Congressional Record: June 25, 2003 (House)
Page H5866-H5870
PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION H.R. 2417, INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call
up House Resolution 295, and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution as follows:
H. Res. 295
Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this
resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 2(b) of rule
XVIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the
Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of
the bill (H.R. 2417) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 2004 for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes. The
first reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. All points
of order against consideration of the bill are waived.
General debate shall be confined to the bill and shall not
exceed one hour equally divided and controlled by the
chairman and ranking minority member of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence. After general debate the bill
shall be considered for amendment under the five-minute rule.
It shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the
purpose of amendment under the five-minute rule the amendment
in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence now printed in the bill. The
committee amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be
considered as read. All points of order against the committee
amendment in the nature of a substitute are waived. No
amendment to the committee amendment in the nature of a
substitute shall be in order except those printed in the
report of the Committee on Rules accompanying this
resolution. Each amendment may be offered only in the order
printed in the report, may be offered only by a Member
designated in the report, shall be considered as read, and
shall not be subject to a demand for division of the question
in the House or in the Committee of the Whole. All points of
order against such amendments are waived. At the conclusion
of consideration of the bill for amendment the Committee
shall rise and report the bill to the House with such
amendments as may have been adopted. Any Member may demand a
separate vote in the House on any amendment adopted in the
Committee of the Whole to the bill or to the committee
amendment in the nature of a substitute. The previous
question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and
amendments thereto to final passage without intervening
motion except one motion to recommit with or without
instructions.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) is
recognized for 1 hour.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the
customary 30 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Florida (Mr.
Hastings), my colleague and friend, who I am happy to report sits on
both the Committee on Rules and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence with me, pending which I yield myself such time as I may
consume. During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is
for the purposes of debate only.
Mr. Speaker, the Committee on Rules has granted a modified open rule
for H.R. 2417, the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2004.
This is the standard rule that we have used for many years for the
consideration of the intelligence authorization. The rule is fair. It
will allow ample time for consideration of all matters.
The rule provides for one hour of general debate equally divided
between the chairman and ranking member of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence. Pro forma amendments listed in the report
will be debatable under the 5-minute rule.
As in past rules for this legislation, amendments were required to be
preprinted. This allowed for the vetting of amendments regarding
classified matters, a procedure we have found to be a very good
practice, helpful to both the committee and Members.
Finally, the rule provides one motion to recommit with or without
instructions, as was announced.
Mr. Speaker, as in past years, we thought it best to allow Members a
good opportunity to review the bill and debate the issues that they
feel are important, those particularly to our Nation's security at this
time when national security is on our minds. Our classified annex and
staff has been made available to any Member of Congress that was
interested previously or is interested now in reviewing the underlying
bill and reports.
{time} 1600
H.R. 2417 is, in fact, must-do legislation because of the rules of
the House. It authorizes appropriations for fiscal year 2004
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System. In effect, what
that is is the 15 agencies of the intelligence community.
In the nearly 2 years since the tragic terrorist attacks on September
11, the intelligence community continues to build its capabilities to
combat new threats that are threats to our Nation's safety, the well-
being of Americans at home and abroad. The bill authorizes resources to
improve the analytical depth and capacity in all areas of intelligence,
an area that has been in crying need. This will allow us to process and
disseminate the information collected in a more efficient, hopefully
wiser and more timely fashion, and make sure all interested parties
have access.
In addition, this legislation continues the sustained effort and
long-term strategy to enhance human intelligence, an area that is vital
to our current war on terrorism and is essentially the core business of
intelligence, plans, and intentions of the enemy. H.R. 2417 helps to
improve information sharing among Federal, State, and local
governments. This is an area and a desire where we have overlapping
interests with other committees in the House. This bill also provides
including increased training for State and local officials on how the
intelligence community can support their counterterrorism efforts,
again, a matter of some overlapping interest.
Mr. Speaker, these are only a few highlights from the bill that
passed the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence unanimously, in
the true bipartisan fashion we like to operate our House Permanent
Select Committee on. I am sure a whole breadth of topics will be
discussed during our general debate; and I think that we have, in this
modified open rule, provided ample opportunity for all matters to come
to the floor.
I noted today in earlier debate that there was focus on one issue
that was not necessarily the subject that was under debate, and that
was the intelligence assessments of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.
Obviously, this is a topic currently under review by the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and I would like all
Members and all interested listeners to understand that we have been
conducting a review on the House Permanent Select Committee to
discharge properly our oversight responsibilities. We have been using
the tools of oversight that are available to us. I think they are
adequate, and I think they are being well used. I think we are using
them in a thorough and in a nonpartisan manner. And, in fact, the
ranking member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), and I
have taken extra steps to detail how this review will be conducted and
have actually issued a public statement on that.
[[Page H5867]]
I think it is worth rehashing what that statement says: committee
hearings, closed and open, as appropriate, that will permit Members to
question senior administration officials about the prewar intelligence
on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction holdings and programs, and its
links to terrorism, to include questions relating to the sufficiency of
intelligence collection and analytical coverage on these targets.
Granting accesses to any Member of the House who wishes, under
appropriate security provisions and House rules, to review the
documentation provided to the Committee by the Director of Central
Intelligence in response to a May 22 letter from the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Harman) and myself to provide information. And I am
happy to report we are getting full cooperation from the Director of
Central Intelligence on that.
Staff interviews of intelligence community personnel involved in
drafting intelligence community analyses of Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction holdings and programs and Iraqi links to terrorism.
Regular committee updates and status reports on current efforts to
locate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, which, after all, is a
priority, including actions of the Iraq Survey Group and other
government agencies employed in that task.
And a written report suitable to the results of the committee's
review, including an unclassified summary as promptly as is possible.
In fact, I would say, Mr. Speaker, the committee has taken a very
important additional step in its review. We have voted to allow access
to the 19 volumes that we now have on hand of information provided by
the Director of Central Intelligence outlining American intelligence
analysis on Iraq and the sources that supported it. I do not believe we
have ever done anything that specific before.
To those who believe that the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence is not doing its job or that we are incapable of doing our
job, they can come and literally read over our shoulder. I think that
the committee is doing its job, and I am very proud of its members and
its staff and the way it works; and I am very thankful that I have a
ranking member who is anxious to preserve the nonpartisan approach that
we take to the Nation's important security business.
Those who have questions about the competence of myself, my ranking
member, or any of the other members on the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence are welcome to express that today in a vote of no
confidence; but I would urge that they not do that. We are doing our
very best, and if you would like to come upstairs and help us try to do
it better, we would welcome your presence.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I first want to thank my good
friend, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), the distinguished
chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, for
yielding me the time, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I would like to first point to the extraordinary
leadership of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the ranking
member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), and the
bipartisan spirit of the unanimous consent of the entire Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence in support of H.R. 2417. I rise in
support of the rule providing for the consideration of that measure. It
is the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2004. This is a
modified open rule, and I believe that it is adequate for a bill that
is relatively noncontroversial and was reported from the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence by unanimous vote, as I just said.
I would like to reiterate a part of what the gentleman from Florida
(Mr. Goss) has said and state to Members who wish to do so that they
can go to the committee's office to examine the classified schedule of
authorizations for the National Intelligence Program. This schedule
includes the CIA, as well as the Foreign Intelligence and
Counterintelligence programs within the Department of Defense, the
National Security Agency, the FBI, and the Departments of State,
Treasury, and Imaging.
Also included in the classified documents are the authorizations for
the Tactical Intelligence and related activities and the Joint Military
Intelligence program of the Department of Defense.
Mr. Speaker, the Intelligence Authorization Act we consider today
will provide authorizations for some of the most important national
security programs in this country. This bill is the result of the
committee's ongoing oversight of the intelligence community and
oversight responsibilities, which include hundreds of hearings,
briefings, and site visits annually.
We are well aware that the global war on terrorism has focused even
greater attention on the intelligence community and its mission. The
men and women who serve in this community have faced many challenges in
the past 21 months and, in my judgment, have responded admirably. This
bill assists them in these many challenges. It fully supports the
intelligence community's efforts in the war on terrorism by providing
funds for analysis, analytic tools, and a unified overhead imagery
architecture.
Overall, the committee found the intelligence community is making
progress in many areas, but noted that there is currently no one office
in the executive branch that is charged with coordinating all elements
of the intelligence and law enforcement communities to ensure they
cooperate and coordinate their efforts.
The committee also called on the Director of Central Intelligence to
improve diversity in the workplace and special attention on recruitment
initiatives for women and minorities. I would be terribly remiss right
here if I did not mention two former members, one still alive and one
who is deceased: former member Louis Stokes from Ohio, and our dear
departed friend Julian Dixon, from California, both of whom spearheaded
efforts to ensure greater diversity in the intelligence community.
I hasten to urge that the chairman of this committee, and the now
leader of the Democratic Caucus, the gentlewoman from California (Ms.
Pelosi), and certainly the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman),
the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Eshoo), the gentleman from Texas
(Mr. Reyes), and the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Bishop), who served on
the committee previously, have all been vigorous in their assertions
that the intelligence community must do more in the area of diversity.
So I will be introducing an amendment that I believe will assist the
director in attaining the goals in this critical area.
I do urge my colleagues to support this rule and the bill; and before
reserving the balance of my time, I take a point of personal privilege
to thank the fine staff of the majority and the minority for the rather
extraordinary work that it takes in putting this measure together, and
the many measures that come across their desks on a given day,
including putting up with some of us as Members and our requests. I
urge my colleagues to support the rule.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume, and
I wish to thank the gentleman for his kind remarks. I also associate
myself with his remarks about Lou Stokes and Julian Dixon, as well as
the efforts of the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), when she
was ranking member in the committee, to deal with the diversity issue.
It is critically important. And as the gentleman from Florida knows, I
am prepared to accept his amendment at the appropriate time and pleased
to have his leadership.
I would also point out that I believe the gentleman from Texas (Mr.
Reyes) has shown another element that has improved our bill that we
approved and were able to bring to the floor in our mark. So that is an
area that has received attention because it needed attention, and I am
entirely satisfied that we are taking good steps.
I would also point out for other Members that we had a number of
amendments requested. I do not think any were particularly
controversial as to the bill itself. We have this year, because we are
dealing with standing up the Department of Homeland Security, some
questions about where we plug in the intelligence piece from our
foreign
[[Page H5868]]
intelligence community, which is a very big piece, into the homeland
security apparatus. The gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) has
been a leader on that and done excellent work and is working with the
gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) and the gentleman from Texas (Mr.
Turner), the chairman and ranking member of the Select Committee on
Homeland Security.
We also, obviously, are working closely in some other areas that are
a little new for us with the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Oxley), the
chairman of the Committee on Commerce, because of some questions about
how we deal with some of the Treasury aspects, and, additionally, how
we deal with some of the judicial aspects as we respond to the
challenge in this country of preventive enforcement for people who
would take advantage of our hospitality here and do mischief. And
regrettably, we do get the reports regularly that there are still some
of those folks in our midst. So we are going to be working in that
area.
Not all of that is going to come to a final conclusion today. We are
going to go from here, from our authorization bill, to a conference
process. I expect there will be progress made in some of these areas
where there is some apparent overlap between now and conference time,
and certainly everybody is going to be assured that this committee is
interested only in the portfolio of intelligence. That is what we do,
the Foreign Intelligence Program. The other committees of standing that
have jurisdictional areas that are associated we will work with closely
and on a friendly and nonterritorial basis. I wish to assure them all
of that.
We had, I understand, some amendments that came in late and we had
one amendment that was not germane; but otherwise, I understand that
the Committee on Rules made six amendments in order. Five were
Democratic amendments, one was a Republican amendment; and I believe
that the Committee on Rules responded very fairly. I see no reason to
oppose this rule and every reason to support it.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the
distinguished gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), the ranking
member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time, and I would state that I do not intend to use all the time. I
will spend the first part of the debate on H.R. 2417 sharing my views
about our bill and several other issues of enormous interest to the
public.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this rule and of the underlying
bill, H.R. 2417. It is interesting and wonderful that both managers of
this rule also ably serve on the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) is our bipartisan
and collaborative chairman, and the gentleman from Florida (Mr.
Hastings) is a senior member on the Democratic side. Both have
contributed enormously to this rule and, obviously, enormously to the
product we will soon debate.
{time} 1615
Under this rule, as has been explained, amendments will be considered
under the 5-minute rule and thus debate on all amendments that were
filed with the Rules Committee, germane and did not require waivers
will be in order. I am certain we will have a spirited debate on
several of those amendments, and I think that is exactly what we should
be doing in the people's House. In that vein, I will conclude, and I
look forward to a spirited debate in a few minutes.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the
gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).
(Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise
and extend her remarks.)
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I, too, wish to comment and
respond that all of us know that individuals who accept the
responsibility of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence go to
it with nothing but good intentions and a desire to provide the
greatest service to this Nation, so I appreciate very much the
leadership of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and our ranking
member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman). They have been
unique in the shadow of the controversy of the Iraqi war to have come
together on the question of weapons of mass destruction. I look forward
to their work. They have come to this floor to indicate the opportunity
for Members to review thousands of documents.
Mr. Speaker, I will continue to pursue my position, and that is that
there should be an independent commission designed to investigate the
issues dealing with the weapons of mass destruction. But in light of
their bipartisan effort, I wrote an amendment that indicated subsequent
to the completion of their work, 6 months subsequent to that, that we
would have the opportunity to design a commission that would then be
able to address the questions again, and that is an independent
commission separate and apart from this body and as well, of course,
the executive and legislative bodies.
I believe the intent was respectful of the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence. I am disappointed that the amendment was not allowed
to be admitted on the basis of waiving the points of order, but I will
continue to insist that this is the appropriate process to proceed
under.
It is not a question of whether or not we find weapons of mass
destruction or not. It is not a question of whether we are in a battle
over the truth. All we need is the truth, the finding of weapons of
mass destruction or not. Many made the decision to vote for the war
because we were told that we were about to be under imminent attack. I
think the American people are owed the ultimate determination how that
decision was made.
My other amendment had to do with providing local law enforcement
assess to intelligence as needed and to get security clearances faster
than they have been able to do so in the past. I hope we will be able
to work together to ensure that happens so all of us who have local
officials who need the information to perform their duties
appropriately can assess this important intelligence to serve our
communities. I look forward to this bill moving through the House, and
working on these important issues.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the Rule governing floor debate
on H.R. 2417, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.
I oppose this modified open Rule because it fails to make in order
several amendments that improve this legislation and benefit the
public.
I proposed two amendments to H.R. 2417 that were not made in order.
The first amendment called for the establishment of a "National
Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq." This Commission
was to be responsible for reviewing and assessing the administration's
knowledge of the status of and threats posed by Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction program before America went to war. The need for and the
benefits of this Commission are obvious. The administration declared
war, without a declaration of war by the Congress, based upon the claim
that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction and that the
United States was in immediate danger of being attacked by the Iraqi
regime. Over the several weeks of Operation Iraqi Freedom, dozens of
American and British soldiers lost their lives and many more suffered
grave injuries. I had the honor of personally meeting many of our
valiant, injured troops on visits to Bethesda Medical Facility and
Walter Reed Army Hospital. Their courage and sacrifice was
overwhelming.
For many Americans, myself included, questions remain whether the
deaths and injuries suffered by young Americans in Operation Iraqi
Freedom were justified. To date, we have discovered no evidence of
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Many Americans are left wondering
if the justifications for waging war proffered by the administration
were legitimate. That is why I proposed an amendment to H.R. 2417
calling for the establishment of a National Commission on Weapons of
Mass Destruction in Iraq. We must study the intelligence available to
the administration when war with Iraq was commenced. Was Saddam Hussein
producing weapons of mass destruction? Was the Iraqi regime capable of
producing weapons of mass destruction? Did the Iraqi regime conceal
their weapons of mass destruction after Operation Iraqi Freedom began?
These questions, and many more, need answers. The Commission
established under my amendment would have provided those answers.
I support the amendment offered by my colleague from California, the
Honorable Barbara Lee. Her amendment calls for a General
[[Page H5869]]
Accounting Office report on the degree to which U.S. intelligence
services shared information about weapons of mass destruction sites
with the United Nations inspections teams searching for those weapons
in Iraq. Ms. Lee's timely and important Amendment will provide many of
the answers the American public seeks.
I also proposed an amendment to H.R. 2417 to expand the security
clearance for law enforcement agents, specified by State executives, so
that classified and vital information related to homeland security can
be shared. This amendment was also not made in order, but is vital to
preparing or local communities to wage the war on terrorism. Protecting
our homeland will be conducted by local law enforcement agencies and
small communities across the country. It is vital for valuable, often
classified information related to homeland security to be accessible to
local law enforcement agents. My amendment would have expanded the
security clearance for designated State and local officials and given
them the ability to receive vital information.
Mr. Speaker, I reiterate my opposition to this Rule. The Rule is too
narrowly drafted and fails to make in order several valuable amendments
offered by myself and my colleagues. I urge my colleagues to join me in
opposing the narrowly-tailored Rule and in support of the amendment to
H.R. 2417 offered by my colleague Ms. Barbara Lee.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I just wish to respond to my colleague by inviting the
gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee) to come upstairs, as all
Members are permitted, and see the material being worked on by the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and to read the mission of
the committee in that regard. I think all Members would find that
substantial work is being done, and I believe all Members of this body
would be very proud of the efforts put forward by Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence in investigating the continuing concern that
all of us in this body have, and I dare say the members of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence are probably more directly
concerned in light of the fact that we are there on a day-to-day basis.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from California
(Mrs. Tauscher).
Mrs. TAUSCHER. Mr. Speaker, I rise to oppose the rule for the
Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2004. I commend the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the ranking member, the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), who are doing valuable work
by looking into the intelligence surrounding Operation Iraqi Freedom.
By necessity and design, their work is classified. I feel strongly
that their work must continue, but that this issue is beyond the scope
of a single committee and is of such importance to our democracy that
responsible public hearings by a select committee of users of
intelligence are necessary. Members of relevant committees such as the
Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on International
Relations, who use intelligence to make policy decisions every day,
provide valuable perspective that should be part of a broader review.
As a member of the Committee on Armed Services, I am a user of
intelligence, and the information I receive shapes the decisions I make
for many men and women in uniform every day. Members of Congress and
military planners need to have confidence that intelligence is
objective and provides a sound basis for policy decisions.
No decision is more grave than sending American fighting men and
women into harm's way. We have a duty to be certain that public policy
that we base these decisions on is credible and real. With American and
British soldiers continuing to be killed at an alarming rate in Iraq,
we have to be sure that our intelligence is providing a realistic view
of the threats they have.
Having open hearings by a select committee of policymakers who are
customers of intelligence would not only allow Congress to reclaim its
vital oversight role, but help convince the American people that their
elected officials and President have the right tools to make the right
decisions to protect them.
Mr. Speaker, this is not about the purview of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence. I deeply respect the work that the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence does, but with all due respect, as a
customer of that intelligence, the classified work that the committee
does needs to remain classified, but after that work is declassified
and moves to the National Security Agency, to the Pentagon, to the
military planners, to the differing alphabet soups of agencies, who
then take that classified work and begin to shape public policy with
it, once that work becomes declassified and is starting to be moved
into the public policy realm, I and others in relevant committees, like
the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on International
Relations, need to understand what exactly is being done to that
intelligence to either promote it or shape it to perhaps fit a
preconceived decision by people in the administration or in other parts
of the policy-making chain.
I want to know if the intelligence work that is being done so ably by
our intelligence people and the analysis done by them has been shaped
in any way that would change my mind when I make these decisions. That
is why I think we need a select committee. I urge my colleagues to vote
no on the rule, but I support the work of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), the ranking member.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I would just point out to the gentlewoman
from California (Mrs. Tauscher) that our committee is one of the users
of intelligence. We are part of this community that uses intelligence
information; and so it seems to me her point is right, and we are,
therefore, the right committee to be assessing these questions and
issues..
Second, we have already agreed on a bipartisan basis to hold public
hearings as appropriate, and the subject and timing of our first
hearing is under active discussion right now. I am hopeful it will be
held in July. I certainly agree that the public needs to know about
some of these questions. We will discuss them in more detail in a
moment. I do commend her for raising this issue. We are trying to
address it responsibly in the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence. If we should fail, then it would be timely to set up a
different committee, or a commission, or use another mechanism.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the
gentlewoman from Colorado (Ms. DeGette).
Ms. DeGETTE. Mr. Speaker, we are in a very curious position in
Congress today. We standing here debating a critical bill to provide
funding for our intelligence services while we ask whether those
intelligence services might have suffered a massive failure in
assessing Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program.
I use the word "might" very deliberately because we do not know
whether there was an intelligence failure. That is why we need an
investigation, and I commend my colleague from California for pushing
for an investigation within the committee because not only the public
deserves to know, but we deserve to know equally.
I am puzzled by many of my colleagues' lack of curiosity on this
issue. The question of where Iraq's biological, chemical and nuclear
weapons now may be is critical to the security of our Nation, and yet
more than 90 days after the fall of Saddam Hussein, we have still not
located one chemical weapon, biological weapon, or even their
precursors production facilities or delivery systems.
We went to war because of the imminent threat those weapons posed. We
need to find those weapons if they are there; and if they are not
there, we need to ask the question what caused this massive
intelligence failure that was presented to Congress as an imminent
threat to our national security? Our soldiers in Iraq are still engaged
in combat operations. Saddam Hussein may still be out there, Osama bin
Laden and al Qaeda are still on the loose, and we need to ensure
through our Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that we have
solid information as we move forward.
Congress has to exercise its powers of oversight openly and honestly
and look into these in a thorough way. That is what our constituents
deserve. That is what the American people deserve. I
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look forward to working with the committee to make sure this happens in
a timely fashion.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt), a distinguished member of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time.
Mr. Speaker, although I think this should be a totally open rule, as
has been the tradition for dealing with this bill each year, I do think
that the House should understand that the bill that is being brought to
the House today is not controversial in the sense that it was agreed to
unanimously within the committee. I would add to the remarks of my
friend from Florida that this is, once again, a truly nonpartisan and
bipartisan effort. It is appropriate that the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence should operate that way, both as the
committee that provides oversight for intelligence activities and a
committee that is, as the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman)
points out, a consumer of intelligence product.
No doubt there will be a great deal of controversy to follow, a great
deal of political discussion to follow in coming weeks and months about
the intelligence that led up to the fighting and into the fighting in
Iraq. In fact, I think this will be very good for the committee because
it is an excellent case study of what intelligence should be, what
intelligence should not be, how it can be used, and how it can be
misused. I applaud the decision of the chairman and the ranking member
to investigate the disturbing matter thoroughly, and I have no doubt
that we will be able to investigate it thoroughly.
{time} 1630
I applaud their decision to allow Members of the House to read the
large volume of material that the Director of Central Intelligence has
provided to the Congress. And our committee intends to issue a written
report on its findings as promptly as possible.
We have only begun to examine in detail the testimony, the
statements, the published intelligence relating to Iraq's weapons
programs and terrorist associations. It is early in our investigation,
too early in the military's search within Iraq itself to come to any
definitive conclusions or explanations of our failure so far to
substantiate the prewar claims and expectations of what we would find
there. But I have no doubt that the House will be satisfied with the
thorough and critical look that the committee will take in this issue.
There is no question that there is a lot of ambiguous information to
search through. There is no doubt that there have been some exaggerated
claims at least, and lives and deaths have hung on these things. We
must take a thorough look at it. We will and I think the Members of the
House will be satisfied with that look.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for
time, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I just wanted to add one bit of remark with regard to some of the
comment we have just heard which I thought was very helpful. We
understand very clearly and the Intelligence Community understands very
clearly that finding the weapons of mass destruction or what happened
to them or whether there was faulty intelligence is a critical issue
and that is indeed ongoing. As the gentleman from New Jersey just said,
we are early in the game and we have literally thousands of pages for
our staff and Members to work through.
There is one thing that has not been said very clearly yet that does
need to be said. I think we all share the desire to make as much of
this known as possible to the public. We want the public to understand
how good intelligence is and how good it is not. Frankly, I want to do
everything I can to make the American people aware as well as people
overseas who might be watching what we have to say here, whether they
are our friends or our enemies, that our intelligence is indeed
formidable and when in fact we find a place where there is a gap in it,
it will be repaired and fixed and that gap will no longer be there. I
think that will be a comfort to everybody. That process is partially
what this bill is about. But we are doing this as regard to the debate
with the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq at a time when we desire
transparency but we understand that transparency might include some
people who are our enemies in the Iraq area where there is still a very
dangerous and difficult operational climate as we are tragically
reminded every day.
I would ask that we understand that this is not just a question of
going back and reviewing material at our leisure trying to come to some
Solomon decision about whether it was good or bad or where we can fix
it. This is matching information that we had which was the best we had
at the time as far as we know with what we are beginning to find as we
are able to talk to people who are captured in Iraq and other areas who
are terrorists or are associated with them, document exploitation,
those types of things and match that up. This process is a process that
the committee has taken on. We are not just doing the prewar analysis.
We are doing the what is going on now and where is it going on a daily
basis.
I hope Members can be assured, we will be in a continuous position to
assess, both give a score card to the community and perhaps to come
back to our colleagues here and say there are some other areas where we
need to invest in the Intelligence Community because a small investment
will yield a greater national security return before we are through.
That is an ongoing process and charge of this committee and one we take
seriously.
Mr. Speaker, I urge support of the rule.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the
previous question on the resolution.
The previous question was ordered.
The resolution was agreed to.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________
Congressional Record: June 25, 2003 (House)
Page H5870-H5881
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 295 and rule
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 2417.
The Chair designates the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Isakson) as
Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, and requests the gentleman from
California (Mr. Ose) to assume the chair temporarily.
{time} 1635
In the Committee of the Whole
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill
(H.R. 2417) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes, with Mr. Ose (Chairman pro tempore) in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is
considered as having been read the first time.
Under the rule, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss).
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I am very pleased to bring the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2004 to the floor today. As always, this authorization is
the culmination of both an intensive review of the intelligence budget
request and the rigorous oversight of the Intelligence Community that
the committee conducts on
[[Page H5871]]
an ongoing basis. And I mean ongoing basis. That involves Members and
staff here in Washington and elsewhere around the globe.
In putting together this legislation and schedule of authorizations,
the committee must first answer the question, what is the state of
America's Intelligence Community? Overall there have been some
significant improvements since the low point we hit in the last decade,
and I am pleased about that. I applaud the President for making needed
investments in intelligence capabilities and his appreciation for
intelligence as a vital element of the national security of our Nation.
I am pleased to say that our intelligence authorization comes very
close to the number that the President has asked for. In dollar terms,
we have basically come in at exactly the level of the President's
request. Within that framework and building on the progress made to
date, the committee has been able to accomplish quite a bit. Among
other things, the bill before us provides full support for the
Intelligence Community's efforts in the war on terrorism, job one. It
postures the United States for the future with a unified overhead
imagery intelligence architecture.
I just can put it this way. We have been well served by technology
for a number of years. Technology gets old, just like the rest of us,
and gets fragile. We need to be in a position to keep a robust
architecture of the best technology available and this bill goes a long
way to doing that.
This bill also makes needed investments in analysis and analytic
tools. Anybody who has followed the progress of the 9/11 joint review
done with our colleagues in the Senate and our committees have come to
the conclusion that a big part of the problem lies in the coordination
and making the whole analytical piece work better. We have focused
rather extensively on that this year. It is not a new subject for us.
We also address counterintelligence concerns stemming from such
celebrated cases tragically as the Hanssen case and the Montes
espionage cases. These cases did do us damage and there are others that
can as well. Counterintelligence becomes even more important because we
understand counterintelligence may stop people from doing damaging
things to Americans here at home.
In addition, the bill continues the committee's push for improved and
aggressive human intelligence tools and capabilities. Human
intelligence, spying, espionage, getting enemies' plans and intentions
is the core business of intelligence.
On the homeland front, homeland security is very much part of our
mission in the sense that we must authorize the establishment of some
connection between our foreign intelligence and our domestic
authorities who are dealing with the problems on the homeland. So we
authorize the establishment of a pilot program to enable State and
local authorities to gather terrorist threat related information and
push it upward to the Federal level.
