Congressional Record: July 16, 2003 (Senate)
Page S9448-S9484


                           Amendment No. 1275

  Mr. CORZINE. Madam President, I call up my amendment which is at the 
desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from New Jersey [Mr. Corzine] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 1275.

  Mr. CORZINE. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       At the appropriate place insert the following:

[[Page S9472]]

                      INTELLIGENCE RELATED TO IRAQ


       There is established the National Commission on the 
     Development and Use of Intelligence Related to Iraq.

     SEC. 102. FINDINGS.

       (1) The Congress underscores its commitment to and support 
     for ongoing Congressional reviews regarding the collection 
     and analysis of intelligence related to Iraq.

     SEC. 103. PURPOSES.

       The purposes of the Commission are to--
       (1) examine and report upon the role of policymakers in the 
     development of intelligence related to Iraq and Operation 
     Iraqi Freedom;
       (2) examine and report upon the use of intelligence related 
     to Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom;
       (3) build upon the reviews of intelligence related to Iraq 
     and Operation Iraqi Freedom, including those being conducted 
     by the Executive Branch, Congress and other entities; and
       (4) investigate and publicly report to the President and 
     Congress on its findings, conclusions, and recommendations.


       (a) Members.--The Commission shall be composed of 12 
     members, of whom--
       (1) 3 members shall be appointed by the majority leader of 
     the Senate;
       (2) 3 members shall be appointed by the Speaker of the 
     House of Representatives;
       (3) 3 members shall be appointed by the minority leader of 
     the Senate; and
       (4) 3 members shall be appointed by the minority leader of 
     the House of Representatives.
       (b) Chairperson; Vice Chairperson.--
       (1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2) the Chairperson 
     and Vice Chairperson of the Commission shall be elected by 
     the members.
       (2) Political party affiliation.--The Chairperson and Vice 
     Chairperson shall not be from the same political party.
       (c) Qualifications; Initial Meeting.--
       (1) Qualifications.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     individuals appointed to the Commission should be prominent 
     United States citizens, with national recognition and 
     significant depth of experience in such professions as 
     intelligence, governmental service, the armed services, law 
     enforcement, and foreign affairs.
       (2) Initial meeting.--Once six or more members of the 
     Commission have been appointed, those members who have been 
     appointed may meet and, if necessary, select a temporary 
     chairperson, who may begin the operations of the Commission, 
     including the hiring of staff.
       (d) Quorum; Vacancies.--After its initial meeting, the 
     Commission shall meet upon the call of the chairperson or a 
     majority of its members. Six members of the Commission shall 
     constitute a quorum. Any vacancy in the Commission shall not 
     affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same manner in 
     which the original appointment was made.


       The functions of the Commission are to--
       (1) conduct an investigation that--
       (A) investigates the development and use of intelligence 
     related to Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom; and
       (B) shall include an investigation of intelligence related 
     to whether Iraq--
       (i) possessed chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, and 
     the locations of those weapons;
       (ii) had links to Al Qaeda;
       (iii) attempted to acquire uranium in Africa, and if so, 
       (iv) attempted to procure aluminum tubes for the 
     development of nuclear weapons;
       (v) possessed mobile laboratories for the production of 
     weapons of mass destruction;
       (vi) possessed delivery systems for weapons of mass 
     destruction; and
       (vii) any other matters that bear upon the imminence of the 
     threat to the national security of the United States and its 
       (2) submit to the President and Congress such report as is 
     required by this title containing such findings, conclusions, 
     and recommendations as the Commission shall determine, 
     including proposing organization, coordination, planning, 
     management arrangements, procedures, rules, and regulations.
       (A) Form of report.--Each report prepared under this 
     section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
     contain a classified annex.


