Congressional Record: July 22, 2003 (Senate)
Page S9667-S9671
MISLEADING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, last week there was a historic meeting of
the Senate Intelligence Committee, of which I am a member. Director
Tenet of the Central Intelligence Agency came before us. There has been
a lot written and said about that meeting of the Intelligence
Committee.
I think what is important is we reflect on what has occurred since
that meeting because I think it speaks volumes about where we are in
America when it comes to the issue of being
[[Page S9668]]
critical of this administration, its policies, and its use of
intelligence.
At issue, of course, were 16 words in the President's State of the
Union Address last January. This address on January 28 included the
following statement by the President of the United States:
The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein
recently sought significant quantities of uranium from
Africa.
This sentence was part of a speech delivered by the President, the
most important speech any President delivers in the course of a given
year, at a time in our Nation's history when we were asked to rally
behind our troops and our President to invade the nation of Iraq. This
was a moment, of course, of great consequence because not only was
America's foreign policy about to be decided in relation to the Middle
East, but families across America were going to be asked to send their
sons and daughters, husbands and wives, and loved ones into harm's way.
The words have to be measured carefully because the consequences of
those words are so serious.
Many people have said, What was wrong with the President's statement?
The British intelligence was insisting that they had evidence that, in
fact, Iraq had tried to obtain uranium, fissile material to build
nuclear weapons from Niger, an African nation. It turns out there was
much more to the story. In addition to the efforts of British
intelligence, our own intelligence agencies had been looking closely at
the same issue and had come to the opposite conclusion. They decided
that the evidence presented did not make the case. In fact, in October
of 2002, when President Bush was going to give a very important speech
in Cincinnati, OH, outlining the reasons he believed we should be
mindful of the threat of Iraq, White House staffers--Mr. Hadley, who
was with the security portion of the White House--wanted to include in
that speech the same reference to this sale of uranium from Niger to
Iraq. He was cautioned by the Central Intelligence Agency in October
not to include it because the sources of the information, according to
the American intelligence agency, were not credible; the claim was
dubious. So the charge was taken out of the President's Cincinnati
speech in October.
Then comes the President's State of the Union Address in January.
Once again, the same White House staff--I am not alluding to Mr. Hadley
again, but someone on the White House staff came forward and said these
words should be included, even after being warned 3 months earlier that
they were not accurate.
So Director Tenet came before us last week to explain what happened,
why words that were disqualified from the President's earlier speech
were then included in this State of the Union Address. As the Director
came before us, we knew several things. A week before, the President of
the United States said the words should not have been included in the
speech, and Director of the CIA, Mr. Tenet, said he took personal
responsibility for not removing them; that the Central Intelligence
Agency, responsible for reviewing that kind of wording in the speech,
should have stopped the President from using those remarks a second
time in the State of the Union Address.
I said publicly and on the floor of the Senate that what Director
Tenet told us was important, but equally important was the question as
to what individual or group of individuals within the White House was
so adamant in their pursuit of including this important language in the
speech, in the President's State of the Union Address--particularly
after the White House had been told not to say that in an earlier
Presidential speech.
I made that point after the hearing. I certainly did not disclose the
name of the White House employee given to us during the course of the
Intelligence Committee hearing. I said, as I believe now, that as a
result of that hearing it was clear that when we make this inquiry, all
roads lead to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. We have to really look to the
White House staff and the role they played in pushing for and putting
this language in the speech which led the President to mislead the
American people.
I have said and repeated, there is no evidence or indication that
President Bush knew this statement was wrong--none. If that comes out
at some later time, so be it. I am not making any allegation about the
President's motive of including it. But I will say this, unequivocally.
The President was let down by his staff in the White House. They had a
responsibility to make certain what he said to the American people was
true, and they knew better. In October, they had been warned by the CIA
that this information was not accurate, was dubious, could not be
backed up. Yet they persisted in January in including these same
remarks.
After I made the statement, it was interesting the reaction from the
White House. The next day, the White House Press Secretary, Mr. Scott
McClellan, called my claims nonsense and went on to say that because I
voted against the use of force resolution when it came to the invasion
of Iraq when it was before the Senate last October, that I was, in
fact, trying to justify my vote by the statements I was making.
That was the White House interpretation of my remarks. They did not
go to the heart of the issue, obviously, as to whether there was anyone
in the White House staff insistent or persistent when it came to
including these remarks and what action might be taken by the White
House to take that staffer off the case, perhaps to remove them
completely from the White House because they had misled the President.
