Congressional Record: November 24, 2003 (Senate)
Page S15838-S15842
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
By Mr. CORZINE:
S. 1946. A bill to establish an independent national commission to
examine and evaluate the collection, analysis, reporting, use, and
dissemination of intelligence related to Iraq and Operation Iraqi
Freedom; to the Select Committee on Intelligence.
Mr. CORZINE. Mr. President, I am introducing today a bill to
establish an independent, bipartisan commission to examine intelligence
issues related to Iraq. This commission is necessary because what we
have discovered on the ground in Iraq has shown our intelligence to be
wrong. It is necessary because Administration officials misused
intelligence--that is, they made public statements and submitted
reports to Congress that the Administration knew at the time to be
unsupported by the available intelligence. And it is necessary because
inaccurate and misused intelligence played a role in leading us to war.
[[Page S15839]]
Accurate, objective, and credible intelligence is a fundamental
cornerstone of our national security, particularly in an age of shadowy
terrorist networks and clandestine weapons programs. Unless we improve
our intelligence, we risk failing to identify serious threats to the
United States and being distracted by lesser dangers at the expense of
larger and more urgent security concerns.
This effort must include not only the collection and analysis of
intelligence, but the use, reporting, and dissemination of intelligence
assessments. If the American people are asked to go to war to preempt
an attack, or--as in the case of Iraq--to prevent a possible future
threat from emerging, it is critical that the public statements of our
officials be supported by the available intelligence. If members of
Congress are to consider authorizing the use of force, particularly
against countries that have not attacked the United States, they must
be provided with honest and complete intelligence. And if our allies
are to be asked to join us in confronting these threats, the
intelligence that we share with them and that we rely on to bolster our
case must be credible in the eyes of the world.
I first proposed an independent commission to examine intelligence
related to Iraq last summer, when it became clear that President Bush
had made an important but unsubstantiated claim in his January 2002
State of the Union address. That claim was, quote: "The British
government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant
quantities of uranium from Africa."
Although this statement has been dismissed as the "16 words," its
significant cannot be overstated. The State of the Union address is the
most important, the most scrutinized speech the President delivers. The
statement concerned the most important topic a President can discuss--
whether to send Americans to war. And this claim was the most important
element of the President's argument for war: that there was evidence
that Saddam Hussein might have the necessary materials to produce a
nuclear bomb. As for the reference to the British government, it is
hard to imagine how the use of the word "learned" could imply
anything other than that the United States independently believed that
the claim was true.
It turns out that the Bush Administration had ample reason to know at
the time that what the President was telling the nation could not be
substantiated. The CIA had sought to dissuade the White House from
making claims about uranium purchases. And on February 5, a week after
the State of the Union address, Secretary of State Powell made a
presentation to the Untied Nations in which he omitted the claim
precisely because it was not supported by the available intelligence.
Despite this knowledge, the Administration never issued a
clarification. As a result, the President's statement stood, as an
important element of the Administration's case for war. Only last
summer, after Americans learned from Ambassador Joe Wilson and others
what Administration officials knew at the time, did the Administration
acknowledge that the uranium allegation should never have been included
in the State of the Union Address.
The case generated outrage across party lines. Republicans as well as
Democrats expressed serious concern about the credibility of the
Administration and the country. They stressed that cabinet members, the
vice president, and the entire administration are responsible for
honestly representing intelligence. They called for someone in the
Administration to be held accountable. The Senate passed a resolution
by voice vote. The chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee
promised to undertake a, quote "very aggressive review." And the Bush
Administration insisted that it would cooperate. As White House
spokesman Ari Fleischer stated on June 11, quote: "The Administration
welcomes the review. It's important."
In July, when I first sought to establish this commission, there was
no dispute that the use of intelligence, as well as the collection and
analysis of intelligence, should be examined. Republicans who voted
against the commission did so, they said, because the commission would
intrude on the jurisdiction of the Intelligence Committee. I was, and
remain supportive of efforts by the committee to look into the use of
intelligence related to Iraq, an inquiry that is clearly included
within the committee's jurisdiction. But it was and is my belief that
an independent, bipartisan commission, building on the findings of
Congressional and other investigations, could undertake the most
thorough, depoliticized review possible.