       (a) In General.--
       (1) Hearings and evidence.--The Commission or, on the 
     authority of the Commission, any subcommittee or member 
     thereof, may, for the purposes of carrying out this title--
       (A) hold such hearings and sit and act at such times and 
     places, take such testimony, receive such evidence, 
     administer such oaths; and
       (B) require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and 
     testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, 
     records, correspondence, memoranda, cables, e-mails, papers, 
     and documents, as the Commission or such designated 
     subcommittee or designated member may determine advisable.
       (2) Subpoenas.--
       (A) Issuance.--Subpoenas issued under paragraph (1)(B) may 
     be issued under the signature of the Chairperson of the 
     Commission, the Vice Chairperson of the Commission, the 
     chairperson of any subcommittee created by a majority of the 
     Commission, or any member designated by a majority of the 
     Commission, and may be served by any person designated by the 
     Chairperson, subcommittee chairperson, or member.
       (B) Enforcement.--
       (i) In general.--In the case of contumacy or failure to 
     obey a subpoena issued under paragraph (1)(B), the United 
     States district court for the judicial district in which the 
     subpoenaed person resides, is served, or may be found, or 
     where the subpoena is returnable, may issue an order 
     requiring such person to appear at any designated place to 
     testify or to produce documentary or other evidence. Any 
     failure to obey the order of the court may be punished by the 
     court as a contempt of that court.
       (ii) Additional enforcement.--In the case of any failure of 
     any witness to comply with any subpoena or to testify when 
     summoned under authority of this section, the Commission may, 
     by majority vote, certify a statement of fact constituting 
     such failure to the appropriate United States attorney, who 
     may bring the matter before the grand jury for its action, 
     under the same statutory authority and procedures as if the 
     United States attorney had received a certification under 
     sections 102 through 104 of the Revised Statutes of the 
     United States (2 U.S.C. 192 through 194).
       (b) Closed Meetings.--
       (1) In general.--Meetings of the Commission may be closed 
     to the public under section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory 
     Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) or other applicable law.
       (2) Additional authority.--In addition to the authority 
     under paragraph (1), section 10(a)(1) and (3) of the Federal 
     Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to any 
     portion of a Commission meeting if the President determines 
     that such portion or portions of that meeting is likely to 
     disclose matters that could endanger national security. If 
     the President makes such determination, the requirements 
     relating to a determination under section 10(d) of that Act 
     shall apply.
       (c) Contracting.--The Commission may, to such extent and in 
     such amounts as are provided in appropriation acts, enter 
     into contracts to enable the Commission to discharge its 
     duties under this title.
       (d) Information From Federal Agencies.--The Commission is 
     authorized to secure directly from any executive department, 
     bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent 
     establishment, or instrumentality of the Government 
     information, suggestions, estimates, and statistics for the 
     purposes of this title. Each department, bureau, agency, 
     board, commission, office, independent establishment, or 
     instrumentality shall, to the extent authorized by law, 
     furnish such information, suggestions, estimates, and 
     statistics directly to the Commission, upon request made by 
     the Chairperson, the chairperson of any subcommittee created 
     by a majority of the Commission, or any member designated by 
     a majority of the Commission.
       (e) Assistance From Federal Agencies.--
       (1) General services administration.--The Administrator of 
     General Services shall provide to the Commission on a 
     reimbursable basis administrative support and other services 
     for the performance of the Commission's functions.
       (2) Other departments and agencies.--In addition to the 
     assistance prescribed in paragraph (1), departments and 
     agencies of the United States are authorized to provide to 
     the Commission such services, funds, facilities, staff, and 
     other support services as they may determine advisable and as 
     may be authorized by law.
       (f) Gifts.--The Commission may accept, use, and dispose of 
     gifts or donations of services or property.
       (g) Postal Services.--The Commission may use the United 
     States mails in the same manner and under the same conditions 
     as departments and agencies of the United States.


       (a) In General.--
       (1) Appointment and compensation.--The chairperson and vice 
     chairperson, in accordance with rules agreed upon by the 
     Commission, may appoint and fix the compensation of a staff 
     director and such other personnel as may be necessary to 
     enable the Commission to carry out its functions, without 
     regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, 
     governing appointments in the competitive service, and 
     without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter 
     III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification 
     and General Schedule pay rates, except that no rate of pay 
     fixed under this subsection may exceed the equivalent of that 
     payable for a position at level V of the Executive Schedule 
     under section 5316 of title 5, United States Code.
       (2) Personnel as federal employees.--
       (A) In general.--The executive director and any personnel 
     of the Commission who are employees shall be employees under 
     section 2105 of title 5, United States Code, for purposes of 
     chapters 63, 81, 83, 84, 85, 87, 89, and 90 of that title.
       (B) Members of commission.--Subparagraph (A) shall not be 
     construed to apply to members of the Commission.
       (b) Detailees.--Any Federal Government employee may be 
     detailed to the Commission without reimbursement from the 
     Commission, and such detailee shall retain the rights, 
     status, and privileges of his or her regular employment 
     without interruption.

[[Page S9473]]

       (c) Consultant Services.--The Commission is authorized to 
     procure the services of experts and consultants in accordance 
     with section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, but at 
     rates not to exceed the daily rate paid a person occupying a 
     position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 
     5315 of title 5, United States Code.


       (a) Compensation.--Each member of the Commission may be 
     compensated at not to exceed the daily equivalent of the 
     annual rate of basic pay in effect for a position at level IV 
     of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, 
     United States Code, for each day during which that member is 
     engaged in the actual performance of the duties of the 
       (b) Travel Expenses.--While away from their homes or 
     regular places of business in the performance of services for 
     the Commission, members of the Commission shall be allowed 
     travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, 
     in the same manner as persons employed intermittently in the 
     Government service are allowed expenses under section 5703(b) 
     of title 5, United States Code.