No, that was not the issue. The issue was this Senator and my
credibility. Well, I understand that. Politics isn't a bean bag. I was
not born yesterday. You have to have a tough mental hide if you are
going to aspire to this office and be in a national debate. But it was
interesting, on the first day, when the time came to address the issue,
instead of attacking the problem, they attacked me. So be it.
But then there was more to follow. On the following day, on Friday,
the White House press operation started floating the story that there
were Senators in this Chamber who were asking for my removal from the
Senate Intelligence Committee because of the statements I had made. And
when pressed as to what those statements were, the White House said
Durbin has disclosed classified information and, therefore, should be
removed from the Senate Intelligence Committee.
Now, that is a very serious charge. I can think of perhaps only once
or twice in my entire congressional career that I have ever heard a
similar charge. So, of course, the reporters who called said to the
White House: What did he disclose? And they said two things: First, he
disclosed the name of the White House staffer who was responsible for
writing this speech. And, secondly, on the floor of the Senate, at this
very desk, he said there were 550 suspected sites of weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq identified by the U.S. Government before our
invasion.
The White House said: Both of those items are classified, Durbin
disclosed them, and he should leave the Intelligence Committee.
Well, the facts are these: No. 1, I never disclosed the name of the
White House staffer--to this day--who was involved in the preparation
of the speech. And, secondly, the information I gave on the floor of
500 suspected sites of weapons of mass destruction had been
declassified a month earlier, declassified and made public. So the
White House allegations to back up my removal from the Intelligence
Committee, attacking my credibility, saying that I disclosed classified
information, were, in fact, false and inaccurate.
Sadly, what we have here is a continuing pattern by this White House.
If any Member of this Senate--Democrat or Republican--takes to the
floor, questions this White House policy, raises any questions about
the gathering of intelligence information, or the use of it, be
prepared for the worst. This White House is going to turn on you and
attack you. They are going to question your patriotism. They are going
to question the fact of whether or not you are living up to your oath
of office here in the Senate. And they are going to question as to
whether or not you belong in this debate on intelligence; whether, for
instance, you should be a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee.
I think that is a very serious outcome. It is one that all of us should
reflect on for a moment.
[[Page S9669]]
This morning, Paul Krugman has an article in the New York Times. I
ask unanimous consent the article be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the New York Times, July 22, 2003]
Who's Unpatriotic Now?
(By Paul Krugman)
Some nonrevisionist history: On Oct. 8, 2002, Knight Ridder
newspapers reported on intelligence officials who "charge
that the administration squelches dissenting views, and that
intelligence analysts are under intense pressure to produce
reports supporting the White House's argument that Saddam
poses such an immediate threat to the United States that pre-
emptive military action is necessary." One official accused
the administration of pressuring analysts to "cook the
intelligence books"; none of the dozen other officials the
reporters spoke to disagreed.
The skepticism of these officials has been vindicated. So
have the concerns expressed before the war by military
professionals like Gen. Eric Shinseki, the Army chief of
staff, about the resources required for post-war occupation.
But as the bad news comes in, those who promoted this war
have responded with a concerted effort to smear the
messengers.
Issues of principle aside, the invasion of a country that
hadn't attacked us and didn't pose an imminent threat has
seriously weakened our military position. Of the Army's 33
combat brigades, 16 are in Iraq; this leaves us ill prepared
to cope with genuine threats. Moreover, military experts say
that with almost two-thirds of its brigades deployed
overseas, mainly in Iraq, the Army's readiness is eroding:
normal doctrine calls for only one brigade in three to be
deployed abroad, while the other two retrain and refit.
And the war will have devastating effects on future
recruiting by the reserves. A widely circulated photo from
Iraq shows a sign in the windshield of a military truck that
reads, "One weekend a month, my ass."
To top it all off, our insistence on launching a war
without U.N. approval has deprived us of useful allies.
George Bush claims to have a "huge coalition," but only 7
percent of the coalition soldiers in Iraq are non-American--
and administration pleas for more help are sounding
increasingly plaintive.
How serious is the strain on our military? The Brookings
Institution military analyst Michael O'Hanlon, who describes
our volunteer military as "one of the best military
institutions in human history," warns that "the Bush
administration will risk destroying that accomplishment if
they keep on the current path."
