107th Congress Report
SENATE
2d Session 107-149
======================================================================
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003 FOR INTELLIGENCE AND
INTELLIGENCE-RELATED ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, THE
COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT, AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
_______
May 13 (legislative day, May 9), 2002.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Graham, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, submitted the
following
R E P O R T
[To accompany S. 2506]
The Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI or Committee),
having considered an original bill (S. 2506), to authorize
appropriations for fiscal year 2003 for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for
other purposes, reports favorably thereon and recommends that
the bill pass.
CONTENTS
Page
Purpose of the Bill.............................................. 2
Classified Supplement to the Committee Report.................... 3
Scope of Committee Review........................................ 4
Committee Action on the Fiscal Year 2003 Intelligence Budget..... 4
Congress and the Intelligence Community
Clarification of Intelligence Community Reporting
Requirements............................................... 6
Specificity of National Foreign Intelligence Budget Amounts
for Counterterrorism, Counterproliferation,
Counternarcotics and Counterintelligence................... 8
Modification of Authority to Make Funds for Intelligence
Activities Available for other Intelligence Activities..... 8
Presidential Determinations to Limit Access to Reporting of
Covert Actions............................................. 9
Effective Provision of Intelligence to, and Use by, Congress. 10
Clarification of Authority of Intelligence Community to
Furnish Information on Intelligence Activities to Congress. 10
Intelligence Community Personnel
Standards and Qualifications for the Performance of
Intelligence Activities.................................... 11
Military Support to the National Foreign Intelligence Program 12
David L. Boren National Security Education Program........... 13
Scholarships and Work-Study for Pursuit of Graduate Degrees
in Science and Technology.................................. 16
Intelligence Collection, Analysis and Dissemination
Establishment of the National Commission for the Review of
the Research and Development Programs of the U.S.
Intelligence Community..................................... 17
National Virtual Translation Center.......................... 18
Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center...................... 18
Terrorist Identification Classification System............... 19
Counterdrug.................................................. 20
National Imagery and Mapping Agency Support to Homeland
Security................................................... 21
Annual Report on Foreign Companies Involved in the
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction that Raise
Funds in the United States Capital Markets................. 21
Counterintelligence
FBI Implementation of Webster Commission Report
Recommendations............................................ 22
FBI Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism Training and
Analysis................................................... 22
The National Counterintelligence Executive................... 23
Counterintelligence at the Department of Energy and the
National Nuclear Security Administration................... 24
Intelligence Community Financial Management, Planning, and
Performance
Intelligence Community Compliance with Federal Financial
Accounting Standards....................................... 25
Strategic and Performance Planning for the Intelligence
Community.................................................. 28
Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion....................... 28
Committee Action................................................. 35
Estimate of Costs................................................ 35
Evaluation of Regulatory Impact.................................. 35
Changes in Existing Law.......................................... 35
PURPOSE OF THE BILL
This bill will:
(1) Authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2003 for
(a) U.S. intelligence activities and programs; (b) the
Community Management Account of the Director of Central
Intelligence; and (c) the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System;
(2) Authorize the personnel ceilings as of September
30, 2003, for intelligence activities of the U.S.
Government and for the Community Management Account of
the Director of Central Intelligence;
(3) Authorize the Director of Central Intelligence,
with Office of Management and Budget approval, to
exceed the personnel ceilings by up to two percent;
(4) Amend the National Security Act to define the
intelligence committees of Congress;
(5) Require that the National Foreign Intelligence
Program budget submission specify the amounts
attributable to counterterrorism, counterproliferation,
counternarcotics and counterintelligence;
(6) Modify the legal authority to reprogram funds
from one intelligence activity to another;
(7) Clarify that there are no statutory impediments
to the provision of information by the Director of
Central Intelligence to the congressional intelligence
committees;
(8) Require the Director of Central Intelligence to
establish a standard method for transliteration;
(9) Require the Director of Central Intelligence to
establish standards and qualifications for persons
performing intelligence functions;
(10) Modify the David L. Boren National Security
Education Program;
(11) Establish scholarships and work-study
opportunities for persons studying in the fields of
science and technology;
(12) Establish the National Virtual Translation
Center;
(13) Establish within the Central Intelligence Agency
the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center;
(14) Require the Director of Central Intelligence to
develop and provide to the Intelligence Community and
appropriate federal, state and local officials a list
of known or suspected international terrorists and
international terrorist organizations;
(15) Require an annual report on foreign companies
involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction that raise funds in the United States
capital markets;
(16) Extend for two years the Central Intelligence
Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act;
(17) Suspend for an additional year the
reorganization of the Diplomatic Telecommunications
Service Program Office;
(18) Identify recurring reports due to the
congressional intelligence committees, establish
uniform due dates for reports, provide for extensions
of due dates under certain circumstances, and repeal
certain requirements for reports;
(19) Establish the Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive in the Executive Office
of the President;
(20) Establish the National Commission for Review of
Research and Development Programs of the United States
Intelligence Community.
CLASSIFIED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMITTEE REPORT
The classified nature of United States intelligence
activities prevents the Committee from disclosing the details
of its budgetary recommendations in this Report. The Committee
has prepared a classified supplement to this Report which
contains (a) the Classified Annex to this Report and (b) the
classified Schedule of Authorizations which is incorporated by
reference in the Act and has the same legal status as public
law. The Classified Annex to this report explains the full
scope and intent of the Committee's action as set forth in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations. The Classified Annex has
the same status as any Senate Reportand the Committee fully
expects the Intelligence Community to comply with the limitations,
guidelines, directions, and recommendations contained therein.
The classified supplement to the Committee Report is
available for review by any Member of the Senate, subject to
the provisions of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress.
The classified supplement is made available to the
Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of the Senate
and the House of Representatives, the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and
to the President. The President shall provide for appropriate
distribution within the Executive branch.
SCOPE OF COMMITTEE REVIEW
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI or
Committee) conducted a detailed review of the fiscal year 2003
budget requests for the National Foreign Intelligence Program
(NFIP) of the Director of Central Intelligence; for the Joint
Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) of the Deputy Secretary of
Defense; and for the Tactical Intelligence and Related
Activities (TIARA) of the military services. The Committee's
review entailed a series of briefings and hearings with senior
government officials, numerous staff briefings, review of
budget justification materials, and numerous written responses
provided by the Intelligence Community to specific questions
posed by the Committee. The Committee also monitored compliance
with reporting requirements contained in statute. Those
reports, if received by the Committee by their due dates, were
scrutinized by the Committee and provided important information
and analysis upon which appropriate action could be taken, if
deemed necessary.
In accordance with a Memorandum of Agreement with the
Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), the SSCI is including
its recommendations on both JMIP and TIARA in the Classified
Annex. The SSCI has agreed that JMIP and TIARA issues will
continue to be authorized in the defense authorization bill.
The SASC has also agreed to involve the SSCI staff in staff-
level defense authorization conference meetings and to provide
the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the SSCI the opportunity to
consult with the SASC Chairman and Ranking Member before a JMIP
or TIARA issue is finally closed out in conference in a manner
with which they disagree. The Committee looks forward to
continuing its productive relationship with the SASC on all
issues of mutual concern.
In addition to its annual review of the Administration's
budget request, the Committee performs oversight of various
intelligence activities and programs. The Committee's Audit
Staff conducts in-depth audits and reviews of specific programs
and activities identified by the Committee as needing close
scrutiny. The Audit Staff also supports the Committee's
continuing oversight of a number of administrative and
operational issues. The Audit Staff's inquiries frequently lead
to Committee action with respect to the authorities, applicable
laws, and budget of the activity or program concerned. During
the last year, this group completed the Committee's
investigative work on the Intelligence Community's actions in
the case of Navy Commander Michael Scott Speicher, the October
2000 attack on the USS Cole and the Intelligence Community's
foreign materiel acquisition and exploitation programs. The
Audit Staff also continued the Committee's review of the
espionage activities of former Federal Bureau of Investigation
employee Robert Hanssen and the investigation leading to
Hanssen's arrest. The Staff's additional projects included
monitoring the products and activities of the Intelligence
Community's statutory and administrative Inspectors General and
overseeing efforts by Intelligence Community agencies to
improve their financial management systems.
COMMITTEE ACTION ON THE FISCAL YEAR 2003 INTELLIGENCE BUDGET
The Committee conducted a thorough review of the
Administration's budget request for the National Foreign
Intelligence Program for fiscal year 2003. Consistent with its
oversight responsibilities, the Committee carried out an
extensive examination of the individual programs comprising the
U.S. Intelligence Community. Building on the approach it took
last year, the Committee's review of the Administration's
fiscal year 2003 request reaffirmed its belief that the
National Foreign Intelligence Program should be reviewed by
specific priority areas as well as by individual agencies and
functions.
For fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2007, the
Administration has proposed significant resource increases for
our overall national intelligence effort. Such increases build
upon substantial supplemental appropriations approved for the
Intelligence Community for fiscal years 2001 and 2002 in the
wake of the horrific terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
The increased amounts already approved or requested for the
National Foreign Intelligence Program are consistent with the
need to strengthen the Intelligence Community in executing its
roles in the ongoingwar against terrorism and the protection of
the American homeland. Additionally, requested resources will aid the
Intelligence Community's ongoing effort to pursue those intelligence
subjects of greatest concern to our nation.
The Committee compliments the Administration for requesting
higher levels of resources for the Intelligence Community for
fiscal year 2003 and beyond. As the Committee has noted in past
years, the challenges confronting the Intelligence Community
have, for too long, received inadequate attention and
insufficient resources. This situation has changed in the wake
of the attacks of September 11, 2001. The Intelligence
Community is poised to benefit from an infusion of additional
people and funding that can provide momentum for a renewal of
intelligence efforts against those individuals, groups, and
states that seek to do us harm. As the Intelligence Community
is our first line of defense, the Administration's fiscal year
2003 request for the National Foreign Intelligence Program is a
necessary first step in correcting the deficiencies of the
past.