       The appropriate executive departments and agencies shall 
     cooperate with the Commission in expeditiously providing to 
     the Commission members and staff appropriate security 
     clearances in a manner consistent with existing procedures 
     and requirements, except that no person shall be provided 
     with access to classified information under this section who 
     would not otherwise qualify for such security clearance.


       (a) Report.--Not later than nine months after the date of 
     the first meeting of the Commission, the Commission shall 
     submit to the President and Congress a report containing such 
     findings, conclusions, and recommendations for corrective 
     measures as have been agreed to by a majority of Commission 
       (b) Termination.--
       (1) In general.--The Commission, and all the authorities of 
     this title, shall terminate 60 days after the date on which 
     the report is submitted under section (a).
       (2) Administrative activities before terminating.--The 
     Commission may use the 60-day period referred to in paragraph 
     (1) for the purpose of concluding its activities, including 
     providing testimony to committees of Congress concerning its 
     reports and disseminating the second report.


       There are authorized to be appropriated to the Commission 
     to carry out this title $5,000,000, to remain available until 

  Mr. CORZINE. This amendment is premised on a strong view that 
intelligence and its honest analysis are vital tools in our war on 
terrorism. To protect the American people, our intelligence must not be 
shaped to win an argument, but must be used to inform.
  This amendment calls for a bipartisan commission to study the use of 
intelligence related to Iraq. The commission would examine several key 
issues, including intelligence related to the following questions:
  Whether Iraq possessed chemical, biological and/or nuclear weapons;
  Whether Iraq had links to Al-Qaida, and;
  Whether Iraq attempted to acquire uranium in Africa.
  Earlier today I joined in a growing expression of concern by my 
colleagues and the American people about the representation of 
intelligence information by the President and the administration in 
building its case for the war in Iraq. Without a thorough explanation 
of why many of the administration's statements are in conflict, and 
have included claims unsubstantiated by the best intelligence, the 
American people, their representatives, and many of our would-be 
international partners in post-conflict Iraq, will most certainly begin 
to lose confidence in the administration's intelligence analysis, if 
not their word. Simply put, the Nation's credibility, in my view, is at 
  This credibility is important for the security of the American people 
who have and continue to bear an enormously high cost, a heavy burden, 
in both life and treasure, with regard to our presence in Iraq. I know 
in my home State of New Jersey there have been seven soldiers who have 
been lost since the beginning of the conflict. It is something that 
impacts people's daily lives.
  We stand with our troops. We stand with the mission they are trying 
to do, to bring about democracy, but we do have a right, and they have 
a right to have credibility with regard to the intelligence that is 
  There have been a lot of accusations and allegations circulating in 
recent days. Some may be trying to politicize this debate. This 
amendment is an attempt to ensure that this debate does not become a 
political one, and that we focus in a bipartisan way on getting to the 
  In my view, in order to preserve the public credibility of the United 
States, we need a thorough public review, one that is above politics, 
one with conclusions that will be regarded as credible and definitive, 
not only in the U.S. but around the world.
  As we are now all well aware, in this year's State of the Union 
Address President Bush said:

       The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein 
     recently sought significant quantities of uranium from 

  The power of the President's allegations in those 16 short words 
cannot be overstated. The Bush administration, using legalistic 
language, was leading people to embrace, at least in the opinion of 
many, the view that Saddam Hussein had an active nuclear program. The 
President did not say the British were claiming anything. He did not 
say they alleged anything. He said they ``learned'' that Saddam was 
attempting to buy uranium, implicitly accepting the charge as fact.
  Although just 16 words long, it was a powerful statement that 
resonated in the context of debates that had gone on throughout the 
Nation and the world for nearly 5 months, in every public forum, the 
floor of the Senate, the halls of the United Nations, and across the 
airwaves. Only after many months did we the people and the Congress 
learn this statement was based on information that our own intelligence 
agency earlier learned was false. In fact, the administration's own 
spokesperson said the statement was inappropriate for the State of the 
Union address. And the Director of Central Intelligence has stated 
that: These 16 words should never have been included in the text 
written for the President.
  Yesterday morning, Senator Levin, the distinguished ranking member of 
the Senate Armed Services Committee, raised several areas of particular 
concern, including: the aluminum tubes; the Iraq-al-Qaida connection; 
whether Iraq reconstituted nuclear weapons; whether Iraq possesses 
chemical and biological weapons; allegations of mobile biological 
warfare labs.
  Furthermore, Senator Levin laid out seven questions about claims 
specifically regarding Iraq and the uranium. He argued that these 
should be answered in the context of a bipartisan investigation. I 
believe that is true, and I could not agree more.
  This is not just a concern about the African uranium issue. It is 
about whether there was a fair and full presentation to the American 
people. But to that list of questions, I would add several others.
  For example, if the information in the State of the Union Address was 
``technically accurate,'' as administration officials have lately 
argued, why was it excluded in Secretary Powell's 90-minute 
presentation before the United Nations only 8 days later?
  Also, why did we learn about the misleading nature of these comments, 
not from the administration, but from the International Atomic Energy 
Agency and the media?
  This is not an academic matter. At stake is nothing less than the 
credibility of the United States, and that credibility is important for 
protecting the American people. That credibility gets weakened each day 
we fail to have a full accounting of the facts about what happened, 
facts such as who knew that certain information was false? When did 
they know it? Why was it expunged from one administration speech but 
not another? And why are we just learning about much of this now?

