Congressional Record: July 24, 2002 (House)
Page H5413-H5441
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call
up House Resolution 497 and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:
H. Res. 497
Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this
resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 2(b) of rule
XVIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the
Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of
the bill (H.R. 4628) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 2003 for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes. The
first reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. All points
of order against consideration of the bill are waived.
General debate shall be confined to the bill and shall not
exceed one hour equally divided and controlled by the
chairman and ranking minority member of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence. After general debate the bill
shall be considered for amendment under the five-minute rule.
It shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the
purpose of amendment under the five-minute rule the amendment
in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence now printed in the bill. The
committee amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be
considered as read. All points of order against the committee
amendment in the nature of a substitute are waived. No
amendment to the committee amendment in the nature of a
substitute shall be in order except those printed in the
portion of the Congressional Record designated for that
purpose in clause 8 of rule XVIII and except pro forma
amendments for the purpose of debate. Each amendment so
printed may be offered only by the Member who caused it to be
printed or his designee and shall be considered as read. At
the conclusion of consideration of the bill for amendment the
Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with
such amendments as may have been adopted. Any Member may
demand a separate vote in the House on any amendment adopted
in the Committee of the Whole to the bill or to the committee
amendment in the nature of a substitute. The previous
question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and
amendments thereto to final passage without intervening
motion except one motion to recommit with or without
instructions.
{time} 2215
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Isakson). The gentleman from Florida is
recognized for 1 hour.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, for purposes of the debate only, I yield the
customary 30 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Florida (Mr.
Hastings), pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume.
During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the
purposes of debate only.
Mr. Speaker, this is the standard rule that we have used for many
years on the intelligence authorization. As far as I know, it is not
controversial in any way. As in past years, we have thought it best to
allow Members good opportunity to review the bill and debate the issues
they feel are important to our Nation's security. Of course, that is
particularly appropriate now. Therefore, as has been the tradition, the
rule is a modified open rule, providing for 1 hour of general debate,
equally divided between the chairman and ranking member of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
The rule further provides for the consideration of only pro forma
amendments for the purpose of debate and those amendments printed in
the Congressional Record prior to their consideration, as we heard in
the Clerk's reading. This has allowed for vetting of amendments
regarding classified matters in years past and has proved to be good
practice.
Finally, this rule provides for a motion to recommit with or without
instruction. So I think it is a very clear, fair rule that suits the
purpose well.
Mr. Speaker, just one year ago we met to consider this bill in the
wake of the tragic terrorist attacks and rallied support for our
intelligence community and national security initiatives. Our country
has come a long way since then, but there is still a lot more that
needs to be done. This year's intelligence authorization bill contains
the most significant investment by the administration for the
intelligence community in more than 8 years. This is an important bill.
These funds allow the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to
continue the work that we have been promoting to address many of the
longstanding shortfalls that have besieged our intelligence community
throughout the 1990s.
[[Page H5414]]
In the upcoming general debate, we will discuss in more detail some
of the specific provisions of H.R. 4628. However, I would like to
briefly highlight a few of the critical areas upon which the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence has focused in this year's bill.
We have further enhanced efforts to rebuild our Nation's human
intelligence capabilities, human, spies; and shortfalls in the
intelligence community's analytic core, more analysis; as well as
addressing longstanding recapitalization needs for technical
intelligence, heavy investment in important equipment. Of specific note
are actions we are taking to address critical needs in the area of
linguistic capabilities, people who speak the languages we need to
understand. Addressing these critical areas is crucial to meeting our
immediate counterterrorism challenges and to correcting our longer-
range problems facing the intelligence community and the basic
structure of the U.S. intelligence establishment.
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence continues bold
initiatives on these points, knowing that true intelligence community
reform will be necessary if our intelligence establishment is to
successfully meet all of the national security challenges this Nation
faces in today's puzzling and dangerous world. Through our regular
oversight work and in our joint inquiry efforts with our Senate
counterparts, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence is and
will be further addressing the pressing need for appropriate
intelligence community reform.
Meanwhile, this bill provides the President with the intelligence
tools to win the war on terrorism and to remedy many other longstanding
problems of the intelligence community, which we have pointed out
several years in this process.
In sum, this is a good, noncontroversial, bipartisan bill with very
few, if any, contentious amendments to consider. The rule that has been
crafted for its consideration is fair and will provide ample
opportunity for debate. I urge support for the rule and the underlying
bill.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I
may consume. First let me thank my good friend from Sanibel for
yielding me the customary time. It is a pleasure to serve with the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) on the Committee on Rules, and I look
forward to rejoining him on the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence in the near future.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this rule providing for the
consideration of H.R. 4628, the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2003. The rule is a modified open rule, as Mr. Goss has
said, requiring that amendments be preprinted in the Congressional
Record. As we all know, the preprinting requirement for the
intelligence authorization bill has been the accepted practice of this
Chamber for several years because of the sensitive nature of much of
the bill and the need to protect classified information.
The underlying bill, H.R. 4628, is noncontroversial and it was
reported from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence by a
unanimous vote. Members who wish to do so can go to the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence office to examine the classified
schedule of authorizations for the programs and activities of the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the National
Intelligence Program.
This includes authorizations for the CIA, as well as the foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence programs within, among others, the
Department of Defense, the National Security Agency, the Departments of
State, Treasury and Energy and the FBI.
I might add, for Members who have not done so at any point, as a
Member having served most recently on the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and hoping to rejoin it again in the future, I would urge
them to take advantage of the opportunity to review the programs and
activities of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Also included in the classified documents are the authorizations for
the tactical intelligence and related activities and joint military
intelligence program of the Department of Defense.
Today, more than ever, we must make the creation of a strong and
flexible intelligence apparatus one of the highest priorities of this
body. The terrorist attacks of September 11, combined with the
continuing threat of further attacks, underscores the importance of
this legislation, and I am pleased that it has been brought to the
floor before the August recess.
Now, Mr. Speaker, while this bill is noncontroversial, it is not
closed to improvement. Today is not the first time that I have noted on
the floor that experts in the intelligence community continue to argue
that our intelligence operations must not only be a strong and flexible
intelligence apparatus, but also a diverse one. For the past 15 years,
Members of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
directors of our country's largest intelligence agencies have labored
to create a more diverse intelligence community. Although their efforts
have borne some fruit, much more needs to be done.
Later this evening I will be offering two amendments to H.R. 4628,
both of which are aimed at increasing diversity in our Nation's
intelligence agencies. The first of the two amendments expresses the
sense of Congress that the CIA, DIA, NSA and NIMA make minority
recruitment a priority in their hiring decisions. Of the 13 agencies
that currently make up the U.S. intelligence community, only the DIA
boasts a minority population that even comes close to the average
percentage of minorities in the Federal workforce.
The second amendment instructs the Director of Central Intelligence
to issue an annual report to Congress on the hiring and retention of
minorities by the intelligence community. Such a report will allow this
body to monitor the progress of the intelligence community's efforts to
recruit and retain minorities.
I do hope that my colleagues will support both of the amendments, and
I believe they will be supported, having spoken with the chairman in
this regard.
Further, I would also like to urge my colleagues to support the
amendment which will be offered by my good friend, the gentleman from
Indiana (Mr. Roemer), and he is my good friend.
The Roemer amendment establishes an independent commission to examine
the events leading up to and ensuing the September 11 attacks. Though
later this week the House may pass a bill creating a new Department of
Homeland Security, the bill will in no way identify nor fix the
problems that currently exist in the United States intelligence
community. The Roemer amendment, in examining the intelligence failures
of September 11, will provide a comprehensive examination and critique
on this issue, and I urge my colleagues to support it.
Mr. Speaker, H.R. 4628 provides authorizations and appropriations for
some of the most important national security programs in this country.
Any hesitation by this body in passing it would be a disservice to the
American people.
I urge my colleagues to support this rule, and I ask that they
support my amendments, the Roemer amendment and the underlying bill.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I am privileged to yield 5 minutes to the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert), the chairman of the Committee
on Science and a member of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence.
(Mr. BOEHLERT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me
time, and I rise in support of a very fair rule.
Mr. Speaker, this bill is complex in its specific recommendations,
but simple in its intent: To restore our Nation's intelligence
capabilities so that we can absolutely minimize the possibility of
another surprise terrorist attack on our homeland. Our goal; no more
surprises, no more attacks.
The President is absolutely correct; homeland security is and must
continue to be the number one priority of government at all levels, and
the first priority of the Federal Government is to guarantee, as much
as humanly possible, the peace and security of the
[[Page H5415]]
American people. They, we, all of us, have a right to live our lives
without fear.
The largest increase in spending for our national intelligence
activities in over a decade is provided for in this bill.
{time} 2230
For the first time in many years, the administration has requested an
increase in intelligence operations and capabilities. We are providing
the total funding the President requested, placing greater emphasis on
areas which require the most attention.
Specifically, this bill addresses not just with words, but with
deeds, dollars to back up what we say: the shortfall in human
intelligence with essential language capabilities. We must aggressively
pursue a program to significantly increase a number of foreign
language-qualified individuals in the intelligence community. It adds
significant funding for initial and follow-on training for linguists,
and there is a provision to create a new language university for the
entire intelligence community.
