Congressional Record: July 22, 2003 (Senate)
Page S9710-S9736
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
By Mr. GRASSLEY (for himself and Mr. Leahy):
S. 1440. A bill to reform the Federal Bureau of Investigation; to the
Committee on the Judiciary.
Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I am proud to be reintroducing the FBI
Reform Act of 2003 with Senator Patrick Leahy. This reform bill is
designed to address the accountability problems that have plagued the
FBI for years. For almost a decade, I have been engaged in FBI
oversight, and during that time, I have seen numerous scandals and
coverups. I am pleased to see that Director Mueller is committed to
changing the culture of the FBI. He is making good strides toward
overcoming past bad policies and procedures at the Bureau. However,
Congress also has a role to play in this overhaul of the FBI.
A little over a year ago, a bill similar to this one was approved
unanimously by the Judiciary Committee. Since then, a number of the
provisions of that bill were enacted in separate legislation. However,
some of the most important provisions of that bill--provisions
protecting whistleblowers, creating a Security Career Program and
Counterintelligence Polygraph Program, and ending the double standard
for discipline of senior FBI executives--have yet to be taken up by the
full Senate. These provisions are needed to maintain America's
confidence in the FBI.
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When I was growing up, I was surrounded by a generation that believed
the FBI could do no wrong. Yet today at a time when we rely on the FBI
to protect us from acts of catastrophic terrorism that endanger the
lives of the American people, a time when the need for confidence in
the FBI is at its greatest, Americans' trust and confidence in the FBI
has been shaken. Do not get me wrong, the majority of FBI agents and
especially those who are posted all over the heartland of this country,
are honorable, hard working Federal servants who are doing a great job
of protecting us from harm. However, there are a few bad apples that
must be dealt with because their actions give the Bureau a black eye.
The spy cases of Robert Hanssen and Chinese espionage in Los Angeles
have highlighted internal security problems. Retaliation against agents
like John Roberts, Frank Perry, and Patrick Kiernan, who did their duty
investigating internal wrongdoing and spoke the truth to Congress,
highlight continuing cultural hostility to criticism. This bill goes a
long way to address these systemic problems and shore up trust and
confidence in the FBI in the wake of these concerns.
While Congress sometimes follows a hands-off approach to the FBI, the
Judiciary Committees hearings and other oversight activities over the
last 2 or 3 years have highlighted the actions that Congress needs to
take to do its part in reforming the Bureau. The hearings that spurred
this legislation demonstrated the need to extend adequate whistleblower
protections to the FBI, enhance the Bureau's internal security program,
end the double-standard for discipline, and modernize the FBI's
information technology systems. These and additional management issues
the committee has explored are reflected in this bill. As the Patriot
Act has increased the FBI's powers, as the American people have
increased their reliance on the FBI to stop terrorism, and as we
continue to increase the FBI's funding, it is time for Congress to take
action with a more hands-on approach. Let me provide some more detail
about the most important provisions of the FBI reform bill.
First, title I of the bill contains much needed protections for FBI
whistleblowers. As my colleagues know, I have long held that good
government requires that the brave men and women who blow the whistle
on wrongdoing be protected. It is my strong belief that disclosures of
wrongdoing by whistleblowers are an integral part of our system of
checks and balances. However, although whistleblowers play a critical
role in ensuring that waste, fraud, and abuse are brought to light and
that public health and safety problems are exposed, the same
whistleblower protection laws that apply to almost all other Federal
employees do not currently apply to the FBI. In fact, it is a violation
for FBI agents to report problems to Congress. That restriction leaves
patriotic, loyal FBI employees with little recourse. This bill will fix
that problem.
I truly believe that reform at the FBI will only occur when FBI
employees feel free to blow the whistle on wrongdoing. Without adequate
whistleblower protections, I am concerned that agents, such as Coleen
Rowley and others, who speak out about abuses and problems at the FBI
will be subject to retaliation. Thus, this bill finally gives FBI
whistleblowers the same rights and protections that other Federal
employees currently possess. When this bill is passed, FBI employees
who are retaliated against for blowing the whistle will be able to
avail themselves of all the protections afforded by the Whistleblower
Protection Act.
