Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

8 April 2002

The Honorable Bob Graham
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Enclosed are the unclassified responses to the Questions for the Record from the Worldwide Threat Hearing on 6 February 2002.

Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to call me or have a member of your staff contact Jeff Powell of my staff at (703)482-7642.

An original of this letter is also being sent to Vice Chairman Shelby.

Sincerely,

Stanley K. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

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The Intelligence Community's Ability to Monitor Terrorist Activity

1) What are the Intelligence Community's greatest strengths and deficiencies in monitoring terrorism? What lessons have you learned from September 11 to address any shortcomings? Do you all believe that you have sufficient resources to light the war on terrorism?

• The Intelligence Community's ability to draw on existing collection capabilities and cooperation from allies around the world is among its greatest strengths in combating torrorism--particularly efforts against al-Qa'ida, our greatest terrorist threat. These capabilities have resulted in the arrest of nearly 1,000 al-Qa'ida operatives in over 60 countries, and have disrupted terrorist operations and potential terrorist attacks. The IC's collection and operational initiatives also supported strikes against Taliban and al-Qa'ida targets in Afghanistan.

• The IC's close interaction with other US Government agencies in efforts to monitor or disrupt potential terrorist activities is a key strength in countering threats to the continental United States. This includes close collaboration with the FBI, FAA, Secret Service, and other organizations regarding potential domestic threats. Such efforts have produced threat reports that identify travel plans for suspected terrorists to support immigration databases and other tracking systems that identify individuals of concern.

• The IC works closely with other US government agencies and allied governments in countering terrorist threats overseas. These efforts include the dissemination of threat warning reports to overseas facilities and US government agencies to support decisions on protective measures and other efforts to disrupt or mitigate the threat.

• The attacks on 11 September reinforced the IC's assessment that al-Qa'ida practices robust operational security that can frustrate efforts to identify the specific timing and location of some operations. This represents a continuing challenge for the Intelligence Community at a tactical level. The attacks have also reinforced the importance of close collaboration with other US Government agencies on counterterrorism matters--particularly when the threat is not well defined in terms of timing and targets. After 11 September, the CIA and FBI expanded their cooperation by producing a joint, daily terrorist threat assessment for senior officials to keep them apprised of the latest threat developments.

• The worldwide security crackdown since 11 September has forced al-Qa'ida to operate more clandestinely. This complicates Intelligence Community and law enforcement measures to disrupt al-Qa'ida cells already in place in Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere. We know the group's modus operandi is to have multiple attack plans in the works simultaneously, and to have cells in place to conduct them long before any attack is to take place. The events of 11 September, therefore, reinforce the importance of maintaining robust collection capabilities while also collaborating with allies around the world in efforts to monitor and disrupt terrorism.

• Although the 11 September attacks and other terrorist events since then demonstrate that terrorists are developing innovative attack schemes while they also continue to use conventional weapons, we are concerned that groups are showing a growing interest in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. Indeed, documents recovered from al-0a'ida facilities in Afghanistan since 11 September show that Bin Ladin was pursuing a biological weapons research program. The dual use nature of many CW and BW agents complicates our assessment of offensive programs -- which can be hidden in plants that are virtually indistinguishable from genuine commercial facilities.

• The Intelligence Community has made significant organizational changes to support the war against terrorism. We will address these and their associated resource issues in a classified response.

"The Axis of Evil"

2) In his recent State of the Union message, the President described an "Axis of Evil" consisting of Iran, Iraq and North Korea warranting continued U.S. action. What is the basis for assessing the threat associated with these three countries? From a counterterrorism standpoint, what is more threatening about these countries than others?

• Iran continues to act as a potentially destabilizing element within the Middle East, primarily by pursuing the acquisition of expanded WMD and ballistic missile capabilities, working against the resumption of Middle East peace negotiations, and supporting terrorist groups.

• Tehran has some of the most advanced WMD and ballistic missile programs in the Middle East. Although Iran has denied that it is developing WMD programs, Iranian leaders have stated that they view ballistic missiles as vital to the security of the regime.

• Although Tehran has denied that it supports terrorism--including Palestinian rejectionist groups and Hizballah--Iranian armaments and ammunition constituted a large portion of the weapons discovered aboard the merchant ship recently seized by Israeli forces.

• Iraq continues to build and expand an infrastructure capable of producing WMD. Baghdad is expanding its civilian chemical industry in ways that could be diverted quickly to manufacturing CW agents, and retains a significant amount of dual-use infrastructure that could support a rejuvenated nuclear weapons program.

• Baghdad also has a history of supporting terrorism, and has often altered its targets to reflect changing priorities and goals, including the aborted terrorist attack planned in 1993 against former President Bush. Iraq has worked to rebuild its intelligence networks abroad and maintains close ties with several Palestinian rejectionist and Iranian opposition terrorist groups, which have the infrastructure and experience to become more active against US interests should Saddam encourage them.

• North Korea remains a proliferator of high concern to the Intelligence Community. Its export of ballistic missiles, system components, and production capabilities--together with P'yongyang's willingness, for a price--to share its expertise on these systems contributes to the threat posed by the North's client states and undermines regional stability.

Measuring Success In the War on Terrorism

3) What is the analytic assessment of the relationship between the current war on terrorism and the level of threat from terrorism? Is the war successful, if success is measured in lowered threat levels?

• The war on terrorism is not yet won, but we have made significant progress during this first stage of the fight. The al-0a'ida leadership is on the run, command and control are more difficult, and the Afghan safehaven is no longer available for large-scale training and support activities.

• We have delivered a message to state supporters of anti-US terrorism that such activity would carry a heavy price. Increased vigilance on the part of many countries will also moderate the overall threat.

• However, rebel groups around the world that account for the vast majority of terrorist incidents generally are continuing their activities with little or no change. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army in Colombia, for example, last year were the source of about 85 percent of the 200 anti-US incidents worldwide--mostly in the form of strikes on oil and gas pipelines.

The Continuing Threat Posed by Al-Qa'ida

4) What is the status of our efforts against suspected al-Qa'ida cells worldwide? How would you characterize the level of cooperation with the US from foreign intelligence services and law enforcement agencies with the al-Qa'ida target? With respect to cooperation with foreign law enforcement agencies, are we hampered by any lack of legal authorities or agreements? How much information has the Intelligence Community obtained on al-Qa'ida from US military operations in Afghanistan? How long will it take all this information to be translated and analyzed? Please characterize the nature and extent of this information. What, ft any, information have you obtained regarding possible future terrorist attacks or al-0a'ida possession of and ability to use weapons of mass destruction?

• The war on terrorism has dealt major blows to al-Qa'ida's network abroad. Our work with cooperative law enforcement and intelligence services has resulted in the arrest of over 1,300 extremists suspected of association withthe al-Qa'ida organization in over 70 countries. Some of these arrests have disrupted ongoing terrorist planning.

• Our military campaign in Afghanistan has produced a large volume of information on al-Qa'ida's network and activities, drawn from debriefings of detainees and documentary materials, such as videotapes and training manuals. Most of the materials that we have reviewed thus far have been general in nature, allowing us to flesh out our understanding of al-Qa'ida's leadership, structure, and terrorist capabilities, but some reports have been more actionable, providing leads to operatives abroad or ongoing terrorist planning.

• We cannot provide an unclassified response to the remaining parts of this question.

Bin Ladin's Whereabouts

5) What is the Intelligence Community's assessment of whether Usama Bin Ladin is alive and where he might be located?

• This is a question that we cannot address in an unclassified forum.

Status of U.S. Objectives in Afghanistan

6) President Bush has indicated that among U.S. objectives in Afghanistan are the following: deliver to the U.S. all the leaders of al-0a'ida who hide in Afghanistan; release all foreign nationals, including U. S. citizens, who have been unjustly imprisoned; closing every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, and handing over every terrorist, and every person in their support structure, to appropriate authorities; and give the U.S. full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating. Please provide an overview of the status of compliance with these demands. What level of commitment will need to be made to Afghanistan to prevent it from once again becoming a breeding place for international terrorism?

• The Taliban's failure to comply with the President's demands after 11 September prompted the coalition military action - Operation Enduring Freedom - in Afghanistan. The American citizens imprisoned by the Taliban, along with fellow foreign members of the NGO Shelter Now, were freed as a result of the operation.

• All the terrorist training facilities that we knew of beforehand also are closed and large numbers of terrorist personnel have been killed or turned over to our custody.
  
• We are in the process of evaluating captured al-Qa'ida documents, large volumes of which continue to arrive in the United States. Documents recovered include plans and videos associated with possible terrorist operations.

• Significant work remains to be done in establishing the political stability and security that are needed to prevent Afghanistan from reverting to terrorism incubator. We believe the risk of immediate civil war is low, but attacks on targets of opportunity or assassinations of officials could destabilize regions or undermine the Afghan Interim Administration (AIA). Security is most precarious in smaller cities and some rural locations--especially in contested areas such as the east's Paktia and Khowst Provinces.

