Congressional Record: September 26, 2002 (Senate)
Page S9364-S9366
HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition to encourage my
Senate colleagues to pass legislation on homeland security and to send
it to conference. There are many more agreements, much more agreement
than disagreement, and the disagreements are relatively minor.
Last week, I said the Senate was dysfunctional because we had not
passed a budget resolution. For the first time since the Budget Act was
passed in 1974, the Congress has not passed a budget resolution. The
Senate has not passed a budget resolution. Thirteen appropriations
bills have not been passed. We have been on the Interior bill for weeks
now and homeland security for weeks. Long speeches. Not getting to the
point. Not voting. Not moving ahead with the legislation.
Last week, it was an accurate characterization to say the Senate was
dysfunctional. This week, the Senate has become a chamber of rancor. It
is plain that President Bush did not intend to impugn anyone's
patriotism. He was commenting on two provisions of the homeland
security bill related to labor-management relations. Even on those
matters, the differences are relatively minor. The relationship between
Republicans and Democrats is better characterized by the embrace
between President Bush and the majority leader at the joint session of
Congress shortly after September 11, 2001.
The current controversy may well be giving encouragement, aid, and
comfort to Osama bin Laden, deep in some cave, and Saddam Hussein, in
the bowels of some bomb shelter. However, we know who the enemies are.
The enemies are the terrorists and the enemies are those who pose the
risk of using weapons of mass destruction.
I believe it is vital to move ahead with the homeland security bill
to correct major deficiencies which have been disclosed in the
intelligence agencies in the United States. We had a veritable
blueprint, prior to September 11, 2001, and if we had connected all of
the dots, I think the chances were good that we could have avoided
September 11. The Congress of the United States and the administration
have a duty, a solemn duty, to do everything in our power to prevent
another terrorist attack. We lost thousands of Americans and the
official word from the administration, articulated by a number of
ranking executive department officials, is that there will be another
terrorist attack. It is not a matter of if, it is not a matter of
whether, it is a matter of where or when.
I am not prepared to accept that conclusion. I believe the United
States has the intelligence resources and can muster the intelligence
resources to prevent another September 11.
When I served as chairman of the Intelligence Committee in the 104th
Congress, I introduced legislation which would have brought all of the
intelligence agencies under one umbrella. There have been repeated
efforts to accomplish that, not just the legislation I introduced in
1996. There is on the President's desk a plan submitted by former
National Security Adviser, General Scowcroft, to accomplish a
coordination of all intelligence agencies. However, it has not been
done because of the turf battles between the various intelligence
agencies. Those turf battles regrettably are endemic and epidemic in
Washington, DC. They have to come to a conclusion.
We have the mechanism now, the homeland security bill, to make those
corrections. We knew prior to September 11, from the FBI Phoenix
memorandum, about men taking flight training who had big pictures of
Osama bin Laden. The report was disregarded. We knew prior to September
11 that there were two terrorists in Kuala Lumpur. The CIA knew about
it, but did not tell the FBI or INS, and they turned out to be two of
the pilots on September 11.
We know from the efforts made by the Minneapolis Office of the FBI to
get a warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act as to
Zacarias Moussaoui, which would have given us a veritable blueprint of
al-Qaida's intention, that certainly it would have led us to the trail
and could have prevented September 11.
Then we have the famous, or infamous, report coming to the National
Security Agency on September 10 about an attack the very next day,
which was not translated.
There is much more I could comment about, but the time is limited.
Mr. REID. Will the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. SPECTER. OK, on your time.
Mr. REID. We don't have any time, but I am sure if we need any time--
--
Mr. SPECTER. Senator Domenici, who is the only Senator waiting, says
it is OK, so I will be glad to respond to the question.
Mr. REID. The reason I want to have an exchange with the Senator is I
think maybe what the Senator said here today could resolve this
homeland security matter.
I believe, as the Senator from Pennsylvania does, that if there are
differences we have here in the Senate version of the bill, it will go
to conference with the House. The House and the Senate will sit down,
the White House people will be involved, as they always are in
important conferences, and we will come up with a product. I think
instead of scrumming, as we are here, I think we would be better off,
as the Senator has suggested, to get a bill out of here, get it to
conference, and get something to the President's desk.
So I fully support, as I heard him, the Senator from Pennsylvania. I
think that is the way to resolve this matter. Get a bill out of here,
get it to the conference, and, as the Senator said--how much difference
is there between the two versions of this amendment that is creating so
much controversy? There are differences, but I am not sure they are as
big as some think.
The labor-management issue, which seems to be a big problem, if that
matter is as close as what the Senator from Pennsylvania said, I think
it could be resolved in conference.