  Keep in mind, political leaders around the world, not just here at 
home, have staked their own reputations on their support of President 
Bush and the United States. As a consequence, many of our closest 
allies and their elected officials are facing enormous criticism from 
their own citizens, and sometimes--and this is quite telling--from 
their own political parties. We owe it not only to the American people 
but to all those who stood with us to be straight and to come clean 
immediately; otherwise, this episode will only undermine our ability to 
win support for other critical foreign policy interests in the future, 
and they are substantial. In fact, without a clear explanation, we put 
the American people at risk facing a world

[[Page S9474]]

where our partners question our credibility on many interconnected 
concerns: Korea, Iran, Syria, and the road map to peace in the Middle 
  We need to understand whether this is part of a broader pattern of 
selective release of information or just a series of unfortunate 
snafus. Last October, for example, during the Iraq debate, Secretary 
James Kelly was in Pyongyang, meeting with the North Koreans. At that 
meeting, a meeting that occurred a full week prior to the Senate vote 
on the resolution authorizing force in Iraq, the North Koreans admitted 
to an active nuclear program. Yet despite its importance and relevance 
to the debate regarding Iraq and America's national security posture 
generally, administration officials waited until after the Congress had 
voted on the resolution--6 days, by the way--to authorize the use of 
force before revealing the details of the North Korean disclosure.
  To this Senator, that information was both relevant and timely to the 
Iraq debate. Was this information withheld because it might affect the 
tenor of the debate, or might impact the Congress's view of the Iraqi 
threat, or the relative view of the Iraq threat?
  As Senator Levin and others have explained, there may have been other 
instances in which the administration selectively, in some form or 
another, misrepresented or withheld information to support their case 
for the war in Iraq.
  For example, the administration claimed there were linkages between 
al-Qaida and Iraq. But many now believe those claims were overstated or 
exaggerated, and based on scant and circumstantial evidence.
  Another widely discussed issue relates to Iraq's purchase of aluminum 
tubes, where there was considerable debate within the intelligence 
community about whether the tubes were intended for use as part of a 
nuclear program.
  When these claims are added up, many people have concluded that the 
administration may have been seeking to win an argument--not inform the 
American public. And we need to know the truth. We need to be informed 
to make good decisions, to set priorities, to go forward, to protect 
the American people. The American people deserve to be informed 
  The commission I am proposing would be completely bipartisan. It 
would neither supplant nor interfere with ongoing Congressional reviews 
regarding the collection and analysis of intelligence related to Iraq.
  So, again, I hope we can support this proposal. We need to ensure 
that the facts come out. We should do it on a bipartisan basis, and we 
should do it immediately. The safety and security of the American 
people are at stake.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Ms. STABENOW. Madam President, I rise to support the Corzine 
amendment. I think this is an incredibly important amendment to this 
important bill. In doing so, once again, as I have done before on this 
floor, I commend our service men and women who have served us so well 
in Iraq, as well as around the world.
  We join in our pride and gratitude for their courage and their 
  However, I must rise today to express my deep concern about 
revelation after revelation of the fragile nature of the facts 
presented to the American public and the world about the reasons we had 
to preemptively, unilaterally attack Iraq.
  Those misleading words in the President's State of the Union Address 
this past January have brought into question the credibility of our 
Government. This is extremely serious. It hurts our country because 
Iraq is not the only threat to our Nation, as the Senator from New 
Jersey indicated. We continue to be threatened by terrorists in 
emerging nuclear countries such as Iran and North Korea. In order to 
win the war on terrorism and ultimately disarm Iran and North Korea, we 