The Intelligence Community must be forward leaning on this. As we
have discovered consistently through our oversight and through the
joint inquiry into the events of September 11, the United States does
not have the luxury to be complacent about its national security
requirements. Risk aversion, inattention to detail, lack of investment
in capabilities, these are not options that the American people are
willing to accept and certainly the committee is not willing to accept.
Mr. Chairman, I am also pleased that H.R. 2417 continues the
nonpartisan tradition of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of reaching consensus. This is entirely appropriate
because partisanship has no place in a debate over America's security.
None at all. This measure was reported out of the committee by a
unanimous vote of 16-0. And I daresay, we did not start with a piece of
paper that we all agreed on. We got to 16-0 by dealing with some things
that we did not necessarily all agree on but we did it in a responsible
and, I would say, adult way, understanding that the flag we work for is
the flag of this country, not the flag for any other agenda.
I urge the House to support H.R. 2417. I will look forward to making
comments on individual amendments as they come along.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume
and rise in support of H.R. 2417.
First, I want to thank the chairman of our committee for the way he
runs the committee. His approach is constructive, collaborative and
cooperative and shows a real willingness to work with every member of
the committee. I have had the privilege of serving on the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence for 6 years. Chairman Goss has
gracefully and competently chaired the committee since 1997 and my
predecessors as ranking member during my service include the late and
great Julian Dixon and our able leader the gentlewoman from California
(Ms. Pelosi). The membership of our committee is truly talented,
diverse and hardworking, and deeply committed to fulfilling its
oversight duties and responsibilities to the House. By the way, Mr.
Chairman, so is our staff. Committee members and staff worked closely
together to craft a bill that provides new and better capabilities to
fight the war on terrorism as well as address a range of global
challenges. As we have just heard from our chairman, it is a good bill
and it received the unanimous vote of our committee.
An excellent summary of the public portions of our bill has been
presented by the chairman, so I will not repeat it. The committee made
thorough but sensible decisions to focus resources on the highest
priority intelligence collections programs and placed limitations on
certain new programs until they are defined in more detail. The bill
also supports the strategic vision of the committee for strengthening
the Intelligence Community. It provides additional support for all-
source analysis and encourages virtual reorganization for better
information sharing and collaboration across the agencies.
Mr. Chairman, whatever the details of this intelligence authorization
bill, we all know that it was developed at a time of heightened concern
about the nature and quality of the intelligence that led to the
decision to go to war in Iraq. I know that there are questions on both
sides of the aisle about this intelligence, questions which our
committee is already asking. While an independent commission or other
mechanism might be needed at some later date, the members of our
committee have now initiated an investigation and I would like to spend
a few minutes discussing our effort.
As our colleagues know, I voted to authorize the use of military
force against Iraq because I believed the intelligence case was
compelling. The Intelligence Community judged that Iraq possessed
weapons of mass destruction and the danger, in the President's words,
was grave and gathering. The aftermath of the war has revealed just how
brutal Saddam Hussein's regime was. The discovery of mass graves in
Iraq and the gut-wrenching grief of families victimized by the regime
speak for themselves.
To date, however, coalition forces have only uncovered two suspected
Iraqi mobile biological warfare agent production plants. Coalition
forces have yet to uncover chemical or biological weapons or further
evidence of Iraqi links to terrorism. Where are Iraq's chemical and
biological weapons? Why can't our forces find them? For our committee,
these questions have loomed over the preparation of this authorization
bill. It has been anything but business as usual.
On May 22, Chairman Goss and I sent a letter to the Director of
Central Intelligence, George Tenet, expressing the committee's interest
in learning in detail how the intelligence picture regarding Iraq's WMD
and ties to terrorism was developed. The chairman and I have also met
twice with the Director on this subject. In response to our request,
the Intelligence Community has provided 19 volumes of information on
Iraq's WMD programs and ties to terrorism. On June 12, the chairman and
I announced the bipartisan and unanimous commitment of our committee to
a serious, focused, comprehensive review of the quality and objectivity
of prewar intelligence. We announced that we would hold hearings,
closed and open--open means public--to question senior administration
and intelligence officials about the prewar intelligence on Iraq's WMD
and its links to terrorism.
[[Page H5872]]
{time} 1645
I think it is very important that the committee hold public hearings,
and I have the gentleman from Florida's (Chairman Goss) personal
commitment that we will. I hope our first hearing will occur in July.
Our committee also decided to produce a written, unclassified report as
promptly as possible, and in addition we agreed to give all House
Members access to the materials provided by the intelligence community
in response to the committee's request, under appropriate security
conditions and House rules.
Last week our committee held two hearings in connection with our
investigation, one examining the October, 2002, National Intelligence
Estimate on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs and the other
on the current search for Iraq's weapons. While we are still at an
early stage in this investigation, I want to comment on what we have
reviewed so far.
First, past possession of WMD. We know that Iraq had chemical and
biological weapons in the past. In the 1980s the Iraqi military used
chemical weapons against Iran and the Kurds. In the 1990s Iraq admitted
to U.N. weapons inspectors that it had produced over 8,400 liters of
anthrax and 3.9 tons of the chemical warfare agent VX. Drawing on both
direct and circumstantial evidence collected over many years, the
intelligence community also concluded that Iraq had people, planning
documents, and equipment to support WMD production.
Number two, hiding WMD. The agents that comprise weapons of mass
destruction are exceedingly easy to hide, a point neither the
administration nor the intelligence community made adequately clear
before the war in Iraq. Five hundred metric tons of bulk chemical
agents would fill a backyard swimming pool. Biological agents can be
hidden in small vials in private residences. But it is not so easy to
hide delivery vehicles like unmanned aerial drones, missiles, or
munitions. That none of these other harder-to-hide items has been found
is cause for real concern.
Number three, overstating the case. When discussing Iraq's WMD,
administration officials rarely included the caveats and qualifiers
attached to the intelligence community's judgments. Secretary of State
Powell, for example, told the U.N. Security Council that "we know that
Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction .
. . " On the eve of war, President Bush said, "Intelligence gathered
by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime
continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever
devised." And on a March 30 Sunday news show, Defense Secretary
Rumsfeld said that he knew where the WMD were located. Bogus
information on Iraq's alleged nuclear connection to Niger was even
included in the President's State of the Union Address. For many
Americans, the administration's certainty gave the impression that
there was even stronger intelligence about Iraq's possession of and
intention to use WMD.
Number four, circumstantial evidence. The committee is now
investigating whether the intelligence case on Iraq's WMD was based on
circumstantial evidence rather than hard facts and whether the
intelligence community made clear to the policy-makers and Congress
that most of its analytic judgments were based on things like aerial
photographs and Iraqi defector interviews, not hard facts. This is an
issue that we have to explore.
And, finally, number five, weak ties to al Qaeda. Iraq did have ties
to terrorist groups, but the investigation suggests that the
intelligence linking al Qaeda to Iraq, a prominent theme in the
administration's statements prior to the war, contradictary contrary to
what was claimed by the administration. Much remains to be investigated
in this area.
Mr. Chairman, the highest priority of our committee, and I think of
our Nation, remains finding and dismantling Iraq's WMD. It is
counterintuitive to think that Iraq destroyed its weapons and did not
report this to the United Nations. It is conceivable that Saddam
destroyed them on the eve of or even after the start of the war once he
recognized the futility of using them and the political advantage of
keeping the United States from finding them; but the more likely
scenario is that he buried or dispersed his weapons of mass destruction
and that some may now be in the hands of terrorist groups outside of
Iraq or counterinsurgents in Iraq who continue to harm and kill U.S.
and British troops.
But even if Iraq's chemical and biological weapons are found
tomorrow, and I hope they are, these issues warrant scrutiny by the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. It is already clear that
there were flaws in U.S. intelligence. Iraq's WMD was not located where
the intelligence community thought it might be. Chemical weapons were
not used in the war despite the intelligence community's judgment that
their use was likely. I urge this administration not to contemplate
military action, especially preemptive action, in Iran, North Korea or
Syria until these issues are cleared up. Certainly this Member would
not support such action until these matters are cleared up.
As the committee moves forward with its investigation, we need also
be mindful of the burden the intelligence agencies are carrying, not
only in Iraq but also in the war on terrorism in other areas of the
world. Our Nation is best served by an effective intelligence
community, not one hobbled by risk aversion and finger-pointing. The
committee's review must be based on facts, which I and others intend to
follow unflinchingly wherever they may lead.
Our Nation needs a robust intelligence budget, which this
authorization bill supports. At the same time, the committee's
immediate priority is to resolve the questions regarding Iraq's weapons
of mass destruction and ties to terrorist groups. If the answers
dictate changes in the future intelligence budgets or policy, I am
committed to bringing those recommendations forward. Meanwhile, this
authorization bill deserves our strong support.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased that we are going to have a
lot of Member participation in the general debate today.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Nevada (Mr.
Gibbons), the chairman of the Human Intelligence, Analysis and
Counterintelligence Subcommittee.
(Mr. GIBBONS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the intelligence
authorization bill, and I thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss)
for yielding me this time.
This bill addresses vital intelligence needs, and may I say there is
no greater need nor more important need, in my view, than the need for
more and better human intelligence, also known as HUMINT. For America's
intelligence community, fighting terrorism, as the chairman has said,
is job one and rightly so. In order to learn the plans and intentions
of America's terrorist enemies, which we must do to defend against
another terrorist attack, we must improve the quality and quantity of
intelligence from human sources. Technology certainly can help, but it
has limited application. For instance, the overhead collection systems
of the Cold War era continue to be a wonderful resource. However, they
are not much good for tracking individual terrorists, and they
certainly cannot get inside the heads of those individuals who are
plotting to kill Americans. For that we must have HUMINT. HUMINT is the
force multiplier.
As good as the information is that the National Security Agency
collects, it is that much more powerful when HUMINT officers down on
the ground locate individuals who can tell them just what those
electronic signals mean while talking to them in their native language.
This authorization bill recognizes this fact, and I am very proud of
the significant bipartisan support given to our HUMINT capabilities by
the community.
As I have said previously, throughout much of the 1990s there was a
debate about whether America really needed to spend so much money on
defense; and as for intelligence, some people even said there was no
longer any need for the CIA. Mr. Chairman, that debate is long over.
The task before us now is to continue to provide the necessary
[[Page H5873]]
resources for HUMINT programs so that our policymakers can have a
better, more detailed understanding of what the intelligence analysis
means.
Unfortunately, the HUMINT programs of the CIA, America's premier
HUMINT agency, were nearly starved to death during the mid-1990s; and
with the help from the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, the Congress, and now a supportive administration, those
programs are being resuscitated and brought back to new life. But
despite this renewed commitment, the CIA still has to surge to cover
the world's hot spots. This needs to change, and this bill helps us get
there.
The men and women of the CIA wherever they are found are doing a
wonderful job; but they need encouragement, they need support from
Congress, and they need the support of the American people. Our
committee has again this year, under the leadership of the chairman and
with the support of the ranking member, made the commitment to provide
the resources to properly support these fine people to add to their
numbers, to improve their foreign language skills, and to get them
overseas where they are needed and needed badly. The support for the
effort of these people must be sustained and a vote on H.R. 2417 is a
perfect expression of that support. I urge my colleagues to support
this bill.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Reyes), a very valuable member of our committee.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman, ranking member, for
yielding me this time.
I want to thank the chairman for his leadership, along with our
ranking member, in presenting a bill that I think addresses many of the
concerns that many Members of Congress have expressed to a number of us
on the committee.
H.R. 2417 expresses, among other things, the committee's deep and
longstanding concern about the lack of progress made by the
intelligence community in diversifying its workforce, especially in the
senior ranks and the core mission areas. In fiscal year 2002, the
intelligence community had a smaller proportion of women and minorities
than the Federal Government workforce and the civilian workforce at
large. Women and minorities continue to be especially underrepresented
in senior grades GS-13 through 15 and in Senior Intelligence and
Executive Services positions.
This bill requires that the Director of Central Intelligence submit a
report outlining the current diversity action plan including short- and
long-term goals. This report should also include the DCI's plan for
implementing diversity initiatives across the intelligence community
and plans for measuring the progress made by the individual agencies in
the intelligence community. The bill limits the use of a portion of the
money authorized to be appropriated to the Community Management Account
until such time as the Director of Central Intelligence reports to this
committee on his plan for implementing an effective and a meaningful
diversity plan.
Diversity in the workforce is a corporate imperative. It is critical
to defeating global threats and simply makes good business sense.
Therefore, the committee will look to the Director of Central
Intelligence and each intelligence community agency director to ensure
that more is done to diversify the intelligence workforce. The DCI and
agency heads are also urged to take diversity into account when
selecting officers to fill the many senior management vacancies in the
agencies across the intelligence community. It makes good business
sense. Therefore, I strongly urge my colleagues to support H.R. 2417.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood), who is the chairman of the
Terrorism and Homeland Security Subcommittee who has done an
extraordinary job on a very difficult subject.
Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 2417, the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.
{time} 1700
I want to pay my respects and admiration to both the chairman and the
ranking member who I think are extraordinary public servants and do a
great job for our committee.
As chair of the HPSCI's Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland
Security, I am continuously impressed by the men and women of the
Intelligence Community. Over the past year, we have witnessed
significant success in the war on terrorism, to include the capture of
a number of significant terrorist operatives around the world. The men
and women of the Intelligence Community have worked tirelessly to
deter, disrupt, and destroy terrorist capabilities wherever they
threaten our interests, and they have performed remarkably in support
of our successful military action in Iraq. Their ability to carry out
their mission is due, at least in part, to the support provided by the
Select Committee on Intelligence.
Under the leadership of the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss)
and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), this House has
consistently supported providing more resources and better tools to the
Intelligence Community. This support has only now begun to reverse the
underinvestment suffered by the Intelligence Community in the last
decade.
As we continue to face threats to U.S. interests at home and abroad,
we must remain vigilant. We must ensure that the Intelligence Community
has the personnel, the skill, the languages, and the resources
necessary to work against such threats. The Intelligence Community must
be prepared to confront the asymmetrical threat to the future.
Mr. Chairman, to this end, H.R. 2417 provides authorization funding
for the counterterrorism activities of the Intelligence Community. It
provides money and other resources to deepen all-source analytical
capabilities. This is most important when confronting the terrorist
target. It is through our analytical efforts that all the dots that get
collected ultimately get connected.
This bill also provides funding for the Terrorist Threat Integration
Center proposed by the President of the United States in his State of
the Union address. The TTIC is a primary example of how well the
Intelligence Community is marshalling its resources, encouraging
efficiencies, and disseminating timely intelligence across government
in defense of the American homeland.
The President deserves a great deal of credit for his vision. The
Intelligence Community deserves credit for putting that vision into
action.
H.R. 2417 also authorizes additional funding to specifically improve
the sharing of terrorist threat-related information across all levels
of government, Federal, State and local, and it is through the
aggressive collection, analysis, and dissemination of threat
information that the agencies and organizations of the Federal, State,
and local governments, as well as the private sector, can best protect
the homeland, prosecute the war on terrorism, and work together to keep
America safe.
The counterterrorism elements of the Intelligence Community are at
the forefront of this effort, and this bill is an investment in that
effort, and I urge support of H.R. 2417.
I want to say a word about two other issues. Some of us have been
briefed on the House floor by Secretary Rumsfeld. He stood in the well
of this House and briefed many Members. On one occasion, when asked the
question, how do we know when we have won the war, he said three
things: regime change, which we have accomplished; a new regime, which
is now being put in place; and finding the weapons of mass destruction.
I have great faith that with two of those goals accomplished, the third
goal will be accomplished. I have great faith, after a number of
briefings from folks in the Intelligence Community, that the weapons of
mass destruction will be found. And I think all Members should have
that kind of reassurance from the Select Committee on Intelligence,
based on reports that we have received, based on information we have
been given by the Secretary of Defense that that will take place.
If I could say one other thing. I want to say this, Mr. Chairman: I
think our committee probably has stepped over the bounds a little bit
by saying to every Member of the House they can have all of this
information. I think sharing this information is going to
[[Page H5874]]
turn out to be a mistake. This is the greatest talking body in the
whole world. People love to talk. Very few listen. And I am afraid that
when 435 Members have access to the information we do, a select
committee, an important committee, I am afraid of what is going to
happen, particularly after what the New York Times had to say about a
very important meeting that we had in the Select Committee on
Intelligence, which is now out in the public. Nobody knows how it got
out there, but I guarantee my colleagues, if we give 435 access, we got
big problems.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would say to the gentleman, I have great
faith that the WMD will be found too, and in the seriousness and
responsibleness of the Members of the House.
Mr. Chairman, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman
from Iowa (Mr. Boswell), who is ranking member of the Subcommittee on
Human Intelligence, Analysis and Counterintelligence.
(Mr. BOSWELL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BOSWELL. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me
this time, and I thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) for his
hard work. He is truly a leader, and he treats us with fairness, and he
has the best interests of our Nation in his heart, as well as the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman). I appreciate that very much.
I would associate myself with some of the remarks that the previous
speaker just made concerning having some faith. We are two-thirds of
the way there, and I think we have reason to believe we will get there.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 2417. As the ranking member
of the Subcommittee on Human Intelligence, Analysis and
Counterintelligence, working with the gentleman from Nevada (Mr.
Gibbons), who I appreciate very much his hard work and efforts, we have
observed firsthand the dedication and the professionalism of the men
and women on the frontline collecting intelligence around the globe.
Through their sacrifices and their heroic efforts, they have helped
make our Nation more secure and have contributed greatly to our
military success in Iraq and Afghanistan. I am pleased that this bill
provides the tools essential to intelligence collectors to meet
operational goals; in particular, those related to military operations,
combating terrorism, and countering the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction.
My colleagues will also appreciate that in H.R. 2417, it also
requires the Director of Central Intelligence to report back to the
committee on lessons learned from the war in Iraq. Careful analysis of
the strengths and weaknesses of our technical systems and processes
will allow both the executive branch and Congress to make better
resource allocation decisions in the future.
H.R. 2417 also stresses the need for improved strategic and all-
source intelligence analysis, both key to U.S. policymaker
understanding of the capabilities and the intentions of rogue nations
and individuals posing threats to U.S. interests. The bill further
authorizes additional billets for analysts, as we all know we have to
have people to do jobs, and additional funds for information technology
upgrades to help analysts more efficiently do their job.
Mr. Chairman, this is a good bill. I trust my colleagues will support
it.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Collins), who is a new and
valued member of our committee, and we welcome him.
Mr. COLLINS. Mr. Chairman, I too rise in strong support of H.R. 2417,
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004. It is a good
bill with bipartisan support and, hopefully, it will be adopted, and I
feel sure it will.
Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on our Nation, the
Select Committee on Intelligence has noted the urgent need for better
information-sharing between and among our various Intelligence
Community's agencies, and Federal, State, and even local law
enforcement are enjoying better shared intelligence. Since joining the
committee earlier this year, I have observed the chairman, ranking
member, and committee members, how they have advocated the
implementation of new policies and technologies which are designed to
facilitate the timely sharing of important information among our
intelligence agencies and our local law enforcement.
Technical shortfalls in communications and collaboration systems,
however, have undermined efforts to fully share information across the
Intelligence Community. This bill makes an effort to correct those
issues. These technical limitations can be overcome with proper
management and capital investments. This bill provides significant
funding to assist the Intelligence Community's leadership in developing
and sharing useful information, management tools, capabilities, and
operating systems throughout the Intelligence Community.
As important as technological solutions to information-sharing are
the needs for updated policies to direct the flow of information. The
community's leadership has not been sufficiently clear about its
information-sharing policies with its various component agencies. As a
result, information becomes irrelevant due to outdated directives or
conflicting opinions about what information can or cannot be shared,
and with whom. One of the key lessons learned by the committee's 9/11
inquiry last year was that a failure to communicate sensitive data on
an urgent basis among intelligence law enforcement agencies can cost
our Nation dearly.
The committee has taken steps to improve this situation with this
important bill. It is a good piece of legislation, a strong piece of
legislation. I encourage its passage and support it fully.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Minnesota (Mr. Peterson), a valued member of our committee.
Mr. PETERSON of Minnesota. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for
yielding me this time.
Today I rise in support of H.R. 2417, the Intelligence Authorization
Bill for Fiscal Year 2004. I want to commend the gentleman from Florida
(Chairman Goss) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), our
ranking member, for their leadership and the professional, bipartisan
manner in which they conduct the business of the Committee on
Intelligence.
H.R. 2417 includes authorizations for the CIA, as well as Foreign
Intelligence and Counterintelligence Programs within the Departments of
Defense, Justice, State, Treasury, Energy and the FBI. The bill
addresses critical threats to our national security, but it also calls
attention to particular areas of concern. Among those concerns is the
connection between drug trafficking and terrorist activities.
The committee is concerned about the level of personnel and funding
resources dedicated to combat transnational crimes such as drug
trafficking, arms smuggling, and money laundering. As seen in both
Colombia and Afghanistan, the activities of terrorist organizations are
closely linked to the drug trade. These illicit activities feed upon
and sustain each other. To defeat terrorist organizations, the
Intelligence Community must understand the transnational organized
crime that supports them. Therefore, the committee calls upon the
administration to reinvigorate the strategy in this area.
In addition, the bill extends the authority granted last year to
allow foreign intelligence funds dedicated for Colombia to be used in a
unified campaign against drug trafficking and activities by groups
designated as terrorist organizations.
Finally, the bill establishes an Assistant Secretary of Intelligence
and Enforcement within the Department of Treasury to enhance the
identification and targeting of illicit financial transactions. This
office will also seek to improve the coordination and dissemination of
intelligence products concerning drug trafficking, international crime,
and terrorist activities.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this measure.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am very happy to yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter), the distinguished vice chairman
of the committee.
(Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman for yielding me
[[Page H5875]]
this time. I rise in strong support of the legislation.
This Member would like to commend the exemplary bipartisan efforts of
the chairman and the distinguished ranking member, the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Harman). Often when people in Washington talk about the
need for bipartisanship, what they really mean is that the other side
should agree with them. In the case of the Committee on Intelligence,
however, there has been true bipartisanship and genuine cooperation
towards the goal of serving the Nation's interest. Although this
bipartisanship is a tradition on the Committee on Intelligence, it is
commendably reinforced by the leadership style and the efforts of the
gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) and the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Harman).
Under the chairman's leadership, and in this bill, the legislative
branch will be moving rapidly to address a number of long-standing
concerns in our collection and analysis of intelligence. This Member
would mention just a few.
First, it should be recognized that in the aftermath of the terrorist
attack of September 11, President Bush declared war on terrorist
financing. There is, however, no single office in the Federal
government that is responsible for ensuring that all elements of law
enforcement and intelligence share terrorist information in a timely
fashion. As a result, our counterterrorist financing efforts to date
have not been as effective as they could be. The committee concluded
that the Department of the Treasury needs to be more effective in
implementing its counterterrorist financing mission from an
intelligence sharing perspective. By elevating the intelligence
function within the Treasury Department, this bill ensures that the
coordination and information sharing between the Treasury and the rest
of the Intelligence Community can be more effective.
This Member recognizes that the assistance and the cooperation of the
chairman of the Committee on Financial Services, the distinguished
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Oxley), will be required to achieve this
important policy change. The Select Committee on Intelligence will
continue to work with him and his committee, on which this Member also
serves, to ensure that we get this correct.
Mr. Chairman, secondly, it should be noted that Americans have become
painfully aware of the threats to the homeland and the risk that
terrorist cells and their support networks may be operating in the
United States. Several suspected cells already have been cracked.
Indeed, an individual has just been convicted last week of conducting
surveillance operations for possible al Qaeda attacks. The presence of
this new and very real threat has compelled the FBI to transform the
way it conducts investigations.
{time} 1715
No longer does the FBI solely pursue investigations in order to build
criminal cases. Now they are also actively at work to disrupt and
destroy terrorist cells before they launch attacks. This is nothing
less than revolutionary in the way that the FBI does its business. It
is a very necessary transformation that the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence is following closely through careful oversight. We in
the legislative branch are attempting to ensure that the information
flow between the FBI and the intelligence community is done
effectively, but also within the confines of the law.
The committee intends to continue aggressive oversight. I want to
assure our colleagues of this evolving relationship between this
intelligence and law enforcement.
Third, and finally, this Member would remind his colleagues of the
enormity of the challenge now faced by the intelligence community. The
war on terrorism has required an unprecedented commitment requiring
timely, actionable intelligence on a truly global scale.
In addition, our intelligence services are devoting significant
resources to the effort to Iraq, not only to identify and to apprehend
the remaining elements of Saddam Hussein's regime but also to locate
Saddam's weapons of mass destruction. More on that subject later.
Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman for yielding me time.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Alabama (Mr. Cramer), the distinguished ranking member of our
subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence, TNT, who became a
grandfather for the second time yesterday.
Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Chairman, on behalf of my new granddaughter, Patricia
Lanier, I would say it is my pleasure today to speak about a very
important piece of legislation that our colleagues in this House will
pass judgment on.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 2417, the fiscal year 2004
intelligence authorization act. I am a fairly new member of this House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. It is a unique opportunity
for Members of the House to serve on this select committee.
I came on to the committee at the time that the joint 9-11 hearings
were taking place. And as I look around the room today and I observe my
colleagues that participated in those joint sessions with the Senate, I
want my other colleagues that are not on this committee to know how
impressed I was with the leadership of this committee and our
participation with the Senate as well.
I also want to take this opportunity to thank the staff who have been
most kind and generous on both sides of the aisle to participate with
us as we have gone through these very tough issues.
This is a good bill. It is a complicated bill. It is hard for some
Members to understand. For example, traditionally, the executive
branch, the Congress, the industry, we focus on expanding the
capability of sensors. Sensors are used to take pictures, to intercept
communications or to measure some special signature whether they are
from satellites, whether they are from aircraft, or whether they are
from ships. But the government has underinvested in abilities to task
the collection systems properly and to exploit and disseminate the
collection data once received.
For a number of years this subcommittee that I am on on this
committee has worked to improve and rectify that imbalance. This year's
bill accomplishes that and expands the concept as well. In years past,
the committee has stressed the need for more investment and better
management at the National Imagery and Mapping Agency and the National
Security Agency to improve processing, exploitation and dissemination
capabilities for imagery and signals intelligence. The committee
sustained these initiatives in the current bill.
We also lay a foundation for applying information technology to solve
problems revealed by the congressional investigation into the September
11 tragedy as well.
This is an important bill. I urge its support. I also want to point
out that the missile in space intelligence command in my district is
adequately covered by funding under this important piece of
legislation.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Boehlert), the distinguished chairman of the House Committee
on Science.
(Mr. BOEHLERT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the
intelligence authorization bill, and I want to start by commending the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the ranking member, the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), for their leadership, their
bipartisanship and their commitment. We are all in this together. And
while I am at it, I want to compliment the most professional staff that
I have seen of any committees in the Congress in my years in this
institution.
As a member of the committee, I know well the threats facing our
country. They are many. They are varied and they are serious. The job
of intelligence is challenging and never ending. All of us, not just in
the Congress but across the country, have become painfully aware that
while many countries of the world are working with us to promote peace
and stability, there are those who are committed to undermining our
efforts. The Nation has been exposed to this ugly reality. The memory
of September 11 will forevermore be seared on our souls.
Our collective awareness has increased as has our understanding of
the
[[Page H5876]]
absolute need for a very capable intelligence community. This bill
accelerates investment in enhanced capabilities and people to move the
intelligence community from being postured from the threats of the past
to being positioned to address the increasingly asymmetric threats
facing us in the future.
It will not happen overnight, but the changes needed must and will
come about at a rapid pace. Rebuilding the infrastructure and retooling
for the future is under way even as we debate this issue. Every area of
intelligence operations needs support and attention. But I want to
focus on what I believe is the most critical need we face, and that is
in the area of human intelligence.
Mr. Chairman, the sad fact is that we, of necessity, need to reverse
course from the years of decline in investments in the people that make
up our cadre of human intelligence officials. This does not mean we
should not continue to invest in important technical systems, but we
must not become solely dependent on them. Satellites in the heavens and
all the sophisticated and complex technologies here on Earth must be
complemented by our eyes and ears around the globe. There must be a
proper balance between people and machines.