Mr. SPECTER. I thank the distinguished Senator from Nevada for that
question, and I am glad to respond. I had intended to talk a little
later about the differences. Let me take them up now to emphasize the
point that the Senator from Nevada has made, that the differences are
not very big.
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I agree with the Senator from Nevada that we ought to send the bill
to conference. When we had prescription drugs on the Senate floor, I
voted for the Republican measure, Grassley-Snowe, and then I voted for
the bill put up by the Democrats, by Senator Graham of Florida. It
seemed to me the important thing was to get the matter to conference so
that the issue could be resolved with finality.
The two pending issues which are outstanding on labor relations, the
difference between the bill offered by Senator Gramm and the bill
offered by Senator Lieberman, with the Breaux amendment, boil down to
this: It is the President's authority to waive the provisions on
collective bargaining in the event of a national emergency.
Now, listen closely to what the President must do under existing law:
The President may issue an order excluding any agency or
subdivision thereof for coverage under this chapter,
collective bargaining, if the President determines that, A,
the agency or subdivision has as a primary function
intelligence, counterintelligence, investigative, or national
security work; and the provisions of this chapter cannot be
applied to that agency or subdivision in a manner consistent
with national security requirements and considerations.
This is what Senator Breaux wishes to add:
The President could not use his authority without showing
that, No. 1, the mission and responsibilities of the agencies
or subdivision materially changed and, No. 2, a majority of
such employees within such agencies or subdivision have as
their primary duty: Intelligence, counterintelligence, or
investigative work directly related to terrorism
investigation.
It is true the Breaux amendment does add a requirement for the
President to exercise his authority. It is true that there is an
additional requirement, and the President does lose a little power.
However, the requirements of existing law which relate to intelligence,
counterintelligence, and investigation are very similar to the
provisions of the Breaux amendment which again relate to intelligence,
counterintelligence, or investigative work directly related to
terrorism investigation.
The President must make an additional showing. However, it is a
showing which is very much in line with what the President has to show
under existing law.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has used 10 minutes.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for an additional
5 minutes.
Mr. DOMENICI. Reserving the right to object, what is the order
following the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is no order of speakers.
Mr. DOMENICI. I ask unanimous consent that I follow him for up to 15
minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and
it is so ordered.
Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the Chair.
Mr. SPECTER. I thank my colleague from New Mexico.
Mr. President, the other provision which is in controversy relates to
the flexibility which the President is seeking on six categories. The
Breaux amendment would allow the President to have the flexibility
under four of the categories, and then in the event of disagreement
between management and the union, the controversy would go to the
Federal Services Impasse Panel.
There are seven members of that panel and all have been appointed by
President Bush. It is customary for that panel to change when the
administration changes. The four categories which are in the Breaux
bill allow for performance appraisal, classification, pay raise system,
and labor-management relations, all of which the President wants, and
only the limitation going before the impasse panel, which should not be
an obstacle, and then the other two are adverse actions and appeals.
So that if you boil it all down, our area of disagreement is really
very minor. The bill which is going to come out of conference is
obviously going to take up these issues. We know as a matter of
practice when there is a Presidential veto or a firm statement about a
Presidential veto, invariably the Congress relents on an individual
point.
So it would be my hope that we could yet resolve this controversy. I
talked to Senator Breaux, Senator Gramm of Texas, and Senator
Lieberman, and the parties are very close. I have not yet stated a
preference for either position. I am being lobbied on both sides. It is
a very major matter for my constituency on both sides, a very large
labor constituency in Pennsylvania, and very grave concern on my part
that the President's powers not be diminished in a way which would
impede his efforts on a Department of Homeland Security.
When you take a look at where we are with the various problems of
lapses in security--there have been a parade of witnesses before the
joint intelligence committees of the House and Senate. We counted some
of these, not all. In view of the limited time, Mr. President, I ask
that there be added at the conclusion of my comments a recitation of a
number of other warnings which were given, which could have provided a
veritable blueprint.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. SPECTER. Our job is plain, it seems to me, and that is to move
ahead, to have a reconciliation, a rapprochement. Let us not have this
as a chamber of rancor. Let us not have a dysfunctional Senate. We have
many bills which are now pending in the conference committees, which
have not been acted upon--the energy bill, the Patients' Bill of
Rights, the voting machine correction bill, the terrorism reinsurance
bill, the bankruptcy bill, and others, which are awaiting conference.
We have a very heavy duty to the American people to complete the
people's business, and we need to finish the appropriations bills and
not have a continuing resolution.
I think it is becoming apparent to the American people that we have a
dysfunctional Senate. We have to move away from that. We have to let
our enemies--the terrorists and Saddam Hussein--know that the Democrat
and Republican Party system is better characterized by that famous
embrace between the President and Senate majority leader at the Joint
Session of Congress shortly after September 11.