In order to enhance internal security at the FBI, title II of the
bill requires the FBI to establish a career security program and ensure
that appropriate management tools and resources are devoted to that
task. Modeled after the Department of Defense Acquisition Career
Program, security professional career development requirements would
bring the FBI into line with the other Federal agencies that handle top
secret intelligence. This bill establishes and defines the Career
Security Program and sets out the framework for career development and
training in internal security. With the development of a Career
Security Program, the FBI can meet the challenges of espionage,
information technology vulnerability, and the threat of direct
terrorist attack.
This bill requires the Attorney General to establish policies and
procedures for career management of FBI security personnel. It directs
the Director of the FBI to appoint a Director of Security who would
chair a security career program board that would advise in the
management of hiring, training, education, and career development. The
bill also requires the FBI Director to designate certain positions as
security positions. The bill requires that career paths to senior
positions be published, and it ensures that all FBI personnel would
have the opportunity to acquire the education, training and experience
needed for senior security positions. Moreover, in order to ensure that
security professionals gain the stature that special agents enjoy, the
bill provides that special agents would not have preference for
security positions and security positions could not be restricted to
special agents unless the Attorney General makes a special
determination.
Furthermore, the bill would direct that education, training, and
experience requirements be established for each position and that
before assignment as a manager or a deputy manager of a significant
security program, a person would have to complete an accredited
security program management course and have at least 6 years security
experience, including 2 years in a similar program.
In addition to the Security Career Program, the bill will also
enhance security through the creation of an FBI counterintelligence
polygraph program. The program would consist of the periodic screening
of employees and contractors who have access to sensitive information
or restricted data. While the program recognizes the value of polygraph
screening, it also provides safeguards for those subject to polygraph
examination. The bill directs that the program have procedures to
address false positives, ensure quality control, requires that no
adverse personnel action could be taken solely by reason of
physiological reaction on an exam without further investigation, and
provides that employees would have prompt access to unclassified
reports of their exams that relate to adverse personnel action. Thus,
title III provides increased security while at the same time protecting
employee rights.
Title IV requires the Attorney General to report on the legal
authority for the FBI's programs and activities. This report will help
the FBI focus on its most important duty--preventing terrorism--by
cutting back on the FBI's jurisdiction, which has become cumbersome and
unwieldy. Currently, the FBI investigates over 300 different Federal
offenses, which are divided between violent crime, white collar crime,
organized crime, drugs, national security, and civil rights. In many of
these areas, there are instances of concurrent or overlapping
jurisdiction with other Federal law enforcement agencies who specialize
in investigating these crimes.
The FBI needs to scale back on the broad range of investigations
which are duplicated by other Federal and State agencies. The Bureau
needs to completely jettison some of these areas and in other areas,
the Bureau could simply take a secondary role, allowing another agency
to take the lead. In order to assist the FBI in scaling back its
jurisdiction, this bill directs the Attorney General to report to
Congress on the legal authority for FBI programs and activities,
identifying those that have express statutory authority and those that
do not. The bill also requires the Attorney General to recommend what
criminal statutes for which he believes the FBI should have
investigative responsibility.
Additionally, there exists a gross inequality in the way Senior
Executive Service, SES, employees of the FBI and rank and file agents
are disciplined. SES employees are often given a slap on the wrist for
an infraction, whereas the rank and file agents are often punished to
the letter of the law. Title V of the bill attempts to address this
double standard. The bill attempts to address the double standard by
providing some flexibility in how SES employees can be punished. The
Senate Judiciary Committee has heard repeatedly that this inflexibility
is one of the main causes for the inequality in punishment at the FBI.
Under the current
[[Page S9714]]
system, the minimum suspension that an SES employee can receive is 14
days. This means that the FBI's management is often left with the
choice of either an overly harsh penalty or no penalty at all. Often
they decide not to impose any meaningful disciplinary action.
In order to attempt to remedy this problem our bill lifts the 14-day
minimum suspension for SES disciplinary cases to provide for additional
options in disciplining senior executive employees. Hopefully, this
change will help to remedy this double standard. In addition, our bill
would require the Office of Inspector General to submit to the
Judiciary Committees of both houses, for 5 years, annual reports by the
FBI Office of Professional Responsibility on its investigations,
recommendations, and their disposition including an analysis of whether
any double standard is being employed.
