Congressional Record: July 16, 2003 (Senate)
Page S9448-S9484
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2004
[...]
Amendment No. 1275
Mr. CORZINE. Madam President, I call up my amendment which is at the
desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from New Jersey [Mr. Corzine] proposes an
amendment numbered 1275.
Mr. CORZINE. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the
reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the appropriate place insert the following:
[[Page S9472]]
TITLE ______.--NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF
INTELLIGENCE RELATED TO IRAQ
SEC. 101. ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMISSION.
There is established the National Commission on the
Development and Use of Intelligence Related to Iraq.
SEC. 102. FINDINGS.
(1) The Congress underscores its commitment to and support
for ongoing Congressional reviews regarding the collection
and analysis of intelligence related to Iraq.
SEC. 103. PURPOSES.
The purposes of the Commission are to--
(1) examine and report upon the role of policymakers in the
development of intelligence related to Iraq and Operation
Iraqi Freedom;
(2) examine and report upon the use of intelligence related
to Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom;
(3) build upon the reviews of intelligence related to Iraq
and Operation Iraqi Freedom, including those being conducted
by the Executive Branch, Congress and other entities; and
(4) investigate and publicly report to the President and
Congress on its findings, conclusions, and recommendations.
SEC. 104. COMPOSITION OF THE COMMISSION.
(a) Members.--The Commission shall be composed of 12
members, of whom--
(1) 3 members shall be appointed by the majority leader of
the Senate;
(2) 3 members shall be appointed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives;
(3) 3 members shall be appointed by the minority leader of
the Senate; and
(4) 3 members shall be appointed by the minority leader of
the House of Representatives.
(b) Chairperson; Vice Chairperson.--
(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2) the Chairperson
and Vice Chairperson of the Commission shall be elected by
the members.
(2) Political party affiliation.--The Chairperson and Vice
Chairperson shall not be from the same political party.
(c) Qualifications; Initial Meeting.--
(1) Qualifications.--It is the sense of Congress that
individuals appointed to the Commission should be prominent
United States citizens, with national recognition and
significant depth of experience in such professions as
intelligence, governmental service, the armed services, law
enforcement, and foreign affairs.
(2) Initial meeting.--Once six or more members of the
Commission have been appointed, those members who have been
appointed may meet and, if necessary, select a temporary
chairperson, who may begin the operations of the Commission,
including the hiring of staff.
(d) Quorum; Vacancies.--After its initial meeting, the
Commission shall meet upon the call of the chairperson or a
majority of its members. Six members of the Commission shall
constitute a quorum. Any vacancy in the Commission shall not
affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same manner in
which the original appointment was made.
SEC. 105. FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSION.
The functions of the Commission are to--
(1) conduct an investigation that--
(A) investigates the development and use of intelligence
related to Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom; and
(B) shall include an investigation of intelligence related
to whether Iraq--
(i) possessed chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, and
the locations of those weapons;
(ii) had links to Al Qaeda;
(iii) attempted to acquire uranium in Africa, and if so,
when;
(iv) attempted to procure aluminum tubes for the
development of nuclear weapons;
(v) possessed mobile laboratories for the production of
weapons of mass destruction;
(vi) possessed delivery systems for weapons of mass
destruction; and
(vii) any other matters that bear upon the imminence of the
threat to the national security of the United States and its
allies.
(2) submit to the President and Congress such report as is
required by this title containing such findings, conclusions,
and recommendations as the Commission shall determine,
including proposing organization, coordination, planning,
management arrangements, procedures, rules, and regulations.
(A) Form of report.--Each report prepared under this
section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
contain a classified annex.
SEC. 106. POWERS OF THE COMMISSION.
(a) In General.--
(1) Hearings and evidence.--The Commission or, on the
authority of the Commission, any subcommittee or member
thereof, may, for the purposes of carrying out this title--
(A) hold such hearings and sit and act at such times and
places, take such testimony, receive such evidence,
administer such oaths; and
(B) require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and
testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books,
records, correspondence, memoranda, cables, e-mails, papers,
and documents, as the Commission or such designated
subcommittee or designated member may determine advisable.
(2) Subpoenas.--
(A) Issuance.--Subpoenas issued under paragraph (1)(B) may
be issued under the signature of the Chairperson of the
Commission, the Vice Chairperson of the Commission, the
chairperson of any subcommittee created by a majority of the
Commission, or any member designated by a majority of the
Commission, and may be served by any person designated by the
Chairperson, subcommittee chairperson, or member.