In this budget, the Committee seeks to highlight five
priority areas that must continue to receive particular
attention in the near term if intelligence is to fulfill its
role in our national security strategy. Four of the five
priority areas were first addressed by the Committee in last
year's Intelligence Authorization Act. They are: (1)
revitalizing the National Security Agency; (2) correcting
deficiencies in human intelligence; (3) addressing the
imbalance between intelligence collection and analysis; and (4)
rebuilding a robust research and development program. This
year, the Committee adds a fifth priority: modernizing the
capabilities of Measurements and Signatures Intelligence to
fulfill key intelligence requirements. In comparing the
Administration's fiscal year 2003 request to funding levels
which the Committee recommended last year, the Committee is
encouraged by the progress of the Intelligence Community in
addressing the resource needs in the first four priority areas.
The Administration's request surpasses the Committee's
recommendation in every area. The Committee looks forward to
progress in Measurements and Signals Intelligence in the coming
year.
Higher levels of proposed resources for fiscal year 2003
for the National Foreign Intelligence Program, however, will
not rectify several important resource challenges which
continue to confront the Intelligence Community. Two of these
important challenges are the product of the new paradigm facing
Intelligence Community agencies and programs. In the past, the
level of resources requested for the Intelligence Community was
not commensurate with the myriad strategic and tactical
missions of critical importance to national policy-makers and
military forces in the post-Cold War world. This led to
difficult and self-defeating trade-offs among mission areas by
intelligence leaders. Today, however, those same intelligence
leaders must ensure that the Intelligence Community can absorb
and execute efficiently the substantial increase in resources
that have flowed to, or are requested for, key intelligence
programs in the wake of September 11, 2001. Two such programs
include the continued efforts to recapitalize our human
intelligence capabilities and to improve the pace and quality
of the modernization of the National Security Agency. It will
take persistent and strong management to ensure that taxpayer
dollars are spent in a manner that minimizes waste and
maximizes performance.
At the same time, Intelligence Community leaders must
address the shortfalls in the National Foreign Intelligence
Program budget that did not, or could not, receive adequate
attention during the Administration's budget process. Such
shortfalls include:
<bullet> Concerns about our ability to collect
information from certain key platforms;
<bullet> Insufficient funds to complete a major
acquisition program; and
<bullet> Inadequate funds to ensure that information
collected by the next generation of collection
platforms will be processed, exploited, and
appropriately disseminated to intelligence analysts.
These shortfalls are not the only ones facing the
Intelligence Community. Additionally, as the war against
terrorism continues into its next phase, a series of
intelligence challenges will likely arise which will further
tax the resources and overall capabilities of the people and
programs comprising the National Foreign Intelligence Program.
The Committee credits the Administration for responding
forcefully, in the midst of the ongoing war against terrorism,
to improve the posture of the Intelligence Community in
carrying out its all-important national security mission. More
work, however, remains to be done. Beyond any specific measures
proposed for fiscal year 2003, the Administration must continue
to devote attention to the five priority areas identified by
the Committee, as well as a host of resource-related issues
that must be addressed if near-term increases in intelligence
capabilities are to translateinto sustained intelligence
successes against complex and long-term threats to our nation. The
Committee looks forward to working with the Administration on this
overall effort in the days ahead.
CONGRESS AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Clarification of Intelligence Community reporting requirements
One important mechanism for oversight by the Committee is
to require annual and one-time reports by the Director of
Central Intelligence to the intelligence committees of the
Congress. As the Committee conducts its oversight
responsibilities each year, it identifies problems, issues and
subject areas about which it needs additional information from
the Community. In most cases, the Committee needs the
information sought in the reports in order to inform the
drafting of legislation or the budget authorization decisions
for the following year. Accordingly, it is important that such
reports be accurate and thorough. It is equally important that
they be submitted on or before their due dates.
The Committee has taken a close look at the performance of
the Director of Central Intelligence in providing these
important reports in a timely manner. The results of this
review are dismal. Between December 1, 2001, and May 1, 2002,
the Intelligence Community was required to submit a total of 84
annual and one-time reports to the congressional intelligence
committees. Of this number, 18 were submitted after their due
date; eight were incomplete, interim reports; and 51 were not
submitted at all. Perhaps most disturbing, 10 of the reporting
requirements not met were contained in statute. In sum, of the
84 reports required, seven were submitted by the deadline, for
an overall record of eight percent compliance.
By clarifying and reorganizing the various reporting
requirements, Title IV of the bill is intended to address the
problem of repeated failure by the Director of Central
Intelligence to comply with the legal requirements to provide
reports to Congress. First, the Committee has attempted to
baseline all the annual and semi-annual reports that are
required by prior statutes, intelligence committee reports, and
classified annexes. Section 401 establishes a uniform due date
for annual and semi-annual reports in the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. Sec. 401 et seq.). Also, in an effort to
ensure that all of the reports required are, in fact, important
to the fulfillment of the Committee's responsibilities, the
Committee surveyed the outstanding requirements. Section 441
repeals certain reports that the Committee found were no longer
necessary. Further, in recognition that intelligence officers
have critical duties that may inhibit their ability to meet the
reporting deadlines in some circumstances, Section 401 provides
for an automatic 30-day extension of any report deadline with
written notice to the congressional intelligence committees.
Beyond the 30-day extension, the due date for a report may be
further extended by certification to the intelligence
committees by the responsible official, the Director of Central
Intelligence, Secretary of Defense, or Attorney General, that
preparation and completion of the report by the due date would
be detrimental to national security. Section 105 also resolves
any ambiguity as to the legal status of reports required in
committee reports and classified annexes by incorporating them
by reference into the statute. Sections 411-431 incorporate
certain recurring reports that were required in previous
intelligence committee reports.
The Committee expects that Section 401 will improve
compliance by the Intelligence Community with the reporting
requirements. In that regard, Section 401 requires by December
1, 2002, that the General Counsel of the Central Intelligence
Agency, the legal advisor to the Director of Central
Intelligence, prepare and provide a report describing the steps
that have been taken to ensure that the Director obeys the law
in the future.
The Committee has directed in the Classified Annex to this
bill that a portion of the funds requested for fiscal year 2003
for the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence not be
obligated or expended until reports to the congressional
intelligence committees have been provided in accordance with
Title IV.
Specificity of national foreign intelligence budget amounts for
counterterrorism, counterproliferation, counternarcotics and
counterintelligence
The Committee believes that it is essential to a rational
budgeting process that budgets be built to reflect key concerns
of policymakers. Unfortunately, this does not take place with
respect to certain disciplines of vital concern to our nation's
security. Specifically, it is very difficult from existing
Congressional Budget Justification Books to determine how much
money the Intelligence Community has budgeted for
counterterrorism, counternarcotics and counterproliferation.
Counterintelligence, as an intelligence discipline, is
accounted for in annual summary budget materials describing the
National Foreign Intelligence Program, butthere is no
requirement for the Intelligence Community to continue to do so. This
is not the first time the Congress has addressed this issue. In Section
1051 of the 1998 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 105-85) the
Congress required the Administration to provide information on
Executive branch funding to combat terrorism, including intelligence
funding. Such information has proven useful in assisting this Committee
in carrying out its budgeting and policy oversight responsibilities.
The need for information on counterterrorism spending is all the more
important in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
The Committee notes, however, that the Administration's "cross-cut"
report on fiscal year 2002 counterterrorism spending levels has not yet
been received and is past due. The result is that the Congress must
review the President's Fiscal Year 2003 budget request without the
benefit of the report.
The Committee believes that it is important for both the
Executive and Legislative branches to be fully informed about
annual resource levels requested by the Intelligence Community
for the important disciplines of counterterrorism,
counterproliferation, counternarcotics and counterintelligence.
Accordingly, Section 304 will ensure that the National Foreign
Intelligence Program budget, as submitted next year and in
years following, will contain this essential "cross-cut"
information.
Modification of authority to make funds for intelligence activities
available for other intelligence activities
The Committee takes great care to set the amount authorized
for a specific intelligence activity at the proper level to
enable that program to be conducted in an effective and
efficient manner. In some cases, however, the funding needs for
a particular activity or program change after the intelligence
authorizations have been enacted by Congress and signed by the
President. In those cases, in accordance with the terms of
Section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
Sec. 414), the Director of Central Intelligence may notify the
intelligence committees that funds need to be reprogrammed from
one activity to another. In addition to this notification,
Section 504(a)(3) also requires that in such instances, (1) the
activity to be funded be of a "higher priority" than the
activity from which the funds are taken and (2) the need for
funds for such activity be based on "unforeseen"
requirements.
The Committee is concerned that the correspondence it
receives notifying it of the reprogramming of funds from one
activity to another often does not set forth clearly how the
Section 504 requirements of "higher priority" and
"unforeseen" circumstances have been satisfied. Section 305
clarifies the "unforeseen" requirement by stating that such a
requirement does not include the failure of the Director of
Central Intelligence to anticipate an action by Congress, such
as an authorization or appropriation level for an activity at a
level lower than that requested in the President's budget.
Section 305 also amends Section 504 to require the Director of
Central Intelligence to certify the facts that meet those
statutory requirements.
Presidential determinations to limit access to reporting of covert
actions
This Committee expressed concern in Senate Report 107-63
accompanying S. 1428, the Intelligence Authorization Bill for
Fiscal Year 2002, with Executive branch compliance in some
cases with the requirement in the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. Sec. 401 et seq.) to provide the intelligence
committees with written notice of Presidential covert action
findings.
Section 503 of the National Security Act (50 U.S.C.
