107th Congress
2nd Session COMMITTEE PRINT S. Prt.
107-61
_______________________________________________________________________
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM
AND HOMELAND SECURITY:
THE ROLE OF OTA
__________
R E P O R T
PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF
HON. ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, Chairman
FOR THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
APRIL 2002
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation
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COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West TED STEVENS, Alaska
Virginia CONRAD BURNS, Montana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
RON WYDEN, Oregon SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
MAX CLELAND, Georgia GORDON SMITH, Oregon
BARBARA BOXER, California PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois
JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida
Kevin D. Kayes, Democratic Staff Director
Moses Boyd, Democratic Chief Counsel
Jeanne Bumpus, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel
C O N T E N T S
__________
Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ v
Letter of Submittal.............................................. vii
Preface.......................................................... 1
Executive Summary................................................ 2
Findings..................................................... 2
Conclusion................................................... 2
Recommendation............................................... 2
Rationale.................................................... 3
Terrorist Technology Threats............................. 3
Precluding or Deterring Terrorist Acts................... 3
Detecting Terrorist Acts When They Occur................. 4
Coping with the Consequences of Terrorist Acts........... 4
Technological Choice..................................... 5
Technology Assessment.................................... 6
OTA's Structure and Pattern of Operations................ 7
OTA: 1993-1995........................................... 8
Current Situation........................................ 8
Technology Assessment in the War on Terrorism and Homeland
Security: The Role of OTA.................................. 10
Terrorist Technology Threats............................. 10
Precluding or Deterring Terrorist Acts................... 12
Detecting Terrorist Acts When They Occur................. 15
Coping with the Consequences of Terrorist Attacks........ 17
Technological Choice..................................... 20
Technology Assessment.................................... 23
OTA's Unique Role and History............................ 24
OTA's Structure and Pattern of Operations................ 26
OTA's Credibility, Objectivity, and Relevance............ 28
The Relative Roles of OTA, CRS, and GAO.................. 29
OTA After Gibbons: 1993-1995............................. 30
Findings................................................. 32
Conclusion................................................... 33
Recommendations.............................................. 34
Notes........................................................ 36
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC, April 11, 2002.
Dear Colleague: Technology is crucial to our conduct of the
War on Terrorism and to the success of our homeland security
programs. The Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation is deeply engaged in evaluating policies and
programs involving the role of technology in enhancing homeland
security in the areas of communications, airlines and airports,
seaports, railroads, trucking, transportation of hazardous
materials, manufacturing facilities, and science and technology
in general. In conducting these evaluations, the Committee is
concerned not only with the effectiveness and costs of the
technologies, but also with their impact on U.S. industries and
consumers, and the privacy rights of individual citizens.
To aid the Committee in its consideration of these matters,
I have requested that a study conducted by Mr. Ellis R. Mottur,
as a Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars, be made available to the Committee. Mr.
Mottur earlier served as the first Assistant Director of the
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment and more recently
as Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Transportation and Technology Industries.
This document contains the report prepared by Mr. Mottur,
entitled: "Technology Assessment in the War on Terrorism and
Homeland Security: The Role of OTA." Although the report has
not been considered or endorsed by the Committee or any of its
members, I believe it will be of interest to the Congress and
many persons in the scientific, technical, academic, and
professional communities, as well as the general public. To
insure its general availability, I have directed that this
document be published as a Committee print.
Sincerely,
Ernest F. Hollings,
Chairman.
LETTER OF SUBMITTAL
----------
Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars,
Washington, D.C., March 22, 2002.
Hon. Ernest F. Hollings, Chairman,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you very much for your kind letter
expressing interest in my study at the Woodrow Wilson Center.
In response to your request, I am pleased to provide the
Commerce Committee with my report entitled: "Technology
Assessment in the War on Terrorism and Homeland Security: The
Role of OTA."
The report focuses on the utilization of technologies in
achieving homeland security, demonstrates the need for
technology assessment to evaluate those technologies, traces
the history of OTA, and concludes with a recommended course of
action. I hope the report proves useful to the Committee.
With best personal wishes.
Sincerely,
Ellis R. Mottur,
Public Policy Scholar.
Enclosure
PREFACE
----------
In the months since September 11, it has become abundantly
clear that America's unparalleled superiority in technology is
critical to achieving success in the War on Terrorism and
ensuring homeland security. Accordingly, the choices the United
States makes with respect to the implementation of particular
technologies will continue to be of paramount importance to the
course of that struggle for years to come.
Those choices are exceedingly complex, involving
assessments of effectiveness, costs, benefits, and impacts on
the economy, environment, society, and human values, as well as
comparisons with alternative technologies. Technology
assessment is the methodology for making such choices.
As one of the founders of the congressional Office of
Technology Assessment (OTA), and its first Assistant Director,
I was well acquainted with that methodology and its application
within the congressional context. Accordingly, in order to
contribute to the national response to this unprecedented
challenge, I joined the Woodrow Wilson Center as a Public
Policy Scholar to conduct a study on technologies in the War on
Terrorism and homeland security, with a focus on the potential
role of OTA. The initial result is this report, which I hope
proves useful in helping empower Congress to fulfill its
legislative, appropriation, and oversight responsibilities in
this overarching conflict.
I want to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to
the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and
especially to Michael Van Dusen, Samuel F. Wells, Jr., Kent H.
Hughes, and Robert S. Litwak for making this project possible,
to all of the Scholars at the Center for their stimulating
intellectual discussions, to my intern, Jonathan Radke, for his
valuable assistance, and above all to Lee H. Hamilton whose
far-sighted, inspired leadership of the Center makes it as
great a pleasure as it is a privilege to be a part of it.
Of course, the statements, views, and recommendations
expressed in this report are solely the responsibility of the
author and are not in any way intended to reflect those of the
Woodrow Wilson Center, its management, staff, or other
scholars.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
----------
FINDINGS
Technology is critical to U.S. success in the War on
Terrorism and ensuring homeland security.
A wide variety of sophisticated technologies may be
involved in those efforts.
Choosing among possible technologies and patterns of
implementation is a complex process, oftentimes
involving unintended consequences.
Technology Assessment is the methodology for making
such choices.
The leading exemplar of technology assessment was
the congressional Office of Technology Assessment
(OTA), founded in 1972.
For almost a quarter of a century, OTA provided
Congress with valuable analyses of policy options on
important issues involving technology.
During that period OTA achieved a world-wide
reputation for excellence, as a non-partisan,
objective, and credible conductor of technology
assessments.
When OTA's funding was discontinued in 1995, there
was no dissatisfaction with its performance; indeed OTA
received accolades for its excellent work.
Elimination of its funding was a cost-cutting
measure at a time of fiscal stringency and a symbol for
Executive Branch agencies to emulate.
Congress now needs its own source of non-partisan,
objective technology assessment in order to fulfill its
legislative, appropriation, and oversight
responsibilities in the War on Terrorism and ensuring
homeland security.
While OTA's funding was discontinued, its enabling
statute remains in effect, including its authorization
of "such sums as may be necessary."
CONCLUSION
To fulfill its constitutional responsibilities in pursuing
the War on Terrorism and ensuring homeland security, Congress
urgently needs to reactivate OTA.
RECOMMENDATION
In the first supplemental appropriation bill considered in
this session, Congress should include $1 million for OTA to
canvass and consult with congressional committees, and plan a
series of technology assessments designed to meet the priority
needs of those committees with respect to the War on Terrorism
and homeland
security.
RATIONALE
In the War on Terrorism, America's principal advantage is
its unparalleled technological superiority--measured not only
in highly sophisticated hardware and software--but also in the
competence and character of its citizens in controlling that
technology. This is true not only in dealing with the war, but
just as importantly, in ensuring homeland security.
Terrorist Technology Threats
Each terrorist threat or act can be characterized by the
specific technology utilized, by its means of delivery, and by
its intended target. The diversity of technologies involved is
enormous. There are 36 deadly biological agents, including 13
viruses, 7 bacteria, 3 micro-organisms with traits common to
both bacteria and viruses, 1 fungus, and 12 biological toxins.
Cyber-terrorists can hack into information systems, deny
service to others by overwhelming sites with bogus requests,
and spread computer viruses or worms. Chemical agents encompass
nerve gases, cyanides, phosgene, and vesicants. Explosives run
the gamut from nuclear fission, fusion, or dirty nuclear bombs
through plastic explosives, nitrogen-based varieties, to pipe
bombs, or simple hand grenades.
Similarly there are a great variety of means whereby
terrorists can deliver their agents of destruction or
disruption, including mail, modems, missiles, aircraft, ships,
trains, trucks, autos, on foot, or by remote detonation. And
their targets are equally varied, including: transportation and
telecommunications systems; air, water and food supplies;
energy sources and distribution channels; financial and
computer networks; factories; key buildings; population groups;
and prominent individuals.
But surpassing the extensive array of technologies,
transmissions, and targets available to terrorists is the wide
range of countervailing technologies we can deploy to deal with
their threats or attacks. These fall into 3 categories, those
aimed at: (1) precluding or deterring the terrorist act; (2)
detecting it when it occurs; and (3) coping with its
consequences.
Precluding or Deterring Terrorist Acts
The overarching campaign in this category consists of the
current and projected military actions, along with the
coordinated diplomatic, intelligence, public safety, and
financial efforts to thwart terrorism wherever it lurks. On the
homeland security front, there are a wide variety of
technological systems under consideration. A number of these
involve the enhanced coordination of more sophisticated,
computerized information systems to track and apprehend
terrorists before the deed is done. Most of the other
technological systems directed at preventing terrorist acts are
aimed at either or both of 2 goals: (a) to maintain boundaries
which only authorized individuals can traverse; and (b) to
ascertain whether the identities of specific individuals or
entities meet the authorization criteria. The role of
technology in maintaining boundaries lies essentially in
electronic barriers, surveillance sensors, video cameras,
alarms, and communications systems.
Identification technologies to confirm authorization to
traverse boundaries include those aimed at screening things and
those designed to verify persons' identities. Since
conventional x-ray screening of baggage is not very effective
for moderately sophisticated explosive devices, a number of
more advanced systems are being investigated, such as pulsed
fast-neutron transmission spectroscopy. An example of a
technology for screening things that may be carried by persons
is a holographic imaging system that can see objects hidden
under clothing. A host of new technologies are being studied
for verifying individuals' identities, including sophisticated
biometric identification techniques, such as facial pattern
recognition and iris or retina scanning systems.
Detecting Terrorist Acts When They Occur
If the terrorist act involves an explosion or shooting,
witnesses are immediately aware that something terrible has
transpired; but if the act involves cyber-terrorism or chemical
or biological agents, there may be a considerable time lag
before the act is discovered. If cyber-terrorists disrupt major
electric power or communications systems, the act would be
readily recognized; but when cyber-terrorists introduce
computer worms or viruses into information systems, crucial
time may elapse before the deed is discovered. Detection of
chemical or biological agents is even more challenging. An
example of a detection technology under development is a
portable isotopic neutron spectroscopy chemical assay system
that can identify nerve gases or explosives. Detection of
biological agents is most difficult since the effect on the
exposed individuals may not become apparent for a considerable
period--by which time it may be too late to counteract the
agent. An example of a technology being considered for
detecting 8 different biohazards (including anthrax spores) is
Polymerase Chain Reaction of PCR which uses specific enzymes to
amplify tiny quantities of DNA to match them with DNA samples
of the biological agent.
Coping with the Consequences of Terrorist Acts
After a terrorist act has been detected, it is imperative
that its nature and extent be rapidly comprehended so that
appropriate countermeasures can be undertaken. But it is
sometimes difficult quickly to ascertain the character of
chemical agents utilized in an attack; and biological weapons
are especially troublesome in confounding rapid comprehension
of what has transpired, as was evidenced in last fall's anthrax
attacks. To facilitate more rapid comprehension, there's a need
for a greatly improved communications network. This is
underscored by the fact that the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC) were not aware of May 2001 Canadian studies that
confirmed the threat of spreading anthrax through the mail,
even though 6 other U.S. agencies were cognizant of the
studies. CDC did not learn of the studies until early November
when the anthrax outbreak was almost over. Examples of
technologies for coping with chemical attacks are the Antidote-
Treatment-Nerve-Gas-Agent Auto-injector, a pen-like device to
administer both types of anti-nerve-gas antidotes, and Sandia
National Laboratory's development of a nontoxic, non-corrosive
foam to neutralize chemical agents. Examples with respect to
biological agents include an advanced, hand-held nucleic acid-
analyzer to identify biological agents in the field within a
matter of minutes and the use of irradiation of mail to destroy
bacteria or spores. The administration's budget includes $6
billion for combating bioterrorism, including a substantial
amount for research and development of such technologies.