We are proud of our intelligence professionals because of the
outstanding work they perform day in and day out, so often putting
their lives at risk. What they do and how they do it is not easy. And
they have earned our gratitude for their dedication and
professionalism.
One of the basic tools that these professionals need in order to do
their job is the ability to speak foreign languages. Quite frankly, and
this is sad to say, this is a deficient area. I am not at all happy,
and I will confess it up front, about the response we have received
from the intelligence community leadership on this issue, despite our
continuing efforts to improve language skills. We set a clear priority
to ensure that we have people with native language capabilities
regardless of where we might find ourselves. Yet year after year we
have provided an increase in the amount of funds requested for language
training, and year after year something happens that is not our intent.
The response to our concerns has been unsatisfactory. Year after year
the intelligence community finds ways to avoid implementing these
initiatives which are essential to its success.
Mr. Chairman, this year we insist that the community leadership
resolve to fix the language inadequacy. No more finessing, no more
fudging. Just do it or else.
Our country's intelligence community is still recovering from years
of decline. There are fundamental shortcomings that must be addressed,
and we will fail in this challenge if we do not adequately restore the
resources to a sufficient level to get the job done.
While this budget represents a significant increase over the past
years, we support it with the full knowledge and understanding there is
a great deal more work to be done. Language being only one of the
issues, but this is an issue that we have to pay attention to. It does
not do us any good to have some sophisticated satellite costing a
jillion dollars up in the heavens taking pictures of Afghanistan, if in
the caves there are all these people bent on doing us harm and there is
nobody in there who can understand them, communicate with them, or
provide us with necessary intelligence. And that is what we intend to
correct, and I am proud to say the committee stands strong behind this
commitment and we will follow through on it.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 15 seconds. The 15 seconds
is to tell the prior speaker, our wonderful colleague, that I totally
agree with him. As the representative from the district in America that
probably makes most of our intelligence satellites and has fabulous
technology, that is great; but we need more investment in human
intelligence. And he is right.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Eshoo), a classmate and good friend, one of the rookies
on our committee, but already the ranking member on the Subcommittee on
Intelligence, Policy, and National Security.
Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Chairman, I thank our distinguished ranking member,
the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), and the chairman of our
committee for their joint leadership and the standards that they set
for us every day.
I respect and have high regard for the men and women of the
intelligence community, and I really consider it a high privilege to
have been appointed to serve on the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence in the House. As a new member, I have valued meeting and
learning from the many talented and patriotic individuals in our
intelligence community; and I believe it is important for the foreign
policy and the national security of the United States that our
intelligence community be given the tools and the support they need and
that their efforts be focused on important priorities. That is why we
are on the floor today in support of this authorization act for fiscal
year 2004.
I do have some concerns today that I would like to voice. I serve as
the ranking member of the Subcommittee of the Intelligence Policy and
National Security, as the ranking member just said. The role of the
subcommittee is to examine how intelligence supports national security
policy, ensuring that intelligence is focused on the right priorities
and is as reliable as it can be and that it is used appropriately by
senior policymakers in furthering U.S. foreign policy. Issues such as
potentially politicized intelligence, potential exaggeration of
intelligence and imprecise characterizations of intelligence are of
significant concern to me in my role on this committee. So I am very
concerned about the role intelligence played in the foreign policy
debates about going to war in Iraq.
The answers must await a thorough accounting, and we cannot
predetermine what those outcomes are. But I am concerned that the
administration and the American people and the Members of this House
relied too heavily on their interpretation of the threat facing this
country, a threat that was described as imminent, as grave and growing
without sufficient transparency into the intelligence picture
underpinning the argument for war.
I think we are learning that a foreign policy based on preemption
puts far too much pressure on the intelligence community to deliver
certainty when it simply cannot. So the intelligence community must be
given all that they need to protect our magnificent Nation.
Every administration deserves the best intelligence that they
possibly can get. But we must assure the credibility of this for the
American people and for the world community.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of this
authorization act. It is important for our country and the protection
of our people.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Cunningham), the distinguished gentleman who is a very
valued member of our committees and has helped us on a number of
fronts.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I would like to first thank not only
the chairman, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), but he ranking
member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman).
Our committee is a bipartisan committee. The defense committee that I
sit on is also, with the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Murtha) and
the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) and people like that; and it
is really a pleasure to work on.
{time} 1730
When there is a pressure put on the ranking member to force political
gain on weapons of mass destruction, it is a sign of true leadership
and bipartisanship to not do that and to work with the chairman to come
about and perform a bill like this, and we should all be proud of that,
the Members, and I want to personally thank the gentlewoman from
California.
The weapons of mass destruction, we cannot say too much about them,
but the chairman and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) also
made something in order that has not been done before, and that is for
every single Member to be able to look at the information. I am
convinced that if anyone on this floor looks at that information, they
only have one conclusion. There are weapons of mass destruction still
there. If we take a vial
[[Page H5877]]
this big, the size of an eye dropper and have two seeds in it and in 2
days a person can whip up a batch to kill every man, woman and child in
New York City and then try and find that with deceit, a system that was
designed to hide it on deceit or destroy it if people get close, and
the one thing I can say is we were told there would be absolutely no
way possible for Hans Blix and the U.N. to find such things, especially
with Saddam Hussein still there trying to hide it. So that was a bogus
issue.
I would also tell them that the committee does not just deal with
terrorism, the war on drugs, local crime and the one thing that I could
say before we ever did a pre-9/11 look was that we did not fund the
folks enough. We need to change some laws.
The Phoenix report, we knew there were terrorists in Arizona, but our
intelligence agencies were afraid to act because they would be sued
because it would be racial profiling, and these guys put out papers
supporting Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, and we could not touch them
under the first amendment and that is wrong. There is the same type of
people there in Arizona today. One guy was so stupid he went to
navigator school. He failed that. Do my colleagues know what he is in
today? Airport security, and we cannot touch him.
So I think we need to go further and change some of our laws to
protect American citizens, and I know there is a fine line in
protecting rights and the other, but by golly, I know where I stand and
I know where the committee stands, and I am proud of them.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his comments. We
are all proud to serve on this committee. It is now my pleasure to
yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger), the
rookie on the committee and a rookie in Congress, but he is no rookie
to these issues.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I too want to acknowledge the
leadership of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), the chairman, and
the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), the ranking member. I
have been in local politics for 18 years, and we have tremendous
leadership on this committee, and I think all members of this committee
put the Nation first.
I rise in support of H.R. 2417. The bill reflects the committee's
support for the Intelligence Community and the men and women who serve
in the intelligence agencies. Often unrecognized, these individuals
have made great sacrifices to secure our homeland and to support the
war in Iraq, the global war on terrorism and other important national
priorities. I am proud to represent many of the men and women who work
for the National Security Agency, NSA, in Fort Meade, Maryland, my
Second Congressional District.
This bill addresses concerns for the health and well-being of NSA
employees by providing additional funds to ensure a cleaner, healthier
and better maintained workforce. It provides tort liability protection
to NSA security officers so that they have legal protections similar to
those provided other law enforcement officers.
The bill gives NSA the authority to provide living quarters to the
bright and talented students participating in NASA's summer and
cooperative educational programs.
It also encourages NASA to continue its acquisition reform
initiatives and bring its processes in line with standard commercial
and government practices. It increases funds available for the
recapitalization and modernization of NASA's technical systems which
will allow the Nation's Signals Intelligence Systems to keep pace with
changing technology.
H.R. 2417 emphasizes the need for the Federal Government to improve
information sharing with State and local governments. As the Baltimore
County Executive, I was the county executive during 9/11, this is very
important, and where appropriate, private companies.
To make this possible, the bill allows the Director of Central
Intelligence to establish pilot projects to train State and local
officials to increase the flow of information between them and Federal
agencies. Advisory councils on privacy and civil liberties and State
and local issues will help ensure the protection of individual rights,
and the needs of State and local governments need to be properly
addressed.
I am also pleased that this bill provides additional funding to the
Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center to enhance the analysis of
health risks to our deployed forces.
Together, the enhancements provided for in H.R. 2417 will contribute
to our Nation's efforts to prevent terrorism and to curb the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction around the globe. I urge
my colleagues to support this bill.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Burr), also a valuable member of our
committee.
(Mr. BURR asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BURR. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2417.
After terrorists struck on September 11, 2001, our government has
been engaged in an aggressive prosecution of the global war on
terrorism, a war that will be fought for years to come, I fear. Our
efforts I have no doubt will be successful. To ensure success, however,
we must prepare for the long road ahead of us. That is exactly what
this bill does.
The men and women of Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities
have been instrumental in the numerous successes thus far. I thank them
for their sacrifices, for their dedication. We are indebted to them for
their tireless service.
In my view, the key to success in this war on terrorism is
communication. We have to improve our communication across the Federal
Government. We must improve and make seamless the flow of information
within our Intelligence Community. It is essential to have good
communication with our liaison partners, and better communication
between Federal, State and local authorities and with the private
sector must be ensured.
Without doubt, intelligence and law enforcement officers are our
front line defenders in our daily battle against this evil. State and
local authorities also stand at the forefront of this war. Success in
safeguarding the homeland lies firmly in the ability to communicate
effectively and share sensitive, timely and actionable information
among Federal, State and local officials.
Mr. Chairman, H.R. 2417 is an important bill because it also
specifically authorizes greater training and support to local and State
authorities as it relates to preventing the possible use of weapons of
mass destruction in the United States.
Additionally, H.R. 2417 authorizes funding to ensure greater
participation of city, county and State law enforcement officials in
joint terrorism task forces that are spread across this country.
Mr. Chairman, only with better communication and sharing necessary,
relevant and actionable information with State and local authorities,
can we best wage the best effort on the war on terrorism in our
homeland.
I urge its passage.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, we have no further speakers except for me
and I have some brief closing remarks. So I would yield if there are
speakers over there and perhaps speak just before our chairman closes
this debate.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to advise the Chair to advise
the gentlewoman that we have no further speakers except myself to make
a few household and closing remarks.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
This debate has been friendly, collaborative, supportive, not just of
each other but our staffs. It is clear that committee members are
putting the country first in our service on the committee. I believe
that our authorization bill is putting the country first in terms of
the priorities it chooses, and I believe further, Mr. Chairman, that
our investigation of the quality of intelligence supporting the war in
Iraq is also putting the country first.
Our investigation has a long way to go but it is serious,
collaborative, and bipartisan. We will do as much as possible in
public, and we will report to the public on our findings.
Should we hit the wall and fail in our endeavor, then it may be time
for a commission or an alternative committee or set of committees of
Congress to take over. But meanwhile, I
[[Page H5878]]
want to commend the Members of this committee who serve with great
distinction, and I urge the passage of this authorization bill, H.R.
2417.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, how much time do I have?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida has 2 minutes remaining.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the remaining time.
I would like to also announce that the gentleman from Michigan (Mr.
Hoekstra), who is the chairman of our Subcommittee on Technical and
Tactical Intelligence, and the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Everett) and
the gentleman from California (Mr. Gallegly) are other members of the
committee who will probably join us later on and we are equally proud
of them.
We obviously have an extraordinarily high level of group of members,
as my colleagues have seen, on both sides of the aisle who take this
business quite seriously, and we are very pleased about that.
I would like to include for the Record the administration policy and
exchange of correspondence with the chairmen of the appropriate
committees. That would be the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Oxley), the
gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner), and the gentleman from
California (Mr. Hunter).
Statement of Administration Policy
H.R. 2417--Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2004
(This statement has been coordinated by OMB with the
concerned agencies.)
The Administration appreciates the support of the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence for the work and efforts of
the Intelligence Community (IC), as well as the Committee's
inclusion in its bill of a significant number of requested
provisions. The Administration would support H.R. 2417 if the
concerns outlined below are addressed.
The Administration has not had the opportunity to review
the classified schedule of authorizations, and reserves
comment on those authorizations. The Administration would
strenously object if certain high priority transformational
development programs affecting the IC's future collection and
research and development strategies, are not authorized as
requested.
The Administration appreciates the Committee's support for
our initiatives to improve our nation's intelligence
capabilities, and believes that section 336, regarding
improved information sharing among federal, State, and local
government officials, addresses significant and important
issues. However, the Administration has concerns with this
and other sections of the bill (such as section 321) which
seek to direct specific roles and responsibilities to be
carried out by particular components of the Executive Branch.
They could impinge on the President's constitutional
authority to determine how Executive Branch agencies should
be organized to carry out national defense and anti-terrorism
activities.
Section 505, concerning the measurement and signatures
intelligence (MASINT) research program, would provide the
Defense Department the authority to review CIA and other
intelligence agencies' MASINT programs. The Administration
would oppose this expanded authority for DoD, as we believe
the existing authorities and responsibilities are properly
vested.
The Administration looks forward to working with the
Congress on these and a number of other policy and technical
concerns as H.R. 2417 moves through the legislative process.
____
House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary,
Rayburn House Office Building,
Washington, DC, June 17, 2003.
Hon. Porter Goss,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House
of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Goss: In recognition of the desire to
expedite floor consideration of H.R. 2417, the intelligence
authorization bill for fiscal year 2004, the Committee on the
Judiciary hereby waives consideration of the bill with the
understanding that you will continue to work with me on
sections within the Committee on the Judiciary's jurisdiction
and that for any of those sections on which we cannot reach a
mutually agreeable resolution, you will remove them before
enactment. I further understand that you will support the
Committee on the Judiciary's request for conferees on these
sections.
The sections in the bill as reported that contain matters
within the Committee on the Judiciary's Rule X jurisdiction
are:
104(e) (relating to funding for the Department of Justice's
National Drug Intelligence Center);
321 (relating to procedures for using classified
information);
332 (relating to the use of explosives by certain qualified
aliens if they are in the United States to cooperate with the
CIA or the United States military);
333 (relating to the naturalization of certain persons);
334 (relating to the types of financial institutions from
which law enforcement can obtain financial records for
criminal investigation purposes);
335 (relating to certain aspects of the mandatory source
rules for Federal Prison Industries as they relate to
procurements by the Central Intelligence Agency);
336 (relating to pilot projects to encourage the sharing of
intelligence information between state and local officials
and representatives of critical infrastructure industries on
the one hand and federal officials on the other)
401 (relating to giving certain employees of the Central
Intelligence Agency the protections of the Federal Tort
Claims Act when they take certain actions to prevent crime)
504 (relating to giving certain employees of the National
Security Agency the protections of the Federal Tort Claims
Act when they take certain actions to prevent crime)
(These section numbers refer to the bill as reported.)
Based on this understanding, I will not request a sequential
referral based on their inclusion in the bill as reported.
The Committee on the Judiciary takes this action with the
understanding that the Committee's jurisdiction over these
provisions is in no way diminished or altered. I would
appreciate your including this letter in your Committee's
report on H.R. 2417 and the Congressional Record during
consideration of the legislation on the House floor.
Sincerely,
F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence,
Washington, DC, June 16, 2003.
Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Sensenbrenner: Thank you for your letter
regarding H.R. 2417, the intelligence authorization bill for
fiscal year 2004. As you noted, several provisions of the
bill as reported fall within the Rule X jurisdiction of the
Committee on the Judiciary. I will continue to work with you
on these sections. For any of these sections on which we
cannot reach a mutually agreeable resolution, I will remove
them before enactment. Further I will support the Committee
on the Judiciary's request for conferees on these sections.
The sections of the bill as reported that contain matters
within the Committee on the Judiciary's Rule X jurisdiction
are:
104(e) (relating to funding for the Department of Justice's
National Drug Intelligence Center);
321 (relating to procedures for using classified
information);
332 (relating to the use of explosives by certain qualified
aliens if they are in the United States to cooperate with the
CIA or the United States military);
333 (relating to the naturalization of certain persons);
334 (relating to the types of financial institutions from
which law enforcement can obtain financial records for
criminal investigation purposes);
335 (relating to certain aspects of the mandatory source
rules for Federal Prison Industries as they relate to
procurements by the Central Intelligence Agency);
336 (relating to pilot projects to encourage the sharing of
intelligence information between state and local officials
and representatives of critical infrastructure industries on
the one hand and federal officials on the other);
401 (relating to giving certain employees of the Central
Intelligence Agency the protections of the Federal Tort
Claims Act when they take certain actions to prevent crime);
504 (relating to giving certain employees of the National
Security Agency the protections of the Federal Tort Claims
Act when they take certain actions to prevent crime).
(These section numbers refer to the bill as reported.) I
appreciate you willingness to forgo consideration of the bill
and not request a sequential referral based on this
understanding.
I acknowledge that by agreeing to waive its consideration
of the bill, the Committee on the Judiciary does not waive
its jurisdiction over the bill or any of the matters under
your jurisdiction. I will include a copy of your letter and
this response in our Committee's report on H.R. 2417 and the
Congressional Record during consideration of the legislation
on the House floor.
Thank you for your assistance in this matter.
Sincerely,
Porter J. Goss,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives, Committee on Financial
Services, Rayburn House Office Building,
Washington, DC, June 17, 2003.
Hon. Porter J. Goss,
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Goss: On June 12, 2003, the Select Committee
on Intelligence ordered reported H.R. 2417, The Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004. As you are
[[Page H5879]]
aware, the bill as reported contained several provisions
which fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee on
Financial Services pursuant to the Committee's jurisdiction
under Rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives.
As you know, we continue to have strong concerns about some
of these provisions, particularly those relating to the
creation of a Bureau of Enforcement and Intelligence within
the Department of the Treasury. However, because of your
commitment to support my position regarding all of these
provisions as the bill moves through the process and the need
to move this legislation expeditiously, I will waive
consideration of the bill by the Financial Services
Committee. By agreeing to waive its consideration of the
bill, the Financial Services Committee does not waive its
jurisdiction over H.R. 2417. In addition, the Committee on
Financial Services reserves its authority to seek conferees
on any provisions of the bill that are within the Financial
Services Committee's jurisdiction during any House-Senate
conference that may be convened on this legislation. I ask
your commitment to support any request by the Committee on
Financial Services for conferees on H.R. 2417 or related
legislation.
Finally, I request that you include a copy of this letter
and your response in the Select Committee's report on the
bill, and that they be printed in the Congressional Record
during the consideration of this legislation on the floor.
I appreciate your commitment to address my concerns as the
process moves forward and willingness to work constructively
toward common goals.
Sincerely,
Michael G. Oxley,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence,
Washington, DC, June 17, 2003.
Hon. Michael G. Oxley,
Chairman, Committee on Financial Services, Rayburn House
Office Building, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Oxley: On June 12, 2003, the Select Committee
on Intelligence ordered reported H.R. 2417, the
"Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2004." The
bill as reported contained several provisions which fall
within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Financial
Services, pursuant to the Committee's jurisdiction under Rule
X of the Rules of the House of Representatives.
I am quite aware of, and sensitive to the specific concerns
you raise about the inclusion of section 105 in H.R. 2417
concerning the establishment of a Bureau of Intelligence and
Enforcement within the Department of the Treasury. Once
again, I want to convey my personal commitment to work with
you to resolve this issue to our common satisfaction and
support your position in a conference with the Senate on the
Intelligence Authorization bill.
I very much appreciate your willingness to waive
consideration of H.R. 2417 by the Financial Services
Committee. I acknowledge that, by agreeing to waive its
consideration of the bill, the Financial Services Committee
does not waive its jurisdiction over H.R. 2417. I further
recognize that the Committee on Financial Services reserves
its authority to seek conferees on any provisions of the bill
that are within the Financial Services Committee's
jurisdiction during any House-Senate conference that may be
convened on this legislation. I will support a request by the
Committee on Financial Services for conferees on H.R. 2417 or
related legislation.
Finally, I am pleased to accommodate your request to
include a copy of your letter and my response in the Select
Committee's report on the bill, and that they be printed in
the Congressional Record during the consideration of this
legislation on the floor.
I appreciate your commitment to work together so as to
achieve an appropriate and mutually satisfactory resolution
of this important national security matter.
Sincerely,
Porter J. Goss,
Chairman.
____
Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, June 19, 2003.
Hon. Porter J. Goss,
Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Goss: I am writing to you concerning the
jurisdictional interest of the Committee on Armed Services in
matters being considered in H.R. 2417, the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.
I recognize the importance of H.R. 2417 and the need for
this legislation to move expeditiously. Therefore, while the
committee is entitled to a jurisdictional claim on this
legislation, I do not intend to request a sequential
referral.
The Committee on Armed Services asks that you support our
request to be conferees on the provisions over which we have
jurisdiction during any House-Senate conference.
Additionally, I request that you include this letter as part
of your committee's report on H.R. 2417.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Duncan Hunter,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence,
Washington, DC, June 18, 2003.
Hon. Duncan Hunter,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, Rayburn House Office
Building, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Hunter: Thank you for your letter regarding
H.R. 2417, the intelligence authorization bill for fiscal
year 2004. As you noted, elements of the bill as reported
fall within the Rule X jurisdiction of the Committee on Armed
Services. I will continue to work with you on these sections.
I will support the Committee on Armed Services' request for
conferees on these sections.
I appreciate your willingness to forgo consideration of the
bill and not request a sequential referral based on this
understanding.
I acknowledge that by agreeing to waive its consideration
of the bill, the Committee on Armed Services does not waive
its jurisdiction over the bill or any of the matters under
your jurisdiction. I will include a copy of your letter and
this response in our Committee's report on H.R. 2417 and the
Congressional Record during consideration of the legislation
on the House floor.
Thank you for your assistance in this matter.
Sincerely,
Porter J. Goss,
Chairman.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank our staff. We have a perfect
balance, I believe, between professional management staff and expertise
on the various facets of the Intelligence Community which is what we
need to do our job properly in terms of providing oversight on the one
hand, to make sure the Intelligence Community plays in bounds and to
make sure they have the necessary wherewithal, the advocacy piece that
is our other side, the other hat we wear.
I am very much convinced that intelligence is the best investment. We
are involved globally. There is no question the United States of
America is no secret any place around the world, and in order for us to
do the best we can in terms of our security, we have to have good
information. It is a good investment.
Nobody would pretend that we are fully sufficient in all that we
have. We can always do better, and I think we will probably be talking
about sufficiency and insufficiency as we go along in our review.
Nobody would say that we are inherent. There is no document I know
that is written that is inherent with the possible exception of the
Bible, and some would say the New York Times, but I think they
forfeited their right to that recently, nor is there anyone infallible.
We are all human beings. What I can say to the American people is that
I am satisfied that the men and women of the Intelligence Community of
our Nation, and there are thousands of them, are doing their best for
our national security, and I think we need to be behind them, and
supporting this bill would be a good way to do that.
Mr. SIMMONS. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of H.R. 2417, a
bill to reauthorize appropriations for FY 2004 for the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government.
It has been my honor to serve this Nation with the Central
Intelligence Agency for 10 years, five of which were spend as an
operations officer in Southeast Asia. For over 30 years I served on
active and reserve duty as a Military Intelligence Officer and have
also had the unique privilege of serving as Staff Director for the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence under Chairmen Barry Goldwater
and Daniel Patrick Moynihan. All this service took place at a time when
our Nation was seeking to win the Cold War.
The collapse of the Soviet Union changed our world for the better,
but did not eliminate the need for accurate and timely intelligence. We
now face a new uncertainty and risk. Rather than focusing on one or two
superpowers, we have to defend against numerous lethal covert terrorist
groups.
H.R. 2417 responds to these changing threats by boosting the role of
human intelligence or HUMINT gathered from human sources around the
world; increases our ability to analyze material from a broad spectrum
of sources; increases our capability to conduct counter terrorism; and
authorizes protections and benefits for our intelligence officers at
home and abroad.
Mr. Chairman, it is incumbent on this body to improve the
intelligence capabilities of the Nation, to better serve as the "eyes
and ears" of America in a difficult and dangerous world. This bill
responds to this urgent requirement, and I support it completely.
[[Page H5880]]
H.R. 2417--Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2004, Updated June 24,
2003
floor situation
The House is scheduled to consider H.R. 2417, pursuant to a
rule, on Wednesday, June 25, 2003. On Tuesday, June 24, 2003,
the Rules Committee granted, by voice vote, a modified open
rule providing one hour of general debate equally divided and
controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The rule provides
that the bill shall be considered for amendment under the
five-minute rule. The rule provides that it shall be in order
to consider as an original bill for the purpose of amendment
under the five-minute rule the amendment in the nature of a
substitute now printed in the bill, which shall be considered
as read. The rule waives all points of order against
consideration of the bill, and against the committee
amendment in the nature of a substitute. The rule provides
that no amendment to the committee amendment in the nature of
a substitute shall be in order except those printed in the
Rules Committee report accompanying the resolution, and all
points of order against said amendments are waived. The rule
provides that each amendment may be offered only in the order
printed in the report, may be offered only by a Member
designated in the report, shall be considered as read, and
shall not be subject to a demand for division of the question
in the House or in the Committee of the Whole. Finally, the
rule provides one motion to recommit with or without
instructions.
summary
H.R. 2417 authorizes appropriations for FY 2004 for (a) the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S.
Government, (b) the Community Management Account, and (c) the
Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System.
The authorization level is classified. The funding levels and
personnel ceilings for most programs are outlined in a
classified annex to the committee report, which Members only
may review in the offices of the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence in H-405 in the Capitol.
highlights
H.R. 2417 will:
Provide full support for the Intelligence Community's
efforts in the war on terrorism;
Focus attention on the need to enhance Human Intelligence
capabilities and tools;
Authorize additional resources to improve analytical depth
in all areas of intelligence, and increase our analytical
capacity to process, exploit, and disseminate all of the
intelligence that is collected;
Posture the Intelligence Community to develop a framework
for a unified overhead imagery architecture;
Include provisions that are intended to improve the
government's ability to identify any spies that might be
working against the United States and to provide the
government additional leverage as it moves to prosecute such
traitors, such as Hanssen, Ames, and Montes;
Establish a Bureau of Intelligence and Enforcement within
the Department of the Treasury, to be headed by an Assistant
Secretary for Intelligence and Enforcement, that will enhance
the government's ability to gather and process information
about the financial support of terrorism and other illegal
activity;
Require the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to
report on lessons learned as a result of military operations
in Iraq;
Improve information sharing among Federal, State, and local
government officials; including increased training for state
and local officials on how the intelligence community can
support their counterterrorism efforts;
Require the Intelligence Community's senior leadership to
comprehensively examine (and report to Congress on) policy
and technical issues related to digital information sharing,
electronic collaboration, and "horizontal integration"
across the Intelligence Community;
Extend the authority for the use of funds designated for
intelligence and intelligence-related purposes for assistance
to the Government of Colombia for counter-drug activities to
be used also to fund counterterrorism activities in Colombia
for each of FYs 2004 through 2005;
Provide limited immunity from tort liability to those
Special Police Officers of the Central Intelligence Agency
and the National Security Agency;
Authorize the personnel ceilings on September 30, 2004 for
the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the
U.S. Government and permit the Director of Central
Intelligence to authorize personnel ceilings in Fiscal Year
2003 for any intelligence element up to two percent above the
authorized levels, with the approval of the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget; and
Authorize $226.4 million for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund (CIARDS) in order to
fully fund the accruing cost of retirement benefits for
individuals in the Civil Service Retirement System, CIARDS,
and other Federal retirement systems.
background
Agencies' activities affected by the Intelligence
Authorization Act of 2003, include fourteen agencies of the
U.S. government, such as: Central Intelligence Agency;
National Security Agency; Defense Intelligence Agency;
National Imagery and Mapping Agency; National Reconnaissance
Organization; FBI (Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence);
DOE; Homeland Security; and U.S. Coast Guard.
Legislative History
H.R. 2417 was introduced by Chairman Goss on June 11, 2003.
It was reported from the Select Intelligence Committee by a
vote of 16-0 on June 12, 2003 (H. Rpt. 108-163).
Cost Estimate
CBO estimates that the unclassified portions of this
measure will cost $320 million over the 2004-2008 period,
assuming appropriation of the specified and estimated
amounts. CBO also estimates the bill will affect direct
spending and receipts by an insignificant amount.
H.R. 2417 contains intergovernmental and private-sector
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
(UMRA), but CBO estimates that the costs of complying with
these mandates will not exceed the thresholds established by
that act ($59 million for intergovernmental mandates and $117
million for private-sector mandates in 2003, adjusted
annually for inflation).