• The residual al-Qai'da/Taliban fighters and the warlords represent the most significant immediate threat to undermining the AIA. These remnant elements--particularly al Qai'da--are presently well-placed to co-opt local or tribal leaders and use them to re-establish a base from which to challenge the central governments authority and undermine its credibility.

• Reconstruction may be the single most important factor in increasing security throughout Afghanistan and preventing it from again becoming a haven for terrorists--while enhancing the credibility and extending the writ of the central government. This is a long-term process that will rgquire years. Engaging Afghans in rebuilding their country will give them a means to earn a living and could give them an incentive to preserve their communities against any effort by al Qai'da elements to regain a political entré. It would also help reconstitute Afghanistan's labor force.

Duration of the War on Terror

7) In his speech to the Joint Session Of Congress last September 20, President Bush said of the war on terror that "...[I]t will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated." In your opinion, how long will it take to obtain this objective?

• While we are striking major blows against al-Qa'ida--the preeminent global terrorist threat--the underlying causes that drive terrorists will persist. Several troublesome global trends--especially the growing demographic youth bulge in developing nations whose economic systems and political ideologies are under enormous stress--will fuel the rise of more disaffected groups willing to use violence to address their perceived grievances.

• These trends are fueling a growing backlash against globalization itself. Although we view globalization as having been the driver of the world economy in recent years, it has come under attack from those who see it as the source of income disparities, unemployment, slower growth, and financial crises.

Nations Supporting Terrorism

8) In his Speech to a Joint Session of Congress last September 20, President Bush stated that "from this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime." The Secretary of State maintains a list of countries that have "repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism." Currently there are seven countries on the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism--Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, and Sudan. How good is our intelligence on the terrorist activities of these countries? Has the Intelligence Community noted any increase or diminution of these countries' support to terrorism since September 11, 2001?

• Collecting intelligence on what level and types of support these seven states provide to terrorist groups is one of the Intelligence Community's highest priorities. The collection surge against terrorism--thanks in large part to strong Congressional support--will boost our capabilities.

• Iran continues to provide support--including arms transfers--to Palestinian rejectionist groups and Hizballah.

• Iraq has a long history of supporting terrorists, including giving sanctuary to Abu Nidal.

• Syria refuses to restrain Hizballah and Palestinian rejectionist groups. Damascus provides political and logistic support to groups engaged in the Palestinian intifada until a negotiated settlement on the Golan is achieved with Israel. Damascus generally upheld its agreement with Ankara not to support the Kurdish PKK.

• Since 11 September, Libyan leader Mu'ammar Qadhafi repeatedly condemned terrorism, publicly supported the US right to retaliate against al-Qa'ida, and called attention to his efforts to bring Usama Bin Ladin to justice through Interpol for alleged activities against the Libyan Government.

• North Korea, which seeks to escape the economic and strategic consequences of its pariah status, has little incentive in this international environment to order a terrorist operation, either directly or by proxy. Pyongyang, however, continues to provide safehaven to members of the Japanese Communist League-Red Army.

• Cuba likely is unable to provide significant assistance to international terrorist groups because of its limited resources, but Castro continues to allow members of ETA, the FARC, and ELN to live and receive medical care in Cuba.

• Although Sudan has taken steps to crack down on some terrorists, others remain present in Sudan. Sudan condemned the 11 September attacks, and the United Nations recognized Sudan's positive steps against terrorism last year by removing UN sanctions in late September. Sudan continues to demonstrate increased willingness to cooperate with us against terrorism.

Tracking and Freezing Terrorist Assets

9) A major area of U.S. focus has been tracking and freezing the finances of al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups. What have you learned about the nature and extent of terrorist financing that we did not know prior to September ll, 2001? Where are our most important information gaps when it comes to terrorist financing?

• The breadth and depth of our knowledge of terrorist financing has improved since September 11. Although we were aware that Usama Bin Ladin provided tens of millions of dollars a year to the Taliban, other terrorist groups, and his own terrorist infrastructure, we have learned new details on the importance that al-Qa'ida placed on fundraising and finance from the dismantlement of several al-Qa'ida cells and the capture of al-Qa'ida members in Afghanistan. The organization tries to raise funds from mosques, Islamic charities, and individuals--rich and poor--throughout much of the world. This has helped corroborate our view that al-Qa'ida relies on a steady stream of contributions.

• Since September 11, we have devoted substantially greater resources to the terrorist finance effort and have found solid information on al-Qa'ida financial links to numerous regions of the world, such as East Asia, Europe, and the United States. Financial links have helped establish al-Qa'ida associations in several US cities, Spain, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere that have been disrupted by arrests and asset freezes.

• We will never be able to stop all terrorist money flows, but we can definitely slow the rate of terrorist funding and fundraising with foreign cooperation in investigating and freezing accounts, and targeting those that finance terrorists with the same vigor that we target terrorist operatives.

The Threat of Cyber-terrorism

1O) The FBI has issued a nationwide alert to law enforcement agencies and the private sector to prepare for the possibility of attacks against critical infrastructure facilities. Do we have any information that al-Qa'ida had the interest or ability to conduct cyberterrorist operations against the US? What terrorist groups are the likeliest to conduct such operations?

• We are alert to the possibility of cyber warfare attack by terrorists on critical infrastructure systems that rely on electronic and computer networks. Cyberwarfare attacks against our critical infrastructure systems will become an increasingly viable option for terrorists as they become more familiar with these targets, and the technologies required to attack them. Various terrorist groups--including al-Qa'ida and Hizballah--are becoming more adept at using the Internet and computer technologies, and the FBI is monitoring an increasing number of cyber threats.

• The groups most likely to conduct such operations include al-Qa'ida and the Sunni extremists that support their goals against the United States. These groups have both the intentions and the desire to develop some of the cyberskills necessary to forge an effective cyber attack modus operandi.

• Aleph, formedy known as Aum Shinrikyo is the terrorist group that places the highest level of importance on developing cyber skills. These could be applied to cyber attacks against the US. This group identifies itself as a cyber cult and derives millions of dollars a year from computer retailing.

Nuclear Terrorism

11) Perhaps the most frightening terrorist tools are nuclear weapons--including radiological weapons which would disperse hazardous radioactive isotopes. What is the Intelligence Community's assessment of the likelihood that terrorists already possess such weapons? How confident are you that terrorists have not been able to successfully smuggle such nuclear devices into the U.S. already? (U)

• Terrorist groups worldwide have ready access to information on unconventional weapons, including nuclear weapons, via the Internet. We believe that Usama Bin Ladin was seeking to acquire or develop a nuclear device, and Al Qa'ida may be pursuing a radioactive dispersal device -- whatsome call a "dirty bomb" -- which could cause disruption and panic.

• Obtaining a nuclear weapon or acquiring sufficient fissile material and expertise needed to fabricate a crude nuclear device are far greater obstacles to terrorists than the challenge of smuggling a device into the country.

Trying Terrorists by Military Tribunals
(for DCI, DIA, and FBI)

12) On November 13, 2001, President Bush signed a Military Order pertaining to the detention, treatment, and trial of certain non-citizens in the current war against terrorism. Please describe how the Intelligence Community is involved in this process, including the interrogation of prisoners.

• CIA provides intelligence support to the military and law enforcement entities involved in interrogating detainees upon request. Such assistance may involve the utilization of Intelligence community resources to conduct name traces, provide background information on terrorist organizations, develop intelligence requirements for interrogators, and draft analytical assessments of information provided by detainees.

Leaks About the Intelligence Community's Role in the War on Terrorism

13) Since September 11, 2001, there has been a significant amount of information in the press regarding the Intelligence Community's work on the war on terrorism -- particularly Afghanistan. How damaging have these public revelations been to the Intelligence Community's effort and what is being done to plug these leaks?

• There has been a continued degradation of intelligence sources and collection methodologies through media leaks. Sensitive, highly compartmented programs have been discussed, with serious ramifications for assets and our capabilities against hostile elements and enemies. We continue aggressive efforts to identify and prosecute the sources of these leaks.

Possible Terrorist Use of "Conflict Diamonds"

14) The mining and sales of diamonds by parties to armed conflicts-- particularly Angola, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo-- are regarded as a significant factor fueling such hostilities. These diamonds, known as "conflict diamonds," comprise an estimated 3.7 percent to 15 percent of the value of the global diamond trade. Do you have any information that "conflict diamonds" are being used to subsidize the activities of terrorist groups, including al-Qa'ida?

• We are aware of press reports alleging Al-Qa'ida ties to the African diamond trade--the most notable being The Washington Post article "Al Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamond Trade" from November 2001. We are vigorously attempting to verify these reports; most of our information to date does not support the allegations.

• We are also exploring charges that some ethnic Lebanese elements in Africa with long-standing involvement in the diamond trade are providing support to Hizballah.