Finally, title VI of the bill attempts to provide further enhancement
to security at the Department of Justice as a whole. This title would
implement recommendations of the Webster Commission for enhancing
security at the DOJ. It requires the Attorney General to submit a
report to Congress on the manner by which the Department plans to
improve protection of security information at the DOJ. Moreover, this
title authorizes funds to meet the demands for increased security at
the DOJ. Also, the bill would authorize funds for the DOJ Office of
Intelligence Policy and Review to help meet the increased demands to
combat terrorism, process applications to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court, participate effectively in counterespionage
investigations, provide policy analysis and oversight on national
security matters, and enhance computer and telecommunications security.
Mr. President, I say to my fellow colleagues, it is time we acted on
the reforms in this bill. It has been almost a year since this bill
passed unanimously out of committee. Let's act to reform the FBI and
help maintain America's trust and confidence in the Bureau.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 1440
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Federal Bureau of
Investigation Reform Act of 2003''.
TITLE I--WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION
SEC. 101. INCREASING PROTECTIONS FOR FBI WHISTLEBLOWERS.
Section 2303 of title 5, United States Code, is amended to
read as follows:
``Sec. 2303. Prohibited personnel practices in the Federal
Bureau of Investigation
``(a) Definition.--In this section, the term `personnel
action' means any action described in clauses (i) through (x)
of section 2302(a)(2)(A).
``(b) Prohibited Practices.--Any employee of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation who has the authority to take, direct
others to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action,
shall not, with respect to such authority, take or fail to
take a personnel action with respect to any employee of the
Bureau or because of--
``(1) any disclosure of information by the employee to the
Attorney General (or an employee designated by the Attorney
General for such purpose), a supervisor of the employee, the
Inspector General for the Department of Justice, or a Member
of Congress that the employee reasonably believes evidences--
``(A) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation; or
``(B) mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of
authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public
health or safety; or
``(2) any disclosure of information by the employee to the
Special Counsel of information that the employee reasonably
believes evidences--
``(A) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation; or
``(B) mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of
authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public
health or safety,
if such disclosure is not specifically prohibited by law and
if such information is not specifically required by Executive
order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense
or the conduct of foreign affairs.
``(c) Individual Right of Action.--Chapter 12 of this title
shall apply to an employee of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation who claims that a personnel action has been
taken under this section against the employee as a reprisal
for any disclosure of information described in subsection
(b)(2).
``(d) Regulations.--The Attorney General shall prescribe
regulations to ensure that a personnel action under this
section shall not be taken against an employee of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation as a reprisal for any disclosure of
information described in subsection (b)(1), and shall provide
for the enforcement of such regulations in a manner
consistent with applicable provisions of sections 1214 and
1221, and in accordance with the procedures set forth in
sections 554 through 557 and 701 through 706.''.
TITLE II--FBI SECURITY CAREER PROGRAM
SEC. 201. SECURITY MANAGEMENT POLICIES.
The Attorney General shall establish policies and
procedures for the effective management (including accession,
education, training, and career development) of persons
serving in security positions in the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
SEC. 202. DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.
(a) In General.--Subject to the authority, direction, and
control of the Attorney General, the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (referred to in this title as the
``Director'') shall carry out all powers, functions, and
duties of the Attorney General with respect to the security
workforce in the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(b) Policy Implementation.--The Director shall ensure that
the policies of the Attorney General established in
accordance with this Act are implemented throughout the
Federal Bureau of Investigation at both the headquarters and
field office levels.
SEC. 203. DIRECTOR OF SECURITY.
The Director shall appoint a Director of Security, or such
other title as the Director may determine, to assist the
Director in the performance of the duties of the Director
under this Act.
SEC. 204. SECURITY CAREER PROGRAM BOARDS.