Technological Choice
Choosing among the vast array of technological options for
homeland security is a complex process. Sometimes there are
inadequate data; other times the underlying science is not
fully understood. But even when the scientific basis and data
are available, there remains the so-called `Law of Unintended
Consequences,' which refers to the fact that many technologies
engender ancillary, unexpected consequences that are difficult
to foresee and sometimes detrimental in their impacts.
The most obvious example from the past is the use of the
internal combustion engine for vehicles. While this innovation
served as one of the prime movers of 20th century economic
expansion, its long-term effects on the environment have been
deleterious because of air pollution and the possibility of
global warming. Another example is the use of
chlorofluorocarbons for refrigeration and air conditioning.
Along with the very beneficial effects of this innovation has
come the diminution of the ozone layer, which serves to block
the sun's rays and prevent skin cancer.
The point of these past examples is not that we should have
refrained from utilizing the internal combustion engine for
vehicles or Freon for cooling, both of which have bestowed
substantial benefits on our standard of living. But if we had
anticipated their ancillary, adverse consequences earlier, we
might have been able to structure their implementation in such
a way as to mitigate those unintended consequences and to
design research and development programs aimed at alternative
or supplemental means of achieving the same ends.
Technologies considered for homeland security have already
exhibited some unintended consequences. The irradiation of mail
damages computer chips, film, food, pharmaceuticals, contact
lens, etc. Moreover, the process appears to have caused illness
in some mail handlers because the irradiation heats the plastic
warp used to protect the mail, thereby releasing noxious fumes.
A potential problem arises with retinal scanning for
identification purposes because of possible adverse health
effects from the infrared light used to scan the retina and the
threat of infection because of contact with the equipment. With
respect to on-flight security, it appears that Tasers, a kind
of stun gun, might interfere with the plane's operational
instruments. A broader case of unintended consequences involves
the impact on personal privacy from the more intrusive use of
surveillance cameras and the integration of data bases
containing background information on individuals. Similarly the
wider use of antibiotics, like Cipro, could trigger greater
resistance as bacteria adapt to them. The planned computerized,
surveillance system of foreign students has also engendered
considerable opposition from the colleges and universities that
fear the loss of their tuition--another unintended consequence.
The lesson from all this is that technologies often have
unintended, ancillary consequences which--to the extent
feasible--should be anticipated and taken into account in
selecting among alternative technological solutions and
structuring their implementation. The point is not that any
particular technology is inherently good or bad, but rather
that its relative benefits and detriments depend partially on
its ancillary consequences, as well as on the uses to which it
is put and the way in which it is implemented.
Technology Assessment
The analysis, comparison, and selection of technologies is
a complex process, involving the following components:
determining the technical capabilities of the
technology;
evaluating its effectiveness in achieving its
primary objectives;
ascertaining its costs;
delineating the benefits it confers;
anticipating its ancillary consequences, both
positive and negative;
discerning its probable impact on the economy,
environment, society, and individual values;
comparing the technology with alternatives in terms
of all the foregoing factors; and
delineating the advantages and disadvantages--the
pros
and cons--for the various policy options confronting
decision
makers.
Technology assessment is the methodology for conducting
such analyses. Incorporating elements of operations research,
systems analysis, cost-benefit studies, game theory, linear
programming, simulation studies, and alternative-futures
scenarios--along with pragmatic public policy considerations--
technology assessment emerged as a distinct field of academic
research in the mid-1960s. After 5 years of extensive hearings
before the House Science and Astronautics Committee, and
subsequent consideration by the Senate Rules Committee, the
Technology Assessment Act of 1972 was signed into law on
October 13, 1972, thereby establishing OTA as only the third
support agency of Congress in the history of the Republic. (The
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) was not created until 1974.)
During the legislative consideration of creating OTA, a
great deal of attention was focused on why Congress needed a
new agency, rather than relying on CRS and GAO. It was the
overwhelming judgment of the academic, scientific, technical,
and public policy communities that neither CRS nor GAO was
capable of carrying out the technology assessments required by
Congress, a view in which the Director of CRS, the Librarian of
Congress, and the Comptroller General all concurred.
OTA went through its formative stages, guided by its
Founding Director, former Congressman Emilio Q. Daddario. OTA
later achieved maturity under the leadership of Director John
Gibbons, who served about 15 years from 1979 to 1993. He built
the credibility of the Office within Congress and throughout
the nation's academic, scientific, technical, and professional
communities. Indeed, OTA was recognized worldwide as the top
institution of its kind, with many countries creating their own
comparable organizations, modeled on OTA, including Austria,
Denmark, the European Union, France, Germany, Great Britain,
the Netherlands, and Sweden. While OTA products had a pervasive
impact on congressional activities during the Gibbons Era, and
the Office received many accolades and awards, its impact was
best summed up by an article in the Federal Times, which
stated: "[I]n a town where unimpeachable sources are oh-so-
hard to come by, OTA has managed to secure a position near the
top of the list." \1\
OTA's Structure and Pattern of Operations
OTA consists of a congressional Technology Assessment Board
(TAB), a Director and his staff, and an Advisory Council. TAB
consists of 6 Senators and 6 House members, evenly split
between the 2 parties. The 10 public members of the Advisory
Council are appointed by TAB and are joined on the Council by 2
ex officio members, the Comptroller General and the Director of
CRS. TAB appoints the Director, who then appoints the office
staff. The TAB Chairmanship rotates between Senate and House in
different congresses. Traditionally the Chairman comes from the
majority party in his House and the Vice Chairman from the
opposite party in the other House. Assessments are undertaken
at the request of congressional committees, not in response to
individual members as is the case with CRS and GAO.
For each assessment undertaken, OTA convenes an advisory
panel made up of experts, stakeholders, and citizens relevant
to the particular assessment. These advisory panels play a key
role in the design of the assessment, in the analysis of the
data that has been assembled, and in reviewing the final
report, which is also examined by a number of other outside
reviewers who bring special expertise and points of view to the
assessment. Over time OTA came to draw upon a pool of about
1,000 panelists and outside reviewers.
The overall assessment process embodies a series of checks
and balances that confer credibility, objectivity, and
relevance on the final report. Some of the most important
checks and balances are the:
even balance between House and Senate and the 2
parties on TAB;
tradition of the Chair and Vice Chair from opposite
parties;
need for TAB approval to initiate assessments and
release
reports;
Advisory Council's salutary influence on OTA's
standards of excellence;
advisory panel's role in design, analysis, and
review of assessment;
role of stakeholders and additional outside
reviewers;
preparation of Review Memorandum which describes
reactions of panelists and reviewers to each portion of
report and shows how final version takes account of
those comments; and
the pattern of continuing, informal communication
between OTA and committee staff before, during, and as
follow-up to the assessment.
With this understanding of the OTA process, it becomes
clear why neither CRS nor GAO could effectively carry it out.
Neither one operates under the close control of a congressional
board; neither one responds only to requests from committees;
and neither one has the statutory authority or institutional
capability to integrate the expertise and views of 1,000
outside advisers into assessments.
Examples of some OTA reports particularly relevant to the
War on Terrorism and homeland security include:
The Border War on Drugs
Electronic Surveillance in a Digital Age
High Level Radioactive Waste Site Characterization
Impacts of Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria
New Developments in Biotechnology
Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing
Taggants in Explosives
Technology Transfer to China
Technology and Counter Terrorism
Transportation of Hazardous Materials
Virtual Reality and Technologies for Combat
Simulation
Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction
OTA: 1993-1995
After about 15 years of outstanding service, Gibbons
resigned as OTA Director in early 1993 to join the new
administration. He was succeeded by Dr. Roger C. Herdman who
had been serving as Assistant OTA Director with responsibility
for Health and Life Sciences.
In 1995, however, there was a sea change in control of
Congress. The new leadership was intent on eliminating a number
of cabinet departments and on reducing the costs of government,
including within the Legislative Branch. The likeliest target
for reduction within Congress was one of the support agencies,
CBO, CRS, GAO, and OTA. Of these, OTA was the smallest and most
vulnerable. Accordingly, in order to save money, the House
Appropriations Committee recommended elimination of all funding
for OTA. This was strenuously opposed by many members--
including all TAB members in the House--but the leadership
prevailed. In the Senate the committee proposed a small amount
for OTA, but only enough to enable it to close down its
operations in an orderly manner. Again there was a strong
effort to provide adequate funding, led by all Senators who
have served on TAB. But again the majority voted it down and
OTA ceased operations at the end of FY 1995.
Current Situation
As noted in the Findings, while OTA's funding was
discontinued, its enabling statute remains in effect, including
its authorization of "such sums as may be necessary."
Moreover, since the Senate is a continuing body and the act
does not limit the tenure of its members, the Senators who were
Board members in 1995--Senators Grassley, Hatch, Hollings, and
Kennedy--are still Board members. Since the House is not a
continuing body, it could be argued that the current House
members who were on TAB in 1995--Representatives Dingell,
Houghton, McDermott, and Oxley--would not still be members. But
in any case, the act stipulates that: "Vacancies in the
membership of the Board shall not affect the power of the
remaining members to execute the functions of the Board." In
short, OTA has an ongoing authorization for appropriations, and
TAB is empowered to submit a recommendation to the
Appropriations Committees for such an appropriation.
To underscore the urgent necessity for reactivating OTA,
one example of OTA's potential impact on the War on Terrorism
and homeland security should suffice. The anthrax attacks last
fall engendered considerable confusion and consternation among
public health authorities, public safety officials, and policy
makers throughout federal, state, and local government. There
was great uncertainty on many matters, including the number of
spores necessary to trigger inhalation anthrax in humans; but
it was widely believed that 8,000-10,000 spores would be needed
to cause inhalation or pulmonary anthrax. If OTA had been
operational at the time, it could have brought a highly
relevant 1993 OTA report to the attention of the public health
authorities. The report entitled Technologies Underlying
Weapons of Mass Destruction stated: "1,000 spores or less can
produce fatal pulmonary anthrax in some members of an exposed
population." \2\ If this information had been readily
available, it's conceivable that it even could have saved a
life or--at the very least--afforded much better guidance to
the public health authorities in designing their response to
the crisis.
It is clear that Congress urgently needs to reactivate OTA,
and that to do so, all that is required is inclusion of $1
million in the next supplemental appropriation. Considering
that this $1 million would reactivate an Office that could aid
Congress in evaluating the $38 billion the President has
recently requested for homeland security, the $1 million amount
does not seem unreasonable.
* * * * *
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY:
THE ROLE OF OTA
In the War on Terrorism, America's principal advantage is
its unparalleled technological superiority--measured not only
in highly sophisticated hardware and software--but also in the
competence and character of its citizens in controlling that
technology. The military action in Afghanistan was a striking
demonstration of those assets.
Eight thousand mile bombing runs from the continental
United States, tactical aircraft sorties from carriers in the
Persian Gulf or Arabian Sea, targeting by satellites and
Predator drone planes, real-time information displays, GPS-
guided smart bombs--along with night vision and special forces
providing laser guidance on the ground--enabled precision
bombing that could penetrate cave entrances horizontally and
explode underground with greater devastation than hundreds of
dumb bombs in World War II or Vietnam.
In short, the awesome enhancement of our military
capabilities through technology is apparent to all who tune in
to CNN. But perhaps not as overtly obvious, yet promising to be
as powerful and pervasive is the potential impact of technology
on homeland security. This potential impact flows both from the
technology utilized by the terrorists and from the technology
we need to employ to deal with their threats.
Terrorist Technology Threats
Each terrorist threat or act can be characterized by the
specific technology utilized, by its means of delivery, and by
its intended target. Thus the catastrophe of September 11
utilized jet fuel as an explosive, delivered by means of fully-
fueled, Boeing-757 and -767 aircraft, and directed at the World
Trade Center towers. The subsequent anthrax events utilized
highly refined, aerosolizable anthrax powder, delivered through
envelopes in the mail, and aimed at Senate and media personnel.
The ongoing bombings in Israel utilize plastic explosives,
delivered by suicidal individuals on foot or in vehicles, and
targeted at groups of innocent bystanders.