Now, however, it seems an independent commission is the only
remaining means left to examine the use, or misuse, of intelligence. On
November 13, the Chairman of the Intelligence Committee announced that
there would be no examination of how intelligence was used by
policymakers. I deeply regret this decision by the chairman and
fervently hope the committee will ultimately exercise its role,
established in the resolution laying out its jurisdiction,
in overseeing the, quote: "use or dissemination" of intelligence. In
the meantime, I would expect that an independent commission would
receive strong bipartisan support.
It is now beyond question that our intelligence on Iraq was
inaccurate. After months of searching, investigative teams have yet to
find stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons. David Kay, who heads
up the Iraqi Survey Group, has stated that Iraq's nuclear program was
only at the, quote: "very most rudimentary level." The Administration
has yet to produce evidence of the high-level ties between Iraq and al
Qaeda that it warned of prior to the war. And now, tragically, we must
add to the list of intelligence failures the inability to anticipate
the current resistance to U.S. occupation. Clearly, the facts and
circumstances surrounding these failings warrant a detailed and
systematic review.
But what of the use of intelligence? As important as the State of
the Union address was, that speech was only part of a larger case made
by the Administration for war. Administration officials made many
claims--particularly those related to chemical and biological weapons--
that were expressed in terms that were more specific and more certain
than the intelligence may have supported. Most troubling, however, were
the highly dubious assessments and suggestions related to nuclear
programs and terrorism with which the Administration built its most
powerful and emotionally potent argument. That argument had three
elements: 1. That Iraq had a nuclear weapons program, and possibly even
a nuclear weapon; 2. that Saddam Hussein was allied with al Qaeda, and
that he may have been involved with the terrorist attacks of September
11; and 3. that the threat was imminent.
The Administration began to make its argument in the summer of 2002.
As vice President Cheney stated in an August 26 speech, quote: "Simply
stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass
destruction." In an indication of how Administration officials would
make their case over the next seven months, the vice president insisted
that the intelligence indicated no doubt, no internal disagreement, and
no uncertainty.
Then, on September 12, President bush, in his speech to the United
Nations, went further, stating, quote: "right now, Iraq is expanding
and improving facilities that were used for the production of
biological weapons." the President also made two statements regarding
Iraq's alleged nuclear program. The first was that Iraq had made,
quote: "several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to
enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon." He failed to mention that
neither the Department of Energy nor the Department of State's Bureau
of Intelligence and Research believed that the tubes were intended for
that purpose. The President's second statement added the missing
ingredient: the uranium itself. As the President stated, quote:
"Should Iraq acquire fissile material, it would be able to build a
nuclear weapon within year." This was the context for the President's
claim made in the State of the Union address that Iraq had sought to
purchase uranium from Africa.
The Administration continued making its case throughout the fall of
2002, adding claims concerning ties between Saddam Hussein and al
Qaeda. One of many examples was Secretary Rumsfeld's September 26
statement that the
[[Page S15840]]
Administration had, quote: "very reliable reporting of senior level
contacts going back a decade."
As Congress deliberated whether to authorize the use of force against
Iraq, the Administration officials made increasingly alarming
statements about Iraq's ties to al Qaeda and about its nuclear weapons
program. On October 7, three days before the vote in the House of
Representatives and four days before the vote in the Senate, President
Bush gave a speech in which he said, unequivocally, that, quote: "We
know that Iraq and al Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go back a
decade," and, quote: "The evidence indicates the Iraq is
reconstituting its nuclear weapons program." He repeated the
allegations about uranium tubes and the warning about purchases of
uranium. Then the President put it all together--the implication that
Iraq was connected to the September 11 attacks, the implication that
Iraq could have a nuclear bomb at any time, and the warning that Saddam
Hussein could decide on any day to explode a nuclear bomb in the United
States. Here is what the President said: "Why do we need to confront
it [Saddam] now? And there's a reason. We've experienced the horror of
September the 11th. We have seen that those who hate America are
willing to crash airplanes into buildings full of innocent people. Our
enemies would be no less willing, in fact, they would be eager, to use
biological or chemical, or a nuclear weapon. Knowing these realities,
America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear
evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof--the smoking
gun--that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud."
This was the most powerful, dire, and convincing warning a President
could give. And it was based on one inference that the President has
acknowledged he never had any evidence of, that Saddam was tied to
September 11, and another which had already been refuted by many within
the Administration, that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program.
