Congressional Record: November 18, 2003 (House)
Page H11434-H11440
APPOINTMENT OF CONFEREES ON H.R. 2417, INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to take from the
Speaker's table the bill (H.R. 2417) to authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 2004 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and
the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and
for other purposes, with a Senate amendment thereto, disagree to the
Senate amendment, and agree to the conference asked by the Senate.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Florida?
There was no objection.
Motion to Instruct Offered by Ms. Harman
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to instruct conferees.
The Clerk read as follows:
Ms. Harman moves that the managers on the part of the House
at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses
on the Senate amendment to the bill H.R. 2417 be instructed
to insist upon section 344 of the House passed bill (relating
to the report on lessons learned from military operations in
Iraq) and to include in the conference report a requirement
that the report be submitted as soon as possible within the
scope of conference.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Harman) and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) each
will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman).
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to instruct this bill's conferees to
insist upon section 344 of the House-passed bill requesting an
intelligence "lessons learned" report and to include a requirement
that this report be submitted as soon as possible.
Section 344 of the House bill requests within 1 year of enactment a
report from the Director of Central Intelligence on intelligence
lessons learned as a result of military operations in Iraq. But as we
know all too well, the lives of American soldiers, sailors, airmen and
-women, Marines and civilians are on the line in Iraq and Afghanistan
today. There is an urgent need to identify what policymakers, military
forces, and the intelligence community can be doing better today rather
than months or years from now.
As we all know, Mr. Speaker, the war in Iraq is not over, and daily
reports from Baghdad continue to be grave and disheartening. In the
last several weeks, we have seen suicide bombings of the International
Red Cross headquarters and several Baghdad police stations, a rocket
attack on the al-Rashid Hotel where Deputy Secretary of Defense
Wolfowitz was staying at the time, mortar attacks inside the U.S.-
controlled Green Zone in central Baghdad, the downing of five U.S. Army
helicopters, a suicide bombing of Italian military police in An
Nasariyah, and a steady stream of improvised road-side explosive
devices directed against U.S. and coalition soldiers.
Coalition forces are being attacked up to 35 times a day. As of
today, Mr. Speaker, 181 U.S. soldiers have been killed in Iraq by
hostile fire since the President announced the end of major combat
operations on May 1. Clearly, our intelligence efforts on the ground
are not where they should be. We are only now setting up information
sharing fusion centers. We have just recently begun to increase the
number of analysts and intelligence experts. The bottom line is that we
still know very little about the nature of the insurgency.
Accurate and actionable intelligence is vital if we are to prevail in
this continuing conflict, and I and other members of the Committee
intend to do everything possible to provide our forces with the very
best intelligence. Lessons learned with respect to both prewar
intelligence and intelligence support to the war fighters during combat
operations are a key ingredient in that effort. The intelligence
community must understand what worked well and what did not work so
well so that improvements in intelligence support to U.S. and coalition
forces in Iraq today can be made as quickly as possible. Lessons
learned are also important if future intelligence assessments of Iran,
North Korea, and the war on terrorism in general are to be credible.
The gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) has said, and I agree,
that intelligence community reform, or transformation, must be on the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence's agenda next year. That
effort should be informed by an understanding of where U.S.
intelligence in Iraq needs to be better.
{time} 1715
In the course of a 5-month investigation, the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence on a bipartisan basis has identified serious
shortcomings in the prewar intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction and ties to terrorism. We found that sketchy and often
circumstantial evidence produced estimates that likely were
substantially wrong. At a minimum, the intelligence community
overstated the strength of the underlying data supporting its
conclusions.
Our Senate counterparts are engaged in a similar effort to identify
intelligence shortcomings and recommend changes. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff have prepared their own assessment of strategic lessons learned
from the Iraq war, and I strongly supported the Defense Authorization
bill's requirement of a "lessons learned" report from the Department
of Defense by March of next year.
Unfortunately, the intelligence community has yet to acknowledge any
flaws in prewar intelligence. With American lives on the line, the
problems with prewar intelligence must be addressed and analyzed now.
An intelligence "lessons learned" study cannot await the conclusion
of David Kay's ongoing WMD search in 9 months or a year from now.
Regardless of what he finds, we already know there were problems with
collection, analysis, and the way policymakers used the information.
Mr. Speaker, I offer this motion to instruct because the best
intelligence is key to stopping the insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan,
which will then permit reconstruction and implementation of true self-
government.
I am hopeful that the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) will
accept my motion and that we will continue to work on a bipartisan
basis to expedite the report and to implement its findings.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I appreciate the gentlewoman's comments and, of course, all the
extraordinary hard work that she has put in on her side with her staff
and her members. It clearly has been a good exercise in bipartisanship
which I think distinguishes this House very well on an extremely
important subject.