But instead of explaining what happened to the Al Qaeda
link and the nuclear program, in the last few days a series
of hawkish pundits have accused those who ask such questions
of aiding the enemy. Here's Frank Gaffney Jr. in The National
Post: "Somewhere, probably in Iraq, Saddam Hussein is
gloating. He can only be gratified by the feeding frenzy of
recriminations, second-guessing and political power plays. .
. . Signs of declining popular appreciation of the legitimacy
and necessity of the efforts of America's armed forces will
erode their morale. Similarly, the enemy will be
encouraged."
Well, if we're going to talk about aiding the enemy: By
cooking intelligence to promote a war that wasn't urgent, the
administration has squandered our military strength. This
provides a lot of aid and comfort to Osama bin Laden--who
really did attack America--and Kim Jong II--who really is
building nukes.
And while we're on the subject of patriotism, let's talk
about the affair of Joseph Wilson's wife. Mr. Wilson is the
former ambassador who was sent to Niger by the C.I.A. to
investigate reports of attempted Iraqi uranium purchases and
who recently went public with his findings. Since then
administration allies have sought to discredit him--it's
unpleasant stuff. But here's the kicker: both the columnist
Robert Novak and Time magazine say that administration
officials told them that they believed that Mr. Wilson had
been chosen through the influence of his wife, whom they
identified as a C.I.A. operative.
Think about that: if their characterization of Mr. Wilson's
wife is true (he refuses to confirm or deny it), Bush
administration officials have exposed the identity of a
covert operative. That happens to be a criminal act; it's
also definitely unpatriotic.
So why would they do such a thing? Partly, perhaps, to
punish Mr. Wilson, but also to send a message.
And that should alarm us. We've just seen how politicized,
cooked intelligence can damage our national interest. Yet the
Wilson affair suggests that the administration intends to
continue pressuring analysts to tell it what it wants to
hear.
Mr. DURBIN. This morning, in the New York Times, Paul Krugman wrote
about another episode. I would like to read from it because I think it
indicates what I have been through over the past several days is not
unique.
We are aware of the fact that Ambassador Joe Wilson, who has served
the United States, was called on by this administration to go to Africa
and to establish whether or not the sale of uranium took place. He came
back, and it is my understanding he made an oral report to the
administration questioning whether or not there was any background
evidence to support the claim that Iraq had tried to obtain or had
obtained uranium fissile material from Niger. He made the report to the
administration, which is part of the cumulative evidence of the
weakness of this assertion by British intelligence.
And, of course, a week or two ago, in the New York Times, Ambassador
Wilson published a column indicating the timeline and substance of his
involvement with this issue, and making it clear that based on the
request of the administration, he had gone to Africa, came back with
the information, and told the administration he could not make this
claim.
Let me read from Paul Krugman's article today about Ambassador Joe
Wilson and what has happened to him since he went public with the fact
that he had warned this administration that saying anything about the
uranium coming from Africa was really not credible, of dubious
background. Here is what Krugman writes:
And while we're on the subject of patriotism, let's talk
about the affair of Joseph Wilson's wife. Mr. Wilson is the
former ambassador who was sent to Niger by the C.I.A. to
investigate reports of attempted Iraqi uranium purchases and
who recently went public with his findings. Since then
administration allies have sought to discredit him--it's
unpleasant stuff. But here's the kicker: both the columnist
Robert Novak and Time magazine say that administration
officials told them that they believed that Mr. Wilson had
been chosen through the influence of his wife, whom they
identified as a C.I.A. operative.
Think about that: if their characterization of Mr. Wilson's
wife is true . . .
And Krugman writes that Wilson refuses to confirm or deny it--
Bush administration officials have exposed the identity of
a covert operative. That happens to be a criminal act; it's
also definitely unpatriotic.
So why would they do such a thing? Partly, perhaps, to
punish Mr. Wilson, but also to send a message.
And that should alarm us. We've just seen how politicized,
cooked intelligence can damage our national interest. Yet the
Wilson affair suggests that the administration intends to
continue pressuring analysts to tell it what it wants to
hear.
End of quote from this Krugman article.
Mr. President, I am going to ask the chairman of the Senate
Intelligence Committee and the ranking member to investigate this
matter. This is an extremely serious situation. If, in fact,
administrative officials have publicly disclosed the identity of Mr.
Wilson's wife, who is allegedly, according to these news articles,
working for the CIA, this is an extremely serious matter. In their
effort to seek political revenge against Ambassador Wilson for his
column, they are now attacking him and his wife, and doing it in a
fashion that is not only unacceptable, it may be criminal. And that,
frankly, is as serious as it gets in this town.
