestioned and that
tolerated an absence of rigorous analysis and a kind of monolithic
grouping.
From that report, we now know that even after the lack of information
sharing was found to have played a key role in the intelligence
failures of 9/11, intelligence reporting continues to be highly
compartmentalized, and analysts with a need to know are not given
access to information. Essentially, the intelligence community
continues to operate in a ``stovepiped'' manner, preventing critical
information sharing essential for sound analysis. There was a lack of
analytic rigor on one of the most critical and defining issues spanning
more than a decade: the question of the preponderance of weapons of
mass destruction within Iraq. The community had failed to do its
analysis for more than a decade, we soon discovered.
Moreover, there was a lack of human intelligence that is so critical
to assessing the enemy's capabilities and intentions. They were forced
to rely on outdated, vague intelligence from less than credible
sources.
I say all of this because that is the reality that our next Director
of Central Intelligence must not only confront, but he also must
address. It is in that light that our committee, during the
confirmation process, reviewed the qualifications, the credentials, and
the qualities that Porter Goss possesses in order to address some of
the most systemic and profound changes this intelligence community is
going to face since its inception in 1947.
I have come to believe that Porter Goss, in examining his record, his
testimony before the committee, his responses to the committee, has the
experience, the character, the credibility, the knowledge, the
disposition, and the predilection for reform to lead this comprehensive
overhaul and restructuring of our entire intelligence community.
Let me first say that I worked with Congressman Goss in the House of
Representatives for 6 years. I have no doubt about his competence,
certainly his intelligence, his character, his unimpeachable integrity,
or his bipartisanship. He was far from a polarizing or partisan force
in the House of Representatives. Rather, what I discovered in working
with him in the House, he was interested in solving problems rather
than creating political points or sound bites. He was interested in
reaching a consensus on the issues.
I know there had been some questions during the course of the hearing
as to whether Porter Goss would be able to be sufficiently independent
minded in a position where he will be the President's chief adviser on
intelligence issues. Certainly this was an issue that was thoroughly
explored in the confirmation hearings just concluded. At the opening of
that hearing, Congressman Goss addressed the issue directly when he
told the committee:
. . . I understand completely the difference in obligations
the position of [director of Central Intelligence agency]
carries with it and that which the role of a Congressman
carries. These are two completely distinct jobs in our form
of government. I understand these distinctions and if
confirmed commit myself to a nonpartisan approach to the job
of [director of Central Intelligence agency].
That is important to underscore.
Moreover, in response to questions about some specific political
statements that Porter Goss had mentioned a few months ago on the floor
of the House of Representatives, he expressed regret and apologized if
he sounded any partisan notes in the past on any issues or matters of
national security.
I know others have raised the question of whether Porter Goss will be
willing to inform administration officials if or when public statements
deviate from or distort available intelligence. In responding to this
question, I would refer directly to the House Intelligence Committee's
2003 interim assessment of the pre-Iraq-war intelligence when then-
Chairman Goss stated that if public officials cite intelligence
incorrectly, the intelligence community has a responsibility to address
that policymaker on any mischaracterization of available intelligence.
I expect that not only would Porter Goss be held to that assessment as
DCI but that he would hold himself to that assessment.
We must also recognize the unique qualifications that Porter Goss
brings to the position. As I mentioned earlier, he is a product of
service in the intelligence community, while he also later served as
chairman of the House Intelligence Committee. He can view the
intelligence community through the eyes of a former CIA officer and
intelligence officer and also as someone who has stood outside of that
world looking in with his oversight of the intelligence apparatus as
chair of the House Intelligence Committee.
I know there has been some concern expressed that maybe Porter Goss
will be too wedded to the CIA or that he is too CIA-centric and,
therefore, would not have the independent vision necessary to institute
the required changes and the reforms that surely are to come. I would
argue that it is precisely because of his past work within the
community that he is best suited to take it into the future, all the
more so as his service imbues him with an indispensable credibility
that would engender the kind of trust within a community where some
continue to believe that necessary changes have already been made, that
we should not identify the failures that we did in our comprehensive
report within the intelligence community in the prewar assessments as
egregious or systemic or broad or comprehensive failures. That is the
kind of atmosphere that he will be entering as the new Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency and trying to bring about the kind of
reform that is absolutely vital.
His own record of reform initiatives is also important to explore
because it also will belie the claim that somehow he will not be
predisposed or have a predilection for the type of reform we certainly
are going to be considering, hopefully next week, and enacting in
Congress, and also the reform that has also been brought about as a
result of the President's Executive orders.