I intend to return to the floor to talk in more detail about the
Breaux amendment, but I think it is plain by an analysis of what the
Breaux amendment does that it ought to be resolved and it ought not to
stop this Congress in legislating. It would be a travesty and a tragedy
if we were to go over into next year without having a homeland security
bill so that we can correct the major problems in the intelligence
function of this country.
I again thank my colleague from New Mexico and yield the floor.
Exhibit 1
A Virtual Blueprint
NSA Intercepts
The NSA intercepted two messages on the eve of September 11
attacks on the world Trade Center and the Pentagon warning
that something was going to happen the next day, but the
messages were not translated until September 12. The Arabic-
language messages said, "the match is about to begin," and
"Tomorrow is zero-hour." They came from sources--a location
or phone number--that were of high enough priority to
translate them within two days but were not put in the top
priority category, which included communications from Usama
bin Laden or his senior al Qaeda assistants.
Murad
In January 1995, the Philippine National Police discovered
Ramzi Yousef's bomb making lab in Manila and arrested an
accomplice named Abdul Hakim Murad. Captured materials and
interrogations of Murad revealed Yousef's plot to kill the
Pope, bomb U.S. and Israeli embassies in Manila, blow up 12
U.S.-owned airliners over the Pacific Ocean, and crash a
plane into CIA headquarters. Murad is a promoter of the same
radical interpretation of Sunni Islam ideology as Usama bin
Laden, who emerged during this time frame as promoting this
radical ideology.
NOTE: This provided a data point on a terrorist group
discussing a plan to use an aircraft as a weapon in the
possession of the Intelligence Community.
Phoenix Memorandum
The FBI paid too little attention to a July 10, 2001
memorandum written by an FBI agent in Phoenix urging bureau
headquarters to investigate Middle Eastern men enrolled in
American flight schools. The "Phoenix Memo" cited Usama bin
Laden by name and suggested that his followers could use the
schools to train for terror operations.
Federal authorities have been aware for years that a small
number of suspected terrorists with ties to bin Laden had
received flight training at schools in the United States and
abroad.
Pakistani terrorist plotter Murad, who had planned to blow
up airliners over the Pacific,
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trained at four U.S. schools in the early 1990s.
Crawford Briefing
President Bush and his top advisers were informed by the
CIA in early August 2001 that terrorists associated with
Usama bin Laden had discussed the possibility of hijacking
airplanes. The top-secret briefing memo presented to
President Bush on August 6 carried the headline, "Bin Laden
Determined to Strike in US," and was primarily focused on
recounting al Qaeda's past efforts to attack and infiltrate
the United States.
Moussaoui & Minneapolis FBI
Minneapolis FBI agents investigating terror suspect
Zacarias Moussaoui last August were severely hampered by
officials at FBI headquarters, who resisted seeking FISA
surveillance and physical search warrants, applied erroneous
probable cause standards, and admonished agents for seeking
help from the CIA.
Kuala Lumpur
The CIA tracked two of the Flight 77 (Pentagon) terrorists
to a Qaeda summit in Malaysia in January 2000, then did not
share the information as the terrorists reentered America and
began preparations for September 11. The CIA tracked one of
the terrorists, Nawaf Alhazami, as he flew from the meeting
to Los Angeles, and discovered that another of the men,
Khalid Almihdhar, had already obtained a multiple-entry visa
that allowed him to enter and leave the United Stats as he
pleased. The CIA did nothing with this information. Instead,
during the year and nine months after the CIA identified them
as terrorists, Alhazami and Almihdhar lived openly in the
United States, using their real name, obtaining drivers
licenses, opening bank accounts and enrolling in flight
schools--until the morning of September 11, when they boarded
American Airlines Flight 77 and crashed into the Pentagon.
Bin Laden
On February 26, 1993, a bomb was detonated in the parking
garage of the World Trade Center in New York City. On June
24, 1993, the FBI arrested eight individuals for plotting to
bomb a number of New York City landmarks, including the
United Nations building and the Lincoln and Holland tunnels.
The central figures in these plots were Ramzi Yousef and
Shaykh Omar Abd al-Rahman--both of whom have been linked to
Usama Bin Laden and are now serving prison sentences.
Following the August 1998, bombings of two U.S. Embassies
in East Africa, Intelligence Community leadership recognized
how dangerous Bin Laden's network was and that he intended to
strike in the United States. In December 1998 DCI George
Tenet provided written guidance to his deputies at the CIA,
declaring, in effect, "war" with Bin Laden.