are going to have to work with NATO and other allies to protect 
American citizens.
  Unfortunately, the misleading statements about Iraq attempting to 
purchase uranium from Niger will make building such coalitions even 
more difficult. This means our homeland will be less safe and our 
American citizens less secure. This is a deep concern of mine. I wish 
the misleading statements about Iraq and Niger were the only statements 
in question that the President and his administration have made to the 
American people. Unfortunately, there have been others.
  First, let's go through what transpired with the statements on Iraq 
and Niger. Before the State of the Union referencing Iraqi purchases of 
uranium from Africa, the administration, at the direction of the CIA, 
took out a nearly identical line in a speech the President gave in 
Cincinnati last October justifying the use of force in Iraq. Then, the 
African uranium purchase was back in the State of the Union Address, 
although we were told now this was a mistake by the CIA director George 
Tenet. Then, the African reference was dropped from Secretary of State 
Powell's presentation on Iraqi weapons capabilities to the United 
Nations just 8 days later. Then, Saddam's nuclear weapons came back 
with certainty when Vice President Cheney appeared on Meet the Press in 
March and said, ``We believe he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear 
  This was one of the main assertions used that took us to war, and I 
believe the American people have a right to know which is it. If it was 
good intelligence, why the constant change of mind? Either Iraq had 
nuclear weapons or it didn't. If it was bad intelligence, who kept 
pushing to use it in the administration speeches and interviews? We 
need to know the answers to these questions. It is important for the 
credibility of our country and for the trust of the American people in 
our Government.
  It does not end there. We heard much about specially-made aluminum 
tubes that could be used to build centrifuges to create weapons-grade 
uranium. In the same State of the Union where he referenced uranium 
purchases from Africa, President Bush also said: Our intelligence 
sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength 
aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production.
  But, in fact, an unclassified intelligence assessment back in October 
stated some intelligence specialists ``believe that those tubes are 
probably intended for conventional weapons programs.''
  Last February, Secretary of State Colin Powell told the U.N. Security 
Council that ``we all know there are differences of opinion,'' and that 
``there is controversy about what these tubes are for.''
  However, the International Atomic Energy Agency, after conducting its 
own study, concluded the uranium tubes were not for uranium enrichment.
  Which is it? Enough time has gone by; we should have and are entitled 
to answers. We are entitled to the truth. Most importantly, the 
American people are entitled to the truth. Although we now have more 
than 140,000 troops in Iraq, we have not yet found chemical or 
biological weapons or even the plants needed to make them. We have not 
found evidence of al-Qaida training camps, although in the runup to the 
war the administration not only said they were there in Iraq but that 
they knew precise locations.
  Again, this administration has taken us into a new age, an age where 
we claim the right to unilaterally, preemptively strike another nation 
because we believe our national survival is at stake. In such a world, 
the intelligence used as proof for striking first has to be 
unassailable, has to be totally credible, or the American people and 
our allies will be deeply suspicious of any future claims.
  The claims led to decisions to put American men and women in harm's 
way and in too many instances have led to the loss of life. We need to 
find out the truth behind the various claims and questions, legitimate 
questions that have arisen, questions that have been asked by 
colleagues on both sides of the aisle, questions that have taken us 
into the deserts of Iraq and put our men and women in harm's way.
  The only way we can get to the bottom of this is to set up an 
independent commission to get the facts, a bipartisan commission, a way 
to objectively look at what happened so it does not happen again.
  There is nothing more serious than a potential nuclear threat to our 
people. If there was ever a need for an independent commission, it is 
now. We now

[[Page S9475]]

