Congressional Record: June 20, 2002 (Senate)
Page S5795-S5797
THE PIECES TO THE PUZZLE
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I thank the Chair for that clarification.
I have sought recognition this morning to express my concern that the
legislation submitted by the President for homeland security submitted
two days ago to the Congress does not meet the critical need for
collection and analysis of intelligence information in one place.
Each day there are new disclosures of key information, information
which was known prior to September 11, 2001. If it had been activated
and put together with other information, this might well have prevented
the September 11 attack.
This morning's Washington Post has as its major story, in the upper
right-hand corner, ``NSA Intercepts On Eve of 9/11 Sent a Warning.''
The first sentence reads:
The National Security Agency intercepted two messages on
the eve of the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon warning that something was going to happen
the next day.
If that information had been put together with other information
which was in the files of Federal intelligence agencies but not focused
on, there would have been, I think, an emerging picture providing a
warning, not just connecting dots, but a picture which was pretty
obvious when all of the pieces were put together.
The FBI had the now-famous Phoenix report, which had been submitted
in July 2001 by the Phoenix office, telling about aeronautical training
to people with backgrounds which indicated potential terrorist
leanings, aeronautical students with a large picture of Osama bin Laden
in their room and a background which would have supported the inference
that those students in training might well have been put up to
something. If that had been put together with the confession that was
obtained by a Pakistani terrorist known as Abdul Hakim Murad in 1996,
who had connections with al-Qaida, when he told of plans to attack the
CIA headquarters in Washington by plane and to fly into the White
House, there might have been a pretty sharp focus, especially if linked
to the information which had been developed by the FBI field office in
Minneapolis, that there was a man named Zacarias Moussaoui, who had
terrorist connections to al-Qaida, and that plans were being developed
and that he was actually to be the twentieth hijacker.
That information never came to full fruition because of a failure of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation to move the matter forward for a
warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
The Judiciary Committee heard testimony from special agent Coleen
Rowley about the difficulties of dealing with the FBI, which requires a
standard not in accordance with the law, 51 percent, more probable than
not where the standard of a warrant does not require that. Had
Moussaoui's computer been examined, it would have provided a virtual
blueprint for what was about to happen.
These are very glaring and fundamental defects in our intelligence
system. They have existed for a very long time. We have had a situation
where the Director of Central Intelligence, who is supposed to be in
charge of all intelligence, does not have key components of the
intelligence apparatus under his wing. For example, he does not have
access to the National Reconnaissance Office. He does not have
unfettered access to the National Security Agency, the National Imagery
and Mapping Agency, and certain special Navy units. This is a
deficiency which has gone on for a long time.
When I chaired the Senate Intelligence Committee during the 104th
Congress, I introduced Senate bill 1718. That bill was designed to
correct the deficiency that the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, who nominally and in the public view had access to all of the
intelligence information, but, in fact, did not have it. My bill, S.
1718, is only one of many efforts which are currently underway, efforts
which are currently under consideration by the White House. However,
there is strong opposition by the Department of Defense and opposition
by others. I am not characterizing it necessarily as a turf battle. It
is a battle which has its origin in the concerns of some in the
Department of Defense that the Department of Defense has the
responsibility to fight a war and needs access to all of these
intelligence matters; that is unique control.
The reality is that a structure can be worked out so the Department
of Defense is not deprived of access to any of this information in time
of war or at any time. However, the Director of Central Intelligence
ought to have it in one coordinated place.
Now, when you create a Department of Homeland Security, it is
obviously very difficult to touch upon matters on the broader picture.
That is something that must be done and which must be addressed. When
this matter was considered, I raised some of these issues in a meeting
which Senators had with the White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card and
Homeland Security Advisor, Governor Ridge. Recently, there have been
additional meetings at the staff level, working together with the White
House staff extensively, one of which was last Friday afternoon. During
that meeting, my staff made a specific proposal that on the Department
of Homeland Security, there should be a repository in one place to
gather all of this information. The suggestion which we submitted was
that there should be a national terrorism assessment center, a concept
developed by someone who is very experienced in intelligence affairs,
Charles Battaglia, who spent years in the CIA, as well as the Navy, and
who served as majority staff director for the Intelligence Committee
during my tenure as chairman during the 104th Congress.