The subject that the gentlewoman has brought up is one of great
concern to us. A report on lessons learned from the military operations
in Iraq has a place in the bill, much deserved because it is important,
and the language that is in there that her proposed instruction goes to
in terms of the scope of the conference, for Members' benefit, says a
report not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this
act shall be made on lessons learned,
[[Page H11435]]
and we put that kind of a time requirement in, I think, because this is
an issue we wanted to keep the pressure up on.
I think that it is pretty obvious that the type of combat that we
have in Iraq is not what one would call conventional warfare. I do not
know whether the words low-intensity conflict, low-intensity lethal
conflict, what the right designation of words are, but it is something
different, and there is no question that we are making adjustments as
we go along not only with our military, but in our intelligence.
Adjustments have, in fact, been made because of lessons learned, some
of which have been very painful, some of which have not been so
painful. Adjustments are going to continue to be made, and I know that
our people are going to do that there because they are very interested
in making sure that we minimize our casualties, that we enhance our
advantages in every way possible in this lower-intensity type of
conflict we are dealing with on a global basis with terrorism, not only
in Iraq but elsewhere as well.
I think that it is, as I have said, an important part of the bill to
learn and adjust and respond under lessons learned or whatever
designation we wish to make. The gentlewoman has suggested that Defense
people are talking about March of next year. I am a little wary of
assigning any arbitrary dates. I do not think that serves us well
because I have a very strong conviction that lessons learned are not
going to end on an arbitrary date. I think that they are things that we
are going to have to deal with as long as we are in Iraq, and I am not
even so sure that we have it right in our report that 1 year from now,
we are still not going to be in a position to having lessons learned
and made adjustments accordingly.
So I find myself in a position of very much supporting the
gentlewoman's idea of making sure that we keep the pressure on, and
within the scope of the conference, I think that saying that within
this year, hopefully as soon as possible, is a good idea. But I do not
wish to suggest in any way, shape, or form by that formulation I have
made that this is a one-time deal. I believe that we will be doing
lessons learned forever.
I note that we are about to have an anniversary of a great tragic
event in our country which was the assassination of President John F.
Kennedy. I also note that there is new evidence coming out that says
perhaps we have not learned all we should have learned from that tragic
event even 40 years later. So in the spirit of the authorization bill,
which is for a year, and for the spirit of keeping the pressure on
lessons learned and doing the right thing, I am prepared to accept the
gentlewoman's amendment in the context of the comments I have made.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for those remarks and
agree that this is not a one-time deal.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa (Mr.
Boswell), ranking member of the Human Intelligence, Analysis and
Counterintelligence Subcommittee.
Mr. BOSWELL. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the ranking member for her
hard work and for her leadership on our committee and our chairman in
their working together. I appreciate those remarks, and we might call
it the interim report, but it will be continuing.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the motion to instruct conferees to
insist upon section 344 of the House-passed bill requesting an
intelligence "lessons learned" report on Iraq and strongly support
asking for this report to be submitted to Congress as soon as possible.
Congress does its best work when it asks tough questions. The
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has asked a lot of tough
questions over the past 7 months about our intelligence on Iraq. In our
hearings and our briefings, committee members' oversight trips to
Baghdad, a lot of talk with dozens of the intelligence officers who
fought the war and continue to fight has taken place. I admire their
bravery, their patriotism, and their selfless dedication to duty as
they prepared this country for what was to take place.
Even as I applaud their efforts, I feel it is my own duty to ask them
tough questions, questions like, "What did you do well?" Questions
like, "What did you get wrong? What can be done better in the
future?"
It is important to ask these questions because the answers are
important. The answers are important because we thought we would be
tripping over chemical and biological weapons all over Iraq, and so far
we have not found any stockpiles of weapons. We need to know why.
These answers are also important for the future credibility of the
U.S. foreign policy on Iran, North Korea, and other challenges around
the world. And the answers are important for improving intelligence
now, today, in Iraq, where our fine men and women face a dangerous
insurgency.
For these reasons I believe time is of the essence. The time to ask
and to answer these tough questions must begin now. I believe that
instructing the conferees to insist on a timely "lessons learned"
study is the right step forward to answering those tough questions and
to making our country and our troops more secure and to be prepared and
willing to do better as we go forward from this time on.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Reyes), an excellent committee member.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me this
time.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the motion to instruct
offered by the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman).
I traveled in Iraq in May of this year to observe the situation
firsthand and to see how our soldiers were fairing in the aftermath of
major combat operations. The situation was still tense back then, and
today I think it is even worse.