The Situation in Iraq

15) What is the likelihood that Saddam Husayn will be in power one year from now? How good is the Intelligence Community's ability to ascertain what is going on in Iraq? What is the likeliest scenario for Iraq when Saddam is removed from the scene? How will Iraq and othe rneighboring countries react to Saddam's departure? What evidence does the Intelligence Community have that Iraq may have been involved in the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks? If the US were to take military action to remove Saddam from power, what would be the likely reaction to this from US allies as well as other countries in the region? Is the Iraqi military's readiness at a high enough level to pose a significant threat to neighboring countries? What is the status of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capability?

• Saddam maintains a vise grip on the levers of power through a pervasive intelligence and security apparatus, and even his reduced military force -- which is less than half its pre-Gulf war size -- remains capable of defeating more poorly armed internal opposition groups. In Baghdad, senior government and military officials view their fortunes as tied to Saddam and their allegiance is probably bolstered by the regime's decade long propaganda campaign against UN sanctions and the West which exalts Saddam as necessary for the survival and integrity of the state. Over the next year the regime will continue to use a carrot and stick approach to control the two main groups opposed to its rule: the Shias in the south and the Kurds in the north.

• The nature of post-Saddam Iraq would depend on how and when Saddam left the scene, but any new regime in Baghdad would have to overcome significant obstacles to achieve stability. If Saddam and his inner circle are out of the picture and internal opponents of the regime band together, we assess that a centrist Sunni-led government would be pressed to accept an Iraqi state less centralized than Saddam's. Iraq's restive sectarian and ethnic groups, however, would probably push for greater autonomy. Decades of authoritarian rule have deprived Iraqis of the opportunity to build democratic traditions and parliamentary experience that could help them master the art of consensus building and compromise.

• Even though the Iraqi military is at less than half its pre-war size--it remains capable of threatening Iraq's neighbors. Baghdad continues efforts to import military spare parts and dual-use items in spite of UN sanctions. Iraq's movement of forces to the Kuwaiti border in October 1994 and its seizure of the Kurdish-held city of Irbil in August 1996 demonstrate that the military retains the capacity to organize and execute multi-division operations.

• We assess that Iraq retains a small force of Scud-type missiles similar to the type used to strike Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain during the Gulf war. Iraq is capable of producing and delivering both chemical and biological weapons with ballistic missiles, aircraft and artillery. Iraq continues to build and expand an infrastructure capable of producing WMD. Baghdad is expanding its civilian chemical industry in ways that could be diverted quickly to CW agent production, and retains a significant amount of dual-use infrastructure that could support a rejuvenated nuclear program.

The Situation in Iran

16) What is the status of President Khatami's hold on power? To what extent has he been an agent for democratic reform? Would it be accurate to characterize Iran as being as democratic a government as any other nation in the Islamic world? What is your assessment of the nature and extent of Iran's support for international terrorism? Does Iran continue to provide assistance to Hizaballah in Lebanon and to Islamic-oriented Palestinian groups that oppose the Arab - Israeli peace process, such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)? To what extent has the Iranian government provided support to the effort against al-0a'ida and the Taliban since September 11, 2001? Does Iran continue to receive weaponry & WMD-related technology from China, Russia, and North Korea?

• Although there is widespread discontent with the current Iranian Government, the current regime appears stable for now. Security forces have easily contained dissenters, the public does not appear ready to take to the streets, and no charismatic leader has emerged capable of mobilizing a large cross-section of the population.

• Nevertheless, the public is losing faith in the ballot box as an engine of reform because conservatives' hardball tactics have dashed prospects for reform. The public's preference for nonviolent, gradual change could be quickly transformed into a direct confrontation if the current regime continues to disregard popular will, the conservatives overplay their hand, or the security forces employ excessive force.

• Social and demographic shifts favor the reformers, and over time a new generation of leaders will emerge. Iran has struggled for over 100 years to implement a pluralist form of government, and despite setbacks, this trend has persisted. Although a rapid upheaval is possible, the most likely scenario is a slow transformation of the political process into a more open system.

• Russian, North Korean, and Chinese entities continue to assist Iran's ballistic missile programs, and sustained cooperation suggests that Tehran may intend to develop and deploy a longer-range ballistic missile capability. Iran's success in gaining technology and materials from Russian entities has helped to accelerate development of the Shahab-3 MRBM. Continuing Russian assistance will likely support Iranian efforts to develop new missiles and increase Tehran's seff-sufficiency in missile production.

• Russia remains a key supplier for civilian nuclear programs in Iran. Russian assistance enhances Iran's ability to support nuclear weapons development, even though the ostensible purpose of most of this assistance is civilian applications. Despite Iran's NPT status, the United States is convinced Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program.

• Iran is pursuing civilian biotechnology activities along with its BW program. Russian assistance could further Iran's pursuit of biotechnology for military applications.

• China has sold cruise missiles to Iran, and Chinese firms remain key suppliers of missile-related technology.

• Iran is attempting to develop the capability to produce both plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Tehran has dedicated civilian and military organizations that are acquiring and developing nuclear facilities and technologies inconsistent with a purely peaceful program, but which are critical for the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. A chief goal has been the acquisition of a large, heavy water-moderated, natural uranium-fueled nuclear reactor and associated facilities suitable for production of weapons-grade plutonium. Iran has also investigated different uranium enrichment technologies, but seems to be primarily focused on gas centrifuges.

• We have no indication of a reduction in Iran's support for terrorism in the past year. Since the collapse of the peace process, Iran has continued to support Paleatnian rejectonist groups and Hizballah. Tehran's participation in the attempt to transfer arms to the Palestinian Authority via the Karine A was likely intended to escalate the violence of the intifada and perhaps to strengthen the position of Palestinian elements that prefer armed conflict with Israel.

• We have no information that suggests Iran and Usama Bin Ladin are working together to conduct terrorist operations, but al-Qa'ida members have reportedly transited Iran on their way to and from Afghanistan.

Iranian Missile Capabilities

17) Last December's NIE on the ballistic missile threat states that "Iran is pursuing short- and long-range missile capabilities. Iran has one of the largest missile inventories in the Middle East. The Iranian missile program is designed to confront what specific security threats? Under what circumstances, if any, would Iran be likely to curtail its missile program?

• Iran is developing longer-range ballistic missiles that by 2015 could include ICBMs capable of directly targeting the US. Iran has several hundred Scud Bs, Scud Cs, and Chinese-supplied CSS-8 SRBMs. Iran can now produce Scud missiles and is focusing on developing the 1,300-km Shahab-3 MRSM. Iran has flight-tested the Shahab-3 and can probably deploy a limited number in the event of a crisis. Iranian leaders have publicly mentioned plans for a Shahab-4 and Shahab-5, characterizing them as space launch vehicles (SLVs).

• ICBMs and SLVs share much of the same technology and we assess Iran could use an SLV program to covertly develop an ICBM. Tehran could attempt an ICBM/SLV launch between 2005 and 2010, but some assessments suggest 2015 at the earliest.

• There appears to be a broad consensus among Iranians that they live in a highly dangerous region and face serious external threats to their government, prompting us to assess that Tehran will pursue missile and WMD technologies indefinitely as critical means of national security.

• Despite ongoing friction between conservative and reform-minded elements in Iran, social, political, and economic factors are pushing the regime away from the revolutionary and confrontational ideologies that have guided it over the last 20 years. This change will likely orient Tehran toward pragmatic national interests that are less confrontational with the United States. That said, persistent suspicion of US motives will help preserve the broad consensus among Iran's political elite and public for the pursuit of missile and WMD technologies as a matter of critical national security.

• Iran is unlikely under any circumstances to give up its arsenal of short- and medium-range missiles as they are intended to confront multiple, long-standing regional security threats.

• As Iran's domestic capabilities mature, the potential for further proliferation of sensitive technology increases. Iran has already shown the willingness to export missile-related technology.

Stability of the Jordanian Regime

18) How stable is the Jordanian regime of King Abdullah? What threats does King Abdullah face from Islamic fundamentalists? What is the likelihood that resurgent Palestinian nationalism will destabilize Jordan?

• King Abdallah maintains the support of key pillars of the regime, including the military and security services and East Bank tribal members--native Jordanians who historically have supported the monarchy. The military and security forces are highly capable and can be relied on to deal with threats to the Kingdom.

• Jordanian officials recognize the threat Islamic extremists could pose to the Kingdom's stability and actively work to root out such groups. Jordanian authorities have arrested a number of Islamic extremists who have ties to al-Qaida and other terrorist groups and have imposed stringent sentences on those found guilty of participating in terrorist activities.

• The majority of Jordanian-Palestinians still believe in the legitimacy of the monarchy. Even Palestinian members of the largest opposition group in Jordan--the Muslim Brotherhood--generally consider themselves part of a loyal opposition and do not seek to overthrow the monarchy. Nevertheless, Jordan's majority Palestinian population identifies with the plight of Palestinians in the West Bank and sympathizes with the problems of the Iraqi people. A sharp escalation in Israel-Palestinian violence or a US strike on Iraq could produce significant unrest.