Later statements included Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's claims to
specific knowledge of the whereabouts and movements of biological
and chemical weapons. On March 11, he stated, quote: "We know he
continues to hide biological and chemical weapons, moving them to
different locations as often as every 12 to 24 hours, and placing them
in residential neighborhoods." On March 30, he said, quote: "We know
where they are. They're in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad and east,
west, south and north somewhat."
The Administration also continued to insist that the threat was
imminent--a claim that served to counter arguments that the United
Nations should be given more time. On February 6, the day after
Secretary of State Powell made his presentation to the UN, Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld made an appeal for immediate action. "Why now?" he
asked. "The answer is that every week that goes by, his weapons of
mass destruction programs become more mature." That same day, Deputy
Secretary Wolfowitz stated, quote: "Connections with terrorists, which
go back decades, and which started some 10 years ago with al Qaeda, are
growing every day."
Finally, on March 16, the day before President Bush's ultimatum to
Saddam Hussein, Vice President Cheney went beyond claims that Iraq had
the intent to produce nuclear weapons, and even beyond the claims that
Iraq was seeking centrifuge equipment or uranium. Rather, the vice
president stated flatly, quote: "We believe he has, in fact,
reconstituted nuclear weapons." This assertion, which the vice
president has recently acknowledged was a misstatement, was not
corrected. Instead, it was allowed to stand as nearly the final word on
why we were going to war.
Questions surrounding the Administration's use of intelligence extend
beyond public statements, to include reports to and testimony before
Congress. One example of unsubstantiated reporting was the January 20
report to Congress, mandated by the use of force resolution, that cited
Iraq's failure to declare its, quote: "attempts to acquire uranium and
the means to enrich it"--the same unsubstantiated claim made in the
President's State of the Union address.
This commission would be authorized to examine other intelligence
issues related to Iraq, as well. The Administration made claims related
to weapons delivery systems, including President Bush's assertion on
October 7 that, quote: "Iraq has a growing fleet of manned and
unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to disperse chemical or
biological weapons across broad areas," and that Iraq could use them
for, quote: "missions targeting the United States." There has never
been evidence that Iraq had UAVs with ranges of thousands of miles.
Administration officials made claims related to the occupation,
including Vice President Cheney's March 16 assertion that, quote: "I
really do believe that we will be greeted as liberators," and Deputy
Defense Secretary Wolfowitz's November 17 analogy to, quote: "post-
liberation France."
The Administration also downplayed the costs of the occupation.
Despite White House economic advisor Lawrence Lindsey's estimate that
the occupation would cost between $100 and $200 billion--an estimate
for which he was apparently fired--Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld on
January 19 put the figure at, quote: "something under $50 billion,"
On February 27, Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitiz stated that, quote:
"there's a lot of money there, and to assume that we're going to pay
for it is just wrong." And, on March 27, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz
stated, quote: "We're dealing with a country that can really finance
its own reconstruction, and relatively soon."
The independent commission I propose would be authorized to examine
the relationship between policy makers and the intelligence community.
Were members of the intelligence community pressured to produce
analyses that conformed to the Administration's policies? Did
Administration officials seek to bypass the normal analysis process by
cherry-picking bits of intelligence that suited their agenda, through
the Office of Special Plans in the Department of Defense or through
other special or ad hoc arrangements? Did the Administration base its
analyses on foreign intelligence sources of dubious credibility? These
questions must be answered, and corrective measures undertaken, if our
intelligence community is to be as effective and objective as we need
it to be.
Perhaps the most egregious undermining, indeed betrayal, of the
intelligence community was the identification by senior Administration
officials of a covert CIA operative. The operative is the spouse of a
person who has been called a national hero by President George H.W.
Bush but who questioned the current Administration's statements
regarding Iraq. The leak of this operative's identity sent an implicit
warning to others in the intelligence community who might disagree with
the Administration's positions. It potentially endanged the life of the
operative and those with whom the operative worked. And it rendered the
operative's skills, experience and sources permanently useless, thus
wasting precisely the kind of intelligence asset that the United States
so desperately needs right now.
The purpose of this commission is to identify ways in which we can
learn from past mistakes and thus improve our collection, analysis,
reporting, use and dissemination of intelligence. The commission's
members, who will come from both parties, will be prominent Americans
with experience in intelligence, the armed forces and other relevant
areas. Their work will build on relevant Congressional and other
investigations.