These current examples illustrate the diversity of
technologies, means of delivery, and targets that terrorists
may employ. The full range of possibilities is extremely wide.
Thus biological agents could include--besides anthrax--small
pox, plague, viral encephalitis, yellow fever, and Marburg
virus. Examples of other agents that could be introduced
through the food supply are botulism, salmonella, E. coli, and
cholera. In fact, "the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention lists 36 classes of . . . potential weapons . . .
[including] 13 viruses, 7 bacteria, 3 rickettsiae (micro-
organisms that have traits common to both bacteria and
viruses), 1 fungus and 12 biological toxins." \3\
Cyber-terrorists utilize the internet, software, and their
extensive computer skills to hack into purportedly inaccessible
information systems, to deny service to others by overwhelming
sites with bogus requests, and to spread deleterious computer
viruses or worms. In contrast with weapons of mass destruction,
"cyber threats are considered weapons of mass disruption . . .
Computer security experts . . . have begun seeing evidence of
increasingly potent attacks by hackers . . . denial of service
attacks [are] becoming more common and more disruptive . . .
Attackers have also employed `worms' . . . aimed at routers,
which direct traffic throughout the internet . . . No computer
on the internet is immune from denial of service attacks." \4\
Chemical agents encompass: nerve agents like sarin, tabun,
soman, and VX gas; cyanides; phosgene; and vesicants such as
sulfur mustard gas. Explosives run the gamut from nuclear
fission or fusion bombs to dirty nuclear bombs (which disperse
radioactive materials without a chain reaction) to highly
energetic plastic explosives to nitrogen-based (nitramine)
varieties like nitroglycerine to pipe bombs or simple hand
grenades. Arson can be committed merely with a container of
gasoline and some matches. And of course, determined terrorists
can rely on simple weapons like automatic rifles, hand guns
or--as we saw on September 11--even small box cutters.
While not as diverse as the wide range of technologies
terrorists may employ, there are a number of means through
which they can deliver their agents of destruction or
disruption, including: mail; computer modems; missiles;
aircraft (from crop dusters to Boeing 767s); ships (from huge
tankers to small harbor craft); trains; trucks; automobiles;
bicycles; on foot; by a hand hurling a grenade; or by remote
detonation, which itself can be accomplished by a variety of
methods.
For example, in the "early 1970s, IRA [bombs in the UK
consisted of] . . . nails wrapped around a lump of plastic
explosive and detonated simply by lighting a fuse. . . .
[Their] time bombs . . . were . . . dynamite and commercial
detonators . . . attached to ordinary battery-powered alarm
clocks." Later on to avert danger to their agents, they began
detonating remotely "by using the radio controls for model
aircraft. The British Ministry of Defense (MoD) thwarted this
means of attack through electronic countermeasures and jamming
techniques." The IRA then developed a "network of
sophisticated electronic switches [to] bypass the . . .
countermeasures . . . [T]he MoD scientists . . . [then devised]
a new system of electronic scanners able to detect radio
emissions . . . before the bomber can actually transmit the
detonation signal." But the IRA subsequently developed "a
photo-flash `slave' unit that can be triggered from a distance
of up to 800 meters by a flash of light." \5\ So the various
technologies for detonating and thwarting detonation continue
to contend with each other.
The targets terrorists may attack are equally varied,
ranging from: telecommunication systems; computer networks;
water systems; \6\ food supplies; energy sources and
distribution systems (nuclear or coal power plants,
hydroelectric dams, natural gas pipelines, oil refineries,
etc.); transportation systems (roads, rail, subways, bridges,
tunnels, seaports); financial institutions and networks;
factories; key buildings; and concentrated populations or even
prominent individuals.
The vulnerability of the nation's electric power system,
for example, was underscored at a recent conference of industry
executives, at which it was revealed that: "The computers that
control the electric power system around the nation have been
probed from the Middle East, and terrorists may have inspected
the physical equipment . . . Government experts identified
nuclear power plants as perhaps the most attractive targets,
but said dams, gas pipelines and oil refineries were not far
behind." \7\
Surpassing the extensive array of technologies,
transmissions, and targets available to terrorists is the wide
range of countervailing technologies we can deploy to deal with
their threats or attacks. These countervailing technologies
fall into three categories, those aimed at: (1) precluding or
deterring the terrorist act; (2) detecting it when it occurs;
and (3) coping with its consequences. It is instructive to
examine illustrative examples of technologies in each of these
categories.
Precluding or Deterring Terrorist Acts
The best example in this category, of course, is the
current effort to root out and extirpate the Al Qaeda network,
cells of which are reputed to be festering in about 60
countries throughout the world. Accomplishing this goal would
surely go a long way toward precluding many terrorist attacks.
But as President Bush reiterated in his January 2002 State of
the Union speech, the War on Terrorism extends far beyond the
Al Qaeda network or the former Taliban government, as is
evidenced by the recent incursion of American special forces
into the Philippines and planned deployments into Yemen and the
Republic of Georgia. Furthermore, underscoring his oft-stated
warning that nations that harbor terrorists are equally
culpable, he specifically cited Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as
"seeking weapons of mass destruction," castigating them as
constituting "an axis of evil." \8\ Proceeding in parallel
with the military actions in Afghanistan and the Philippines
and the President's public exhortations, are the coordinated
diplomatic, intelligence, public safety, and financial efforts
to thwart terrorism wherever it lurks. Undoubtedly this
concerted campaign has already impeded previously plotted
terrorist events.
But as President Bush also noted in his State of the Union
address: "Thousands of dangerous killers . . . are now spread
throughout the world like ticking time bombs, set to go off
without warning." \9\ To intercept and prevent any of their
attempted terrorist acts from implementation, homeland security
measures may encompass a wide variety of technological systems.
Many of these technologies involve "the use of powerful
computers . . . [which] can spot linkages among [innumerable]
individual pieces of information . . . Germany pioneered the
use of computers in this field . . . Two apparently unrelated
individuals could be shown to be extremely likely to belong to
the same terrorist group by showing an overlap in the
information about them which was too complete to be
coincidental . . . The FBI has now refined and expanded upon
the capacities pioneered by the German police . . . [by
developing a computer system] designed to draw investigative
inferences from the organized examination of all the data that
the Justice Department and its component agencies are
collecting." \10\
Most of the other technological systems directed at
preventing terrorist acts are aimed at one or both of two
goals: (a) to maintain some kind of boundaries which only
authorized individuals or entities can traverse; and (b) to
ascertain whether the identities of specific individuals or
entities meet the authorization criteria.
The boundaries can be as wide as the U.S. seacoasts and
northern and southern border or as narrow as the walls of a
particular facility, building, or secure room within a
building. They can be the perimeters of nuclear, electrical, or
telecommunications facilities or the confines of a particular
airfield, airplane, seaport, ship, train station, train,
bridge, or tunnel. They can be secured through appropriate
configurations of powerful walls, fences, doors, electronic
barriers, surveillance sensors, video cameras, communication
systems, alarms, guards, and guard dogs. Current examples range
from the projected increase of customs agents and immigration
officials to be stationed at the Mexican and Canadian borders
and various airports and seaports to the National Guard troops
at nuclear power facilities to the reinforced cockpit doors on
aircraft.
With respect to border crossings, a number of technologies
are being explored. The Director of Homeland Security, Governor
Tom Ridge said: "experimental high-tech `fast lanes' for
frequent travelers, and inspecting cargo trucks and
electronically sealing them at locations away from the border
would . . . move the border into the 21st century . . .
[although] scanners to read the 5 million `laser'
identification cards issued to people who frequently cross the
border [still need to be installed] . . . The new laser IDs
include biometric features, such as fingerprints . . . The
other new technology under discussion includes more mobile x-
ray units, which resemble a drive-through car wash. A vehicle
crossing the border would drive through the apparatus and an
inspector could, for instance, detect false compartments used
to smuggle people or check sealed cargo." \11\
The role of technology in maintaining boundaries lies
essentially in electronic barriers, surveillance sensors, video
cameras, communication systems, and alarms. Some examples will
serve to illustrate the range of technologies involved. Thus
alarm systems are generally based on hard-wire lines,
microwave, radio frequency, or cellular transmission
technologies.\12\ When available, fiber optics may replace
copper hard-wire lines, since fiber optics provides longer
distance transmission and freedom from electromagnetic or radio
frequency interference.\13\ Because of the heightened emphasis
on anti-terrorism activities since September 11th, many efforts
are underway to develop more sophisticated surveillance
systems. A good example is the software that has been developed
by NetTalon Security Systems, Inc. of Fredericksburg, Virginia.
This software enables real-time, simultaneous transmission to
and from an aircraft and the ground for a host of video, sound,
and sensor information (e.g., motion or vapor detection,
changes in pressure or temperature, etc). As a result, the
ground station could instantaneously trigger response
mechanisms like aiming a Taser stun gun or releasing pepper
spray at a precise target.\14\
Identification technologies to confirm authorization to
traverse boundaries fall into two classes: those aimed at
screening things and those designed to verify persons'
identities. In both cases there are a multitude of technologies
entering into practice, under consideration, or still in
research and development. Illustrative of these is the wide
range of devices under consideration for baggage screening at
airports. Conventional x-ray screening of baggage is not very
effective at locating moderately sophisticated explosive
devices.\15\ Other technologies that have been studied for this
purpose include: thermal neutron activation (TNA); automated
neutron-source accelerator; elastic neutron scattering; pulsed
fast-neutron transmission spectroscopy (PFNTS); photon
activation; nuclear resonant absorption (NRA); fast-neutron
associated particle (FNAP); dual energy x-ray systems;
backscatter x-ray; coherent x-ray scattering; and dual energy
x-ray computed tomography (CT).\16\
Numerous other technologies are being developed for
screening things that may be carried by persons. For example,
the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (pNNL) in Washington
State has developed a hand-held "device that uses ultrasonic
waves to see inside of sealed containers, a holographic imaging
system that can see objects hidden under clothing, and a
polymer that detects nerve agents." \17\ The Federal Aviation
Agency (FAA) is "developing . . . electromagnetic devices for
screening bottles and other containers . . . [for] detecting
liquid explosives." Other devices, known as trace detectors,
have been manufactured for "detect[ing] the residue or vapor
from explosives on the exterior of carry-on bags and on
electronic items, such as computers or radios," or even on
shoes. Other trace detectors under development screen items
handled by persons to detect residue or vapor from explosives
on the persons' hands. Also in development are walk-through
screening portals that can: "detect particles and vapor from
explosives on passengers' clothing or in the air surrounding
their bodies." \18\
There is also a wide array of technologies being considered
for verifying individuals' identities and authorization to
traverse boundaries. Some of these are as simple as the use of
wireless devices with software developed by Aether Systems,
Inc. of Maryland whereby airport security personnel can
instantaneously check electronic records to identify
passengers, airport employees, and vehicles.\19\ Others include
the more extensive use of photo IDs and smart cards (with
embedded computer chips), encryption for electronic
communications, and increasingly sophisticated biometric
identification techniques. One biometric system utilizes
passive and active imaging technologies, which "can see
through clothes and produce an image of the human body
underneath . . . In passive screening, the natural radiation
emitted by the human body is detected and analyzed . . . Active
imaging entails irradiating the body with x-rays or millimeter
waves and analyzing the radiation scattered from the body . . .
[M]etallic weapons or explosive materials . . . will appear
different from [the body]." \20\
Generally, biometrics refers to a set of technologies that
utilize human characteristics or behavioral traits to identify
particular individuals. These include: fingerprinting, finger
patterns, palm prints, hand geometry, hand topography, hand and
wrist vein patterns, facial pattern recognition, voice
recognition, signature or handwriting analysis, key stroke
dynamics, and iris or retina scanning. An example that employs
facial pattern recognition is the FaceIT technology
manufactured by a New Jersey company, Visionics. This system
generates ID codes "based on 80 unique aspects of
[individuals] facial structures, like the width of the nose and
the location of the temples. FaceIT can instantly compare an
image of any individual's face with a database of the faces of
suspected terrorists." \21\ Iris scanning systems are based on
the fact that not only are everyone's irises--even those of
identical twins--different, but also that each individual's two
irises are different from each other. Software has been
developed that enables scanning and database comparison of
irises to take place within a few seconds.\22\
Detecting Terrorist Acts When They Occur
When efforts to prevent or deter terrorism fail and a
terrorist act occurs, it is not always immediately obvious what
has happened. If the terrorist act involves an explosion or
shooting, witnesses are immediately aware that something
terrible has transpired; but if the act involves cyber-
terrorism or biological or chemical agents, there may be a
considerable time lag before the act is discovered. Our
increasingly interdependent, technologically complex society is
highly vulnerable to the disruptive effects of cyber-terrorism.