Saudi Arabia

19) How stable is the Saudi government? What factors would be most likely to bring about change in that country? To what extent are the Saudi government and public supportive of the US-led campaign against Usama Bin Ladin and terrorism? To what extent would the removal of US military forces from Saudi Arabia diminish anti-US sentiment both within Saudi Arabia and throughout the Islamic world?

• The Saudi royal family faces increasingly open challenges to its control. These include opposition from disparate elements hostile to the Al Saud and the US military presence, lack of job creation, a rapidly growing population, and over reliance on oil income for government budget revenues. The Saudi economy needs rapid reform to invigorate the private sector, attract domestic and foreign investment, and generate rapid job growth. Finally, growing public access to the Internet and satellite television continues to weaken the Al Saud's historical control of information.

• Crown Prince Abdallah, the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, has strongly endorsed the US-led campaign in Afghanistan. He views Bin Ladin and terrorism as direct threats to his country. The Saudi press has condemned terrorism but criticized US military actions in Afghanistan and warned the United States against widening the campaign to include Arab countries.

• According to press, in a recent Gallup poll of nearly 10,000 Muslims in nine countries, respondents described the United States as "ruthless, aggressive, conceited, arrogant, easily provoked, and biased." Saudi Arabia was among the countries where the respondents registered the most negative views.

• Saudi citizens also view the United States through the optic of the Arab-Israeli relationship and see the United States as one-sided in its support for Israel. This view contributes to anti-US sentiment as much as public resentment ofthe US troop presence.

Stability of the Syrian Regime

20) How stable is the regime of President Bashar el Asad of Syria? What are the most significant threats to his regime? What is the status of Syria's WMD infrastructure, as well as its support for international terrorism?

• President Asad, who succeeded his late father in July 2000, will have to prove himself to key regime power centers in Syria, especially in the military and security services. Conservative senior officials from his father's generation expect him to defend their interests and protect his father's legacy. Asad will have to balance pressures from the "Old Guard" against Syria's need for economic and political reform to meet the needs of its rapidly growing population.

• Syria has not been linked directly to an act of terrorism since 1986, but Damascus provides safehaven and logistical support to Hizballah and several Palestinan terrorist groups either in Syria or Syrian-controlled parts of Lebanon.

• Syria denounced the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States and has expressed a willingness to support US efforts against al-Qaida members, but Syria has not acted to stop anti-Israeli attacks by Hizballah and Palestinian rejectionist groups, which Damascus claims are engaged in a just struggle against Israel's occupation of Palestinian territory.

• Syria has several hundred Scud B and C missiles as well as Soviet-supplied SS-21 SRBMS. All of these missiles are mobile and allow Damascus to target much of Israel and large portions of Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey. Damascus continues to receive significant North Korean assistance in its efforts to domestically produce the Scud-C and develop a new Scud model with a range of up to 700 kilometers.

• Syria, with Iranian assistance, is working to develop a solid-propellant rocket motor production capability. Damascus probably hopes to use solid propellant technology to produce a modern SRBM.

• Syria, an NPT signatory with full-scope safeguards, has a nuclear research center at Dayr Al Hajar. In January 2000, Russia approved a draft cooperative program with Syria that included cooperation on civil nuclear efforts. Access to Russian expertise could provide opportunities for Syria to expand its indigenous capabilities, should it decide to pursue nuclear weapons.

• Syria has a longstanding chemical warfare program and is pursuing the development of biological weapons. It has signed but not ratified the BWC and is not a state party to the CWC. Damascus has a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin that can be delivered by aircraft or ballistic missiles. It is trying to develop the more toxic and persistent nerve agent VX and will likely continue to improve its chemical agent production and delivery infrastructure.

• Damascus remains dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its chemical warfare program, including precursor chemicals and key production equipment. It has adequate biotechnology infrastructure to support a limited biological warfare program.

Qadhafi's Hold on Power in Libya

21) What is your assessment of Qadafi's hold on power in Libya? What is your assessment of Qadafi's ability to both further and frustrate Western policy objectives in the region? What is the status of Libya's weapons of mass destruction infrastructure, as well as its support for international terrorism?

• Qadafi's grip on power appears secure in the near term. He maintains the final decision-making authority on all matters of national interest and has surrounded himself with a core group of apparently loyal supporters who implement his orders.

• Qadafi maintains the ability to complicate Western policy objectives in the region if he so chooses by giving financial support to groups hostile to Western interests.

• Libya continues to pursue WMD and advanced delivery means and remains heavily dependent on foreign assistance to further its programs. The recent suspension of UN sanctions has opened new trade and travel opportunities that are allowing Libya to expand its procurement efforts.

• Libya's current missile capability remains limited to its aging Scud B missiles, although it is continuing its efforts to obtain ballistic missile-related equipment, materials, technology and expertise from foreign sources. Outside assistance is critical to Libya's ballistic missile development programs and may eventually result in Libya achieving its long-desired goal of an MRBM capability within a few years.

• Libya remains dependent on foreign suppliers for precursor chemicals and other key CW-related equipment, and may be re-establishing contacts with sources of expertise, equipment and precursors now that sanctions have been suspended. Tripoli has not given up its goal of establishing its own offensive CW capability and continues to pursue an indigenous production capability for the weapons. Libya also may use its new procurement opportunities to develop an indigenous BW capability.

• Libya continues to develop its nascent nuclear research and development program, but still requires significant foreign assistance to advance to a nuclear weapons option. In early 2000, Tripoli and Moscow continued discussions on cooperation at the Tajura Nuclear Research Center and on a potential power reactor deal. Should this civil-sector work come to fruition, Libya could gain opportunities to conduct weapons related R&D.

Possibility of Support to Terrorists by the Palestinian Authority

22) Is there any evidence to suggest that the Palestinian Authority (PA) has been involved with or supported terrorist activities in the last year? Who would be the likely successor to Arafat as head of the Palestinian Authority? What is the likelihood that the Palestinian leadership will become more radical after Arafat leaves the scene?

• Although individual Palestinian security officers have been involved in attacks against Israelis, they probably were acting on their own rather than in accordance with an established PA policy. Some of these officers may have become involved in militant groups during the intifadah for personal reasons, such as the killing of a family member by Israeli forces. Their participation may have included providing weapons or other support to terrorist operations, or turning a "blind eye" to attacks. Palestinian authorities say that Israeli military attacks against PA facilities in retaliation for attacks by militant groups reduce their officars' ability and incentive to arrest militants.

• Israeli officials charge that a PA policeman opened fire in an outdoor market in Afula on 4 October, killing three Israelis and wounding 17 others. A Fatah-affiliated militant group, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Battalions, claimed credit for the operation. Israeli authorities during the last year have disrupted cells of militants they say included PA police. The PA in late 2001 arrested some members of its security services participating in anti-Israel attacks.

• PA and PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat has no clear-cut successor, and any candidate will have neither the power base nor the leadership qualities necessary to wield full authority in the PA. Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazin), Arafat's principal deputy and Secretary General of the PLO-Executive Committee, and Ahmad Qurei (Abu Ala), Speaker of the PA's Legislative Council, are poised to assume preeminent roles after Arafat. Security chiefs like Muhammad Dahlan and Jabril Rajub and Fatah Tanzim leader Marwan Barghuti are likely to play important supporting roles in the succession.

• According to PA laws, after Arafat's death Ahmad Qurei, in his role as Speaker of the PA's Legislative Council, would assume the duties of PA president for no more than 60 days, during which a new president would be elected. Israeli Academic Ehud Ya'ari predicts the creation of regional coalitions following Arafat's departure in the form of the "United Palestinian Emirates," although not necessarily in a peaceful alliance. He argues that any figurehead will need to possess some of Aratat's credentials and prestige in order to obtain international recognition. It is possible that there will be potentially violent infighting among the competing security services vying for supremacy.

• Any Palestinian leadership after Arafat will have to deal with a Palestinian public that has become more radical since the outbreak of violence in September 2000. According to Palestinian polling data from December 2001, 80 percent of the Palestinian public supports the continuation of the Al-Aqsa intifadah. According to separate Palestinian polling data from December 2001, 92 percent support armed attacks against Israeli soldiers and settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The recent fighting has prompted many Fatah members to participate in attacks on Israelis despite the group's stated support for a negotiated two-state solution.

• Challenged to consolidate control and unable to match Arafat's ability to unite Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and diaspora a new leadership would be more beholden to the sentiment of the Palestinian "street" and less likely to show moderation toward a Palestinian-Israeli peace process.

Vietnam

23) What is your assessment of Vietnam's record on human, religiousand labor rights?

• Vietnam's human rights record remains generally poor despite some improvement in the last decade. Communist leaders are wary of threats to their monopoly on power, especially in the face of dynamic social pressures such as expanding rural-urban migration, rising economic expectations, increased unemployment, and a demographic "youth bulge."

• The Socialist Republic of Vietnam is a one-party state. The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) controls all top government positions and all political, religious, social and labor organizations are under strict government, and thus party, oversight and control. According to State Department reporting, the government restricts civil liberties on grounds of national security and social stability. Privacy rights are restricted, and the government maintains an effective internal security service and household registration system that allows state monitoring of citizens for illegal activities.