Amendments Made in Order Under the Rule (6 amendments)
Rep. Cox will offer an amendment (#10) on Wednesday, June
25, 2003. The amendment strikes Section 336 (Improvement of
Information Sharing Among Federal, State, and Local
Government Officials) of the bill. Contact: 6-8417.
Rep. Farr will offer an amendment (#9) on Wednesday, June
25, 2003. The amendment seeks to improve the foreign language
training of the intelligence community by providing: (1)
training in the application of standardized foreign language
skill assessment mechanisms; (2) development of curriculum
for advanced proficiency intelligence community foreign
language speakers and interpreters; (3) non-degree training
for translators and interpreters; (4) training intelligence
community foreign language teachers in the use of technology
geared for teaching advanced "critical languages;" (5)
intensive on-site foreign language training. Contact: 5-
2861.
Rep. Harman will offer an amendment (#2) on Wednesday, June
25, 2003. It amends section (g)(1) of Section 343 of the bill
by requiring the Director of Central Intelligence to report
on whether further consolidation or elimination of watch list
databases in Federal departments and agencies would
contribute to the efficacy and effectiveness of the Terrorist
Identification Classification System in identifying known or
suspected terrorists. If passed, it would also require the
Director of Central Intelligence to report on steps required
to consolidate or eliminate such watch lists. Contact: 5-
8220.
Rep. Hastings (FL) will offer an amendment (#1) on
Wednesday, June 25, 2003. The amendment directs the Director
of Central Intelligence to establish a pilot project to
improve recruitment of ethnic and cultural minorities and
women to meet the diversity of skills, language, and
expertise required by the current mission. Contact: 5-1313.
Rep. Kucinich will offer an amendment (#8) on Wednesday,
June 25, 2003. The amendment directs the Inspector General of
the Central Intelligence Agency to conduct an audit of all
telephone and electronic communications between the CIA and
the Office of the Vice President that relate to weapons of
mass destruction obtained or developed by Iraq preceding
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Not later than one year after the
date of enactment, the Inspector General shall submit a
report to Congress on the audit conducted. Contact: 5-5871.
Rep. Lee will offer an amendment (#7) on Wednesday, June
25, 2003. The amendment requires the Comptroller General of
the United States to conduct a study to determine the extent
of intelligence sharing by the Department of Defense and
intelligence community with United Nations inspectors
searching for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq prior to
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Contact: 5-2661.
Ms. McCARTHY of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to commend the
collaborative efforts of my colleagues who serve on the Permanent
Select Committee in crafting the FY2004 Intelligence Authorization,
H.R. 2417.
This measure encourages information sharing among agencies, which is
critical to our Nation's ability to respond to threats to our homeland
security.
There are still important intelligence questions unresolved from our
war in Iraq--questions that will, and should, face greater scrutiny in
the coming months. This Intelligence Authorization provides added
resources that will be used in securing the answers to those questions
and we should support it.
Mr Chairman, in closing, I want to commend the committee for giving
us a bill that strengthens the Intelligence Community and provides new
and better capabilities to fight the war on terrorism, and I urge my
colleagues to support this measure.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. All time having expired, the debate is concluded.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
The motion was agreed to.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
[[Page H5881]]
Hefley) having assumed the chair, Mr. Isakson, Chairman of the
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 2417) to
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for intelligence and
intellience-related activities of the United States Government, the
Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, had come to
no resolution thereon.
____________________
Congressional Record: June 25, 2003 (House)
Page H5883-H5903
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 295 and rule
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill,
H.R. 2417.
{time} 1824
In the Committee of the Whole
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of
the bill (H.R. 2417) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004
for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United
States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes, with Mr. Simpson (Chairman pro tempore) in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. When the Committee of the Whole rose
earlier today, all time for general debate had expired.
Pursuant to the rule, the committee amendment in the nature of a
substitute printed in the bill shall be considered as an original bill
for the purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule and shall be
considered read.
The text of the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute is
as follows:
H.R. 2417
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
"Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004".
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Sec. 105. Intelligence elements of the Department of the Treasury.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Subtitle A--Recurring General Provisions
Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Subtitle B--Intelligence
Sec. 311. Modification of notice and wait requirements on projects to
construct or improve intelligence community facilities.
Subtitle C--Counterintelligence
Sec. 321. Counterintelligence initiatives for the intelligence
community.
Subtitle D--Other Matters
Sec. 331. Extension of suspension of reorganization of Diplomatic
Telecommunications Service Program Office.
Sec. 332. Modifications of authorities on explosive materials.
Sec. 333. Modification of prohibition on the naturalization of certain
persons.
Sec. 334. Modification to definition of financial institution in the
Right to Financial Privacy Act.
Sec. 335. Procedural requirements for Central Intelligence Agency
relating to products of Federal prison industries.
Sec. 336. Improvement of information sharing among federal, State, and
local government officials.
Subtitle E--Reports and Technical Amendments
Sec. 341. Extension of deadline for final report of the National
Commission for the Review of the Research and Development
Programs of the United States Intelligence Community.
Sec. 342. Modification of various reports required of intelligence
community elements.
Sec. 343. Technical amendments.
Sec. 344. Report on lessons learned from military operations in Iraq.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Sec. 401. Protection from tort liability for certain Central
Intelligence Agency personnel.
Sec. 402. Repeal of limitation on use of funds in Central Services
Working Capital Fund.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE MATTERS
Sec. 501. Use of funds for counterdrug and counterterrorism activities
for Colombia.
Sec. 502. Authority to provide living quarters for certain students in
cooperative and summer education programs of the National
Security Agency.
Sec. 503. Authority for intelligence community elements of Department
of Defense to award personal service contracts.
Sec. 504. Protection of certain National Security Agency personnel from
tort liability.
Sec. 505. Measurement and signatures intelligence program.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
year 2004 for the conduct of the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the following elements of
the United States Government:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Department of Defense.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(6) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
(7) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(8) The Department of State.
(9) The Department of the Treasury.
(10) The Department of Energy.
(11) The Department of Justice.
(12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(13) The Department of Homeland Security.
(14) The Coast Guard.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The
amounts authorized to
[[Page H5884]]
be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized
personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2004, for the conduct
of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of
the elements listed in such section, are those specified in
the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to
accompany the bill H.R. 2417 of the One Hundred Eighth
Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of
Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate
and House of Representatives and to the President. The
President shall provide for suitable distribution of
the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule,
within the executive branch.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director
of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian
personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year
2004 under section 102 when the Director of Central
Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the
performance of important intelligence functions, except that
the number of personnel employed in excess of the number
authorized under such section may not, for any element of the
intelligence community, exceed 2 percent of the number of
civilian personnel authorized under such section for such
element.
(b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of
Central Intelligence shall notify promptly the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate whenever the Director exercises the authority
granted by this section.
SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account of the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal
year 2004 the sum of $192,640,000. Within such amount, funds
identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a) for the Advanced Research and
Development Committee shall remain available until September
30, 2005.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of
Central Intelligence are authorized 320 full-time personnel
as of September 30, 2004. Personnel serving in such elements
may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community
Management Account or personnel detailed from other elements
of the United States Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence
Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are
also authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence
Community Management Account for fiscal year 2004 such
additional amounts as are specified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).
Such additional amounts shall remain available until
September 30, 2004.
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the
personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the
Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30,
2004, there are hereby authorized such additional personnel
for such elements as of that date as are specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations.
(d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during
fiscal year 2004 any officer or employee of the United States
or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff
of the Intelligence Community Management Account from another
element of the United States Government shall be detailed on
a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee,
or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a
period of less than one year for the performance of temporary
functions as required by the Director of Central
Intelligence.
(e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
(1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be
appropriated in subsection (a), $34,248,000 shall be
available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within
such amount, funds provided for research, development,
testing, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until
September 30, 2005, and funds provided for procurement
purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2006.
(2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central
Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General funds
available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under
paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so
transferred for the activities of the National Drug
Intelligence Center.
(3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug
Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the
provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)).
(4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the
operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center.
SEC. 105. INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
TREASURY.
(a) In General.--(1) Title I of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by adding at the
end the following new section:
"bureau of intelligence and enforcement of the department of the
treasury
"Sec. 119. (a) In General.--There is within the Department
of the Treasury a Bureau of Intelligence and Enforcement
headed by an Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and
Enforcement, who shall be appointed by the President, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate.
"(b) Responsibilities.--(1) The Assistant Secretary for
Intelligence and Enforcement shall oversee and coordinate
functions of the Bureau of Intelligence and Enforcement.
"(2) The Assistant Secretary shall report directly to the
Secretary of the Treasury.
"(c) Composition of Bureau.--The Bureau of Intelligence
and Enforcement shall consist of the following offices:
"(1) The Office of Intelligence Support.
"(2) The Office of Foreign Assets Control.
"(3) The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.
"(4) Such other offices as the Assistant Secretary may
establish.".
(2) The table of contents contained in the first section of
such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to
section 118 the following new item:
"Sec. 119. Bureau of Intelligence and Enforcement of the Department of
the Treasury.".
(b) Consultation with DCI in Appointment of Assistant
Secretary for Intelligence and Enforcement.--Section
106(b)(2) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 403-6(b)(2)) is amended by
adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
"(E) The Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and
Enforcement.".
(c) Conforming Amendments.--(1) Section 3(4) of such Act
(50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended--
(A) by striking "the Department of the Treasury," in
subparagraph (H);
(B) by striking "and" at the end of subparagraph (J);
(C) by redesignating subparagraph (K) as subparagraph (L);
and
(D) by inserting after subparagraph (J) the following new
subparagraph:
"(K) the Bureau of Intelligence and Enforcement of the
Department of the Treasury; and".
(2) Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended
in the item relating to Assistant Secretaries of the Treasury
by striking "(7)" and inserting "(8)".
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal
year 2004 the sum of $226,400,000.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Subtitle A--Recurring General Provisions
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be
increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may
be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not
be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity which is not otherwise permitted under
the Constitution or authorized pursuant to the laws of the
United States.
Subtitle B--Intelligence
SEC. 311. MODIFICATION OF NOTICE AND WAIT REQUIREMENTS ON
PROJECTS TO CONSTRUCT OR IMPROVE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY FACILITIES.
(a) Increase of Thresholds for Notice.--Section 602(a) of
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995
(Public Law 103-359; 108 Stat. 3432; 50 U.S.C. 403-2b(a)) is
amended--
(1) by striking "$750,000" each place it appears and
inserting "$5,000,000";
(2) by striking "$500,000" each place it appears and
inserting "$1,000,000"; and
(3) in paragraph (2), as amended by paragraph (2) of this
subsection, by inserting after "$1,000,000" the second
place it appears, the following: "but less than
$5,000,000".
(b) Notice and Wait Requirements for Emergency Projects.--
Section 602(b)(2) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-359; 108 Stat. 3432; 50
U.S.C. 403-2b(b)(2)) is amended--
(1) in the third sentence, by striking "21-day" and
inserting "7-day"; and,
(2) by adding at the end the following new sentence:
"Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this paragraph,
when the Director of Central Intelligence and Secretary of
Defense jointly determine that an emergency relating to the
national security or to the protection of health, safety, or
environmental quality exists and that delay would irreparably
harm any or all of those interests, the project may begin on
the date the notification is received by such committees.".
Subtitle C--Counterintelligence
SEC. 321. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES FOR THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) In General.--(1) Title XI of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the
end the following new section:
"counterintelligence initiatives
"Sec. 1102. (a) Inspection Process.--(1) In order to
protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure, the Director of Central Intelligence shall
establish and implement an inspection process for all
agencies and departments of the United States that handle
classified information relating to the national security of
the United States intended to assure that those agencies and
departments maintain effective operational security practices
and programs directed against counterintelligence activities.
[[Page H5885]]
"(2) The Director shall carry out the process through the
Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive.
"(b) FBI Counterintelligence Office.--The Attorney
General, acting through the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, shall establish an Office of
Counterintelligence within the Bureau to investigate
potential espionage activities within the Bureau.
"(c) Annual Review of Dissemination Lists.--(1) The
Director of Central Intelligence shall establish and
implement a process for all elements of the intelligence
community (as defined in section 101(4)) to review, on an
annual basis, individuals included on distribution lists for
access to classified information. Such process shall ensure
that only individuals who have a particularized `need to
know' (as determined by the Director) are continued on such
distribution lists.
"(2) Not later than October 15 of each year, the Director
shall certify to the congressional intelligence committees
that the review required under paragraph (1) has been
conducted in all elements of the intelligence community
during the preceding fiscal year.
"(d) Required Completion of Financial Disclosure
Statements.--(1) The Director of Central Intelligence shall
establish and implement a process by which heads of the
elements of the intelligence community (as defined in section
101(4)) direct that all employees, in order to be granted
access to classified information, submit financial disclosure
forms required under section 1.3(b) of Executive Order No.
12969 (August 2, 1995; 60 F.R. 40245; 50 U.S.C. 435 note).
"(2) The Director shall carry out paragraph (1) through
the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive.
"(e) Arrangements To Handle Sensitive Information.--The
Director of Central Intelligence shall establish, for all
elements of the intelligence community (as defined in section
101(4)), programs and procedures by which sensitive
classified information relating to human intelligence is
safeguarded against unauthorized disclosure by employees of
those elements.".
(2) The table of contents contained in the first section of
such Act is amended in the items relating to title XI by
adding at the end the following new item:
"Sec. 1102. Counterintelligence initiatives.".
(b) Intelligence and National Security Aspects of Espionage
Prosecutions.--The Attorney General, acting through the
Office of Intelligence Policy and Review of the Department of
Justice, in consultation with the Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive, shall establish policies and
procedures to assist the Attorney General in the Attorney
General's consideration of intelligence and national security
equities in the development of charging documents and
related pleadings in espionage prosecutions.
Subtitle D--Other Matters
SEC. 331. EXTENSION OF SUSPENSION OF REORGANIZATION OF
DIPLOMATIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROGRAM
OFFICE.
Section 311 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law 107-108; 115 Stat. 1401; 22
U.S.C. 7301 note), as amended by section 351 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public
Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2401; 22 U.S.C. 7301 note), is
amended--
(1) in the heading, by striking "two-year" before
"suspension of reorganization"; and
(2) in the text, by striking "ending on October 1, 2003"
and inserting "ending on the date that is 60 days after the
date on which appropriate congressional committees of
jurisdiction (as defined in section 324(d) of that Act (22
U.S.C. 7304(d)) are notified jointly by the Secretary of
State (or the Secretary's designee) and the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget (or the Director's designee)
that the operational framework for the office has been
terminated".
SEC. 332. MODIFICATIONS OF AUTHORITIES ON EXPLOSIVE
MATERIALS.
(a) Authority To Distribute Explosive Materials To
Qualified Aliens.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, it shall be lawful for any person knowingly to
distribute explosive materials to any qualified alien--
(1) if, in the case of a qualified alien described in
subsection (c)(1), the distribution to, shipment to,
transportation to, receipt by, or possession by the alien of
the explosive materials is in furtherance of such
cooperation; or
(2) if, in the case of a qualified alien described in
subsection (c)(2), the distribution to, shipping to,
transporting to, possession by, or receipt by the alien of
explosive materials is in furtherance of the authorized
military purpose.
(b) Authority for Qualified Aliens To Ship Explosive
Materials.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it
shall be lawful for a qualified alien to ship or transport
any explosive in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce
or to receive or possess any explosive which has been shipped
or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce--
(1) if, in the case of a qualified alien described in
subsection (c)(1), the possession, shipment, or
transportation by the alien of the explosive materials is in
furtherance of such cooperation; or
(2) if, in the case of a qualified alien described in
subsection (c)(2), the possession, shipment, or
transportation by the alien of explosive materials is in
furtherance of the authorized military purpose.
(c) Qualified Alien Defined.--In this section, the term
"qualified alien" means an alien--
(1) who is lawfully present in the United States in
cooperation with the Director of Central Intelligence; or
(2) who is a member of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), or other friendly foreign military force (as
determined by the Attorney General with the concurrence of
the Secretary of Defense) who is present in the United States
under military orders for training or other military purpose
authorized by the United States.
SEC. 333. MODIFICATION OF PROHIBITION ON THE NATURALIZATION
OF CERTAIN PERSONS.
Section 313(e)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1424(e)(4)) is amended--
(1) by inserting "when Department of Defense activities
are relevant to the determination" after "Secretary of
Defense"; and
(2) by inserting "and the Secretary of Homeland Security"
after "Attorney General".
SEC. 334. MODIFICATION TO DEFINITION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTION
IN THE RIGHT TO FINANCIAL PRIVACY ACT.
(a) In General.--Section 1101(1) of the Right to Financial
Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3401(1)) is amended by
inserting ", except as provided in section 1114," before
"means any office".
(b) Definition.--Section 1114 of such Act (12 U.S.C. 3414)
is amended by adding at the end the following:
"(c) For purposes of this section, the term `financial
institution' has the same meaning as in section 5312(a)(2) of
title 31, United States Code, except that, for purposes of
this section, such term shall include only such a financial
institution any part of which is located inside any State or
territory of the United States, the District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, or the United States
Virgin Islands.".
SEC. 335. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY RELATING TO PRODUCTS OF FEDERAL PRISON
INDUSTRIES.
The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a
et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
"procedural requirements for central intelligence agency relating to
products of federal prison industries
"Sec. 23. (a) Market Research.--Before purchasing a
product listed in the latest edition of the Federal Prison
Industries catalog under section 4124(d) of title 18, United
States Code, the Director shall conduct market research to
determine whether the Federal Prison Industries product is
comparable to products available from the private sector that
best meet the Agency's needs in terms of price, quality, and
time of delivery.
"(b) Competition Requirement.--If the Director determines
that a Federal Prison Industries product is not comparable in
price, quality, or time of delivery to products available
from the private sector that best meet the Agency's needs in
terms of price, quality, and time of delivery, the Director
shall use competitive procedures for the procurement of the
product or shall make an individual purchase under a multiple
award contract. In conducting such a competition or making
such a purchase, the Director shall consider a timely offer
from Federal Prison Industries.
"(c) Implementation by Director.--The Director shall
ensure that--
"(1) the Agency does not purchase a Federal Prison
Industries product or service unless a contracting officer of
the Agency determines that the product or service is
comparable to products or services available from the private
sector that best meet the Agency's needs in terms of price,
quality, and time of delivery; and
"(2) Federal Prison Industries performs its contractual
obligations to the same extent as any other contractor for
the Agency.
"(d) Market Research Determination Not Subject to
Review.--A determination by a contracting officer regarding
whether a product or service offered by Federal Prison
Industries is comparable to products or services available
from the private sector that best meet the Agency's needs in
terms of price, quality, and time of delivery shall not be
subject to review pursuant to section 4124(b) of title 18.
"(e) Performance as a Subcontractor.--(1) A contractor or
potential contractor of the Agency may not be required to use
Federal Prison Industries as a subcontractor or supplier of
products or provider of services for the performance of a
contract of the Agency by any means, including means such
as--
"(A) a contract solicitation provision requiring a
contractor to offer to make use of products or services of
Federal Prison Industries in the performance of the contract;
"(B) a contract specification requiring the contractor to
use specific products or services (or classes of products or
services) offered by Federal Prison Industries in the
performance of the contract; or
"(C) any contract modification directing the use of
products or services of Federal Prison Industries in the
performance of the contract.
"(2) In this subsection, the term `contractor', with
respect to a contract, includes a subcontractor at any tier
under the contract.
"(f) Protection of Classified and Sensitive Information.--
The Director may not enter into any contract with Federal
Prison Industries under which an inmate worker would have
access to--
"(1) any data that is classified;
"(2) any geographic data regarding the location of--
"(A) surface and subsurface infrastructure providing
communications or water or electrical power distribution;
"(B) pipelines for the distribution of natural gas, bulk
petroleum products, or other commodities; or
"(C) other utilities; or
"(3) any personal or financial information about any
individual private citizen, including information relating to
such person's real property however described, without the
prior consent of the individual.
"(g) Application of Provision.--This section is subject to
the preceding provisions of this Act, and shall not be
construed as affecting any right or duty of the Director
under those provisions.
[[Page H5886]]
"(h) Definitions.--In this section:
"(1) The terms `competitive procedures' and `procurement'
have the meanings given such terms in section 4 of the Office
of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 403).
"(2) The term `market research' means obtaining specific
information about the price, quality, and time of delivery of
products available in the private sector through a variety of
means, which may include--
"(A) contacting knowledgeable individuals in government
and industry;
"(B) interactive communication among industry, acquisition
personnel, and customers; and
"(C) interchange meetings or pre-solicitation conferences
with potential offerors.".
SEC. 336. IMPROVEMENT OF INFORMATION SHARING AMONG FEDERAL,
STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.
(a) Pilot Project To Encourage State and Local Officials,
As Well As Representatives of Critical Infrastructure, To
Collect and Share Relevant Information.--Section 892(c) of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296; 6
U.S.C. 482) is amended by adding at the end the following new
paragraph:
"(3)(A) The Under Secretary for Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection of the Department of Homeland
Security, in consultation with the Director of Central
Intelligence, may conduct projects in several cities to
encourage officials of State and local government, as well as
representatives of industries that comprise the critical
infrastructure in those cities to lawfully collect and to
pass on to the appropriate Federal officials information
vital for the prevention of terrorist attacks against the
United States.
"(B) The Director of Central Intelligence shall carry out
any duty under this paragraph through the Director of the
Terrorist Threat Integration Center.
"(C) Under the projects, training shall be provided to
such officials and representatives to--
"(i) identify sources of potential threats through such
methods as the Secretary determines appropriate;
"(ii) report information relating to such potential
threats to the appropriate Federal agencies in the
appropriate form and manner; and
"(iii) assure that all reported information is
systematically submitted to and passed on by the Department
for use by appropriate Federal agencies.
"(D) The Under Secretary shall carry out the pilot project
under this paragraph for a period of 3 years.
"(E) Not later than 1 year after the implementation of the
pilot project, and annually thereafter, the Under Secretary
shall submit to Congress a report on the pilot project
conducted under this paragraph. Each such report shall
include--
"(i) an assessment of the effectiveness of the project;
and
"(ii) recommendations on the continuation of the project
as well as any recommendations to improve the effectiveness
of information collection and sharing by such officials and
representatives and the Federal government.".
(b) Pilot Project To Test Use of Tear-line Intelligence
Reports.--(1) Subtitle C of title II of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) is amended by adding at the
end the following new section:
"SEC. 226. PILOT PROJECT TO TEST USE OF TEAR-LINE
INTELLIGENCE REPORTS.
"(a) Authority.--The Under Secretary for Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection of the Department of
Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of
Central Intelligence, may carry out a pilot program under
which the Under Secretary may make intelligence information
in the possession of the Department available to officials of
State and local governments through the use of tear-line
intelligence reports.
"(b) Tear-line Intelligence Reports Described.--For
purpose of this section, a tear-line report is a report
containing intelligence gathered by an agency or department
of the United States that is in the possession of the
Department that is prepared in a manner such that information
relating to intelligence sources and methods is easily
severable from the report to protect such sources and methods
from disclosure. Such a report may be in a paper or an
electronic format.
"(c) Duration of Project.--The Under Secretary shall carry
out the pilot project under this section for a period of 3
years.
"(d) Reports to Congress.--Not later than 1 year after the
implementation of the pilot project, and annually thereafter,
the Under Secretary shall submit to Congress a report on the
pilot project conducted under this section, and shall include
in the report an assessment of--
"(1) the effectiveness of the use of the tear-line reports
in providing intelligence information on a timely basis to
State and local authorities; and
"(2) if the use of such tear-line reports were to be made
permanent, whether additional safeguards are needed with
respect to the use of such reports.
"(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are
authorized to be appropriated to the Under Secretary such
sums as may be necessary to carry out this section.".
(2) The table of contents in section 1(b) of such Act is
amended in subtitle C of title II by adding at the end the
following new item.
"Sec. 226. Pilot project to test use of tear-line intelligence
reports.".
(c) Homeland Defender Intelligence Training Program.
(1) Establishment of program.--The Director of Central
Intelligence may establish a comprehensive program of
orientation and training to qualified State and local
officials in accessing and using available resources of the
intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401(4))).
(2) Consultation.--Insofar as the Director establishes the
intelligence training program under paragraph (1), the
Director shall consult and coordinate with the director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Secretary of
Homeland Security on the development and administration of
the program.
(3) Program goals.--Any intelligence training program
established under paragraph (1) shall provide qualified State
and local officials instruction on the mission and roles of
the intelligence community to promote more effective
information sharing among Federal, State, and local officials
to prevent terrorist attacks against the United States.
(4) Curriculum.--Insofar as the Director establishes the
intelligence training program under paragraph (1), the
Director shall develop a curriculum for the program after
consultation with qualified State and local officials. The
curriculum shall include classroom instruction with respect
to and orientation to the various elements of the
intelligence community.
(5) Reports to congress.--Not later than 1 year after the
initial implementation of the intelligence training program
under paragraph (1), and annually thereafter, the Director
shall submit to Congress a report on the program. Each such
report shall include--
(A) an assessment of the effectiveness of the project; and
(B) recommendations on the continuation of the project as
well as any recommendations to improve the effectiveness of
information collection and sharing by qualified officials and
representatives and the Federal government.
(6) Qualified state and local officials defined.--For
purposes of this subsection, the term "qualified State and
local officials" means officials of State and local
government agencies that Director of Central Intelligence
determines--
(A) have received appropriate security clearances from the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for access to
classified information; and
(B) oversee or manage first responders or counterterrorism
activities.
(7) Authorization of appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated to the Director such sums as are necessary
to carry out the intelligence training program under this
subsection.
(d) Advisory Councils.--(1) The Director of the Terrorist
Threat Integration Center shall establish two advisory
councils (described in paragraph (2)) to provide the Director
such advice and recommendations as the Director may require
to effectively carry out the functions of the Center.
(2)(A) One advisory council shall have as its focus privacy
and civil liberties issues.
(B) The other advisory council shall have as its focus
State and local government information needs.
Subtitle E--Reports and Technical Amendments
SEC. 341. EXTENSION OF DEADLINE FOR FINAL REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF THE
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED
STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 1007 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public
Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 401 note; 116 Stat. 2442) is amended
by striking "September 1, 2003" and inserting "September
1, 2004".
(b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a)
shall take effect as if included in the enactment of section
1007 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2003.
SEC. 342. MODIFICATION OF VARIOUS REPORTS REQUIRED OF
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ELEMENTS.
(a) Reports on Acquisition of Technology Relating to
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional
Munitions.--Subsection (b)(1) of section 721 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public
Law 104-293; 110 Stat. 3474; 50 U.S.C. 2366), as amended by
section 811(b)(5)(C) of the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2424; 50
U.S.C. 2366), is amended by striking "a semiannual" and
inserting "an annual".
(b) Periodic and Special Reports on Disclosure of
Intelligence Information to United Nations.--Section
112(b)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
404g(b)(1)) is amended by striking "semiannually" and
inserting "annually".
SEC. 343. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS.
(a) National Security Act of 1947.--Section 112(d)(1) of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404g(d)(1)) is
amended by striking "section 103(c)(6)" and inserting
"section 103(c)(7)".
(b) Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.--(1) Section
6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C.
403g) is amended by striking "section 103(c)(6)" and
inserting "section 103(c)(7)".
(2) Section 15 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 403o) is amended--
(A) in subsection (a)(1), by striking "special policemen
of the General Services Administration perform under the
first section of the Act entitled `An Act to authorize the
Federal Works Administrator or officials of the Federal Works
Agency duly authorized by him to appoint special policeman
for duty upon Federal property under the jurisdiction of the
Federal Works Agency, and for other purposes' (40 U.S.C.
318)," and inserting "officers and agents of the Department
of Homeland Security, as provided in section 1315(b)(2) of
title 40, United States Code,"; and
(B) in subsection (b), by striking "the fourth section of
the Act referred to in subsection (a) of
[[Page H5887]]
this section (40 U.S.C. 318c)" and inserting "section
1315(c)(2) of title 40, United States Code".