If such acts were to penetrate and disrupt the FAA flight
control system, or power grids, or major communication systems,
they would undoubtedly be readily recognized. It also would be
obvious if the method of disruption consisted of, "flooding
[an information] system with false requests for service [so
that it was] impossible to respond to legitimate requests"--as
happened with Yahoo in the year 2000.\23\ But if the hackers or
cyber-terrorists cleverly introduce computer worms or viruses
into information systems--as is occurring with increasing
frequency \24\--prompt detection of the act poses a constant
challenge to the ingenuity of our software designers and the
vigilance of our system operators.
Detecting the introduction of chemical or biological agents
is perhaps even more challenging. One of the most widely
reported acts of chemical terrorism occurred on March 20, 1995,
when "the nerve gas sarin was released in commuter trains on
three different Tokyo subway lines by a terrorist cult group.
Sarin was concealed in lunch boxes and soft-drink containers
and . . . released as terrorists punctured the containers with
umbrellas before leaving the trains. Over 5,500 were injured,"
11 of whom died. Since there was no detection capability within
the train system and since sarin is colorless and odorless,
detection occurred only after sick patients flooded the area
hospitals.\25\
To provide rapid detection for such events in the future,
U.S. scientists from Argonne, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore
national laboratories "have been developing and experimenting
with chemical sensors in two downtown [Washington] Metro
stations . . . [They have] studied how air moves through the
subway and how trains, heat and humidity affect air flow . . .
how chemicals spread . . . [and how they] can be released
through air exhaust systems into the streets above . . . They
can detect the presence of a harmful chemical, such as sarin
gas, [but] cannot yet detect biological agents, such as
anthrax." \26\ Other detection technologies under development
at the national laboratories include: "a cyanide microsensor,
[a] portable isotopic neutron spectroscopy chemical assay
system that can identify nerve agents, compressed gases, or
explosives inside artillery shells or bombs [and] . . . a
`laboratory on a chip' that can identify . . . all . . . known
chemical warfare agents in under 30 seconds." \27\
Detection of biological agents is generally more difficult
because the effect of the biological agent on the exposed
individuals frequently does not become obvious until quite some
time has elapsed; and oftentimes it is then too late to
counteract the harmful agent. So it's imperative that effective
detection technologies are developed and made widely available
throughout the U.S. public health system.
Biological agents can be delivered through the air, the
water, the food supply, or--as we recently witnessed--through
the mail system. Since detecting biological agents in the mail
poses extremely daunting problems, high security targets--like
the Congress and key government agencies--are beginning to
irradiate all such mail in an effort to kill any biological
organisms that may be present.
The U.S. Postal Service recently announced its exploration
of an even more sophisticated technology that could "detect
eight biohazards, including anthrax spores." Termed PCR (for
polymerase chain reaction)--although sometimes referred to as
`molecular photo-
copying'--the technology would take air samples every half-hour
from mail passing through high-speed postal sorters and test
the samples for the specific signatures of particular bacteria
like anthrax. "PCR is a general term for a process that uses
specific enzymes to amplify tiny quantities of DNA and make a
DNA match." \28\
With respect to food, the current system for detecting
contaminants is similar to searching for a needle in a
haystack. The paucity of resources that have been devoted to
this effort is thinly spread among the Departments of
Agriculture, Commerce, and Defense, the Food and Drug
Administration, and the Environmental Protection Agency.
Inspections are infrequent and some items--e.g., fish that goes
from the boat directly to a wholesaler or retailer--are not
inspected at all. Moreover, "the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention catches [sic] only a small percentage of food-
borne outbreaks because state reporting is voluntary and
inconsistent." In 1984 when "members of a religious commune
in Oregon contaminated 10 salad bars with salmonella
[sickening] 151 people . . . it took a year to link the
outbreak to the commune." \29\
With respect to biological agents in general, "because the
time lag between exposure to a pathogen and the onset of
symptoms may be days or weeks, effective response to a covert
terrorist action will be critically dependent upon (a) the
ability of individual clinicians, perhaps widely scattered
around a large metropolitan area, to identify and accurately
diagnose an uncommon disease and (b) a surveillance system for
collecting reports of such cases that is actively monitored to
catch disease outbreaks as they arise." \30\
One such surveillance system is the Pittsburgh "Real Time
Outbreak and Disease Surveillance System [which] tracks
patients by zip code, looking for spikes that often signal an
upcoming wave of illness. For example, a jump in fever and
respiratory illness in one neighborhood could tip off medical
detectives that an anthrax outbreak has occurred." \31\
Unfortunately, the nation's public health system is
woefully unprepared to deal effectively with bioterrorism.
"Vast numbers of the nation's private doctors are uninformed
about how to recognize, treat and report casualties of a
biological attack." \32\ "Half of all U.S. states [lack] even
a single `disease detective' to investigate outbreaks . . . Ten
percent of the nation's 120 largest city and county health
departments [do] not have e-mail." \33\ While "some
serological, immunological, and nucleic acid assays are
available for identifying . . . biological agents, . . .
[since] laboratories do not perform these assays regularly . .
. it therefore seems unlikely that many labs will be
immediately prepared to conduct the specific analytical test
needed . . . even when the attending physician is astute enough
to ask for the appropriate test." \34\ To begin to remedy
these deficiencies in the nation's public health system, the
President's recent budget calls for an increase in overall
funding for combating bioterrorism to $5.9 billion, including
"$1.2 billion to improve the ability of state and local health
systems to respond to bioterrorism attacks." \35\
Coping with the Consequences of Terrorist Attacks
After a terrorist act has been detected, it is imperative
that its nature and extent be rapidly comprehended so that
appropriate countermeasures can be undertaken. Even with a
simple explosive or shooting attack, one has to determine the
number of fatalities and the nature and extent of the injuries.
In the case of arson, one has to know the extent and nature of
the fire to know where to deploy the firefighters and what type
of extinguishers to employ. It is sometimes difficult quickly
to ascertain the character of chemical agents utilized in an
attack. But when dealing with a `dirty' radiological device or
a nuclear bomb, the process of comprehension becomes even more
complex. While acts of cyber-terrorism can usually be traced to
their sources, the challenge comes in doing so fast enough to
minimize the damage they have caused. And biological weapons
are especially troublesome in confounding rapid comprehension
of what has transpired.
The recent anthrax attack illustrates the nation's lack of
necessary knowledge and effective organization to deal with
biological terrorism. First, there was widespread confusion
within the public health system as to the nature of the anthrax
involved and, indeed, the amount of anthrax needed to cause
inhalation anthrax in humans. Moreover, while the mails were
used to transmit the anthrax spores to Senator Daschle's office
in October 2001, as of this writing in March 2002, there is
still no resolution as to how anthrax was transmitted to the
women who died in New York and Connecticut. Equally baffling is
the case of the postal inspector who spent 45 days in a
Baltimore hospital after inspecting a mail-sorting machine at
the Brentwood facility in which the Daschle letter was
processed. Although he evinced most of the symptoms of
inhalation anthrax, there was no evidence of anthrax bacteria
in his blood.\36\
Clearly there are three paramount preconditions that must
be met in order to promote the more rapid comprehension of the
nature and extent of terrorist acts: Firstly, we need much more
research and development, especially regarding all aspects of
bioterrorism. Secondly, we need much more extensive and
effective educational programs for the front-line responders to
terrorism (police, firefighters, emergency rescue teams, hazmat
squads, etc.), as well as the medical and scientific public
health officials who must analyze the situation and prescribe
treatment. And thirdly, we need a vastly expanded and enhanced
communication network integrating the intelligence community
with state and local government officials, front-line
responders, police and other public safety officers, and public
health diagnosticians and practitioners.
The need for a greatly improved communication network is
underscored by the fact that the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC) were not aware of significant Canadian studies conducted
in May 2001, "which showed . . . that a real anthrax threat
letter was a far more dangerous weapon than anyone had believed
. . . [Although] bioterrorism and civil defense experts in a
half-dozen [U.S.] agencies had the information . . . CDC
epidemiologists . . . didn't learn of the Canadian studies
until early November. By then, the anthrax outbreak was almost
over." \37\
Depending on the determination of the nature and extent of
the terrorist act, there are a number of ways we can attempt to
cope with its consequences. When cyber-terrorism has occurred,
it is up to the experience, ingenuity, and software available
to the cyber-security experts to structure the best approach to
blocking further damage and restoring the system under attack
to its normal functioning. When the terrorist employs small
arms fire or simple explosives, the treatment for non-fatal
victims is straightforward, requiring the standard medical
technologies for dealing with accident injuries. In addition,
newly developed technologies can ameliorate the situation. For
example, there is the jackhammer developed at Brookhaven
National Laboratory "for rescue teams working in collapsed,
unstable buildings. The jackhammer . . . creates fewer shocks
and vibrations than a conventional device, reducing the risk of
further collapse . . . [And Sandia National Laboratory is
developing] the robot family, a group of intelligent, mobile
machines that can swarm over a site . . . looking for victims .
. . The robots . . . have demonstrated independent `swarm
intelligence' in carrying out their tasks." \38\
In cases when the terrorist has perpetrated arson,
technology can be of great assistance in enhancing the
effectiveness of the response. For example, the NetTalon system
cited earlier with regard to internal aircraft surveillance
could also be utilized in fighting fires. That system would
enable the firefighters speeding to the scene to have real time
pictures on their laptop screens of precisely where in the
building the fire was located, its intensity, speed of
spreading, associated vapors, and whether it required water or
specialized foams.\39\
A rudimentary response to a chemical gas attack, of course,
is to don a gas mask before the gas takes effect. "Although
sarin [nerve] gas can seep through the skin, breathing it in
delivers a lethal dose about 400 times faster--so the mask
could give you enough time to escape from a noxious cloud."
However, the mask has to be in good working order, and the fit
has to be airtight for it to function effectively.\40\ A good
example of a technology for responding to chemical attack, is
the Antidote-Treatment-Nerve-Gas-Agent Auto-injector developed
by Meridian Medical Technologies, Inc. of Columbia, Maryland.
This pen-like device enables soldiers to self-administer
precise doses of both types of required anti-nerve-gas
antidotes (atropine and praladoxime chloride).\41\ Another
excellent example is Sandia National Laboratory's "development
of a nontoxic, noncorrosive foam that neutralizes both chemical
agents and biologic species such as anthrax . . . The foam . .
. was used extensively to clean up anthrax-contaminated areas
on Capitol Hill." \42\
With respect to biological agents, Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory has developed a prototype of an advanced,
hand-held nucleic-acid-analyzer, only slightly larger than a
scientific calculator, that would enable emergency workers to
identify biowarfare agents in the field in a matter of
minutes.\43\ For use after a dangerous substance has been
detected, the same national laboratory has developed a gel "to
kill biological agents and neutralize chemicals without harming
people." \44\ Another approach, still in the research phase,
is the attempt to find an antitoxin that would neutralize the
toxins produced by the anthrax bacteria. A group at Harvard
Medical School led by Dr. R. John Collier has developed two
methods of neutralizing the anthrax toxins: one by combining
with the toxin molecules and inactivating them; the other by
adhering to the toxin molecules and blocking them from entering
the host cells. Both methods have been tested on rats who have
survived with no symptoms. Still another approach, in an early
research stage, "involves a new type of antibiotic against
anthrax bacteria . . . discovered by Dr. Lucy Shapiro of
Stanford University and Dr. Stephen J. Benkovic of Penn State.
In early laboratory tests, this antibiotic worked not only
against anthrax bacteria, but also against brucellosis and
tularemia, both of which are "potential germ warfare
weapons." \45\
An entirely different approach for counteracting biological
agents is irradiation. But, of course, this cannot be used on
infected individuals, but only on things that are carrying the
bacteria or the spores that will produce the bacteria.
Following the delivery of anthrax-laden letters to Capitol Hill
in October, all mail for the White House and Congress and much
of the mail for federal agencies is irradiated. All mail for
Washington, D.C. is first machine sorted for zip codes. All
mail with government-zip-code destinations is then sorted by
hand. Mail for the White House, Congress, and much of the mail
for other federal government entities is then "wrapped in
plastic, packed in boxes, and taken by tractor-trailer to
irradiation centers in Bridgeport, New Jersey or Lima, Ohio."