I believe this is critical to developing the human intelligence
officers of the future that will be able to collect and, more
importantly, analyze information on those who would pose a threat to
the United States of America. It does not serve our national interests
if we are the best at collecting intelligence if we are lacking in our
ability to analyze and disseminate to decision-makers sensitive
information in a timely manner. That possibility exists today because
of our deficiencies in language capabilities.
This bill takes on, in a very direct way, the issues of intelligence,
collection, analysis, and production against threats of terrorism. We
do so by placing added emphasis and resources where I think they are
most needed: on human intelligence, our eyes and ears with a global
reach.
Let me state the obvious. It does not do much good if we have the
right people in the right places dealing with collecting or analyzing
if they do not have the language ability to understand what is being
collected or what is being analyzed.
Mr. Speaker, as I said, the intent of this bill is simple. It is
designed to provide the necessary resources, direction, and
authorizations for the Nation's intelligence community to provide the
best foreign intelligence possible to defend the United States against
the many worldwide threats. The threats are not going to go away; and
from my days as a boy scout, I know we must be prepared.
Mr. Speaker, I will close with a thank you. Thank you to the
dedicated men and women of the U.S. intelligence community. We owe them
a debt of gratitude for the tough and unheralded work they do for all
of us. The memory of a failure of intelligence to present something as
horrific as September 11 will forever be seared in our minds. It is
important to never forget the untold numbers of threats that never
materialized into anything but words, with no action following, because
of the endless number of intelligence success stories where the system
worked as intended.
The system is not perfect; it probably never will be. But we must
continue to strive for perfection. This bill is a contribution toward
that end. Thank you, all of you, in the intelligence community for
quietly being there, working behind the scenes, to discover and counter
the threats to our security and our liberties.
I also want to thank the committee chairman, the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Goss), and the ranking member, the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Pelosi), for their leadership and hard work on this
bill. And I want to express my respect and admiration for my colleagues
on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and their very able
professional staff. They work hard, very hard for the cause.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 4628.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 5 minutes
to the distinguished gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Bishop), my good
friend, and he is my friend.
Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman yielding me this
time and recognizing me.
I want to talk about the need in this bill and in our intelligence
community for diversity. Intelligence and the intelligence community
has a mission for providing the best real-time information for our
policymakers and our warfighters. It is about information. It is about
having a heads-up; and if 9-11 has taught us anything, it certainly has
taught us that we need to have a heads-up.
All of the professionals, as has been stated already, have indicated
to us that if we are to be the best that we can be in our intelligence
community, we must have the best human assets for collecting
information and the best technical assets for collecting information;
and we must be able to process, analyze, and disseminate that
information where it needs to go.
But the problem that we face, the challenge we face, is that as hard
as the men and women in our intelligence community are working to
gather the necessary information so that when our servicemen and women
go into harm's way they know what they will be facing, we still do not
have adequate human assets and the kind of technical analysis assets
that will allow us to have the information that we need real-time.
Why should we not have diversity in the intelligence community? Every
intelligence professional, the heads of the CIA, NSA, DIA, NIMA, Army
intelligence, naval intelligence, all have indicated that we will be
much more effective in our collection by our human assets, if our
targets are hard to distinguish from our collectors. So if we need to
have information about Islamic culture, our intelligence collectors
need to be knowledgeable of that. Yes, if we are going into Rwanda and
we need information of what is happening there, maybe some Rwandan-
Americans ought to be a part of our collection force, Somalians or
Pakistanis or Afghans or Africans or Latinos; Asian Americans, Arab
Americans, Indian Americans, Mexican Americans, Cuban Americans,
Turkish Americans, Nigerian Americans, Muslim Americans, Christian
Americans, Jewish Americans, Irish Americans, human assets. We must
have racial diversity, cultural diversity, and language diversity if we
are to be effective in our efforts.
When we put the men and women who fight and defend this country and
who go all over the world protecting American interests, when we put
them in harm's way, they need to know what they will be faced with, and
the policymakers who send them there need to have that real-time
information; and they need to have the best quality information. They
need to be able to penetrate the sources of the information so that we
can, indeed, have a heads-up.
The creation of a more diverse intelligence workforce must be a
priority, the intelligence agencies, the undergraduate training
programs that use these programs to increase their minority efforts. I
was proud this morning to be able to go out to one of the agencies and
participate in the graduation ceremony of one of the programs designed
to help create that diversity. But this is a start. We have a long way
to go. We have challenges that we face, and unless we accelerate our
efforts to create and maintain the kind of diversity in our
intelligence community, we will not achieve the success that we desire.
Racial diversity, cultural diversity, language diversity are
necessities. They not only are the right thing to do, but they make
good business sense for gathering and disseminating and analyzing and
understanding the information that we must have.
Mr. Speaker, this is a good rule; this is a good bill. With the
amendments, it will be a better bill; and I urge my colleagues to
support it so that we can have the best intelligence-gathering
apparatus that our country can possibly have.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I am very happy to yield 5 minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. Cunningham), a very valued
member of our committee.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, it is an honor to serve on the Committee
on Intelligence with Members on both sides of the House. I also sit on
the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations, two
committees I think that work together in this House, together for
national security and the best interests of the American
[[Page H5416]]
people. That is why most of us came here, and we wish that all
committees that we served on have that decorum to work in a single
direction. It makes my heart soar like an eagle to serve on those kinds
of committees and do the people's work.
I think when we look at what the committee does, and the gentleman
from Florida (Mr. Goss), the chairman of our committee, and I have seen
chairmen and leaders that micromanage; he does not. He kind of gives
you the reins and he says, go out there and do your thing and do it for
the betterment of both sides of the aisle and the American people. He
does not micromanage; he gives us that free rein and for that I thank
the chairman.
The committee staff, I want to tell my colleagues that each Member
has a right to go to the committee staff and get these briefings. I
would recommend that my colleagues do it; and these staff members, some
are the James Bonds of the world. Some work in technology; some work in
administration. But if my colleagues want a brief on any area, ask, and
they will be delighted to give it. That is the kind of committee that
we serve on.
A good example is that if you are going to best determine what the
needs of the future, whether it is in defense or whether it is our
intelligence agencies, you need to be able to know for a fact what the
current threat is.
I see the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) and he looks to the
B-2, because he knows what the future threat is, the F-22.
So if we know what the threat is today through our intelligence
agencies, then we know better what to plan. For example, why do we need
a B-2 and its effectiveness with stealth? Why do we need the F-22? In
my opinion, we ought to double the buy, because it is the only airplane
in the system that can meet the threat of the SU-30 and the SU-37 and
plus whatever they have now. If we shorten that buy in defense, as some
are talking about in the White House, I think it is foolhardy.
But the basis that we get in this committee in a bipartisan way to go
forward with national security needs is laudatory.
I would tell my colleagues that when people start going after
defense, or they go after our intelligence services, most of us on the
committee get very defensive. Because as a body, this body and the
other body, in many cases we have not given our military or
intelligence agencies the assets they need to do the job.
In the last administration, we went on 149 deployments. That spread
our military thin. We only had 22 percent re-enlistment, and people
were stretched, and 25-year-old airplanes were stretched. The reason I
bring it up is because every time we deployed, our intelligence
agencies had to deploy also, and many of the systems that they had on
the drawing board to give us SIGINT and ELINT and HUMINT information
had to be scuttled because it went to pay for the war.
This committee, in a bipartisan way, is attempting to rectify some of
those things. We cannot make that up over the next 5 years. But the
committee is doing the best they can, based on the testimony from our
services. That is why it is such a neat deal to work on this committee.
We are doing something very, very positive and something good for this
country.
Is the war on drugs dead? No. But we have problems there as well as
with al Qaeda.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my
time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I am happy to yield 2 minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk).
Mr. KIRK. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this rule and this bill.
No one is more qualified to guide our intelligence legislation than the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss). Our intelligence community grew from
World War I and the Cold War to be supremely able to monitor foreign
militaries and governments.
{time} 2245
No more Pearl Harbors and powerful support to the war fighter. I
served for 13 years as a reserve Naval intelligence officer and
received vital intelligence that saved American lives in Haiti, Bosnia,
Kosovo and Iraq.
Our intelligence community must now be upgraded to meet the terrorist
threat. Our system is supremely designed to monitor foreign militaries,
but has left ability to monitor clandestined terror organizations
backed by familiar relations. We must upgrade our linguistic defenses.
We have Russian linguists but now need to speak Pastoon, Dari, Urdu and
dozens of other languages where terrorists are recruited from. Our
defense language institute in Monterey will play a key part of that
role.
Analysts now receive huge numbers of messages but they need back up
to rapidly translate and analyze information to develop actionable
intelligence in time. We are all aware of the failures of September 11.
We should know more about the successes of the intelligence community
in defeating the millennium bombers and Hezbollah in Bosnia or dozens
of other victories won, but not reported on the front page of The
Washington Post.