Sec. 413b) describes the process by which the President
authorizes the conduct of covert actions by departments,
agencies, or entities of the United States Government. Under
this provision, the President may authorize a covert action if
"the President determines such an action is necessary to
support identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United
States and is important to the national security of the United
States, which determination shall be set forth in a finding * *
* [and] [e]ach finding shall be in writing. * * *" Section
503(a)(1) and (c)(1) set forth special circumstances in which
the President is given the authority either to delay the
written notification for 48 hours in an emergency situation, or
to limit the access to the written finding in extraordinary
circumstances to only eight members of Congress--the leadership
of the Senate and House of Representatives and the leadership
of the intelligence committees. In those special circumstances,
however, the President is not relieved of his statutory
responsibility to provide a copy of the finding in writing.
Section 503(c)(3) and (4) state clearly that whenever prior
notice of a covert action is not given to Congress, or
Committee access is limited, the written finding shall state
the reasons justifying those special circumstances.
The Committee restates its belief that the provision of
written copies of the President's findings is essential to
effective congressional oversight of covert action programs. In
cases in which access has been limited to the leadership of the
Senate and House of Representatives and the leadership of the
intelligence committees--and denied, because of the extreme
sensitivity of the program, to the other members of the
intelligence committees who are charged with oversight of the
activities of the Intelligence Community--section 503(c)(4)
requires that the President provide to the Chairmen of the
intelligence committees a copy of the finding, including the
reasons for such limited access. This is necessary in order to
allow proper oversight, as contemplated by the statute, of
these important and sensitive programs that the President has
determined "affect the vital interests of the United States."
Accordingly, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence direct that, whenever they are
notified about a covert action initiative, an Executive branch
official should bring the written copy for their personal
review at the time of the notification. The Committee respects
the desire of the Executive branch to keep custody of these
sensitive documents and believes that this accommodation can
satisfy the needs of both branches of government to fulfill
their respective responsibilities.
Effective provision of intelligence to, and use by, Congress
In Senate Report 107-63 accompanying S. 1428, the Committee
noted the importance of the role of Congress as a "consumer of
intelligence to inform its decisionmaking on policy, and its
concern that there had "been little effort to develop
mechanisms to ensure that members of Congress receive
intelligence, in a form tailored to their unique needs, to
enable them to perform their policy-making responsibilities
efficiently and effectively." In an attempt to address this
issue, the Committee directed the Director of Central
Intelligence to prepare a comprehensive report on the subject.
The Director has not, as yet, complied with this directive.
Recent events have underscored the importance of Congress
being informed with timely, relevant and accurate intelligence.
Thus, the failure of the Director of Central Intelligence to
comply with this directive is particularly troubling. The
Committee also notes that this failure is, unfortunately,
consistent with the pattern described above of noncompliance
with requests, directives and statute concerning the provision
of reports to Congress.
Accordingly, the Committee adopts and renews the directive
contained in Senate Report 107-63 concerning this report.
Clarification of authority of Intelligence Community to furnish
information on intelligence activities to Congress
Section 306 reaffirms longstanding requirements that the
Intelligence Community must report to the intelligence
committees of the Congress all information necessary for those
committees to fulfill their oversight responsibilities. This
includes a duty to fulfill the Intelligence Community's
reporting requirements under sections 501, 502, and 503 of the
National Security Act of 1947, and other statutes. Section 306
is designed to preserve the Intelligence Community's unique
relationship with its oversight committees in the wake of the
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, which gave intelligence agencies
access to sources of information that were previously denied
it. In order to ensure continued effective oversight of
Intelligence Community activity, this section would make clear
that it remains lawful for the Director of Central Intelligence
to transmit information to Congress pursuant to the above-
mentioned reporting requirements. This provision does not
authorize Congress to have direct access to grand jury or other
protected information in the possession of the law enforcement
community. In the interest of ensuring continued oversight of
Intelligence Community activities, it merely authorizes access,
pursuant to existing statutory reporting requirements, to such
otherwise protected information as may be used by intelligence
officials in conducting analysis or making operational
decisions.
The Committee is well aware of the unique constitutional,
statutory and historical aspects of the grand jury, and is
extremely sensitive to the need to ensure that vigorous
oversight by Congress is reconciled with the need for an
independent grand jury. This legislation is not intended to
change this balance, but merely to recognize that where grand
jury-derived or other sensitive law enforcement information is
made available to the Intelligence Community, it is the
responsibility of the Congress to exercise meaningful oversight
of how it is used. Similarly, where such information
contributes to analytic products or operational decision
making, the Congress, as a policy-making and oversight
organization which, as a matter of law, must be kept informed
of intelligence activities and other intelligence information,
cannot be barred by statute from having access to the
information necessary to fulfill its responsibilities.
The tension between grand jury secrecy and Congressional
oversight, after all, is not a unique dynamic. A similar
tension exists between the President's constitutional foreign
affairs role (and the Director of Central Intelligence's
statutory duty to protect sources and methods) and the
intelligence committees' oversight function. It is the
Committee's view that this tension has been resolved
successfully during the 25-year history of the intelligence
oversight committees. The Committee is confident that a similar
accommodation can be reached in the context of grand jury
information and other protected law enforcement information
that is provided by law enforcement entities to the
Intelligence Community pursuant to the USA PATRIOT Act, or
other authorities. This legislation simply sets out a statutory
framework for resolving these issues, and is designed
principally to clarify the relationship between Rule 6(e) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the oversight
provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. It
does not seek to alter or describe the constitutionally-derived
relationship between the three branches of government.
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL
Standards and qualifications for the performance of intelligence
activities
Section 308 clarifies the role of the Director of Central
Intelligence, as head of the Intelligence Community, as the
official responsible for ensuring that there are common
standards and qualifications for individuals performing
intelligence functions throughout the Community. The provision
provides the Director broad flexibility to establish such
standards and qualifications and it is the Committee's hope
that he will integrate this effort with the ongoing personnel
programs detailed in the Classified Annex to this bill.
The impetus for this legislation is two-fold. First, the
Committee has an overall interest in ensuring that the Director
vigorously exercise his authorities and prerogatives as head of
the Intelligence Community. It is the view of the Committee
that ensuring basic standards and qualifications for
intelligence officers, whether they be collectors, analysts, or
technical experts, is a fundamental element of leading a
community. In this respect it is not the Committee's intention
to require the Director to intrude into the internal personnel
practices and decisions of the constituent elements of the
Intelligence Community. He must, however, set some guidelines
for the Community within which these elements can make their
own judgments.
Second, the Committee has become concerned that,
particularly in the area of analysis, elements of the
Intelligence Community are denominating individuals as
"analysts" or "intelligence analysts" without adherence to
a meaningful common definition of that word. Since September
11, 2001, the Committee has been struck by the ever-growing
number of individuals who are called "intelligence analysts,"
particularly in the area of terrorism. It is the Committee's
intention to require the Director to ensure that individuals
performing analytic or other intelligence functions meet clear
and rational minimum standards for performing those jobs.
Military support to the National Foreign Intelligence Program
The Committee continues to be concerned about the high
percentage of military billets programmed for National Foreign
Intelligence Program (NFIP) agencies that go unfilled each
year. The problem continues to plague, in particular, the
General Defense Intelligence Program, the Consolidated
Cryptologic Program, and the National Imagery and Mapping
Agency Program. Historically, approximately 3,000 military
intelligence billets go unfilled in the NFIP by the Department
of Defense each year. This accounts for well over $100 million
that must be included in the NFIP budget, but from which the
Intelligence Community receives no benefit. To date, however,
no comprehensive solution has been worked out within the
Executive branch that satisfies the concerns of the Department
of Defense, the Intelligence Community, and the Congress. In
the absence of any solution, intelligence requirements in
support of policy-makers and military forces will go unmet,
while the amount of funding devoted to intelligence activities
will continue to be overstated to the Congress.
Last year, the Committee noted that, for a variety of
reasons, the military services might choose to assign personnel
to intelligence positions at rates that are less than those
stated in budget justification materials. The Committee also
noted that it opposed such a practice, given the critical,
ongoing importance of intelligence in supporting national
decision-makers and deployed military forces. In light of the
contributions of intelligence to the ongoing war against
terrorism, the Committee believes that filling intelligence
billets within the NFIP should be a top priority of the
Department of Defense. In particular, the Committee believes
that it is unacceptable that over 70 intelligence analytic
billets are currently vacant at the U.S. Central Command, which
is leading the fight against al Qaida terrorists in
Afghanistan. The Committee is not alone in this view. It is the
Committee's understanding that the issue of unfilled military
intelligence billets has been raised by the Commander of the
U.S. Central Command in discussions with the Secretary
ofDefense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Clearly, a
solution must be found for this ongoing problem.
The Committee notes that the Office of the Secretary of
Defense agreed to provide a fair share of any military
reprogramming back to the NFIP beginning in fiscal year 2001.
To date, however, and despite the persistent nature of unfilled
military billets in the NFIP, no military reprogramming has
taken place. The Committee understands that the Department of
Defense is currently studying the unfilled military billet
problem, given concerns raised about the issue by the Defense
Health Program and the Special Operations Command. The study,
being carried out by the Program Analysis and Evaluation Office
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, has developed a
number of options to address the overall issue. The Committee
also understands, however, that any final decisions and
implementation of agreed-upon solutions may not occur until
fiscal year 2004.
The Committee feels that this is too long to wait. Given
the need to support fully our policy-makers and deployed forces
with intelligence personnel at a level consistent with the
Administration's own budget request, the Committee strongly
urges the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central
Intelligence to resolve this matter prior to the submission of
the fiscal year 2004 budget request.
David L. Boren National Security Education Program
The National Security Education Program (NSEP), the
National Security Education Trust Fund, and the National
Security Education Board are the result of the David L. Boren
National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. Sec. 1901 et
seq.) The NSEP was created due to a concern after Operation
Desert Storm by Senator David L. Boren, then-Chairman of the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, that the Intelligence
Community lacked Arabic language expertise. Presently, the
program provides scholarships and grants to students and
academic institutions focused on those geographic areas,
languages and fields of study that are deemed most critical to
U.S. national security.