At those centers the boxes of mail move on a conveyor belt past
a `gun' that subjects them to a high dose of ionizing
radiation. Afterwards they are trucked back to Maryland where
"they are opened and allowed to breathe for up to 48 hours to
dispel gases created by irradiation." They are then ready for
final sorting and delivery.\46\
Regardless of which technology is used to respond to the
effects of the terrorist act, critical to the success of any
countermeasures are the resources, training, and organization
that are brought to bear on the situation. For example, in
dealing with a chemical attack: "the removal of solid or
liquid chemical agent from exposed individuals is the first
step in preventing severe injury or death . . . Very few
[hazmat] teams are staffed, equipped, or trained for mass
decontamination . . . [F]ew hospitals have formal
decontamination facilities; even fewer have dedicated outdoor
facilities or an easy way of expanding their decontamination
operations in an event involving mass casualties." \47\ The
administration's budget submission for FY 2003 makes a start
toward remedying these deficiencies. The $38 billion for
Homeland Security includes nearly $6 billion for combating
bioterrorism, encompassing a range of programs: research and
development for vaccines, diagnostic tests, decontamination
methods, and related technologies; expansion of the National
Pharmaceutical Stockpile; development of rapid response
networks; and training and technical assistance to states and
local governments to strengthen their public health
systems.\48\
Technological Choice
It is clear from the preceding discussion that the menu of
technological options available for homeland security is vast.
However, choosing among alternative strategies and technologies
is not a simple, straightforward matter; on the contrary, it is
highly complex and fraught with difficulties. Sometimes there
are inadequate data on which to base a sound decision; other
times the underlying science on which the technology is founded
is not fully known--as was the case with understanding the
transmission of inhalation anthrax from anthrax spores.
Even when the scientific basis and data are available,
however, a significant difficulty remains: the so-called `Law
of Unintended Consequences.' This refers to the historical fact
that many technologies have engendered ancillary, unexpected
consequences that are frequently difficult to foresee and
sometimes somewhat detrimental in their impacts. In order to
gain some perspective on this issue, it is useful to examine
some examples from the past and some apparent instances that
have already emerged in the application of technology to the
War on Terrorism.
The most obvious example from the past is the use of the
internal combustion engine to power automobiles and other
vehicles. There is no question that this innovation served as
one of the prime movers of 20th century economic expansion.
Moreover, it not only facilitated much more rapid
transportation of people and goods, but also its initial impact
on the environment was salutary; for it led to the elimination
of foul-smelling horse manure from roads and city streets. Yet
we now know that its long-term effect on the environment has
been deleterious because of its substantial contribution to air
pollution and the possibility of global warming. Furthermore,
the use of motorized vehicles has had the unfortunate ancillary
consequence of tens of thousands of traffic fatalities and
injuries in the United States annually.
Another past example of the `Law of Unintended
Consequences' was the use of chlorofluorocarbons for
refrigeration and air conditioning. This was an immensely
important innovation that facilitated the comfortable use of
many otherwise unsuitable facilities in the heat of summer and
the longer-term distribution and preservation of food products,
thereby transforming the role of homemakers who no longer had
to shop for food each day. In referring to Freon, a trade name
for these chemicals, the 1973 edition of the Encyclopaedia
Britannica stated: "The importance of the Freons lies in the
fact that they are so stable that they are entirely harmless."
\49\ As we now know, however, it is the very stability of these
chemicals that enables them to rise up above the atmosphere and
serve to deplete the ozone layer, thereby interfering with its
blocking of sun rays that can cause skin cancer.
The point of these past examples is not that we should have
refrained from utilizing the internal combustion engine or
making use of refrigeration and air conditioning; both
innovations have bestowed substantial benefits on our standard
of living. But if we had anticipated their ancillary, adverse
consequences earlier, we might have been able to structure
their implementation in such a way as to mitigate those
unintended consequences and to design research and development
programs aimed at alternative or supplemental means of
achieving the same ends.
As noted above, some apparent instances of the `Law of
Unintended Consequences' have already emerged in the
application of technology to the War on Terrorism. Most notable
among them is the use of irradiation to sanitize mail from
anthrax spores and other pernicious contaminants. This
"process tends to destroy computer chips and to damage . . .
delicate items including food, [photos], pharmaceuticals,
clothing, contact lens--and even the paper mail itself." \50\
Also the fact that the process entails wrapping the mail in
plastic prior to irradiation has apparently caused varying
forms of distress among some mail handlers. This may be due to
the interaction of the electrons [in the irradiation] and the
plastic wrap, thereby producing ozone and carbon monoxide.\51\
In any case, the mail room in the U.S. Department of Commerce
had to be temporarily shut down because a number of the mail
room employees complained of nausea and respiratory
distress.\52\ Similarly "seventy-three employees of the U.S.
Senate have reported health problems including headaches, eye
irritation and skin rash after handling irradiated mail, and
the government has issued a cautionary advisory to 180,000
federal workers in the District.\53\ In addition, "87 . . .
workers at the Gaithersburg [Maryland mail] facility . . . are
experiencing nosebleeds, runny noses, runny eyes, extreme
headaches, nausea." \54\
Again these unanticipated consequences do not imply that
sensitive mail should not be irradiated. Indeed, as a result of
such concerns, "engineers lowered radiation dosages by about
40% after concluding that that was sufficient to kill anthrax
spores and other biological contaminants." \55\ Also mail is
now being "removed from the boxes and plastic and allowed to
air . . . for as long as 48 hours before re-entering the usual
mail delivery system." \56\ The point is that the earlier one
can anticipate the ancillary consequences, the better one can
implement the technology in a manner designed to obviate or
mitigate its adverse effects.
An example of a potential problem with an identification
technology occurs in the field of biometrics. "Retinal scan .
. . is perhaps the most secure biometric option. Users,
however, fear health effects from the infrared light used to
read the retina, as well as possible infections from contact
with the equipment . . . [Moreover,] a person's retinal
patterns change after he or she experiences a heart attack.
Unions have fought the installation of retinal scan equipment
on the theory that the scan could be used by companies to spot
sick employees and terminate them." \57\ Iris scans may not be
as reliable as retina scans, in terms of false acceptance or
false rejection rates, but since they do not involve physical
contact, they may prove more desirable in some instances.\58\
This example illustrates the importance of including
examination of ancillary consequences in consideration of
alternative technologies.
Technologies for coping with terrorists who are onboard an
aircraft in flight also pose a number of problems that need to
be assessed, according to a draft report of the National
Institute of Justice, a research resource of the Justice
Department. The draft report stated that: "Tasers--a type of
stun gun . . . could interfere with the plane's operational
instruments . . . `In the preliminary tests . . . an electrical
discharge less-than-lethal device fired at cockpit instruments
adversely affected a number of systems . . . [Furthermore,] in
the confined space of a cockpit, crew members are likely to be
incapacitated' . . . by other non-lethal weapons such as pepper
spray or tear gas . . . [The draft report also raised serious
questions on a number of other technologies, including,] . . .
the Laser Dazzler, a light that temporarily blinds an attacker,
. . . anesthetics or calmative chemicals that could
incapacitate all passengers when released into the air, a
`slippery foam' on the cabin floors that could make an attacker
slip, and some kinds of ear-piercing acoustic weapon." \59\
A broader problem of unintended consequences that permeates
a number of the technologies that may be used in the War on
Terrorism is their impact on the privacy of individuals. This
impact can be readily perceived in the proliferation of video
cameras and human scanning equipment for purposes of security.
As indicated earlier, one biometric system utilizes imaging
technologies that can penetrate clothing and produce an image
of the body beneath them.\60\ The increasing use of closed
circuit TV (CCTV) for security surveillance portends a
pervasive impact on personal privacy. The proliferation of CCTV
in the UK over the past decade may be a prognosticator of what
lies ahead for the United States. In the early 1990s, after
terrorist bombs exploded in the `City of London,' the
government installed a network of CCTV cameras around that area
and over the decade encouraged local governments to do the same
in their areas. "By 1998, 440 city centers were wired [with
CCTV] . . . There are now [estimated to be] 2.5 million
surveillance cameras in Britain." \61\ "In Britain in the
late 1990s it is unlikely that any urban dweller, in their
[sic] role as shopper, worker, commuter, resident or school
pupil can avoid being . . . monitored by camera surveillance
systems." \62\
A further instance of the potential invasion of privacy
arises from the intended expansion and integration of data
bases containing background information on individuals for use
in security at airports, seaports, border crossings, etc. The
more extensive and integrated such data bases are, the more
susceptible they become to misuse of the information. A third
example of the potential infringement of privacy comes from the
pervasive expansion of the internet, with its manifold
possibilities for mischief. As these technologies continue
their diffusion, it is essential that every effort
be made to ensure as much protection of individual privacy as
possible.
Another potentially adverse consequence from anti-terrorist
technology is the much wider use of microwave and other forms
of radiation to which persons may be exposed. While there is no
conclusive evidence at this time as to such adverse impact, it
is important that such technologies be designed, perfected, and
operated so as to minimize the possibility of any such effects.
The more widespread use of specific antibiotics, such as Cipro,
also poses potential unintended consequences. This is evidenced
by a recent study which "found that a powerful strain of
salmonella developed a resistance to the antibiotic Cipro in
less than two years." \63\
A different kind of unintended consequence has emerged from
the current effort to establish a comprehensive computer
network to track foreign students in the U.S. "Officials
concede they do not know . . . where [or whether] the 547,000
people holding student visas are attending school . . .
[H]igher education institutions . . . raised a raft of
objections [to the planned system] . . . The issue is
particularly pressing for community and technical colleges,
which rely heavily on foreign students because they pay higher
tuition . . . [C]olleges have also objected to a plan . . .
that would prevent foreign students from receiving diplomas
until they confirm that they have either returned home or have
extended their visas." \64\ It is clear that this planned
computerized, surveillance system of foreign students would
pose major unintended consequences for the academic
institutions involved.
Perhaps the ultimate, tragic example of the `Law of
Unintended Consequences' is the fact that without the Internet,
cell phones, and modern telecommunications systems, the Al
Queda network could never have evolved into the pervasive,
pernicious web of evil it has become. So in that warped sense,
the terrible tragedy of September 11 was--at least in some
small part--an unintended consequence of the proliferation of
those technologies.
The lesson from all this is that technologies often have
unintended, ancillary effects which--to the extent feasible--
should be anticipated and taken into account in selecting among
alternative technological solutions and structuring their
implementation. The point is not that any particular technology
is inherently good or bad, but rather that its relative
benefits and detriments depend partially on its ancillary
consequences, as well as on the uses to which it is put and the
way in which it is implemented.
Technology Assessment
The analysis, comparison, and selection of technologies to
be implemented is a complex, difficult process. Discerning
unintended consequences is not the only hurdle that must be
overcome. The process involves the following components:
determining the technical capabilities of the
technology;
evaluating its effectiveness in achieving its
primary objectives;
ascertaining its costs;
delineating the benefits it confers;
anticipating its ancillary consequences and
estimating their positive and negative effects;
discerning its probable impact on the economy,
environment, society, and individual values;
comparing the technology with alternatives in terms
of all the foregoing factors; and
delineating the advantages and disadvantages--the
pros
and cons--for the various policy options confronting
decision
makers.
Technology assessment is the methodology for conducting
such analyses. Focused on the future, "it is the
institutionalization of a methodology for previewing potential
effects of technological developments so that the information
generated may increase our ability to forestall the detrimental
effects and encourage the beneficial effects of our
inventions." \65\ Incorporating elements of operations
research, systems analysis, cost-benefit studies, game theory,
linear programming, simulation studies, and alternative-futures
scenarios--along with pragmatic public policy considerations--
technology assessment emerged as a distinct field of academic
research in the mid-1960s.