Still others have questioned whether Porter Goss could have done more
to institute intelligence reform prior to the attacks of 9/11. Again, I
think as we review the 9/11 Commission's recommendations, we can see
much could
[[Page S9516]]
have been done in all spheres. Whether it was on the part of former
Presidents, on the part of Congress, committees, individuals, agencies,
and bureaucracies, we know that the history documented in the 9/11
report was replete with examples of what could have been and should
have been done differently.
What is required now is that we look at the totality of the record of
the nominee we are considering today. In so doing, I believe we will
see an individual who is wholly committed to providing the impetus and
the leadership required to institute critical reform. Indeed, who
better than someone who has not only been a member of the intelligence
world but also one who has investigated that world to understand why
change is necessary.
The most glaring of problems--those we identified in the Senate
Intelligence Committee report, such as the poor state of human
intelligence, operations, intelligence collection in general, analysis,
and the pervasive problems with information sharing--these have all
been issues that Porter Goss has been committed to addressing
throughout his tenure as chairman of the House Intelligence Committee.
Indeed, Mr. Goss has held over 62 hearings on intelligence community
reform just this year. So I do believe that he shows a predisposition
and indeed a drive for reform.
I think we also see that commitment reflected in Mr. Goss's
contributions as a member of the Aspin-Brown commission, which was
formed to assess the future direction, priorities, and structure of the
intelligence community in the post-Cold-War world. This commission made
a number of recommendations including looking at how to streamline the
DCI's responsibilities and provide him with additional flexibility in
managing the community.
He provided insights and leadership in the ``Joint Inquiry Into
Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist
Attacks of September 11, 2001''--a report that contained 19
recommendations, including the creation of a director of national
intelligence among the many changes that we have now been debating in
Congress.
So all of this undoubtedly served as a catalyst for Congressman Goss
authoring his own reform legislation, which he introduced this past
June, that calls for significant reform of the intelligence community's
structure, as well as enhanced DCI, with critically needed personnel
and budgetary authority--going beyond even what the President issued in
his own Executive orders.
But I think Porter Goss also understands, in response to many of the
questions that were raised during the course of the confirmation
hearing, that a director of national intelligence will need to possess
both the budgetary and personnel authorities that will be vital to a
newly created director of national intelligence in order for that
individual to be effective in implementing the kinds of changes that
need to be brought about within the overall intelligence community.
Finally, there is further evidence of the extent to which Porter Goss
is compelled to remedy our intelligence shortcomings. He has
recognized--after his committee's investigation into the failures that
occurred prior to the Iraq war--that the intelligence community has
repeatedly fallen short in the area of information collection, most
notably in the area of human intelligence.
For those who are not convinced he understands what is required to be
done--particularly in this regard--as Porter Goss himself has said, the
CIA's human spy operation was headed ``over a proverbial cliff'' and in
danger of becoming only a fleeting memory of ``the nimble, flexible,
core, mission-oriented enterprise'' it once was. Sounds like a person
who is convinced of the need for change.
He has also stated that the intelligence community failed to provide
the best possible intelligence to policymakers, and that the requisite,
both from a collection and analytical viewpoint, was not provided.
I believe Porter Goss embodies the credibility and credentials that
will be required to lead the intelligence community agencies and the
professionals within that community in implementing the types of
reforms from within--by Executive order or through congressional
enactment. He brings unique and exceptional experience both in the
field and behind the gavel. I believe he is well prepared to see our
intelligence apparatus as it undergoes the major transformation
necessary for a new era.
I yield the floor.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the
distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, a vital member
of the Intelligence Committee, be recognized for 5 minutes. Senator
Warner is a previous member of the Intelligence Committee, now again on
the Intelligence Committee, and he is chairman of the Armed Services
Committee. He has a unique perspective to offer my colleagues. Is 5
minutes appropriate?
Mr. WARNER. Yes, thank you.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my good friend and colleague, the
chairman of the Intelligence Committee. I hope the Senate appreciates
the thoroughness with which Chairman Roberts has gone into this
nomination. He has provided the members of the committee and many
others with an opportunity to express their views with regard to the
nomination. An extensive series of hearings have been held--more than
have been held on a nominee in a long time. Maybe only Supreme Court
Justices occasionally see the volume and thoroughness with which this
nomination has been carefully viewed by the Senate. I compliment the
chairman, and indeed the ranking member who participated very actively
in this, as well as the members of the committee.