I want to thank the professionals from DIA, CIA, NSA, NIMA and the
military services who are on watch tonight protecting America. This
bill provides critical resources and, more importantly, new flexibility
to meet the new challenge. We face terrorists, wealthy terrorists who
may one day have weapons of mass destruction. Without the intelligence
community, we would some day face a nuclear Pearl Harbor. With the
community we will extend security and freedom for our people and
allies. I urge adoption of the rule and the bill.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
Mr. Speaker, at this time in the interest of all the Members tonight,
in spite of the fact that I feel I could talk about this matter for a
substantial period of time, I would just urge the Members at this time
to vote for this good rule and for the underlying bill which serves a
great purpose for our Nation.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
General Leave
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may
have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks
and include extraneous material on H. Res. 497.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Florida?
There was no objection.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I would echo my colleague and friend's sentiment. This a
fair and good rule. It deserves everybody's support.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the
previous question on the resolution.
The previous question was ordered.
The resolution was agreed to.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Tauzin). Pursuant to House Resolution
497 and rule XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of
the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the
bill, H.R. 4628.
{time} 2248
In the Committee of the Whole
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill
(H.R. 4628) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2003 for
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes, with Mr. Isakson in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having
been read the first time.
Under the rule, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Bishop) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss).
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I rise this evening in very strong support of this
bill, which is the annual authorization for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities, as required by law. This is a unique
authorization bill in that sense.
[[Page H5417]]
This is a very good bill that was crafted on a bipartisan basis. In
fact, I think it more appropriate, I should say, nonpartisan basis. And
it passed unanimously from our committee.
This would not have been possible without the attention and
involvement of all of our stellar members, and I truly mean that, but
especially the tireless efforts of our ranking member, the gentlewoman
from California (Ms. Pelosi), who, I am sorry to say, is on other
duties before the Committee on Rules now which is never a great place
to be if you can be on the intelligence community.
I cannot say enough about her support and guidance in this process,
all in the spirit of ensuring that our intelligence community is
positioned in the best possible way to protect our Nation. I want to
thank the gentlewoman for the number of hours that she has contributed
to the committee's all-important work and for the good nonpartisan work
you do and for the leadership she provides for her side.
Mr. Chairman, this bill turns a corner on rebuilding our intelligence
capabilities. The administration has requested a significant amount of
investment into these capabilities which is frankly long overdue. More
importantly, the bill lays the groundwork for sustained investment in
programs that will take a while to rebuild, but they are crucial,
absolutely crucial to our success against today's and tomorrow's
threats, which we have begun to better recognize and this bill begins
to address some of the issues that have heretofore been placed on a
back burner, despite the fact that some of us have been urging they be
moved to a more forward place.
In some ways, I see this bill as emphasizing the needs to get back to
the basics of intelligence. Often of the last decade especially, many
have gotten overly enamored with technology and finding ways to collect
data with the least amount of risks, the intelligence version of the
no-casualties policy.
Although, I will be the first to emphasize the need to keep on top of
various technologies and the importance of them to our intelligence
capabilities, our real security relies on some of the most fundamental
aspects of intelligence. Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, despite our
concerns and warnings, we learned in a very tragic way how important
these fundamentals really are, notwithstanding the extraordinarily good
work a great many men and women representing our country are providing
for us around the world in the intelligence community.
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 were well conceived; they
were coordinated; they took advantage of liberties that we have come to
rely on in our quality of life in this country. That also confirmed our
fears that the world is, indeed, a very dangerous and very unstable
place. And for the committee it unfortunately proved our worst fears
that the Nation's intelligence community was not sufficiently robust or
positioned to provide the first line of defense we need and do count
on.
Mr. Chairman, the price was much too high, and we owe it to those who
lost their lives, some of whom were members of the intelligence
community, I might add, to make sure we rebuild our capabilities and
our people to the best of our ability is the mission of this bill.
Other members of committee will highlight certain provisions of the
bill, so I am not going through them. I will make the point, however,
that certain lessons are involved in the getting back to the basics
part of this. They include: That the way to gain the most vital
information, plans and intentions of the enemy, what they are actually
thinking of doing, is more often than not to be physically close to the
target, that is the right way to do it, whether that is through the
human agent assets or assets of other types, like technical assets or
such things an unmanned aerial vehicles or manned aircraft, even.
This involves taking risks, both in terms of who you may have to work
with and in terms of, frankly, potential loss of life and tragically we
have seen casualties in the intelligence community in the war on
terrorism this year.
Once you collect that data, you have the mechanisms and capabilities
to analyze, understand and use the data, get it to the right people in
a timely way, and that involves having the right people with the right
training and the right skills and armed with the right tools to make
sure those who get that information can get it, and the right
management and guidance are available to you through the intelligence
community, and that community is structured in such a way to allow the
management to be effective.
Those are all things that we need to work on.
Mr. Chairman, this bill addresses many of these basics, save the
structure question. And I want to emphasize that this is a task that is
yet to be completed, but is every bit as important as the investment in
the basics. This is an area that the committee hopes to address soon as
has actually been somewhat sidetracked because of the 9-11 review, but
it remains a major priority on the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence to deal with the intelligence architecture.
Before I close, let me recognize two groups of people. First are the
men and women of the intelligence community whom I referred to
previously who are working tirelessly around the globe, and they are
doing everything they can to protect us. They work 7-24, and they
working in dangerous conditions and not very nice conditions and they
do things that a lot of us would not be very happy to do, and they take
up that work. They are the front lines of America. They are remarkable
people. I think anyone on the committee would tell you, we owe them a
great deal of gratitude and thanks. And I am sorry we cannot actually
reveal some of the exploits and success of these people because it
would make Americans proud, as it makes us on the committee proud when
we get to know these things.
The second group of people is close to home, Mr. Chairman. We would
not be here tonight if it were not for our committee members and our
committee staff. I have spoken my in the committee and my membership,
my vice chairman, the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter) who does a
great job taking care of me and pinch-hitting for me, and all the other
members of committee. We have now broken down into subcommittee so we
have more subcommittee chairman and ranking members and everybody has
risen to the occasion and the extra tasks that our committees this year
has been asked to take.
We have expanded by something like 25 percent in terms of our
membership and staff. We have been given many extra responsibilities
because of 9-11 and everybody has risen to the task. I must say the
committee staff has impressed me every day. When I arrive at the
committee, I admire their work ethic and their understanding of the
very complex and arcane activities of the Intelligence Community. I
think they represent the committee and Congress very well. Special
thanks to staff director Tim Sample, Mike Sheehy, the senior minority
staffer who worked to make sure the functions of the committee occur in
the least partisan atmosphere possible. And I am extremely proud of
that accomplishment on their park. Thank to Chris Barton, our chief
counsel, and Chris Healey, a minority counsel, as well as Michele Lang,
our deputy chief counsel, and Mike Meermans, our budget coordinator for
their tireless work on preparing this bill.
Obviously, each and every person on this staff beyond those I named
deserve our thanks and praise for jobs well done.
In the atmosphere I want to particularly thank our security staff who
have been given some extraordinary problems to cope with and I think
have done an amazingly good job. Mr. Chairman, I ask my colleagues to
support this bill.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 4628. The committee has
worked hard to provide the resources that our military forces and the
intelligence community require in order to prevail in the war on
terrorism and to safeguard all of our other national security
interests.
This is a bipartisan bill for which the gentleman from Florida (Mr.
Goss), the ranking Democrat, the gentlewoman from California (Ms.
Pelosi), my counterpart on the technical and
[[Page H5418]]
tactical subcommittee, the gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Castle) and all
of the other committee members deserve great credit.
I want to thank the committee staff for the tireless hours and the
hard work that they have put into the preparation of this bill. It is a
good bill. And I urge all of my colleagues to support it.
I want to emphasize a few points to my colleagues in the House as
well as the administration about what the bill accomplishes, as well as
some of my concerns for the future.
As is well known from press accounts, unmanned aerial vehicles
performed superbly in Afghanistan. With some exceptions in the past,
reconnaissance systems flew over or passed the battlefields in a matter
of seconds or minutes, and therefore provided only a sort of snapshot
of what was going on. Given the time delays in getting that information
to our tactical forces, it was extremely difficult to attack mobile
targets. What these UAVs provide is persistence, a constant presence.
Once targets are detected, UAV's can loiter and track them until an
attack can be mounted as demonstrated repeatedly in Afghanistan.
Now the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs are
advocating adding persistent surveillance capability from space. For
example, by launching many small radar satellites that can detect and
track moving vehicles. I believe this is the direction next generations
collection systems must take. DOD is also right to plan on buying many
UAV's and equipping them with capable sensor, but so far DOD has failed
to plan to buy the communication and ground processing capacity
necessary to support these platforms.
{time} 2300
This makes no sense and clearly it must be corrected.
The war also showed that no single sensor system alone is able to
perform all of the functions necessary to attack mobile targets, wide
area surveillance, target detection, identification, tracking and
precise target location. The only solution is to work the separate
sensor systems together in a network. Building this network of sensors
is feasible and it is very affordable, but although DOD appears to
understand its importance, progress has been slow.