(B) Enforcement.--
(i) In general.--In the case of contumacy or failure to
obey a subpoena issued under paragraph (1)(B), the United
States district court for the judicial district in which the
subpoenaed person resides, is served, or may be found, or
where the subpoena is returnable, may issue an order
requiring such person to appear at any designated place to
testify or to produce documentary or other evidence. Any
failure to obey the order of the court may be punished by the
court as a contempt of that court.
(ii) Additional enforcement.--In the case of any failure of
any witness to comply with any subpoena or to testify when
summoned under authority of this section, the Commission may,
by majority vote, certify a statement of fact constituting
such failure to the appropriate United States attorney, who
may bring the matter before the grand jury for its action,
under the same statutory authority and procedures as if the
United States attorney had received a certification under
sections 102 through 104 of the Revised Statutes of the
United States (2 U.S.C. 192 through 194).
(b) Closed Meetings.--
(1) In general.--Meetings of the Commission may be closed
to the public under section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory
Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) or other applicable law.
(2) Additional authority.--In addition to the authority
under paragraph (1), section 10(a)(1) and (3) of the Federal
Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to any
portion of a Commission meeting if the President determines
that such portion or portions of that meeting is likely to
disclose matters that could endanger national security. If
the President makes such determination, the requirements
relating to a determination under section 10(d) of that Act
shall apply.
(c) Contracting.--The Commission may, to such extent and in
such amounts as are provided in appropriation acts, enter
into contracts to enable the Commission to discharge its
duties under this title.
(d) Information From Federal Agencies.--The Commission is
authorized to secure directly from any executive department,
bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent
establishment, or instrumentality of the Government
information, suggestions, estimates, and statistics for the
purposes of this title. Each department, bureau, agency,
board, commission, office, independent establishment, or
instrumentality shall, to the extent authorized by law,
furnish such information, suggestions, estimates, and
statistics directly to the Commission, upon request made by
the Chairperson, the chairperson of any subcommittee created
by a majority of the Commission, or any member designated by
a majority of the Commission.
(e) Assistance From Federal Agencies.--
(1) General services administration.--The Administrator of
General Services shall provide to the Commission on a
reimbursable basis administrative support and other services
for the performance of the Commission's functions.
(2) Other departments and agencies.--In addition to the
assistance prescribed in paragraph (1), departments and
agencies of the United States are authorized to provide to
the Commission such services, funds, facilities, staff, and
other support services as they may determine advisable and as
may be authorized by law.
(f) Gifts.--The Commission may accept, use, and dispose of
gifts or donations of services or property.
(g) Postal Services.--The Commission may use the United
States mails in the same manner and under the same conditions
as departments and agencies of the United States.
SEC. 107. STAFF OF THE COMMISSION.
(a) In General.--
(1) Appointment and compensation.--The chairperson and vice
chairperson, in accordance with rules agreed upon by the
Commission, may appoint and fix the compensation of a staff
director and such other personnel as may be necessary to
enable the Commission to carry out its functions, without
regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code,
governing appointments in the competitive service, and
without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter
III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification
and General Schedule pay rates, except that no rate of pay
fixed under this subsection may exceed the equivalent of that
payable for a position at level V of the Executive Schedule
under section 5316 of title 5, United States Code.
(2) Personnel as federal employees.--
(A) In general.--The executive director and any personnel
of the Commission who are employees shall be employees under
section 2105 of title 5, United States Code, for purposes of
chapters 63, 81, 83, 84, 85, 87, 89, and 90 of that title.
(B) Members of commission.--Subparagraph (A) shall not be
construed to apply to members of the Commission.
(b) Detailees.--Any Federal Government employee may be
detailed to the Commission without reimbursement from the
Commission, and such detailee shall retain the rights,
status, and privileges of his or her regular employment
without interruption.
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(c) Consultant Services.--The Commission is authorized to
procure the services of experts and consultants in accordance
with section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, but at
rates not to exceed the daily rate paid a person occupying a
position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section
5315 of title 5, United States Code.
SEC. 108. COMPENSATION AND TRAVEL EXPENSES.
(a) Compensation.--Each member of the Commission may be
compensated at not to exceed the daily equivalent of the
annual rate of basic pay in effect for a position at level IV
of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5,
United States Code, for each day during which that member is
engaged in the actual performance of the duties of the
Commission.
(b) Travel Expenses.--While away from their homes or
regular places of business in the performance of services for
the Commission, members of the Commission shall be allowed
travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence,
in the same manner as persons employed intermittently in the
Government service are allowed expenses under section 5703(b)
of title 5, United States Code.
SEC. 109. SECURITY CLEARANCES FOR COMMISSION MEMBERS AND
STAFF.
