Congressional Record: July 22, 2003 (Senate)
Page S9701-S9703
FBI CHALLENGES
Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
faces tremendous challenges in the war on terrorism, particularly with
its internal operations, where a culture of fear, retaliation, and
coverup demoralize agents and weaken the organizations.
Director Mueller has taken at least two important steps to address
this culture. First, he has recognized it, making him one of the first
Directors in recent memory to acknowledge the problem. His appointment
of Judge Griffin Bell and Dr. Lee Colwell to study the Office of
Professional Responsibility, OPR, is an excellent example of his
recognizing the seriousness of the problem.
Second, Director Mueller has translated this attitude into action.
For example, earlier this year, he justly and fairly punished a senior
manager, which was especially noteworthy because he had been handpicked
by the Director for the job. Just a few years ago, I could not have
imagined an FBI Director taking action against a top official the way
he did with Robert Jordan, the Assistant Director of OPR. By
implementing the recommended punishment of the Justice Department
Inspector General (DOJ OIG), Director Mueller fairly applied high
standards to a senior-level FBI official.
I commend the Director for these positive developments, and that is
why I feel the following issues are important.
Specifically, I am concerned about the FBI recently awarding
contracts to several former senior officials involved in wrongdoing
during their careers. The former top officials are Charles Mathews III,
who recently retired from the position of Special Agent in Charge of
the Portland, OR, Division; Thomas Coyle, who held the position of
Assistant Director, Personnel Division; and Special Agent in Charge of
the Buffalo, NY, Division; and Joseph Wolfinger, who retired in the
late 1990s from the position of Assistant Director of the Training
Division in Quantico, VA.
First, it is my understanding that Mr. Mathews recently was selected
to accompany several current FBI officials on a trip to Jakarta,
Indonesia, to conduct training for law enforcement and security
officials.
Second, it is my understanding that MPRI, an Alexandria VA, defense
and security contracting company, was awarded a contract worth between
$500,000 and $1.5 million to conduct counter-intelligence training for
FBI agents. Mr. Wolfinger, who holds the title of Senior Vice President
and General Manager, heads MPRI's ``Alexandria Group,'' which ``will
provide the highest quality education, training, and organizational
expertise, to law enforcement and corporations around the world,''
according to the company's Web site. Mr. Coyle is listed as ``Senior
Law Enforcement Affiliate'' for the company.
One reason I have questions about these former officials and/or their
companies obtaining contracts is that they were involved in the Ruby
Ridge scandal (Mathews) and the ``Pottsgate'' scandal (Wolfinger). Mr.
Coyle was involved with both Ruby Ridge and Pottsgate.
Ruby Ridge refers not only the deadly 1992 standoff at the Idaho home
of Randall Weaver, but also the ensuring coverups of misconduct and
lying by senior FBI officials. The Pottsgate scandal refers to the sham
conference held in 1997 so friends and co-workers of then-Deputy
Director Larry Potts could fly to Washington for his retirement party
on the taxpayers' dime, rather than their own personal money.
It is not worth repeating the long and sorry history of the
misconduct of all the senior-level officials involved in the Ruby Ridge
standoff; Pottsgate; the ensuing investigations, re-investigations, and
reviews of investigations; and the failure to take appropriate
disciplinary action in both matters. A full recounting covering more
than a dozen officials who were involved in wrongdoing would take
hundreds of pages.
The most comprehensive, public details of these two scandals are
outlined in the DOJ OIG's report, entitled ``A Review of Allegations of
a Double Standard of Discipline at the FBI,'' issued in November 2002.
The FBI's reputation and integrity suffered enough when these men
escaped any appropriate discipline for wrongdoing during their careers.
Not only did they avoid accountability, but recent developments
indicate that their former colleagues and friends are rewarding them
with lucrative contracts. I am sure this is not the lesson Director
Mueller wants agents and the public to learn about the FBI and the way
it handles misconduct in its top ranks.
Before I explain my other concerns about Mr. Mathews, Mr. Wolfinger/
MPRI, and Mr. Coyle/MPRI profiting--either directly of indirectly--from
these contracts, a brief explanation of their involvement in misconduct
is necessary. The following is based on the DOJ OIG's report on the
double standard in discipline.
Mr. Mathews, in June 1994, led an internal inquiry into the findings
of a previous criminal investigation regarding allegations of FBI
misconduct during the Ruby Ridge standoff. Danny Coulson, for whom Mr.
Mathews worked from 1988 to 1990 in Portand, OR, was one subject of the
criminal probes and Mr. Mathews' inquiry.
Mr. Mathews' probe led to discipline for several agents and officials
at the scene of the standoff, but not for any headquarters officials--
including Mr. Coulson and his boss, Mr. Potts. Later, the Justice
Department, DOJ, conducted criminal and administrative investigations
into new allegations, including that Mr. Mathews and his investigation
covered up misconduct. While under investigation for those issues, Mr.