Concern about Bin Laden continued to grow over time and
reached peak levels in the spring and summer of 2001, as the
Intelligence Community faced increasing numbers of reports of
imminent al Qaeda attacks against U.S. interests. In July and
August 2001, that rise in intelligence reporting began to
decrease, just as three additional developments occurred in
the United States: the Phoenix memo; the detention of
Zacarias Moussaoui; and the Intelligence Community's
realization that two individuals with ties to Usama Bin
Laden's network--Nawaf Alhazami and Khalid Almihdhar--were
possibly in the United States.
In June 1998, the Intelligence Community learned that Usama
Bin Laden was considering attacks in the U.S., including
Washington, DC, and New York. This information was provided
to senior U.S. Government officials in July 1998.
In August 1998, the Intelligence Community obtained
information that a group of unidentified Arabs planned to fly
an explosive-laden plane from a foreign country into the
World Trade Center. The FBI's New York office took no action
on the information. The Intelligence Community has acquired
additional information since then indicating links between
this Arab group and al Qaeda.
In September 1998, the Intelligence Community obtained
information that Usama Bin Laden's next operation could
involve flying an aircraft loaded with explosives into a U.S.
airport and detonating it; this information was provided to
senior U.S. Government officials in late 1998.
In October 1998, the Intelligence Community obtained
information that al Qaeda was trying to establish an
operative cell within the United States. This information
indicated there might be an effort underway to recruit U.S.
citizen Islamists and U.S.-based expatriates from the Middle
East and North Africa;
In the fall of 1998, the Intelligence Community received
additional information concerning a Bin-Laden plot involving
aircraft in the New York and Washington, DC, areas;
In November 1998, the Intelligence Community learned that a
Bin Laden was attempting to recruit a group of five to seven
young men from the United States to strike U.S. domestic
targets.
In the spring of 1999, the Intelligence Community learned
about a planned Bin Laden attack on a U.S. Government
facility in Washington, DC. Additionally, in 1999, the threat
of an explosive-laden aircraft being used in a suicide attack
against the Pentagon, CIA headquarters, or the White House,
was noted in a Library of Congress report to the National
Intelligence Council.
In late 1999, the Intelligence Community learned of Bin
Laden's possible plans to attack targets in Washington, DC,
and New York City during the New Year's Millennium
celebrations.
On December 14, 1999, an individual named Ahmed Ressam was
arrested as he attempted to enter the United States from
Canada with detonator materials in his car. Ressam's intended
target was Los Angeles International Airport. Ressam, who has
links to Usama Bin Laden's terrorist network, has not been
formally sentenced yet.
In March 2000, the Intelligence Community obtained
information regarding the types of targets that operatives in
Bin Laden's network might strike. The Statue of Liberty was
specifically mentioned, as were skyscrapers, ports, and
airports, and nuclear power plants;
Between late March and September 2001, the Intelligence
Community detected numerous indicators of an impeding
terrorist attack, some of which pointed specifically to the
United States as a possible target. Among these are:
Between May and July, the National Security Agency reported
at least 33 communications indicating a possible, imminent
terrorist attack--none of which were specific as to where,
when, or how an attack might occur, nor was it clear that any
of the individuals involved in these intercepted
communications had any first-hand knowledge of where, when,
or how an attack might occur. These reports were widely
disseminated within the Intelligence Community.
In May 2001, the Intelligence Community obtained
information that supporters of Usama Bin Laden were
reportedly planning to infiltrate the United States via
Canada in order to carry out a terrorist operation. This
report mentioned an attack within the United States, though
it did not say where in the U.S., or when, or how an attack
might occur. In July 2001, this information was shared with
the FBI, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),
U.S. Customs Service, and the State Department and was
included in a closely held intelligence report for senior
government officials in August 2001.
In May 2001, the Intelligence Community received
information that seven individuals associated with Usama Bin
Laden departed various locations for the United States;
In June 2001, the DCI's Counter Terrorism Center (CTC) had
information that key operatives in Usama Bin Laden's
organization were disappearing while others were preparing
for martyrdom;
In July 2001, the DCI's CTC was aware of an individual who
had recently been in Afghanistan who had reported, "Everyone
is talking about an impending attack." The Intelligence
Community was also aware that Bin Laden had stepped up his
propaganda efforts in the preceding months;
In the late summer 2001, the Intelligence Community
obtained information that an individual associated with al
Qaeda was considering mounting terrorist operations in the
United States. There was no information available as to the
timing of possible attacks or on the alleged targets in the
United States.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
Mr. DOMENICI. I say to Senator Specter, I am sure you had some more
to say and I apologize, but it seems like the harder I try to get time
here the worse it works out for me.
Mr. SPECTER. It is the Senator's turn, and I am anxious to hear what
the Senator has to say.
Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the Senator.
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