The commission, through an objective, independent, highly
professional examination process, will help depoliticize an extremely
complicated and sensitive topic. By reviewing intelligence related to
Iraq beginning in 1998, it will draw conclusions about the use of
intelligence by a Democratic as well as Republican Administration. And
by reporting its recommendations directly to the President and to
Congress, it will serve as a valuable resource outside the context of
open political debate. In this respect, I disagree with the Chairman of
the Intelligence Committee who has stated that the full Congress and
the public could "decide for themselves whether the intelligence was
accurately represented by government officials."
This issue is far too serious to simply ignore. Over one hundred
thousand brave Americans are currently serving
[[Page S15841]]
in Iraq, facing challenges that require accurate and objective
intelligence. We have an obligation to pursue every opportunity to
improve that intelligence. Meanwhile, the United States faces other
threats--from despotic regimes with nuclear, chemical, or biological
weapons, from terrorism, and from the horrible possibility that
terrorists could acquire these weapons. Our ability to confront these
threats requires that our intelligence be accurate and objective. And,
as we seek to enlist our friends and allies in our efforts to address
these common threats, we must ensure that our intelligence is credible.
Unless we identify and correct the mistakes of the past, we will not
be safer.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the legislation be printed
in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 1946
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Independent Iraq
Intelligence Commission Act".
SEC. 2. ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMISSION.
There is established the National Commission on Iraq
Intelligence (in this Act referred to as the "Commission").
SEC. 3. PURPOSES.
The purposes of the Commission are as follows:
(1) To examine and evaluate the performance of the United
States intelligence community with respect to the collection
of intelligence, and the quality of intelligence obtained, on
the weapons of mass destruction and related delivery systems
capabilities of Iraq in the period from 1998 until the
conclusion of military operations against Iraq under
Operation Iraqi Freedom.
(2) To examine and evaluate the performance of the United
States intelligence community with respect to the collection
of intelligence, and the quality of intelligence obtained, on
the connections and support, if any, of Iraq with and for the
plans and intentions of terrorist groups to attack the United
States or United States interests abroad during the period
referred to in paragraph (1).
(3) To examine and evaluate the performance of the United
States intelligence community with respect to the collection
of intelligence, and the quality of intelligence obtained,
during and after the period referred to in paragraph (1), on
matters relating to--
(A) the conduct of military and intelligence operations
against Iraq;
(B) the search for and securing of weapons of mass
destruction, related delivery systems capabilities, and
conventional weapons in Iraq; and
(C) the military, political, and economic aspects of the
occupation of Iraq.
(4) To examine and evaluate the quality of the analysis by
the United States intelligence community of the available
intelligence related to the matters referred to in paragraphs
(1) through (3), including intelligence from foreign
intelligence services, that served as a basis during the
period referred to in paragraph (1) for--
(A) reports, testimony, and presentations to policymakers
in the Executive Branch and Congress, and to United Nations
bodies and other consumers; and
(B) assessments that were used or disseminated by the
Executive Branch.
(5) To examine and evaluate the effect, if any, on the
United States intelligence community of the actions of
Executive Branch officials regarding the collection,
analysis, and reporting on intelligence matters referred to
in paragraphs (1) through (3).
(6) To examine and evaluate the relevant facts and
circumstances relating to the use and dissemination by
Executive Branch officials of intelligence and intelligence
analyses underlying assessment of intelligence matters
referred to in paragraphs (1) through (3) during the period
referred to in paragraph (1), including assessments contained
in public speeches, statements, and interviews, reports to
and testimony before Congress, and communications with and
reports and presentations to United Nations bodies.
(7) To build on the investigations of other entities, and
avoid unnecessary duplication, by reviewing the work,
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of other Executive
Branch, Congressional, or independent commission
investigations into the collection, analysis, reporting, use,
and dissemination of intelligence related to Iraq by the
United States.
(8) Based on the examinations and evaluations under
paragraphs (1) through (6) and the work, findings,
conclusions, and recommendations of other investigations
referred to in paragraph (7), to identify corrective measures
to improve the collection, analysis, reporting, use, and
dissemination of intelligence by the Executive Branch, and to
report to the President and Congress on the examinations,
evaluations, findings, and conclusions of the Commission and
on the recommendations of the Commission with respect to such
corrective measures.