(c) National Security Agency Act of 1959.--Section 11 of
the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note)
is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(1), by striking "special policemen
of the General Services Administration perform under the
first section of the Act entitled `An Act to authorize the
Federal Works Administrator or officials of the Federal Works
Agency duly authorized by him to appoint special policeman
for duty upon Federal property under the jurisdiction of the
Federal Works Agency, and for other purposes' (40 U.S.C.
318)" and inserting "officers and agents of the Department
of Homeland Security, as provided in section 1315(b)(2) of
title 40, United States Code,"; and
(2) in subsection (b), by striking "the fourth section of
the Act referred to in subsection (a) (40 U.S.C. 318c)" and
inserting "section 1315(c)(2) of title 40, United States
Code".
(d) Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003.--
Section 343 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2399; 50 U.S.C.
404n-2) is amended--
(1) in subsection (c), by striking "section 103(c)(6) of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(6))"
and inserting "section 103(c)(7) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(7))"; and
(2) in subsection (e)(2), by striking "section 103(c)(6)"
and inserting "section 103(c)(7)".
(e) Public Law 107-173.--Section 201(c)(3)(F) of the
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002
(Public Law 107-173; 116 Stat. 548; 8 U.S.C. 1721(c)(3)(F))
is amended by striking "section 103(c)(6) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(6))" and inserting
"section 103(c)(7) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 403-3(c)(7))".
(f) Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002.--
Section 3535(b)(1) of title 44, United States Code, as added
by section 1001(b)(1) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002
(Public Law 107-296), and section 3545(b)(1) of title 44,
United States Code, as added by section 301(b)(1) of the E-
Government Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-347), are each amended
by inserting "or any other law" after "1978".
SEC. 344. REPORT ON LESSONS LEARNED FROM MILITARY OPERATIONS
IN IRAQ.
(a) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence
shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a
report on the intelligence lessons learned as a result of
Operation Iraqi Freedom, including lessons relating to the
following:
(1) The tasking, collection, processing, exploitation,
analysis, and dissemination of intelligence.
(2) Accuracy, timeliness, and objectivity of intelligence
analysis.
(3) Intelligence support to policymakers and members of the
Armed Forces in combat.
(4) Coordination of intelligence activities and operations
with military operations.
(5) Strengths and limitations of intelligence systems and
equipment.
(6) Such other matters as the Director considers
appropriate.
(b) Recommendations.--The report under subsection (a) shall
include such recommendations on improvement in the matters
described in subsection (a) as the Director considers
appropriate.
(c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this
section, the term "appropriate committees of Congress"
means--
(1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives;
and
(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee
on Armed Services of the Senate.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SEC. 401. PROTECTION FROM TORT LIABILITY FOR CERTAIN CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY PERSONNEL.
(a) In General.--Section 15 of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403o) is amended by adding at
the end the following new subsection:
"(d)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any
Agency personnel designated by the Director under subsection
(a) shall be deemed for purposes of chapter 171 of title 28,
United States Code, or any other provision of law relating to
tort liability, to be acting within the scope of their office
or employment if the Agency personnel take reasonable action,
which may include the use of force, to--
"(A) protect an individual in the presence of the Agency
personnel from a crime of violence;
"(B) provide immediate assistance to an individual who has
suffered or who is threatened with bodily harm; or
"(C) prevent the escape of any individual whom the Agency
personnel reasonably believe to have committed a crime of
violence in the presence of such personnel.
"(2) In this subsection, the term `crime of violence' has
the meaning given that term in section 16 of title 18, United
States Code.".
(b) Construction.--Subsection (d) of section 15, as added
by subsection (a), shall not be construed as affecting the
authorities of the Attorney General under the Federal
Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988
(Public Law 100-694; 28 U.S.C. 2671, 2674, 2679(b), 2679(d)).
SEC. 402. REPEAL OF LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS IN CENTRAL
SERVICES WORKING CAPITAL FUND.
Section 21(f)(2) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 403u(f)(2)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A), by striking "(A) Subject to
subparagraph (B), the Director" and inserting "The
Director"; and
(2) by striking subparagraph (B).
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE MATTERS
SEC. 501. USE OF FUNDS FOR COUNTERDRUG AND COUNTERTERRORISM
ACTIVITIES FOR COLOMBIA.
(a) Extension of Authority.--Subsection (a) of section 501
of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003
(Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2404) is amended by striking
"for fiscal years 2002 and 2003" and inserting "for each
of fiscal years 2002 through 2005".
(b) Modification.--(1) Subsection (e) of such section is
amended to read as follows:
"(e) Prohibition.--No United States Armed Forces
personnel, United States civilian employee or contractor
engaged by the United States will participate in any combat
operation in connection with assistance made available under
this section, except for the purpose of acting to protect the
life or the physical security of others, in self defense, or
during the course of search and rescue operations.".
(c) Technical Amendment.--Subsection (d) of such section is
amended by striking "Sections 556, 567, and 568 of Public
Law 107-115, section 8093 of the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 2002," and inserting "Section 553 and
the certification requirements of section 564(a)(2) of the
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2003 (division E of Public Law 108-7; 117
Stat. 200, 205), and section 8093 of the Department of
Defense Appropriations Act, 2003 (Public Law 107-248; 116
Stat. 1558; 10 U.S.C. 182 note),".
(d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsections (b)
and (c) shall apply to assistance made available under such
section 501 during fiscal years 2004 and 2005.
SEC. 502. AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE LIVING QUARTERS FOR CERTAIN
STUDENTS IN COOPERATIVE AND SUMMER EDUCATION
PROGRAMS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.
Section 2195 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following new subsection:
"(d)(1) The Director of the National Security Agency may
provide a qualifying employee of a defense laboratory of that
Agency with living quarters at no charge, or at a rate or
charge prescribed by the Director by regulation, without
regard to section 5911(c) of title 5.
"(2) In this subsection, the term `qualifying employee'
means a student who is employed at the National Security
Agency under--
"(A) a Student Educational Employment Program of the
Agency conducted under this section or any other provision of
law; or
"(B) a similar cooperative or summer education program of
the Agency that meets the criteria for Federal cooperative or
summer education programs prescribed by the Office of
Personnel Management.".
SEC. 503. AUTHORITY FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ELEMENTS OF
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO AWARD PERSONAL SERVICE
CONTRACTS.
(a) In General.--Subchapter I of chapter 21 of title 10,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following new section:
"Sec. 426. Personal services contracts: authority and
limitations
"(a) Personal Services.--(1) The Secretary of Defense may,
notwithstanding section 3109 of title 5, enter into personal
services contracts in the United States if the personal
services directly support the mission of a defense
intelligence component or counter-intelligence organization.
"(2) The contracting officer for a personal services
contract shall be responsible for ensuring that a personal
services contract is the appropriate vehicle for carrying out
the purpose of the contract.
"(b) Definition.--In this section, the term `defense
intelligence component' means a component of the Department
of Defense that is an element of the intelligence community,
as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).".
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the
beginning of such subchapter is amended by adding at the end
the following new item:
"426. Personal services contracts: authority and limitations.".
SEC. 504. PROTECTION OF CERTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
PERSONNEL FROM TORT LIABILITY.
Section 11 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50
U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
"(d)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, agency
personnel designated by the Director of the National Security
Agency under subsection (a) shall be considered for purposes
of chapter 171 of title 28, United States Code, or any other
provision of law relating to tort liability, to be acting
within the scope of their office or employment when such
agency personnel take reasonable action, which may include
the use of force, to--
"(A) protect an individual in the presence of such agency
personnel from a crime of violence;
"(B) provide immediate assistance to an individual who has
suffered or who is threatened with bodily harm; or
"(C) prevent the escape of any individual whom such agency
personnel reasonably believe to have committed a crime of
violence in the presence of such agency personnel.
"(2) Paragraph (1) shall not affect the authorities of the
Attorney General under section 2679(d)(1) of title 28, United
States Code.
"(3) In this subsection, the term `crime of violence' has
the meaning given that term in section 16 of title 18, United
States Code.".
[[Page H5888]]
SEC. 505. MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURES INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH
PROGRAM.
(a) Research Program.--The Secretary of Defense, acting
through the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency's
Directorate for MASINT and Technical Collection, shall carry
out a program to incorporate the results of basic research on
sensors into the measurement and signatures intelligence
systems of the United States, to the extent the results of
such research is applicable to such systems.
(b) Program Components.--The program under subsection (a)
shall review and assess both basic research on sensors and
technologies conducted by the United States Government and by
non-governmental entities. In carrying out the program, the
Director shall protect intellectual property rights, maintain
organizational flexibility, and establish research projects,
funding levels, and potential benefits in an equitable manner
through Directorate.
(c) Advisory Panel.--(1) The Director shall establish an
advisory panel to assist the Director in carrying out the
program under subsection (a).
(2) The advisory panel shall be headed by the Director who
shall determine the selection, review, and assessment of the
research projects under the program.
(3)(A) The Director shall appoint as members of the
advisory panel representatives of each entity of the MASINT
community, and may appoint as such members representatives of
national laboratories, universities, and private sector
entities.
(B) For purposes of this subsection the term "MASINT
community" means academic, professional, industrial, and
government entities that are committed towards the
advancement of the sciences in measurement and signatures
intelligence.
(C) The term for a member of the advisory panel shall be
established by the Director, but may not exceed a period of 5
consecutive years.
(D) Members of the advisory panel may not receive
additional pay, allowances, or benefits by reason of their
service on the advisory panel, but may receive per diem in
lieu of subsistence, in accordance with applicable provisions
under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States
Code.
(4) The Director may accept contributions from non-
governmental participants on the advisory panel to defray the
expenses of the advisory panel.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. No amendment to the committee amendment is
in order except those printed in House Report 108-176. Each amendment
may be offered only in the order printed in the report, by a Member
designated in the report, shall be considered read, and shall not be
subject to a demand for division of the question.
It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in House
Report 108-176.
Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Cox
Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 1 offered by Mr. Cox:
Strike section 336.
Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, as chairman of the Select Committee on
Homeland Security, I am pleased to rise in support of H.R. 2417. The
amendment that I have introduced I will address in a moment but let me
state at the outset that there is no more important function in the war
on terrorism than having and acting on good intelligence, intelligence
about attacks that are yet to come, intelligence about who is involved,
what is planned, where and when it will take place and how it might be
executed.
The bill as it is written provides critical support for the
Intelligence Community's efforts in the war on terrorism. I especially
appreciate the provisions in the legislation focusing additional
attention on enhancing our capability for gathering human intelligence
as well as the provisions that provide additional resources to increase
our analytical capacity to process and make use of the intelligence we
do gather.
The amendment that I am offering seeks to strike section 336 of the
legislation. Section 336 would amend the Homeland Security Act to
create two pilot programs, one, to encourage State and local officials,
critical infrastructure owners to collect and share relevant
information; and, two, to test use of tear-line intelligence reports.
However, Mr. Chairman, the Homeland Security Act already includes
training and information sharing requirements for State, local and
private sector officials. The Director of Central Intelligence, the
head of the CIA, would under the language of the bill as it is written
have a central role in both of these pilot programs which would inject
the CIA into this domestic, homeland security function.
Under the first section 336 pilot program on sharing critical
infrastructure information, the DCI would carry out his
responsibilities through the Director of the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center, or TTIC, which has never before been recognized in
law and has no responsibilities whatever for critical infrastructure
information. Using TTIC in this way would undermine the statutory
function of the Office of Infrastructure Protection subdirectorate of
the Department of Homeland Security. We do not need to pilotize the
Department's existing statutory obligations.
The Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Under
Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection,
already is required to, and this is now a quote from existing law,
"coordinate training and other support to the elements and personnel
of the Department, other agencies of the Federal Government, and State
and local governments that provide information to the Department, or
are consumers of information provided by the Department, in order to
facilitate the identification and sharing of information." That is the
Homeland Security Act as it is written.
The Homeland Security Act already requires that the Secretary of
Homeland Security "coordinate with elements of the Intelligence
Community and with Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies,
and the private sector." Extensive information sharing requirements
covering State, local and private officials already exist in the
Homeland Security Act, for example, in sections 891 and 892.
Tear-line reporting, unclassified reports to convey the critical
substance of classified intelligence reporting, is already a common
practice. There is not a need for a pilot program. The Homeland
Security Act already requires that the Secretary of Homeland Security
"in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, shall work
to ensure that intelligence or other information relating to terrorism
to which the Department has access is appropriately shared with State
and local governments."
{time} 1830
At this point I hope that the distinguished gentleman from Florida
(Mr. Goss), chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
could rise to enter into a colloquy so that I might obtain additional
information on the amendments to the Homeland Security Act contained
within section 336 of the legislation, and I would yield for this
purpose to the chairman.
As the chairman knows, I am offering an amendment to strike section
336 of the legislation as it proposes amendments to the Homeland
Security Act that fall within the jurisdiction of the Permanent Select
Committee on Homeland Security. I am prepared to withdraw this
amendment pending appropriate clarification by the gentleman.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. COX. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
I would like to clarify for the record that the provisions of H.R.
2417, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, amending the
Homeland Security Act, fall within the jurisdiction of the Select
Committee on Homeland Security and that their inclusion in H.R. 2417
does not create a basis for the assertion of jurisdiction over the act
by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Furthermore, I would
like to clarify for the distinguished chairman that the chairman of the
Select Committee on Homeland Security and I have indeed agreed upon a
revision of the provisions that are acceptable to both our ranking
members, that is, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) and the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner), the gentleman's committee's ranking
member. I will commit to work with the gentleman's committee and the
Committee on the Judiciary for substitution of the revised language in
the conference negotiations between the House and the Senate, and to
that end I have also agreed to support the request of the Select
Committee on Homeland Security for the appointment of two conferees on
H.R. 2417.
Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I thank the gentleman for
his comments.
[[Page H5889]]
I include in the Congressional Record copies of the exchange of
correspondence between our two committees on this topic.
U.S. House of Representatives,
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC, June 25, 2003.
Hon. Christopher Cox,
Chairman,
Select Committee on Homeland Security, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: This letter is to memorialize our
understanding that the provisions of H.R. 2417 (the
"provisions") amending the Homeland Security Act (the
"Act") fall within the jurisdiction of the Select Committee
on Homeland Security, and that their inclusion in H.R. 2417
does not create a basis for the assertion of jurisdiction
over the Act by the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence.
We have agreed upon a revision of the provisions that is
acceptable to both of our Ranking Members, a copy of which is
attached, and we agree to work for a mutually agreeable
resolution of this provision with your Committee and the
Committee on the Judiciary, for substitution in the
conference negotiations between the House and the Senate.
To that end, I have agreed to support the request of the
Select Committee on Homeland Security for the appointment of
two conferees on H.R. 2417.
Sincerely,
Porter J. Goss,
Chairman.
____
U.S. House of Representatives,
Select Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC, June 25, 2003.
Hon. Porter Goss,
Chairman,
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington,
DC.
Dear Chairman Goss: This letter is to memorialize our
understanding that the provisions of H.R. 2417 (the
"provisions") amending the Homeland Security Act (the
"Act") fall within the jurisdiction of the Select Committee
on Homeland Security, and that their inclusion in H.R. 2417
does not create a basis for the assertion of jurisdiction
over the Act by the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence.
We have agreed upon a revision of the provisions that is
acceptable to both of our Ranking Members, a copy of which is
attached, and we agree to work for substitution of the
revised language in the conference negotiations between the
House and the Senate.
To that end, I have agreed to support the request of the
Select Committee on Homeland Security for the appointment of
two conferees on H.R. 2417.
Sincerely,
Christopher Cox,
Chairman.
____
Amendment to H.R. 2417, as Reported Offered by Mr. Cox of California
(for himself and Mr. Turner of Texas)
Amend section 336 to read as follows:
SEC. 336. IMPROVEMENT OF INFORMATION SHARING AMONG FEDERAL,
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.
(a) In General.--Section 892(c) of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296; 6 U.S.C. 482) is amended by
adding at the end the following new paragraph:
"(3)(A) The Secretary shall establish a program to provide
appropriate training to officials described in subparagraph
(B) in order to assist such officials in--
"(i) identifying sources of potential terrorist threats
through such methods as the Secretary determines appropriate;
"(ii) reporting information relating to such potential
terrorist threats to the appropriate Federal agencies in the
appropriate form and manner;
"(iii) assuring that all reported information is
systematically submitted to and passed on by the Department
for use by appropriate Federal agencies; and
"(iv) understanding the mission and roles of the
intelligence community to promote more effective information
sharing among Federal, State, and local officials to prevent
terrorist attacks against the United States.
"(B) The officials referred to in subparagraph (A) are
officials of State and local government agencies that oversee
or manage first responders or counterterrorism activities.
"(C) The Secretary shall consult with the Attorney General
to ensure that the training program established in
subparagraph (A) does not duplicate the training program
established in section 908 of the USA PATRIOT Act (Public Law
107-56; 28 U.S.C. 509 note).
"(D) The Secretary shall carry out this paragraph through
the Under Secretary for Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection (acting pursuant to the duties
described in section 201(d)(16)), in consultation with the
Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney
General.".-
(b) Report.--(1) Not later than 30 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security
shall submit to Congress a report that describes the
Secretary's plan for implementing such section 892 (as in
effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this
Act) and an estimated date of completion of the
implementation.
Because of the agreement between our two committees, I will also ask
unanimous consent to withdraw the amendment.
I look forward to working with the chairman and members of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for an agreeable resolution
of this matter in conference.
Mr. Chairman, if I have remaining time, I yield to the gentlewoman
from California (Ms. Harman), the ranking member.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I rise
to state that I fully support the agreement that has been worked out
between the chairmen of the two committees on which I serve. Since the
language at issue was language that was inserted in our bill at my
request, I want to make clear that we should work out these
jurisdictional issues, but we also should proceed to find the right
sections of the right bills to insert additional language on
information sharing which is still a critical need in the homeland
security and the terrorist threat areas.
We also need to insert language at the right places about the
protection of civil liberties. I listened to the comments by the
gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) concerning the fact that we have no
statutory language for TTIC, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center,
and perhaps we should decide about that in some other forum.
Nonetheless, TTIC exists, and it is critically important that we make
sure that it respects the civil liberties of Americans. So we will
continue to search for new venues, but I thank both chairmen for
finding the proper way to solve this issue.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Mr. Chairman, I am not going to use the 5 minutes. I just want to
clarify this point while the distinguished chairman of the Select
Committee on Homeland Security is here that his efforts and the
gentlewoman from California's (Ms. Harman) efforts to work out
acceptable language had in fact transpired and we were prepared to
accept an amendment to the bill to do that. There is another party
involved, and we wanted to make sure that the appropriate full dialogue
took place because what we are about here is really trying to plug in a
Foreign Intelligence Program, which is what our portfolio is with the
new efforts domestically to deal with terrorism on the homeland.
We are not interested in any territorial acquisition, as I have said
many times. We are interested in plugging in the national foreign
intelligence activity and capability in the right places in the right
way. That will involve working with a number of committees.
Fortunately, we have good Members who serve on a number of committees
and we are using that expertise to make these bridging arrangements. I
would like to publicly thank the gentlewoman from California (Ms.
Harman) and the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) for their efforts
to get the homeland security piece done. We have more work to do on
this particular element. They have my pledge in the colloquy that we
will work together to get this done properly, and I have nothing
further to add to that.
Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I want to return the favor and thank both the
gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) and the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Harman), ranking member, for all of the work that went
into making this language acceptable, the language that we had agreed
upon. I am sorry it cannot be included procedurally, but our
understanding to do it at the next step is certainly satisfactory to
me; and I just want to say that I could not agree more with the
sentiments of both the chairman and the ranking member about the
importance of sharing information. That is what the mission of Homeland
Security is all about, and we do have between us and among us ample
opportunity to amend whatever laws it takes to get this job done; and I
would point out that the Speaker has made it possible for all three of
us to work together on the Select Committee on Homeland Security. So we
are doing our version of fusion here in the House, and I am confident
we will succeed.
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw the amendment.
[[Page H5890]]
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). Is there objection to the
request of the gentleman from California?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. It is now in order to consider amendment
No. 2 printed in House Report 108-176.
If the amendment proposed by the gentleman from California (Mr. Farr)
is not to be offered, then it is now in order to consider amendment No.
3. printed in House Report 108-176.
Amendment No. 3 Offered by Ms. Harman
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 3 offered by Ms. Harman:
At the end of title III, add the following new section:
SEC. 345. MODIFICATION OF TERRORIST IDENTIFICATION
CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM.
(a) Certification Requirement for Consolidation of Watch
Lists.--Subsection (g)(1) of section 343 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306;
116 Stat. 2399; 50 U.S.C. 404n2) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subparagraph (D) as subparagraph (E);
(2) by inserting after subparagraph (C) the following new
subparagraph:
"(D) Whether further consolidation or elimination of watch
list databases in the departments and agencies with access to
the System would contribute to the efficiency and
effectiveness of the System in identifying individuals who
are known or suspected international terrorists."; and
(3) in subparagraph (E), as so redesignated, by adding at
the end the following: "If the certification under
subparagraph (D) is in the positive, the steps required to
consolidate or eliminate such watch lists.".
(b) Establishment of Advisory Council.--Subsection (b) of
such section is amended by adding at the end the following
new paragraph:
"(4) The Director shall establish an advisory council
comprised of experts in the field of civil liberties and
privacy issues to advise the Director on issues of civil
liberties and privacy as they relate to the maintenance of
the System.".
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, let me say first that the amendment which
the gentleman from California (Mr. Farr) would have offered is an
excellent amendment having to do with language skills, and my
understanding is that we have accommodated him in some other way. I am
sure the chairman will speak to that. And I would be happy to yield to
him first on that subject.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. HARMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentlewoman for yielding.
All I would say is that I was going to compliment the gentleman from
California (Mr. Farr) for a very helpful, thoughtful contribution to
our work product. In fact, we have been working on this subject for a
number of years, which is the training question and the language
question; and the gentleman has some very unique perspectives on this
which have been very helpful to us. We are improved in our committee
for his participation in this process. I do not believe it is necessary
to offer the amendment. Apparently he has not, but I nevertheless
wanted to appreciate publicly the contribution he has made.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, turning to my amendment, in August, 2001,
the FBI was frantically looking for two men who became part of the
terrorist suicide team on 9-11. Had we been able to find Nawaf al-Hazmi
and Khaled al-Mihdhar, we may have been able to unravel the plot for 9-
11. At least we would have stopped these two individuals from
participating in it.
The problem, it turns out, was that the State Department and INS
watchlists, which included their names, were not available to the FAA
and the airlines. So the hijackers were freely allowed to board the
ill-fated American Airlines Flight 77.
Two years later, the Federal Government still has as many as 50
databases used for tracking international terrorists and international
terrorist organizations. Just recently, the GAO highlighted 12
watchlists run by nine agencies.
This is shocking. Information contained in one database need not be
connected to information in another. Vital data that could help prevent
the next terrorist attack could be missed. We must consolidate or at
least ensure the interoperability of government watchlists, and my
amendment pending before this House to this intelligence authorization
bill addresses this.
In last year's intelligence authorization act, the Congress required
the creation of a Terrorist Identification Classification System, TICS.
This system is intended to be an authoritative real-time compilation of
individuals and organizations known or suspected of international
terrorism derived from all-source intelligence and available for use by
other government agencies. The establishment of TICS is still a work in
progress. The Director of Central Intelligence is required to report on
progress by the end of November.
My amendment requires the Director of Central Intelligence to certify
whether further consolidation, or increased interoperability, is the
best way to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of TICS. Either
way we go, the point is to connect the dots in real time.
The concept of a single government database to track suspected
terrorists does raise some civil liberties concerns. To address the
privacy and civil liberties concerns, my amendment requires the
Director of Central Intelligence to establish an advisory council of
experts on matters of civil liberties and privacy.
Mr. Chairman, the relationship of civil liberties and security has
been an abiding concern for this committee. The gentleman from New
Jersey (Mr. Holt), one of our members, has been active in this area,
and so has our chairman, who convened the first hearing, public
hearing, on civil liberties earlier this year where a panel of
witnesses from the ACLU to the Heritage Foundation agreed that we need
to balance civil liberty and security.
As Ben Franklin once said: "They that can give up essential liberty
to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor
safety." The Harman amendment addresses both liberty and safety, and I
urge its adoption.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
First of all, I want to congratulate the gentlewoman on an amendment
that she has worked hard on and I know cares a great deal about, and I
will say right up front that the amendment is acceptable to the
committee. I do want to make a comment on it, though.
The amendment requires the DCI to consider whether further
consolidation of the various U.S. Government terrorist watchlist
databases might add to the efficiency of the watchlist system in
identifying known or suspected terrorists. Absolutely a goal that we
have to achieve. The question is what is the right way to do it? And
the gentlewoman has raised the question properly. I commend her for it.
Her dedication and expertise on counterterrorism issues I think is well
known. She has served not only the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of this Congress but previous iterations of this effort on
national commissions and so forth; and I think we all very much respect
her judgment.
And as I said, this amendment is a good one and it brings the issue
to the floor. It asks the DCI to review and determine how much more
consolidation of the various terrorist watchlists is needed, but I
would add the words "if any." And the reason I say that is I am
concerned about the potential loss of data that might result from the
consolidation of all the watchlists available to the government. I do
not know that that would happen. It is a question that has to be asked.
Additionally, I would think that there is one other area that I worry
about a little bit, and that is sort of the idea of Big Brother. The
one big unified, centralized U.S. Government computer database with all
of the information available to the U.S. Government on individuals and
their associates might be viewed to some as concerning, particularly
those who worry about Big Brother invading their privacy.
I am not saying I have the answer; but at this stage of my thinking,
I am sort of in the position to be inclined to support a network
solution that virtually combines the data in various databases without
actually dumping all of the information from all the databases into one
big government Big
[[Page H5891]]
Brother database. So I would think that something on the order perhaps
of Web browser or Web sniffer, some way of searching out all the
databases simultaneously, using some of those extraordinary
technological tools that are developed in the gentlewoman's district,
the software that is out there that not only searches all of them at
the same time but also crossreferences the search results in such a way
that maximizes the researchers' efficiencies and at the same time gives
us some of the safeguards, or the appearance of safeguards anyway, the
perception that we are safeguarding better than one big database.
I do not wish to prejudge the outcome of the review. As we always do,
we candidly state our positions on these things. As I said, I think the
gentlewoman has raised exactly the right question. I thank her for her
contribution in doing that, and I believe the amendment is worded
properly so we go forward, and I will accept the amendment on behalf of
the committee.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
I support the gentlewoman's amendment also, and I am very pleased to
acknowledge the atmosphere in this committee that allows us to function
so well. It is what a committee should be. The gentleman from Florida
(Chairman Goss) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman),
ranking member, avoid, I think, destructive partisanship and allow us
to air our differences in a very constructive way.
I would like to draw attention to section 336 of this bill that
includes a provision that I have strongly advocated for to require the
director of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center to establish two
advisory councils to help the center carry out its critical and time-
sensitive work, Mr. Chairman.
{time} 1845
One Advisory Council will focus on privacy and civil liberty
concerns. We all know and understand that we are engaged in an ongoing
fight against global terrorism and that our entire Intelligence
Community is central to prosecuting and winning this struggle. But, at
the same time, as we enhance our intelligence-gathering and analysis,
it is equally important that the Director of the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center and all employees there must respect the basic civil
liberties that define our lives as Americans. Surely this Advisory
Council will help us more nearly achieve the right delicate balance
between security and liberty.
Now, equally important, this section of the bill also requires an
Advisory Council to the Director of the Terrorist Threat Integration
Center be established to concentrate on getting more and better
information to State and local governments. The efforts to improve
substantially our homeland security as a matter of urgency fall
primarily upon our first responders and the local and State governments
who employ them. In my meetings with State and local officials in New
Jersey, and with first responders in my district, I have heard
repeatedly that they receive only the most general and vague and almost
useless information from Washington. They seldom, if ever, receive any
more specific information about what they should guard against.
Clearly, they deserve more timely and useful information if they are to
function to protect the lives, the safety, and the security of
Americans. This Advisory Council should help overcome this incomplete
communication of practically useful intelligence information from the
Federal to the community level.