Prompted by information on this field from the academic and
scientific communities, along with congressional concern with
comprehending the technological aspects of public policy
issues, Representative Emilio Q. Daddario began a public
dialogue in March 1967, when he "introduced a bill proposing
the creation of a `Technology Assessment Board' . . . to
provide Congress with an `early warning signal' of the
potential good and bad consequences of technological
programs." As Chairman of the Subcommittee on Science,
Research, and Development of the Committee on Science and
Astronautics, Congressman Daddario followed up by launching
several years of seminars, studies, and hearings with
substantial input from reports by the Legislative Reference
Service [now the Congressional Research Service] and by each of
the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Public
Administration.\66\
Based on these extensive deliberations, a revised bill was
introduced in the House in 1971, and followed by a companion
bill in the Senate. With further amendments, the bill passed
the House in February 1972; and, with some additional
revisions, the bill to create an Office of Technology
Assessment passed the Senate in September 1972. After
consideration by a conference committee and final passage in
both Houses, the Technology Assessment Act of 1972 was signed
into law by President Nixon on October 13, 1972,\67\ thereby
establishing OTA as only the third support agency of the
Congress in the history of the Republic. (The first, the
Legislative Reference Service, which later became the
Congressional Research Service, was created in 1914; the
second, the General Accounting Office (GAO) came in 1921; and
the fourth, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), was not
created until 1974.)
OTA's Unique Role and History
Under the enabling statute, OTA consists of a Technology
Assessment Board (TAB) and a Director. TAB consists of 6
Senators and 6 House members, evenly split between the two
parties (to ensure non-partisanship), along with the Director
as an ex officio non-voting member. The Senate members are
appointed by the President pro-tempore of the Senate; the House
members by the Speaker of the House; and the Director is
appointed by the Board. The Director appoints the office staff.
In addition, there is a Technology Assessment Advisory Council
(TAAC), whose 10 public members are appointed by the Board and
which includes 2 ex officio members, the Comptroller General
and the Director of the Congressional Research Service.\68\
During the 5 years of extensive consideration before this
measure was enacted into law, a great deal of attention was
focused on the question of why a new Office of Technology
Assessment (OTA) was needed, rather than relying on the
existing congressional support agencies of the General
Accounting Office (GAO) and the Congressional Research Service
(CRS). The overwhelming judgment of the academic, scientific,
technical, and public policy communities was that neither GAO
nor CRS was capable of doing the job of technology assessment
required by the Congress. Indeed, "both the Comptroller
General and the Director of the Congressional Research Service
(and also the Librarian of Congress) support[ed] the
establishment of an OTA." \69\
In the first appropriations hearings on OTA, Representative
John Davis, the ranking House Democrat on the newly created
Technology Assessment Board (TAB) stated: "[OTA] would perform
a function far greater than could be performed by [CRS] . . .
inasmuch as much of the information that would be desirable to
have on the part of the committees of both the House and of the
Senate would . . . require the generating of information rather
than simply the retrieval of information." And the ranking
House Republican on TAB, Representative Charles Mosher said:
"GAO . . . investigations have been after the fact. The type
of investigation they do is in retrospect . . . OTA . . .
investigations are before the fact. They are . . . an early
warning system for the Congress and I think that is a very
important distinction . . . [Also] assessments . . . are
assigned to OTA . . . by a request from congressional
committees . . . The [Congressional] Research Service is
responsive to any request of a Congressman and, therefore, gets
a plethora of every variety, some very unimportant." \70\ The
issue of whether OTA's functions could be adequately performed
by either CRS or GAO was re-examined in 1976 by the Commission
on the Operation of the Senate, which published the conclusion
that: "The functions OTA can perform represent important needs
of the Senate, needs that cannot be met through the committee
structure or by other support agencies." \71\
In any case, this point of view had prevailed when, a
little over a year after enactment of its enabling statute, OTA
received its first appropriation in November 1973, appointed
its first staff in December, and commenced operations in early
1974, with then former Congressman Daddario as its first
Director. Recognizing the challenge of creating a new
institution within Congress, he gradually built his in-house
staff, developed an extensive network of consultants and
advisory panelists, and focused on establishing good working
relationships with the various congressional committees. He
structured OTA's initial assessments into seven program areas:
energy, food, health, materials, national R&D policies and
priorities, technology and international trade, and
transportation.
After guiding OTA through its formative first four years,
he resigned in 1977, and was succeeded in 1978 by the former
governor of Delaware, Russell Peterson. Unlike Daddario,
Peterson did not manage to develop good relationships with the
TAB Members who had appointed him. "Several members of the
board felt that . . . [his] priorities . . . strayed too far
from what Congress considered to be the most important
legislative concerns . . . One [TAB Member] complained that
Peterson was trying to create a `sort of Brookings Institution
in the Congress' . . . another accused the OTA of a `disturbing
pattern of ignoring congressional oversight and service'."
\72\ In any event, Peterson resigned in 1979 after serving only
one year as Director.
OTA achieved maturity with its next Director, Dr. John
Gibbons who served close to 15 years, from 1979 to 1993. He
developed very good relationships with TAB Members and
congressional committees and, through astute management of OTA,
built the Office's credibility within the Congress and
throughout the nation's academic, scientific, technical, and
professional communities. Indeed, OTA "gradually became
recognized worldwide as the top institution of its kind . . .
Austria, Denmark, the European Community, France, Germany,
Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden have copied or
adapted the OTA style. Similar organizations are being
discussed or formed in Hungary, Japan, Mexico, the People's
Republic of China, Russia, Switzerland, and Taiwan." \73\
From 1974 through 1995, "OTA published nearly 750 full
assessments, background papers, technical memoranda, case
studies, and workshop proceedings. The quality of those
products is attested to by the facts that from 1992 to 1994,
twelve assessments won the National Association for Government
Communicators' prestigious Blue Pencil Award . . . [and during]
the same 3 years, 12 additional reports were named among the 60
Notable Government Documents selected annually by the American
Library Association's Government Documents Roundtable--
representing the best Federal, State, and local government
documents from around the world . . . OTA's reports were often
bestsellers at the Government Printing Office and the National
Technical Information Service . . . [For example,] GPO sold
48,000 OTA reports in [one year] alone." \74\
The authoritative credibility achieved by OTA over the
years is perhaps best articulated in a 1988 article entitled
"Influential Office Guides Congress into Space Age," in which
the author asserts: "Without OTA's nod, leading scientific
theories stand little chance of winning status as conventional
wisdom on Capitol Hill . . . The Office is credited with having
matured into the scientific heavyweight whose assessments can
mean life or death for technical problems in the appropriations
process . . . At least one thing is clear: in a town where
unimpeachable sources are oh-so-hard to come by, OTA has
managed to secure a position near the top of the list." \75\
OTA's Structure and Pattern of Operations
OTA achieved this status as a consequence of the prescience
embodied in its enabling statute and the implementing pattern
of operations that subsequently evolved. Although the bill that
originally passed the House called for the majority party to
hold a majority of seats on TAB, the Senate bill stipulated a
board evenly divided between the two parties, and the Senate
version was accepted in conference.\76\ This assurance of TAB's
non-partisanship--highly unusual at a time when both Houses of
Congress had been controlled by the Democrats for a
generation--was absolutely essential for enabling OTA to
realize both the reality and public perception of objectivity
and credibility.
Along with a governing board, evenly split between House
and Senate and between Democrats and Republicans, the Act
called for the creation of an advisory council, including:
"ten members from the public . . . eminent in one or more
fields of the physical, biological, or social sciences or
engineering or experienced in the administration of
technological activities, or . . . qualified on the basis of
contributions made to educational or public activities." \77\
Thus the Act provided TAB and the Director with the perspective
of an eminent group of outside advisers. Since the assessments
to be undertaken by OTA, however, spanned a multitude of
scientific and technical disciplines and specialities, OTA also
built a network of advisory panels and consultants who were
versed in the specific issues involved in particular assessment
projects. Over the years as the OTA in-house staff grew to
number nearly 150, this outside network of advisers grew to
about 1,000 individuals throughout the nation.
The professional staff consisted of about half scientists
and engineers and about half social scientists, lawyers, and
health care professionals. From 1979 on, the OTA staff was
organized in three divisions, each headed by an Assistant
Director of OTA. These were the divisions of: (a) Energy,
Materials, and International Security; (b) Science,
Information, and Natural Resources; and (c) Health and Life
Sciences. Each division in turn was organized in three
programs, headed by a Program Director. The programs in
division (a) were: Energy and Materials; Industry, Technology,
and Employment; and International Security and Commerce. The
programs in division (b) were: Communications and Information
Technologies; Oceans and Environment; and Science, Education,
and Transportation. And the programs in division (c) were:
Biological Applications; Food and Renewable Resources; and
Health.
Each program in turn usually had several projects underway
at any one time, each of which was headed by a project
director. Some relevant examples of specific OTA assessments
include:
The Border War on Drugs
Electronic Surveillance in a Digital Age
High Level Radioactive Waste Site Characterization
Impacts of Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria
New Developments in Biotechnology
Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing
Taggants in Explosives
Technology Transfer to China
Technology and Counter Terrorism
Transportation of Hazardous Materials
Virtual Reality and Technologies for Combat
Simulation
Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction
As noted above, in addition to the in-house staff and the
congressional board and advisory council, OTA made extensive
use of a national network of about 1,000 advisory panelists and
consultants who addressed specific assessment projects. Thus
for each full-fledged assessment an advisory panel of about 12-
20 individuals was appointed which included scientific and
technical experts in the particular subject under
consideration, as well as participants from industry, labor,
academia, the professions, state and local government, and the
public at large. And before an assessment report was finalized,
it was critiqued by a wider array of experts and stakeholders
throughout the nation.\78\
"The steps in the assessment process may be summarized as
follows: (1) OTA staff engage in informal communication with
congressional committee staff. (2) This leads to formal
committee request letters to OTA, a proposal from the staff to
TAB, and TAB approval to initiate an assessment. (3) An
advisory panel is appointed which critiques the staff's
preliminary assessment design at the panel's first meeting. (4)
Months later, at the second panel meeting, OTA discusses its
analysis of the data it has obtained and the way it is likely
to be handled in the assessment report. (5) Some months later
OTA presents a draft of its final report to the advisory panel
and subsequently to additional outside reviewers. (6) About
eighteen months after the start of the project, OTA presents a
final report to TAB for approval to release it to the
requesting committees and the public at large. (7) OTA then
presents its results to the requesting committees, in the form
of briefings and testimony at hearings, as well as in a written
document, and disseminates its findings to appropriate
Executive Branch agencies, other interested parties, and the
general public." \79\
OTA's Credibility, Objectivity, and Relevance
While this process may appear lengthy and laborious, it
embodies an elaborate panoply of checks and balances that
confer credibility, objectivity, and relevance on the final
assessment report. These checks and balances are inherent in
OTA's statute and pattern of operations. Some of the most
important ones are:
the even balance between House and Senate and the
two parties on TAB;
the tradition of choosing the Vice Chair from the
opposite party to the Chair;
the need for TAB approval both to initiate an
assessment and subsequently to release the final
report;
the Technology Assessment Advisory Council's
salutary influence on OTA's standards of excellence;
each advisory panel's role in the design of the
assessment, the analysis of the data, and the content
of the final report;
the role of the stakeholders and additional expert
consultants in reviewing the draft report;
the presentation of a Review Memorandum from the
Project Director to the OTA Director, which "describes
the reactions of the panel and outside reviewers to
each portion of the report and shows how the final
version takes account of those comments;" \80\ and
the pattern of continuing, informal communication
between OTA and committee staff before, during, and as
follow-up to the assessment.
The relevance of OTA's assessments is ensured by the close
control the congressional board exercises over the initiation
and final approval of OTA products, as well as by the
continuing communication between OTA and congressional
committee staff. While OTA reports have received widespread
acclaim throughout the academic, scientific, technical, and
professional communities, their primary purpose is not to edify
scholars, but rather to serve congressional needs for the
analysis of policy options involving technology. Because of the
continuing oversight of TAB and interaction with congressional
committees, adherence to this purpose is preserved.
OTA's objectivity is ensured through a number of the checks
and balances, the most fundamental one of which is that the
Board is evenly split between the two parties and has
traditionally included a range of conservatives, moderates, and
liberals among its members. Moreover, the pattern of choosing
the Chair and Vice Chair of TAB from opposite parties adds to
OTA's non-partisanship, and hence its objectivity. This
characteristic is further enhanced by the roles played by the
advisory council, the specialized advisory panels, and the many
outside reviewers involved in each assessment. They comprise
not only a very wide range of technical experts, but
stakeholders as well--representatives of industry, labor,
public interest groups, and the public at large.