• The government significantly restricts freedom of speech, the press. and assembly and association. Freedom of religion, particularly organized religious operations, are restricted and controlled by the government and CPV. Government-controlled worker's associations are widespread and have increasingly played a role in negotiating health, safety, and wage standards. The government is working with the International Labor Organization (ILO) and international donors to improve implementation of the Labor Law, which prohibits forced and child labor.

• The government has become less heavy-handed in its methods of control over the past decade. Hanoi's "zone of indifference"--those activities it tolerates but does not approve of--has grown significantly. Instead of automatic imprisonment, dissidents are now placed under surveillance and sometimes house arrest. Small, controlled demonstrations against local officials are tolerated in some areas, especially in the south. In the last two years the government has extended official recognition--with concurrent central oversight--to several previously banned religious groups.

The Situation in Georgia

24) How strong is Edward Shevardnadze's hold on power? To what extent is he making a serious effort to end corruption and strengthen Georgia's economy? What is the status of Georgia's relationship with Russia?

• Shevardnadze's hold on power remains strong despite his growing unpopularity and the loss of support from several young reformers. Even many of his critics say that there currently is no viable alternative to his leadership.

• Recognizing Georgia's strategic geographic location, Shevardnadze sees Georgia's economic future as a transit state and has provided unwavering support for the planned east-west gas and oil pipeline projeds that will traverse his country. That said, he has made little progress in fighting corruption despite a strong public commitment, which continues to impede economic reform and discourage foreign investment.

• In late 2001, he announced the start of reform of the security ministries, and last month his new security and internal affairs ministers launched operations in the Pankisi Gorge, an area seen as a safe haven for criminals.

• Georgia has difficult relations with Russia because of Shevardnadze's strong western orientation, Russian military bases, and reports of Chechan guerillas in the Pankisi Gorge. Tbilisi and Moscow currently are negotiating a range of issues, including closing three Russian military bases.

Security of the Russian Nuclear Stockpile

25) What is your assessment of the safety and security of the Russian nuclear stockpile (including weapons grade material)? How does the security of the Russian nuclear stockpile compare to the security of the US nuclear stockpile?

• Russian safeguards for its WMD arsenal are uneven despite some improvements made with US assistance. We have no credible evidence that a Russian nuclear warhead has been lost or stolen. We remain concerned about corruption and the negative effect of the post-Soviet decline in military spending on personnel reliability and physical security. Russia employs an extensive array of physical, procedural, and technical measures to protect their nuclear warheads and is deploying US-provided equipment to enhance physical security at their storage sites.

• US efforts to improve Russia's safeguards and security for this material through the Department of Energy International Materials Protection Control, and Accounting program has made only limited progress. A major reason is Russia's reluctance to grant foreigners access to perceived sensitive information about materials used in nuclear weapons and to storage facilities.

Russia's Closure of Intelligence Facilities in Cuba and Vietnam

26) On October 17, 2001, Russia announced that it will close its large electronic intelligence base in Lourdes, Cuba, as well as its naval base in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam. What is the status of the closure of these facilities? What will be the impact of the closure of these facilities on Russia's relations with Cuba and Vietnam?

• Last October, President Putin promised to close the GRU-FAPSI SIGINT facility at Lourdes, Cuba. Press speculation as early as last August suggested that the Kremlin was considering closing the facility, partly to redirect money toward other military modernization efforts. The process of shutting down the facility was to begin on 1 Jan 2002.

• Russian press indicated that a formal closure ceremony was held at Lourdes on 28 December. Russian press reports in mid-January, however, said that the withdrawal was delayed by the Defense Ministry's temporary financial difficulties in servicing aircraft that would be involved in withdrawing equipment and in paying aircrews.

• Russian Defense Ministry officials have stated that most of Lourdes' personnel departed by the end of December with a skeleton crew staying behind to facilitate the dismantlement of equipment. We expect this process to take several months to complete and have no information indicating that the Russians have reversed their decision to close the facility.

• President Putin announced last October that he had directed Russia's Defense Ministry to withdraw from Cam Ranh Bay beginning 1 January 2002. We have seen no official statements since then, however, that a withdrawal is underway. Defense Minister Ivanov has publicly stated that the closure will not affect the "military security interests" of Russia or Vietnam. Moscow's withdrawal appears to suit both Russia -- which has made little use of the facility in recent years -- and Vietnam, and should have little impact on bilateral relations.

Chechnya and Russia

27) What is the status of Russia's effort against Chechen guerrillas? Do we have information about a Chechen connection to Usama Bin Ladin?

• Neither side is prevailing militarily in Chechnya, and both remain committed to attrition warfare to forcing the other side to give up its primary demands. The civilian population of Chechnya is bearing the brunt of both indiscriminate Russian retaliation for guerrilla attacks, and guerrilla assassinations of so-called "National Traitors"--administrators, teachers, policemen, construction workers, and other civil servants--who work for the Moscow-appointed government.

• There are no authoritative figures available for Chechen losses during this conflict, but they are likely to be in the tens of thousands. Russian press sources quote official government claims to have killed as many as 13,000 to 15,000 guerrillas alone since September 1999. Press reports claim that some 80,000 civilians and guerrilla fighters were killed by Russian forces during the 1994-1996 conflict, out of a prewar population of some 750,000 to 800,000.

• The steady drain of Russian casualtes--official spokesmen admit that at least 3,438 soldiers have been killed and 11,661 wounded--could begin exhausting the patience of the Russian public, who may press for a negotiated end to the fighting. Moscow and moderate Chechen nationalists late last year appeared to be moving toward negotiations, but the effort apparently has failed, since neither side was willing to meet the other's minimum conditions for an end to the fighting.

• We have no credible information to indicate that the Chachan Government currently maintains relations with Usama Bin Ladin. Although Chechan President Alsan Maskhadov sought assistance from all quarters--including the Taliban and al-Qa'ida--after the Russians attacked Chechnya in September 1999, concerns that Islamic extremists would gain a bigger foothold in Chechnya and that Chechan insurgents would be labeled terrorists appear to have prompted Maskhadov to distance the Chechen Government from Islamic extremists by mid-2000.

Russian Military Capabilities

28) If present trends continue, what will be the Russian military's capability to conduct operations 5 years from now? Do these trends indicate the possibility that Russia may soon have insufficient military force to retain order within Russia?

• Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia's military has been reduced dramatically but is still not adequately funded. It suffers from poor infrastructure, insufficient training, and low morale, and its equipment inventory is large but aging. As a result, it had only a very limited offensive capability compared to its Soviet predecessor.

• The Russian military has conducted small-scale operations in Chechnya since 1999 that point to marginal improvement compared to the 1994 - 1996 campaign, but also reveal chronic deficiencies, such as poor morale, widespread corruption, and inadequate training.

• Nevertheless, the initial reinforcement of Chechnya in 1999 suggests that the Russian military, particularly its relatively small "permanently ready" forces, can operate on the Russian periphery. Many of Russian's potential adversaries also are even less well-trained and equipped force.

• Russian nuclear forces have not been immune to the problems affecting the rest of the military, but Moscow retains a large number of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. This inventory will likely decline in size significantly over the next decade, but maintaining credible nuclear forces is a key national goal that we judge Moscow will be able to achieve well beyond the next five years.

• The Putin government has limited violent opposition and separatism to the North Caucasus. Moscow has strong support among most elements of the population, reducing the prospects for the sort of widespread violent unrest that would require military intervention.

• The Russian military--even supported by elements of the 100,000 Ministry of Internal Affairs troops and several hundred thousand local policemen--would be hard-pressed to handle two or more operations comparable in size to the Chechnya conflict at once. We have no reason to conclude that Russia will face multiple large-scale internal security problems in the next five years, however, or that its military and paramilitary forces could not retain order in the face of less demanding internal challenges.

Transfer of Technology From Russia

29) What general trends has the Intelligence community noticed of scientists, technology, and conventional and unconventional military sales from Russia to other nations? What trends have you detected that Russian nuclear materials, BW, CW, or ballistic missile-related materials or technology, have found their way to the International black market? What is the current state of transfers of technology from Russia?

• Russia is often the first choice of states seeking advanced technology and training, while Moscow views weapons-related sales as a major source of funds for its commercial and defense industries. The Putin government's commitment, willingness, and ability to curb proliferation-related transfers remains uncertain.

• Russian entities provide a variety of ballistic missile-related goods and technical know-how to countries such as Iran, India, China, and Libya. They are the main suppliers of technology and equipment to India and China's naval nuclear propulsion programs, and key suppliers for civilian nuclear programs in India and Iran. Russian entities also provide other countries with technology and expertise applicable to cruise missile projects.

• Russian entities are a significant source of dual-use biotechnology, chemicals, production technology, and equipment for Iran.

• Russia continues to be a major supplier of conventional arms to countries such as China, Iran, Libya, Sudan, and India.