SEC. 4. COMPOSITION OF COMMISSION.
(a) Members.--The Commission shall be composed of 10
members, of whom--
(1) 1 member shall be appointed by the President, who shall
serve as co-chairman of the Commission;
(2) 1 member shall be appointed by the leader of the Senate
(majority or minority leader, as the case may be) of the
Democratic Party, in consultation with the leader of the
House of Representatives (majority or minority leader, as the
case may be) of the Democratic Party, who shall serve as co-
chairman of the Commission;
(3) 2 members shall be appointed by the senior member of
the Senate leadership of the Democratic Party;
(4) 2 members shall be appointed by the senior member of
the leadership of the House of Representatives of the
Republican Party;
(5) 2 members shall be appointed by the senior member of
the Senate leadership of the Republican Party; and
(6) 2 members shall be appointed by the senior member of
the leadership of the House of Representatives of the
Democratic Party.
(b) Qualifications; Initial Meeting.--
(1) Political party affiliation.--Not more than 5 members
of the Commission shall be from the same political party.
(2) Nongovernmental appointees.--An individual appointed to
the Commission may not be an officer or employee of the
Federal Government or any State or local government.
(3) Other qualifications.--It is the sense of Congress that
individuals appointed to the Commission should be prominent
United States citizens, with national recognition and
significant depth of experience in such professions as
governmental service, the armed services, law, intelligence,
and foreign affairs.
(4) Deadline for appointment.--All members of the
Commission shall be appointed not later than one month after
the date of the enactment of this Act.
(5) Initial meeting.--The Commission shall meet and begin
the operations of the Commission as soon as practicable.
(c) Quorum; Vacancies.--After its initial meeting, the
Commission shall meet upon the joint call of the co-chairmen
or a majority of its members. Six members of the Commission
shall constitute a quorum. Any vacancy in the Commission
shall not affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same
manner in which the original appointment was made.
SEC. 5. FUNCTIONS OF COMMISSION.
The functions of the Commission are--
(1) to conduct an investigation into the relevant facts and
circumstances relating to the collection, analysis,
reporting, use, and dissemination by the United States
intelligence community and others in the Executive Branch of
intelligence relating to Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom,
including--
(A) an examination and evaluation of the quantity and
quality of United States intelligence underlying assessments
made during the period referred to in section 3(1) of--
(i) weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems
capabilities of Iraq;
(ii) connections and support, if any, of Iraq with and for
the plans and intentions of terrorist groups to attack the
United States or United States interests abroad;
(B) an examination and evaluation of the quantity and
quality of United States intelligence underlying assessments
made during after the period referred to in section 3(1) on
intelligence matters relating to--
(i) the conduct of military and intelligence operations
against Iraq;
(ii) the search for and securing of weapons of mass
destruction, related delivery systems capabilites, and
conventional weapons in Iraq; and
(iii) the military, political, and economic aspects of the
occupation of Iraq;
(C) an examination and evaluation regarding whether the
analytical judgments in the assessments referred to in
subparagraphs (A) and (B) were thorough, timely, objective,
independent, and reasonable, based upon intelligence
collection;
(D) an examination and evaluation of the accuracy of the
assessments referred to in subparagraphs (A) and (B) when
compared with the results of the investigative efforts of the
Iraq Survey Group and other relevant Executive Branch and
Congressional entities, and with relevant assessments of the
United Nations and other multilateral bodies, foreign
governments, nongovernmental organizations, and other
institutions and individuals;
(E) an examination and evaluation of the quality of the
intelligence on Iraq that was provided to the United States
intelligence community and Executive Branch policymakers,
including by foreign intelligence services, that served as a
basis during the period referred to in section 3(1) for--
(i) reports, testimony, and presentations to policymakers
in the Executive Branch and Congress, and to United Nations
bodies and other consumers; and
(ii) assessments that were used or disseminated by the
Executive Branch;
(F) a determination of the extent, if any, to which
elements of the United States intelligence community were
inappropriately pressured by members of the Executive Branch
to produce intelligence consistent with such members policy
objectives, and of the extent, if any, to which intelligence
was manipulated or misrepresented by members of the Executive
Branch or elements under their control;
[[Page S15842]]
(G) an assessment of the extent to which Congress was kept
fully and currently informed about intelligence related to
Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom;
(H) a determination of the extent to which the intelligence
of the United States intelligence community, and of the
United States Armed Forces and coalition forces, were
sufficiently accurate, thorough, timely, objective, and
independent to prepare such forces to conduct effective
military and intelligence operations against Iraq, including
the search for and securing of weapons of mass destruction
and conventional weapons in Iraq, and to prepare such forces
and other United States and coalition entities to
successfully carry out the military, political, and economic
aspects of the occupation of Iraq; and
(I) an examination, evaluation, and assessment of such
other related facts and circumstances that the Commission
considers appropriate;
(2) to identify, review, and evaluate the lessons learned
from issues related to the collection, analysis, reporting,
use, and dissemination of intelligence relating to Iraq and
Operation Iraqi Freedom;
(3) to investigate the facts and circumstances relating to
disclosures, if any, by Executive Branch officials of the
identify of a covert Central Intelligence Agency official;
and
(4) to submit to the President and Congress the reports
provided for by section 11.