face potential nuclear threats from Iran, from North Korea. We could 
face more in the future. American families and our American troops 
deserve answers to the questions that have been raised. We all deserve 
answers. We all deserve the truth.
  I hope my colleagues will join in support developing this independent 
commission. I believe nothing less than the credibility of our country 
is at stake. I hope we all join in supporting the Corzine amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Alexander). The Democratic leader.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I rise for a couple of minutes to 
compliment the distinguished Senator from Michigan for her very 
eloquent statement and for the leadership of the Senator from New 
Jersey, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. Both Members have 
made their points very ably. I am grateful to both of them for their 
leadership in this effort.
  The real question is, How do we assert the facts in the most logical 
and the most bipartisan manner? As we have seen on so many other 
occasions, the only way to ensure that is done with a public review of 
the information provided and all of the facts available to us is 
through this independent approach. The Intelligence Committee has done 
an outstanding job. I commend them for their session, even this 
afternoon as we speak, looking into the facts as they are presented 
from those within the intelligence community.
  As Senator Rockefeller has noted on several occasions, they are 
constrained by their own understandable jurisdictional review and do 
not have the capacity to go beyond that jurisdictional review when 
issues involving other branches of the Government, other agencies of 
the executive branch, and certainly the White House itself, are 
  So this affords an opportunity to do the right thing, to give the 
American people the confidence they need that we understand now what 
the facts are, what the story is, and how we can ensure as we make 
these judgments we are doing so with the very best policy and goals in 
  I think this is a very worthy amendment. I think it ought to pass on 
an overwhelmingly bipartisan vote. I am hopeful we can do that this 
evening, and I am grateful to those who have committed to this 
amendment, and especially for the leadership of Senators Stabenow and 
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.
  Mr. DAYTON. Mr. President, I rise also in support of Senator 
Corzine's amendment. Yesterday was a very grim day in Minnesota. We had 
the funeral service of the first Minnesotan to be killed in Iraq this 
year in the line of duty, PVT Edward James Herrgott. It is a grim 
reminder that 63 days after the President declared the hostilities 
almost over in Iraq, this young man lost his life on July 3, standing 
out in front, guarding the Baghdad Museum, the site where some of my 
colleagues and I had swept by, well protected, just 2 days before. He 
was killed, murdered by a sniper's bullet. At the age of 20, his life 
and all of its promise was snuffed out.
  We learned last week from the Secretary of Defense that, in his 
judgment, the military presence, some major component of which will 
have to be from the United States--hopefully much less will be, when we 
do as we must, which is to internationalize the continued development 
and hopefully economic recovery in Iraq--but as long as there is going 
to be a presence there, United States troops are going to be a big part 
of that, and it is almost unavoidable under the circumstances, 
especially as they exist today, the number of men and women who have 
lost their lives since May 1--which stands now at 79--will only 
  So, as Americans are faced, again and again, with a member of the 
family, a friend, an acquaintance, or just through the media a fellow 
citizen of that State, again and again they are going to be confronted 
with this question of, what are we doing in Iraq? What is the game plan 
to extricate our troops after achieving the success the military had so 
dramatically, remarkably in the 3 weeks it took from entering the 
country to sweeping into Baghdad with an incredible display of 
technology, the training, and most of all the dedication of those men 
and women who have really redefined the words ``courage'' and 
``patriotism'' for this Senator.
  They continue to labor there under the most extreme conditions, 115-
degree temperatures, all the other difficulties that are manifest 
there, not to mention the life-threatening danger that so many of them 
are under day and night.
  Given all that, I think it is imperative for our national security 
that we understand that we--all of us collectively in the Congress and 
the President, this administration--made what is the most momentous 
decision that can be made by this body and the administration, the 
decision whether or not to go to war--in this case, to initiate a war 
against another sovereign nation. To know that decision was made on 
accurate information from our intelligence operations, to me, is 
essential to our national security in the days and years ahead.
  It is also essential to our democracy to know the information we are 
getting from our leaders is truthful, accurate, to the best of their 
knowledge. There are enough questions that have been raised that must 
be answered, and they must be answered with the truth and with the 
facts as that can be determined objectively and dispassionately to be.
  I regret that the Senate Armed Services Committee, of which I am a 
member, is not going to be undertaking the bipartisan investigation 
into these issues as its counterpart, the Senate Intelligence 
Committee, has agreed to do. I think there has to be that kind of 
willingness on both sides of the aisle to seek the truth. I cannot 
understand why anybody would not want to find the truth and present it 
to the Members of this body and, even more importantly, to the American 
people. But that is a decision that evidently has been reached.
  In the absence of that, I think this independent commission is 
essential. We owe it to ourselves. We owe it to the Private Herrgotts 
whose lives have been sacrificed in this endeavor. We owe it to the 
future men and women who will be over in Iraq, in future engagements, 
if necessary. We owe it, ultimately, to our country, our democracy, and 
to ourselves.
  I yield the floor.


  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, we had a time agreement and the Senator 
from New Jersey and the Senator from Arizona have spoken. I will make a 
few brief remarks and yield to my colleague. Then it is my intention to 
move to table these two amendments. Let me state why.
  With regard to the amendment offered by Senator Corzine, I have a 
problem, a decided problem with this. There is an ongoing investigation 
or series of hearings--I don't know whether you want to call it an 
investigation yet--of the items covered by this proposed amendment, 
creating a national commission on the development and use of 
intelligence related to Iraq.
  Iraq is still ongoing. To create a commission now to look into Iraq 
primarily based upon the problem related to the President's statement 
in his State of the Union Message--which, by the way, was true, but not 
really totally accurate in terms of the interpretation people gave to 
it--in order to start the campaign of 2004, at a time when we have men 
and women in uniform over there now, their commanders, Ambassador 
Bremer, all of the people who participated in the process of this 
intelligence activity, including the CIA and the National Security 
Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, all of them will be 
involved in hearings before the commission. They are already in 
hearings before the House and the Senate, and they have unknown 
involvement in the internal investigation also going on in the 
  As I said previously, almost all of us heard the Secretary of State, 
my great friend Colin Powell, tell us about his involvement and how 
this train of circumstances developed with regard to how that statement 
was in the President's State of the Union Message. We all know 
Presidents don't write their own State of the Union Message. They 
review drafts, and they rely on their