I was disappointed that the administration, despite the large budget
increases, failed to request sufficient funds to support the contract
award for NIMA's modernization program. The committee corrected this
problem by redirecting other funds to that area. The committee also
added funds to begin acquiring the capability to receive and process
airborne imagery.
I am encouraged with regard to commercial imagery by the NIMA
director's progress in developing a rational strategy for the first
time. However, NIMA to date has received funding adequate to support
only one satellite collection company but no policy guidance to rely on
a single source. If NIMA is to support multiple companies and meet
DOD's readiness requirements for geospatial products, NIMA must receive
more funding. It is as simple as that. That key issue must be resolved,
and it must be resolved soon.
Finally, a word about the National Security Agency. Unfortunately,
NSA's serious acquisition management problems persist, preventing the
agency from keeping pace with the global telecommunications industry.
These problems contributed to limiting NSA's operational capabilities
in key areas relevant to the war on terrorism and other so-called
transnational threats as noted in the report of the Subcommittee on
Terrorism and Homeland Security on the events of September 11. NSA's
problems could have very serious consequences and, in my opinion,
demand more attention from the Secretary of Defense.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am privileged to yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter), the distinguished vice-chairman
of the committee, who also takes care of all of the policy coordination
on our committee, which always dazzles me.
(Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, this Intelligence Authorization Act
addresses a number of pressing intelligence needs. For example, the
legislation takes steps to strengthen the intelligence community's
absolutely critical analytical core.
In recent years, the U.S. has been forced to focus on terrorists,
proliferators and drug traffickers. These are far more difficult
targets to track, and frankly, the intelligence community took too long
to adapt to these new threats. It did not reach out aggressively to
recruit the human intelligence sources that could have provided us with
invaluable information. We lost far too many skilled analysts whose job
was to provide early warning.
This legislation provides much-needed funding to help rebuild a
dynamic, wide-ranging, global analytical capability. It is an effort
for which this committee has been serving a leading role for some years
now.
A second important component of the Intelligence Authorization Act
relates to terrorist finances. One of the major intelligence
initiatives in the wake of 9/11 has been a serious effort to attack the
financial assets of terrorist organizations and their supporters.
Terrorist networks such as al Qaeda obviously cannot function without
significant financial backing.
Al Qaeda, for example, is supported by, one, a shadowy network of
fundraisers, money lenders and shakedown artists; two, businesses and
charities serving as front organizations; and three, unscrupulous
facilitators and middlemen. However, with the decision of the executive
branch to fully exploit its existing authorities to target terrorist
finances, and with the granting of additional authorities under the
U.S. PATRIOT Act, we are now aggressively attacking the money flow. To
date, over $100 million in suspected terrorist money has been seized or
frozen by the United States and its allies.
Mr. Chairman, this is an important and powerful set of financial
tools in the war on terrorism.
Mr. Chairman, there are other important initiatives here, but I want
to say that I think one of the important things that we have done is
close an important loophole caused by the Freedom of Information Act.
Our adversaries were able to make requests that had to be dealt with
for very sensitive information, and we have taken a commonsense
approach to ending that loophole.
Mr. Chairman, I would conclude by congratulating the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Goss), the chairman of the committee and the distinguished
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi) for the leadership they have
demonstrated in bringing this genuinely bipartisan product to the
floor. This legislation is a very serious effort and was unanimously
approved by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Each and every member of the committee and our extraordinary staff
dedicated long hours to the hearings and drafting of the bill. Each
Member, I think, and the staff clearly recognizes the importance of our
actions and our responsibilities to the body, and I think my colleagues
can take, if I may say so, justifiable pride in the efforts of HPSCI
and our staff and particularly the leadership of the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Goss) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi).
Mr. Chairman, I urge strong support and the adoption of H.R. 4628.
Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3\1/4\ minutes to the distinguished
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), the ranking member on the
Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security.
(Ms. HARMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend her
remarks.)
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding commend
him for his leadership on the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical
Intelligence, and commend our colleagues for their strong bipartisan
contributions to this committee.
I rise in strong support of the Intelligence Authorization Act and
join others in expressing my pride in the bipartisan way in which this
committee works. For those who question whether this House can tackle
the tough ones, tonight proves it. Our actions over the past three
hours in the Traficant matter were a somber and clear example of
bipartisanship and facing up to our responsibilities. This bill is
another such example.
[[Page H5419]]
Members of this committee have traveled all over the world and have
met U.S. intelligence personnel working in many shabby and often
dangerous conditions. They do this despite their family's
understandable fears that they are in harm's way. This bill is designed
to give good people better tools, to fill gaps in performance. It is
not about gaps in the dedication, commitment and patriotism of
thousands of Americans who work in the intelligence agencies, both here
and abroad.
Many issues addressed in this bill, Mr. Chairman, were identified in
a report that our Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security
released last week. Our full intelligence committee wants no time to
elapse before implementing that report's recommendations, and this bill
recommends action, action that the families of those who died on 9/11
deserve.
Our report said, for example, that inadequate penetration of the al
Qaeda target stemmed in large part from too few resources devoted to
counterterrorism and an overreliance on assistance from allies to
collect information. We fix that in this report; we insist that we
invest more resources in human intelligence (humint), and we spell out
how that should happen.
Penetration of the al Qaeda target, our report says, requires
multiyear investment and cutting edge technologies. This bill directs
that mission-critical technology is available and improved.
Our report said that watch lists were inadequate. This bill calls on
the intelligence community to provide global coverage and common access
to information, which should help fix the watch list problem.
Our report said that we were concerned about the HUMINT career
structure. Too often, individuals get promoted based on their broad and
general knowledge in wide-ranging areas. Those who stay focused in one
area or even one country, where an understanding of local political
conditions is key to our fight against terrorism, are not being given
the credit or rewards deserved. This bill recommends that those rewards
be given.
Regrettably, there is a huge language problem. This bill addresses
that problem.
As in past years, this bill also expresses continuing concern about
the organizational framework in place to produce intelligence
capabilities that can meet future national security demands. This bill
addresses that problem.
{time} 2310
Mr. Chairman, our language is terse, our calls for reform are urgent,
but we also state that "the successes of the intelligence community
normally go unnoticed for obvious and correct reasons . . . The problem
is not with the individuals, but with the tools and the organization
with which they work."
This is a good bill. I urge its support, and I urge support later
this week for a bipartisan homeland security bill.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the
gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Castle), the chairman of the Subcommittee
on Technical and Tactical Intelligence, and former Governor of
Delaware.
(Mr. CASTLE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for that introduction
and for yielding me this time.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 4628, the fiscal year
2003 intelligence authorization bill. Before I move to the substance of
my statement, I would like to recognize and commend the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Goss), the chairman of the committee, and the ranking
member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), for the
outstanding leadership they have provided to the Nation and
particularly to the intelligence community during this past year.
This has been a difficult time for our intelligence community. There
have been failings, but there have been many successes that have not
and should not be publicized. The gentleman from Florida and the
gentlewoman from California have been at the forefront of efforts to
ensure our professional intelligence offices get the resources
necessary to do their vital work for our national security. I thank
them both.
Mr. Chairman, those of us on the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence are among the few who understand that the world has not
changed, despite the tragedy that befell us on September 11. We have
been painfully aware for a long time that while many regions of the
world are working together with us to promote peace and stability,
there are many elements that are committed to undermining such efforts.
We are intimately familiar with the difficult tasks our intelligence
professionals are up against, and, moreover, with the outstanding work
they do day in and day out around the globe. For all they do, I would
like to extend my gratitude to them for all their unheralded successes.
Oddly, their past successes have resulted in the American public
having a combination of a low awareness of the magnitude of the threats
and the high expectation that the intelligence community would always
be able to counter them. The difficulty of such a task is daunting.
What makes this intelligence community all the more special is that
they have done as well as they have, in spite of years of resource
neglect.
This year's funding request begins to restore the capabilities that
have withered over the years. Today, the intelligence community's
challenges remain large, but we will continually assess the
intelligence community's ability to meet their challenges. Because this
year represents a significant point in our history to consider the
priorities and needs for intelligence activities and set a new course
for the future, I am particularly concerned with how much the strategic
vision has been dedicated toward our future collection needs and
systems, and, more importantly, whether the administration is willing
to sustain the investment through the duration necessary to deliver the
new capabilities.
As chairman of the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical
Intelligence, I understand the critical need to invest in and modernize
our technical intelligence systems. These systems take years to field
and tens of thousands of highly skilled scientists and engineers to
complete. In this bill, I am happy that we address the resource strain
of the legacy programs in hopes that we avoid sacrificing our future.
I am concerned that the U.S. technology industry has not held itself
to a high enough standard of accountability. When the country needs
special capabilities, we cannot be held captive to a single contractor,
regardless of their performance, simply because there are no
alternatives. I believe even the intelligence community must take some
calculated risks in order to ensure we acquire the kinds of
capabilities that future threats demand. The bill before us details how
we intend to ensure the country is on an appropriate and sustainable
technology path for the future.
Although this budget represents a significant increase over the past
years, we need to support it with the full knowledge and understanding
that there is a great deal more work to be done. Rebuilding the
intelligence capabilities of the United States is not going to be done
with a single budget. Congress and the American people need to
understand that these threats against our Nation will not be eliminated
with the demise of al Qaeda. In order to close the gap between demands
on intelligence and the complexity of the current and future threats,
we must commit to a long-term intelligence capability restoration.