I would say to my colleagues in the Senate, understand what this is
all about. If you come to the floor of this Senate, or stand before a
microphone, and are critical of this administration for their policy or
use of intelligence, be prepared for the worst. You are in for a rough
ride.
Certainly what happened to me was minor league compared to what
happened to Ambassador Wilson. In my situation, they merely questioned
my integrity and asked I be removed from the Senate Intelligence
Committee. In Mr. Wilson's situation, they have set out to destroy the
career of his wife. That speaks volumes of where this administration
has gone when it comes to this essential issue.
People have asked me: Why are 16 words so important? Why does it make
any difference if the President happened to make a mistake? And maybe
technically he didn't. He attributed this information to British
intelligence. Tony Blair was here last week and says he still stands by
it.
I think it is important in this respect: We spend billions of dollars
each year accumulating important intelligence information to protect
America. We can count on the dedicated men and women in intelligence
agencies around the United States and around the world to keep us safe.
They risk their lives to do it. They are as fine and patriotic as any
man or woman
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who has ever served this country in uniform. And they try to bring this
gathered information together, to sift through it, establish what is
credible and what is not, and to alert the policy leaders--the
President and others--as to the steps we need to take as a nation to
defend ourselves.
That is always an important job, but in a war on terrorism it is
essential. That intelligence becomes increasingly important. Without
that intelligence data, how can we possibly protect this Nation from
another 9/11?
Second, there is a question as well; that is, not only whether we are
gathering accurate intelligence but whether that intelligence that we
have gathered and that information is being accurately and honestly
reported to the American people. What is at issue is not just the
intelligence data but the honesty and credibility of the policymakers
who use it and portray it.
The question we have before us is whether the intelligence
information in this important statement about nuclear weapons in Iraq
was somehow spun, hyped, or exaggerated. If that is true, what was the
motive? How far up the chain does it go? Is it only one zealous White
House staffer who was trying his best to put this information in a
speech or is it more? It is an important question. It is one which I am
certain the administration doesn't want to face. But in this age where
intelligence is more important than ever, it has to be faced.
Let me go into the chronology of how the White House has responded as
we have questioned whether those 16 words should have been included in
the State of the Union Address. This is over a span of about 5 or 6
weeks.
On June 8, 2003, on Meet the Press, National Security Adviser
Condoleezza Rice said that the uranium claim in the State of the Union
address was "mistaken," but that the White House had not known about
intelligence doubts until afterward. Rice claimed, "We did not know at
the time--no one knew at the time, in our circles--maybe someone knew
down in the bowels of the agency, but no one in our circles knew that
there were doubts and suspicions that this might be a forgery." Since
then, it has been shown that the National Security Adviser Condoleezza
Rice was indeed aware of deep doubts regarding this claim. In fact, the
CIA prevented one of Dr. Rice's chief deputies from including the
uranium reference in an October 2002 speech the President gave in
Cincinnati.
When Dr. Rice said on June 8, 2003, on "Meet the Press" that, "We
did not know at the time--no one knew at the time in our circles" that
there were opportunities and suspicions that this might be a forgery,
that ran in direct contradiction of the simple facts that have been
disclosed. The CIA had advised the White House and the national
security portion of the White House not to include the same words in
the speech 3 months earlier.
Let us go to July 7, 2003.
Prompted by a New York Times op-ed article in which Joseph Wilson,
former U.S. ambassador to Gabon, contended that the Bush administration
ignored--and possibly manipulated--his findings regarding an Iraq-Niger
uranium connection, the White House acknowledged that Bush should not
have made the claim because of concerns about the intelligence behind
it. Then White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer tried to shut down
the story in its tracks, insisting it was old news.
On July 10, 2003--Four days into the controversy, as Bush was dogged
with questions while visiting Africa, Secretary of State Colin Powell
said there was no intention to deceive and called the outcry
"overwrought and overblown and overdrawn." In defending the process
by which the President allowed such a statement in the State of the
Union speech, he said "There was sufficient evidence floating around
at the time that such a statement was not totally outrageous."
Is that the standard? It was not totally outrageous?
Frankly, it is interesting that a few days after the President's
State of the Union Address when Secretary of State Colin Powell was in
careful preparation of his presentation before the United Nations
Security Council, he consciously decided not to include that same
reference in the speech to the United Nations Security Council. He knew
better, and he knew that the standard of credibility of America is not
whether something is or is not totally outrageous.