The scholarship portion of the NSEP includes both
undergraduate and graduate programs that seek to provide
support to students who are interested in studying languages
and cultures not commonly studied in the United States. It is
the Committee's understanding that undergraduate students often
use their scholarships to study abroad or work as interns in an
American Embassy. Graduate students use the scholarships to
integrate studies into their existing curriculum by studying
abroad or taking immersion language courses in the United
States. An average of 150 students participate in the
undergraduate program and 80 students participate in the
graduate program each year. The institutional grant component
of the program is an annual competition that provides funding
to universities and colleges throughout the U.S. The grants
give institutions of higher education financial assistance to
develop or strengthen their capabilities to educate U.S.
citizens in critical languages, cultures, and international
fields. Areas focused upon in the grants programs are similar
to those in the student program.
The primary role of the National Security Education Board
is to develop criteria for awarding scholarships, fellowships,
and grants for the program. It consists of representatives from
the Department of Defense, the Department of Education, the
State Department, the Commerce Department, the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Department of Energy, the National
Endowment for the Humanities, and six presidential appointees.
The Secretary of Defense serves as the Chairman of the Board,
and the statute requires that the individuals appointed by the
President be "experts in the fields of international,
language, and area studies education." The Board meets
annually.
The objective of the NSEP is to enhance the national
security of the United States by increasing its capacity to
deal effectively with foreign cultures and languages. The
program seeks to produce an increased pool of applicants for
work in the departments and agencies of the United States
Government with national security responsibilities. The
Committee views the graduate program as the most effective way
of achieving the stated goal of the program for several
reasons. First, the graduate program reaches students after
they have already selected a career path. Also, NSEP officials
have told the Committee that graduate students are enthusiastic
about serving as federal employees, and generally seek
employment in national security positions. The Committee notes
that the undergraduate program, while providing unique learning
opportunities, is an inadequate mechanism for ensuring that
students will obtain employment with the federal government,
and thereby fails to meet the stated goal of producing an
increased pool of applicants to serve in the federal
government.
Because the NSEP is essentially taking a "risk" on
students by providing them with a substantial amount of
financial assistance, the Committee believes it is in the best
interest of the program to focus on those students most likely
to seek and attain employment in the field of national
security. For these reasons, the Committee has included Section
309 in the bill, which is designed to refocus theNational
Security Education Program by eliminating the undergraduate portion of
the Program and mandating the creation of the National Foreign Language
Initiative.
The NSEP retains the authority provided in the original
legislation to award grants to institutions of higher
education. The amended legislation seeks to streamline the
grants component of the NSEP by mandating the creation of the
National Foreign Language Initiative and eliminating the
original grants component. The Committee notes that no new
legislative authority is required to implement the Flagship
Language Initiative; the proposed program is completely
compatible with NSEP's current legislative mandate.
The National Foreign Language Initiative will unite the
federal sector with the higher education community by utilizing
the management and structure of the NSEP, the Defense Language
Institute, the National Foreign Language Center, located at the
University of Maryland, and several of the nation's leading
universities. Overall management of the initiative will be
provided for the NSEP by the National Foreign Language Center
at the University of Maryland. The National Foreign Language
Center will, through institutional grants, establish working
relationships with a set of flagship programs at major
universities, which will commit to specific goals and
objectives.
The goal is to produce students with professional
proficiency in critical foreign languages. At this so-called
"level three" standard, the individual is capable of speaking
with sufficient structural accuracy and vocabulary to
participate effectively in most formal and informal
conversations on practical, social, and professional topics. It
is the intention of the Committee that the creation of the
National Foreign Language Initiative lead to the creation of a
permanent national capacity for advanced ability in critical
languages. The flagship initiative will, in its first stage,
focus on highly critical languages including Arabic, Chinese,
Japanese, Korean, Russian, Hindi, Persian/Farsi, and Turkish.
The Committee endorses the proposal submitted by the NSEP
to establish the National Foreign Language Initiative. It is
the intent of the Committee that this proposal be followed
strictly. The Committee, therefore, requires that any changes,
updates or modifications made to the proposal be submitted to
the Committee in writing so that the Committee may provide its
views prior to implementation.
The Committee directs that no new grants be awarded under
the previous program. Upon enactment of this legislation, all
grants shall be awarded under the umbrella of the National
Foreign Language Initiative. The Committee recognizes, however,
that the NSEP may have outstanding grants that must be
fulfilled. Once those obligations are met, the NSEP shall have
no new grants authority, other than those outlined in the
National Foreign Languages Initiative. No new funds are to be
authorized for this year and no further funding is to be
authorized for outstanding grants other than the original
amount. The NSEP is further directed to use the current
resources in the National Security Education Trust Fund to
implement the National Foreign Language Initiative, pending
development of a new funding mechanism.
The NSEP was originally created by establishing a trust
fund consisting of $150 million. The Department of Defense
Appropriations Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-172), provided that $150
million of the funds appropriated in that Act were to be
available only for the trust fund. Subsequently, Section 311 of
the Intelligence Authorization Act for 1994 (P.L. 103-178)
required that the amount in the fund in excess of $120 million
was to be transferred to the Treasury as miscellaneous
receipts. Following that action, an additional $75 million of
the fund was rescinded by the Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations and Rescissions for the Department of Defense to
Preserve and Enhance Military Readiness Act of 1995 (P.L. 104-
6). Today, the fund contains approximately $43 million. Based
on budget projections, the trust fund will require additional
financial resources by Fiscal Year 2006 if the program is to
continue.
Based on the above data and the impending depletion of the
National Security Education Trust Fund, it is the view of the
Committee that incorporating the program into the regular
annual appropriations process is the best way to ensure the
continuity and success of the program. Therefore, the Committee
directs the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the
Director of Central Intelligence, to conduct a study, and
publish a report based on that study, examining the best way to
allow for a smooth transition from the trust fund to the
regular appropriations process within the Department of
Defense. This report shall be due 90 days after enactment of
this provision.
Scholarships and work-study for pursuit of graduate degrees in science
and technology
The Intelligence Community has a growing requirement for
scientists and engineers to ensure the strength of its
technology development and analysiscapabilities. The Community
must compete against private industry to recruit these scientists and
engineers. The requirement of a lengthy clearance process, however, has
sometimes hampered the Community in its efforts to attract the best and
brightest. While the pay is often lower in the Intelligence Community
than in industry, the Committee is convinced that once individuals
experience the sense of mission and public service of intelligence
work, the Intelligence Community will be substantially enhanced in its
ability to hire and retain top scientists and engineers.
In light of the need to attract scientists and engineers to
the Intelligence Community, and noting both the direct and
indirect benefits to the Intelligence Community of involving
the talents of young scientific professionals in its work,
Section 310 directs the creation of a Director of Central
Intelligence Science and Technology Graduate Scholarship
Program. The primary purpose of the program is to provide
funding for graduate scholarships at the Masters and Ph.D.
levels in the areas of advanced science and technology of
greatest importance to the Intelligence Community through work-
study opportunities and post-graduation service obligations.
Section 310 sets forth the basic eligibility requirements
for participation in the program. To ensure that there is a
possibility of full employment in the Intelligence Community
upon completion of the academic program, the Committee has
directed that the applicants be required to obtain a SECRET
level clearance as a condition of acceptance into the program.
The program should provide for higher level clearances as
needed. The Committee believes that the scholarship should pay
the full tuition for applicants and that, in return, the
applicants should commit to work in some element of the
Intelligence Community. In this regard, the Committee believes
that the Director of Central Intelligence should ensure that
adequate personnel billets are available for each of the
accepted applicants. Two options should be available to the
recipients for completion of their service obligation: (1) if
the scholarship recipient attends a college or university with
classified information facilities or near an Intelligence
Community entity, the recipient may work on classified projects
during the academic year or during periods between academic
years; (2) if the recipient does not select the first option,
the work program can begin after graduation.
The Committee believes the scholars emerging from this
program should be under the direction of the Community
Management Staff with options for rotation among various
elements of the Intelligence Community. At the end of the
service obligation, the scholars will then have a number of
options for Intelligence Community employment. The program,
therefore, should be overseen by the Assistant Director of
Central Intelligence for Administration with the support of the
Intelligence Community's Chief Technical Officer. The Committee
also believes that endowed academic chairs might offer the
Intelligence Community with additional science and technology
options.
The Committee directs that by July 1, 2002, the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence for Administration, in
consultation with the Intelligence Community's Chief Technical
Officer and the leading technical officers within the
individual intelligence agencies, shall submit a plan to the
intelligence committees recommending the optimal implementation
of the Director of Central Intelligence Science and Technology
Graduate Scholarship Program. The implementation plan should
specify, at a minium, the most appropriate size of the program,
optimal resources, security clearance considerations, academic
qualifications of scholarship recipients, work study and future
Intelligence Community employment considerations, and work
products required of scholarship recipients. The plan should
also discuss any administrative or legal requirements necessary
for successful implementation. Furthermore, the plan should
include views on the option of endowing academic chairs in
Science and Technology as part of this program. The Committee
expects to review the implementation plan prior to final
congressional action on the fiscal year 2003 Intelligence
Authorization Act.
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, ANALYSIS AND DISSEMINATION
Establishment of the National Commission for the review of the research
and development programs of the U.S. Intelligence Community
The Committee supports a strong Intelligence Community
research and development program. Research and development
efforts support virtually all other Intelligence Community
efforts by laying the groundwork for the necessary
modernization and innovation of intelligence capabilities. The
Committee remains focused on research and development as a key
priority for current and future Intelligence Community
resources.