(a) Establishment.--The Director acting through the
Director of Security shall establish a security career
program board to advise the Director in managing the hiring,
training, education, and career development of personnel in
the security workforce of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
(b) Composition of Board.--The security career program
board shall include--
(1) the Director of Security (or a representative of the
Director of Security);
(2) the senior officials, as designated by the Director,
with responsibility for personnel management;
(3) the senior officials, as designated by the Director,
with responsibility for information management;
(4) the senior officials, as designated by the Director,
with responsibility for training and career development in
the various security disciplines; and
(5) such other senior officials for the intelligence
community as the Director may designate.
(c) Chairperson.--The Director of Security (or a
representative of the Director of Security) shall be the
chairperson of the board.
(d) Subordinate Boards.--The Director of Security may
establish a subordinate board structure to which functions of
the security career program board may be delegated.
SEC. 205. DESIGNATION OF SECURITY POSITIONS.
(a) Designation.--The Director shall designate, by
regulation, those positions in the Federal Bureau of
Investigation that are security positions for purposes of
this Act.
(b) Required Positions.--In designating security positions
under subsection (a), the Director shall include, at a
minimum, all security-related positions in the areas of--
(1) personnel security and access control;
(2) information systems security and information assurance;
(3) physical security and technical surveillance
countermeasures;
(4) operational, program, and industrial security; and
(5) information security and classification management.
SEC. 206. CAREER DEVELOPMENT.
(a) Career Paths.--The Director shall ensure that
appropriate career paths for personnel who wish to pursue
careers in security are identified in terms of the education,
training, experience, and assignments necessary for career
progression to the most senior security positions and shall
make available published information on those career paths.
(b) Limitation on Preference for Special Agents.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in the policy
established under paragraph (2), the Attorney General shall
ensure that no requirement or preference for a Special Agent
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (referred to in this
title as a ``Special Agent'') is used in the consideration of
persons for security positions.
(2) Policy.--The Attorney General shall establish a policy
that permits a particular security position to be specified
as available only to Special Agents, if a determination is
made, under criteria specified in the policy, that a Special
Agent--
(A) is required for that position by law;
(B) is essential for performance of the duties of the
position; or
(C) is necessary for another compelling reason.
(3) Report.--Not later than December 15 of each year, the
Director shall submit to the Attorney General a report that
lists--
(A) each security position that is restricted to Special
Agents under the policy established under paragraph (2); and
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(B) the recommendation of the Director as to whether each
restricted security position should remain restricted.
(c) Opportunities To Qualify.--The Attorney General shall
ensure that all personnel, including Special Agents, are
provided the opportunity to acquire the education, training,
and experience necessary to qualify for senior security
positions.
(d) Best Qualified.--The Attorney General shall ensure that
the policies established under this Act are designed to
provide for the selection of the best qualified individual
for a position, consistent with other applicable law.
(e) Assignments Policy.--The Attorney General shall
establish a policy for assigning Special Agents to security
positions that provides for a balance between--
(1) the need for personnel to serve in career enhancing
positions; and
(2) the need for requiring service in each such position
for sufficient time to provide the stability necessary to
carry out effectively the duties of the position and to allow
for the establishment of responsibility and accountability
for actions taken in the position.
(f) Length of Assignment.--In implementing the policy
established under subsection (b)(2), the Director shall
provide, as appropriate, for longer lengths of assignments to
security positions than assignments to other positions.
(g) Performance Appraisals.--The Director shall provide an
opportunity for review and inclusion of any comments on any
appraisal of the performance of a person serving in a
security position by a person serving in a security position
in the same security career field.
(h) Balanced Workforce Policy.--In the development of
security workforce policies under this Act with respect to
any employees or applicants for employment, the Attorney
General shall, consistent with the merit system principles
set out in paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 2301(b) of title
5, United States Code, take into consideration the need to
maintain a balanced workforce in which women and members of
racial and ethnic minority groups are appropriately
represented in Government service.
SEC. 207. GENERAL EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND EXPERIENCE
REQUIREMENTS.
(a) In General.--The Director shall establish education,
training, and experience requirements for each security
position, based on the level of complexity of duties carried
out in the position.