I served in Vietnam, as the Members know, and it is an eerie feeling
to see how similar the situation in Iraq today is to the situation back
then in Vietnam, insurgents who blend into the local population, the
constant danger our soldiers face every day, and the steady stream of
American casualties. The Secretary of Defense has said that Iraq will
be a "long, hard slog." Our soldiers deserve much better than that.
We cannot let Iraq become another Vietnam.
To me that means that we must all be learning lessons as we go along,
the military, the intelligence community, policymakers, and Congress.
The Defense Authorization bill asks for a "lessons learned" report
from the Department of Defense by March 31 of next year on military
operations in Iraq. However, the intelligence community should be
preparing, I think, its own report, not a year from now, but as soon as
possible.
In that vein, let me also reiterate a point that was made by our
ranking member. The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, on a
bipartisan basis, already knows that there were serious deficiencies in
prewar intelligence on Iraq. In fact, I had such concerns about prewar
intelligence even before we went to war with Iraq, which prompted me to
write a letter to the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) and our
ranking member (Ms. Harman) prior to the initiation of that war.
Specifically, my concern was about the connections between Iraq and al
Qaeda the intelligence community wrote about just as the administration
was trying to build its case for war in the fall of 2002. The
intelligence community had not yet previously brought these connections
to the committee's attention, even though I had been asking questions
along these lines for some time. The intelligence community must review
the analysis that it produced in this regard and determine whether
there are lessons that need to be learned. Our soldiers deserve nothing
less. Our country deserves nothing less.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes and 10 seconds to the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Eshoo), another committee member, the
ranking member on the Intelligence Policy and National Security
Subcommittee.
Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from California (Ms.
Harman), our very distinguished ranking member, for yielding me this
time.
[[Page H11436]]
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, under the
leadership of the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) and the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), our distinguished ranking
member, has been carefully evaluating the prewar intelligence
assessments of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and Iraq's purported
ties to al Qaeda. This bipartisan investigation has already established
that the intelligence community significantly overstated the strength
of its evidence that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, failed
to convey where hard intelligence left off and assumptions began, and
dropped caveats from crucial judgments.
In my view, it is also clear that policymakers went even further
beyond the intelligence assessments in categorically stating that Iraq
possessed chemical weapons and had restarted a nuclear program.
Regarding ties between Iraq and al Qaeda, the intelligence community,
in my judgment, curiously made the opposite error. Instead of coming to
an overall conclusion, as it did in the case of Iraq's WMD programs,
the community simply arrayed everything it had and let policymakers
come to their own conclusions, which they were only too happy to do. No
one should expect perfection when trying to unearth secrets from a
ruthless dictatorship, although a strategy of preempting WMD threats
appears to impose that very standard. But we must be honest and
forthcoming about the limits of our knowledge and of our ability to
penetrate tough targets.
If Iraq had been littered with WMD as predicted, the substantive and
methodological shortcomings of our intelligence on Iraq might not have
even been noticed. But the attention of the world is instead riveted on
the gulf between our estimates and reality. The credibility of our
foreign policy requires an explanation. If the world does not witness
an appraisal and corrective actions, who will have faith in our future
declarations?
It is therefore doubly galling and deeply troubling that the
intelligence community leadership rejects the very notion that its
estimates were flawed. In this time of peril, it would be dangerously
irresponsible to indulge this stubbornness and delay the time of
reckoning.
{time} 1730
Our security requires action now. That is why I support this motion
to instruct.
I appreciate what the ranking member has brought forward. It is
thoughtful, it is responsible, and I thank the chairman for supporting
the language as well.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New
Jersey (Mr. Holt), another member of our committee.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the ranking member, the gentlewoman
from California, for yielding me this time; and I rise in support of
the motion to instruct conferees to insist on section 344 of the House-
passed bill requesting an intelligence lessons learned report.
The data we have received so far, and that is thousands of pages of
raw reports, finished intelligence products, statements by
administration officials, hearings with key officials, trips by staff
and members to Iraq, leads me to judge that there have been serious
deficiencies in collection, in analysis, in reporting, and in use of
intelligence.
The chairman mentioned that we are always learning lessons, but the
case of Iraq presents a particularly good case study that tells us and
will tell us how our intelligence operation is functioning. I am struck
so far that the leadership of the intelligence community and senior
administration officials have seemed unwilling to learn these lessons.
They have refused to acknowledge any deficiencies in pre-war
intelligence, and I fear that this stubbornness in spite of the facts
is harming our intelligence efforts, even today, as our troops fight an
insurgency in Iraq.
So in the face of this denial by the administration, I feel that
Congress must insist in law on a thorough and substantive lessons
learned report.
But that is not the end of it. We have a responsibility in our
committee as well to exert oversight, and I hope we will do that. As
the committee goes to conference, I also hope that we can make certain
that we have foreign language programs that will increase the pool of
linguists in critical languages. Our search for the still-missing Osama
bin Laden is hampered by language deficiencies of those looking. Dr.