• We are concerned about the potential for black market sales of nuclear, chemical, or biological material. To date, the few seizures of nuclear material, such as highly enriched uranium or plutonium have generally involved opportunistic thieves or sellers with no prearranged buyers.

The India Pakistan Conflict

30) What is the likelihood that India and Pakistan will go to war within the next year? What is the likelihood that such a conflict would result in an exchange of nuclear weapons? Which nation would likely prevail in such a conflict? Why? What is the likelihood that both India and Pakistan will ultimately agree to accept the Line of Control in Kashmir as their international border?

• The likelihood that India and Pakistan will go to war within the next year is higher than it has been since their last war in 1971, and will remain so as long as their armies are deployed along their shared border on a war footing. Even though the subject has fallen from the headlines, the risk has not declined appreciably since January. Until the issues of cross-border terrorism and Kashmir are resolved, they will remain a flashpoint between the two countries, which have faced the prospect of war on three previous occasions since 1971.

• There is a higher likelihood that nuclear weapons would be exchanged because of India's greater ability to sustain a prolonged conflict, the ambiguity of Pakistani nuclear thresholds, and the potential for miscalculation during war.

• Neither country has a decisive advantage in conventional forces, but India is more capable of prevailing in a war of attrition. Both sides would stand to lose in a nuclear exchange because millions could die as a result. Pakistan would be more devastated, however, because most of its productive capacity is located in the narrow belt between the Indus River and the Indian border within easy range of Indian nuclear weapons.

• Before any resolution of the Kashmir dispute can be reached, the two countries will have to improve diplomatic relations to the point where dialogue can begin. Accepting the Line of Control as the international border would require changes to both countries' publicly stated claims on the disputed territory.

The Situation in North Korea

31) What is the likelihood that North and South Korea will unify within the next five years? What is the likelihood that unification between North and South Korea will be a peaceful process? Under what circumstances would a war be likely? How strong is Kim Chong-Il's hold on power? Who will likely succeed him?

• Leaders in both North and South Korea have spoken publicly of formulas for peaceful unification that encompass years or even decades of intermediate stages. Notwithstanding agreement at the inter-Korean summit in June 2000 that there were similarities between the first stages of each side's formula, P'yongyang has demonstrated no interest in beginning official negotiations with Seoul to reconcile their approaches. The North Korean leadership, in our view, remains preoccupied with ensuring the survival of its regime and makes that a priority over a political settlement resulting in unification.

• We cannot exclude the possibility that state collapse in North Korea could lead to reunification. Although North Korea is a regime under stress, it has demonstrated a willingness to accept hardship for its people and to take whatever steps it deems necessary to maintain domestic order and political control.

• We do not see signs that North Korea is preparing for or contemplating a war of unification anytime soon, but we assess that P'yongyang remains committed to its longstanding goal of eventual preeminence in a unified Korea and has not excluded the use of force to achieve that end. The deterrence provided by the US-South Korean alliance makes war less likely, barring a massive North Korean miscalculation.

• Kim Chong-Il maintains his grip on power through the military, security services, and the party. The economic and political stresses on the country, however, create potential vulnerabilities over time that cannot be quantified or predicted.

• Kim has not formally designated a successor. Family members are available if the regime wants to pursue a dynastic succession, but that would not preclude jockeying among key elites.

Cuba After Castro

32) What is the Intelligence Community's current assessment of what will happen in Cuba after Castro passes from the scene? Does the Intelligence Community believe that the resumption of U.S. trade with Cuba could hasten economic and political reform in Cuba?

• The Castro brothers and their inner circle are developing procedures that the Intelligence Community assesses will have a better than even chance of ensuring a relatively smooth succession, with Raul Castro presiding over a more consultative leadership group committed to the core values of the Cuban revolution - national independence and rough egalitarianism. No successor group, however, will have the stature and legitimacy currently enjoyed by Fidel Castro and they will encounter substantial challenges to include popular pressure for economic progress, early in the succession. Should our most likely line scenario prove accurate, the prospects for long-term stability, democratization, and an open economy still would be far from certain.

• The United States will be faced with both challenges and opportunities as it attempts to balance policy objectives encouraging regime stability with efforts to further democratization in Cuba.

• A less likely but plausible alternative scenario envisions the leadership fragmenting over pressures for change, personal differences and an inability to manage Castro's legacy, resulting in instability, violence, and probably mass migration.

• Resumption of trade under the likely successor government could hasten reform, but probably only over the medium term, and this benefit would depend on the political dynamic within the new leadership. The immediate effect of resuming trade would probably be to reduce pressure for reform by providing modest economic relief--the benefits would be small, as compared with the country's problems--temporarily meeting public demands for improvement in living conditions.

• Over the medium term, however, the loss of sanctions as an excuse for poor performance could boost pressure for market-oriented changes in domestic policy that would yield additional gains. Similarly, the end of sanctions could undermine the siege mentality that has helped hardliners defeat proposals for economic and political reform.

Colombia

33) To what extent is Colombia's weak economy--falling exports, lack of progress on fiscal reforms, high unemployment--having an impact on Colombia's government reform initiatives? What is the likelihood that President Pastrana will be able to reach a final settlement with the FARC within the next year?

• Colombia's anemic growth and record high unemployment continue to limit Bogota's policy options and fiscal resources. Colombia's economy grow only 1.5 percent in 2001, and prospects for 2002 are clouded by insurgent attacks against infrastructure, lack of progress on fiscal reforms, and depressed demand in both domestic and key export markets.

• The government budget has not increased in real terms for the past two years, and defense spending as a percentage of the budget decreased slightly last year. Bogota's fiscal deficit was 3.3 percent of GDP last year, the public debt burden is approaching 50 percent of GDP with debt servicing costs consuming a third of the budget.

• With presidential elections rapidly approaching, the Pastrana administration is poised to leave key reforms to Colombia's next president, including overhauling the near-bankrupt pension system, strengthening tax and revenue sharing systems, revamping labor laws, and improving regulatory and judicial regimes. Budgetary realities will force the next administration to reconcile campaign promises of job creation and increased defense spending with the need for unpopular austerity measures. The presidential candidates have said they will continue to look to the international community for trade and financial assistance.

• The collapse of peace talks has dashed hopes for a settlement with the FARC any time soon. Neither side shows any willingness to make the dramatic concessions or reductions in violence that would be necessary for a negotiated solution.

Haiti

34) Aristide has been confronting growing dissent. At what point will his hold on power be jeopardized? What is the likelihood that we will see an increase in Haitian migrants sailing for the US in the next year?

• President Aristide's backers are increasingly frustrated with his inability to deliver on promises to improve life for ordinary Haitians, and deteriorating government services, failing remittances, and overall economic decay are feeding anti-government sentiment. No challenger can match Aristide's standing, however, in part because his supporters continue to intimidate opponents.

• Public infighting last year suggests Aristide's grip on his party may be weakening. The erosion of Aristide's popularity could embolden challengers, and we cannot rule out the possibility of a coup attempt in the coming year. Aristide's hold on power could be especially vulnerable if economic conditions prompt new, prolonged bouts of social unrest.

• We do not anticipate a mass migration from Haiti this year. We judge, however, that the worsening economic situation in Haiti will increase the number of migrants attempting to enter the United States illegally, especially if political tensions worsen. Rumors of changes in US immigration policy have driven past mass migrations, and we are monitoring several events that have the potential to effect such perceptions:

• Haitians are following the status of the 186 migrants currently in INS processing in Miami after a successful landing in December for signs of shifts in US policy.

• Changes in the Haitian views regarding the disposition of Coast Guard forces and their willingness to repatriate Haitians found at sea. An up tick in migration at the end of 2001 was in part due to perceptions that the Coast Guard had redeployed assets to focus on homeland defense.

Mexico

35) In the year since his inauguration, how successful has Mexico's President Fox been in bringing about an end to corruption, stepping up the fight against illicit narcotics, focusing more on human rights and generally bringing effective governance to his country?

• President Fox has made little progress toward implementing his reform agenda since his inauguration, primarily because the opposition controls Congress. The opposition, for example, pushed through a fiscal reform law in December that differed radically from the administration's proposal, and President Fox says that the resulting lack of budgetary resources will limit his ability to finance his social agenda. In order to obtain energy and labor reforms, President Fox must find a way to capitalize on his broad popular support and gain opposition support in the legislature.

• President Fox has announced several initiatives to strengthen democracy, the rule of law, and human rights, including proposing a law similar to our Freedom of Information Act and appointing a special prosecutor to investigate abuses during the government's struggle against guerrillas in the 1970s and 1980s. To advance this agenda, President Fox must work within the constraints of a law enforcement and judicial system that has been plagued by corruption in the past.

• Fox has demonstrated a commitment to working with the United States to staunch drug trafficking. Maintaining that both Mexico and the United States are responsible for the drug trade, he has made countenarcotics one of his administration's top priorities.

• President Fox is committed to strengthening the bilateral relationship with the United States and he is approaching trade and migration issues in the spirit of dialogue. By eschewing a confrontational style towards the United States, President Fox has more successfully tabled Mexico's own priorities in the bilateral agenda, with migration as the best example.