The Committee further believes that the Intelligence
Community's research and development program should be focused
on Community-wide, rather than agency-specific, requirements
and priorities as much as practicable. Traditionally, however,
the Intelligence Community has not taken a centrally-managed
approach to research and development investment. While a
program such as the IntelligenceTechnology Innovation Center
concentrates on channeling research and development funding to tackle
intelligence problems of common concern, individual agencies, which
retain the majority of research and development funding across the
National Foreign Intelligence Program, still retain a large amount of
flexibility in determining their own research and development agendas.
Complicating the situation is a lack of common definitions across the
Community as to what constitutes research and development. This leads
in some cases to the funding of programs more commonly related to
acquisition than to research. Additionally, it remains unclear as to
whether the Intelligence Community's designated lead officials for
research and development possess the insight into specific agency
programs that is necessary to construct a unified, coherent research
and development program.
In an effort to allow for increased understanding and focus
of the Intelligence Community's research and development
efforts, the Committee has established, in Title VI of the
bill, the National Commission for the Review of the Research
and Development Programs of the U.S. Intelligence Community.
The purpose of the Commission, to be composed of government
officials and private sector experts, is to review the current
state of research and development within the Intelligence
Community. The Commission will pay particular attention to the
individual research and development activities being sponsored
across each intelligence agency or program, the level of
resources devoted to research and development, and whether
current activities are aligned with those scientific or
technological fields judged to be of greatest importance to the
anticipated intelligence efforts of the future. The Committee
has provided for the transfer of $2 million from the Community
Management Account to allow the Commission to carry out its
work.
National Virtual Translation Center
In Senate Report 107-63 the Committee noted its concern
"that intelligence in general, and intelligence related to
terrorism in particular, is increasingly reliant on the ability
of the Intelligence Community to quickly, accurately and
efficiently translate information in a large number of
languages." The Committee suggested that this problem could
be, in part, "alleviated by applying cutting-edge Internet-
like technology to create a `National Virtual Translation
Center.' " The Committee, however, declined to recommend
establishing such a Center in law without thoughtful commentary
from the Intelligence Community. Pursuant to Section 907 of the
USA PATRIOT Act, such a report was required to be submitted on
or before February 1, 2002. The report was received more than
two months late, a delay which, in addition to contravening the
explicit words of the statute, deprived the Committee of timely
and valuable input into its efforts to craft this legislation.
Despite the delay, the report, when finally received, was
helpful. It is adopted by reference into this report. (See
Director of Central Intelligence Report on the National Virtual
Translation Center: A Concept Plan to Enhance the Intelligence
Community's Foreign Language Capabilities, April 29, 2002.)
Section 311 of the bill establishes in law the National Virtual
Translation Center as outlined in the Director's report. The
Committee looks forward to the growth of what it anticipates
will be a valuable Intelligence Community tool.
Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center
In Senate Report 107-63, the Committee "endorse[d], in
principle, efforts to develop elements within the Intelligence
Community designed to exploit effectively financial
intelligence," and noted that the "Foreign Terrorist Asset
Tracking Center" (FTATC), then located in the Department of
Treasury, showed "promise as a vehicle to address this need."
The Committee was hesitant to draft legislation directing
Executive branch action on this vital issue without the benefit
of receiving the carefully considered views of the Director of
Central Intelligence and the Secretary of the Treasury.
Accordingly, the Committee directed that a "report assessing
the feasibility and advisability of establishing an element of
the federal government to provide for effective and efficient
analysis and dissemination of foreign intelligence related to
the financial capabilities and resources of international
terrorist organizations." That report has not been provided to
the Committee.
The same issue was addressed in Section 906 of the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-56). In that statute, Congress
again directed the Director of Central Intelligence and the
Secretary of the Treasury to prepare the report called for in
Senate Report 107-63. This time the Congress required in law
that the report be provided on or before February 1, 2002. The
Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of the
Treasury failed to provide a report, this time in direct
contravention of a section of the USA PATRIOT Act.
Despite the lack of Administration compliance with the
statutory reporting requirement, the Committee continued its
own analysis of the situation, and concluded that such an
entity is a necessary component of the Intelligence Community,
and that it would be best placed within the Central
Intelligence Agency. Accordingly, Section 312 establishes the
FTATC, under the direction of the Director of Central
Intelligence, within the Central Intelligence Agency.
The Committee further directs that the statutorily-directed
report be completed immediately, and that it should include a
section describing the circumstances which led to the
Director's failure to comply with lawful reporting
requirements.
Terrorist Identification Classification System
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks against the United States, the Committee reviewed the
Intelligence Community's process for storing, retrieving, and
disseminating intelligence collection and analysis regarding
known or suspected international terrorists, and known or
suspected international terrorist organizations. During a
number of hearings this year, Committee members queried
witnesses concerning the ability of CIA and FBI officials to
derive a comprehensive list of the identities and biographic
information on known or suspected international terrorists from
the multitude of intelligence reports and databases containing
potentially relevant information. The Committee found that,
although the Intelligence Community did have a significant
amount of intelligence concerning known or suspected
international terrorists and terrorist organizations, the main
databases used to store this information were not well-
configured to provide it to those responsible for protecting
American citizens from international terrorists. The Committee
also believes that the current lack of a centralized system to
handle such information not only hinders effective
counterterrorism efforts, but makes meaningful oversight of
Intelligence Community handling of United States person
information contained in these databases more difficult.
On May 6, 2002, Senator Wyden introduced S. 2459, a bill to
require the creation of Terrorist Identification Classification
System (TICS). The purpose of this legislation was to provide
for the establishment and maintenance of a data system that
both stores and retrieves the identities and biographic
information of known or suspected international terrorists, as
well as known or suspected international terrorist
organizations, and to ensure that those federal, state, and
local officials responsible for protecting Americans from this
threat have appropriate, timely, and thorough access to this
information. The Committee has incorporated a version this
legislation into Section 313 of the Fiscal Year 2003
Intelligence Authorization Bill.
This provision directs the Director of Central Intelligence
to establish and maintain a list of individuals who are known
or suspected international terrorists and organizations that
are known or suspected international terrorist organizations.
The Director of Central Intelligence must also ensure that
pertinent information on this list is shared with departments
and agencies of the Federal Government, State and local
government agencies, and foreign governments or international
organizations as the Director considers appropriate. This
system also must be interoperable to the maximum extent
practicable with the information systems of those departments,
agencies, and organizations to ensure timely and thorough
access to this vital information in the effort against
terrorism. Pursuant to this provision, moreover, the DCI shall
prescribe specific procedures for ensuring the appropriate
standards for including names on--or removing names from--this
list.
The Committee intends that this system be maintained in
accordance with existing laws and regulations governing the
collection, storage, and dissemination of intelligence
concerning United States persons. This provision does not
confer additional authorities to the Director or any other
element of the United States Government regarding the
collection, retention, or dissemination of intelligence
information on United States persons.
Counterdrug
The events of September 11, 2001, have demonstrated the
pressing importance of strengthening our counterterrorism
efforts. Recent analysis, however, has uncovered considerable
information that terrorist groups often use illegal narcotics
trafficking to raise funds for their operations. This
illustrates the continuing importance of the United States'
counterdrug fight.
For example, it is clear that the Taliban in Afghanistan
procured significant funding by trafficking in the derivatives
of the opium poppy plant. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) has become a major force in the production of
Colombian cocaine, which enables it to expand its terrorist
insurgency activities, reported to include obtaining training
in bomb-making from other international terrorist groups. Not
only do illegal drugs threaten our national security through
the scourge of addiction among Americans, they also provide the
financial wherewithal for terrorists to carry out their
murderous operations around the world. As such, the
Intelligence Community must continue to make vigorous efforts
to stem the flow of illegal drugs.
As was described in last year's public report to accompany
the Intelligence Authorization bill (S. Report 107-63), on
April 21, 2001, an American missionary plane was mistakenly
shot down by a Peruvian Air Force jet operating as part of the
"air bridge denial" program. In H.R. 2883, the Fiscal Year
2002 IntelligenceAuthorization Act, Congress required the
President to provide an annual report to Congress concerning any such
program no later than February 1 of each year. Congress has still not
received the report for 2002.
The Administration is currently examining options for
resuming support to air interdiction efforts in Peru and
Colombia. State Department representatives have kept Committee
staff informed of the status of this review. The Committee
appreciates this consultative effort and looks forward to
continuing this dialogue as an implementation plan is
developed.
National Imagery and Mapping Agency support to homeland security
The Committee recognizes the valuable role that the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) can play in
supporting homeland security operations generally, and the
newly-created U.S. Northern Command, specifically. Exceptions
to the standing prohibition against the NIMA tasking satellites
to image the United States currently require detailed
justifications that are adjudicated by a separate group of
government officials outside the normal imagery tasking
process, in order to ensure that the requests pass legal
muster. With the prospect of increased imaging of the United
States being necessary in support of homeland security and the
war on terrorism, the Committee is concerned that the checks
and balances in place to ensure against improper imaging
requests not be circumvented or otherwise diminished. At the
same time, the Committee does not want the added scrutiny given
to such requests to unnecessarily hinder urgent collection
needs that may arise.
Accordingly, the Committee directs the Director of Central
Intelligence, in coordination with the NIMA Director and the
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Director, to provide a
report detailing the process for approving the use of National
Technical Means to image the United States and what changes to
this process, if any, are being proposed or considered in the
wake of the stand-up of the U.S. Northern Command and other
homeland security initiatives. The report shall be submitted to
the Committee no later than March 1, 2003. The Committee also
directs the NIMA Director to provide a semi-annual report to
the Committee detailing the number and purpose of all requests
for imaging of the United States approved in the prior six
month period. The semi-annual report will be due in accordance
with the provisions in Section 401.