Kay's search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq is hampered by our
shortage of people who understand the technical terms of chemical,
nuclear, and biological weapons and a flexibility in local language. So
there are a number of things that we should be doing in conference, but
certainly one of them is insisting on a lessons learned record.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger), our rookie member of the committee.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. A rookie with a bad wing, Mr. Speaker. First, I
thank the chairman for accepting this report, and I thank the ranking
member also for yielding me this time.
I rise in support of the motion to instruct conferees to insist upon
section 344 of the House-passed bill requesting an intelligence lessons
learned report on Iraq and strongly support asking for this report to
be submitted to Congress as soon as possible.
I was a former Baltimore County executive of one of the larger
counties in the country, and I know well the challenges, the
exhilarations, and the pains of leading large organizations. Usually,
one does not have time to get beyond the crisis that is filling one's
inbox. But every so often, especially after a major milestone, a
critical part of leadership of an organization is making sure you are
asking your people to look back at their failures and successes with
the benefit of hindsight to see what has worked well and what can be
done better. It is all part of this experience of improving what you do
for the next time around so that you are doing the best you possibly
can for your constituents and taxpayers. It is even more important to
do so when the lessons you learn about the past can directly help your
work today.
This is absolutely the case in our work to win the peace in Iraq. I
know that our intelligence community had some great successes in
Operation Iraqi Freedom. I have no doubt that there were some serious
problems. Leadership is about taking on the responsibility to examine
what has worked well and what can be done better and making sure those
lessons are learned and implemented.
The message here is a bipartisan one, and it is a simple one. Let us
not waste any more time. Let us turn talk into action. Let us turn
yesterday's problems into tomorrow's solutions. The purpose of this
motion is to put behind us debates about who is right and who is wrong
and move on to the next step of fixing problems. It is too important
for the national security of this country and for our troops protecting
this Nation in Iraq and around the world.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, how much time is remaining on both sides?
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). The gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Harman) has 14\3/4\ minutes remaining.
Ms. HARMAN. May I inquire whether the chairman is going to have
speakers? I am curious how we are going to proceed here.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I am very happy to respond to the gentlewoman.
The number of requests I have had has been very minimal at this point.
I do not know whether that will continue or not.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am happy to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Washington (Mr. McDermott).
Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, more Americans have died in Iraq in the
last 8 months than died during the first 3 years of Vietnam. There are
three Members of Congress who have not put themselves in the secrecy
bag in this place, so I represent the 280-some million people in this
country who do not know what is going on in the secret world. But it is
very obvious from reading the newspapers, whether one reads the
American newspapers or the European newspapers, there is an enormous
fight going on between the intelligence agencies and the White House.
The Secretary of the Army, or the Secretary of War, or whatever we
want
[[Page H11437]]
to call Mr. Rumsfeld, saw fit to establish his own agency which gave
information to the President, and the President stood in this very well
and told us things which apparently he believed, but have turned out to
be absolutely fallacious. Nobody, even the President, has come back and
said it is not true.
Now, this report, this motion is the minimum that we can do for the
American people. We want to know why those kids are dying, why the
intelligence was so bad, and why the President took us over there into
something that he is now saying, we are not going to cut and run, but
what he is doing is calling Mr. Bremer over and saying, how can we get
out of here before the election? Now, we have to hurry. We have to get
out of here by next June. We were going to have a constitution, and
then we were going to have an election; but never mind the
Constitution. Let us have the election, and then we will sort of give
it to them and run away.
Now, the kids that have died, and if you go up to Walter Reed
Hospital and you meet those kids who have lost arms and legs, and you
say to them, what was the point of what we were doing? If we run out of
Iraq, leaving chaos behind us, we will have diminished what they did.
They bravely fought for us. I spent 2 years during Vietnam taking care
of kids who went through that, and we cannot put these kids through
that same thing.
I urge everyone to adopt this resolution, or this motion to instruct.
It is the minimum.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey).
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, what did George Tenet know? What did Colin
Powell know? What did Donald Rumsfeld know? We need to know why it was
that the intelligence information relating to the presence of nuclear
weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons in Iraq was so
flawed. Either our intelligence agencies did not know the truth, or
they knew the truth, but deliberately exaggerated or distorted the
truth to advance a decision to go to war that had already been
predetermined; or the intelligence community allowed itself to be
bullied or intimidated or cajoled into providing senior Bush
administration officials with the answers they wanted to get so that
they could begin a war. Any of these options raise very disturbing
issues, but we have an obligation to get to the bottom of the
situation.