The appropriate executive departments and agencies shall
cooperate with the Commission in expeditiously providing to
the Commission members and staff appropriate security
clearances in a manner consistent with existing procedures
and requirements, except that no person shall be provided
with access to classified information under this section who
would not otherwise qualify for such security clearance.
SEC. 110. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION; TERMINATION.
(a) Report.--Not later than nine months after the date of
the first meeting of the Commission, the Commission shall
submit to the President and Congress a report containing such
findings, conclusions, and recommendations for corrective
measures as have been agreed to by a majority of Commission
members.
(b) Termination.--
(1) In general.--The Commission, and all the authorities of
this title, shall terminate 60 days after the date on which
the report is submitted under section (a).
(2) Administrative activities before terminating.--The
Commission may use the 60-day period referred to in paragraph
(1) for the purpose of concluding its activities, including
providing testimony to committees of Congress concerning its
reports and disseminating the second report.
SEC. 111. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There are authorized to be appropriated to the Commission
to carry out this title $5,000,000, to remain available until
expended.
Mr. CORZINE. This amendment is premised on a strong view that
intelligence and its honest analysis are vital tools in our war on
terrorism. To protect the American people, our intelligence must not be
shaped to win an argument, but must be used to inform.
This amendment calls for a bipartisan commission to study the use of
intelligence related to Iraq. The commission would examine several key
issues, including intelligence related to the following questions:
Whether Iraq possessed chemical, biological and/or nuclear weapons;
Whether Iraq had links to Al-Qaida, and;
Whether Iraq attempted to acquire uranium in Africa.
Earlier today I joined in a growing expression of concern by my
colleagues and the American people about the representation of
intelligence information by the President and the administration in
building its case for the war in Iraq. Without a thorough explanation
of why many of the administration's statements are in conflict, and
have included claims unsubstantiated by the best intelligence, the
American people, their representatives, and many of our would-be
international partners in post-conflict Iraq, will most certainly begin
to lose confidence in the administration's intelligence analysis, if
not their word. Simply put, the Nation's credibility, in my view, is at
stake.
This credibility is important for the security of the American people
who have and continue to bear an enormously high cost, a heavy burden,
in both life and treasure, with regard to our presence in Iraq. I know
in my home State of New Jersey there have been seven soldiers who have
been lost since the beginning of the conflict. It is something that
impacts people's daily lives.
We stand with our troops. We stand with the mission they are trying
to do, to bring about democracy, but we do have a right, and they have
a right to have credibility with regard to the intelligence that is
presented.
There have been a lot of accusations and allegations circulating in
recent days. Some may be trying to politicize this debate. This
amendment is an attempt to ensure that this debate does not become a
political one, and that we focus in a bipartisan way on getting to the
facts.
In my view, in order to preserve the public credibility of the United
States, we need a thorough public review, one that is above politics,
one with conclusions that will be regarded as credible and definitive,
not only in the U.S. but around the world.
As we are now all well aware, in this year's State of the Union
Address President Bush said:
The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein
recently sought significant quantities of uranium from
Africa.
The power of the President's allegations in those 16 short words
cannot be overstated. The Bush administration, using legalistic
language, was leading people to embrace, at least in the opinion of
many, the view that Saddam Hussein had an active nuclear program. The
President did not say the British were claiming anything. He did not
say they alleged anything. He said they ``learned'' that Saddam was
attempting to buy uranium, implicitly accepting the charge as fact.
Although just 16 words long, it was a powerful statement that
resonated in the context of debates that had gone on throughout the
Nation and the world for nearly 5 months, in every public forum, the
floor of the Senate, the halls of the United Nations, and across the
airwaves. Only after many months did we the people and the Congress
learn this statement was based on information that our own intelligence
agency earlier learned was false. In fact, the administration's own
spokesperson said the statement was inappropriate for the State of the
Union address. And the Director of Central Intelligence has stated
that: These 16 words should never have been included in the text
written for the President.
Yesterday morning, Senator Levin, the distinguished ranking member of
the Senate Armed Services Committee, raised several areas of particular
concern, including: the aluminum tubes; the Iraq-al-Qaida connection;
whether Iraq reconstituted nuclear weapons; whether Iraq possesses
chemical and biological weapons; allegations of mobile biological
warfare labs.
Furthermore, Senator Levin laid out seven questions about claims
specifically regarding Iraq and the uranium. He argued that these
should be answered in the context of a bipartisan investigation. I
believe that is true, and I could not agree more.
This is not just a concern about the African uranium issue. It is
about whether there was a fair and full presentation to the American
people. But to that list of questions, I would add several others.
