Congressional Record: March 18, 2002 (Senate)
Page S2009-S2014                    


      By Mr. LUGAR:
  S. 2026. A bill to authorize the use of Cooperative Threat Reduction 
funds for projects and activities to address proliferation threats 
outside the states of the former Soviet Union, and for other purposes; 
to the Committee on Armed Services.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Nunn-Lugar/
CTR Expansion Act. My bill would authorize the Secretary of Defense to 
use up to $50 million of unobligated Nunn-Lugar/Cooperative Threat 
Reduction funds for non-proliferation projects and emergencies outside 
the states of the former Soviet Union.
  In 1991, I introduced the Nunn-Lugar/Cooperative Threat Reduction 
legislation with former Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia. The program was 
designed to assist the states of the former Soviet Union in dismantling 
weapons of mass destruction and establishing verifiable safeguards 
against the proliferation of those weapons. For more than 20 years the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program has been our country's principal 
response to the proliferation threat that resulted from the 
disintegration of the custodial system guarding the Soviet nuclear, 
chemical, and biological legacy.
  The Nunn-Lugar program has destroyed a vast array of former Soviet 
weaponry, including 443 ballistic missiles, 427 ballistic missile 
launchers, 92 bombers, 483 long-range nuclear air-launched cruise 
missiles, 368 submarine ballistic missile launchers, 286 submarine 
launched ballistic missiles, 21 strategic missile submarines, 194 
nuclear test tunnels, and 5,809 nuclear warheads that were mounted on 
strategic systems aimed at us. All this has been accomplished at a cost 
of less than one-third of 1 percent of the Department of Defense's 
annual budget. In addition, Nunn-Lugar facilitated the removal of all 
nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus.
  Nunn-Lugar also has launched aggressive efforts to safeguard and 
eliminate the former Soviet chemical and biological weapons arsenals. 
The Nunn-Lugar Program has been used to upgrade the security 
surrounding these dangerous substances and to provide civilian 
employment to tens of thousands of Russian weapons scientists. We are 
now beginning efforts to construct facilities that will destroy the 
Russian arsenal of chemical warheads.
  The continuing experience of Nunn-Lugar has created a tremendous non-
proliferation asset for the United States. We have an impressive cadre 
of talented scientists, technicians, negotiators, and managers working 
for the Defense Department and for associated defense contractors. 
These individuals understand how to implement non-proliferation 
programs and how to respond to proliferation emergencies. The bill I am 
introducing today would permit and facilitate the use of Nunn-Lugar 
expertise and resources when non-proliferation threats around the world 
are identified.
  The Nunn-Lugar/CTR Expansion Act would be a vita component of our 
national security strategy in the wake of the September 11 attacks. The 
problem we face today is not just terrorism. It is the nexus between 
terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. There is little doubt that 
Osama bin Laden and al-Quaeda would have used weapons of mass 
destruction if they had possessed them. It is equally clear that they 
have made an effort to obtain them.

  The al-Quaeda terrorist attacks on the United States were planned to 
kill thousands of people indiscriminately. The goal was massive 
destruction of institutions, wealth, national morale, and innocent 
people. We can safely assume that those objectives have not changed. As 
horrible as the tragedy of September 11th was, the death, destruction, 
and disruption to American society was minimal compared to what could 
have been inflicted by a weapon of mass destruction.
  Victory in this war must be defined not only in terms of finding and 
killing Osama bin Laden or destroying terrorist cells in this or that 
country. We must also undertake the ambitious goal of comprehensively 
preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
  Let me propose a fairly simple and clear definition of victory. 
Imagine two lists. The first list is of those nation-states that house 
terrorist cells, voluntarily or involuntarily. Those states can be 
highlighted on a map illustrating who and where they are. Our stated 
goal will be to shrink that list nation by nation. Through intelligence 
sharing, termination of illicit financial channels, support of local 
police work, diplomacy, and public information, a coalition of nations 
led by the United States should seek to root out each cell in a 
comprehensive manner for years to come and maintain a public record of 
success that the world can observe and measure. If we are diligent and 
determined, we can terminate or cripple most of these cells.
  But there should also be a second list. It would contain all of the 
states that possess materials, programs, or weapons of mass 
destruction. We should demand that each of these nation-states account 
for all of the materials, programs, and weapons in a manner that is 
internationally verifiable. We should demand that all such weapons and 
materials be made secure from theft or threat of proliferation, using 
the funds of that country and supplemented by international funds if 
required. We should work with each nation to formulate programs of 
continuing accountability and destruction.
  Victory, then, can be succinctly stated: we must keep the world's 
most dangerous technologies out of the hands of the world's most 
dangerous people. This requires diligent work that shrinks both lists. 
Both lists should be clear and finite. The war against terrorism will 
not be over until all nations on the lists have complied with these 
  Despite the tremendous progress realized by the Nunn-Lugar program in 
the former Soviet Union, the United States continues to lack even 
minimal international confidence about many foreign weapons programs. 
In most cases, there is little or no information regarding the number 
of weapons or amounts of materials a country may have produced, the 
storage procedures they employ to safeguard their weapons, or plans 
regarding further production or destruction programs. We must pay much 
more attention to making certain that all weapons and materials of mass 
destruction are identified, continuously guarded, and systematically 
  As the United States and our allies have sought to address the 
threats posed by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction in the 
aftermath of September 11, we have come to the realization that, in 
many cases, we lack the appropriate tools to address these 
threats. Traditional avenues of approach such as arms control treaties 
and various multilateral sanction regimes have met with some success, 
but there is still much work to do. In some cases, it is unlikely that 
the existing multilateral frameworks and non-proliferation tools retain 
much utility. In fact, several nations have announced their intention 
to continue to flout international norms such as the Non-Proliferation 