Implications of US Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty

36) On December 12, 2001, President Bush notified Russia that the US intends to withdraw from the ABM Treaty - the withdrawal to be completed in June of this year. How will Russia react militarily to the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty? What is the likelihood that the deployment of a U.S. ballistic missile defense will lead to the escalation of ballistic missile and tactical missile defense systems by other countries, as well as a commensurate increase in the number of ballistic and tactical missiles to overwhelm these defensive systems?

• IC assessments of the numbers of deployed ballistic missiles take into consideration the effects of a deployment of a US ballistic missile defense (BMD). Estimates of the number of Chinese strategic ballistic missile warheads, 75 to 100 for example, targeted primarily against the United States in 2015 factor in likely Chinese responses, such as multiple RVs on the CSS-4, to a US missile defense system.

• A potential counter to US development of BMD would be the increased development of cruise missiles as an alternative WMD delivery system. This would complicate the air and missile defense problem.

Surprise Missile Attacks

37) In his State of the Union speech, the President alluded to missile defense, noting a threat from surprise missile attacks. What is the basis for assessing this threat? What is the analytic assessment of the effect on threat levels if missile defense is implemented?

• The annual report on the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States serves as the basis for threat assessments. The classified NIE, "Foreign Responses to US National Missile Defense Deployment" published in 2000 also looks at possible foreign responses to changes in related US policies.

• We note, for example, that countries of concern are increasingly interested in acquiring a land-attack cruise missile (LACM) capability. LACMs could pose a serious threat to our deployed forces, even the mainland U.S., by the end ofthe decade. The technical capabilities required to defend against LACMs are different from those required for ballistic missiles, so the introduction of LACMs would significantly complicate the air and missile defense problem, particularly in regions already struggling to come to terms with increasingly capable ballistic missiles.

WMD Delivery Systems

38) What is the most likely delivery system of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to be delivered by terrorists or states against the U.S.? Are the most likely adversaries of the U.S. acquiring weapons of mass destruction and missiles as deterrence or as an offensive military capability to use against the U.S. or its allies?

• Delivering weapons of mass destruction by non-missile means does not provide the same prestige or degree of deterrence and coercive diplomacy associated with ICBMS. Nevertheless, we remain concerned about non-missile delivery of WMD to the United States by state and non-state actors. Ships, trucks, airplanes, and other means may be used. The Intelligence Community judges that US territory is more likely to be attacked with WMD using non-missile means.

• Non-missile delivery is less expensive than developing and producing ICBMs and probably would be more reliable than ICBMs that have not completed rigorous testing and validation programs. Non-missile systems probably would be more accurate than emerging ICBMs over the next 15 years.

• Even a few long-range ballistic missiles armed with WMD will enable weaker countries to deter, constrain, and harm the United States. Such weapons need not be accurate or highly reliable because their strategic value is derived primarily from the implicit or explicit threat of their use, not the near certain outcome of such use.

ICBM Threats to the US

39) Last December, the Intelligence Community released an unclassified version of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) which states that before 2015 the United States most likely will face ICBM threats from North Korea and Iran, and possibly from Iraq, barring significant changes in their political orientations, in addition to the longstanding missile forces of Russia and China. Please elaborate on the nature and scope of the ICBM threats to the U.S. from these nations. What is the Intelligence Community's assessment of the likelihood that there will be "significant changes" in the political orientations of these nations by 2015 to diminish the ICBM threat to the U.S.?

• Russia still maintains the most comprehensive ballistic missile force capable of reaching the United States, but force structure decisions resulting from resource problems, program development failures, weapon system aging, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and arms control treaties have resulted in a steep decline in Russian strategic nuclear forces over the last 10 years. Unless Moscow significantly increases funding for its strategic forces, the Russian arsenal will decline to less than 2,000 warheads by 2015, with or without arms control.

• Chinese ballistic missile forces will increase several-fold by 2015, but Beijing's future ICBM force deployed primarily against the United States, which will number around 75 to 100 warheads, will remain considerably smaller and less capable than the strategic missile forces of Russia and the United States. China has three new, mobile strategic missiles in development--the road-mobile DF-31 ICBM; the longer range road-mobile DF-31 follow-on; and the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). These programs date from the mid-1980s and are the basis of Beijing's efforts to field a modern, more survivable strategic deterrent to the United States and Russia.

• North Korea continues to develop missiles. The multiple-stage Taepo Dong-2, which can reach parts of the United States with a nuclear weapon-sized payload (several hundred kg), may be ready for flight-testing. North Korea in May 2001, however, extended its voluntary moratorium on long-range missile flight-testing until 2003, provided that negotiations with the United States proceed. A Taepo Dong-2 test probably would be conducted in a space launch configuration, like the Taepo Dong-1 test in 1998.

• Iraq, constrained by international sanctions and prohibitions, wants a long-range missile and probably retains a small, covert force of Scud-variant missiles. If UN prohibitions were eliminated or significantly reduced, Iraq would be likely to spend several years reestablishing its short-range ballistic missile force, developing and deploying solid-propellant systems, and pursuing development of medium-range ballistic missiles. Iraq could test different ICBM concepts before 2015, possibly before 2010 if it received foreign technology, if UN prohibitions were eliminated in the next few years.

• Iran is developing longer-range ballistic missiles that by 2015 could include ICBMs capable of directly targeting the US. Iran has several hundred Scud Bs, Scud Cs, and Chinese-supplied CSS-8 SRBMs. Iran can now produce Scud missiles and is focusing on developing the 1,300-km Shahab-3 MRBM. Iran has flight-tested the Shahab-3 and can probably deploy a limited number in the event of a crisis. Iranian leaders have publicly mentioned plans for a Shahab-4 and Shahab-5, characterizing them as space launch vehicles (SLVs). ICBMs and SLVs share much of the same technology and we assess Iran could use an SLV program to covertly develop an ICBM. Iran could attempt an ICBM/SLV launch between 2005 and 2010, but some assessments suggest 2015 at the earliest.

• We are alert to the possibility that political change in any of these countries could affect the ICBM threat to the United States. As matters stand, perceptions of key security equities and other national interests in these countries combined with the apparent importance of missile development efforts in several of them lead us to conclude that the threat will not diminish significantly any time soon.

North Korea's Taepo Dong-2

40) Last December's NIE on the ballistic missile threat states that "North Korea's multiple-stage Taepo Dong-2, which is capable of reaching parts of the United States with a nuclear weapon-sized (several hundred kilogram) payload, may be ready for flight=testing." What will be the impact of the continuation of the North's flight test moratorium on the development of this missile? Under what circumstances would North Korea be likely to use its missile capability against the US? What is the current estimate of the size of North Korea's nuclear weapon arsenal? How confident are we that the North is complying with the terms of the 1994 Agreed Framework regarding plutonium production activities in Yongbyon?

• Given the North Korean leadership's commitment to regime survival, we cannot rule out the possibility that P'yongyang--despite understanding the likely consequences for doing so--would be prepared to use whatever means are at its disposal if it perceived no better options to try to preserve the regime.

• We assess that North Korea has one, possibly two, nuclear weapons and are confident that P'yongyang is complying with the terms of the agreed framework.

Nonmissile Means for Delivering Weapons of Mass Destruction

41) Last December's NIE on the ballistic missile threat states that "[s]everal countries could develop a mechanism to launch SRBMs [short-range ballistic missiles], MRBMs (medium-range ballistic missiles], or land-attack cruise missiles from forward-based ships or other platforms; a few are likely to do so - more likely for cruise missiles - before 2015." Which countries have the capability to threaten U.S. territory with missiles from ships or other platforms? Which nations are the likeliest to do so? What is the Intelligence Community's ability to monitor this threat and provide early warning against an attack?

• Russia still maintains the most comprehensive ballistic missile force capable of reaching the United States. Chinese ballistic missile forces will increase several-fold by 2015, but Beijing's future ICBM force deployed primarily against the United States, which will number around 75 to 100 warheads, will remain considerably smaller and less capable than the strategic missile forces of Russia and the United States. China has three new, mobile strategic missiles in development--the road-mobile DF-31 ICBM; the longer range road-mobile DF-31 follow-on; and the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).

• North Korea's multiple-stage Taepo Dong-2, which can reach parts of the United States with a nuclear weapon-sized payload (several hundred kg), may be ready for flight-testing.

• Iraq could test different ICBM concepts before 2015, possibly before 2010 if it received foreign technology, if UN prohibitions were eliminated in the next few years. Iran is developing longer-range ballistic missiles that by 2015 could include ICBMs capable of directly targeting the US.

Foreign Countries Spying on the US

42) An area of concern is what other countries do to spy on US companies. Are more countries getting into the business of using their intelligence services to engage in economic espionage? How do you balance the benefits that come from collecting intelligence on economic issues against the risk that such collection - or even the mere allegation of it - could prompt other countries to retaliate by increasing their defensive measures, by spying in turn on US companies, or by becoming anti-American in policy discussions?