The Battaglia proposal to establish a national terrorism assessment
center, in my opinion, goes right to the mark. It would be staffed by
analysts who would come from the FBI, the Central Intelligence Agency,
the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the National Reconnaissance
Office, and a listing of other Federal agencies, including the State
Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which would have
access to all of this information.
The bill, which was submitted by the President two days ago to
establish the Department of Homeland Security, I say respectfully, does
not meet this core critical ingredient. For example, referring to
intelligence staff, the President's proposal provides at section 201:
The Secretary may obtain such material by request.
Mr. President, that is hardly the authority that the Secretary of
Homeland Defense needs to do his job. If he has to ask somebody in
Washington, DC, for something, it is an enormous uncertainty as to
whether he will get it. In fact, it is more probable than not that he
will not get it. There is a long trail around here to get information
from anyone. I have seen that in detail in my time trying to conduct
oversight on the FBI or in conducting oversight when I chaired the
Intelligence Committee. That information just is not forthcoming.
The President's bill further provides that the Secretary may enter
into ``cooperative arrangements with other executive agencies to share
such material.'' Whether or not there will be such arrangements entered
into, and whether the other executive agencies will be agreeable to
that, is highly uncertain.
The time has long since passed to leave it to the discretion of a
large variety of the Federal bureaucrats as to what they will do on
intelligence. The time has come for the Congress of the United States
in legislation signed by the President to establish central authority
in one place, under one roof, to collect all the information which is
available. To do any less is dereliction of our duty. That has not been
done. The intelligence community has been stumbling along. America
stumbled into September 11 because this Congress had not undertaken the
approach with the strength to resolve all of these jurisdictional
disputes and see to
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it that this information was under one roof.
The Congress of the United States has a fundamental responsibility to
provide for the security of the United States. When the Judiciary
Committee conducts hearings and finds out that the FBI does not have
the procedures in place to know what is in the Phoenix report on a
potential terrorist with Osama bin Laden's picture on his wall, when
the Judiciary Committee commits oversight and finds out that the FBI
Minneapolis office cannot get headquarters to request a warrant under
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act because they are applying the
wrong standard, when the Intelligence Committee conducts oversight on
the Director of Central Intelligence and finds his authority lacking
because he does not know what many other intelligence agencies are
collecting, and when the National Security Agency has on the eve of
September 11 specific warnings and these pieces are not put together,
the time has come to act.
On this legislation, we ought to move ahead with a national terrorism
assessment center. This information, as I noted earlier, was
communicated by my staff to the White House staff. We did not have it
prepared in time, but we had it this week in draft form. However, the
matter is now before the Congress.
For the information of my colleagues, I ask unanimous consent that
this draft proposal be printed in the Congressional Record. It is by no
means a finished product, however it might be of some help as we move
ahead with hearings on this very important subject in the Congress.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Amendment No.--
(Purpose: To provide the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security with timely and objective intelligence assessments on
terrorism and actionable intelligence essential to carry out the
Secretary's duties as assigned, and to refocus the efforts of Federal
law enforcement (including the FBI) on the collection, analysis, and
dissemination of intelligence related to terrorism)
At the appropriate place, insert the following:
SEC. ____. NATIONAL TERRORISM ASSESSMENT CENTER.
(a) Establishment.--There is established the National
Terrorism Assessment Center (in this section referred to as
the ``NTAC''), to provide--
(1) the Department of Homeland Security with the authority
to direct the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other officers of
Federal agencies to provide the NTAC with all intelligence
and information relating to threats of terrorism; and
(2) the means for intelligence from all sources to be
analyzed, synthesized, and disseminated to Federal, State,
and local agencies as considered appropriate by the
Secretary.
(b) Duties of the NTAC.--The NTAC shall--
(1) direct the Director of Central Intelligence, the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other
officers of Federal agencies to provide the NTAC with all
intelligence and information relating to threats of
terrorism;
(2) synthesize and analyze information and intelligence
from Federal, State, and local agencies and sources;
(3) disseminate intelligence to Federal, State, and local
agencies to assist in the deterrence, prevention, preemption,
and response to terrorism;
(4) refer, through the Secretary of Homeland Security, to
the appropriate law enforcement or intelligence agency,
intelligence and analysis requiring further investigation or
action; and
(5) perform other related and appropriate duties, as
assigned by the Secretary.
(c) Management of the NTAC.--
(1) In general.--The NTAC shall be under the operational
control of the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security, who shall evaluate the performance of personnel
assigned to the NTAC.