  Beyond Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union, Nunn-
Lugar-style cooperative threat reduction programs aimed at weapons 
dismantlement and counter-proliferation do not exist. The ability to 
apply the Nunn-Lugar model to states outside the former Soviet Union 
would provide the United States with another tool to confront the 
threats associated with weapons of mass destruction.
  The precise replication of the Nunn-Lugar program will not be 
possible everywhere. Clearly, many states will continue to avoid 
accountability for programs related to weapons of mass destruction. 
When nations resist such accountability, other options must be 
explored. When governments continue to contribute to the WMD threat 
facing the United States, we must be prepared to apply diplomatic and 
economic power, as well as military force.
  Yet we should not assume that we cannot forge cooperative non-
proliferation programs with some critical nations. The experience of 
the Nunn-Lugar program in Russia has demonstrated that the threat of 
weapons of mass destruction can lead to extraordinary outcomes based on 
mutual interest. No one would have predicted in the 1980s that American 
contractors and DOD officials would be on the ground in Russia 
destroying thousands of strategic systems. If we are to protect 
ourselves during this incredibly dangerous period, we must create new 
non-proliferation partners and aggressively pursue any non-
proliferation opportunities that appear. The Nunn-

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Lugar/CTR Expansion Act would be a first step down that road. 
Ultimately, a satisfactory level of accountability, transparency, and 
safety must be established in every nation with a WMD program.
  My legislation is designed to empower the Administration to respond 
to both emergency proliferation risks and less-urgent cooperative 
opportunities to further non-proliferation goals. When the Defense 
Department identifies a non-proliferation opportunity that is not time 
sensitive, when the near-term threat of diversion or theft is low, it 
should consult with Congress. In such a scenario my bill would require 
the Secretary of Defense to notify the appropriate congressional 
entities of his intent to utilize unobligated Nunn-Lugar funds and to 
describe the legal and diplomatic framework for the application of non-
proliferation assistance. Congress would have time to review the 
proposal and consult with the Department of Defense. This process would 
closely parallel the existing notification and obligation procedures 
that are in place for Nunn-Lugar activities in the former Soviet Union.
  However, proliferation threats sometimes require an instantaneous 
response. If the Secretary of Defense determines that we must move more 
quickly than traditional consultation procedures allow, my legislation 
provides the Pentagon with the authority to launch emergency 
operations. We must not allow a proliferation or WMD threat to "go 
critical" because we lacked the foresight to empower DOD to respond. 
In the former Soviet Union the value of being able to respond to 
proliferation emergencies has been clearly demonstrated. Under Nunn-
Lugar the United States has undertaken time-sensitive missions like 
Project Sapphire in Kazakstan and Operation Auburn Endeavor in Georgia 
that have kept highly vulnerable weapons and materials of mass 
destruction from being proliferated.
  This type of scenario does not mean Congress will abandon its 
oversight responsibilities; the Secretary of Defense will be required 
to report to the appropriate congressional entities within 72 hours of 
launching of a mission describing the emergency and the conditions 
under which the assistance was provided. The review process permits 
Congress to investigate the incident and decide if the authority needs 
to be restricted or amended.
  In consulting with the administration on this legislation, we 
explored how to create the flexibility necessary to respond to WMD 
threats while protecting congressional prerogatives and maintaining the 
necessary checks and balances. Accordingly, I have included several 
conditions beyond the strenuous reporting requirements.
  First, my bill permits the Secretary of Defense to provide equipment, 
goods, and services but does not include authority to provide cash 
directly to the project or activity. This preserves one of the basic 
tenets of the program: Nunn-Lugar is not foreign aid. In fact, more 
than 80 percent of Nunn-Lugar funds have been awarded to American firms 
to carry out dismantlement and non-proliferation assistance programs in 
the former Soviet Union.
  The bill also requires the Secretary of Defense to avoid singling out 
any particular existing Nunn-Lugar project as an exclusive or 
predominate source of funds for emergency projects outside the former 
Soviet Union. In other words, it is my intent that the Pentagon utilize 
resources from a number of different Nunn-Lugar projects so as to 
reduce any impact on the original, on-going Nunn-Lugar program in the 
former Soviet Union. The Secretary also is required to the maximum 
extent practicable, to replace any program funds taken on emergency 
operations in the next annual budget submission or supplemental 
appropriations request.
  Lastly, if the Pentagon employs the emergency authority to carry out 
non-proliferation or dismantlement activities in two consecutive years 
in the same country, the Secretary of Defense must submit another 
report to Congress. This report would analyze whether a new Nunn-Lugar-
style program should be established with the country in question. If 
the Pentagon has successfully carried out cooperative threat reduction 
activities 2 years in a row with a country, we should explore how to 
expand this cooperation. We should also recognize that where sustained 
cooperation has been developed it is likely to be more efficient to 
provide assistance through an established Nunn-Lugar-style program.
  The Nunn-Lugar/CTR Expansion Act can make valuable contributions to 
the implementation of the war on terrorism and our non-proliferation 
policy. It is not a silver bullet, and it cannot be used in every 
circumstance, but it is our best option in carrying out cooperative 
non-proliferation activities outside the former Soviet Union.
  There are always risks when expanding a successful venture into new 
areas, but we must give the Administration every opportunity to 
interdict and neutralize the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. This new venture, like its predecessor, will take time to 
organize and to establish operating procedures. But I am hopeful that a 
decade from now, we will look back on this effort and rejoice in our 
persistent and successful efforts to provide great security for our 
country and the world at critical moments of decision.
  I ask my colleagues to join with me in passing this important