The next attack against us may be to undermine our confidence in some
critical part of our infrastructure, or may be chemical or biological
warfare. We do not know. But what we do know is that the threats are
real and we need to act accordingly. Mr. Chairman, this bill is a
downpayment to provide our senior policymakers with the capabilities
and tools for the near term. It is a responsible, reasonable, and
appropriate request to fund our Nation's national security needs.
The President, our policymakers, our military, the people of the
United States, and al Qaeda deserve nothing less; and I ask the Members
of the House to give H.R. 4628 their full support.
Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer), who is a very hard-
working member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
[[Page H5420]]
Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I thank my good friend from the State of
Georgia for yielding me this time; and I want to note, as some of my
colleagues may have, that this is the first entire budget put together
by the United States Congress since the horrific attacks on our people,
our homeland, and our country on September 11. I could not be more
proud to serve in this Chamber and with the people that have put this
intelligence budget together: our chairman, the gentleman from the
State of Florida (Mr. Goss), who it is a pleasure to work with; the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), who provides such strong
leadership; the other members of the committee, who do such honorable
work; and the bright and dedicated staff that we serve with and who
serve us so well.
Mr. Chairman, we have debated many bills this year. I am not sure we
will debate a more important one for the security and the strength of
our Nation. I want to thank the intelligence community for the hard
work they do, the work on U.S. goals, U.S. programs, U.S. policies, and
U.S. interests. Every day they make us a little bit more secure.
I want to say, too, Mr. Chairman, that the events of 9-11 may not
have been absolutely preventable; but mistakes were made, failures were
made, there were gaps and cracks that the snakes crawled through on 9-
11, and we intend to fix them and to close those gaps. There are too
many stovepipe agencies that make communication difficult across
agencies, there is still too much outdated technology, there is still
too many old structures and cultures, there is not enough emphasis on
human intelligence and language skills and analytical capabilities; and
we need to work on ways to turn information into knowledge to help
mitigate and prevent future attacks.
This bill takes significant steps forward in those areas. But there
is a very important caveat written in our report that I encourage all
Members to read on page 13: investment, but not in old structures. New
resources, but not toward old ideas and old mistakes.
We say on page 14, and I quote, "The committee must emphasize,
however, that investment alone, without reorganization or reform of
some of the basic components and practices of the intelligence
community, will not provide effective national intelligence
capabilities."
President Lincoln, in one of the most dire times in our Nation's
history, when we were fighting in the Civil War, said, "As the times
are new, we must think anew and act anew." That is certainly the
challenge today as we are in a global war on terrorism. Let us think in
new ways to reform the old structure and make it new so that these
investments in language, in analytical capabilities, and in human
intelligence pay off and make our country stronger.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to yield 4 minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss), the chairman of
our Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security, and the partial
author with the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) of the recent
report that has been well received on the first outing of our efforts
on counterterrorism.
(Mr. CHAMBLISS asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman for yielding me
this time, and I say to my chairman and our ranking member what a great
job they have done in leading our committee; and to the staff, I do not
think I have ever worked with a greater staff on both sides of the
aisle than what we have in the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, and I thank both for that.
To my ranking member on my subcommittee, the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Harman), who has been such a great partner in this
effort to fight this war on counterterrorism, what a great partner she
has been in this.
I rise today in support of H.R. 4628, the Intelligence Authorization
Act for fiscal year 2003. As chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism
and Homeland Security, I have spent considerable time these past months
reviewing the capabilities, gaps, and needs of the intelligence
community. In fact, last Wednesday we released the unclassified summary
of our report to the Speaker on gaps in counterterrorism capabilities
at CIA, FBI, and the National Security Agency.
{time} 2320
It is true that the community was not adequately prepared for the
events of September 11, 2001, and the report was very critical in some
areas. By and large we found that in spite of the best efforts of this
body and the many hard-working rank-and-file on the front lines in the
intelligence community, not enough resources and effort were dedicated
to key mission areas, such as HUMINT and SIGINT over a protracted
period of time.
Available resources, moreover, were sometimes redirected by senior
community managers away from core collection and analytic activities to
feed a growing bureaucracy at headquarters.
There were not and still are not enough CIA agents on the streets of
the world collecting against our enemies. NSA's signals intercept and
exploitation capabilities, once second to none, are now badly in need
of retooling.
There are insufficient foreign language capabilities, both to conduct
effective intelligence operations against terrorists and to exploit
material acquired in such operations.
The FBI lacked analytic capability to enable it to pursue preventive
measures rather than simply to respond to crimes that have already been
committed. And no one was sharing information in such a way that all
the consumers with a need-to-know actually got everything relevant to
their responsibilities.
While no single authorization bill can hope to fix all of these
problems, H.R. 4628 will give the community the means to get its
collective house in order by addressing the most pressing of these
shortcomings. The intelligence community will be in a position to hire
more collectors, analysts, linguists, and technicians. It will be able
to make long-needed investments in infrastructure, systems integration,
and training that will pay significant dividends over the long-term and
will, perhaps, make it possible to penetrate the hitherto impenetrable
terrorist organization at a level sufficient to get at plans and
intentions.
Resources alone, however, will not be enough. Community managers will
have to get moving on reform before new intelligence dollars will have
full effect. The community must accept this criticism in the right way;
and upon that being done, I am confident that long-needed reforms of
the community will be hastened by this bill.
As one notable example, DCI George Tenet, in response to our report,
repealed the human rights guidelines that have had a chilling effect on
counterterrorist recruitment operations since 1995.
Will H.R. 4628 stop all future 9-11-type attacks? No one can make
such a guarantee, but this bill will make it much more likely we will
have the intelligence capabilities to identify and thwart such hostile
actions in the future. We are going to be facing potentially
catastrophic threats from terrorists and other adversaries over the
long haul. This is not something we are going to be able to stop on a
global basis all at once. Therefore, it is critically important that we
move swiftly to make the necessary investments in our intelligence
capabilities that H.R. 4628 provides.
Mr. Chairman, I urge passage of this bill.
The neglect of the 1990s in the form of decreasing resources and
political support for intelligence can never be allowed to be repeated
in this country. And it will necessarily require considerable time and
effort on all our parts to correct. America needs and deserves an
intelligence capability that is second-to-none, and as 9-11 proved, we
do not yet have that capability.
Rather than the Cold War threats of old, today's threats are likely
to be aircraft hijackings, suicide bombings, cyber attacks, the
poisoning of agriculture or our water supply, the use of biological or
chemical agents, or the use of radioactive materials to devastate
cities. Such threats require a much more innovative and robust
Intelligence Community than we have ever had before.
I urge all of my colleagues to vote for H.R. 4628. This bill will
move us towards the kind of Intelligence Community all Americans need
and deserve. We simply cannot afford to wait
[[Page H5421]]
any longer to make the necessary investments. H.R. 4628 will make
America safer.
Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman, I yield 7 minutes to the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Pelosi), the ranking member of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished gentleman for
managing this bill for the Democrats and for the gentleman's
distinguished work on the committee.
I have to be excused for having to be upstairs in the Committee on
Rules speaking for the rule on the homeland security bill which will
come to the floor hopefully tomorrow.
I begin by complimenting the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss)
for the manner in which he has guided the committee. He has been
consistently fair and always true to his word. I think that is a great
compliment and one that he deserves completely. The committee's
reputation for bipartisanship has been enhanced by his disposition
toward encouraging and respecting the views of all of our members, as
will be clear when we see how easy it is for this bill to pass on the
floor.
The chairman has explained well the provisions of the bill. It
recommends substantially more money, many billions of dollars more,
than was provided for the current fiscal year. If the amounts
recommended in the bill are appropriated, the community will receive
the largest one-year increase in funding on a percentage basis in at
least the last two decades. Much of this increase is directly
attributable to the September 11 attacks.
Although no amount of money can guarantee that there will not be
additional instances of terrorism, the funding recommended by this bill
should make it harder to undertake in a successful way future terrorist
attacks like those conducted on September 11. The committee's priority
must be on making sure that this money is spent well on programs and
activities that will produce results, not only against terrorism, but
against other important intelligence targets as well.
We have worked very closely in a bipartisan way on our committee
under the leadership of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss). I want
to commend the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Bishop), the gentlewoman
from California (Ms. Harman), the gentleman from California (Mr.
Condit), the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer), the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Reyes), the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Boswell), the gentleman
from Minnesota (Mr. Peterson), and the gentleman from Alabama (Mr.
Cramer) for their distinguished service on the committee as well, and
join others in commending the staff for the excellence of their work
and their service to our country.
I leave it to the distinguished chairman to recognize the majority
members, but every one of them makes a tremendous contribution to our
country's security.
Intelligence is integral to that security, to the protection of the
American people and our national interests at home and abroad. Whether
our interests are defined as providing security to a special operations
team in Afghanistan or passengers in an airliner in the skies over
California, timely and reliable intelligence is a necessity.