(2) Director.--
(A) Appointment.--The NTAC Director shall be a senior
officer of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and appointed
by the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security from
candidates recommended by the Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation.
(B) Duties.--The Director of the NTAC shall--
(i) ensure that the law enforcement, immigration, and
intelligence databases information systems containing
information relevant to homeland security are compatible; and
(ii) with respect to the functions under this subparagraph,
ensure compliance with Federal laws relating to privacy and
intelligence information.
(3) Deputy director.--The NTAC Deputy Director shall be a
senior officer of the Central Intelligence Agency and
appointed by the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security from candidates recommended by the Director of
Central Intelligence.
(d) Staffing of the NTAC.--
(1) In general.--The NTAC shall be staffed by analysts
assigned by--
(A) the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
(B) the Central Intelligence Agency;
(C) the National Security Agency;
(D) the Defense Intelligence Agency;
(E) the National Imagery and Mapping Agency;
(F) the National Reconnaisance Office;
(G) the Department of Energy;
(H) the Department of Homeland Security;
(I) the Department of the Treasury;
(J) the Department of Justice;
(K) the Department of State; and
(L) any other Federal agency, as determined by the
Secretary in consultation with the President or the
President's designee.
(2) Additional staffing.--The Secretary may also require
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Customs Service,
Coast Guard, Secret Service, Border Patrol, and other
subordinate agencies to assign additional employees to the
NTAC.
(3) Administrative support.--Administrative support to
employees assigned to the NTAC from other agencies shall be
provided by such agencies.
(e) Authority To Employ Personnel and Consultants.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of Homeland Security may,
without regard to the civil service laws, employ and fix the
compensation of such personnel and consultants, including
representatives from academia, as the Secretary considers
appropriate in order to permit the Secretary to discharge the
responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security.
(2) Personnel security standards.--The employment of
personnel and consultants under paragraph (1) shall be in
accordance with such personnel security standards for access
to classified information and intelligence as the Director of
Central Intelligence shall establish for purposes of this
subsection.
(f) Tour of Duty Requirement.--
(1) Senior intelligence service.--Title III of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 409a) is amended by inserting
after section 303 the following:
``promotion to senior intelligence service
``Sec. 304. An employee of an element of the intelligence
community may not be promoted to a position in the Senior
Intelligence Service until the employee has served 1 or more
tours of duty, aggregating not less than 24 months, in a
nonacademic position in 1 or more other elements of the
intelligence community.''.
(2) Senior executive service for employees of fbi.--Chapter
33 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by inserting
after section 536 the following:
``Sec. 536A. Promotion to Senior Executive Service
``(a) An employee of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
may not be promoted to a position in the Senior Executive
Service until the employee has served 1 or more tours of
duty, aggregating not less than 24 months, in a non-academic
position in 1 or more other elements of the intelligence
community.
``(b) In this section, the term `element of the
intelligence community' means an element of the intelligence
community specified by or designated under section 3(4) of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).''.
(3) Technical and conforming amendments.--
(A) Senior intelligence service.--The table of sections for
the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting
after the item relating to section 303 the following:
``304. Promotion to Senior Intelligence Service.''.
(B) Senior executive service for employees of fbi.--The
table of sections at the beginning of chapter 33 of title 28,
United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item
relating to section 536 the following:
``536A. Promotion to Senior Executive Service.''.
(4) Effective date.--The amendments made by this subsection
shall take effect on the date of enactment of this Act, and
shall apply with respect to promotions that occur on or after
that date.
(g) Access of Director of Central Intelligence to
Intelligence Collected by Intelligence Community.--Section
104 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4) is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``(h) Access to Intelligence.--(1) The Director shall have
full and complete access to any intelligence collected by an
element of the intelligence community that the Director
requires in order to discharge the responsibilities of the
Director under section 103.
``(2) The head of each element of the intelligence
community shall take appropriate actions to ensure that such
element complies fully with the requirement in paragraph
(1).''.
(h) Electronic Networking of Intelligence Data.--As soon as
practicable after the date of enactment of this Act, the
Director of Central Intelligence shall implement a program to
provide for the full interconnection by electronic means of
the intelligence databases of the intelligence community in
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order to ensure the ready accessibility by all elements of
the intelligence community of intelligence and other
information stored in such databases.
Mr. SPECTER. I yield the floor.
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