This diversity of expertise and points of view ensures that
the OTA staff is aware of virtually all relevant issues and
interests involved in the particular assessment. The fact that
the final Review Memorandum has to show specifically how each
concern has been taken into account accords a high degree of
objectivity to the final OTA report. Attesting to that
objectivity is the fact that in debates on congressional
proposals, OTA reports were oftentimes cited by both the
proponents and opponents of the particular proposal. OTA's
credibility consequently comes from the entire assessment
process and the enviable reputation OTA achieved during the
Gibbons directorship.
The Relative Roles of OTA, CRS, and GAO
Having this understanding of the OTA process, it becomes
clear that Congress made the right decision in establishing OTA
in 1972, rather than attempting to rely on CRS and GAO for
providing the necessary analysis of policy options involving
complex technological issues. Congress needs technology
assessment that is timely, targeted to the specific legislative
priorities of congressional committees, and presented in a
format that clarifies the consequences--both pro and con--of
the various policy options related to the technologies under
consideration.
Neither CRS nor GAO has the capability to design and
conduct such assessments. Both CRS and GAO must respond to the
requests of individual members of Congress; whereas OTA
responds only to requests from congressional committees.
Accordingly, OTA assessments are inherently oriented toward the
priority needs of congressional committees, thereby rendering
them relevant to the committees' legislative agendas. This
legislative relevance is further ensured by the requirement for
TAB approvals both to initiate assessments and release final
reports, as well as its continuing oversight of OTA activities
throughout the process. While CRS research and GAO
investigations certainly provide valuable information to
individual members of the Senate and the House, they cannot
possibly attain the same degree of conformance to committees'
legislative requirements.
Furthermore, as former Representative Davis noted, CRS
essentially retrieves existent information, while OTA generates
new information. And as former Representative Mosher stated:
GAO does retrospective investigations; whereas OTA assessments
are future oriented and serve as "an early warning system for
the Congress . . . a very important distinction." \81\
Finally, neither CRS nor GAO has the statutory authority or
institutional capability to make as extensive use of outside
advisers drawn from all segments of the scientific, technical,
professional, and public interest communities as OTA has. As
indicated earlier, these advisers have played an integral,
essential role in ensuring that OTA reports take account of
virtually all relevant expertise and points of view. Without
that involvement, OTA's products could not have been able to
achieve so high a level of objectivity and credibility as they
did. Neither CRS nor GAO is equipped to make that kind of use
of 1,000 consultants.
When one considers that OTA is controlled by a
congressional board--similar to a joint committee--and has
maintained continuing communication with congressional
committees, along with the pattern whereby the office has drawn
upon its pool of about 1,000 outside advisers, the essence of
OTA's unique role becomes clear. In effect, OTA has served as a
critical translation link between the widespread technical
knowledge of the academic, scientific, and professional experts
and the policy-oriented queries and concerns of congressional
committees. OTA effects this translation in a thorough, in-
depth fashion that focuses on future-oriented policy options
for Congress. In brief, OTA is the interface between Congress
and the nation's science and technology community. For all of
the reasons that have been cited, neither CRS nor GAO can
fulfill that function.
OTA After Gibbons: 1993-1995
After 15 years of high achievement as OTA Director, Gibbons
resigned in early 1993 to join the new administration as
Science and Technology Adviser to the President and Director of
the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. He was
succeeded by Dr. Roger C. Herdman who had been serving as an
OTA assistant director, with responsibility for the Health and
Life Sciences Division. In his new role, Dr. Herdman carried on
in the tradition of excellence established by his predecessor.
However, in 1995 there was a sea change in control of
Congress. The new leadership was intent on eliminating a number
of cabinet departments--Energy, Education, and Commerce--and
also on reducing the costs of government, including within the
Legislative Branch. The likeliest target for reduction within
the Congress was one of the support agencies, CBO, CRS, GAO,
and OTA. Of these, OTA was the smallest and most vulnerable.
Accordingly, in order to save money--the FY 1995
appropriation for OTA had been $22 million--the House
Appropriations Committee on June 15, 1995 recommended
elimination of funding for OTA. On June 22 following a failed
effort by Representative Vic Fazio (D-CA) to restore OTA
funding, the House passed the FY 1996 Legislative Branch
Appropriations bill with no funding for OTA. The House also
eliminated the Joint Committee on Printing, reduced the Joint
Economic Committee budget by 25 percent, cut House committee
budgets overall by a total of $40 million, and the GAO budget
by $57 million. So the elimination of OTA's appropriation
occurred within a context of extreme cost-cutting measures
across the board. \82\
On July 18 the Senate Appropriations Committee reported out
its bill, including $3.6 million for OTA--but solely for the
purpose of closing down the office. Senator Ernest F. Hollings,
who had served on the OTA board for 23 years, had led an
unsuccessful fight in committee to restore full funding. Again
on the Senate floor on July 20, he offered an amendment to the
committee bill to provide OTA with $15 million. Although his
amendment was supported by then Minority Leader Daschle,
Appropriations Committee ranking Democrat, Senator Byrd, as
well as all other senators who had served on the OTA Board--
Senators Grassley, Hatch, Kennedy, and Stevens--it still went
down to defeat.
"While lauding the past successes of the Office of
Technology Assessment (OTA), [opponents of the amendment]
stated that Senators . . . should support efforts to conserve
taxpayers' funds and streamline the bureaucracy surrounding
Congress." \83\ Senator Hollings retorted: "What you're doing
is eliminating the most economical approach to this
technological need." \84\ Senator Kennedy said: "The Office
of Technology Assessment . . . continues to serve an
indispensable role . . . it should not be abolished." Senator
Grassley noted: "OTA is our source of objective counsel when
it comes to science and technology and its interaction with
public policy decision making . . . [I]f we do not have an
unbiased source of information, then we have to rely on
organizations with a stake in keeping alive programs that
benefit their interests." Senator Hatch added: "OTA . . . is
the one arm of Congress that does give us . . . unbiased,
scientific and technical expertise that we could not otherwise
get where most everybody has confidence in what they do." And
Senator Stevens stated: "[W]e are about ready to do away with
the one entity in the Congress that tries to . . . deliver to
Members of Congress credible, timely reports on the development
of technology. I believe . . . that we are changing the course
of history in this Congress, but this is not one of the
hallmarks of that change. This entity (OTA) ought to be out in
the forefront of that change, and it will not be unless it is
properly funded and maintained." \85\
In the conference committee, Representative Fazio made
another unsuccessful attempt to restore funding for OTA. In
that debate Representative Ray Thornton (D-AK) made a
rhetorical connection between the elimination of OTA's funds
and the inclusion in the bill of funds to renovate the
congressional Botanic Garden. He said: "The arguments that
there are alternatives to OTA apply equally to [the Botanic
Garden, which] could be privatized. There are florists all over
the country. If we're going to cancel the garden of the mind--
OTA--then we can't afford to keep a [Botanic] garden." \86\
The House adopted the conference report on September 6, and
the Senate followed suit on September 22, with a proponent of
the bill stating: "This bill sets the standard. If we in
Congress can cut our own budget, every federal agency should be
able to do the same." The President vetoed the bill on October
3, because Congress submitted it to him prior to passing
appropriations measures for various Executive Branch
departments and agencies. After re-introducing the identical
bill, the House passed it again on October 31, and the Senate
on November 2. This time the bill was sent to the President,
coupled with the appropriation for the Treasury Department and
the White House, and he signed it into law on November 17.\87\
OTA had already ceased regular operations on September 29, the
last work day of FY 1995. A skeleton staff was retained for a
few months at the start of FY 1996, in order to archive OTA's
records, arrange for internet access to its reports at various
university sites, close out its personnel and financial
commitments, dispose of its computers, furniture, and other
equipment, and prepare its Annual Report to Congress for FY
1995. \88\
* * * * *
Findings
The findings that emerge from the foregoing discussion are
as follows:
Technology is critical to U.S. success in the War on
Terrorism and ensuring homeland security.
A wide variety of sophisticated technologies may be
involved in those efforts.
Choosing among possible technologies and patterns of
implementation is a complex process, oftentimes
involving unintended consequences.
Technology assessment is the methodology for making
such choices.
The leading exemplar of technology assessment was
the congressional Office of Technology Assessment
(OTA).
For almost a quarter of a century, OTA provided
Congress with valuable analyses of policy options on
important issues involving technology.
During that period OTA achieved a world-wide
reputation for excellence, as a non-partisan,
objective, and credible conductor of technology
assessments.
There was no dissatisfaction with its performance;
indeed OTA received accolades for its excellent work
while its funding was being eliminated.
Elimination of its funding was a cost-cutting
measure at a time of fiscal stringency and a symbol for
Executive Branch agencies to emulate.
Congress now needs its own source of non-partisan,
objective technology assessment in order to fulfill its
legislative, appropriation, and oversight
responsibilities in the War on Terrorism and ensuring
homeland security.
CONCLUSION
Fortunately, in 1995 when OTA's funding was discontinued,
its enabling statute remained in effect; no action was taken to
rescind it. So the law establishing OTA is still on the books.
OTA still technically exists. For practical purposes, what does
this mean?
To determine its import, it's necessary to examine the
provisions of the enabling statute, the Technology Assessment
Act of 1972. Section 3(b) of the act states that OTA "shall
consist of a Technology Assessment Board . . . and a
Director." Discontinuing OTA's funding vacated the positions
of the director and the staff, but the Board still technically
exists. Moreover, since the Senate is a continuing body and the
act does not limit the tenure of its members, the Senators who
were Board members in 1995--Senators Grassley, Hatch, Hollings,
and Kennedy--are still Board members. Since the House is not a
continuing body, it could be argued that the current House
members who were on TAB in 1995--Representatives Dingell,
Houghton, McDermott, and Oxley--would not still be members.
However, the facts that TAB is an independent board, rather
than a congressional joint committee and that the OTA statute
does not impose any time limit on board appointments provide a
basis for arguing that they still are members of TAB. In any
case, section 4(b) of the act stipulates that: "Vacancies in
the membership of the Board shall not affect the power of the
remaining members to execute the functions of the Board." In
addition, the appropriations section of the act, section 12(a)
states that: "To enable the Office to carry out its powers and
duties, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the
Office [following its first 2 fiscal years of existence] . . .
"thereafter such sums as may be necessary." \89\
In short, OTA has an ongoing authorization to receive
appropriations, and the Technology Assessment Board (TAB) is
empowered to submit a recommendation to the Appropriations
Committee for such an appropriation. Given these facts and the
finding that Congress needs its own source of technology
assessment to fulfill its role in the War on Terrorism and
ensuring homeland security, it is the conclusion of this author
that OTA should be reactivated.
But to underscore the urgent necessity for reactivating
OTA, it is instructive to consider one final example of OTA's
potential impact on the War on Terrorism and homeland security.
As is well known, the anthrax attacks last fall engendered
considerable confusion and consternation among public health
authorities, public safety officials, and policy makers
throughout federal, state, and local government. There was
great uncertainty as to the source and extent of the attacks,
the potency and persistence of the anthrax spores, the manner
of transmission, and--not least--the number of spores necessary
to trigger inhalation anthrax in human beings. In the course of
reacting to the attacks, it was widely reported that it was
believed that 8,000-10,000 spores would have to be inhaled for
a person to contract inhalation or pulmonary anthrax. This
belief undoubtedly played a role in shaping the public health
response to the attacks.
It's unfortunate that OTA was not operational at that time.
If it had been, OTA staff could have ensured that a 1993 OTA
report was promptly brought to the attention of the public
health authorities. The report entitled Technologies Underlying
Weapons of Mass Destruction contained the following finding:
"1,000 spores or less can produce fatal pulmonary anthrax in
some members of an exposed population." \90\ If this
information had been readily available, it's conceivable that
it even could have saved a life or--at the very least--afforded
much better guidance to the public health authorities in
designing their response to the crisis.
* * * * *
RECOMMENDATIONS
The War on Terrorism and the striving for homeland security
are urgent national necessities. However, the reactivation of
OTA is equally urgent, if Congress is to be empowered to
partner with the President in pursuit of those objectives--in
its role as a co-equal branch of government.
The sooner Congress can reactivate OTA, the sooner it can
effectively deal with those issues. Once OTA receives an
appropriation, it still will take some months to build its
staff and network of outside advisers, and to work with the
congressional committees to delineate an assessment agenda that
meets their priority needs. At this time of national challenge,
waiting until the start of the next fiscal year, October 1,
2002, is too long a period to remain without this resource.
Accordingly, an appropriation for OTA should be included in the
next supplemental appropriations bill to come before the
Congress.