I first came to know the nominee about a decade ago. I remember one
of our most revered, distinguished contemporary colleagues, Senator
Moynihan, who sat right back there. I was on the floor and he stood and
said it was time to abolish the CIA. He had a lot of concerns about the
Agency. At that time, I was the vice chairman of the Intelligence
Committee. Together, with Porter Goss and some others, we put together
a piece of legislation establishing a commission to examine some of the
concerns of our distinguished late colleague from New York. Porter Goss
and I served on that commission. Les Aspin was the first chairman. He
had an untimely early death and he was followed by Harold Brown. That
was my initiation to work with this fine, able individual.
I commend the President for selecting him to take on this important
assignment. I thank Representative Goss, his wife, and family for
undertaking another chapter of public life.
All of his credentials have been carefully reviewed. I would like to
talk about somewhat of a different aspect of the challenges that will
face Porter Goss. We just concluded a very extensive briefing upstairs
with the Secretary of Defense, Ambassador Negroponte, the commander of
CENTCOM, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the Deputy Secretary of
State, almost three-quarters of the Senate being present. The briefing
was about the situations primarily in the Iraq and Afghanistan theater,
but it was about terrorism on the whole.
As part of our discussion, we talked about the ongoing work in the
Congress of the United States with regard to the 9/11 report, which all
of us believe is a very significant contribution by a conscientious
group of tried, tested, and able public servants. But we worked through
these equations and options. The Governmental Affairs Committee is
doing the markup of what will be the primary vehicle. Senator Roberts
contributed his views on it.
The Senate Armed Services Committee had a hearing with the Secretary
of Defense, as well as the Acting Director of the CIA. So the Senate
has done a lot of work in preparation.
How does that relate to Porter Goss? I cannot predict, and I don't
think anyone can, at this time what will eventually evolve with regard
to the legislative achievements of this body and the House in a
conference. Perhaps a lot of people have high expectations that a bill
will be before our President shortly.
I intend to work conscientiously, as I have, and will continue to
work, forgetting any question of turf, to try to achieve a strong bill
that clearly improves and strengthens our intelligence system.
I brought in a reference to the briefing today because in some
discussion
[[Page S9517]]
with our colleagues--and it was a classified briefing, but I can share
this--General Abizaid said he is acting on intelligence daily to
conduct his mission. Lives are at risk, and he clearly, drawing on his
extensive experience in the Army said: Today the intelligence
collection that my soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines need and have
and use is vastly improved over what we had in gulf war 1 in 1991.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 5 minutes have expired.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may speak
for another 4 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, there has been steady progress in the
improvements in our intelligence system. The Department of Defense is
the largest user, and these senior people in the Department of
Defense--civilian and military alike--have not tried to tell the
Congress what to do but respectfully told us what not to do: Don't do
anything to weaken the improvements that we have achieved--I say we,
working with the Congress and the President--we have achieved to date
since 1991 in the first gulf war and, indeed, since 9/11 with President
Bush and Executive orders, a wide range of implementation of important
things that have been done to improve our intelligence system,
particularly from the standpoint of the tactical use by the U.S.
military.
If confirmed and if we pass a new law signed by the President, Porter
Goss will be the man entrusted to implement that law. And I say to my
colleagues with the deepest respect, that is a daunting task--to do it
in a way not to shake the confidence of the tens upon thousands of
conscientious employees in the various departments and agencies, the
CIA, the Department of Defense who are concerned about their jobs,
concerned about their futures. We need to hold the team in place. We
need to keep what is working now going as we phase in such new laws and
provisions as this body, working with the House and signed by the
President, may enact.
I do not know of another individual who has the experience of Porter
Goss or is better qualified to take on the task of implementing such
new laws as the Congress and the President may enact.
I urge my colleagues to give this very fine, outstanding American
who, once again, was thinking about a quieter form of life the
opportunity to move into this job.
There was printed in the Record a report that was issued by the CSIS,
prepared by a number of former colleagues and others in the
intelligence community trying to say to the Congress we best move with
considerable caution as we enact this new legislation. I found this
very helpful in my work participating in drawing up this bill, and I
commend it to my colleagues.
Mr. President, again I thank the distinguished chairman and the
distinguished vice chairman of the committee for their work in making
it possible for this nomination to have been carefully reviewed by the
Senate in terms of a series of hearings and a very active and thorough
debate on the Senate floor.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, with this debate and the vote certain at
5 o'clock, I think there has been an extraordinary level of examination
of this nomination. Two days of open hearings were held. By way of
comparison, that is one day more than Secretary of State Powell had
during his confirmation in early 2001.