Although there may be differences over the manner in which some
intelligence activities are conducted, and indeed we have our
differences, I think we all place a high value on the protective
responsibility being discharged effectively by the intelligence
community. To do that, a big investment in technology and in people is
needed. The investments necessary to enhance mission success in this
area are recommended in this bill.
Mission success is produced by things other than money. The world has
changed greatly since I joined the committee 10 years ago. I think I
have served longer on the committee than anyone. Now my service is
coming to an end. At that time, 10 years ago, the intelligence
community was primarily focused on the aftermath of the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Today, as we know, it is primarily focused on fighting
terrorism.
I have been concerned that the intelligence agencies have not been
quick enough to recognize the changes in training, tactics and methods
of operation required to shift from dealing with a fixed target, like
the Soviet Union, to more nimble targets like the terrorists and the
proliferators of weapons of mass destruction. I think the record
suggests that the shift has been harder to accomplish than had been
presumed. In fact, in some areas it has not been fully implemented yet.
For example, the pace toward creating a more diverse workforce in the
intelligence community, and in improving the language capabilities of
the workforce, have been too slow. Although I recognize that the
relatively small number of new employees able to be hired across the
community since the end of the Cold War made that a difficult
challenge, today a significant increase in the workforce is happening
through an acceleration in hiring, and it presents a tremendous
opportunity for us to attract and reach out for the diversity that will
make mission success more possible.
I expect that community leaders will use this opportunity by
redoubling their efforts to attract and advance people with diverse
religious, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds, and with capabilities in
those languages in which the agencies have traditionally been weak.
H.R. 4628 does much to emphasize language training and to provide
incentives to maintain proficiency. Partnerships with entities outside
the government to improve the language skills of current employees, as
well as new hires, are encouraged. An amendment is expected to study
the feasibility of establishing a reserve core of linguists. These are
good initiatives which do much to address one of the intelligence
community's biggest needs. I commend the gentleman from Indiana (Mr.
Roemer), the gentleman from California (Mr. Condit), the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Reyes), the gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert), and the
gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Gibbons) for their leadership within the
committee on the language issue. Their efforts have been assisted from
outside the committee by the gentleman from California (Mr. Farr). He
knows well the importance of this issue, the Defense Language Institute
is located in his district, and he has worked tirelessly to improve
language training programs.
The bill continues to emphasize the kind of human and technical
collection programs necessary to deal with targets like terrorist
groups. This emphasis, however, should not ignore the imbalance across
the intelligence community between collection and the ability to make
use of that which is collected through timely processing, exploitation,
and dissemination.
Progress has been made on dissemination, which was one of the most
important intelligence shortcomings during the Gulf War, but not enough
attention has been paid to making sure that analytic capabilities are
sufficient.
{time} 2330
Agencies need more analysts, more translators, and more equipment to
speed the process of converting data into intelligence. This bill
provides some much needed funding in these areas. I hope that the
administration will sustain these important initiatives in future
budget submissions.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, we are rapidly approaching the first
anniversary of September 11. The terrorist attacks of that day are
always on our minds. Although the World Trade Center site has been
cleared and the rebuilding of the Pentagon proceeds, the mourning for
the victims continues and the life of the Nation has been affected
profoundly. The committee is engaged in a process of evaluating the
performance of the intelligence agencies in the months leading up to
the attacks and in assessing how that performance can be improved to
better ensure our security in the future.
An important step in that process was taken last week with the
release of the report on intelligence capabilities prepared by the
Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security, ably led by the
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss) and the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Harman). The report will be a valuable tool for the
inquiry being conducted jointly by the House and Senate Intelligence
Committees. When the report of the joint inquiry is completed, I
believe the Nation will have a better understanding of the strengths
and weaknesses of our
[[Page H5422]]
intelligence agencies on September 11 and how weaknesses can be
addressed.
The report of the joint inquiry, however, will be limited necessarily
by the jurisdiction of the intelligence committees. Despite our best
efforts, many of the questions of the families of the victims will not
be answered by the committee's work. We owe those families the most
thorough and independent investigation possible. Examining all of the
issues raised by the attacks will require, in my judgment, an
independent commission. I hope such a commission will be established
soon. I commend the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) for his
leadership on this issue. I look forward to discussing his amendment.
In closing, I want to acknowledge, again the contributions of my
colleagues. I will continue my remarks during the amendment process.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Gibbons), a decorated pilot from the
services and the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on Human
Intelligence, Analysis and Counterintelligence which covers quite a
spectrum.
(Mr. GIBBONS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the intelligence
authorization bill and I thank my friend and colleague from Florida for
yielding me this time.
This is a good bill, Mr. Chairman. It addresses intelligence needs
that were identified in past years by the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, but only now, after the deaths of many innocent
Americans, are these needs getting the broad attention they deserve?
Throughout much of the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, there
was a debate about whether America really needed to spend so much on
defense. As for intelligence, some people even said there was no longer
any need for the CIA. I believe, and indeed I believe America believes,
that this debate is now over. As we know now, prior to September 11, we
simply did not have enough intelligence on the plans and intentions of
foreign terrorist groups. We paid a high price for that lack of
intelligence. The bill before you today will help the intelligence
agencies build up their capabilities.
If you want to know the plans and the intentions of terrorist groups,
you have to have HUMINT, human intelligence. This is the information
you get from human sources, known as "assets" or "agents" or just
plain "spies." I want to emphasize that this year's intelligence
authorization bill does a great deal to strengthen our HUMINT
capability.
For one thing, there is money to hire more CIA operations officers.
Last fall after the September attacks, our committee freed CIA's
operations officers from the Deutch guidelines, implemented by former
CIA Director John Deutch, which literally tied the hands of our CIA
intelligence operatives working against so-called "unsavory
characters," such as terrorists and narcotics traffickers.
Since last fall, America's intelligence operatives have been doing a
great job, but they are now few and far between. We need more and this
bill will help ensure that there will be more. This bill also provides
money to hire more intelligence analysts and language specialists.
Likewise, there is more funding for foreign language training. It is
not hard to understand that if your operations officers and analysts
have not learned the language of your enemy, you will not succeed in
learning his plans and intentions.
In addition, to help strengthen our linguistic expertise nationwide,
my Intelligence Committee colleague the gentleman from Indiana (Mr.
Roemer) has offered an amendment to establish a nationwide linguistic
reserve corps. I am happy to cosponsor his amendment. These HUMINT and
foreign language-related items are just some of the good provisions in
this intelligence authorization bill. They are long overdue.
In sum, we have a good bill that provides the proper resources to the
intelligence community for this year. The clock is ticking and
America's enemies continue with their planning. I urge your support for
our intelligence professionals, and I urge your support for this bill.
Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes), a very valuable member
of our committee who has former ties to the Border Patrol.
Mr. REYES. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this bill. First I want to
thank both Chairman Goss and Ranking Member Pelosi for developing a
bill that is designed to meet the intelligence challenges that our
Nation is currently facing. Their leadership on critical intelligence
issues has been an inspiration and very noteworthy for all of us on the
committee.
Since the events of September 11, we have been wrestling with many
issues in our quest to enhance our intelligence-gathering capabilities.
It is apparent now more than ever that intelligence is the cornerstone
in successfully prosecuting the war on terror and securing our
homeland. Chairman Goss and Ranking Member Pelosi have ensured that
this outstanding bill provides for the funding and the policy guidance
to get this job done. I thank them for their continued commitment to
our Nation and to our committee.
One of the things that we have also learned is the need for reliable
human intelligence. The lives of our citizens are much too valuable to
be trusted to proxy agents. This bill addresses this issue. We need
analysts and case officers with language skills and expertise in
foreign areas. At both the NSA and CIA, literally thousands of pieces
of data are never analyzed, or are analyzed after the fact because
there are too few analysts and even fewer with the necessary language
skills.
I am proud to have played a role in the construction of this bill,
especially the components of it that exemplify the mindset of thinking
out of the box, something that will be essential in our future success
in fighting terrorism. If we do not innovate and ride the dragon of
change, then surely that dragon will ride us. That is why I am
especially proud to be a cosponsor of the gentleman from Indiana's
amendment to authorize additional funding for the national security
education program and to establish the national flagship language
initiative.
One of the lessons we have learned in the current conflict is a
shortage of qualified linguists who are central to intelligence-
gathering operations such as interrogations and signals intelligence.
This bill will alleviate that shortage.
Mr. Chairman, I urge all my colleagues to support this bill.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to yield 2\1/2\ minutes to
the distinguished gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood).
Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the intelligence
authorization bill and thank our good friend and colleague, the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) for the good work that he does and
also the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi) for the good work
that she does and all the members of the committee and the staff.
I would like to take just a couple of minutes also to praise the
dedicated men and women of our intelligence agencies. America's rank
and file intelligence specialists were working hard prior to September
11. Since then they have been working overtime and in overdrive, and
there is no let-up in sight. Our intelligence authorization bill gives
these dedicated professionals the resources they need. I strongly urge
colleagues to support it. I am proud of our committee's work. It has
been a strong bipartisan effort that we can all be proud of.
This year's bill helps build its human intelligence capabilities.