For example, if the information in the State of the Union Address was
``technically accurate,'' as administration officials have lately
argued, why was it excluded in Secretary Powell's 90-minute
presentation before the United Nations only 8 days later?
Also, why did we learn about the misleading nature of these comments,
not from the administration, but from the International Atomic Energy
Agency and the media?
This is not an academic matter. At stake is nothing less than the
credibility of the United States, and that credibility is important for
protecting the American people. That credibility gets weakened each day
we fail to have a full accounting of the facts about what happened,
facts such as who knew that certain information was false? When did
they know it? Why was it expunged from one administration speech but
not another? And why are we just learning about much of this now?
Keep in mind, political leaders around the world, not just here at
home, have staked their own reputations on their support of President
Bush and the United States. As a consequence, many of our closest
allies and their elected officials are facing enormous criticism from
their own citizens, and sometimes--and this is quite telling--from
their own political parties. We owe it not only to the American people
but to all those who stood with us to be straight and to come clean
immediately; otherwise, this episode will only undermine our ability to
win support for other critical foreign policy interests in the future,
and they are substantial. In fact, without a clear explanation, we put
the American people at risk facing a world
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where our partners question our credibility on many interconnected
concerns: Korea, Iran, Syria, and the road map to peace in the Middle
East.
We need to understand whether this is part of a broader pattern of
selective release of information or just a series of unfortunate
snafus. Last October, for example, during the Iraq debate, Secretary
James Kelly was in Pyongyang, meeting with the North Koreans. At that
meeting, a meeting that occurred a full week prior to the Senate vote
on the resolution authorizing force in Iraq, the North Koreans admitted
to an active nuclear program. Yet despite its importance and relevance
to the debate regarding Iraq and America's national security posture
generally, administration officials waited until after the Congress had
voted on the resolution--6 days, by the way--to authorize the use of
force before revealing the details of the North Korean disclosure.
To this Senator, that information was both relevant and timely to the
Iraq debate. Was this information withheld because it might affect the
tenor of the debate, or might impact the Congress's view of the Iraqi
threat, or the relative view of the Iraq threat?
As Senator Levin and others have explained, there may have been other
instances in which the administration selectively, in some form or
another, misrepresented or withheld information to support their case
for the war in Iraq.
For example, the administration claimed there were linkages between
al-Qaida and Iraq. But many now believe those claims were overstated or
exaggerated, and based on scant and circumstantial evidence.
Another widely discussed issue relates to Iraq's purchase of aluminum
tubes, where there was considerable debate within the intelligence
community about whether the tubes were intended for use as part of a
nuclear program.
When these claims are added up, many people have concluded that the
administration may have been seeking to win an argument--not inform the
American public. And we need to know the truth. We need to be informed
to make good decisions, to set priorities, to go forward, to protect
the American people. The American people deserve to be informed
accurately.
The commission I am proposing would be completely bipartisan. It
would neither supplant nor interfere with ongoing Congressional reviews
regarding the collection and analysis of intelligence related to Iraq.
So, again, I hope we can support this proposal. We need to ensure
that the facts come out. We should do it on a bipartisan basis, and we
should do it immediately. The safety and security of the American
people are at stake.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Ms. STABENOW. Madam President, I rise to support the Corzine
amendment. I think this is an incredibly important amendment to this
important bill. In doing so, once again, as I have done before on this
floor, I commend our service men and women who have served us so well
in Iraq, as well as around the world.
We join in our pride and gratitude for their courage and their
service.
However, I must rise today to express my deep concern about
revelation after revelation of the fragile nature of the facts
presented to the American public and the world about the reasons we had
to preemptively, unilaterally attack Iraq.
Those misleading words in the President's State of the Union Address
this past January have brought into question the credibility of our
Government. This is extremely serious. It hurts our country because
Iraq is not the only threat to our Nation, as the Senator from New
Jersey indicated. We continue to be threatened by terrorists in
emerging nuclear countries such as Iran and North Korea. In order to
win the war on terrorism and ultimately disarm Iran and North Korea, we
are going to have to work with NATO and other allies to protect
American citizens.
Unfortunately, the misleading statements about Iraq attempting to
purchase uranium from Niger will make building such coalitions even
more difficult. This means our homeland will be less safe and our
American citizens less secure. This is a deep concern of mine. I wish
the misleading statements about Iraq and Niger were the only statements
in question that the President and his administration have made to the
American people. Unfortunately, there have been others.