[[Page S9479]]

subordinates to see that they are absolutely accurate. In the process, 
a statement was inserted that could be interpreted in a way that could 
mislead people.
  Already the Director of the CIA has admitted his system made a 
mistake. He has taken responsibility, as he should, for something that 
should have been taken out by the CIA reviewer. It was not. It was 
taken out of a previous statement at another time. No question was 
raised about its being taken out. In this instance, it was not taken 
out and Director Tenet said it should have been taken out. He takes the 
responsibility himself because of the failure of his Agency, just as I 
make a policy when any member of my staff makes a mistake, I treat it 
as my mistake. George Tenet didn't make the mistake. The process in the 
CIA made the mistake. The President didn't make a mistake. In the 
process of preparing that statement, there was a mistake made.
  I am tired of making a mountain out of a molehill on this one. I am 
particularly disturbed with the fact that people want to create another 
commission. This is not a time for a commission like the commissions we 
have known in the past. This is not Watergate. That is the impression. 
This is not a Watergate. It is not even a ``truth gate.''
  The President read a speech that was prepared for him. We all clapped 
at it, and we all approved of it. It was one part of it, one tiny part 
of it that should have been taken out in the process of review.
  Now to create a commission primarily for that and all the rest of the 
garbage in this thing--pardon my French--all the statements in here as 
to what is going to be investigated with regard to the possession of 
mobile laboratories, with regard to an attempt to procure aluminum 
tubes--it wasn't an attempt; they were procured. But the concept of 
whether or not Iraq possessed delivery systems for weapons of mass 
destruction--we had 17 resolutions of the United Nations that were not 
complied with. Why were they passing 17 resolutions if there was 
nothing to investigate?
  But the main thing, why should we create a commission now to look 
into something that is ongoing? Once this is all tied down and we have 
our people home and Mr. Bremer is residing in the U.S., and the people 
involved in all of the intelligence activities that led to the 
statement are in the United States again, we can have some form of 
commission to review it. This Senator would not oppose that.
  But this is an ongoing operation, and this is an attempt to smear the 
President of the United States. I shall not permit that if I can 
possibly avoid it.
  As I understand it, there is no further time agreement. I have the 
floor. I intend to keep the floor until I make a motion to table this 
  I am happy to yield to my friend from Arizona for a question.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I will ask my colleague from Alaska a 
question. I will preface it by saying I do appreciate the cooperation 
that has been displayed while addressing this bill. I tell my friend 
from Alaska also that it has been very helpful for us to have the 
information and to be able to look at these amendments as they have 
come up. I hope next year we will see Hemingway, Faulkner, F. Scott 
Fitzgerald, and others of my favorite authors included in this program.
  I also ask the Senator, concerning the Corzine amendment, isn't it 
true that the Senate Armed Services Committee is holding, and will be 
holding, hearings concerning the entire conflict, including friendly 
fire casualties, including the enormous success, including the issue of 
weapons of mass destruction; and those will be held openly and in a 
systematic manner, which Senator Warner and Senator Levin have been 
working on in a bipartisan manner? Didn't the chairman of the 
Intelligence Committee hold a closed hearing today, and will he not 
hold a public hearing next week? Aren't we going through an orderly 
process of hearings concerning the conduct of the war?
  The American people, of course, want to know about the friendly fire 
tragedy, and they also want to know how we did so well, how our 
equipment performed in such a magnificent fashion. It was one of the 
most rapid military victories in history.
  Isn't it true that we are going through an orderly process of 
hearings concerning this conflict, in a very appropriate manner? If at 
such time those hearings are not satisfactory to the American people, 
or they don't cover enough information, or something like that, 
wouldn't sometime later be more appropriate to say a commission should 
be appointed rather than at the time when the appropriate committees, 
as far as I can tell, are carrying out their responsibilities and 
reviewing the conduct of the war and the oversight policies dictating 
our military? Does the Senator agree with that?
  Mr. STEVENS. The Senator is absolutely correct. What is more, Senator 
Inouye and I went to the CIA and we talked to the Director, and he 
informed us that he sent a stack of material this high to the committee 
already for its review. It is going to take some time to review all 
that. It is ongoing. This would have us appoint a commission to review 
the same thing that we are already investigating in the Senate 
Intelligence Committee and that the House is investigating. I presume 
the Armed Services Committee has some jurisdiction on this matter, 
also. The Foreign Relations Committee has jurisdiction.
  Why should we appoint a commission to do what we should do--to do our 
work, particularly when it is not on a timely basis? As the Senator 
from Arizona stated in his question to me, the time may come when the 
public will question the results of our activities as Members of 
Congress. If they do, then the right thing for us to do--or the time 
may come when they develop such a conflict within Congress that it 
cannot be resolved, and that would be an appropriate time to perhaps 
look at a commission outside of the Congress. But right now is not the 
  Mr. BOND. Will the chairman yield for a question?
  Mr. STEVENS. Yes, I am happy to yield.
  Mr. BOND. Mr. President, as a member of the Intelligence Committee, I 
know we have been having these hearings and the oversight hearings. We 
are conducting the investigations. I wonder if the chairman is aware of 
the fact that I believe the Office of the Inspector General of the CIA 
is conducting an investigation. I believe the President's Foreign 
Intelligence Advisory Panel had jurisdiction. Is it correct that the 
ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Levin, is 
conducting an inquiry?
  At my count, at least five different investigations are going on. I 
wonder if that number is accurate, and does the chairman think that a 
sixth, which would not start until later on, would add anything?
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, the question is relevant because the 
purpose of this commission is to support ongoing congressional reviews 
regarding the collection and analysis of intelligence data. We have not 
done it yet. We don't need any support that I know of. The support base 
is the executive branch and in the media to examine the report and the 
role of policymakers relating to Iraq and Iraqi freedom. That is not 
over yet.
  Again, there is a timeliness to commissions. But more than that, 
there is the ongoing impact coming into this Senator's soul that we are 
starting a campaign of 2004. It is too early to do that, when we have 
men and women overseas in uniform trying to defend themselves and carry 
out the orders of the Commander in Chief. It is not timely to do this, 
and I do object to it.
  Mr. President, I don't often do this. I am really going to be a 
little bit brash--you could not imagine I would do that, I am sure. 
Does the Senator from Nevada wish to ask a question?
  Mr. REID. No. I was hoping we could vote on Corzine first and McCain 
  Mr. STEVENS. I was going to make that order. I am pleased that the 
Senator said that.
  Mr. President, in order that the Senator from Hawaii and I can go to 
an appointment we have involving World War II veterans, I will take it 
upon myself to move to table the Corzine amendment and to ask for the 
yeas and nays.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.