A key question then becomes: How much should be provided
for OTA in this bill? In the current situation of fiscal
stringency, one should allocate only enough to reactivate the
office effectively. This in turn hinges on what the office
would be doing for the balance of this fiscal year.
After a few essential staff members have been appointed,
their primary function would be to canvass and consult with
congressional committees in both the House and Senate in order
to ascertain their priority needs for technology assessments
with respect to the War on Terrorism and homeland security. The
task would then be to plan a series of assessments designed to
meet those priority needs. Concurrently with these activities,
the office would be identifying potential outside advisers on
whom OTA could rely, and under the guidance of the Technology
Assessment Board, preparing a detailed budget submission for
the following fiscal year that would provide OTA with the
resources to proceed with a number of high priority
assessments.
It is believed that a supplemental appropriation of $1
million would be sufficient for OTA to carry out these initial
activities effectively. Considering that this $1 million would
reactivate an Office that could aid Congress in evaluating the
$38 billion the President has recently requested for homeland
security, the $1 million amount does not seem unreasonable.
Recommendation: In the first supplemental appropriation
bill considered in this session, Congress should include $1
million for OTA to canvass and consult with congressional
committees, and plan a series of technology assessments
designed to meet the priority needs of those committees with
respect to the War on Terrorism and homeland security.
* * * * *
NOTES
1. Sean Ford, "Small Influential Office Guides Congress
Into Space Age," Federal Times, 13 June 1988, 18.
2. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, December
1993, 78.
3. William J. Broad, Stephen Engelberg, and James Glanz,
"A Nation Challenged: The Threats; Assessing Risks, Chemical,
Biological, Even Nuclear," New York Times, 1 Nov. 2001, AI.
4. John Schwartz, "A Nation Challenged: The Computer
Networks; Cyberspace Seen as Potential Battleground," New York
Times, 23 Nov. 2001, B5.
5. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1998) 180-181.
6. It should be noted that water systems are vulnerable not
only to chemical or biological contamination, but also to
cyber-terrorism: ". . . essentially every component of the
water supply system is highly automated. This includes
electronic control of water pumping and storing, water
treatment operations, and water transmission . . . [G]reat
damage could be done if the control of these systems were lost
for a period of time due to cyber attack." U.S. Congress,
House Committee on Science. "Safety of Our Nation's Water,"
testimony by Richard G. Luthy, Professor of Civil and
Environmental Engineering, Stanford University and Chair, Water
Science and Technology Board, National Research Council, 107th
Cong., 1st sess., 14 Nov. 2001.
7. Matthew L. Wald, "Electric Power System Is Called
`Vulnerable,' and Vigilance Is Sought," New York Times, 28
Feb. 2002, A11.
8. President George W. Bush, "State of the Union," U.S.
Capitol, Washington, D.C., 29 Jan. 2002.
9. Ibid.
10. Phillip B. Heymann, Terrorism and America: A Common
Sense Strategy for a Democratic Society (Cambridge: The MIT
Press, 1998) 134-136.
11. Mary Jordan, "Ridge Calls Security at Border
`Outdated'," Washington Post, 6 March 2002, A11.
12. Robert Montgomery, "A Look at Cellular's Alarming
Technology," Mastering Security (Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt, 1996)
12.
13. Robert De Lia, "Seeing Into the World of Fiber Optics
for Security," Mastering Security (Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt,
1996) 17.
14. Donald R. Jones, Jr., Executive Vice President,
NetTalon Security Systems, Inc., Personal Interview, 6 Dec.
2001.
15. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science. "Aviation
Security: Technology's Role in Addressing Vulnerabilities,"
testimony by Keith O. Fultz, Assistant Comptroller General,
Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division,
General Accounting Office, 19 Sept. 1996, 7-12.
16. National Research Council, Detection of Explosives for
Commercial Aviation Security, Executive Summary (Washington,
D.C.: National Academy Press, 1993),
7-12.
17. Jim Dawson, "National Labs Focus on Tools Against
Terrorism in Wake of Airliner and Anthrax Attacks," Physics
Today, Jan. 2002, 19-22.
18. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science. "Aviation
Security," 8-9.
19. Cynthia L. Webb, "A Handy Security Solution: Aether
Software Gets Tryout on Handhelds at Boston Airport,"
Washington Post, 16 Jan. 2002, E5.
20. National Research Council, Airline Passenger Security
Screening: New Technologies and Implementation Issues,
Executive Summary (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press,
1996) 3.
21. Jeffrey Rosen, "A Watchful State," New York Times, 7
Oct. 2001, 6-38.
22. Donald R. Richards, "ID Technology Faces the Future,"
Mastering Security (Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt, 1996) 78.
23. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science, "Cyber
Security: Beyond the Maginot Line," testimony by Wm. A. Wulf,
President, National Academy of Engineering and AT&T Professor
of Engineering and Applied Science, University of Virginia,
107th Cong., 1st sess., 10 Oct. 2001.
24. Robert O'Harrow Jr., "Key U.S. Computer Systems Called
Vulnerable to Attack; Defense, FAA Among Agencies Lacking
Security, Experts Say," Washington Post, 27 Sept. 2001, A6.
25. Sada Yoshi Ohbu, et al., "Sarin Poisoning on Tokyo
Subway," Southern Medical Journal, 3 June 1997, 1.
26. Lyndsey Layton, "Drill Tests Response to Attack In
Metro; Exercise Gauges Chemical Threats," Washington Post, 5
Dec. 2001, B8.
27. Dawson, "National Labs Focus," 19-20.
28. Ellen Nakashima, "USPS Sees New Way to Spot
Biohazards," Washington Post, 9 Mar. 2002, A13.
29. Marian Burros, "Eating Well; A Vulnerable Food Supply,
A Call for More Safety," New York Times, 31 Oct. 2001, Fl.
30. National Research Council, Improving Civilian Medical
Response to Chemical or Biological Terrorist Incidents,
Executive Summary (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press,
1998) 3.
31. Ceci Connolly, "Bush Promotes Plans To Fight
Bioterrorism," Washington Post, 6 Feb. 2002, A3+.
32. Avram Goldstein, "Anti-Terror Campaign Turns to
Doctors; Physicians Scramble to Learn About Bio-Weapons; Some
Urge Mandated Training," Washington Post, 14 Oct. 2001, A12.
33. Joby Warrick and Steve Fainaru, "Bioterrorism
Preparations Lacking at Lowest Levels; Despite Warnings and
Funds, Local Defenses Come Up Short," Washington Post, 22 Oct.
2001, A7.
34. National Research Council, Chemical and Biological
Terrorism: Research and Development to Improve Civilian Medical
Response, Executive Summary (Washington, D.C.: National Academy
Press, 1999) 5-6.
35. Eric Pianin and Bill Miller, "Security Permeates
Budget: Many Agencies Would Share $37.7 Billion in New Funds,"
Washington Post, 5 Feb. 2002, A7.
36. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, "A Nation Challenged: The
Disease; Ill Postal Worker Has Symptoms That Stop Short of
Anthrax," New York Times, 11 Jan. 2002, A11.
37. David Brown, "Agency With Most Need Didn't Get Anthrax
Data," Washington Post, 11 Feb. 2002, A3.
38. Dawson, "National Labs Focus," 21.
39. Jones, Personal Interview.
40. George Musser, "Better Killing Through Chemistry:
Buying Chemical Weapons Material Through the Mail is Quick and
Easy," Scientific American, Dec. 2001, 20-21.
41. Terence Chea, "Firm's Anti-Nerve Gas Device
Approved," Washington Post, 30 Jan. 2002, E5.
42. Dawson, "National Labs Focus," 20.
43. Ibid. 21.
44. John Mesenbrink, "Fighting the War on Bioterrorism,"
Security Magazine, 4 Jan. 2002, 3.
45. Gina Kolata, "Treatments; On Many Fronts, Experts Plan
for the Unthinkable: Biowarfare," New York Times, 23 Oct.
2001, F4.
46. Steve Twomey, "A Recipe for Safe Mail," Washington
Post, 30 Jan. 2002, Al+.
47. National Research Council, Chemical and Biological
Terrorism, 8.
48. Pianin, "Security Permeates Budget."
49. "Freon," Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. 9, 1973 ed.,
924.
50. John Schwartz, "The Irradiation of Mail Can Also Zap
the Contents," New York Times, 11 Feb. 2002, C2.
51. Twomey, "A Recipe For Safe Mail."
52. Andrew DeMillo and Allan Lengel, "Fumes From Mail
Sicken 11 at Commerce," Washington Post, 11 Jan. 2002, B9.
53. Spencer S. Hsu, "73 Senate Workers Report Illness,"
Washington Post, 7 Feb. 2002, B1+.
54. Spencer S. Hsu, "Workers Handling Government Mail
Report Illness," Washington Post, 9 Feb. 2002, A6.
55. Hsu, "73 Senate Workers Report Illness."
56. Schwartz, "The Irradiation of Mail."
57. Sherry L. Harowitz, "More Than Meets the Eye,"
Mastering Security (Dubuque: Kendal1/Hunt, 1996) 73.
58. Richards, "ID Technology Faces the Future," 79.
59. Sara Kehaulani Goo, "Nonlethal Weapons Pose Own Risks
in Air, Report Says," Washington Post, 6 March 2002, A11.
60. National Research Council, Airline Passenger Security
Screening, 3.
61. Rosen, "A Watchful State."
62. Clive Norris and Gary Armstrong, The Maximum
Surveillance Society: The Rise of the CCTV (New York: Berg,
1999) 42.
63. AP, "Resistance Builds to Cipro, Study Says," New
York Times, 7 Feb. 2002, A18.
64. Kate Zernike and Christopher Drew, "Efforts to Track
Foreign Students Are Said to Lag," New York Times, 28 Jan.
2002, Al +.
65. U.S. Congress, Senate, Office of Technology Assessment
for the Congress, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Computer
Services of the Committee on Rules and Administration, 92nd
Cong., 2nd Sess., 2 March 1972, 72.
66. Vary T. Coates, Technology and Public Policy: The
Process of Technology Assessment in the Federal Government
(Washington, D.C., Program of Policy Studies in Science and
Technology, The George Washington University) July 1972, I:14-
36.
67. U.S. Congress, House, Office of Technology Assessment:
Background and Status, Report to the Committee on Science and
Astronautics, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., Aug. 1973, 14-17.
68. "Technology Assessment Act of 1972," Public Law 92-
484 (2 U.S.C 471-481).
69. U.S. Congress, Senate, Technology Assessment for the
Congress, Staff Study of the Subcommittee on Computer Services
of the Committee on Rules and Administration, 92nd Cong., 2nd
Sess., 1 Nov. 1972, 41.
70. U.S. Congress, Senate, Office of Technology Assessment,
Excerpt of Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on
Appropriations, Fiscal Years 1973 and 1974, 93rd Cong., 1st
Sess., 9 May & 20 June 1973, 11-14.
71. U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Support Agencies,
Prepared for the Commission on the Operation of the Senate,
94th Cong., 2nd Sess., 55.
72. David Dickson, The New Politics of Science (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1998) 242.
73. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Annual
Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 1995, 6.
74. Ibid. 7-8.
75. Ford, "Small Influential Office Guides Congress Into
Space Age," 18.
76. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress,
Office of Technology Assessment: Background and Status, Aug.
1973, 13-17.
77. "Technology Assessment Act," sec. 7(a).
78. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, What
OTA Is--What QTA Does--How OTA Works, 1989, 8.
79. Mottur, Alfred E., Institutional Innovation in the
Congress: The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA),
"Sentinels of the Republic Scholar" Honors Thesis, Williams
College, Williamstown, MA, 1989, 37.
80. Ibid. 108.
81. U.S. Congress, Senate, Office of Technology Assessment,
Excerpt of Hearings, 1973, 11-14.
82. CQ Almanac, "Congress Cuts Legislative Funds," 1995,
11-61.
83. U.S. Congress, Senate Democratic Policy Committee,
Senate Voting Record, No. 316, "Legislative Branch
Appropriations, 1996, OTA," July 20, 1995.
84. CQ Almanac, 11-64
85. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Annual
Report, 36-38.
86. CQ Almanac, 11--64-65.
87. Ibid. 11-65.
88. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Annual
Report, 40.
89. "Technology Assessment Act," sec. 3(b), sec. 4(b),
and sec. 12(a).
90. Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies
Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, 78.