First, let's go through what transpired with the statements on Iraq
and Niger. Before the State of the Union referencing Iraqi purchases of
uranium from Africa, the administration, at the direction of the CIA,
took out a nearly identical line in a speech the President gave in
Cincinnati last October justifying the use of force in Iraq. Then, the
African uranium purchase was back in the State of the Union Address,
although we were told now this was a mistake by the CIA director George
Tenet. Then, the African reference was dropped from Secretary of State
Powell's presentation on Iraqi weapons capabilities to the United
Nations just 8 days later. Then, Saddam's nuclear weapons came back
with certainty when Vice President Cheney appeared on Meet the Press in
March and said, ``We believe he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear
weapons.''
This was one of the main assertions used that took us to war, and I
believe the American people have a right to know which is it. If it was
good intelligence, why the constant change of mind? Either Iraq had
nuclear weapons or it didn't. If it was bad intelligence, who kept
pushing to use it in the administration speeches and interviews? We
need to know the answers to these questions. It is important for the
credibility of our country and for the trust of the American people in
our Government.
It does not end there. We heard much about specially-made aluminum
tubes that could be used to build centrifuges to create weapons-grade
uranium. In the same State of the Union where he referenced uranium
purchases from Africa, President Bush also said: Our intelligence
sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength
aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production.
But, in fact, an unclassified intelligence assessment back in October
stated some intelligence specialists ``believe that those tubes are
probably intended for conventional weapons programs.''
Last February, Secretary of State Colin Powell told the U.N. Security
Council that ``we all know there are differences of opinion,'' and that
``there is controversy about what these tubes are for.''
However, the International Atomic Energy Agency, after conducting its
own study, concluded the uranium tubes were not for uranium enrichment.
Which is it? Enough time has gone by; we should have and are entitled
to answers. We are entitled to the truth. Most importantly, the
American people are entitled to the truth. Although we now have more
than 140,000 troops in Iraq, we have not yet found chemical or
biological weapons or even the plants needed to make them. We have not
found evidence of al-Qaida training camps, although in the runup to the
war the administration not only said they were there in Iraq but that
they knew precise locations.
Again, this administration has taken us into a new age, an age where
we claim the right to unilaterally, preemptively strike another nation
because we believe our national survival is at stake. In such a world,
the intelligence used as proof for striking first has to be
unassailable, has to be totally credible, or the American people and
our allies will be deeply suspicious of any future claims.
The claims led to decisions to put American men and women in harm's
way and in too many instances have led to the loss of life. We need to
find out the truth behind the various claims and questions, legitimate
questions that have arisen, questions that have been asked by
colleagues on both sides of the aisle, questions that have taken us
into the deserts of Iraq and put our men and women in harm's way.
The only way we can get to the bottom of this is to set up an
independent commission to get the facts, a bipartisan commission, a way
to objectively look at what happened so it does not happen again.
There is nothing more serious than a potential nuclear threat to our
people. If there was ever a need for an independent commission, it is
now. We now
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face potential nuclear threats from Iran, from North Korea. We could
face more in the future. American families and our American troops
deserve answers to the questions that have been raised. We all deserve
answers. We all deserve the truth.
I hope my colleagues will join in support developing this independent
commission. I believe nothing less than the credibility of our country
is at stake. I hope we all join in supporting the Corzine amendment.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Alexander). The Democratic leader.
Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I rise for a couple of minutes to
compliment the distinguished Senator from Michigan for her very
eloquent statement and for the leadership of the Senator from New
Jersey, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. Both Members have
made their points very ably. I am grateful to both of them for their
leadership in this effort.
The real question is, How do we assert the facts in the most logical
and the most bipartisan manner? As we have seen on so many other
occasions, the only way to ensure that is done with a public review of
the information provided and all of the facts available to us is
through this independent approach. The Intelligence Committee has done
an outstanding job. I commend them for their session, even this
afternoon as we speak, looking into the facts as they are presented
from those within the intelligence community.
As Senator Rockefeller has noted on several occasions, they are
constrained by their own understandable jurisdictional review and do
not have the capacity to go beyond that jurisdictional review when
issues involving other branches of the Government, other agencies of
the executive branch, and certainly the White House itself, are
involved.
So this affords an opportunity to do the right thing, to give the
American people the confidence they need that we understand now what
the facts are, what the story is, and how we can ensure as we make
these judgments we are doing so with the very best policy and goals in
mind.
I think this is a very worthy amendment. I think it ought to pass on
an overwhelmingly bipartisan vote. I am hopeful we can do that this
evening, and I am grateful to those who have committed to this
amendment, and especially for the leadership of Senators Stabenow and
Corzine.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.