On July 11, 2003: first Condoleezza Rice, then President Bush
himself, pointed fingers at the CIA for not removing the claim while
vetting the speech.
Rice:
There was even some discussion on that specific sentence,
so that it reflected better what the CIA thought. And the
speech was cleared. Now, I can tell you, if the CIA, the
director of Central Intelligence, had said, "Take this out
of the speech," it would have been gone, without question.
President Bush said:
I gave a speech to the nation that was cleared by the
intelligence services. And it was a speech that detailed to
the American people the dangers posed by the Saddam Hussein
regime.
At that point, July 11, CIA Director George Tenet made his statement
concerning this particular episode. He said in a statement that CIA
officials reviewing the draft remarks of the State of the Union
"raised several concerns about the fragmentary nature of the
intelligence with National Security Council colleagues. Some of the
language was changed." The change included using British intelligence
as the source of the information. The CIA, however, continued to doubt
the reliability of the British claim, and in fact doubted the
credibility of the statement made by the President of the United
States, which is certainly asserting the same claim.
Between July 11 and July 14, a new line of defense was established by
the White House. Dr. Rice and Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld
appeared on three Sunday talk shows to offer a new explanation: Bush's
remark was technically accurate because he correctly described what
British intelligence had reported:
It turns out that it's technically correct what the
president said, that the UK did say that and still says that.
Even though the words should not have been included in the
speech, they're not necessarily inaccurate. The British say
they believe that it is accurate, and that may very well be
the case. We will just have to wait and see.
Dancing on the head of a pin, the Secretary of Defense, moving back
and forth between whether this statement is accurate or not, says that
the British intelligence discredited by our intelligence agency said
maybe we have to take a wait-and-see attitude and see maybe if they are
right and maybe if they are wrong.
Again, is that the standard for statements by the President of the
United States in preparation for a war where we are about to risk
American lives? I certainly hope the standard is much higher.
On Monday, July 14, White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer
emphasized that the British could be right. He said:
We don't know if [British intelligence claims were] true
but nobody--but nobody--can say it was wrong. The fact of the
matter is whether they sought it from Africa or didn't seek
it from Africa doesn't change the fact that they were seeking
to reconstitute a nuclear program.
That was a statement made in his Monday press briefing. Now they are
basically saying it really doesn't make any difference whether what we
said was truthful or not. According to Ari Fleischer, we all knew they
were setting out to reconstitute a nuclear program. But it turned out
that this was one of the two major pillars the Bush administration was
using to argue that nuclear weapons were a threat from Iraq.
First, the aluminum tube controversy, which went in circles many
times as to whether or not these tubes would be used for nuclear
weapons or conventional munitions and the fissile material and uranium
coming from Africa. What we have here is a situation where they are
trying to build the case, and build it with the shakiest evidence
already discredited by the CIA and other intelligence agencies.
Between July 10 and July 18, there came a new strategy from the White
House on the issue. Scott McClellan, who succeeded Fleischer as White
House spokesman, also tried to dismiss questions. Over four days, he
told reporters 20 times that the particular question they were asking
had already been "addressed."
On July 16, 2003, Scott McClellan said claims by Senator Durbin that
White House officials applied pressure on the CIA to keep the uranium
reference in
[[Page S9671]]
the speech were "nonsense" and accused skeptics of trying to
"politicize this issue by rewriting history." At the same time, the
White House tried to redirect the debate onto the overall danger posed
by Saddam's chemical and biological weapons--uranium or not--and onto
Bush's resolve in acting to confront that threat.
On July 17, 2003, McClellan cautioned that Senator Durbin--and
possibly other Democrats--were "lying about the little things"
related to CIA Director George Tenet's testimony before the Senate
Intelligence Committee. The "little thing" was whether Tenet has
named names of these responsible at the White House.
Although I refused to disclose any names mentioned by the CIA
Director, I will say this: I stand by my statement.
Let me explain for a moment the issue at hand. We have made it clear
that Director Tenet would appear before the Intelligence Committee.
That was public knowledge. The fact is that Director Tenet sat at the
committee table in the Senate Intelligence Committee with several
people from his agency. What he said, of course, was given to the
members of committee. Questions from members of the committee were
directed to appropriate members of the staff, and he would indicate
which member might give an answer to a question.