Annual report on foreign companies involved in the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction that raise funds in the United
States capital markets
Section 314 requires the Director of Central Intelligence
to submit a report to Congress each year setting forth certain
foreign entities that he believes are involved in raising, or
attempting to raise, money in United States capital markets by
means of bond floats, initial public offerings, stock listings,
or other such activities. Companies covered by this report
should include any foreign company the Director believes to be
involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction--
including nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons--and the
means to deliver them, whether or not such transfers violate
specific conventions, treaties, or the provisions of
international export control regimes. This report must be
submitted in unclassified form, but the Committee anticipates
that it may be necessary to provide an associated classified
annex in order to protect intelligence sources and methods
involved in assessing certain entities' involvement in
proliferation activities. (In the event that the Director
should determine that no such entities are involved in the U.S.
capital markets, the Committee anticipates that the
abovementioned report shall simply state this.) This section is
not intended, and should not be construed, to authorize or
encourage any restrictions upon access to U.S. capital markets.
Rather, it is intended instead simply to provide national
security decision-makers with visibility into the efforts of
problem entities to raise money in the United States.
Counterintelligence
FBI implementation of Webster Commission Report recommendations
The findings and recommendations of the March 2002 report
of the Commission for the Review of Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) Security Programs (the "Webster
Commission") have underscored the fact that the FBI has
significant and systemic security problems that need to be
addressed. The Committee commends the FBI for the efforts made
to improve security under the leadership of the new Assistant
Director of Security. Nevertheless, this bill recommends
resources in excess of the Administration's request to address
unfunded security requirements at the FBI in fiscal year 2003.
The Committee remains concerned, however, that even in the wake
of the Robert Hanssen espionage case, the Bureau's perceived
operational needs may still take inappropriate precedence over
security concerns. The Committee believes that thesecurity
problem at the Bureau will never be addressed effectively unless and
until senior FBI management becomes committed to making security--which
has often been, at most, a secondary priority--an important part of its
culture.
The Committee has directed in the Classified Annex to this
bill that a portion of the funds requested for the Bureau's
Foreign Counterintelligence Program in Fiscal Year 2003 not be
obligated or expended until both the Attorney General and the
Director of the FBI provide the intelligence oversight
committees, and other relevant committees of the Congress, with
a written report on the Bureau's plans to implement the
recommendations contained in the Webster Commission report--
including the time frame and funding necessary for their full
implementation, as well as their plans to make security an
integral part of the FBI's culture.
FBI counterintelligence and counterterrorism training and analysis
The Committee is concerned about the adequacy of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation's training for its agents and
analysts for counterintelligence and counterterrorism.
Accordingly, the Committee directs the Director of the FBI, in
consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, to
provide the intelligence committees with a written report no
later than February 1, 2003, assessing the adequacy of the
Bureau's training program and career tracks for both its agents
and its analytic cadre involved with counterintelligence and
counterterrorism, as well as its plans to enhance the
effectiveness of these programs. Specifically, the Committee
requests that this report include the FBI's criteria for
developing certified expertise in counterintelligence and
counterterrorism, a description of the required career
milestones for such specialties, and how FBI
counterintelligence and counterterrorism analytical products
are disseminated within the Bureau and elsewhere in the
Intelligence Community. In addition, the report should include
an assessment of whether the FBI employees whose job duties
include intelligence analysis meet Intelligence Community-wide
standards of education, training and experience.
The National Counterintelligence Executive
In 2001, the President affirmed Presidential Decision
Directive 75 (PDD-75) which created a new, national-level
counterintelligence system to address both traditional and
emerging counterintelligence threats in the 21st century. PDD-
75 established the National Counterintelligence Executive
(NCIX) to serve as the substantive leader of national-level
counterintelligence policy and stipulated that the National
Counterintelligence Executive must have sufficient personnel
and funds to carry out assigned duties. The PDD mandated that
the NCIX provide the U.S. Government with strong, policy-driven
leadership by creating new and enhanced counterintelligence
capabilities; ensure coherent programs, strategies and
cooperative approaches; and conduct effective oversight.
The PDD also established a National Counterintelligence
Board of Directors, chaired by the Director of the FBI, and
comprised of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence and a senior representative of
the Department of Justice. The Board's mission is to select,
oversee and evaluate the National Counterintelligence Executive
and to promulgate the mission, role and responsibilities of the
NCIX.
The specific duties set out for the NCIX include:
<bullet> Identifying and prioritizing what must be
protected (U.S. Critical National Assets);
<bullet> Producing strategic counterintelligence
analysis;
<bullet> Developing a prioritized national threat
assessment;
<bullet> Formulating a National Counterintelligence
Strategy;
<bullet> Creating an integrated counterintelligence
budget;
<bullet> Establishing a strategic outreach program to
the private sector;
<bullet> Implementing a unified counterintelligence
training and education program; and
<bullet> Carrying out program reviews and
evaluations.
The first National Counterintelligence Executive assumed
his duties in early May 2001, and began the process of building
a new office focused on PDD-75 priorities. However, this
individual, an FBI detailee, was transferred back to the Bureau
in February 2002. This important position remains vacant.
The Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive
has also confronted notable resource constraints. The resource
base for the new office consisted of the funds, positions and
people that supported the former National Counterintelligence
Center (NACIC). Although the Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive was tasked with building new
capabilities while continuing NACIC legacy activities, it
received no new resources in fiscal year 2001 and only a small
increase for fiscal year 2002. The Committee believes that the
Administration request for the Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive for fiscal year 2003 doesnot
address the Office's requirements. The Committee has addressed this
deficiency in the Classified Annex by recommending additional resources
for the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive.
The Committee, which was a strong supporter of the creation
of the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive,
believes that the Office of the NCIX is an essential component
of our nation's strategic approach to the counterintelligence
threat. The recent Hanssen, Montes and Regan espionage cases--
coupled with the national security implications of the tragic
events of September 11, 2001--highlight the need for a
cooperative, national-level focus on counterintelligence, as
envisioned by PDD-75, as an integral element of our nation's
homeland security effort. However, the Committee does not
believe that the current placement of the Office of the
National Counterintelligence Executive in the Executive branch
has given the office the appropriate level of stature and
effectiveness that it requires.
Sections 502-504 codify into statute the authorities and
responsibilities of the National Counterintelligence Executive
as contained in PDD-75, and places the Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive into the Executive Office of the
President, reporting directly to the President. The Committee
believes that moving the Office of the NCIX to the Executive
Office of the President with a direct reporting line to the
President will optimize the effectiveness--and accountability--
of the National Counterintelligence Executive's mission, and
give counterintelligence the appropriate emphasis and
visibility it deserves as a core U.S. national security
priority.
Counterintelligence at the Department of Energy and the National
Nuclear Security Administration
This Committee has a long-standing interest in supporting a
strong counterintelligence program at the Department of Energy
(DOE). In 1996, at the request of this Committee, the
Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1997 directed
the FBI Director, in coordination with the Director of Central
Intelligence, to provide a written assessment of the adequacy
of the DOE's current and planned counterintelligence activities
at headquarters as well as the National Laboratories, and
identify recommendations for needed improvements. This report,
completed in 1997, noted that, although DOE's
counterintelligence program had made significant strides in
recent years, problem areas persisted. For example, the
Bureau's report found that the counterintelligence mission at
the DOE was unevenly or inadequately funded and lacked the
central management and focus that would establish consistent
and effective counterintelligence policy across the Department
of Energy complex. (It is noteworthy that the FBI, in the wake
of the Hanssen espionage case, is currently reorganizing itself
to more effectively address the counterintelligence threat by
centralizing its managerial focus on counterintelligence.) As a
result of the concerns raised in this report, a 1998
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-61) directed the Secretary
of Energy to establish an Office of Counterintelligence in the
Department, and this was done that same year.
In 1999, Congress directed the creation of the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semi-autonomous
entity within the DOE with the mandate to streamline the
management of the nation's nuclear weapons and national
security programs. This new entity included an Office of
Defense Nuclear Counterintelligence. The Chief of this Office
reports directly to the Administrator and addresses the
management of counterintelligence in the NNSA through the
implementation of the policies of both the Secretary of Energy
and the Administrator of the NNSA. A Secretarial Memorandum was
signed that laid out the responsibilities and relationship
between the new Office of Defense Nuclear Counterintelligence
and its parent organization, the DOE Office of
Counterintelligence. These two elements comprise the DOE
Counterintelligence Program. Accordingly, there are now two
directors--the Director of the DOE Office of
Counterintelligence and the Chief of the NNSA Office of Defense
Nuclear Counterintelligence--who both manage the same program
staff at DOE Headquarters and manage their field programs at
sites delineated along lines of the NNSA/DOE organization.
However, although the sites are characterized as either DOE or
NNSA, the program activities are not as easily separated since
many NNSA program activities are supported by DOE sites. The
Committee is concerned that this bifurcation has created
administrative inefficiencies that affect day-to-day
operations, has an adverse impact on counterintelligence
investigations management, and diminishes the lines of program
responsibility as well as overall accountability.
Accordingly, the Committee directs the Office of the
National Counterintelligence Executive--in consultation with
the Secretary of Energy, the Administrator of the National
Nuclear Security Administration, the Director of Central
Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation--to review and assess the effectiveness of the
division of the DOE Office of Counterintelligence and the NNSA
Office of Defense Nuclear Counterintelligence, to include
administrative and resource implications, as well as to assess
the implications of consolidating the two programs. The
Committee directs the Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive to provide a written report to
theintelligence committees, and other relevant committees of
the Congress, regarding this matter no later than December 1, 2002.
This report should include recommendations to optimize the
effectiveness and efficiency of the DOE/NNSA counterintelligence
function.
intelligence community financial management, planning and performance
Intelligence Community compliance with Federal financial accounting
standards
A January 1997 Presidential report on Executive Branch
oversight of the Intelligence Community budget stated that
Department of Defense (DoD) elements implementing programs and
activities of the National Foreign Intelligence Program were
subject to the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990 (as
amended). Additionally, the National Security Agency (NSA), the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) were directed to prepare classified
financial statements beginning with their reporting of fiscal
year 1997 financial information.