Young men and women are dying in Iraq, and they were supposedly sent
to Iraq to prevent Saddam from using weapons of mass destruction that
we now know they did not have. We need to learn the lessons of this
massive intelligence failure now so that we never have such a situation
occur in the future. Our brave young men and women should never be
asked to sacrifice their lives for a war whose justification was
largely based on faulty or misleading intelligence.
What did George Tenet know? What did Colin Powell know? What did
Donald Rumsfeld know? The American people have a right to know.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from Washington State (Mr. Dicks), the former chairman of
this committee and a great expert on intelligence matters.
(Mr. DICKS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Speaker, I want to correct the gentlewoman from
California. I wanted to be chairman, but never quite made it. I was the
ranking Democratic member and did serve for 8 years, and it was the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), our distinguished chairman, who I
miss seeing almost every day for hours, as we did for a few years. I
want to compliment him for accepting the motion and compliment the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) for offering this instruction.
I would say, based on my experience, the sooner we get lessons
learned to the Congress, the better off we are going to be in terms of
getting the fixes that we need in terms of our equipment. I can
remember General Schwarzkopf coming to the committee and laying out the
problems we had in Desert Storm, Desert Shield, in the intelligence
area. He said, I want to be able to look over that battlefield and know
what the enemy is doing. That led us to push forward UAVs like
Predator, like Global Hawk. We also had problems with denial and
deception. This time we did so much better out in the West controlling
any opportunity they had to bring up Scud missiles, et cetera, et
cetera.
But those were because there was a lessons learned process where the
Congress got information and we could help get the resources and the
programs necessary to help improve our overall military capability. And
intelligence lessons learned are also critical.
And my colleagues, many of them here have already spoken, and there
is a question of the credibility of the intelligence that was presented
to the American people, presented to the Congress, presented to members
at the White House.
So I think the sooner we clear this up, the sooner we get this
information out in the open, and the sooner we can work together on a
bipartisan basis to make the fixes necessary.
There is a lot of talk about the necessity for additional human
intelligence. The chairman has been a leader. I can remember the
chairman's efforts to add additional HUMINT resources to our
intelligence capability, to build back the HUMINT capability. We are
finding out that right now we may not have as much of that capability
as necessary to deal with the problem that we are facing in this
country. Languages was mentioned by the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr.
Holt). That is still a problem. We do not have enough people who speak
the various languages that are necessary here.
So again, I want to compliment the chairman for accepting the
instruction, and I think we will all be better off getting this
information up here as soon as possible to help the Congress next year
in the authorization and appropriations process, both the Committee on
Armed Services, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to make
some of these fixes that are necessary to improve our overall
intelligence capability.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter), the distinguished vice chairman
of the committee.
(Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I very much appreciate the way that the
chairman started the discussion about our bipartisan cooperation in the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and actually being
referred to by Members on both sides of the aisle today. I think that
is one of our strong points that we need to work hard at preserving. My
colleague from Iowa, my neighbor, said it is important to ask the tough
questions in the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and I
absolutely agree and I think all of us would. I do not believe we have
been timid about doing that, not just recently, but throughout.
{time} 1745
And I believe that the administration and the intelligence community,
regardless of the administration in the office at the moment, is likely
to have more confidence that they can speak candidly, forthrightly,
that we do not have to pull things out of them begrudgingly if they
understand that we use that work well and that we keep the matters that
are classified very carefully, close to the chest, and use it well.
I would say that I think I would certainly disagree, and I have not
heard it here, but I would certainly disagree with any broad-brush,
sweeping indictment that there were severe problems with intelligence
collection analysis or the way the policy makers used the information.
We will be looking at that. We do know that there were gaps in
intelligence collection, and all of us, I think, have spoken frequently
about the problems we have with adequate language and cultural affinity
and certainly about the lack of HUMINT.
Now, if there is one area of the world, about three or four where we
had a real gap in HUMINT, it was, of course, in Iraq. And gaps equate
to information that does not flow to the intelligence community which
they cannot use, which they cannot respond to us on. So I would say
that a collection problem
[[Page H11438]]
would exist if senior managers in the ISC were not taking active steps
to address the known gaps in collection.
We have heard something just a few minutes ago about lessons learned.
And, of course, those lessons to be learned do not suddenly appear at
some point in time in the future. I believe we have been learning
lessons throughout this last several weeks and months. And I believe
that the intelligence authorization bill, which we are prepared to
bring a conference report to this floor soon, does, in fact, reflect
some of the lessons we have learned in the conflict in Afghanistan and
in Iraq and the intelligence operations that preceded and continue to
be conducted in those countries. So lessons learned are being acted on,
and there is more that we can learn.
And I think there is no hesitation on having the kind of review that
will make Members comfortable that we are taking the right steps to
support the community and, in fact, to demand responses and demand
actions where changes need to be made.