• The acquisition of sensitive economic information from US companies, both here and abroad, runs the full spectrum of collection methodologies, including unsolicited e-mail; soliciting open-source information and research; inappropriate conduct during plant visits; exploiting multinational conferences and business information exchanges; covert open source collection; illegal purchase of export-controlled technologies; theft of trade secrets and critical information; traditional agent recruitment.

• Economic espionage is not limited to the latest high-technology products and research. It may include existing product lines or even items no longer in production. In addition, the acquisition of sensitive US economic information is not limited to intellectual capital. Collection may include biographical information on senior corporate officials; marketing and pricing strategies; material lists; production, labor, operations, and maintenance costs; and customer lists.

• In a world that increasingly measures national power and security in economic as well as military terms, the United States continues to be threatened by the theft of proprietary economic information and critical technologies. The risks to sensitive business information and advanced technologies have dramatically increased in the post-Cold War era as foreign govemments--both former adversaries and allies--have shifted their espionage resources from military and political targets to commerce.

• The Intelligence Community does not engage in economic espionage. The IC only collects information on foreign companies to combat illicit practices such as bribery or the supply of controlled goods and materials disregarding United Nations sanctions or other international treaties.

• The potential WMD threats to the United States and its allies that have emerged since 11 September highlights the importance of monitoring illicit foreign advity that supports programs of mass destruction. The large loss of jobs that can result in successful bribery cases also can have a large impact on the United States economic security.

• Economic collection efforts--or allegations of economic espionage--do not appear to be a factor in driving foreign country economic espionage against US companies, increasing defensive measures, or becoming more anti-American in policy discussions.

• Available evidence indicates all of the countries assessed as committing state-sponsored economic espionage against the United States have done so because of US technology advances, their own defense needs, and not as a result of US intelligence activities. We are not aware of any governments that have increased commercial defensive measures as a policy response. The closest is the case of the EU--after determining that there is no evidence of US economic espionage against European firms--making a recommendation that any company concerned about this issue encrypt their communications.

The Impact of HIV/AIDS and Other Infectious Diseases

43) What will be the impact of HIV/AIDS on Africa and other countries 10 years from now? Upon which countries is HIV/AIDS affecting the military and economy the most? Where do these trends seem to be heading in the long term? What other infectious diseases-such as tuberculosis, malaria, and hepatitis-will have the most impact over the next 10 years?

• HIV/AIDS will slow economic growth and development and reverse socioeconomic gains over the next decade. Recent economic studies on South Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean, and Thailand suggest that rising HIV infection rates will result in GDP reductions of up to 20 percent. HIV/AIDS will also lower life expectancies in many countries, lead to negative population growth rates, and change the demographic composition of many societies. Many countries in Southern Africa will have life expectancies of 35 years or less by 2010, and Zimbabwe and South Africa will have negative population growth rates by next year.

• It is too early to ascertain which economy is suffering the most because of HIV/AIDS but based on infection rates only, the countries of Southern African are the most stressed.

• AIDS is adversely affecting most African militaries through the lack of continuity in rank and leadership, increased recruitment and training costs, and reduced military and emergency preparedness.

• We do not anticipate any reversal in these trends over the next 10 to 20 years mainly because of the long incubation period before HIV turns to AIDS. The tens of millions of people already infected with HIV will develop AIDS over the next decade and die. Hope for the long-term rests with reducing transmissions now but this requires strong leadership at the most senior levels of government, a willingness to publicly discuss sexual health, prevention and care initiatives, and education programs--steps that many countries are unwilling to take.

• Tuberculosis (TB) and malaria will continue to have the most impact over the next 10 years despite the creation last June of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria and other initiatives to combat these diseases. TB and malaria claimed 3 million lives and infected an additional 309 million people last year. By 2020, the World Health Organization predicts another 1 billion people will be newly infected with TB, unless current efforts to control it are strengthened and expanded. Drug resistant strains of TB and malaria are complicating treatment of both diseases.

Assessing Environmental Change

44) How will global warming and other environmental factors impact the world's economy over the next decade? To what extent does the Intelligence Community monitor and analyze environmental changes in the world?

• Climate change per se is not likely to have a discernable economic impact over the next decade because it is a long-term phenomenon whose consequences, if any, are more likely to be felt in the latter half of this century.

• Efforts by the international community to limit the threat of climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions could alter the global economic situation by jumpstarting investment in alternative technologies such as hydrogen fuel cells for cars, homes, and offices, which may have significant implications for US promoters of these technologies. These effects, however, are likely to be greater in the next decade than this one.

• If the international community pursues a course of action that leapfrogs current energy technologies, carbon dioxide emissions probably would fall significantly starting in the 2020s, especially if China, India, and other countries with rapidly growing economies participated. Atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gas emissions are lagged, however, so that the environmental repercussions of actions today would not be observed until later in this century.

• More likely to have an impact on economies and societies worldwide are medium-term climat fluctuations such as El Nino and La Nina, and natural and manmade environmental disasters. Countries from East Africa through the Middle East and into Central and South Asia have suffered considerable economic damage from a drought that is nearly four years old.

• We have no reason to believe that volcanoes, earthquakes, hurricanes, or other natural disasters will decrease over the next decade, although the implementation of better prediction and warning systems may reduce their impact.

• Oil and chemical spills on land and at sea will remain significant hazards.

Public Disclosure of the Aggregate Intelligence Budget

45) For a number of years, individuals have advocated the public disclosure of the aggregate intelligence budget. In your opinion, what would be the specific threat to U.S. national security from publicly disclosing the aggregate intelligence budget?

• Disclosure of the aggregate intelligence budget would assist foreign governments in evaluating the extent of US intelligence activities. Specifically, a sophisticated analysis combining intelligence budget figures with media reports, Congressional debates, and previous intelligence budgets could enable hostile intelligence services to: identify intelligence areas, or even specific classified programs, receiving larger or smaller appropriations; determine present US intelligence priorities and predict future trends; discover the location, nature, and extent of individual intelligence appropriations embedded in the federal budget; and develop more effective countermeasures against US intelligence programs.

• Of particular concern this year are the increases to the aggregate intelligence budget as a result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Comparing this year's budget figures with previous years would help foreign governments and other hostile elements determine more precisely how much additional funding the US is devoting to counter-terrorism initiatives.

Criminal Organizations and Networks

46) What is the likelihood that criminal organizations and networks will expand the scale and scope of their activities over the next 10 years? What is the likelihood that such groups will traffic in nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons?

• The dynamics of globalization, particularly the reduction or removal of barriers to travel, trade, communications, and financial transactions across borders, together with the explosion in computer technology, will enable criminal organizations groups to continue to expand their global operations over the next 10 yrs. They will also move beyond traditional rackets such as drugs, extortion, and prostitution to take advantage of new profit-making ventures such as cybercrime, financial crimes, and intellectual property rights theft.

• We cannot rule out an attempted WMD acquisition or sale by a criminal group, particularly if an unexpected opportunity presents itself, but we think it is unlikely that criminal organizations will try to become major traffickers of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. They would have to overcome considerable acquisition, handling and logistics challenges. The disappearance of weapons also would risk intense scrutiny from government authorities that could endanger the criminal organization and its other enterprises. In general, more conventional illicit pursuits generate safer, steadier income streams.

47) Where will the Administration be taking the war against terrorism next?

• CIA's counterterrorist campaign will focus on eliminating the al-Qa'ida terrorist threat while intensifying our operations against other terrorist groups. We will seek to apprehend al-Qa'ida members wherever they might be, to undermine al-Qa'ida's ability to carry out terrorist acts, and to prevent the terrorists from developing more sophisticated means of terrorist attack. We will also work to eliminate the ability of extremist support groups, such as the Wafa organization, to facilitate the terrorists' capability to carry out violence.

Upon what criteria were the decisions made to expand the efforts to those particular countries?

• Defer to NSC, State, and DOD.

What will be the anticipated effect on the countries in the coalition of these choices? (Explain each coalition country's reaction to each choice - Iran, Iraq, North Korea, other)

The war on terrorism is too fluid, complex, and dependent on numerous sets of variables to provide a useful response to this question.

Criminal Organizations and Networks

48) With respect to each country that we believe is seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them (intercontinental missiles), what intelligence do you have that shows what each of these countries believes will be the response of the United States if they were to launch against us? What are the US strategies to mitigate the WMD threat in each of these countries? What do we know about the likelihood that these countries would be deterred from using WMD against the U.S. it they knew they had a low chance of success, and that there would be a massive US response? How confident are we in the intelligence we have to answer that question? If we do not have a high level of confidence, how do you plan to acquire that information?

• The leadership of these countries most likely would expect a severe response from the United States if they attempted to use weapons of mass destruction. This recognition would provide incentives to find ways to move against the United States without playing to US strengths. The variables, conditions, and perceptions that would factor into a decision to use WMD against the United States are sufficiently complex and unpredictable, however, that we cannot rule out such an attempt, possibly born out of desperation or miscalculation.