To date, the NRO has most vigorously pursued compliance
with the CFO Act. An independent public accounting firm
conducted an audit of the NRO's Fiscal Year 2000 financial
statements. The audit, however, revealed significant
shortcomings in the NRO's financial management practices. These
deficiencies caused the accounting firm to issue a disclaimer
of opinion on the fiscal year 2000 statements. The NRO has
worked aggressively to rectify these deficiencies. The
independent accounting firm's audit of the fiscal year 2001
financial statements indicated substantial improvement by the
NRO. As a result, the accounting firm was able to issue a
qualified opinion on the statements. Nevertheless, progress has
been limited for the remainder of the Intelligence Community.
Senate Report 107-63 expressed the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence's concerns about the financial management
practices throughout the Intelligence Community. The Report
required the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation
with the Secretary of Defense, to direct the appropriate
statutory Inspectors General to perform an audit of the form
and content of the Fiscal Year 2001 financial statements of the
DIA, NSA, National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), and the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The principal purpose of the
audits was to determine if the agencies were preparing their
financial statements consistent with Federal financial
accounting standards and appropriate Office of Management and
Budget guidance. Section 414 of this bill institutes a
statutory requirement for an annual report describing the
activities of each agency to ensure that their financial
statements can be audited in accordance with Office of
Management and Budget requirements.
The Committee has received responses from the DoD and CIA
Inspectors General outlining the results of their review of the
form and content of the financial statements of the DIA, NSA,
NIMA and CIA. The responses revealed that none of these
agencies are able to produce auditable financial statements.
Weaknesses include the improper preparation of selected
required statements, failure to use accrual accounting,
inability to reconcile the Fund Balance with Treasury, and
inaccurate reporting of property, plant, and equipment. In
fact, the newly-confirmed Inspector General for the Central
Intelligence Agency identified these problems as a top priority
in his testimony before the Committee at his confirmation
hearing. The Committee is most concerned by the lack of
internal controls reflected by these problem areas. The
independent accounting firm audit conducted at the NRO also
revealed a number of other weaknesses, particularly in the area
of information systems security, that were not covered by the
Inspector General form and content reviews.
The response provided by the DoD Inspector General states
that the NSA halted its plan to purchase a compliant accounting
system based on guidance from the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller). The DoD Comptroller's instruction reflected a
desire to develop a Department-wide Financial Management
Modernization Program. The impact of this guidance is
significant for the Intelligence Community because the DIA and
the NIMA utilize portions of the NSA's accounting system. While
the Committee understands the need for the DoD to have a common
architecture for its myriad accounting systems, we are
concerned that implementation of that standardized system is
not estimated to be completed until 2007. Although the NSA has
a plan to maintain and improve its current accounting system
until the DoD completes its modernization program, its ability
to fully comply with the CFO Act and other accounting
requirements will be hindered. There also will be an impact on
those agencies that rely on the NSA's accounting system. In
order to monitor the impact of the development of the DoD's
Financial Management Modernization Program, the Committee
requests that the annual agency reports outlining progress
towards auditable financial statements include a description of
the impact of the modernization program and the stepsbeing
taken to make current systems compliant with Federal standards in the
interim.
Senate Report 107-63 also directed that the Director of
Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of
Defense, ensure that the DoD intelligence agencies and the CIA
receive an audit of their financial statements no later than
March 1, 2005. The audits are to be performed by a statutory
Inspector General or a qualified Independent Public Accountant,
at the discretion and under the direction of the appropriate
Inspector General. In order to ensure that the Director of
Central Intelligence and the agency heads within the
Intelligence Community have adequate financial data, the
Committee restates the requirement that the CIA, NSA, NIMA and
DIA receive an audit of their financial statements no later
than March 1, 2005.
The Committee notes that while the DoD and CIA Inspectors
General complied with the requirement for form and content
audits as stated in Senate Report 107-63, they did not receive
direction from the Director of Central Intelligence. The
Committee is concerned that this inaction is indicative of a
hands-off approach to financial management by the Intelligence
Community. The Community Management Staff has increased its
efforts in this area to a degree, primarily in response to
Senate Report 107-63. However, it has still conducted minimal
proactive oversight. For example, the Community Management
Staff has not been actively involved in meetings on the
creation of the DoD Financial Management Enterprise
Architecture. While the Community Management Staff would have
little influence on its development, it should be engaged in
discussions on the ability of this architecture to be linked to
new financial management systems installed within the DoD's
Intelligence Community elements. Such access will be crucial if
the Community Management Staff is to provide the oversight
necessary to ensure Community compliance with applicable
financial reporting requirements.
In order to facilitate adequate oversight of the
Intelligence Community's financial management systems and
practices, the Committee directs that no later than February 1,
2003, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community
Management provide the congressional intelligence committees
with a report on how the Community Management Staff is
structured to monitor Intelligence Community compliance with
the CFO Act and related Office of Management and Budget
guidance. This report should include planned actions to monitor
the ability of each agency to comply with the Committee's
requirement for a financial statement audit by 2005. It should
also include a description of the Community Management Staff's
ability to access the financial systems of each agency in order
to generate required oversight information.
Strategic and performance planning for the Intelligence Community
In response to a Committee request, the Intelligence
Community recently completed its strategic and performance
plans for fiscal year 2003. The plans address the priorities
and goals of both the Intelligence Community and the individual
agencies within the National Foreign Intelligence Program
aggregation. Consistent with the Committee's report
accompanying the Fiscal Year 2002 Intelligence Authorization
Bill, the purpose of the plans is to provide the Director of
Central Intelligence with vehicles with which to articulate
program goals, measure program performance, improve program
efficiency, and aid in resource planning. Updated performance
plans for Fiscal Year 2004 are due to the Congress by March 1,
2003.
The Committee has reviewed the strategic and performance
plans for fiscal year 2003 and compliments the Director of
Central Intelligence's Community Management Staff for producing
the first-ever plans coordinated across the Intelligence
Community aimed at establishing performance measures aligned
with the Director of Central Intelligence's stated priorities.
The Committee believes, however, that more work needs to be
done by the intelligence agencies, in close cooperation with
the Community Management Staff, in developing refined program
performance measures that can be used to determine if the
Intelligence Community is achieving its stated strategic goals.
A key issue is the development of performance plans and
measures that are not focused solely on the attainment of
intelligence capabilities but also on the value received from
such capabilities in pursuit of Intelligence Community
missions. The Committee feels that such "mission-based"
performance plans and measures should be an essential element
in any comprehensive effort to understand and evaluate the
overall achievement of the Intelligence Community.
The Committee thus directs the Director of Central
Intelligence to include such output measures, designed to
determine the value of Intelligence Community capabilities in
achieving its stated strategic goals, in its fiscal year 2004
performance plans. The Committee further directs that the
fiscal year 2004 performance plans include specific information
on how they were utilized by the individual intelligence
agencies in preparing their sections of the fiscal year 2004
budget for the National Foreign Intelligence Program.
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 101. Authorization of appropriations
Section 101 lists departments, agencies, and other elements
of the United States Government for the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities for which the Act authorizes
appropriations for Fiscal Year 2003.
Section 102. Classified schedule of authorizations
Section 102 states that the details of the amounts
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities and personnel ceilings for the
entities listed in Section 101 for Fiscal Year 2003 are
contained in a classified Schedule of Authorizations. The
Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated into the Act by this
section.
Section 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments
Section 103 authorizes the Director of Central
Intelligence, with the approval of the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget, to exceed in Fiscal Year 2003 the
personnel ceilings applicable to the components of the
Intelligence Community under Section 102 by an amount not to
exceed two percent of the total of the ceilings applicable
under Section 102. The Director may exercise this authority
only when necessary for the performance of important
intelligence functions or to the maintenance of a stable
personnel force, and any exercise of this authority must be
reported to the intelligence committees of the Congress.
Section 104. Community Management Account
Section 104 provides details concerning the amount and
composition of the Community Management Account (CMA) of the
Director of Central Intelligence.
Subsection (a) authorizes appropriations for Fiscal Year
2003 for the staffing and administration of various components
under the CMA. Subsection (a) also authorizes funds identified
for advanced research and development to remain available for
two years.
Subsection (b) authorizes full-time personnel for elements
within the CMA for Fiscal Year 2003 and provides that such
personnel may be permanent employees of the CMA element or
detailed from other elements of the United States Government.
Subsection (c) expressly authorizes the classified portion
of the CMA.
Subsection (d) requires that personnel be detailed on a
reimbursable basis, with certain exceptions.
Subsection (e) authorizes appropriations in the amount
authorized for the CMA under subsection (a) to be made
available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Subsection
(e) requires the Director of Central Intelligence to transfer
these appropriations to the Department of Justice to be used
for National Drug Intelligence Center activities under the
authority of the Attorney General, and subject to Section
103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-
3(d)(1)).
Section 105. Incorporation of reporting requirements
Section 105 incorporates reporting requirements in the
conference report, and House and Senate reports, and classified
annexes thereto, into the Act.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Section 201. Authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations for fiscal year 2003
for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability
Fund.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized
by law
Section 301 provides that appropriations authorized by the
Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for federal
employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental
amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation
or benefits authorized by law.
Section 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities
Section 302 provides that the authorization of
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is
not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.
Section 303. Definition of congressional intelligence committees
Section 303 adds a definition of congressional intelligence
committees to the National Security Act of 1947.
Section 304. Specificity of National Foreign Intelligence Program
budget amounts for counterterrorism, counterproliferation,
counternarcotics and counterintelligence
Section 304 requires the National Foreign Intelligence
Program budget submission to include cross-agency budget
aggregates for total expenditures in the Intelligence Community
in the areas of counterterrorism, counterproliferation,
counternarcotics and counterintelligence. This information will
assist the authorizing and appropriating committees of Congress
to make informed decisions about funding levels in those
critical areas.