So with those comments, Mr. Speaker, I heard the acceptance of the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) of the language of the gentlewoman
from California (Ms. Harman), and I think we can move forward in a
bipartisan way. I hope, therefore, that our colleagues in the House
will continue to have confidence in this Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and that in this House, we are operating to the maximum
extent possible with bipartisan support of the Members and the
bipartisan activities involving all Members actively involved in the
process.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, we have no additional speakers. I plan to
close.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Gibbons), distinguished subcommittee
chairman of a critical part of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence which does bring out the point of question of human assets
and what most people understand about intelligence, and it is a people
business. He is our subcommittee chairman of the committee that is
responsible for worrying about those areas of intelligence, and has
obviously got a critical role to play.
In addition, the gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Gibbons) has led the
charge on some of the programs and projects that have been particularly
difficult. And I am much indebted for the work he has done on this
bill.
(Mr. GIBBONS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, first of all, I would like to thank the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), the chairman of the committee, for
the way he has handled this committee. I think it goes above and beyond
what we would have expected. Chairman Goss has led this committee
through some rather difficult times in this war on terrorism and,
indeed, our war in Iraq.
There is no question in my mind that a lot of statements have been
made this evening about the substance of the intelligence, the quality
of the intelligence. Let me say that our committee has undertaken to
review the intelligence. We have not made any conclusions at this
point. We have not reached any determinations. I may have my own
personal opinions about the quality of the intelligence, as I am sure
we all do. However, the committee has not done so in a formal basis. I
wanted to make sure that that was clear.
But there is sufficient intelligence out there, and I think we all
have agreed over the time that I have been there and listened to the
cases being made why Saddam Hussein and this war in Iraq was essential
to the people, to the efforts of the people of America to go forward.
But I just wanted to take the time to stand here and sort of challenge
the idea that there was a flawed intelligence process.
I think intelligence is a form of art, and it is not something that
is in concrete. It is an evolving process. We have not yet determined
all of the facts. We will look into that. Our committee is doing so.
And I certainly hope that we can continue to do this in the fair and
bipartisan fashion that this committee has been known for, and
especially our chairman has been known for over the past 8 years that
he has been in charge, or 7 years that he has been in charge of this
committee that I have served on. This is an important time for all of
us.
I think we have an opportunity here to do what many of us want and
that is to learn what it is that we can do to help the intelligence
community around the world. And by doing our job, and our job is to ask
the tough questions, we will be better prepared to do just that. And I
think under the leadership and the guidance of the chairman, we will be
able to bring to this House a very sound conclusion, a very reasoned
approach on what it is our Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
should be doing, what it is our intelligence community should be doing,
and how we can best support them.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Hinchey).
Mr. HINCHEY. Mr. Speaker, I want to join those who have congratulated
the Members of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
particularly the chairman of the committee, the gentleman from Florida
(Mr. Goss), as well as the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman),
our ranking member, for the job that they have done under some very
difficult circumstances. This is an issue that really needs the kind of
attention that it seems to be getting under their leadership.
I think that this motion to instruct is very appropriate,
particularly at this moment. There has been some recent criticism from
a variety of sources with regard to the quality of intelligence that
was available to the administration prior to their advocacy of war in
Iraq, and prior to the resolution passing this Congress a year ago
October. It is very important that we understand every aspect of that
intelligence.
Now, what we have heard is that the administration has not gotten
very good intelligence, that they were misled, perhaps, by poor
intelligence with regard to the connection of Saddam Hussein and al
Qaeda, and also on the issue of weapons of mass destruction. But there
is another aspect of that that ought to be looked at very, very
carefully and that is essentially this: The administration, many of the
important people of the administration, Mr. Rumsfeld, Mr. Cheney,
particularly, were given intelligence, but there is a substantial
amount of evidence to indicate that when they were given the
intelligence that there was little or no connection between Saddam
Hussein and Usama bin Laden and that there was little or no evidence of
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, their instructions back to the
providers of that intelligence, to Mr. Tenet and others, was this: We
do not like that intelligence, will you go back and get other
information. And they got that instruction a number of times. That is
an issue that needs to be looked at very, very carefully.
The quality of intelligence, yes, but what about the way in which
that intelligence was received by policymakers within the
administration. I believe that those policymakers corrupted that
intelligence, and that is a question that needs to be examined in great
detail and with complete accuracy.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood) who is the chairman of the
Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security, which is rather
relevant to this subject.
Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate all the words about bipartisan.
I wish that the bipartisanship that has been talked about would have
been manifested in the vote that we all cast around here to send our
troops the money that they need to do the job that they are doing.
It is great to talk about bipartisanship, and it is great to say that
we all have it, but the truth is when it came time to give the
resources that are needed in Iraq, some people were not there. Some
people in the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence were not
there. So I think we need to examine the idea of bipartisan and what it
really means.