Mr. DAYTON. Mr. President, I rise also in support of Senator
Corzine's amendment. Yesterday was a very grim day in Minnesota. We had
the funeral service of the first Minnesotan to be killed in Iraq this
year in the line of duty, PVT Edward James Herrgott. It is a grim
reminder that 63 days after the President declared the hostilities
almost over in Iraq, this young man lost his life on July 3, standing
out in front, guarding the Baghdad Museum, the site where some of my
colleagues and I had swept by, well protected, just 2 days before. He
was killed, murdered by a sniper's bullet. At the age of 20, his life
and all of its promise was snuffed out.
We learned last week from the Secretary of Defense that, in his
judgment, the military presence, some major component of which will
have to be from the United States--hopefully much less will be, when we
do as we must, which is to internationalize the continued development
and hopefully economic recovery in Iraq--but as long as there is going
to be a presence there, United States troops are going to be a big part
of that, and it is almost unavoidable under the circumstances,
especially as they exist today, the number of men and women who have
lost their lives since May 1--which stands now at 79--will only
increase.
So, as Americans are faced, again and again, with a member of the
family, a friend, an acquaintance, or just through the media a fellow
citizen of that State, again and again they are going to be confronted
with this question of, what are we doing in Iraq? What is the game plan
to extricate our troops after achieving the success the military had so
dramatically, remarkably in the 3 weeks it took from entering the
country to sweeping into Baghdad with an incredible display of
technology, the training, and most of all the dedication of those men
and women who have really redefined the words ``courage'' and
``patriotism'' for this Senator.
They continue to labor there under the most extreme conditions, 115-
degree temperatures, all the other difficulties that are manifest
there, not to mention the life-threatening danger that so many of them
are under day and night.
Given all that, I think it is imperative for our national security
that we understand that we--all of us collectively in the Congress and
the President, this administration--made what is the most momentous
decision that can be made by this body and the administration, the
decision whether or not to go to war--in this case, to initiate a war
against another sovereign nation. To know that decision was made on
accurate information from our intelligence operations, to me, is
essential to our national security in the days and years ahead.
It is also essential to our democracy to know the information we are
getting from our leaders is truthful, accurate, to the best of their
knowledge. There are enough questions that have been raised that must
be answered, and they must be answered with the truth and with the
facts as that can be determined objectively and dispassionately to be.
I regret that the Senate Armed Services Committee, of which I am a
member, is not going to be undertaking the bipartisan investigation
into these issues as its counterpart, the Senate Intelligence
Committee, has agreed to do. I think there has to be that kind of
willingness on both sides of the aisle to seek the truth. I cannot
understand why anybody would not want to find the truth and present it
to the Members of this body and, even more importantly, to the American
people. But that is a decision that evidently has been reached.
In the absence of that, I think this independent commission is
essential. We owe it to ourselves. We owe it to the Private Herrgotts
whose lives have been sacrificed in this endeavor. We owe it to the
future men and women who will be over in Iraq, in future engagements,
if necessary. We owe it, ultimately, to our country, our democracy, and
to ourselves.
I yield the floor.
[...]
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, we had a time agreement and the Senator
from New Jersey and the Senator from Arizona have spoken. I will make a
few brief remarks and yield to my colleague. Then it is my intention to
move to table these two amendments. Let me state why.
[...]
With regard to the amendment offered by Senator Corzine, I have a
problem, a decided problem with this. There is an ongoing investigation
or series of hearings--I don't know whether you want to call it an
investigation yet--of the items covered by this proposed amendment,
creating a national commission on the development and use of
intelligence related to Iraq.
Iraq is still ongoing. To create a commission now to look into Iraq
primarily based upon the problem related to the President's statement
in his State of the Union Message--which, by the way, was true, but not
really totally accurate in terms of the interpretation people gave to
it--in order to start the campaign of 2004, at a time when we have men
and women in uniform over there now, their commanders, Ambassador
Bremer, all of the people who participated in the process of this
intelligence activity, including the CIA and the National Security
Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, all of them will be
involved in hearings before the commission. They are already in
hearings before the House and the Senate, and they have unknown
involvement in the internal investigation also going on in the
Department.
As I said previously, almost all of us heard the Secretary of State,
my great friend Colin Powell, tell us about his involvement and how
this train of circumstances developed with regard to how that statement
was in the President's State of the Union Message. We all know
Presidents don't write their own State of the Union Message. They
review drafts, and they rely on their
[[Page S9479]]
subordinates to see that they are absolutely accurate. In the process,
a statement was inserted that could be interpreted in a way that could
mislead people.