SEC. 6. POWERS OF COMMISSION.
(a) In General.--
(1) Hearings and evidence.--The Commission or, on the
authority of the Commission, any subcommittee or member
thereof, may, for the purpose of carrying out this Act--
(A) hold such hearings and sit and act at such times and
places, take such testimony, receive such evidence,
administer such oaths; and
(B) subject to paragraph (2)(A), require, by subpoena or
otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and
the production of such books, records, correspondence,
memoranda, papers, and documents, as the Commission or such
designated subcommittee or designated member may determine
advisable.
(2) Subpoenas.--
(A) Issuance.--
(i) In general.--A subpoena may be issued under this
subsection only--
(I) by the joint agreement of the co-chairmen; or
(II) by the affirmative vote of 5 members of the
Commission.
(ii) Signature.--Subject to clause (i), subpoenas issued
under this subsection may be issued under the signature of a
co-chairman or any member designated by 5 members of the
Commission, and may be served by any person designated by a
co-chairman or by a member designated by 5 members of the
Commission.
(B) Enforcement.--
(i) In general.--In the case of contumacy or failure to
obey a subpoena issued under subsection (a), the United
States district court for the judicial district in which the
subpoenaed person resides, is served, or may be found, or
where the subpoena is returnable, may issue an order
requiring such person to appear at any designated place to
testify or to produce documentary or other evidence. Any
failure to obey the order of the court may be punished by the
court as a contempt of that court.
(ii) Additional enforcement.--In the case of any failure of
any witness to comply with any subpoena or to testify when
summoned under authority of this section, the Commission may
certify a statement of fact constituting such failure to the
appropriate United States attorney, who may bring the matter
before the grand jury for its action, under the same
statutory authority and procedures as if the United States
attorney had received a certification under sections 102
through 104 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (2
U.S.C. 192 through 194).
(b) Contracting.--The Commission may, to such extent and in
such amounts as are provided in appropriation Acts, enter
into contracts to enable the Commission to discharge its
duties under this Act.
(c) Information From Federal Agencies.--
(1) In general.--The Commission may secure directly from
any executive department, bureau, agency, board, commission,
office, independent establishment, or instrumentality of the
Government, information, suggestions, estimates, and
statistics for the purposes of this Act. Each department,
bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent
establishment, or instrumentality shall, to the extent
authorized by law, furnish such information, suggestions,
estimates, and statistics directly to the Commission, upon
request made by a co-chairman, the chairman or co-chairman of
any subcommittee created by 5 members of the Commission, or
any member designated by 5 members of the Commission.
(2) Receipt, handling, storage, and dissemination.--
Information shall only be received, handled, stored, and
disseminated by members of the Commission and its staff
consistent with all applicable statutes, regulations, and
Executive orders.
(d) Assistance From Federal Agencies.--
(1) General services administration.--The Administrator of
General Services shall provide to the Commission on a
reimbursable basis administrative support and other services
for the performance of the Commission's functions.
(2) Other departments and agencies.--In addition to the
assistance prescribed in paragraph (1), departments and
agencies of the United States may provide to the Commission
such services, funds, facilities, staff, and other support
services as they may determine advisable and as may be
authorized by law.
(e) Gifts.--The Commission may accept, use, and dispose of
gifts or donations of services or property.