The other comment I want to make is this: I think the instruction is
fine. We all know it is probably a little bit meaningless because most
instructions are, but the kind of words that have
[[Page H11439]]
been used around here in a way, the way that I see it, in a way to
degrade people who work in the intelligence community, I think is a
little bit despicable. And I want to say a word about people who work
in the intelligence community, people who work in dark places in this
world, people who collect information, people who we do not know, who
most of us do not know, who do the hard work, we get paid for our jobs
and they get paid too, but we do not get paid to put our life on the
line in the way that they do.
We have a wonderful group of people who work very, very hard and are
very experienced and do a great job collecting information in dark
places in the world, and they deserve a lot of credit. They do not need
to have people come on the floor and tell them they are not doing their
job the right way. What they need to do is have the kind of
encouragement that those of us who have the oversight responsibility
and work with people who have the oversight responsibility to say to
them thank you for a job well done, and thank you for putting your
lives on the line.
And this idea that we are not getting right information or it is not
perfect or it is not what we want or it is not being used the right
way, in my opinion, is nonsense. And, hopefully, that is what the
report will bring out a year from now. But we ought to be paying kudos
and compliments to people in the intelligence community, including, in
my opinion, from the Director George Tenet all the way up and down the
line, people who work in places that none of us have ever been. They
deserve our compliments, our credit, our applause, and anything else we
can give them. They do a great job.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I wanted to thank the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Harman) again for bringing this forward. I think we
focused on an important part of what we are about and finding out what
went wrong to make sure that it is fixed, helping those involved in the
executive branch to do the best job they can and reduce the risk to the
greatest degree possible in what is a very dangerous business. That is
a worthy effort.
I want to point out I certainly agree with the motion. Obviously, I
did not agree with all of the statements that were made in support of
the motion. That would not be my job, or relevant, any way.
{time} 1800
I think that Members have heard today that the themes of the bill
that we have passed, the intelligence authorization bill that the House
passed, have come out a number of times. Yes, there were gaps in the
information that we were able through our intelligence community to
provide with specificity to our decisionmakers.
I think that is called the fog of war. It is also called
intelligence. If we knew everything, we probably would not need to have
an intelligence organization. We certainly would not need to have
analysts.
The fact is we do not know everything. We try to get as much as we
can. We try and analyze it as well as we can. We try to get the value
added to it. As the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood) has so
eloquently said, there are a lot of people taking a lot of risk out
there in very unpleasant circumstances, as we stand here this evening,
who deserve an awful lot of credit to get the best we can.
If there are gaps in it, we will try to provide more resources and a
different mix of capabilities to reduce those gaps. We have had some
very good commentary by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert) in
the committee, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt) echoing it here
today about language problems. We have had public hearings about lack
of necessary capabilities, whether we call them insufficiencies, or
whatever word. No question, we have got to do some different things and
more of them so our decision-makers have an easier time of it and can
be more convinced that what they are doing is on hard fact to the
greatest degree possible.
I think that it is important that Members know that our inquiry is
ongoing. We have not reached conclusions as was stated. We are in the
process of reaching conclusions. Our oversight will continue, and we
will be going about our business. We will get the authorization bill
conference back as quickly as we can, I hope, and get that matter under
way. And then we will be right back to business doing our oversight and
advocacy on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence as we do
every day, working all together.
I thank all the members of the committee and all the staff, both
sides of the aisle and those in the middle as well.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, let me first thank the chairman for accepting this
motion to instruct and for years of partnership on the committee trying
to do the Nation's business in the right way. These are very hard
issues; and they require sober thought, careful articulation and
collaboration with the intelligence community. We intend to offer
criticism where we can offer it constructively and to engage in an
ongoing dialogue with the intelligence community.
It is an honor to serve as ranking member of this committee. I
respect its traditions and all the members, and staff who work so hard.
Let me say to our friend, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood),
that I agree with him. There are very good people in the intelligence
community.
When the chairman and I recently sent some constructive criticism to
the Director of Central Intelligence, our letter started with a long
paragraph about how good the people are who do our work for the
intelligence community. But it is my view that these good people can do
better and they can do better if we ask tough questions in a
constructive fashion and if we can help them learn from things they
have not done as well as they possibly could. So that is what we are
talking about here.
We are talking about requesting a lessons learned report as soon as
possible so that by looking backward on some things that were done not
as well as possible, we can look forward where we have ongoing force
protection issues in Iraq and huge intelligence challenges in Iran,
North Korea and elsewhere, and do things better. Good people with
better tools performing better.