Mathews was promoted twice, and shortly after that DOJ investigation
ended in 2001, he was promoted a third time to head the Portland, OR,
Division. After contradictory conclusions at the senior levels of the
DOJ under former Attorney General Janet Reno, Mr. Mathews, like other
senior officials, escaped any discipline.
However, the November 2002 DOJ OIG report later determined that:
Mathews should have been disciplined for failure to carry
out [his] assigned duties--completing thorough and impartial
inquiries--regardless of whether there was evidence of
improper motivation. Moreover,
[[Page S9702]]
like DOJ OPR, we believe that there was sufficient evidence
in the record to sustain a finding that [Mathews] acted with
an improper purpose. (Page 64)
The DOJ OIG report also stated:
We also believe that Mathews' failure to rescue himself
despite his relationship with Coulson, taken together with
his statements and the unsubstantiated findings in his report
regarding approval of the rules of engagement, established by
a preponderance of the evidence that Mathews conducted an
inadequate investigation. (Page 64)
The Pottsgate scandal refers to the allegation, among others, that
Mr. Wolfinger, in October of 1997, arranged a conference to justify
official business travel to Washington, DC, of senior officials so they
could attend the retirement party of Mr. Potts, who was Deputy Director
of the FBI at the time. The investigation focused on whether: the
``conference'' was a sham; it was used to justify the personal travel
of officials to Washington for the party; those officials
misrepresented their actions on travel forms and other government
documents; and the officials were less than honest to investigators
about their actions.
Mr. Wolfinger, the Assistant Director of the Training Division in
Quantico, VA, was the organizer of the Thursday, October 9, 1997,
retirement party for Mr. Potts. Just 7 days before the party, Mr.
Wolfinger ordered a subordinate to send out a communication to the
field announcing a conference for Special agents in charge, SACs, on
Friday, October 10, 1997, the day after the party.
This ``conference'' was unusual in several ways, as the DOJ OIG
November 2002 report points out. The conference--
announcement did not contain a conference schedule, a
starting or concluding time, a training identification
number, or travel instructions. The conference was scheduled
for a Friday, normally a travel day for FBI employees
following the conclusion of conferences. (Page 17)
The DOJ OIG report identifies other unusual characteristics of the
``conference.'' Only five people attended: Mr. Wolfinger, the
subordinate he ordered to organize it, two SACs, and another
individual. The agent who was ordered to give a presentation was told
of the conference only 3 days before, on October 7, 1997. The
conference had no formal agenda, and it lasted between 45 minutes and
90 minutes, rather than all day.
Despite the damning evidence, a disciplinary board of Senior
Executive Service, SES, officials decided the ``conference'' was not a
sham, though the board did conclude ``the planners exercised poor
judgment in not properly preparing for it.'' (Page 26)
The DOJ OIG report notes that it is unclear exactly what action, if
any, the board during two meetings decided to take against Mr.
Wolfinger, who retired shortly after the board's meetings. Ultimately,
however, it appears that Mr. Wolfinger was not punished. Michael Defeo,
the Assistant Director of FBI OPR at the time, told the DOJ OIG that
``no recommendation as to Wolfinger was ultimately made . . .'' (Page
28)
Mr. Coyle, a coworker of Mr. Wolfinger at MPRI, was one member of the
disciplinary board in the Pottsgate matter. The DOJ OIG concluded:
Coyle should not have participated because, at a minimum,
an appearance of a conflict of interest existed, if not an
actual conflict of interest. (Page 30)
As the DOJ OIG report notes, at the time of the board's decisions,
Mr. Coyle and Mr. Potts were subjects of the Ruby Ridge investigation.
The DOJ OIG wrote:
It was well known that many people wanted to attend the
Potts retirement party to show support for him because of the
Ruby Ridge investigation. That attitude was likely to be
especially strong for someone like Coyle who also was a Ruby
Ridge subject. We believe that Coyle should have recused
himself or been removed from these Board proceedings. (Page
30)
The actions of these officials during their careers at the FBI are
troubling. That is why I sent Director Mueller a letter today asking
questions about the contracts these men were awarded. I asked for a
response by Wednesday, August 27, 2003.
Mr. Chairman, I also ask that the letter, dated today, July 22, be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
July 22, 2003.
Hon. Robert Mueller,
Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Washington, DC.
Dear Director Mueller: The purpose of this letter is to
inquire about the FBI recently awarding contracts to several
former senior officials. The former top officials are Charles
Mathews III, who recently retired from the position of
Special Agent in Charge of the Portland, Oregon Division;
Thomas Coyle, who held the position of Assistant Director,
Personnel Division, and Special Agent in Charge of the
Buffalo, New York Division; and Joseph Wolfinger, who retired
in the later 1990s from the position of Assistant Director of
the Training Division in Quanticao, Virginia.
First, it is my understanding that Mr. Methews recently was
selected to accompany several current FBI officials on a trip
to Jakarta, Indonesia, to conduct training for law
enforcement and security officials.
Second, it is my understanding that MPRI, an Alexandria,
Virginia defense and security contracting company, was
awarded a contract worth between $500,000 and $1.5 million to
conduct counter-intelligence training for FBI agents. Mr.