HUMINT, the information we get from individual human sources overseas,
is something we need a lot more of. We need to know a lot more about
the internal workings and plans of terrorist groups. Every American
understands that we have enemies who are plotting future attacks. We
need to maximize our ability to neutralize these plots, and this bill
provides funding and resources to do just that. The bill helps address
the crying need for more foreign language expertise in the intelligence
agencies. Each agency has traditionally been responsible to hire and
train an adequate number of linguists, but no agency has ever been able
to meet its goals, and the lack of foreign language capability remains
a community-wide problem.
[[Page H5423]]
Ladies and gentlemen, it stands to reason that if America's
intelligence officers cannot understand what our enemies are saying to
each other, we will never be able to adequately protect our citizens
and our interests.
{time} 2340
However, with our bill Congress steps into increased resources for
language training and for transition efforts across the entire
intelligence community.
Let me just say that when the amendment of the gentleman from Indiana
(Mr. Roemer) to establish a commission comes before the floor, I will
strongly oppose that amendment and speak against it as strongly as I
can. I think it is an ill-timed amendment, and I hope we do not pass
it.
In conclusion, I repeat I am proud of America's rank-and-file
intelligence professionals, and I likewise am proud of the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence's work to provide them the resources
they need. I urge strong support of all Members for this bill.
Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Cardin).
(Mr. CARDIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend for yielding me this
time.
Mr. Chairman, I want to congratulate the gentleman from Florida (Mr.
Goss), the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), and all of the
members of the committee for bringing forward an excellent bill. I
encourage all of my colleagues to support the legislation.
I wholeheartedly agree with the committee's report that the success
of intelligence normally goes unnoticed, for obvious and correct
reasons, while failures seem to be immediately brought to the public's
eye.
I want to commend the dedicated and hard-working employees of the NSA
in my district who work tirelessly in secret with little public reward
or praise for their many accomplishments.
Mr. Chairman, I have visited NSA on many occasions, and I agree with
the committee report that there are two critical challenges that NSA
faces. One is sufficient linguists. We have talked about that already
today, the fact is that the inability of budget support to attract
sufficient linguists has compromised NSA's mission and that we need to
improve the current language programs. The legislation before us
authorizes additional funds for us to be able to accomplish that very
important challenge.
The second issue is how to deal with the buy-versus-make policy for
the outsourcing of nonmission critical programs. I think the committee
report addresses that issue appropriately.
Mr. Chairman, the bottom line is that this legislation provides the
additional resources to our intelligence community so they can collect
and analyze the necessary information, set the priorities as to what is
important for national security, and do that in a timely way. It also
at NSA provides resources for additional research to protect U.S.
communications.
I think this is a very balanced bill. It is a bill that responds to
the security challenges of our Nation, providing the resources and
providing the direction that is necessary, and I urge my colleagues to
support the legislation.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra), a very valuable
member of the committee.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 4628,
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. Over the past
decade, Americans have witnessed extraordinary changes in the
international security environment. To the average American, some of
these new threats were unforeseen. To others, they were simply
unimaginable.
We live in a different world than that which existed prior to
September 11, 2001; and this body is obligated to ensure that every
step is taken to protect our Nation against all threats, new and old.
Mr. Chairman, H.R. 4628 provides important funding that permits the
intelligence community to better confront these threats and ensure
greater security of Americans at home and abroad.
It is a good, a bipartisan bill. H.R. 4628 addresses numerous
intelligence needs, some of which have been underscored by the dramatic
events of the past year.
One of the country's most important weapons in the war on terrorism
is a diverse, well-trained and experienced intelligence personnel.
Intelligence officers, whether they are collectors, analysts, linguists
or support personnel, have been working in an overload capacity since
9-11. These brave, patriotic men and women deserve the recognition of
this body, and H.R. 4628 takes steps to encourage these officers to
continue their tireless service to the country by recommending for them
fair compensation, benefits and stronger career planning.
In addition to receiving enhanced specialized training and collecting
and analyzing critical intelligence, these officers need strong foreign
language skills to operate effectively in parts of the world where our
adversaries might lurk. H.R. 4628 addresses the intelligence
community's critical need for better language training, targeting
specific training for its officers as well as the long-standing issue
of the recapitalization of specific technological intelligence
platforms.
Mr. Chairman, this Member urges support for H.R. 4628.
Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Burr.)
Mr. BURR of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. As a member of
the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security, I am particularly
eager for this bill to be voted into law.
During the course of the 107th Congress, the subcommittee, which
began as a Speaker's working group in January 2001, heard testimony
from dozens of intelligence officials, both at home and abroad, from
counterterrorism commissioners, foreign officials and hosts of other
terrorism experts. In the end, we found an intelligence community that
has suffered severely over the protracted period from budget shortfalls
and poor internal management decisions about the allocation of
available resources. Significant collection gaps, not just in the realm
of counterterrorism, were identified, and many of these problems have
proven to be systemic.
H.R. 4628 provides a significant new resource for the most neglected
areas of the community and guidance for how the most pressing gaps can
be expeditiously closed. The community's most crucial counterterrorism
shortcomings, as we judged in a classified report released in
unclassified summary form last Wednesday, are as follows: a chronic
linguistic shortfall across the community; a shortage of core human
intelligence collectors out on the streets in bazaars hunting potential
terrorist spies; a culture of risk aversion that has permeated
collection operation and is manifest in the CIA's 1995 "Internal Human
Rights Guidelines" promulgated by Director of Central Intelligence
John Deutch. These management-generated guidelines have tied the hands
of those brave men and women on the front lines for far too long.
George Tenet finally repealed these guidelines just last Thursday,
the day after the counterterrorism gaps report was released, and some 7
months after he was directed to do so in the fiscal year 2002
intelligence authorization.
The community also lacks analysts in sufficient numbers and with
sufficient skills at the CIA, FBI, and NSA to connect all the dots out
there that are being unearthed and examined in isolation. The FBI needs
to change its culture and traditional methods of operating from
emphasis on after-the-fact.
Does H.R. 4628 solve all the problems? No one authorization could
possibly do that. But this bill takes us further in terms of targeting
resources than we have seen in some time. I submit this bill is
critical in getting the intelligence community on the right track and
that there is no time to waste in this endeavor.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Everett), a valued member of
the committee as well.
Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I, too, rise today in strong support of
H.R.
[[Page H5424]]
4628, the Intelligence Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2003. I am
proud of the bipartisan work that went into the crafting of this bill.
The gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) and the ranking member, the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), deserve a great deal of
credit for this bipartisan effort and the great product that we have
before us today.
{time} 2350
It would be disingenuous to state that all is well within the United
States intelligence community. The House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence has been for a number of years identifying a number of
major shortfalls and providing for our foreign intelligence needs. We
have identified shortfalls, major limitations in human intelligence
officers and assets. We have pointed out the limited capabilities this
Nation has with respect to foreign language specialists. We have
identified problems with aging systems and capabilities. And we have
identified a serious problem with respect to taking calculated risks in
collecting critical intelligence against those who would do our Nation
harm.
Mr. Chairman, this bill represents a major step forward in correcting
many of these problems by funding programs, operations, and personnel
that are vital to the security of this Nation. This bill is important
in particular in that it begins to focus on modernization and upgrading
our signals intelligence capacities. It provides funding authorizations
to modernize capabilities that have long been ignored.
Although I am supportive of the fund recommendations and policy
directions of this bill, I have been personally concerned that it may
be difficult for a national security agency to effectively obligate the
large infusion of funding. Therefore, the bill directs executive
oversight actions for these acquisition programs of the National
Security Agency. I believe the guidance and direction in the bill will
result in honest appraisals and recommendations to the Congress to
ensure the taxpayers' dollars are most effectively spent. I feel this
is a good bill that balances the increased investments against critical
priorities with procedures, and I recommend its passage to my
colleagues.
Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 4628, the
Intelligence Authorization Bill for fiscal year 2003.
I am proud of the bipartisan work that went into the crafting of the
bill. Chairman Goss and our Ranking Member, Nancy Pelosi deserve a
great deal of credit for this bipartisan effort and for the great
product that we have before us today.
It would be disingenuous to state that all is well within the United
States Intelligence Community. The House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence has been for a number of years systematically identifying
a number of major shortfalls in providing for our foreign intelligence
needs. We have identified funding shortfalls, major limitations in
human intelligence officers and assets. We have pointed out the limited
capabilities this nation has with respect to foreign language
specialists. We have identified problems with aging systems and
capabilities. And, we have identified a serious problem with respect to
taking calculated risks in collecting critical intelligence against
those who would do our nation harm.
Mr. Chairman, this bill represents a major step forward in correcting
many of these problems by funding programs, operations, and personnel
that are vital to the security of the United States. This bill
represents the largest increase for foreign intelligence funding in our
a decade, and provides the necessary resources for improving our
efforts to protect the homeland and support our forces--civilian,
military and diplomatic--waging the current war on terrorism. The
policies and programs in this bill will enable us to strengthen our
intelligence capabilities to ensure the best foreign intelligence
efforts possible.
