Testimony of
Dave McCurdy
President
Electronic
Industries Alliance
Before the
Regarding
S. 1867, a bill to establish the
National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
I. INTRODUCTION
I am also a former Member of
Congress from Oklahoma. During my
14-year tenure (1981-1995), I served as Chairman of the House Intelligence
Committee, as well as Chairman of the Armed Services Subcommittee on Military
Facilities and the Science Subcommittee on Aviation, Transportation and
Materials. In addition, I have served
as a member of the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal
Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD
Commission; July 14, 1999).
The commission proposed in S. 1867 is charged with
one of the most serious and significant tasks in our nation’s history. In the aftermath of the September 11
attacks, the United States is united
in its resolve to take the war to the terrorist organizations, as well as the
countries that harbor and support them.
Not since World War II has the country rallied and come together to face
a common enemy, albeit an amorphous and insidious variety.
The most fundamental role and responsibility of government and Congress
is to provide for our common defense. I
commend President Bush, the Administration and Congress for the remarkable
leadership and crisis-management we have witnessed since the September 11
attacks. I share the note of caution,
that even though we have completed the first phase of this war by eliminating
the Taliban and al-Qaida hold on Afghanistan, there is still much to be done to
successfully prosecute the campaign against terrorism. It is imperative that nothing interferes
with or impedes the prosecution of the war or efforts to bolster the defense of
our homeland.
Nevertheless, the requirements of this ongoing war must be balanced
with the right of Americans to know why our intelligence, defense and law
enforcement agencies were unable to prevent the attacks. Without question, now is not the time to
point fingers or look for scapegoats.
But we must understand the causes, identify the weaknesses, and correct
the lapses that allowed this catastrophe to occur. The American people deserve a forthright and complete accounting
of the circumstances of that day. Above
all, we must do all we can to ensure that such an attack never happens again.
There are five Senate and five House Committees that
have jurisdiction and authority to conduct investigations and to review what
happened. Arguably, there are even
more, including this one. I certainly
have the highest confidence in the leadership of these respective committees,
particularly my former colleagues and current chairmen of the Intelligence
Committees, Senator Graham and Congressman Goss and the Armed Services
Committees Senator Levin and Congressman Stump. However, a commission has the advantage of being independent,
singularly focused and able to work outside the glare of the media. For these reasons, I support forming a
commission to investigate the terrorist attacks upon the United States.
In my experience,
commissions work because they are not constrained by arbitrary jurisdiction or
turf-wars and thus have the ability to step back and take a more holistic
view. In this instance, a commission
can objectively collect facts, evaluate the evidence and review the mission and
effectiveness of the federal, state, local and private organizations charged
with our safety. Commissions are
valuable because they are generally non-partisan and, when effectively chaired,
seek consensus based recommendations and solutions. Operating an effective commission on the September 11 attacks
will not be an easy task, but there already has been much valuable forensic
work performed by the intelligence community, law enforcement and the media to
build upon.
Based on my government experience with congressional committees,
presidential and congressional commissions, and war games, as well as my
private-sector experience in the technology industry, I believe there are
numerous questions that this commission must investigate. It is especially important not to have
pre-conceived notions, and in this case there are still many more questions
than answers. These questions include,
but are certainly not limited to the following:
o
Is
there a clear chain of command and authority?
o
Who
is responsible and accountable at each level?
o
Are
the missions relevant and current?
o
What
are the organizational impediments to effective collection, analysis and
dissemination of intelligence and information?
o
Is
technology being used to its fullest potential to provide effective information
management?
o
How
much coordination is there between agencies?
o
Was
there clear direction from the command authority and managers?
o
What
indications and warnings (I & W) mechanisms were in place, how effective
are they?
o
How
do you detect the meaningful signals from the noise?
o
What
was the relative prioritization of effort and resources?
o
Were
the domestic and foreign intelligence services provided the tools and latitude
they needed to preempt, deter and prevent atrocities?
o
Were
there individual lapses or omissions?
o
What
is the role of government versus private organizations?
o
What
are the standards for security in the airline industry and were they followed?
o
What
is being done to remedy the problems?
A priority for this commission must be to
complement, rather than compete with the efforts of Congress. Similarly, cooperation with the relevant
Executive branch agencies will be essential.
I am confident that these issues can be worked through. Indeed, both Congress and the Administration
deserve enormous credit for the actions which have already been taken, such as
the establishment of the Homeland Security Office to improve coordination, the
Patriot Act, and the airline security legislation. In addition, the President’s budget proposal clearly makes
homeland security a top priority.
Still, this commission could serve a valuable role in looking at these
additional measures and identifying areas that may require greater attention.
I am also confident that the failures that resulted
in the terrorist strike will be revealed and addressed. But this outcome is not automatic. Bureaucracies have a natural tendency to prepare
to “fight the last war” rather than the next one. A commission can be particularly helpful in taking a
comprehensive view of the events of September 11, and fashioning
recommendations that mitigate this tendency.
Charles Darwin observed that it is not the strongest
nor the most intelligent that survive, but the ones most responsive to change.
The September 11 attacks were brilliantly evil; they were entirely “outside the
box” of what we thought likely. Now it
is our turn to adapt. To win this new war,
government must change how it thinks and acts and do a much better job of coordinating
its assets.