In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, I think maybe we should freeze-dry this
debate. It was substantive. It was serious. Like the chairman, I did
not agree with every single word that was said, but I think every
single word that was said was said with seriousness and with substance,
and that is the kind of debate that we should have around here. And,
oh, by the way, we also should have outcomes like this because the
chairman has accepted this motion to instruct. I hope that should we
end up voting on it, the vote will be unanimous or near-unanimous and
that will, by my lights, be a very big victory for this body.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). Without objection, the
previous question is ordered on the motion to instruct.
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to instruct
offered by the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman).
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a
quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not
present.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 404,
nays 12, not voting 18, as follows:
[Roll No. 633]
YEAS--404
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Allen
Andrews
Baca
Bachus
Baird
Baker
Baldwin
Ballance
Ballenger
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett (MD)
Bass
Beauprez
Becerra
Bell
Bereuter
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blumenauer
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boswell
Boucher
Bradley (NH)
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Brown (OH)
Brown (SC)
Brown, Corrine
[[Page H11440]]
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Burns
Burr
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Camp
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Capps
Capuano
Cardin
Cardoza
Carson (IN)
Carson (OK)
Carter
Case
Castle
Chabot
Chocola
Clay
Clyburn
Coble
Cole
Collins
Conyers
Cooper
Costello
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crenshaw
Crowley
Culberson
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
Davis (TN)
Davis, Jo Ann
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
DeLay
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Doolittle
Doyle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Edwards
Ehlers
Emanuel
Emerson
Engel
English
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Farr
Feeney
Ferguson
Filner
Foley
Forbes
Ford
Fossella
Frank (MA)
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gingrey
Gonzalez
Goode
Goodlatte
Gordon
Goss
Granger
Graves
Green (TX)
Green (WI)
Greenwood
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Gutknecht
Hall
Harman
Harris
Hart
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Hensarling
Herger
Hill
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hobson
Hoeffel
Hoekstra
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley (OR)
Hostettler
Houghton
Hoyer
Hulshof
Hunter
Hyde
Inslee
Israel
Issa
Istook
Jackson (IL)
Janklow
Jefferson
Jenkins
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (NC)
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kucinich
Lampson
Langevin
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latham
LaTourette
Leach
Lee
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Lofgren
Lowey
Lucas (KY)
Lucas (OK)
Lynch
Majette
Maloney
Manzullo
Markey
Marshall
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McCotter
McCrery
McDermott
McGovern
McHugh
McInnis
McIntyre
McKeon
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Menendez
Mica
Michaud
Millender-McDonald
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Miller, Gary
Miller, George
Mollohan
Moore
Moran (KS)
Moran (VA)
Murphy
Musgrave
Myrick
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Nethercutt
Neugebauer
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nunes
Nussle
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Osborne
Ose
Otter
Owens
Oxley
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Paul
Payne
Pearce
Pelosi
Pence
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Platts
Pombo
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Quinn
Radanovich
Rahall
Ramstad
Rangel
Regula
Rehberg
Renzi
Reyes
Reynolds
Rodriguez
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Sabo
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sanders
Sandlin
Saxton
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schrock
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherman
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shuster
Simmons
Simpson
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Souder
Spratt
Stearns
Stenholm
Strickland
Stupak
Sweeney
Tancredo
Tanner
Tauscher
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thornberry
Tierney
Toomey
Towns
Turner (OH)
Turner (TX)
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Upton
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Vitter
Walden (OR)
Walsh
Wamp
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
Young (AK)
NAYS--12
Barton (TX)
Biggert
Bonilla
Burgess
Everett
Flake
Johnson, Sam
LaHood
Sessions
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Young (FL)
NOT VOTING--18
Boyd
Cubin
Cunningham
DeMint
Dooley (CA)
Fattah
Fletcher
Gephardt
Isakson
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Kleczka
Lantos
Murtha
Pitts
Stark
Sullivan
Weiner
Wexler
Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Simpson) (during the vote). Members are
advised that 2 minutes remain in this vote.
{time} 1825
Mr. SESSIONS changed his vote from "yea" to "nay."
Mrs. BLACKBURN, Mr. WELLER and Mr. TURNER of Ohio changed their vote
from "nay" to "yea."
So the motion was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the Chair appoints the
following conferees:
From the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, for
consideration of the House bill and the Senate amendment, and
modifications committed to conference:
Messrs. Goss, Bereuter, Boehlert, Gibbons, LaHood, Cunningham,
Hoekstra, Burr, Everett, Gallegly, Collins, Ms. Harman, Messrs.
Hastings of Florida, Reyes, Boswell, Peterson of Minnesota, Cramer, Ms.
Eshoo, Mr. Holt and Mr. Ruppersberger.
From the Committee on Armed Services, for consideration of defense
tactical intelligence and related activities:
Messrs. Hunter, Weldon of Pennsylvania and Skelton.
There was no objection.
____________________