(b) Qualification Requirements.--Before being assigned to a
position as a program manager or deputy program manager of a
significant security program, a person--
(1) must have completed a security program management
course that is accredited by the Intelligence Community-
Department of Defense Joint Security Training Consortium or
is determined to be comparable by the Director; and
(2) must have not less than 6 years experience in security,
of which not less than 2 years were performed in a similar
program office or organization.
SEC. 208. EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROGRAMS.
(a) In General.--The Director, in consultation with the
Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of
Defense, shall establish and implement education and training
programs for persons serving in security positions in the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(b) Other Programs.--The Director shall ensure that
programs established under subsection (a) are established and
implemented, to the maximum extent practicable, uniformly
with the programs of the Intelligence Community and the
Department of Defense.
SEC. 209. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT APPROVAL.
(a) In General.--The Attorney General shall submit any
requirement that is established under section 207 to the
Director of the Office of Personnel Management for approval.
(b) Final Approval.--If the Director does not disapprove
the requirements established under section 207 within 30 days
after the date on which the Director receives the
requirement, the requirement is deemed to be approved by the
Director of the Office of Personnel Management.
TITLE III--FBI COUNTERINTELLIGENCE POLYGRAPH PROGRAM
SEC. 301. DEFINITIONS.
In this title:
(1) Polygraph program.--The term ``polygraph program''
means the counterintelligence screening polygraph program
established under section 302.
(2) Polygraph review.--The term ``Polygraph Review'' means
the review of the scientific validity of the polygraph for
counterintelligence screening purposes conducted by the
Committee to Review the Scientific Evidence on the Polygraph
of the National Academy of Sciences.
SEC. 302. ESTABLISHMENT OF PROGRAM.
Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this
Act, the Attorney General, in consultation with the Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Director of
Security of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall
establish a counterintelligence screening polygraph program
for the Federal Bureau of Investigation that consists of
periodic polygraph examinations of employees, or contractor
employees of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who are in
positions specified by the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation as exceptionally sensitive in order to minimize
the potential for unauthorized release or disclosure of
exceptionally sensitive information.
SEC. 303. REGULATIONS.
(a) In General.--The Attorney General shall prescribe
regulations for the polygraph program in accordance with
subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5, United States Code
(commonly referred to as the Administrative Procedures Act).
(b) Considerations.--In prescribing regulations under
subsection (a), the Attorney General shall--
(1) take into account the results of the Polygraph Review;
and
(2) include procedures for--
(A) identifying and addressing false positive results of
polygraph examinations;
(B) ensuring that adverse personnel actions are not taken
against an individual solely by reason of the physiological
reaction of the individual to a question in a polygraph
examination, unless--
(i) reasonable efforts are first made independently to
determine through alternative means, the veracity of the
response of the individual to the question; and
(ii) the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
determines personally that the personnel action is justified;
(C) ensuring quality assurance and quality control in
accordance with any guidance provided by the Department of
Defense Polygraph Institute and the Director of Central
Intelligence; and
(D) allowing any employee or contractor who is the subject
of a counterintelligence screening polygraph examination
under the polygraph program, upon written request, to have
prompt access to any unclassified reports regarding an
examination that relates to any adverse personnel action
taken with respect to the individual.
SEC. 304. REPORT ON FURTHER ENHANCEMENT OF FBI PERSONNEL
SECURITY PROGRAM.
(a) In General.--Not later than 9 months after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation shall submit to Congress a report setting forth
recommendations for any legislative action that the Director
considers appropriate in order to enhance the personnel
security program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(b) Polygraph Review Results.--Any recommendation under
subsection (a) regarding the use of polygraphs shall take
into account the results of the Polygraph Review.
TITLE IV--REPORTS
SEC. 401. REPORT ON LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR FBI PROGRAMS AND
ACTIVITIES.
(a) In General.--Not later than 9 months after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall submit to
Congress a report describing the statutory and other legal
authority for all programs and activities of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
(b) Contents.--The report submitted under subsection (a)
shall describe--
(1) the titles within the United States Code and the
statutes for which the Federal Bureau of Investigation
exercises investigative responsibility;
(2) each program or activity of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation that has express statutory authority and the
statute which provides that authority; and
(3) each program or activity of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation that does not have express statutory authority,
and the source of the legal authority for that program or
activity.