Third, I would like to comment about the importance of incorporating
information based on open sources. These sources of information are not
classified secret. And traditionally, within the Intelligence Community
and to this day, some individuals seem to think that if information is
not classified secret, it is not valuable. In the 21st century this
institutionalized mindset is unfortunate, since our sources of
information and the amount of information readily available to the
public domain and in the public domain have grown enormously. The
Internet has enabled one to access information that was once extremely
hard or impractical to obtain, and the dynamics of globalization, the
accelerated integration of global industry, commerce, communication,
and travel have created many new sources of information. The civil and
commercial sectors, for instance, are looking into subjects and
technologies that once were the exclusive preserve of governments and
intelligence services. A prominent example is imagery from satellites
that is publicly or commercially available. In HUMINT intelligence,
open access to officials and experts is unparalleled today.
I believe that the Intelligence Community should be exploiting such
open source information far more than it is today, and achieving this
goal will require a culture change and the application of technology. I
thank the chairman for agreeing to include in the report a call for the
Director of Central Intelligence to study and report back to Congress
within 6 months how to incorporate and use open source material in
virtually every aspect of intelligence, from collection to analysis,
and across all disciplines. There are many instances where open source
information can be useful, perhaps even more useful than classified
sources, and surely, in many cases, cheaper.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I spoke earlier about the decision by the
gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) and the gentlewoman from
California (Ranking Member Harman) to investigate thoroughly concerns
about weapons of mass destruction and the intelligence that led into
our fighting in Iraq. Our committee intends to issue a written report
on its findings as promptly as possible, and I spoke about that
earlier.
I would like to say a bit more, though. One concern that I have had
is that the administration officials too often appear to have dropped
the caveats and the uncertainties expressed in the intelligence
reporting. Another concern is that at times the intelligence reporting
or the officials presenting the intelligence appear to have been very
certain about their conclusions that were based on uncertain evidence.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). The time of the gentleman
from New Jersey (Mr. Holt) has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Holt was allowed to proceed for 1
additional minute.)
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, it is critically important to determine
whether the Intelligence Community's estimates on Iraq were badly off
base, or whether the Iraqi regime managed to destroy or spirit away the
suspect weapons or materials. Either way, it seems clear that
performance of the Intelligence Community was less than we would
expect. It is clear to all of the world that the coalition did not have
the intelligence information specific enough to find, identify, and
secure any massively destructive weapons. That realization certainly
raises questions about whether we were ready to go to war if the
Commander in Chief and the Pentagon were convinced that the weapons
were real, but they did not know quite where they were or how we would
secure them once we went to war. But that is a question for another
day. We will be talking about that in weeks to come.
Now, I would say, with the amendments that we have in front of us
today, I offer my full support to this legislation.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by
the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman).
The amendment was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. It is now in order to consider Amendment
No. 4 printed in House Report 108-176.
Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Hastings of Florida
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 4 offered by Mr. Hastings of Florida:
At the end of subtitle D of title III, insert the following
new section:
SEC. 337. IMPROVEMENT OF RECRUITMENT, HIRING AND RETENTION OF
ETHNIC AND CULTURAL MINORITIES IN THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Pilot Project to Improve Diversity Throughout the
Intelligence Community Using Innovative Methodologies for the
Recruitment, Hiring and Retention of Ethnic and Cultural
Minorities and Women
[[Page H5892]]
With the Diversity of Skills, Languages and Expertise
Reflective of the Current Mission.--The Director of Central
Intelligence shall carry out a pilot project under this
section to test and evaluate alternative, innovative methods
to recruit and hire for the intelligence community women and
minorities with diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds,
skills, language proficiency, and expertise.
(b) Methods.--In carrying out the pilot project, the
Director shall employ methods such as advertising in foreign
language newspapers in the United States, site visits to
institutions with a high percentage of students who study
English as a second language, and other methods that are not
used by the Director under the DCI Diversity Strategic Plan
to increase diversity of officers and employees in the
intelligence community.
(c) Duration of Project.--The Director shall carry out the
project under this section for a 3-year period.
(d) Report.--Not later than 2 years after the date the
Director implements the pilot project under this section, the
Director shall submit to Congress a report on the project.
The report shall include--
(1) an assessment of the effectiveness of the project; and
(2) recommendations on the continuation of the project as
well as for improving the effectiveness of the project in
meeting the goals of increasing the recruiting and hiring of
women and minorities within the intelligence community.
(e) Diversity Plan.--(1) Not later than February 15, 2004,
the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress
a report which describes the plan of the Director, entitled
the "DCI Diversity Strategic Plan", and any subsequent
revision to that plan, to increase diversity of officers and
employees in the intelligence community, including the short-
and long-term goals of the plan. The report shall also
provide a detailed description of the progress that has been
made by each element of the intelligence community in
implementing the plan.
(2) In implementing the plan, the Director shall
incorporate innovative methods for the recruitment and hiring
of women and minorities that the Director has determined to
be effective from the pilot project carried out under this
section.
(f) Definition.--In this section, the term "intelligence
community" has the meaning given that term in section 3(4)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401(4))).
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to offer an
amendment to the Intelligence Authorization bill on behalf of myself
and the following members who are immediate cosponsors of the Select
Committee on Intelligence: The gentlewoman from California (Ms.
Harman), the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes), the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Eshoo), the gentleman from Maryland (Mr.
Ruppersberger), and the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Boswell). I would also
like to thank the chairman of the committee, my good friend, the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), for his previously stated support
for this amendment.
Further, I would be remiss if I did not recognize the efforts of
former member Louis Stokes and now departed and former member Julian
Dixon; our present minority leader of the Democratic Caucus, the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), and the gentleman from
Georgia (Mr. Bishop), and I had forgotten about Tim Roemer, who also
was very instrumental in this particular arena as a former member, and
others on both sides of the aisle that have been interested in this
issue.
Mr. Chairman, this amendment directs the Director of Central
Intelligence to establish a pilot program to improve the recruitment,
hiring, and retention of ethnic and cultural minorities throughout the
Intelligence Community.
Leaders in the Intelligence Community have, for a number of years,
expressed the view that diversity within their population can pay
dividends with respect to cultural understanding and especially
language capabilities. And, for an equal number of years, the Select
Committee on Intelligence has urged them to improve their efforts of
hiring, promoting, and retaining individuals from diverse backgrounds.
While we noted in our report to accompany H.R. 2417 that progress has
been made and, indeed, it has been, especially in the more recent years
just passed, we also noted a lack of progress with respect to hiring,
promotion, and retention of women and minorities under the current
plan. The Secretary of Defense has stated that, "The current personnel
system is not flexible enough to confront the dangers of the 21st
century."
The amendment we offer today addresses one of the many concerns
raised by the Secretary and proposes a potential solution. It directs
the DCI to develop a pilot program to achieve the goals for increased
diversity amongst the Intelligence Community staff.
This amendment requires that the Director use methods such as
advertising in foreign language newspapers or conducting site visits to
high schools, and I would even encourage middle schools as we look
toward the future, because it is interesting that in those areas I feel
we find many of our grandchildren and little children know a lot about
computers that a lot of us older hands do not know about; and colleges
as well, with a high percentage of students from diverse backgrounds as
two or more recruitment methods. It also requires an annual report from
the Director to assess the effectiveness of this project in meeting his
goals.
If the horrors of 9/11 taught us anything, it is that the biggest
threat to our democratic ideals and cultural beliefs comes from those
who do not share our ideals and beliefs.
The war on terrorism has focused even greater attention on the
Intelligence Community as they have collectively faced these and many
other challenges with commendable determination. It will take time,
innovation, and a long-term strategy to ensure that the Intelligence
Community remains capable of both understanding and responding to the
threats of the 21st century.
I believe that this amendment will help the Intelligence Community
meet the goals they have set for themselves and challenges in the
decades to come. I urge my colleagues to support this noncontroversial
amendment.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that this amendment is before us. It is
entirely consistent with the committee position, and I am very happy to
accept it. I want to congratulate the gentleman from Florida (Mr.
Hastings) for his continued, persistent, effective leadership on this,
along with our colleague, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes), who
have both done the committee a big favor by keeping us focused on this.
The amendment directs the DCI to establish a pilot project to test
and evaluate alternative and innovative methods to recruit and hire
women and minorities with diverse skills, expertise, cultural, and
ethnic backgrounds, and language proficiencies. That is obviously a
very rich contribution to the Intelligence Community.
The pilot project would be carried out for a 3-year period, with a
report on the effectiveness of the project at the end of the second
year, as I understand the amendment.
The amendment also includes direction to the DCI to report to the
committee by mid-February of the next calendar year on the DCI's
diversity strategic plan, which is something we have been after for a
while. This aspect of this amendment incorporates, in part, the
amendment made to the schedule of authorizations by the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Reyes) in the committee's markup. I think they are
complementary to each other. I see no conflict, and I think that
combined, they are a benefit.
Both members deserve and are commended for promoting the needs of the
Intelligence Community in the area of diversity of skills, expertise,
languages, cultural understanding, and ethnic background, which is not
a fully met need, very clearly, in the Community, as we know.
In the committee report we stated that, and I am going to quote the
language, "Diversity throughout the Intelligence Community population
can pay dividends with respect to the richness it brings to the work of
the IC, particularly as it relates to cultural understandings of
particular target sets, increased language capabilities, and increased
skills to address particular intelligence problems." Amen.
I believe that this project will help. I very eagerly accept the
amendment without reservation, and I am pleased that the gentleman has
offered it.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman for the civilized and
collaborative way in which this whole debate is going.
I rise in strong support of this amendment, and I just want to make a
few brief points, Mr. Chairman.
[[Page H5893]]
When the DDCICM, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for
Community Management--that is a mouthful--Joan Dempsey, came to say
good-bye recently, it occurred to me that she was one of the few senior
women in the entire Intelligence Community. The only other one I can
think of is Joanne Isham, who is the Deputy Director of the National
Security Agency. The same story can be said about people from other
ethnic groups. That is unfortunate.
This amendment, which is carefully drafted and consistent with our
policy in our committee for the last 15 years, will hopefully move the
Community forward.
{time} 1900
Earlier in this debate, I spoke, and others did, about the importance
of beefing up HUMINT, our human intelligence resources. What is the
point of human intelligence? The point is obviously to learn about
terrorists. Their plans and intentions.
How do you do that? Well, you try to penetrate terrorist cells. How
do you do that? Well, it would help if you looked like the terrorists
and spoke their languages. And we cannot succeed in our effort if we
just recruit the same old, same old. So it should be obvious that this
is not the politically correct thing to do; it is the intelligent thing
to do if we are trying to expand the talent pool and the capability of
our intelligence agencies.
I strongly support this amendment. I thank the gentleman from Florida
(Mr. Hastings), and the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes). They and
others have done us a huge service.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Hastings amendment. As
has been stated, and I hope those that are watching this debate tonight
can see the kind of cooperation and willingness to work together to
solve some of the issues that greatly effect the national security of
our country watching our chairman and ranking member and other members
of the committee talk about what is good for our country.
Mr. Chairman, I think that people of diverse backgrounds can bring
their unique cultural experiences, skills and language proficiencies to
bear on intelligence problems, intelligence issues and intelligence
expertise. The percentage of women and minorities in the intelligence
community has for way too many years been smaller than the percentage
of women and minorities in the total Federal workforce and the civilian
workforce. Fiscal year 2002 data demonstrates that women and minorities
continue to be under-represented in the intelligence community,
especially in core mission areas and the senior ranks, as has been
noted here by other members of our committee.
The committee has repeatedly expressed grave concern about the lack
of progress made by the intelligence community in recruiting, in hiring
and retaining a diverse workforce, essential if we are going to protect
our country's national security. New tools must be brought to bear on
the challenge of sufficiently diversifying the intelligence community
workforce. Intelligence agencies must think, as we like to say, outside
the box. I believe that the Hastings amendment encourages this kind of
thinking, out-of-the-box thinking, by requiring the Director of Central
Intelligence to carry out a pilot project to test and evaluate
innovative alternative methods for recruiting and hiring people with
diverse backgrounds.
The amendment, like the general provisions that have been reported
out of our committee, also requires that the DCI report to Congress on
his current diversity plan, including short- and long-term goals and
the progress that is being made in implementing it by each of the
intelligence community agencies.
Mr. Chairman, not only does this make good sense. It is good
practice, it is good business, and it is good public policy. And,
therefore, I urge all of my colleagues to support the Hastings
amendment.
Mr. BOSWELL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings) for
putting this before us. I think its time is overdue, and I think it is
reasonable that he would have a pilot project.
I just have to think back on my own life experience, and I will not
tell you about that today, in starting in a country home, way out in
the country. But I go to schools a lot, and I particularly want to talk
to the young folk in regard to their futures and education and what it
means to them. And I often tell them my story and, again, I will not
tell you tonight, but what it can do for equal opportunity. It is the
road to success.
So I think that it would be very good if I can go to my African
American schools, which I will, to my Hispanic community, to my Asian-
Americans and all the others and say to them, this opportunity is
happening and you too can be an effective person if you will get your
education and come forth, and we will have a pilot project to show
that; but you can come forth, and you can be in the high-level place to
make sure our country is secure as the others have done before you.
So I encourage you to do this, and I am really glad that you have
done this. It is a reasonable request that is needed. It ought to be
done, and I am glad to hear the responses that we are hearing here
tonight. I congratulate the gentleman, and I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt).
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague for yielding. I join him
in expressing support for this amendment and accolades to the gentleman
from Florida (Mr. Hastings), the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes), and
the others who are working on this.
I wanted to reiterate my concern about the lack of racial,
linguistic, cultural and gender diversity within the intelligence
community. Our intelligence network should reflect much more of the
diversity and multicultural composition of the American people and of
the world that we seek to understand. But no one should be comforted by
the words in this amendment. This is the umpteenth time that the
problem has been identified and that intelligence agencies have been
exhorted, even required, to do better. I hope this amendment produces
real results.
Mr. BOSWELL. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his comments.
Mr. BISHOP of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite
number of words.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate
the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings), the chairman, and the
members of committee for the sensitivity and the concern that we are
now paying to the issue of diversity.
For some time now this committee has been wrestling with the idea of
diversity going back to former chairman Lou Stokes, former ranking
member Julian Dixon. In my service on the committee for 6 years up
until this term of Congress we have repeatedly been concerned. And I
believe that the director has made it clear that diversity, cultural
diversity, lingual diversity is a matter of good business sense for the
intelligence community.
We all wish that we had been a little more sensitive and a little
more knowledgeable prior to 9-11. But this I think is an opportunity
now for us to get it right. And the gentleman from Florida (Mr.
Hastings) has done an excellent job in helping us to think out of the
box by requiring the director to carry out this pilot test project to
evaluate innovative alternative methods for recruiting and hiring and
retaining members of the intelligence community with a diverse
background.
Let me take this opportunity to mention just one member of the
African American community who is completing 30 years of service to
both the military and the intelligence community, and that is Mr.
Garnett Stowe who has retired as chief of staff of the National
Reconnaissance Office. Mr. Stowe made tremendous contributions in his
own right as a member of the intelligence community, but he too was
very sensitive. And he took the time to come with the Congressional
Black Caucus last year to appear on a panel that we had dealing with
this issue of diversity in diplomatic and intelligence matters.
He has made a tremendous contribution to our country, to the free
world through his 30 years of service; and I
[[Page H5894]]
certainly would like to take this opportunity as we debate this bill to
congratulate him on a career of great service and wish him well in the
future.
With that, I would just like to associate myself with all of the
remarks that have been said in a positive way in support of the
Hastings amendment. I worked very hard when I was on the committee. I
am delighted that the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings) and the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes) and the other members of the committee
are continuing this work because it is one on which we must be
vigilant. We cannot afford to give it up. We have got to get it done,
and we have got to do it until we get it right. And I want to commend
the committee and commend my colleagues for a job well done. Hopefully,
we can complete this and get on the road to having the best real-time
intelligence for our policymakers and our war fighters based on the
most broad net of collection devices and individuals.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BISHOP of Georgia. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. GOSS. I appreciate the gentleman yielding. I just wanted to say I
was remiss in my remarks not to note the gentleman's service on the
committee on this particular issue and many other issues as well. It is
a pleasure to welcome you back to the debate here.
Mr. BISHOP of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman very much.
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the
requisite number of words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise to support the Hastings amendment and to again
restate my appreciation for the service of the gentleman from Florida
(Chairman Goss) and the service of the ranking member, the gentlewoman
from California (Ms. Harman). I also want to thank the members who
served on this committee, and I do not want to say served, I want to
have it correct, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings) is still
serving on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. His
leadership we have appreciated.
In the debate previously, he extended to me an opportunity to pursue
reviewing a number of documents dealing with the question of the
weapons of mass destruction. I wanted to publicly say to him that I
noted in my remarks earlier how pleased I was in a bipartisan way this
committee would not only open up this massive documentation but also
work together in a bipartisan way to find out the truth. And I still
hold to that, and I will comment very briefly in my remarks on that
point. But I wanted to rise initially to support the Hastings amendment
because we learned a lot after 9-11.
We learned that information would come or has come or needs to come
from people from all walks of life, ethnic backgrounds and languages.
We found that in our intelligence community we did not have the reach
that we possibly needed to ensure the safety of this Nation, to secure
the kind of intelligence we needed to have representation in parts of
the world where languages are spoken that we may not be familiar with.
And so the issue of diversity is crucial. Not only that, I think it is
important to have the "mosaicness" of America represented in the
intelligence community, the intellect that they bring, the sensitivity
that they bring, the cultural understanding that they bring, the
knowledge that they bring about the Muslim faith, and also the
understanding that all immigration, all people who are different does
not equate to terrorism. That comes from a cultural understanding.
We know that in the United States military, we found that the
military expanded its chaplain corps and that is, of course, to include
people from many different faiths, and that those serving in the
military come from many different faiths and many different racial and
ethnic backgrounds. Many Hispanics are serving. Many Muslims are
serving, many Native Americans, African Americans, obviously
Caucasians, and certainly the wide breadth of diversity, Asian-
Americans, in our Nation.
So this is a very good amendment, and I applaud the gentleman and I
believe this will go a long way in securing America because that is
what we are talking about in actually securing America.
I would like to take this opportunity also to lend my support to the
Kucinich amendment. That clearly speaks to, I think, us getting at the
truth, and that is to secure an audit that would include information
about telephone and electronic communications between the CIA and the
office of the Vice President.
I also lend my support to the distinguished representative, the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee), her amendment to require the
Government Accounting Office to conduct a study to determine the extent
of intelligence sharing by the Defense Department and the intelligence
community with the United Nations.
Collectively, these amendments do not in any way indict the good work
of the intelligence committee. What it does is helps to build, it
provides anchors, it moves us forward in staffing diversity, but it
also moves us forward in finding out particular aspects of this
question dealing with the weapons of mass destruction.
I have already said on this floor that I believe that ultimately a
commission, after the work of this House committee and after the work
of the Senate committee, whatever their processes will be, that we look
at creating an independent commission. I also believe that if we are to
find wrong-doing that a special prosecutor would be appropriate as
well.
I am prepared to work in this bipartisan effort, but I think truth is
important. And, again, it is important not only for the American
people, but my colleagues who in good faith, many who, sincerely, all
of us, might I say came to the floor of the House and voted our
conscience, many voting because they believed that we were under
imminent attack by the alleged weapons of mass destruction. Many would
say that those of us who argue this point will find it out. We will get
ours. They will find the weapons of mass destruction.
{time} 1915
Mr. Chairman, I will not be in any way offended because the question
of America is about democracy and truth. It is about sharing with the
American people the reasons why we make such decisions. It is not about
a "get you" foreign policy. I do not need a "get you" foreign
policy. I do not need to be victorious in this independent commission
or the work of the intelligence committee. I do not need to find out
that there were no weapons of mass destruction. I simply need to find
the truth because the administration is obligated to tell the truth to
the American people and to this Congress, for us to make the life and
death decision of war and peace.
I also believe that war should have been the last option, but I
believe my colleagues voted in good faith, and therefore, they should
have the truth, the American people should have the truth, and I think
a commission will bring us to a point of securing the truth.
So I rise in support of the Hastings amendment enthusiastically, the
Kucinich amendment and the Lee amendment so we can move forward in a
bipartisan manner.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). The question is on the
amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings).
The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings)
will be postponed.
It is now in order to consider amendment No. 5 printed in House
report 108-176.
Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Kucinich
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 5 offered by Mr. Kucinich:
At the end of title III, add the following new section:
[[Page H5895]]
SEC. 345. REPORT ON COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND THE OFFICE OF THE VICE
PRESIDENT ON WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN
IRAQ.
(a) Audit.--The Inspector General of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall conduct an audit of all telephone
and electronic communications between the Central
Intelligence Agency and the Office of the Vice President that
relate to weapons of mass destruction obtained or developed
by Iraq preceding Operation Iraqi Freedom on or after
September 11, 2001.
(b) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Inspector General shall submit to
Congress a report on the audit conducted under subsection
(a). The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
may contain a classified annex.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, we now know that there were not vast
stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq when the U.S. invaded
and that, therefore, Iraq did not pose an imminent threat to the United
States, as the administration claimed before the war.
The question remaining is whether the administration compelled the
Central Intelligence Agency to release raw, undisseminated information
they knew to be unreliable because it helped support the worst case
scenario concerning Iraq's weapons program and, therefore, helped make
the case, an erroneous case it turns out, that Iraq posed an imminent
threat to the United States.
The administration has made numerous assertions. The President in his
State of the Union said, The British government has learned that Saddam
Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.
Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high
strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production.
Number one, the claim about uranium from Africa was forged. Number
two, the aluminum tubes were not suitable for a nuclear enrichment
program. These assertions made by the President in his State of the
Union to justify an immediate war with Iraq were false.
Did the Vice President play a role in making false information become
the public reason the President went to war in Iraq? The Vice
President, as reported in the Washington Post of June 5, 2003, Vice
President Cheney and his most senior aide made multiple trips to the
CIA over the past year to question analysts studying Iraq's weapons
programs and alleged links to al Qaeda, creating an environment in
which some analysts felt they were being pressured to make their
assessments fit with the Bush administration's policy objectives. That
is from the Washington Post on June 5, 2003.
Number two, the Vice President knew or should have known that
documents purporting to show that Iraq had bought uranium from Niger
were forged. On March 7, the IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei
reported the following to the U.N. Security Council: These documents
which form the basis for reports of recent uranium transactions between
Iraq and Niger are, in fact, not authentic. We have, therefore,
concluded that these specific allegations are unfounded. We have found
no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons
program in Iraq.
It turns out that the forgeries were crude. Anyone with an Internet
search engine could determine that these documents were forgeries. Yet
on March 16, nine days afterwards, the Vice President repeated the
falsehood on national television. He said, We believe, and he was
talking about Hussein, has in fact reconstituted nuclear weapons.
The Vice President knew 1 year earlier, it appears, that the
documents were forgeries and, therefore, the allegations false.
According to the New York Times of May 6, 2003, More than a year ago
the Vice President's office asked for an investigation of the uranium
deal. So a former U.S. ambassador to Africa was dispatched to Niger. In
February 2002, according to someone present at the meetings, that envoy
reported to the CIA and the State Department that the information was
unequivocally wrong and that the documents had been forged.
So public reports indicate the Vice President made assertions which
were unreliable, and the Vice President visited the CIA, making
analysts there feel, according to the Washington Post, that a certain
output was desired from here.
In summary, what this amendment seeks to do is to probe what role the
Vice President played in causing the CIA to disseminate unreliable,
raw, previously undisseminated, untrue information about Iraq's alleged
threat to the United States.
Specifically, this amendment would direct the Inspector General of
the Central Intelligence Agency to audit all electronic and telephone
communications between the Office of the Vice President and the CIA
which would answer the question about how extensive the visits by the
Vice President to the CIA were.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Kucinich
amendment.
The gentleman from Ohio has woven an interesting story and made a
number of bald and bold assertions, but I think it is important to look
at what the amendment says.
The amendment calls for the Inspector General of the CIA to conduct
an audit of all telephone electronic communications between the CIA and
the Office of the Vice President relating to Iraq and WMD. The
amendment is unusual and frankly a bit confusing. It purports to
address what is allegedly a very serious issue, the altering or shading
of intelligence for political, perhaps for strategic, purposes, but
then it focuses only on the Vice President and only on his phone and e-
mail communications.
If there was a real problem, one would expect a comprehensive review,
but the amendment targets only one individual, the Vice President, and
this is an individual who has the right, indeed he has the obligation,
to receive information related to, for example, Iraq WMD and a run-up
to a war.
However, the Vice President's telephone conversations are not
recorded. Thus, the information that is sought in this amendment does
not exist when it comes to telephone calls. Perhaps a record of the
number of telephone conversations between the Vice President and the
CIA could be compiled, but this would tell us only how many calls were
made and when they occurred. Frankly, this is not useful information.
Mr. Chairman, the fact that the Vice President was in contact with
the Intelligence Community should not be surprising. Frankly, it would
be very upsetting if there was insufficient contact. These are
sensitive communications, of course, on important matters. We should
all expect the Vice President's office to talk regularly with the CIA,
to visit the CIA for that matter, and the rest of the Intelligence
Community. So should not the Vice President and the President be avid
consumers of intelligence in order to be well-informed in the decisions
that they make?
Remember what the amendment says. It is targeting the telephone calls
between the Vice President, only the Vice President, and the CIA, only
that component of the Intelligence Community, and the electronic
communications that took place between that individual and that agency.
So it seems very clear to me that it is not a comprehensive review.
It is targeted at the Vice President, and one simply has to realize
that it is going to be unsuccessful in really revealing any information
that it purports to have as an interest of the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I think the amendment should be defeated.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BEREUTER. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I want to point out for clarification
purposes, and I thank the gentleman for yielding, that the result of
this amendment would be both a count of the number of communications
and an inventory of the substance of the communications. The count
would establish the number of times the Vice President took the unusual
step of traveling to the CIA to meet directly with CIA analysts and the
inventory would establish the nature of those visits.
I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Ohio raises the serious issue of
politicization of intelligence. The question of the integrity of the
intelligence process is a legitimate one and has
[[Page H5896]]
been a continuing concern in the oversight of the intelligence
agencies. The question of politicization of intelligence is an area
that our committee, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
will explore in its investigation of Iraq intelligence.
I must, however, oppose the gentleman's amendment. The amendment, in
my view, does not take the best approach to ensuring a comprehensive
look at the matter. It is narrowly focused on one possible area for
investigation, and it addresses that one area in a way I believe would
be counterproductive.
It is not clear to me that the audit as described in the amendment
would develop useful information. The offices of the Inspectors General
can be effectively utilized in congressional investigations and
oversight, but the resources of these offices should be deployed
according to a comprehensive plan of investigation.
In sum, I believe the gentleman has raised an important issue, and
that issue should and will be examined in the context of our
committee's investigation. The amendment in this form should be
defeated.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. HARMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, just to point out to the gentlewoman that
I think it would be helpful if the committee supported the amendment
because, at worst, if the amendment would be repeating the work of the
committee, if it would be essentially redundant, then it could not
hurt, and I would also want to point out that the gentlewoman is
correct.
I mean, this amendment is narrowly focused, and it is aiming
specifically at obtaining information relative to the relationship
between the Vice President and the CIA. I thank the gentlewoman for
yielding.
Ms. HARMAN. Just to conclude, Mr. Chairman, I believe that we can get
to the issue of politicization of intelligence in a different manner,
one that is bipartisan and one that falls within the thorough and
comprehensive investigation of this committee. That would be a better
way for this House to go.
Once again, I commend the gentleman for raising this issue but hope
that we will decide to take a different course on this subject.
Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Mr. Chairman, the way I would characterize this amendment is as the
cheap shot amendment. This is a totally political amendment. It is a
totally cheap shot at the Vice President. It is an extension of a
campaign being waged by the gentleman from Ohio who has made a number
of speeches on this floor and around the country. I believe it is an
extension of his presidential campaign to try and besmirch the record
of this administration, to besmirch the good name of the Vice
President, and I think when people have an opportunity to really look
at the amendment, they can see that it is so shallow in its wording and
in its nature, that it is what it is.