Section 305. Modification of authority to make funds for intelligence
activities available for other intelligence activities
Section 305 is intended to clarify Section 504 of the
National Security Act of 1947 with respect to the reprogramming
of funds from one intelligence activity to another. The
provision makes clear that the "unforeseen" requirement in
Section 504 does not include the fact that it was unforeseen by
the Executive branch that Congress would lower the level of
funding for a particular activity. Section 305 also requires
the Director of Central Intelligence to certify in his letter
to the congressional committees that the need for the
reprogramming is both unforeseen and necessary to move funds
from a lower to a higher priority activity.
Section 306. Clarification of authority of Intelligence Community to
furnish information on intelligence activities to Congress
Section 306 reaffirms longstanding requirements that the
Intelligence Community must report to its oversight committees
all information necessary for those committees to fulfill their
responsibilities. This includes the duty to abide by the
Intelligence Community's reporting requirements under Sections
501, 502, and 503 of the National Security Act of 1947, and
other statutes. This provision is intended to clarify and
preserve the Intelligence Community's unique relationship with
its oversight committees in the wake of the USA PATRIOT Act of
2001, which gave intelligence agencies access to new sources of
information.
Section 307. Standardized transliteration of names into the Roman
alphabet
Section 307 requires the Director of Central Intelligence
to establish a standardized method for transliterating personal
and place names originally rendered in any language that uses
an alphabet other than the Roman alphabet, and to ensure that
the method established is used across the Intelligence
Community.
Section 308. Standards and qualifications for the performance of
intelligence activities
Section 308 requires the Director of Central Intelligence
to prescribe standards and qualifications for individuals who
perform intelligence or intelligence-related activities for use
by all of the agencies of the Intelligence Community. These
standards and qualifications will ensure that there is a
uniform understanding throughout the Intelligence Community of
the Director's expectations for the performance of intelligence
duties.
Section 309. Modification of David L. Boren National Security Education
Program
Section 309 provides for the modification of the David L.
Boren National Security Education Program by eliminating the
undergraduate section of the Program and by restructuring the
grants component to create a National Foreign Language
Initiative. Section 309 also requires the Secretary of Defense,
in conjunction with the Director of Central Intelligence, to
produce a report outlining ways in which to move the Program
from the trust fund into the regular appropriations process.
Section 310. Scholarships and work-study for pursuit of graduate
degrees in science and technology
Section 310 directs the creation of a Director of Central
Intelligence Science and Technology Graduate Scholarship
Program and recommends authorization of funds to initiate the
program. The primary purpose of the program is to provide
funding for graduate scholarships at the Masters and Ph.D.
levels in areas of advanced science and technology of greatest
need to the Intelligence Community, with work-study
opportunities and post-graduation service obligations. Section
310 directs the submission of a plan recommending the optimal
implementation of the Director of Central Intelligence Science
and Technology Graduate Scholarship Program.
Section 311. National Virtual Translation Center
Section 311 requires the Director of Central Intelligence
to establish within the Intelligence Community the National
Virtual Translation Center in order to link by secure
electronic means the elements of the Community responsible for
collection, storage, translation, analysis or other functions
for which timely access to such information is important to the
efficient and effective performance of their duties.
Section 312. Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center
Section 312 requires the Director of Central Intelligence
to establish within the Central Intelligence Agency the Foreign
Terrorist Asset Tracking Center to conduct all-source
intelligence analysis of the finances and financial
interactions of international terrorists and international
terrorist organizations.
Section 313. Terrorist Identification Classification System
Section 313 requires the Director of Central Intelligence
to develop and maintain a list of known or suspected
international terrorists and terrorist organizations and ensure
that such list is available to all elements of the Federal,
State and local governments that have a need for such
information. This system will enable the various elements of
the Intelligence Community that are engaged in counterterrorist
activities to have a common source defining the parameters of
the terrorist target and provide access to this information for
those Federal, State and local officials responsible for
protecting United States citizens from terrorist attacks.
Section 314. Annual report on foreign companies involved in the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that raise funds
in the United States capital markets
Section 314 requires the Director of Central Intelligence
to prepare an annual report setting forth whether--and, where
appropriate, which--any foreign companies involved in the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or the means to
deliver them, are involved in raising money through offerings
in U.S. capital markets.
Section 315. Two-year extension of Central Intelligence Agency
Voluntary Separation Pay Act
Section 315 extends the Central Intelligence Agency
Voluntary Separation Pay Act for two years, to September 30,
2005.
Section 316. Additional one-year suspension of reorganization of
Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office
Section 316 suspends until October 1, 2003 the effective
date of the provisions in the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2001 that require reorganization of the
Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office.
TITLE IV--REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
Section 401. Dates for submittal of various annual and semi-annual
reports to the congressional intelligence committees
Section 401 identifies the various annual and semi-annual
reports required to be submitted to the congressional
intelligence committees under provisions in previous
intelligence authorization acts and various other statutes. The
section sets a uniform due date for annual and semi-annual
reports, and provides for extensions of approximately 30 days
of the due dates for annual, semi-annual and non-recurring
reports with written notice to the congressional intelligence
committees. Additional extensions are permitted if the official
responsible for the report certifies that preparation of the
report by the due date would be detrimental to national
security.
Section 411. Annual assessment of satisfaction of Intelligence
Community with collection, analysis, and production of
intelligence
Section 411 creates a statutory requirement to conduct an
annual review required by Senate Report 106-48.
Section 412. Annual report on threat of attack on the United States
using weapons of mass destruction
Section 412 creates a statutory requirement to submit an
annual report required by Senate Report 105-24.
Section. 413. Annual report on covert leases
Section 413 creates a statutory requirement to submit an
annual report required by Senate Report 105-24.
Section 414. Annual report on improvement of financial statements of
certain elements of the Intelligence Community for auditing
purposes
Section 414 creates a statutory requirement to submit an
annual report required by Senate Report 107-63.
Section 415. Annual report on activities of Federal Bureau of
Investigation personnel outside the United States
Section 415 creates a statutory requirement to submit an
annual report required by House Report 104-832.
Section 416. Annual report of Inspectors General of the Intelligence
Community on proposed resources and activities of their offices
Section 416 creates a statutory requirement to submit an
annual report required by Senate Report 106-48.
Section 417. Annual report on counterdrug intelligence matters
Section 417 creates a statutory requirement to submit an
annual report required by Senate Report 106-279.
Section 431. Evaluation of policies and procedures of Department of
State on protection of classified information at Department
headquarters
Section 431 creates a statutory requirement to submit an
annual report required by Senate Report 106-279.
Section 441. Repeal of certain report requirements
Section 441 repeals two existing annual report
requirements.
TITLE V--COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 501. Short title; purpose
Section 501 cites the title as the "Counterintelligence
Enhancement Act of 2002" with the purpose of facilitating the
enhancement of the counterintelligence activities of the United
States Government.
Section 502. National Counterintelligence Executive
Section 502 establishes the Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive.
Section 503. National Counterintelligence Policy Board
Section 503 establishes the National Counterintelligence
Policy Board, to be chaired by the National Counterintelligence
Executive.
Section 504. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive
Section 504 establishes the Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive, to be headed by the National
Counterintelligence Executive. The Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive shall be located in the Executive
Office of the President.
TITLE VI--NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR REVIEW OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Section 601. Findings
Section 601 presents the findings of Congress with respect
to the importance of the research and development programs of
the United States Intelligence Community.
Section 602. National Commission for Review of Research and Development
Programs of the United States Intelligence Community
Section 602 establishes the National Commission for the
Review of the Research and Development Programs of the United
States Intelligence Community. Section 602 provides for the
composition and membership of the Commission, identifies the
duties of the Commission, and the subject matters for the
Commission's review.
Section 603. Powers of the Commission
Section 603 describes the powers of the Commission to hold
hearings, obtain information and testimony, and seek
cooperation from agencies of the federal Government in support
of the Commission's work.
Section 604. Staff of Commission
Section 604 provides for the hiring of staff and
consultants for the Commission.
Section 605. Compensation and travel expenses
Section 605 provides the procedures for paying compensation
and travel expenses to Commission members.
Section 606. Treatment of information relating to national security
Section 606 directs that the Director of Central
Intelligence assume responsibility for national security
information that is considered or used by the Commission.
Section 607. Final report; termination
Section 607 provides the due date for the Commission's
final report and the date of termination of the Commission.
Section 608. Assessments of final report
Section 608 requires the Director of Central Intelligence
and Secretary of Defense to provide an assessment of the
Commission's final report to the congressional intelligence
committees.
Section 609. Inapplicability of certain administrative provisions
Section 609 exempts the Commission from the Federal
Advisory Committee Act and the Freedom of Information Act.
Section 610. Funding
Section 610 describes the funding for the Commission.
Section 611. Definitions
Section 611 provides definitions for this title.
COMMITTEE ACTION
On May 8, 2002, the Select Committee on Intelligence
approved the Bill and ordered that it be favorably reported.
ESTIMATE OF COSTS
Pursuant to paragraph 11(a) of Rule XXVI of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, the estimated costs incurred in carrying
out the provisions of this Bill for fiscal year 2003 are set
forth in the Classified Annex to this Bill. Estimates of the
costs incurred in carrying out this Bill in the five fiscal
years thereafter are not available from the Executive Branch,
and therefore the Committee deems it impractical, pursuant to
paragraph 11(a)(3) of Rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the
Senate, to include such estimates in this report. On May 10,
2002, the Committee transmitted this Bill to the Congressional
Budget Office and requested that it conduct an estimate of the
costs incurred in carrying out the provisions of this Bill.
EVALUATION OF REGULATORY IMPACT
In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of Rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no
regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing the
provisions of this legislation.
CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW
In the opinion of the Committee it is necessary to dispense
with the requirements of paragraph 12 of Rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate in order to expedite the business
of the Senate.
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