(c) Recommendations.--The report submitted under subsection
(a) shall recommend whether--
(1) the Federal Bureau of Investigation should continue to
have investigative responsibility for each statute for which
the Federal Bureau of Investigation currently has
investigative responsibility;
(2) the legal authority for any program or activity of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation should be modified or
repealed;
(3) the Federal Bureau of Investigation should have express
statutory authority for any program or activity of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation for which the Federal Bureau
of Investigation does not currently have express statutory
authority; and
(4) the Federal Bureau of Investigation should--
(A) have authority for any new program or activity; and
(B) express statutory authority with respect to any new
programs or activities.
TITLE V--ENDING THE DOUBLE STANDARD
SEC. 501. ALLOWING DISCIPLINARY SUSPENSIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE
SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE FOR 14 DAYS OR LESS.
Section 7542 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by
striking ``for more than 14 days''.
SEC. 502. SUBMITTING OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
REPORTS TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.
(a) In General.--For each of the 5 years following the date
of enactment of this Act, the Office of the Inspector General
shall submit to the chairperson and ranking member of the
Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of
Representatives an annual report to be completed by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Professional
Responsibility and provided to the Inspector General, which
sets forth--
(1) basic information on each investigation completed by
that Office;
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(2) the findings and recommendations of that Office for
disciplinary action; and
(3) what, if any, action was taken by the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation or the designee of the
Director based on any such recommendation.
(b) Contents.--In addition to all matters already included
in the annual report described in subsection (a), the report
shall also include an analysis of--
(1) whether senior Federal Bureau of Investigation
employees and lower level Federal Bureau of Investigation
personnel are being disciplined and investigated similarly;
and
(2) whether any double standard is being employed to more
senior employees with respect to allegations of misconduct.
TITLE VI--ENHANCING SECURITY AT THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
SEC. 601. REPORT ON THE PROTECTION OF SECURITY AND
INFORMATION AT THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.
Not later than 9 months after the date of enactment of this
Act, the Attorney General shall submit to Congress a report
on the manner in which the Security and Emergency Planning
Staff, the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, and the
Chief Information Officer of the Department of Justice plan
to improve the protection of security and information at the
Department of Justice, including a plan to establish secure
electronic communications between the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Office of Intelligence Policy and
Review for processing information related to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et
seq.).
SEC. 602. AUTHORIZATION FOR INCREASED RESOURCES TO PROTECT
SECURITY AND INFORMATION.
There are authorized to be appropriated to the Department
of Justice for the activities of the Security and Emergency
Planning Staff to meet the increased demands to provide
personnel, physical, information, technical, and litigation
security for the Department of Justice, to prepare for
terrorist threats and other emergencies, and to review
security compliance by components of the Department of
Justice--
(1) $13,000,000 for fiscal years 2004 and 2005;
(2) $17,000,000 for fiscal year 2006; and
(3) $22,000,000 for fiscal year 2007.
SEC. 603. AUTHORIZATION FOR INCREASED RESOURCES TO FULFILL
NATIONAL SECURITY MISSION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE.
There are authorized to be appropriated to the Department
of Justice for the activities of the Office of Intelligence
Policy and Review to help meet the increased personnel
demands to combat terrorism, process applications to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, participate
effectively in counterespionage investigations, provide
policy analysis and oversight on national security matters,
and enhance secure computer and telecommunications
facilities--
(1) $7,000,000 for fiscal years 2004 and 2005;
(2) $7,500,000 for fiscal year 2006; and
(3) $8,000,000 for fiscal year 2007.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I am pleased to introduce today, with my
friend the senior Senator from Iowa, the FBI Reform Act of 2003.
This legislation stems from the lessons learned during a series of
Judiciary Committee hearings on oversight of the FBI that I chaired
beginning in June 2001. The important changes which are being made
under the FBI's leadership after the September 11 attacks and the new
powers granted the FBI by the USA PATRIOT Act have resulted in FBI
reform becoming a pressing matter of national importance.