I took great care in commenting about his testimony to limit any
reference to anyone in the room, specifically to Director Tenet, so
that I would not even disclose the names of the CIA employees who were
in the room. Perhaps I was over cautious. But that caution on my part
was then used against me by the White House. Because when we asked
Director Tenet pointblank who was the White House staffer responsible
for the State of the Union Address--in fact, it has now been publicly
disclosed by the CIA and others--he turned to Alan Foley, an assistant
who worked on the speech, and Allen Foley gave the name to the
committee with a nod by Director Tenet. So my caution and care not to
even disclose the name of Alan Foley who sat at the table with the CIA
Director was turned and used against me by the White House, saying that
I was lying to the American public as to whether Director Tenet
disclosed the name.
The fact is, Director Tenet was testifying. He turned to Mr. Foley,
his assistant, who said the name. Whether Director Tenet repeated the
name, only the record of the hearing can reflect. But what I was
establishing was the fact that the identity of the person involved was
disclosed during Director Tenet's testimony. I stand by that.
On July 18, on Friday, the White House press staff began leaking word
that one of the leading White House opponents, Senator Durbin of
Illinois, had released classified material regarding names of those
involved in the controversy and the number of suspected WMD sites in
Iraq. As a result, the White House said some Senators were
contemplating having me, Senator Durbin, removed from the Intelligence
Committee.
Our office pointed out to reporters that no classified material had
been released by this Senator. I had refused to name the White House
staffer or characterize specific witness testimony. And the number of
suspected Iraqi WMD sites, 550, which I disclosed on the Senate floor,
had been declassified this year in June. It is public information.
The White House, when they were confronted with the fact that their
accusations against me were not true said, they would "Look into
that."
After attacking my honesty and integrity and suggesting I be removed
from the Senate Intelligence Committee, they were unable to produce any
evidence of the disclosure of classified information. I have gone to
great lengths to avoid that, and I will continue.
Then on July 18, that same day, the White House took the rare step of
declassifying and releasing eight pages of a 90-page top secret
national intelligence estimate that was used to write the questioned
portions of the State of the Union Address. Instead of putting a lid on
the controversy, the document showed prewar divisions within the U.S.
intelligence community that were glossed over by administration
spokesmen. The State Department, for instance, termed the reports that
Saddam Hussein was shopping for uranium in Africa as "highly
dubious."
That is the chronology. It is an important chapter in our political
history. It is an important chapter in the history of the collection
and use of intelligence here in the United States.
I am glad the Senate Intelligence Committee will continue its
investigation. It is my understanding the chairman and ranking Democrat
have said they will call White House staffers before the committee to
ask what led up to this situation and why we are in the position we are
today.
I can recall times in the past when the Intelligence Committee and
its members had been challenged as to whether they disclosed classified
information and called on to take polygraphs for fear they may have
said something that was top secret and should not be public knowledge.
I understand the concern of the administration. That should be the
concern of every American. We have to take care not to disclose
classified information.
But I have to ask the obvious question: How can this administration
declassify things, drop certain items into the press that are
complimentary and positive from their point of view and get away with
it and not be held to the same standard as members of the committee?
When we are in a situation where we are given a body of information and
draw a conclusion from that but cannot speak to that publicly, while
the administration discretely drops into the public domain information
they think is helpful to their side of the case, that is a one-sided
argument. It does not serve this Nation well, and the administration is
pushing the envelope when they do it.
I am glad the Senate Intelligence Committee is going forward. There
is a lot more we need to do. I will say to my colleagues in the Senate,
please do not back off from our responsibility. We have a
responsibility to the people who elect us and to the American people at
large to hold this administration--indeed, every administration--
accountable for honesty and accuracy when they speak to the American
people, particularly in areas of the discussion of intelligence
information which could lead to military action which could, in fact,
endanger the lives of Americans and their families. That is our most
serious and sacred duty. We should not back off of it because of
threats from the White House or efforts by the White House to silence
us.
I yield the floor.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. CARPER. Mr. President, before Senator Durbin leaves the floor, I
want to say that the concerns he has raised are serious and grave. They
deserve serious attention, not just of this body but of the people in
this country. I thank him for bringing them to us today and join him in
voicing the gravity of the situation. The kind of actions he has
described, if they are true, should not be permitted. They should not
be countenanced.
(The remarks of Mr. Carper pertaining to the introduction of S. 1443
are printed in today's Record under "Statements on Introduced Bills
and Joint Resolutions.")
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Enzi). The Senator from Iowa.
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