[[Page S9480]]

  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent at this time that 
it be in order to move to table the McCain amendment, and for that 
purpose I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection. Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, for the information of the Senate, 
following these two amendments, there will be a period for routine 
morning business.
  I ask unanimous consent that following the votes there be a period 
for routine morning business, and that the Senator from Rhode Island, 
Mr. Reed, make a statement.
  Mr. REID. He wants to speak on the bill. After that, we will go into 
morning business.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, Senator Reed will be making a statement 
on the bill. Following his statement, I ask unanimous consent that 
there be a period for routine morning business until the Senator from 
Hawaii and I have returned from our event, which will be, I believe, 
about 8:15.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, the only question I ask is this: We would 
love to have you back here, but I don't think there is need to come 
back tonight. We have a schedule set up for the morning.
  Mr. STEVENS. We have not done that. We need to have the time to do 
  Mr. REID. If the Senator from Alaska wants to be here to do that, 
that is fine, but otherwise, valiant staff will take care of it and 
whoever is closing. We will see you back. That is fine.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, in explanation, it is my intent to come 
back. The Senator from Hawaii will not have to come back. We want to 
enter into a unanimous consent agreement for the order of amendments. 
There will be two amendments. At 10 o'clock Senator Byrd will offer an 
amendment. I believe we will have an order for the Senate to come in 
sometime just prior to 9 o'clock.
  Mr. REID. Nine o'clock is fine.
  Mr. STEVENS. I am not going to make that order yet. That is the 
understanding I have, that we will come in around 9 o'clock and 
consider two amendments, and Senator Byrd is to offer his amendment at 
10 o'clock.
  I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Coleman). The yeas and nays have been 
ordered on these requests.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion to 
table amendment No. 1275. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Florida (Mr. Graham), the 
Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry), the Senator from Connecticut 
(Mr. Lieberman), and the Senator from Georgia (Mr. Miller) are 
necessarily absent.
  I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry) would vote ``nay''.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 51, nays 45, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 284 Leg.]


     Graham (SC)


     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)

                             NOT VOTING--4

     Graham (FL)
  The motion was agreed to.
  Mr. STEVENS. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. INOUYE. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.