Since 9/11 and the anthrax attacks later that fall, we have relied on
the FBI to detect and prevent acts of catastrophic terrorism that
endanger the lives of the American people and the institutions of our
country. The men and women of the FBI are performing this task with
great professionalism at home and abroad. We have all felt safer as a
result of the full mobilization of the FBI's dedicated Special Agents,
its expert support personnel, and its exceptional technical
capabilities. We owe the men and women of the FBI our thanks.
For decades the FBI has been an outstanding law enforcement agency
and a vital member of the United States intelligence community. As our
hearings and recent events have shown, however, there is room for
improvement at the FBI. To fully rise to its current challenges, the
FBI must face and understand the mistakes of the past and make the
changes needed to ensure that they are not repeated. In meeting the
international terrorist challenge, the Congress has an opportunity and
obligation to strengthen the institutional fiber of the FBI based on
lessons learned from recent problems the Bureau has experienced.
This view is not mine alone. When FBI Director Mueller testified at
his confirmation hearings in July 2001, he forthrightly acknowledged
``that the Bureau's remarkable legacy of service and accomplishment has
been tarnished by some serious and highly publicized problems in recent
years. Waco, Ruby Ridge, the FBI lab, Wen Ho Lee, Robert Hanssen and
the McVeigh documents--these familiar names and events remind us all
that the FBI is far from perfect and that the next director faces
significant management and administrative challenges.'' Since then, the
Judiciary Committee has forged a constructive partnership with Director
Mueller to get the FBI back on track.
Congress sometimes has followed a hands-off approach about the FBI.
But with the FBI's new increased powers, with our increased reliance on
the Bureau to prevent terrorism, and with the increased funding
provided by the Congress should come increased scrutiny and
accountability. Until the Bureau's problems are resolved and new
challenges overcome, we should be taking a hands-on approach.
Indeed our hearings and other oversight activities have highlighted
tangible steps the Congress should take in an FBI Reform bill as part
of this hands-on approach. Among other things, these hearings
demonstrated the need to extend whistleblower protection, end the
double standard for discipline of senior FBI executives, and enhance
the FBI's internal security program to protect against espionage as
occurred in the Hanssen case.
Director Mueller once said it is ``critically important'' that he
``hears criticisms of the organization . . . in order to improve the
organization.'' I could not agree more. More than ever, the FBI must be
open to new ideas, to criticism from within and without, and to facing
up to and learning from past mistakes.
During the last Congress, the Judiciary Committee unanimously
approved the Leahy-Grassley FBI Reform Act of 2001. Unfortunately, our
bipartisan efforts were stymied by an anonymous Republican hold, which
prevented the bill from being considered on the floor. While we did
eventually succeed in passing three of the bill's important reform
provisions as part of the Department of Justice authorization act,
other needed reforms were senselessly blocked. These reforms, which
remain as important and urgent as ever, are included in the bill we
introduce today.
There are five key elements of our bill.
First, it strengthens whistleblower protection for FBI employees and
protects them from retaliation for reporting wrongdoing.
Second, it addresses the issue of a double standard for discipline of
senior executives by eliminating the disparity in authorized
punishments between Senior Executive Service members and other Federal
employees.
Third, it establishes an FBI Counterintelligence Polygraph Program
for screening personnel in exceptionally sensitive positions with
specific safeguards.
Fourth, it establishes an FBI Career Security Program, which would
bring the FBI into line with other U.S. intelligence agencies that have
strong career security professional cadres whose skills and leadership
are dedicated to the protection of agency information, personnel, and
facilities.
And fifth, it requires a set of reports that would enable Congress to
engage the Executive branch in a constructive dialogue building a more
effective FBI for the future.
The FBI Reform Act is designed to strengthen the FBI as an
institution that has a unique role as both a law enforcement agency and
a member of the intelligence community. As the Judiciary Committee
continues its oversight work and more is learned about recent FBI
performance, additional reforms may prove necessary. Especially
important will be the lessons learned from the attacks of September 11,
the anthrax attacks, and implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act and
other counterterrorism measures.
We need to help the FBI become as effective, as accountable and as
agile as the American people need it to be to counter the threat of
terrorism on our shores.
Strengthening the FBI cannot be accomplished overnight, but with this
legislation, we take an important step into the FBI's future.
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