It is a political amendment. It is only brought here to the floor to
continue an opportunity for the gentleman from Ohio to try and find
something that simply cannot be found.
It also, I think, degrades the work of the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence. This gentleman who is offering this amendment has been
a Member of this House. He knows of the work of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence. He knows that if he had some kind of a
complaint about the kind of activity that he is trying to allege the
Vice President has engaged in that he could come to the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence. He could petition the chairman, he
could petition the ranking member. He could ask the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence. I guess we are not good enough to do our
work that you have to seek some kind of an outside counsel or outside
organization to try and look into it.
{time} 1930
This is unprecedented what this amendment asks for. It is
unprecedented in its nature to think that this body, under this
amendment, is going to go after the phone records of the Vice
President. Now, anybody who does not see the politicizing of what is
going on here cannot see the nature of it. You can see it in the words,
because they are very shallow.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. LaHOOD. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman. Under the
gentleman's logic, there would be no reason at all for any amendments
to be offered from this floor. We might as well dispense with the
amendment process and move to a system in which the committees of
Congress report bills for a simple up or down vote from the whole
House. So we might as well extend the suspension calendar for all
bills.
Mr. LaHOOD. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, let me respond to the
gentleman by saying this. If this is the authorization for the
intelligence bill, and the gentleman is offering this amendment under
our authorization, why does the gentleman not give some direction to
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to look into the matter?
Why does the gentleman have to find somebody else to do it? And the
gentleman may respond, if he would like.
Mr. KUCINICH. Well, Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for
continuing to yield, and I would say that, first of all, the idea that
it is the committee's jurisdiction and, therefore, should be left to
the committee, I do not believe the gentleman is seriously proposing
what I think is an absurdity, but the argument rests on the same absurd
logic. All Members of the Congress have the privilege to offer
amendments, and if a majority of the House agrees with the amendment,
it passes. However, I do not believe it is legitimate or logical
against my amendment to say that the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence should enjoy an exemption from the amendment process.
Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, what I am saying to the gentleman is
apparently the gentleman does not think the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence is doing their job. Apparently, the gentleman does not
think we have the capability to carry this out, and so he has crafted
an amendment to go to some outside group, some outside organization
because the gentleman does not have trust and faith in what we have
been doing and the work that we have been doing.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will continue to yield,
I would ask that the gentleman not take offense. This is certainly, I
would hope the gentleman would agree, a salient issue of interest to
the American people and that the public does have a right to know, and
there have been published statements that provide contradictory
information relative to what is really a question of a singular cause
of war. So I respect the gentleman's right to make these statements,
and I would ask the gentleman to respect my right as a Member of
Congress to offer this amendment.
Mr. LaHOOD. Well, I would say, Mr. Chairman, that if the gentleman
wanted to offer an amendment on our authorization bill, at least he
ought to give us the benefit of the doubt that we have professional
staff and we have people who spend an inordinate amount of time,
including the gentleman's ranking member because this is her only
committee assignment. She spends all of her time in this Congress
working on intelligence activities. Apparently the gentleman does not
think enough of her expertise and the expertise of the committee staff
on that side to give them some kind of an assignment.
And why the Vice President? Why not the President? Why not the
Director of the CIA? Why not the Director of the FBI? This is a
political amendment. This is an extension of a campaign.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Upton). The time of the gentleman from
Illinois (Mr. LaHood) has expired.
Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 2
additional minutes.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Illinois?
Mr. KUCINICH. Reserving the right to object, I would be happy to
grant the gentleman an additional 2 minutes if he would be happy to
return the favor to me.
[[Page H5897]]
Mr. LaHOOD. I will be more than happy to yield to the gentleman.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Illinois?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood) is
recognized for 2 additional minutes.
Mr. LaHOOD. Why the Vice President? Why not other officials of the
government? Why not officials of the government who have direct
responsibility for intelligence-gathering information? If there is some
kinds of a cabal going on around here, why did the gentleman just
happen to pick this individual?
I believe this is what it is. This is a political amendment. This is
an amendment to try and embarrass one member of this administration.
This is an amendment to try and embarrass the second-highest-ranking
elected official in our government by some way, shape, or form,
thinking that if the gentleman gets some kind of phone records he is
going to find something out.
As members of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, we get
information every day, 24-7, our staff. Pretty much 24-7, our staff are
working on gathering intelligence; and this is a slap in the face at
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to the gentleman's own
members, to our members.
It really is what it is. It is a political amendment, and I stand by
what I said. It is the cheap shot amendment. It is the cheap shot
amendment of the year. It gets the award, in my opinion; and I hope
people see it for what it is.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent for an additional
2 minutes.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Ohio?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich) is
recognized for 2 minutes.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I want to say to my friend, the gentleman
from Illinois (Mr. LaHood), that I would hope the gentleman would
appreciate receiving clear direction for an inquiry. I can only assume
that the gentleman does not want the direction of the whole Congress to
get to the bottom of the Vice President's role.
Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. KUCINICH. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, I simply would say to the gentleman that he
knows that we have established in this bill two advisory committees. We
had people on the floor earlier suggesting a commission; but
apparently, the gentleman does not think the oversight obligation that
we serve, as the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, is enough.
And I say it is a slight. It is a slap at us.
Mr. KUCINICH. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I would just tell the
gentleman that as a member of the Committee on Government Reform I
certainly appreciate the role of government oversight, and I certainly
appreciate the role of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
as well. I would say that if the gentleman did not want to get to the
bottom of the role of the Vice President, which has been a matter of
public contest and controversy long before I have spoken here, that
would indeed be a reason to oppose the amendment; but it would not be a
reason for anyone else in Congress to vote "no" on the amendment.
And to the Members of Congress, I say if they want to demand a
thorough investigation into the role that the Vice President may have
played in offering the American public discredited intelligence reports
of a nonexisting Iraqi weapons program, then they should vote "yes"
for my amendment.
Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield once again?
Mr. KUCINICH. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, let me simply say this. I would say that
the gentleman's ranking member has bent over backwards. It was the
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt) and others who asked for the two
advisory committees. And it is other people on the gentleman's side who
are asking for some kind of a commission. Now, we have not acted on
that, and that is not in this bill; but I think every request that was
made by the gentleman's side to the chairman has been granted.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Time of the gentleman from Ohio (Mr.
Kucinich) has expired.
Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 2
additional minutes.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Illinois?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood) is
recognized for 2 additional minutes.
Mr. LaHOOD. Really, Mr. Chairman, I think we have done everything we
can. Now, to go outside of the jurisdiction of the committee and to
take a cheap shot at the Vice President, it makes no sense, I say to
the gentleman. It really does not. I think, really, the truth is, after
listening to this and listening to the fact that the gentleman's
ranking member is not going to support the gentleman's amendment, I
think it is in his best interest to withdraw the amendment.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. LaHOOD. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the kind words, and it's nice
that the gentleman from Illinois is worried about me and whether I am
respected. I believe I am respected, and I believe that the person who
offers this amendment respects me, and I certainly hope that he
respects our committee.
I just want repeat something I said earlier, which is that our
investigation will be thorough and it will be bipartisan and we will
follow the facts unflinchingly. So I do not want the gentleman from
Ohio to assert, because it is not correct, that we are taking things
off limits. The reason I oppose the gentleman's amendment is that I
think we will do a comprehensive job in a fair way, and all of us, on a
unanimous basis, will proceed and go forward. We will do the right job
for this House, and we should have a chance to proceed and do it that
way.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. LaHOOD. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I take great pride in serving in the
Congress with the gentlewoman and the gentleman. I would say, though,
that I do not see this so much as being a battle over turf as I see it
being an assertion of the need for pursuing the truth. And I would
expect that the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has the
capability to do the job, but I also think that this particular matter
is so unique that it receive the attention of the House, which is why I
have offered this amendment and why I will continue to insist on it.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to my colleague's amendment, and I
put it in the context of the work that this committee has done and that
we have accomplished and the vision that we outlined in the
Intelligence Authorization Act for 2004.
I serve as chairman of the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical
Intelligence. As such, one of our jobs is to oversee some of the
Nation's most sophisticated intelligence technologies. I have the
opportunity and responsibility for critically reviewing new concepts of
operation. I must ensure that currently fielded systems continue to be
capable of meeting the needs that we have outlined.
In this area, we are pursuing aggressive oversight. We have worked
with the ranking member. We have been to the ranking member's district
to meet with some of the contractors there; and I think it is a good
example of how, in a bipartisan way, we have asked some tough questions
of the intelligence community and of those groups that provide us with
the materials and the equipment that we need. We have asked the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to provide us with a long-
range plan and how all of these pieces will fit together and what a
strategic plan may look like for the next 6 to 10 years.
In the comments attached to the bill, we have outlined our
disappointment
[[Page H5898]]
that that plan has not come forward to the committee, so that we are
moving forward with a little bit less information, perhaps, at this
time, than what we would like to have had. But I do not think that the
amendment that the gentleman is bringing up is one that is going to
work in the best interest of what we are trying to get accomplished.
On a weekly basis, this committee meets with the communities analytic
cadre. We have met with them on a regular basis to review the
intelligence that they prepared for us and they prepared for the
President, the Vice President and Members of Congress; and that
information is now available to all 435 Members of Congress so that
they can take a look at what we were looking at and how we were shaping
our judgments and where we were getting our information from.
I think it is important for the American people to know that. That
information is not secret. We are being very open with our colleagues
because we recognize the importance of maintaining the credibility of
the process, the individuals, and the analysis that goes into the
intelligence that we have gathered. We take this job very, very
seriously.
One of the things that I am concerned about with this gentleman's
amendment is that if we pursue this path, and in this case it
identifies the Vice President but also implicates the folks at the
different intelligence agencies as perhaps not keeping the best
interest of the country in the forefront, then what we will end up
with, and I agree with my colleague from Illinois that it is a cheap
shot amendment because there is not a basis in fact to make these
accusations against the Vice President or against the folks at the
intelligence agency, but the result and danger is that what we are
going to end up with is we are going to end up with a cadre of analysts
that are going to be intimidated to such a point that they are going to
go through the process, they are going to gather the intelligence, and
they are going to be sitting there and saying, you know, I really
cannot take the next step of providing some expert judgment, which I
have been trained for, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 years. I am not going to be
able to share that expert judgment with the folks who recognize the
source and the art of this work.
Remember, the job we give these folks, in plain English, is we ask
them to go out and steal other people's secrets. We ask them to do that
in an imprecise way and to put the pieces together. And when they have
a few pieces of the puzzle, we ask them to try to paint for us what the
picture and what the final puzzle may look like. If we put a cloud over
their heads and say every time you have a few of the pieces out there
and you have painted a picture for us, for us to better understand the
environment after the fact, if what you laid out beforehand does not
perfectly match what we find out afterwards, you have failed.
In reality, these are talented people. They are doing a very, very
good job.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Michigan
(Mr. Hoekstra) has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Hoekstra was allowed to proceed for 2
additional minutes.)
{time} 1945
Mr. HOEKSTRA. They come back and they give us their best judgment. I
am impressed with the work of the chairman and the ranking member, how
they have set a course that says we are going to go through this in a
bipartisan way. We are going to take a look at the information and how
the people processed the information. We are going to take a look at
how we analyzed it and how decisions were made off that information,
but we are going to do that in a bipartisan way and we are going to
make sure that we do not take this down a road of pure partisan
politics because in the 2\1/2\ years I have been on this committee, in
a bipartisan way we have kept as our primary focus what is good for
this country, recognizing the sensitive nature of the information that
we deal with, recognizing the importance of us to work through very,
very difficult issues, but to reach a consensus that enables us to move
forward.
That is exactly what the leadership of this committee has done, it is
exactly the way that the members of the committee have guided their
behavior, and it is what sets the behavior of our committee and the
members of that committee apart from the amendment that is brought
forward at this time.
It is a partisan amendment, it has a potential to be used in many,
many different ways, but primarily in my analysis it hurts the prospect
of truly improving the process so that when we move forward in the
future, we will have the intelligence, the capability and the right
people in place to ensure that we make the best possible decisions.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
I rise to underscore the right of the gentleman from Ohio (Mr.
Kucinich) to offer this amendment and say that he is getting at a very
important point, but to say further it is a bad amendment and should be
opposed. It is both too narrow and too broad. He is certainly intending
to get at an important point, but it is too narrow in that it deals
with the phone records of one public official, and it is too broad in
the sense that it is a fishing expedition. It is the kind of fishing
expedition which I think so sullied some previous Congresses.
The question of whether intelligence has been cooked or coerced is a
critical question, and I thank the gentleman for raising it. But in
fact in the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence we have already
raised that, and we will continue to raise that issue. I ask the
assistance of every Member of this body on both sides of the aisle to
help us formulate the questions that need to be asked and to hold us to
task that those questions are asked to the satisfaction of all Members
of this body and of the citizens of America. But I do not believe that
this amendment will help us do that. I must oppose this amendment, and
I encourage my colleagues to oppose it.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. HOLT. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I think it would be useful as we begin
these debates for us to reflect on the essential constitutional role of
the Congress and on the importance of separation of powers and on the
cause which took a Nation into war because we are not talking about
just any other matter here, we are talking about a matter that resulted
in the people of this country having their sons and daughters sent to
Iraq.
Nothing less than the entire involvement of this Congress will do to
be able to hold safe the constitutional prerogatives of separation of
powers. No congressional committee can override the requirements of the
Constitution and the role of this Congress.
When Members of this Congress gave the President authority to pursue
an attack against Iraq, they took upon themselves a serious and grave
responsibility, and since information has been presented that raises
grave questions about the cause of our action against Iraq, we have a
moral obligation to get into this, and I take nothing away from the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, but I would tell Members,
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence should take nothing away
from Members of the House.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, perhaps the gentleman did
not hear me earlier this evening when I said that what we are looking
at are critical questions that have to do with lives and deaths that
have occurred or might occur. It has a lot to do with the future
direction of our country; but I do not believe that this amendment will
help us carry out the investigation that we need to carry out and ask
the questions that we need to ask and have for the future the kind of
truth-telling intelligence agents and analysts who will help this
country get where we want to go.
Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. HOLT. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, I want to respond to the latest speech of
the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich), and that is to say if the
gentleman really wants the prerogatives of the House to be worked out,
let the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence do it. The
gentleman's amendment says the IG or the GAO is supposed to
[[Page H5899]]
go in and get the Vice President's phone records. If the gentleman
thinks it is such a great idea, let us do it. We have been doing it.
Why have some outside group do it? That is the flaw in the gentleman's
amendment. That is what our committee is supposed to do. That is the
flaw, and that is what politicizes it.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. HOLT. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I would direct the gentleman from
Illinois to an article in the Washington Post on June 5 which says that
the esteemed chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
said there is "no indication that analysts at DIA or CIA changed their
analysis to fit what they perceived as the desire of the administration
officials."
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). The time of the gentleman
from New Jersey (Mr. Holt) has expired.
(On request of Mr. Kucinich, and by unanimous consent, Mr. Holt was
allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. HOLT. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, it goes on to say the intelligence
oversight panels have received no whistleblower complaints from the CIA
or other intelligence agencies on the issue. I would maintain that this
would not be a subject of whistleblowing, and only the Office of
Inspector General or in this case the investigative agency would have
an opportunity to be able to get this in an evenhanded way, and it
takes it out of politics at a time when Members suggest this is only
political.
I might further add that I did not make my reputation in this House
by raising partisan issues, and I do not see this as a partisan issue,
I see this as justifying the administration's claim that this country
had to go to war against Iraq because there was imminent threat.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
I want to point out two things, and they are meant to be
constructive. First of all, it is certainly true everybody in the
United States counts on it being true and it is true that the Vice
President and the President are responsible for the protection of the
national security. The national security team involves the Vice
President. The President and the Vice President are regular consumers
of intelligence information, and were they not, we probably should be
calling for some kind of an investigation.
I do recall it was not so long ago that one of the complaints from
one of the Directors of the CIA was in fact just that, that he did not
get enough quality time and enough access with the top leaders of the
country and the Intelligence Community was not being well-served. That
was at another time and we need not go into that.
My suggestion to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich), who I have
great respect for, is that this amendment is truly not worthy of his
best efforts. I do not believe the gentleman is fully informed on it.
It appears that the gentleman is basing his amendment and information
and his case on media. Again, at the risk of getting impaled by the
media, I have this trouble with the errancy problem in the media.
Media simply does not know everything, and if they did, they would
stop asking me and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) and
other members of the committee questions. Believe me, the media does
not know everything. They are not fully informed, and if the gentleman
is using the media, the gentleman is not fully informed.
I invite the gentleman to come upstairs, sign the secrecy agreement
if the gentleman has not already, and review the material. That is why
we have it there. If the gentleman took advantage of that, the
gentleman would be better able to understand what we are doing, and I
would hope would be supportive of our efforts. Having said all that, I
hope we are getting ready for a vote on this amendment.
Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
I rise in support of the Kucinich amendment.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. LEE. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
Mr. KUCINICH. The gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) is familiar
with the amendment and the letter of the amendment, and I would ask if
the chairman would be willing to commit the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence to seeking specifically the information that I am
asking here of the Inspector General. Would the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence be willing to conduct publicly an audit of
all telephone and electronic communications between the Central
Intelligence Agency and the Office of the Vice President as they relate
to this matter?
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. LEE. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, certainly we will publicly not commit to
that. We will publicly commit to where the review of the information
takes us. We have a bipartisan agreement on that. We have 20 able
members who are members of good judgment and good sense who will follow
the review and the material that comes in to the appropriate places.
The gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) has used the word
"unflinching." It is a fair word. I assure the gentleman I am going
where the information takes us.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. LEE. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
Mr. KUCINICH. I would suggest to the gentleman and I would not impugn
his answer by stating that his unwillingness to clearly commit to
gathering this information publicly would in any way reflect a partisan
position on his part, just as my desire to have the Inspector General
bring that information forward is not reflective of a partisan position
on my part.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. LEE. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. GOSS. There are two reasons why this would be a difficult task to
do publicly, and I would not make that broad a commitment. The first is
that much of the material that the gentleman is talking about is
probably classified if the gentleman is talking about the content of
what may or may not be involved in calls, and I cannot go there.
The second part is the matter of Constitution which does understand
that working documents and so forth of the executive are respected and
privileged. That has always been the case no matter who is in the White
House.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. LEE. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, it would be more than instructive. It
would be classified information if the Vice President manipulated CIA
analysts to disseminate false, raw unreliable information to justify a
war in Iraq. I am hopeful no one is saying that and I am not aware that
the administration has asserted executive privilege in an attempt to
shield such information from the Congress. I am not aware of that at
all. Maybe that has happened privately, but I am not aware that such an
assertion can be private and that in fact such an assertion has been
made.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. LEE. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. GOSS. That is an option that they have and that is why I cannot
make a commitment. I cannot overcome that.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. LEE. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
Mr. KUCINICH. I would say in order for the test to be made to make
the request first then imposes our responsibility as Members of
Congress, and as a coequal branch of government, we are entitled to do
that and the executive branch is entitled to assert executive
privilege, if they so choose, and that would be illuminating, I think.
Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to ask that the Bush
administration provide the American people with a full account of the
events leading up to the war with Iraq.
[[Page H5900]]
The amendment sponsored by Representative Kucinich is a good starting
point but there is still much that we do not know about the basis of
our war with Iraq. Since August of last year, when the administration
began beating the war drum, they have offered little concrete evidence
backing up their claims that Iraq posed an "imminent threat" to the
United States.
The rhetoric employed by the administration was strong and
unwavering:
On September 12, 2002, the President told the UN: "Right now, Iraq
is expanding and improving facilities that were used for the production
of biological weapons . . . . Iraq has made several attempts to buy
high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear
weapon."
On October 7, 2002, the President said: "It [Iraq] possesses and
produces chemical and biological weapons. It is seeking nuclear
weapons."
The Vice President said earlier this year on "Meet The Press" that:
"we believe he [Saddam Hussein] has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear
weapons."
And the Secretary of Defense joined in saying: "We know where they
[weapons of mass destruction] are, they are in the area around Tikrit
and Baghdad."
Yet, despite this certainty, 3 months after the fall of Baghdad, no
chemical, biological or nuclear weapons have been found. Nor have the
facilities to make these weapons been found. The administration has
tried to capitalize on our fears born out of the September 11th
terrorist attacks, suggesting there was a link between Saddam Hussein
and leaders of al Qaeda.
Even though this connection has been disproved consistently, the
President still cites it as fact.
And today, we learned that at least one member of the intelligence
community felt pressured to shape his reports to fit the
administration's position on weapons of mass destruction even though he
had no evidence to support those claims.
Congress must work to ensure that the information that comes out of
the intelligence community is reliable and is not unduly influenced by
anyone. This is not a partisan issue. This is about restoring the
credibility of the United States both with our constituents and
throughout the world.
The President has said that he is confident that weapons of mass
destruction will be found; the evidence is strong he says.
I encourage him to shine the light of day on the evidence so that the
world can understand why the United States went to war--unprovoked--and
put the lives of thousands in danger.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by
the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).
The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr.
Kucinich) will be postponed.
{time} 2000
It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6 printed in House
Report 108-176.
Amendment No. 6 Offered by Ms. Lee
Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). The Clerk will designate the
amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 6 offered by Ms. Lee:
At the end of title III, add the following new section:
SEC. 345. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITH UNITED NATIONS
WEAPONS INSPECTORS SEARCHING FOR WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION IN IRAQ.
(a) In General.--The Comptroller General of the United
States shall conduct a study to determine the extent to which
intelligence developed by the Department of Defense and by
the intelligence community with respect to weapons of mass
destruction obtained or developed by Iraq preceding Operation
Iraqi Freedom was made available to the United Nations
weapons inspectors and the quantity and quality of the
information that was provided (if any).
(b) Specific Matter Studied.--The study shall provide for
an analysis of the sufficiency of the intelligence provided
by the Director of Central Intelligence to those weapons
inspectors, and whether the information was provided in a
timely manner and in a sufficient quantity and quality to
enable the inspectors to locate, visit, and conduct
investigations on all high and medium value suspected sites
of weapons of mass destruction.
(c) Access to Information.--(1) Subject to paragraph (2),
the Comptroller General may secure directly from any agency
or department of the United States information necessary to
carry out the study under subsection (a).
(2) The appropriate Federal agencies or departments shall
cooperate with the Comptroller General in expeditiously
providing appropriate security clearances to individuals
carrying out the study to the extent possible pursuant to
existing procedures and requirements, except that no person
shall be provided with access to classified information under
this section without the appropriate security clearances.
(d) Report.--Not later than 12 months after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit
to Congress a report on the study conducted under subsection
(a). The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
may contain a classified annex.
Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, first I would like to thank the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Goss) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) for
her support and her leadership in crafting this bipartisan bill. Also
to my staff, Julie Little and Shannon Smith, I want to thank them for
their very diligent work.
This is a commonsense amendment seeking an answer to a question that
the American people have a right to know: How was our intelligence
regarding Iraqi weapons of mass destruction handled in the months
before the war? Specifically, this amendment seeks a GAO study to
determine the extent and timeliness with which the Intelligence
Community shared information about suspected weapons in Iraq with the
United Nations inspectors on the ground searching for those weapons.
There are growing questions being raised about the use or possible
misuse of intelligence in the months leading up to the war against
Iraq. If intelligence was distorted, that raises serious doubts around
the world about United States credibility. Our President told the
American people, the Congress and the world that inspections had
failed, that Iraq unquestionably possessed weapons of mass destruction,
and that these weapons posed such a dire, imminent threat to the United
States that we had no choice but to go to war. All other options, he
said, had been exhausted. But the question we must continue to ask is,
were those options truly exhausted? Were they, in fact, fully pursued?
Did the United States Intelligence Community share information with the
United Nations inspectors about suspected weapons sites? Did it happen
in a timely and sufficient manner?
President Bush went before the United Nations General Assembly and
stated, "My nation will work with the U.N. Security Council to meet
our common challenge." He and Secretary Powell pledged to work with
the United Nations to pursue inspections to seek out and destroy
weapons of mass destruction. What we have before us is a question of
both policy and credibility. If we failed to fully share intelligence
with United Nations inspectors, we may have undermined their
effectiveness. If we relied on intelligence that was distorted or less
complete than implied, if we failed to share crucial information with
our allies, then we have undermined our own national credibility.
This Nation launched a preemptive war based on what it claimed was
indisputable evidence. If that evidence was not so solid and especially
if it was distorted, then we severely undercut our ability to convince
the world about future dangers from weapons of mass destruction in
other countries. The doctrine of preemption, which I happen
incidentally to strongly oppose, totally collapses without credibility.
For these reasons, we need to find the answer to these questions. The
American people have a right to know. A respected and esteemed member
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence said that he has been
working for the last 6 months to try to force disclosure of important
facts relevant to the sharing of intelligence information on suspect
weapons of mass destruction sites by the CIA with the United Nations
arms inspectors.
He continued, and I quote, "If it had been public knowledge in
February or March of this year that the CIA had not shared information
on all of the top Iraqi WMD suspect sites with the United Nations
inspectors, it could have worked against the administration's timetable
for initiating military
[[Page H5901]]
action against Iraq. There could have been questions as to why; it
could have made the administration's decision to cut short the U.N.
inspection process and to institute military action less compelling;
and there could have been greater demand that we share all such
information with the United Nations before abandoning the inspection
process."
I share his concerns and I echo his call for a bipartisan
investigation. These are not partisan issues, they are fundamental
questions about credibility and they need to be answered. This
amendment calls for a GAO study into the sharing of United States
intelligence with the U.N. inspections teams. It calls for a report to
Congress with a classified annex if necessary for security reasons. We
are all aware that to date the United States military has not found
weapons of mass destruction in its searches since the end of the war.
We also know that that does not prove the weapons are not there. They
may well be. And I believe we should bring in more IAEA and United
Nations inspectors to help seek out, secure and destroy them if they
are hidden in Iraq.
Given the Administration's confident and unequivocal statements that
Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and given the President's
assurances that he wanted to work with the United Nations to seek non-
military solutions through a renewed inspections process, it is
important that we learn to answer to the question of whether or not
intelligence was shared in a timely and sufficient manner with the UN
inspections teams.
I urge you to support this amendment.
Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Members are reminded to refrain from
improper references to the Senate.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word. I rise in
opposition to the Lee amendment. It calls, of course, for the
Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a study and
determine the extent of intelligence sharing within the Intelligence
Community, DOD and the U.N. inspectors in Iraq.
I would like to make two general points first. As a part of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence's review of the Intelligence
Community regarding prewar intelligence on Iraq, the committee has
already begun to examine this issue and will assess the effectiveness
and procedures governing the sharing of intelligence to international
and foreign bodies.
Secondly, the committee acknowledges that the Comptroller has some
capabilities for investigation. But I would note that the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence has a long and distinguished record of
conducting bipartisan and thorough reviews of intelligence matters.
Therefore, before outside help is requested, it seems only appropriate
that the committee should have an opportunity to fulfill its mandate
for the House and for the Congress to conduct rigorous oversight of the
Intelligence Community. This subject area of the amendment is not going
to be neglected.
Now a few details. In the run-up to renewed weapons inspections in
Iraq late last year, U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix told the press
that although his team could use U.S. intelligence, the team was not
supposed to trust anyone, and that it was the team's decision, not a
particular government's, as to what facilities and where the
inspections were to be carried out.
The earlier U.N. mission to Iraq was accused of spying for the United
States. Therefore, Hans Blix indicated that he had to make the
distinction between his possible use of intelligence and his team's
ability to conduct an independent and neutral investigation of Iraq's
WMD facilities. Blix admitted using CIA reports in a November 28
interview with CNN but cautioned that he would not allow his team to be
dictated to by a foreign government.
Some have suggested that the U.S. failed to provide the arms
inspectors with useful information. At this point, this Member believes
that this is simply not true, not true at all. We are going to find out
about that, however, when we complete our investigation. Hans Blix
actually received, I think, unprecedented access to intelligence.
The U.S. provided the U.N. weapons inspectors with the ability to
task and assign U.S. U-2 surveillance aircraft operating over Iraq. He
told the U-2s where to go and what to target. This is virtually unheard
of, U.N. civilians ordering U.S. pilots on hazardous missions. Why did
we do this? Why did we give a U.N. official this extraordinary
opportunity and authority? In the words of Hans Blix, "The U-2 data
will improve our ability to carry out our inspections."