(f) Postal Services.--The Commission may use the United
States mails in the same manner and under the same conditions
as departments and agencies of the United States.
SEC. 7. NONAPPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT.
(a) In General.--The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5
U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to the Commission.
(b) Public Meetings and Release of Public Versions of
Reports.--The Commission shall--
(1) hold public hearings and meetings to the extent
appropriate; and
(2) release public versions of the reports provided for by
subsections (a) and (b) of section 11.
(c) Public Hearings.--Any public hearings of the Commission
shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the protection
of information provided to or developed for or by the
Commission as required by any applicable statute, regulation,
or Executive order.
SEC. 8. STAFF OF COMMISSION.
(a) In General.--
(1) Appointment and compensation.--The co-chairmen, acting
jointly and in accordance with rules agreed upon by the
Commission, may appoint and fix the compensation of a staff
director and such other personnel as may be necessary to
enable the Commission to carry out its functions, without
regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code,
governing appointments in the competitive service, and
without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter
III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification
and General Schedule pay rates, except that no rate of pay
fixed under this subsection may exceed the equivalent of that
payable for a position at level V of the Executive Schedule
under section 5316 of title 5, United States Code.
(2) Personnel as federal employees.--
(A) In general.--The executive director and any personnel
of the Commission who are employees shall be employees under
section 2105 of title 5, United States Code, for purposes of
chapters 63, 81, 83, 84, 85, 87, 89, and 90 of that title.
(B) Members of commission.--Subparagraph (A) shall not be
construed to apply to members of the Commission.
(b) Detailees.--Any Federal Government employee may be
detailed to the Commission without reimbursement from the
Commission, and such detailee shall retain the rights,
status, and privileges of his or her regular employment
without interruption.
(c) Consultant Services.--The Commission may procure the
services of experts and consultants in accordance with
section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, but at rates not
to exceed the daily rate paid a person occupying a position
at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of
title 5, United States Code.
SEC. 9. COMPENSATION AND TRAVEL EXPENSES.
(a) Compensation.--Each member of the Commission may be
compensated at not to exceed the daily equivalent of the
annual rate of basic pay in effect for a position at level IV
of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5,
United States Code, for each day during which that member is
engaged in the actual performance of the duties of the
Commission.
(b) Travel Expenses.--While away from their homes or
regular places of business in the performance of services for
the Commission, members of the Commission shall be allowed
travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence,
in the same manner as persons employed intermittently in the
Government service are allowed expenses under section 5703(b)
of title 5, United States Code.
SEC. 10. SECURITY CLEARANCES FOR COMMISSION MEMBERS AND
STAFF.
The appropriate Federal agencies or departments shall
cooperate with the Commission in expeditiously providing to
the Commission members and staff appropriate security
clearances to the extent possible pursuant to existing
procedures and requirements, except that no person shall be
provided with access to classified information under this Act
without the appropriate security clearances.
SEC. 11. REPORTS OF COMMISSION; TERMINATION.
(a) Interim Reports.--The Commission may submit to the
President and Congress interim reports containing such
examinations, evaluations, findings, and conclusions of the
Commission, and such recommendations with respect to
corrective measures (including changes in policies,
practices, organizational structures, and arrangements), as
have been agreed to by a majority of Commission members.
(b) Final Report.--Not later than 18 months after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Commission shall submit to
the President and Congress a final report containing such
examinations, evaluations, findings, and conclusions of the
Commission, and such recommendations with respect to
corrective measures (including changes in
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policies, practices, organizational structures, and
arrangements), as have been agreed to by a majority of
Commission members.
(c) Termination.--
(1) In general.--The Commission, and all the authorities of
this Act, shall terminate 60 days after the date on which the
final report is submitted under subsection (b).
(2) Administrative activities before termination.--The
Commission may use the 60-day period referred to in paragraph
(1) for the purpose of concluding its activities, including
providing testimony to committees of Congress concerning its
reports and disseminating the final report.
SEC. 12. FUNDING.
(a) In General.--Of the amounts authorized to be
appropriated for the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government for fiscal year
2004, $15,000,000 shall be available for transfer to the
Commission for purposes of the activities of the Commission
under this Act.
(b) Duration of Availability.--Amounts made available to
the Commission under subsection (a) shall remain available
until the termination of the Commission.
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