Already the Director of the CIA has admitted his system made a
mistake. He has taken responsibility, as he should, for something that
should have been taken out by the CIA reviewer. It was not. It was
taken out of a previous statement at another time. No question was
raised about its being taken out. In this instance, it was not taken
out and Director Tenet said it should have been taken out. He takes the
responsibility himself because of the failure of his Agency, just as I
make a policy when any member of my staff makes a mistake, I treat it
as my mistake. George Tenet didn't make the mistake. The process in the
CIA made the mistake. The President didn't make a mistake. In the
process of preparing that statement, there was a mistake made.
I am tired of making a mountain out of a molehill on this one. I am
particularly disturbed with the fact that people want to create another
commission. This is not a time for a commission like the commissions we
have known in the past. This is not Watergate. That is the impression.
This is not a Watergate. It is not even a ``truth gate.''
The President read a speech that was prepared for him. We all clapped
at it, and we all approved of it. It was one part of it, one tiny part
of it that should have been taken out in the process of review.
Now to create a commission primarily for that and all the rest of the
garbage in this thing--pardon my French--all the statements in here as
to what is going to be investigated with regard to the possession of
mobile laboratories, with regard to an attempt to procure aluminum
tubes--it wasn't an attempt; they were procured. But the concept of
whether or not Iraq possessed delivery systems for weapons of mass
destruction--we had 17 resolutions of the United Nations that were not
complied with. Why were they passing 17 resolutions if there was
nothing to investigate?
But the main thing, why should we create a commission now to look
into something that is ongoing? Once this is all tied down and we have
our people home and Mr. Bremer is residing in the U.S., and the people
involved in all of the intelligence activities that led to the
statement are in the United States again, we can have some form of
commission to review it. This Senator would not oppose that.
But this is an ongoing operation, and this is an attempt to smear the
President of the United States. I shall not permit that if I can
possibly avoid it.
As I understand it, there is no further time agreement. I have the
floor. I intend to keep the floor until I make a motion to table this
amendment.
I am happy to yield to my friend from Arizona for a question.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I will ask my colleague from Alaska a
question. I will preface it by saying I do appreciate the cooperation
that has been displayed while addressing this bill. I tell my friend
from Alaska also that it has been very helpful for us to have the
information and to be able to look at these amendments as they have
come up. I hope next year we will see Hemingway, Faulkner, F. Scott
Fitzgerald, and others of my favorite authors included in this program.
I also ask the Senator, concerning the Corzine amendment, isn't it
true that the Senate Armed Services Committee is holding, and will be
holding, hearings concerning the entire conflict, including friendly
fire casualties, including the enormous success, including the issue of
weapons of mass destruction; and those will be held openly and in a
systematic manner, which Senator Warner and Senator Levin have been
working on in a bipartisan manner? Didn't the chairman of the
Intelligence Committee hold a closed hearing today, and will he not
hold a public hearing next week? Aren't we going through an orderly
process of hearings concerning the conduct of the war?
The American people, of course, want to know about the friendly fire
tragedy, and they also want to know how we did so well, how our
equipment performed in such a magnificent fashion. It was one of the
most rapid military victories in history.
Isn't it true that we are going through an orderly process of
hearings concerning this conflict, in a very appropriate manner? If at
such time those hearings are not satisfactory to the American people,
or they don't cover enough information, or something like that,
wouldn't sometime later be more appropriate to say a commission should
be appointed rather than at the time when the appropriate committees,
as far as I can tell, are carrying out their responsibilities and
reviewing the conduct of the war and the oversight policies dictating
our military? Does the Senator agree with that?
Mr. STEVENS. The Senator is absolutely correct. What is more, Senator
Inouye and I went to the CIA and we talked to the Director, and he
informed us that he sent a stack of material this high to the committee
already for its review. It is going to take some time to review all
that. It is ongoing. This would have us appoint a commission to review
the same thing that we are already investigating in the Senate
Intelligence Committee and that the House is investigating. I presume
the Armed Services Committee has some jurisdiction on this matter,
also. The Foreign Relations Committee has jurisdiction.
Why should we appoint a commission to do what we should do--to do our
work, particularly when it is not on a timely basis? As the Senator
from Arizona stated in his question to me, the time may come when the
public will question the results of our activities as Members of
Congress. If they do, then the right thing for us to do--or the time
may come when they develop such a conflict within Congress that it
cannot be resolved, and that would be an appropriate time to perhaps
look at a commission outside of the Congress. But right now is not the
time.
Mr. BOND. Will the chairman yield for a question?
Mr. STEVENS. Yes, I am happy to yield.