If there was a problem in timely response to intelligence, the
problem was in the U.N.'s ability to act on information after they had
received it from the United States or from other sources. This is not
really too surprising since there were literally hundreds of Iraqi
agents or personnel whose job it was to slow down the inspectors, to
send them in the wrong direction, or to make sure they would end up in
the wrong place, or to report on their progress so that deception and
deceit and cover-up could take place before they arrived. This is not a
failing of the United States but, rather, the inability of UNMOVIC to
overcome Iraqi denial and deception techniques.
The gentlewoman, I hope, would understand that if there were problems
in communication of intelligence, much of the problem was the U.N.
reluctance to rely on U.S. sources. This is addressed in an article in
USA Today and I do not cite it except that they are quoting Blix. They
were reluctant, they said, to rely on U.S. intelligence for fear that
Iraq would accuse them of spying for the United States, an accusation
that Iraq made, of course, the first time we had inspectors in. Here is
a quote:
"Still smarting from their admission that U.S. intelligence gave
inspectors secret missions during the last round of inspections in
1998, U.N. officials have deliberately curbed access to the CIA and
allied intelligence agencies."
The ground rules established by the U.N. stipulated that the CIA
would not equip the inspectors, unofficial discussions between the CIA
and the inspectors were prohibited, and only the U.N. would be allowed
to analyze the data that was collected.
We have got a lot to look at. Members will have access to some of
this very information across the board in an unprecedented fashion.
This is a responsibility of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence. We have the capabilities. We have the intent. I would say
we ought to be given the opportunity. Therefore, I rise in opposition
to the gentlewoman's amendment. I hope it will be rejected.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I have enormous respect for the sponsor of this
amendment. She is prepared to vote her conscience in this House, even
if she is a minority of one. I think that is admirable, courageous and
her constituents should be enormously proud to be represented by her. I
am certainly proud to serve with her.
I listened carefully to the comments made by the gentleman from
Nebraska. Frankly, I agree with them. I think that is the context of
the search for weapons by the U.N. inspector. However, agreeing with
them does not get me to his conclusion. My conclusion is that we should
support this amendment because it contains a specific request for a
discrete investigation that would be of value in understanding
precisely what information was shared with the U.N. weapons inspectors.
It may turn out that more was shared than we know. It may turn out
that less was shared than we know. And it may turn out, and I think it
will, that what the gentleman from Nebraska had to say includes the
context in which it was shared. Nonetheless, I think this investigation
could provide a constructive baseline in understanding the difficulties
of conducting U.N. inspections.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me just say that the specific matters to
be studied under this amendment are not to my knowledge currently part
of the scope of our Committee's review. We are not specifically
investigating what information was shared with the U.N., though we
certainly could, I suppose. Thus, I believe the amendment is helpful
and I would urge us to support it.
Ms. WOOLSEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
I rise to support the Lee amendment. I thank the ranking member for
her support. As this House, our Nation and
[[Page H5902]]
the world debate the quality of the intelligence that the war in Iraq
was fought over, it is too easy to forget that our troops were not the
first to search the Iraqi desert for weapons of mass destruction.
United Nations inspectors spent a decade searching for and destroying
illegal Iraqi weapons facilities, but in the days and months leading up
to the war, they were scorned for their failure to find weapons of mass
destruction.
This resolution calls on the GAO to investigate how much cooperation
the United States intelligence agencies gave United Nations inspectors.
Understanding about that cooperation with the United Nations, or lack
thereof, will give us a better picture of the efforts this Nation took
to avoid war with Iraq. If America did not fully share its intelligence
with U.N. inspectors, Congress needs to find out why.
The fact is that the rhetoric leading up to the war in Iraq led many
Americans to believe that finding weapons of mass destruction would be
absolutely easy, that the U.N. inspectors must have been grossly
incompetent. But I do not believe that to be true and I think that our
inability to find weapons of mass destruction now requires the United
States to reexamine the rhetoric and the events that led up to the war.
We need to find out beyond reports from USA Today if our U.S.
intelligence agencies were cooperating fully with the U.N. inspectors.
And we need to find out if the prewar rhetoric reflected the
intelligence we shared with the United Nations.
This amendment is about getting answers to questions that we are all
asking in this country. I urge my colleagues to support the Lee
amendment.
{time} 2015
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
I have given this amendment very careful consideration, and I
appreciate the effort. I do believe we have got the matter handled
already in the committee, and I will tell the gentlewoman that; and I
would invite the gentlewoman upstairs to talk to us about it in a
classified setting if she would like to.
The reason I say that I think this is unnecessary is I think it is
duplicative of work we are doing that, frankly, we are best prepared to
do. But I would like to point out there are a couple of problems with
the United Nations that we have been working with for quite a number of
years, and I think we, frankly, have the expertise to judge better than
anybody else. Perhaps our sister body in the Senate, Senate
Intelligence Committee, would dispute that; but I would say that either
the Senate or us are going to do a pretty good job on this, and in fact
we are both working on it.
The question of how much information we shared with the U.N. is a
fair question to ask, and the answer is we shared a remarkable amount,
more than they could handle. It turns out as we heard from the
gentleman from Nebraska's (Mr. Bereuter) comments that the U.N.
inspectors were very worried about being called spies of the United
States and there was quite a debate about taking any information from
the United States at all lest this be a U.S.-driven thing and Hans Blix
did not want that and he said so publicly a number of times and said
that frankly they could do the job fine without us.
But notwithstanding, we had been working with them for some time and
giving them some good information and frankly at some peril because the
U.N. leaks like a sieve, and there are some things about the U.N. that
are worth noting. Not all the members of the U.N. are particularly
friendly to the United States of America, and that brings us to the
question of do Americans want us to be sharing our crown jewels and our
sovereignty with nations who may not want to be particularly helpful to
us and some who may actually want to be harmful to us.
So there is a question there of whether our American constituency
would like us to keep this in control in the House or get it out where
some other people might want to make some mischief for the United
States of America and our security. And I am very much aware of that
because we have actually had problems in the past that are documented,
which I am not going to go into but which are documented, where
materials and information was not properly safeguarded or was willfully
given to the wrong people in the U.N. That is not a good track record
and I think would not be prudent of us to ignore.
I would say that for some time U.N. weapons inspectors had
unprecedented access to U.S. intelligence information. Whether they
used it or not or wanted to use it was their problem, including
analytical reports. We obviously protected our sources. We had imagery
from the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, which I think everybody knows
now. Probably what some people do not know which I believe I can say is
that the U.N. inspectors had the ability, the task to request how that
U-2 was used. That is rather remarkable, turning over an asset like
that to another country, a set of countries.
I believe everybody knows that Colin Powell played intercepts for the
Security Council that are frankly things that do not happen in our
committee very often. They do not play intercepts for us very often. So
I would say an unusual amount of information, perhaps more than I would
have approved of, was given to the U.N.
And there is a problem with the U.N. that I want to go into a little
further, and it is an appearance problem; and it is one I think we are
better prepared to handle in the House than an outside group trying to
come in here. There is a lot of feeling, I think, that the U.N. does
not always get it right in terms of our national purpose or national
mission, and I would point out that the presidency of the Security
Council for the month of June is the Russian Federation. I would like
to also point out, and I think I can say this in a responsible way,
that there are an extraordinary number of Russian espionage activities
going on in our Nation's capital as I speak, even though we are on a
friendly basis. Nations do spy on each other. Russians are still in a
little bit of their paranoia and their conspiratorial mode that there
are things to find out about us that if they just ask us, they will not
believe the answer; so they have to spy on us. We have a good
friendship with them, but it has got a ways to go. There is a little
bit of a problem there.
There is a problem with Syria which is on our terrorist list being on
the Security Council. These kinds of things lead one to pause about how
we do business, and these are matters which we are well aware of on our
committee. And on the Commission on Human Rights, which has recently
been in the news at the U.N., it is clearly true that the U.N. took a
slap at the United States by throwing us off that commission in order
to put Cuba on it. That is not really great. The chairmanship of that
committee, I understand, right now is Libya. Libya's human rights
record is not worth commenting on, it is so terrible. Zimbabwe? Give me
a break.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). The time of the gentleman
from Florida (Mr. Goss) has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Goss was allowed to proceed for 1
additional minute.)
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, when we take a look at this, the U.N.
business is a complicated, complex business. We work closely with the
Department of State, I&R, and others in this. We for years had a good
working relationship. I do not think it is necessary for us to abandon
that relationship or supplement it. So I am going to urge that we do
not mess with what we have got now. If it turns out that there is a
need to do that down the road, I will come back and admit it. But I do
not think we are there at this point; so I will thank the gentlewoman
for her amendment and the spirit in which it is offered.
Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.
Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, let me just thank the gentleman very much for
his response and for this debate, but I want to reiterate the purpose
of this amendment, really, and it has nothing to do with whether one
supports or opposes the United Nations. Basically, this amendment
requires the GAO to conduct a study, a report, that would be submitted
in an unclassified form but may contain a classified annex with regard
to the sharing of information between our intelligence agencies and the
[[Page H5903]]
United Nations leading up to the war against Iraq. I believe the
American people have a right to know this and this is what this
sentiment of this amendment is, and I would urge the gentleman to
reconsider.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Florida (Mr.
Goss) has again expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Goss was allowed to proceed for 1
additional minute.)
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I well understand the purpose of the
gentlewoman's amendment, and what I am trying to say and outline for
her is that dealing with the United Nations with intelligence is an
extraordinarily complex issue, and I do not think there is a particular
body in Congress that has more experience than the oversight committees
on intelligence, House and Senate. And I therefore say give us a chance
to do our job and I think she will understand. If the gentlewoman wants
to know how much intelligence has been shared with the U.N., I
guarantee we can find out upstairs.
Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.
Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman again for that response;
but, again, this amendment allows the American people to know what that
information was in a declassified form. This amendment allows for a
classified index, and I believe in terms of the fact that U.S. tax
dollars were of course used in this war that people, the American
people, just have a right to ask these questions and have the right to
know. This has nothing to do with whether one supports or opposes the
United Nations.
Mr. GOSS. Reclaiming my time, this is not supporting or opposing the
U.N. I will tell the gentlewoman flat out that I do not have the
capacity to declassify information. Our committee does not. We can get
involved in a process, but the declassification question is another
issue which I would love to enlist her support on on how we can make it
better, but that is not part of this amendment.
Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Chair will once again remind Members to
refrain from improper references to the Senate.
The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Lee).
The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.
Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from California
(Ms. Lee) will be postponed.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
The motion was agreed to.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
Dreier) having assumed the chair, Mr. Simpson, Chairman pro tempore of
the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported
that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R.
2417) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for intelligence
and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government,
the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, had come to
no resolution thereon.
____________________
Congressional Record: June 26, 2003 (House)
Page H5943-H5946
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Pence). Pursuant to House Resolution 295
and rule XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of
the bill, H.R. 2417.
{time} 1020
In the Committee of the Whole
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of
the bill (H.R. 2417) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004
for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United
States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes, with Mrs. Biggert (Chairman pro tempore) in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. When the Committee of the Whole rose on
Wednesday, June 25, 2003, a request for a recorded vote on amendment
No. 6 printed in House report 108-176 by the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Lee) had been postponed.
Sequential Votes Postponed in Committee Of The Whole
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII,
proceedings will now resume on those amendments on which further
proceedings were postponed in the following order:
Amendment No. 4 offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings);
amendment No. 5 offered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich);
amendment No. 6 by the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee).
The first electronic vote, if ordered, will be conducted as a 15-
minute vote. Remaining electronic votes will be conducted as 5-minute
votes.
Amendment No. 4 Offered by Hastings of Florida
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The unfinished business is the demand for a
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida
(Mr. Hastings) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which
the ayes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 4 offered by Mr. Hastings of Florida:
At the end of subtitle D of title III, insert the following
new section:
SEC. 337. IMPROVEMENT OF RECRUITMENT, HIRING AND RETENTION OF
ETHNIC AND CULTURAL MINORITIES IN THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Pilot Project To Improve Diversity Throughout the
Intelligence Community Using Innovative Methodologies for the
Recruitment, Hiring and Retention of Ethnic and Cultural
Minorities and Women With the Diversity of Skills, Languages
and Expertise Reflective of the Current Mission.--The
Director of Central Intelligence shall carry out a pilot
project under this section to test and evaluate alternative,
innovative methods to recruit and hire for the intelligence
community women and minorities with diverse ethnic and
cultural backgrounds, skills, language proficiency, and
expertise.
(b) Methods.--In carrying out the pilot project, the
Director shall employ methods such as advertising in foreign
language newspapers in the United States, site visits to
institutions with a high percentage of students who study
English as a second language, and other methods that are not
used by the Director under the DCI Diversity Strategic Plan
to increase diversity of officers and employees in the
intelligence community.
(c) Duration of Project.--The Director shall carry out the
project under this section for a 3-year period.
(d) Report.--Not later than 2 years after the date the
Director implements the pilot project under this section, the
Director shall submit to Congress a report on the project.
The report shall include--
(1) an assessment of the effectiveness of the project; and
(2) recommendations on the continuation of the project as
well as for improving the effectiveness of the project in
meeting the goals of increasing the recruiting and hiring of
women and minorities within the intelligence community.
(e) Diversity Plan.--(1) Not later than February 15, 2004,
the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress
a report which describes the plan of the Director, entitled
the "DCI Diversity Strategic Plan", and any subsequent
revision to that plan, to increase diversity of officers and
employees in the intelligence community, including the short-
and long-term goals of the plan. The report shall also
provide a detailed description of the progress that has been
made by each element of the intelligence community in
implementing the plan.
(2) In implementing the plan, the Director shall
incorporate innovative methods for the recruitment and hiring
of women and minorities that the Director has determined to
be effective from the pilot project carried out under this
section.
(f) Definition.--In this section, the term "intelligence
community" has the meaning given that term in section 3(4)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401(4))).
Recorded Vote
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. A recorded vote has been demanded.
[[Page H5944]]
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 418,
noes 0, not voting 16, as follows:
[Roll No. 318]
AYES--418
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Allen
Andrews
Baca
Bachus
Baird
Baker
Baldwin
Ballance
Ballenger
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Bass
Beauprez
Becerra
Bell
Bereuter
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Biggert
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blumenauer
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Bradley (NH)
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Brown (OH)
Brown (SC)
Brown, Corrine
Burgess
Burns
Burr
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Camp
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Capps
Capuano
Cardin
Cardoza
Carson (IN)
Carson (OK)
Carter
Case
Castle
Chabot
Chocola
Clay
Clyburn
Coble
Cole
Collins
Cooper
Costello
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crenshaw
Crowley
Culberson
Cummings
Cunningham
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
Davis (TN)
Davis, Jo Ann
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
DeLay
DeMint
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Dooley (CA)
Doolittle
Doyle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Edwards
Ehlers
Emanuel
Emerson
English
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Everett
Farr
Feeney
Ferguson
Filner
Flake
Fletcher
Foley
Forbes
Ford
Fossella
Frank (MA)
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gingrey
Gonzalez
Goode
Goodlatte
Gordon
Goss
Granger
Graves
Green (TX)
Green (WI)
Greenwood
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Gutknecht
Hall
Harman
Harris
Hart
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Hensarling
Herger
Hill
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hobson
Hoeffel
Hoekstra
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley (OR)
Hostettler
Houghton
Hoyer
Hunter
Hyde
Inslee
Isakson
Israel
Issa
Istook
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Janklow
Jenkins
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kucinich
LaHood
Lampson
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latham
LaTourette
Leach
Lee
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Lofgren
Lowey
Lucas (KY)
Lucas (OK)
Lynch
Majette
Maloney
Manzullo
Markey
Marshall
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McCotter
McCrery
McDermott
McGovern
McHugh
McInnis
McIntyre
McKeon
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Menendez
Mica
Michaud
Millender-McDonald
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Miller, Gary
Miller, George
Mollohan
Moore
Moran (KS)
Moran (VA)
Murphy
Murtha
Musgrave
Myrick
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Nethercutt
Neugebauer
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nunes
Nussle
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Osborne
Ose
Otter
Owens
Oxley
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Paul
Payne
Pearce
Pelosi
Pence
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Pombo
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Quinn
Radanovich
Rahall
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Renzi
Reyes
Reynolds
Rodriguez
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Sabo
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sanders
Sandlin
Saxton
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schrock
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherman
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shuster
Simmons
Simpson
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Snyder
Solis
Souder
Spratt
Stark
Stearns
Stenholm
Strickland
Stupak
Sullivan
Sweeney
Tancredo
Tanner
Tauscher
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Tierney
Toomey
Towns
Turner (OH)
Turner (TX)
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Upton
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Vitter
Walden (OR)
Walsh
Wamp
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Weldon (FL)
Weller
Wexler
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Woolsey
Wu
Young (FL)
NOT VOTING--16
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Conyers
Cubin
Engel
Fattah
Gephardt
Hulshof
Jefferson
Kaptur
Kleczka
Rangel
Sessions
Smith (WA)
Weldon (PA)
Wynn
Young (AK)
Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mrs. Biggert) (during the vote). Members
are reminded there are 2 minutes remaining on this vote.
{time} 1042
Messrs. TANCREDO, SIMPSON, CANTOR, GARY G. MILLER of California, and
FLAKE changed their vote from "no" to "aye."
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Kucinich
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The unfinished business is the demand for a
recorded vote on Amendment No. 5 offered by the gentleman from Ohio
(Mr. Kucinich) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which
the noes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 5 offered by Mr. Kucinich:
At the end of title III, add the following new section:
SEC. 345. REPORT ON COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND THE OFFICE OF THE VICE
PRESIDENT ON WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN
IRAQ.
(a) Audit.--The Inspector General of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall conduct an audit of all telephone
and electronic communications between the Central
Intelligence Agency and the Office of the Vice President that
relate to weapons of mass destruction obtained or developed
by Iraq preceding Operation Iraqi Freedom on or after
September 11, 2001.
(b) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Inspector General shall submit to
Congress a report on the audit conducted under sub-section
(a). The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
may contain a classified annex.
Recorded Vote
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 76,
noes 347, not voting 11, as follows:
[Roll No. 319]
AYES--76
Allen
Baldwin
Becerra
Berkley
Blumenauer
Brown (OH)
Brown, Corrine
Capps
Capuano
Carson (IN)
Clay
Clyburn
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
Delahunt
Dingell
Doggett
Farr
Filner
Frank (MA)
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hinchey
Honda
Inslee
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kleczka
Kucinich
Lee
Lewis (GA)
Lofgren
Maloney
Markey
McDermott
McGovern
Meehan
Meeks (NY)
Miller, George
Moran (VA)
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Oberstar
Olver
Owens
Pastor
Paul
Payne
Rahall
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Sanders
Schakowsky
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Slaughter
Solis
Stark
Strickland
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Towns
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Wexler
Woolsey
NOES--347
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Andrews
Baca
Bachus
Baird
Baker
Ballance
Ballenger
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Bass
Beauprez
Bell
Bereuter
Berman
Berry
Biggert
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Bradley (NH)
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Burgess
Burns
Burr
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Camp
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Cardin
Cardoza
Carson (OK)
Carter
Case
Castle
Chabot
Chocola
Coble
Cole
Collins
Cooper
Costello
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crenshaw
Crowley
Culberson
Cummings
Cunningham
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (FL)
Davis (TN)
Davis, Jo Ann
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
DeGette
DeLauro
DeLay
DeMint
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Dicks
Dooley (CA)
Doolittle
Doyle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Edwards
Ehlers
Emanuel
[[Page H5945]]
Emerson
Engel
English
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Everett
Fattah
Feeney
Ferguson
Flake
Fletcher
Foley
Forbes
Ford
Fossella
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gingrey
Gonzalez
Goode
Goodlatte
Gordon
Goss
Granger
Graves
Green (TX)
Green (WI)
Greenwood
Gutknecht
Hall
Harman
Harris
Hart
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Hensarling
Herger
Hill
Hinojosa
Hobson
Hoeffel
Hoekstra
Holden
Holt
Hooley (OR)
Hostettler
Houghton
Hoyer
Hulshof
Hunter
Hyde
Isakson
Israel
Issa
Istook
Janklow
Jenkins
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Kanjorski
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Lampson
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latham
LaTourette
Leach
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Lowey
Lucas (KY)
Lucas (OK)
Lynch
Majette
Manzullo
Marshall
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McCotter
McCrery
McHugh
McInnis
McIntyre
McKeon
McNulty
Meek (FL)
Menendez
Mica
Michaud
Millender-McDonald
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Miller, Gary
Mollohan
Moore
Moran (KS)
Murphy
Murtha
Musgrave
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neugebauer
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nunes
Nussle
Obey
Ortiz
Osborne
Ose
Otter
Oxley
Pallone
Pascrell
Pearce
Pelosi
Pence
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Pombo
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Renzi
Reyes
Reynolds
Rodriguez
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Ruppersberger
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Sabo
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sandlin
Saxton
Schiff
Schrock
Scott (GA)
Sensenbrenner
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherman
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shuster
Simmons
Simpson
Skelton
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Snyder
Souder
Spratt
Stearns
Stenholm
Stupak
Sullivan
Sweeney
Tancredo
Tanner
Tauscher
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thompson (CA)
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Toomey
Turner (OH)
Turner (TX)
Upton
Visclosky
Vitter
Walden (OR)
Walsh
Wamp
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Wu
Young (FL)
NOT VOTING--11
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Conyers
Cubin
Gephardt
Jefferson
Kaptur
Rangel
Sessions
Smith (WA)
Wynn
Young (AK)
Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mrs. Biggert) (during the vote). Members
are reminded that there are 2 minutes remaining in this vote.
{time} 1051
Ms. DeLAURO and Mr. REYNOLDS changed their vote from "aye" to
"no."
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Amendment No. 6 Offered by Ms. Lee
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The unfinished business is the demand for a
recorded vote on amendment No. 6 offered by the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Lee) on which further proceedings were postponed and on
which the noes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 6 offered by Ms. Lee:
At the end of title III, add the following new section:
SEC. 345. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITH UNITED NATIONS
WEAPONS INSPECTORS SEARCHING FOR WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION IN IRAQ.
(a) In General.--The Comptroller General of the United
States shall conduct a study to determine the extent to which
intelligence developed by the Department of Defense and by
the intelligence community with respect to weapons of mass
destruction obtained or developed by Iraq preceding Operation
Iraqi Freedom was made available to the United Nations
weapons inspectors and the quantity and quality of the
information that was provided (if any).
(b) Specific Matter Studied.--The study shall provide for
an analysis of the sufficiency of the intelligence provided
by the Director of Central Intelligence to those weapons
inspectors, and whether the information was provided in a
timely manner and in a sufficient quantity and quality to
enable the inspectors to locate, visit, and conduct
investigations on all high and medium value suspected sites
of weapons of mass destruction.
(c) Access to Information.--(1) Subject to paragraph (2),
the Comptroller General may secure directly from any agency
or department of the United States information necessary to
carry out the study under subsection (a).
(2) The appropriate Federal agencies or departments shall
cooperate with the Comptroller General in expeditiously
providing appropriate security clearance to individuals
carrying out the study to the extent possible pursuant to
existing procedures and requirements, except that no person
shall be provided with access to classified information under
this section without the appropriate security clearances.
(d) Report.--Not later than 12 months after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit
to Congress a report on the study conducted under subsection
(a). The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
may contain a classified annex.
Recorded Vote
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 185,
noes 239, not voting 10, as follows:
[Roll No. 320]
AYES--185
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Andrews
Baca
Baird
Baldwin
Ballance
Becerra
Bell
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Brown (OH)
Brown, Corrine
Capps
Capuano
Cardin
Carson (IN)
Carson (OK)
Case
Clay
Clyburn
Costello
Crowley
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
Davis (TN)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Deutsch
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Dooley (CA)
Doyle
Edwards
Emanuel
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Filner
Ford
Frank (MA)
Frost
Gonzalez
Green (TX)
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Hill
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hoeffel
Holt
Honda
Hooley (OR)
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
Kleczka
Kucinich
Lampson
Langevin
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Lofgren
Lowey
Majette
Maloney
Markey
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Menendez
Michaud
Millender-McDonald
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Moore
Moran (VA)
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Paul
Payne
Pelosi
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Rahall
Reyes
Rodriguez
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Sabo
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sanders
Sandlin
Schakowsky
Schiff
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sherman
Skelton
Slaughter
Snyder
Solis
Spratt
Stark
Stenholm
Strickland
Stupak
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor (MS)
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Towns
Turner (TX)
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Wexler
Woolsey
Wu
NOES--239
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Bachus
Baker
Ballenger
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Bass
Beauprez
Bereuter
Biggert
Bilirakis
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Bradley (NH)
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Burgess
Burns
Burr
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Camp
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Cardoza
Carter
Castle
Chabot
Chocola
Coble
Cole
Collins
Cooper
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crenshaw
Culberson
Cunningham
Davis, Jo Ann
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
DeLay
DeMint
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Doolittle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Ehlers
Emerson
English
Everett
Feeney
Ferguson
Flake
Fletcher
Foley
Forbes
Fossella
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gingrey
Goode
Goodlatte
Gordon
Goss
Granger
Graves
Green (WI)
Greenwood
Gutknecht
Hall
Harris
[[Page H5946]]
Hart
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Hensarling
Herger
Hobson
Hoekstra
Holden
Hostettler
Houghton
Hulshof
Hunter
Hyde
Isakson
Issa
Istook
Janklow
Jenkins
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Lantos
Latham
LaTourette
Leach
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lucas (KY)
Lucas (OK)
Manzullo
Marshall
McCotter
McCrery
McHugh
McInnis
McKeon
McNulty
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Mollohan
Moran (KS)
Murphy
Murtha
Musgrave
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neugebauer
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nunes
Nussle
Osborne
Ose
Otter
Oxley
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Renzi
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Royce
Ruppersberger
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Saxton
Schrock
Sensenbrenner
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shuster
Simmons
Simpson
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Souder
Stearns
Sullivan
Sweeney
Tancredo
Tauzin
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Toomey
Turner (OH)
Upton
Vitter
Walden (OR)
Walsh
Wamp
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Young (FL)
NOT VOTING--10
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Conyers
Cubin
Gephardt
Lynch
Rangel
Sessions
Smith (WA)
Wynn
Young (AK)
Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (during the vote). Members are reminded that
there are 2 minutes remaining in this vote.
{time} 1059
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
{time} 1100
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mrs. Biggert). The question is on the
committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended.
The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended,
was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
Shimkus) having assumed the chair, Mrs. Biggert, Chairman pro tempore
of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported
that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R.
2417) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for intelligence
and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government,
the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, pursuant to
House Resolution 295, she reported the bill back to the House with an
amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is
ordered.
Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the committee
amendment in the nature of a substitute adopted by the Committee of the
Whole? If not, the question is on the amendment.
The amendment was agreed to.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.
(By unanimous consent, Mrs. Harman was allowed to speak out of
order.)
Thanking Members and Staff
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, now that we have completed debate on our
intelligence authorization bill for 2004, I just wanted to thank our
chairman who is graceful, collaborative and bipartisan and the members
and staff on the majority side and to thank the strong team we have on
the Democratic side and especially our staff. By name: Christine
Healey, John Keefe, Marcel Lettre, Wyndee Parker, Beth Larson, Kirk
McConnell, Bob Emmett and Ilene Romack; and also David Flanders of my
personal staff for all the effort they put into yesterday's very
thorough and, I thought, outstanding debate.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Goss was allowed to speak out of order.)
Thanking Members and Staff
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I too would like to congratulate my ranking
member and the members of the staff on both sides of the aisle.
Normally I would name all those staff. This year I am just going to
point to one individual who really was the architect of the bill for
the majority, put it together, did the hard work as he always does. He
does the budget number and he understands the programs. His name is
Mike Meermans. In addition to the spectacular work he did for us in a
bipartisan and a thoroughly professional way, Mr. Meermans and his
family had a sudden and significant illness in the family. We wish his
family well and we wish his son Godspeed, full and complete recovery.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further
proceedings on this question will be postponed.
____________________