It is certainly understandable that an official of the DCI stature
would be the subject of close Senate scrutiny. I think we have achieved
that level of scrutiny, and members of the Intelligence Committee on
both sides have expressed satisfaction with the way this process has
unfolded. It was not by accident. It was in close conference and
cooperation with the distinguished vice chairman of the Intelligence
Committee, the Senator from West Virginia.
I think Mr. Goss has been forthcoming. I think he has been candid
with the committee. He provided literally dozens of written answers to
questions sent to him by the committee, both before and after his
confirmation hearings. He also provided complete and exhaustive details
about his background and his professional life in connection with his
nomination.
In short, I believe the examination of this nomination has been
thorough and informative. The nominee and Members on both sides should
be complimented for the way it has unfolded.
Expressions of support for his nomination have come from both sides
of the aisle and both sides of Capitol Hill. This nominee is ready to
go to work, and he is needed.
I urge the Senate to vote for his confirmation, and I look forward to
working with Porter Goss as the next and, by the way, possibly last
DCI.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, at the proper time, which I believe
will be at 5 o'clock, I will call for the yeas and nays, or can I do
that now before I make a statement?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator can do it any time he chooses.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I wish to make a short statement, and then I will
call for the yeas and nays.
Porter Goss has been very well vetted. What has come from this
discussion back and forth are several things.
One, he is a very good man. Second, he knows the intelligence
business. Third, I think there is still a question of whether he has
run any larger organizations, and that becomes a factor. The third had
to do with partisanship. It was interesting to me that a number of
people said everybody around here is partisan. Of course, that is true.
But this has to do with a nomination for the Central Intelligence
Agency. That is a position where the national security law forbades a
nominee from being political in any way, shape, or form.
I think the question really is with him. I want to believe it is
true, but based upon the record, I cannot accept it as true to this
point, and I have to look at what has happened as opposed to what he
says will happen; that he has been very partisan and very partisan
within the field of intelligence and very partisan within the field of
intelligence very recently at a time, obviously, when we are engaged in
a broad election.
I think it is probable that he will be confirmed, but that does not
take away from my responsibility to point out what I think is critical:
That now, more than ever, it is important for a CIA Director or for
anybody in intelligence to tell the truth, to make sure that if there
was a reference in a Cincinnati October 2 speech about Niger and
uranium enrichment and the possible seeking of it by Iraq, and then
when it comes to the State of the Union that somehow that the CIA
Director disappeared and never said, Oh, no, that shouldn't be in the
State of the Union because it was never true--I don't want to get into
that now. The point is we need somebody who is independent and takes
pride, who describes himself, defines himself as being independent and
standing up for the intelligence business and, therefore, is speaking
the truth. I hope that person will be Porter Goss. That is not yet
proven, and based upon the record it is not possible for me to vote
anything but no at this time.
It being very close to 5, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There appears to be a sufficient second.
The question is, Will the Senate advise and consent to the nomination
of Porter J. Goss, of Florida, to be Director of Central Intelligence?
On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered.
The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. McCONNELL. I announce that the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr.
Santorum) and the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Specter) are
necessarily absent.
Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. Akaka), the
Senator from North Carolina (Mr. Edwards), the Senator from Vermont
(Mr. Jeffords), and the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry) are
necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Murkowski). Are there any other Senators
in the Chamber desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 77, nays 17, as follows:
[[Page S9518]]
[Rollcall Vote No. 187 Ex.]
YEAS--77
Alexander
Allard
Allen
Baucus
Bayh
Bennett
Biden
Bond
Boxer
Breaux
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Campbell
Cantwell
Carper
Chafee
Chambliss
Cochran
Coleman
Collins
Cornyn
Craig
Crapo
Daschle
Dayton
DeWine
Dole
Domenici
Dorgan
Ensign
Enzi
Feingold
Feinstein
Fitzgerald
Frist
Graham (FL)
Graham (SC)
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Hollings
Hutchison
Inhofe
Inouye
Johnson
Kohl
Kyl
Landrieu
Lieberman
Lincoln
Lott
Lugar
McCain
McConnell
Mikulski
Miller
Murkowski
Murray
Nelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)
Nickles
Pryor
Reid
Roberts
Schumer
Sessions
Shelby
Smith
Snowe
Stevens
Sununu
Talent
Thomas
Voinovich
Warner
NAYS--17
Bingaman
Byrd
Clinton
Conrad
Corzine
Dodd
Durbin
Harkin
Kennedy
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Reed
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Stabenow
Wyden
NOT VOTING--6
Akaka
Edwards
Jeffords
Kerry
Santorum
Specter
The nomination was confirmed.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the President will
be immediately notified of the Senate's action.
____________________