Wolfinger, who holds the title of Senior Vice President and
General Manager, heads MPRI's ``Alexandria Group,'' which
``will provide the highest quality education, training and
organizational expertise, to law enforcement and corporations
around the world,'' according to the company's Web site. Mr.
Coyle is listed as ``Senior Law Enforcement Affiliate'' for
the company.
(1) Mr. Wolfinger and Mr. Coyle.
(A) Please provide a list of Mr. Wolfinger's involvement in
counterintelligence cases during his career in the FBI,
including the John Walker spy case. This list should include
the name of the counterintelligence investigation, a brief
description of the case, his role in the case, his title and
place of work at the time. Also, please provide detailed
information on any counterintelligence training Mr. Wolfinger
participated in or led during his career at the FBI.
(B) What role did Mr. Wolfinger, David Szady, Assistant
Director of the Counterintelligence Division, and Beverly
Andrews, a Deputy Assistant Director in the
Counterintelligence Division, play in the John Walker spy
case? This reply should include their titles and place of
work at the time, their duties and responsibilities, and the
time period each person worked on the case.
(C) Did their relationship play any role in the awarding of
the contract to Mr. Wolfinger and MPRI?
(D) Did any FBI official, in the course of awarding the
contract, consider the potential appearance of favoritism if
the contract was awarded to Mr. Wolfinger and MPRI?
(E) Please describe in detail the role that Mr. Wolfinger
and Mr. Coyle play in supervising MPRI contract personnel
conducting the counterintelligence training, and their role
in fulfilling the contract in general.
(F) What objective performance measurements does the DBI
employ to check whether MPRI personnel on this contract are
tardy or absent from some training sessions, or lack the
appropriate security clearances?
(G) Please provide all documents and materials relating to
performance evaluations of MPRI contract personnel, including
for Mr. Wolfinger and Mr. Coyle.
(H) Who was/were the deciding official(s) at the FBI who
selected Mr. Wolfinger/MPRI for this contract? In addition,
please identify all the persons involved in the contract
process, including those persons dealing with the Request For
Proposal, evaluating bids and making the decision to award
the contract.
(I) Please provide all records generated in the course of
selecting a company for this contract, including information
submitted by MPRI, Mr. Wolfinger, and other bidders on the
contract, as well as FBI records. This reply should include
the FBI's Request For Proposal, detailed criteria used to
evaluate the bidders and select MPRI.
(J) Please provide any records of contacts between the
deciding official(s) for this contract and Mr. Szady or Ms.
Andrews. This list of contacts should include copies of,
among other things, all (1) e-mail; (2) facsimiles; (3)
facsimile logs; (4) correspondence; (5) memoranda; (6)
telephone bills and logs; (7) notes; (8) working papers; (9)
reports; (10) minutes of meetings, transcripts or electronic
recording that the FBI or its employees, contractors or
counsel have in their control or possession regarding the
contract.
(K) Please provide a copy of the contract. In addition,
provide in summary form the compensation and general
conditions and terms, as well as any modifications, deletions
and changes.
(2) Mr. Mathews
(A) By what criteria and on what basis was Mr. Mathews
selected for the trip of FBI officials to Jakarta, Indonesia
for a training seminar? This reply should include details of
Mr. Mathews qualifications for the specific purpose of the
trip. This reply should also include, if relevant, the FBI's
Request for Proposal, Mr. Mathews bid, and other bids. If
this was not a competitively bid contract, please explain the
selection process in detail.
(B) Who was/were the deciding official(s) at the FBI who
selected Mr. Mathews for this trip? Please identify all
persons--including title and place of work--involved in
selecting Mr. Mathews for the trip.
(C) Was Mr. Mathews compensation approximately $7,000 for
this 10-day trip, plus expenses? If not, please explain what
his compensation was, including expenses billed to the FBI.
[[Page S9703]]
(D) Please provide the names, affiliation and titles of all
other persons who went on the trip, whether they are or were
employed by the U.S. government or not.
(E) Please provide detailed information on the nature and
purpose of the trip, including the names and a brief synopsis
of lectures or seminars provided by Mr. Mathews and others on
the trip.
(F) What official government-issued identification or
identity documents did Mr. Mathews use for his travel?
(G) Please provide a copy of Mr. Mathews' contract for this
trip. In addition, please provide copies of, among other
things, all (1) e-mail; (2) facsimiles; (3) facsimile logs;
(4) correspondence; (5) memoranda; (6) telephone bills and
logs; (7) notes; (8) working papers; (9) reports; (10)
minutes of meetings, transcripts or electronic recordings
that the FBI or its employees, contractors or counsel have in
their control or possession regarding the contract.
(I) Will Mr. Mathews be considered for future contracts
with the FBI?
I ask that these questions be answered, and requested
documents provided, by Wednesday, August 27, 2003. Once the
answers and documents are provided, I ask that the
appropriate FBI officials brief interested committee staff on
this matter.
Sincerely,
Charles E. Grassley.
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