Mr. BOND. Mr. President, as a member of the Intelligence Committee, I
know we have been having these hearings and the oversight hearings. We
are conducting the investigations. I wonder if the chairman is aware of
the fact that I believe the Office of the Inspector General of the CIA
is conducting an investigation. I believe the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Panel had jurisdiction. Is it correct that the
ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Levin, is
conducting an inquiry?
At my count, at least five different investigations are going on. I
wonder if that number is accurate, and does the chairman think that a
sixth, which would not start until later on, would add anything?
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, the question is relevant because the
purpose of this commission is to support ongoing congressional reviews
regarding the collection and analysis of intelligence data. We have not
done it yet. We don't need any support that I know of. The support base
is the executive branch and in the media to examine the report and the
role of policymakers relating to Iraq and Iraqi freedom. That is not
over yet.
Again, there is a timeliness to commissions. But more than that,
there is the ongoing impact coming into this Senator's soul that we are
starting a campaign of 2004. It is too early to do that, when we have
men and women overseas in uniform trying to defend themselves and carry
out the orders of the Commander in Chief. It is not timely to do this,
and I do object to it.
Mr. President, I don't often do this. I am really going to be a
little bit brash--you could not imagine I would do that, I am sure.
Does the Senator from Nevada wish to ask a question?
Mr. REID. No. I was hoping we could vote on Corzine first and McCain
second.
Mr. STEVENS. I was going to make that order. I am pleased that the
Senator said that.
Mr. President, in order that the Senator from Hawaii and I can go to
an appointment we have involving World War II veterans, I will take it
upon myself to move to table the Corzine amendment and to ask for the
yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
[[Page S9480]]
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent at this time that
it be in order to move to table the McCain amendment, and for that
purpose I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection. Without objection, it is
so ordered.
Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, for the information of the Senate,
following these two amendments, there will be a period for routine
morning business.
I ask unanimous consent that following the votes there be a period
for routine morning business, and that the Senator from Rhode Island,
Mr. Reed, make a statement.
Mr. REID. He wants to speak on the bill. After that, we will go into
morning business.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, Senator Reed will be making a statement
on the bill. Following his statement, I ask unanimous consent that
there be a period for routine morning business until the Senator from
Hawaii and I have returned from our event, which will be, I believe,
about 8:15.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, the only question I ask is this: We would
love to have you back here, but I don't think there is need to come
back tonight. We have a schedule set up for the morning.
Mr. STEVENS. We have not done that. We need to have the time to do
that.
Mr. REID. If the Senator from Alaska wants to be here to do that,
that is fine, but otherwise, valiant staff will take care of it and
whoever is closing. We will see you back. That is fine.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, in explanation, it is my intent to come
back. The Senator from Hawaii will not have to come back. We want to
enter into a unanimous consent agreement for the order of amendments.
There will be two amendments. At 10 o'clock Senator Byrd will offer an
amendment. I believe we will have an order for the Senate to come in
sometime just prior to 9 o'clock.
Mr. REID. Nine o'clock is fine.
Mr. STEVENS. I am not going to make that order yet. That is the
understanding I have, that we will come in around 9 o'clock and
consider two amendments, and Senator Byrd is to offer his amendment at
10 o'clock.
I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Coleman). The yeas and nays have been
ordered on these requests.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion to
table amendment No. 1275. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Florida (Mr. Graham), the
Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry), the Senator from Connecticut
(Mr. Lieberman), and the Senator from Georgia (Mr. Miller) are
necessarily absent.
I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from
Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry) would vote ``nay''.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 51, nays 45, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 284 Leg.]
YEAS--51
Alexander
Allard
Allen
Bennett
Bond
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Campbell
Chafee
Chambliss
Cochran
Coleman
Collins
Cornyn
Craig
Crapo
DeWine
Dole
Domenici
Ensign
Enzi
Fitzgerald
Frist
Graham (SC)
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Hutchison
Inhofe
Kyl
Lott
Lugar
McCain
McConnell
Murkowski
Nickles
Roberts
Santorum
Sessions
Shelby
Smith
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Sununu
Talent
Thomas
Voinovich
Warner
NAYS--45
Akaka
Baucus
Bayh
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Breaux
Byrd
Cantwell
Carper
Clinton
Conrad
Corzine
Daschle
Dayton
Dodd
Dorgan
Durbin
Edwards
Feingold
Feinstein
Harkin
Hollings
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lincoln
Mikulski
Murray
Nelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)
Pryor
Reed
Reid
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Schumer
Stabenow
Wyden
NOT VOTING--4
Graham (FL)
Kerry
Lieberman
Miller
The motion was agreed to.
Mr. STEVENS. I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. INOUYE. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