This bill is important, in particular, in that it begins to focus on
modernizing and upgrading our signals intelligence capabilities. It
provides funding authorizations to modernize capabilities that have
long been ignored. While focusing on modernization, it maintains a fair
balance to ensure that current and legacy capabilities continues to be
viable and contribute to our national security efforts by providing the
necessary collection and analysis capabilities.
Although I am supportive of the funding recommendations and policy
directions in the bill, I have been personally concerned that it may be
difficult for the National Security Agency to effectively obligate the
large infusion of funding. Therefore, the bill directs specific
executive oversight actions for these acquisition programs of the
National Security Agency. I believe the guidance and direction in the
bill will result in honest appraisals and recommendations to the
Congress to ensure the taxpayers' dollars are most effectively spent.
Mr. Chairman, this bill puts a great deal of emphasis on getting the
Intelligence Community "back to the basics." In short, this bill
begins to correct the systemic problems that left us under-prepared for
warning against the terrorist attacks on America.
I feel that this is a good bill that balances the increased
investment against critical priorities with procedures for effectively
monitoring the wise investment of the taxpayers money. Mr. Chairman, I
urge my colleagues to support H.R. 4628.
Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman, we have no further requests for time. I
think the bill has been very adequately explained and debated. It is a
good bill, and I urge my colleagues in the House to support it.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of our time
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I want to congratulate the Members for their
participation and their help in explaining what this bill does for the
American people and our national security.
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank my colleagues,
Congressmen Farr, Roemer, Gibbons, and Reyes, for their leadership in
taking steps to establish a Civilian Linguistic Reserve Corps. As we
search for ways to improve the functioning of our intelligence
agencies, we must take advantage of our existing resources, including
individuals highly trained in linguistics. In fact, the idea of
utilizing citizen linguists was presented to me by one of my
constituents who is a former U.S. Army Arabic linguist. He shared
useful suggestions regarding how we can benefit from the skills of
linguists, such as himself.
The Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps would be comprised of United
States citizens with advanced levels of proficiency in foreign
languages who would be available to perform services using these
foreign languages as the President may specify.
I compliment my colleague Sam Farr for working to establish a
registry of these linguists, which the Civilian Linguistic Reserve
Corps builds upon. The Defense Language Institute (DLI) is located in
Monterey, California in Rep. Farr's district. The DLI trains many
members of our military in languages such as Dari, Pashto, Urdu, Uzbek,
Georgian, Chechen, and Albanian. We cannot afford to lose these
capabilities and the Civilian Linguistic Reserve Corps is a perfect
solution to facilitate the continued service of these linguists.
Mr. SIMMONS. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of the
fiscal year 2003 Intelligence Authorization bill (H.R. 4628). Since the
end of the Cold War we have permitted our intelligence community to
grow weak by under funding accounts and imposing politically correct
restrictions. Our nation cannot afford to keep its guard down. The live
of our citizens are at stake.
This legislation moves us forward in reconstructing our intelligence
gathering and analytical capabilities. H.R. 4628 builds on the progress
of last year's authorization measure adding more money in critical
areas we have now identified as deficient in the analysis of the
attacks on our country last September 11.
This week the House will vote on the biggest restructuring of our
government in 50 years so that we better meet the challenges of
terrorism. But we should never think that structural changes alone
could bring security. H.R. 4628 addresses a critical dimension of our
security needs--better intelligence for early warning.
This legislation enhances efforts to rebuild our Nation's human
intelligence capabilities: sharpening skills and expertise and
strengthening presence and reach. The measure addresses shortfalls in
our intelligence community's analytical abilities so that we might
fortify that capability and provide consumers of intelligence the
precise data and thorough analysis they require.
The measure also shores up shortfalls in the Defense Department's
signals intelligence and Unmanned Airborne Vehicle programs. Directly
addressing the shortage of capability in interrogation, the measure
enhances our ongoing efforts to acquire valuable information from
combatant detainees at Guantanamo Bay.
Finally, the measure addresses the essential need to upgrade our
intelligence community's language skills programs. I spent 10 years as
an operation officer in the CIA. Five of those years were spent
overseas in the Far East where my language training and ability was an
important tool in my daily routine and success. I know that language
skills are critical to operational effectiveness. Not only must we
improve these skills for our operations officers but also for our
communications specialist and analysts.
Mr. Chairman, recently the Greek police arrested ten members of the
Revolutionary Organization November 17. This elusive group
[[Page H5425]]
has terrorized Greece for over 25 years killing more than a dozen
diplomats, civilians and police officers.
One person killed by that group was Richard Welch, the CIA station
chief in Athens, whose name had been exposed by an anti-intelligence
publication. Masked gunmen had cut him down in front of his home, a few
days before Christmas. I remember his murder well. Later I would meet
his widow and work with the late Senator John H. Chafee to pass the
Intelligence Identities Protection Act in 1982 to protect other
clandestine operatives from similar assassination.
The dismantlement of this group is timely in that it reminds us of
the importance of intelligence work today, and the risks involved for
many who serve in our intelligence community. I find comfort that the
assassins of Richard Welch have been captured, that Greek citizens are
free of its terrors, and that justice may finally be served.
Mr. Chairman, our intelligence community remains on the front lines
of the war on terrorism. Many of them serve with great courage and
without recognition. Many of them gather information at great risk to
their lives and those of their families. They provide information of
great value to the defense of our nation. This bill brings more
resources, tools, skills, and more assets to the people whose tireless
and courageous efforts help protect our nation.
I strongly support this legislation and applaud the members of the
committee and the staff on their fine work.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I too am happy to yield back the balance of
our time.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Petri). All time for general debate has
expired.
Pursuant to the rule, the committee amendment in the nature of a
substitute printed in the bill is considered as an original bill for
the purpose of amendment, and is considered read.
The text of the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute is
as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
"Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003".
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Community Management Account.
Sec. 105. Authorization of emergency supplemental appropriations for
fiscal year 2002.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Sense of Congress on intelligence community contracting.
Sec. 304. Semiannual report on financial intelligence on terrorist
assets (FITA).
Sec. 305. Modification of excepted agency voluntary leave transfer
authority.
Sec. 306. Additional one-year suspension of reorganization of
Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office.
Sec. 307. Prohibition on compliance with requests for information
submitted by foreign governments.
Sec. 308. Cooperative relationship between the National Security
Education Program and the Foreign Language Center of the
Defense Language Institute.
Sec. 309. Establishment of National Flagship Language Initiative within
the National Security Education Program.
Sec. 310. Deadline for submittal of various overdue reports.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Sec. 401. Two-year extension of Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary
Separation Pay Act.
Sec. 402. Prohibition on implementation of compensation reform plan.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 501. Use of funds for counter-drug and counterterrorism activities
for Colombia.
Sec. 502. Protection of operational files of the National
Reconnaissance Office.
Sec. 503. Eligibility of employees in intelligence senior level
positions for Presidential Rank Awards.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
year 2003 for the conduct of the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the following elements of
the United States Government:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Department of Defense.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(6) The Department of State.
(7) The Department of the Treasury.
(8) The Department of Energy.
(9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(10) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(11) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
(12) The Coast Guard.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The
amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and
the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2003,
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the elements listed in such section, are those
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 4628 of the One Hundred
Seventh Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of
Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate
and House of Representatives and to the President. The
President shall provide for suitable distribution of the
Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within
the executive branch.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director
of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian
personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year
2003 under section 102 when the Director of Central
Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the
performance of important intelligence functions, except that
the number of personnel employed in excess of the number
authorized under such section may not, for any element of
the intelligence community, exceed 2 percent of the number
of civilian personnel authorized under such section for
such element.
(b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of
Central Intelligence shall notify promptly the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate whenever the Director exercises the authority
granted by this section.
SEC. 104. COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for the Community Management Account of
the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 2003 the
sum of $176,179,000. Within such amount, funds identified in
the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in
section 102(a) for the Advanced Research and Development
Committee shall remain available until September 30, 2004.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Community Management Account of the Director of Central
Intelligence are authorized 350 full-time personnel as of
September 30, 2003. Personnel serving in such elements may be
permanent employees of the Community Management Account or
personnel detailed from other elements of the United States
Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Community
Management Account by subsection (a), there are also
authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management
Account for fiscal year 2003 such additional amounts as are
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts shall
remain available until September 30, 2004.
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the
personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the
Community Management Account as of September 30, 2003, there
are hereby authorized such additional personnel for such
elements as of that date as are specified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations.
(d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during
fiscal year 2003 any officer or employee of the United States
or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff
of the Community Management Account from another element of
the United States Government shall be detailed on a
reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee,
or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a
period of less than one year for the performance of temporary
functions as required by the Director of Central
Intelligence.
(e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
(1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be
appropriated in subsection (a), $34,100,000 shall be
available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within
such amount, funds provided for research, development,
testing, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until
September 30, 2003, and funds provided for procurement
purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2004.
(2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central
Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General funds
available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under
paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so
transferred for the activities of the National Drug
Intelligence Center.
(3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug
Intelligence Center may not be
[[Page H5426]]
used in contravention of the provisions of section 103(d)(1)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)).
(4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the
operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center.
SEC. 105. AUTHORIZATION OF EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL
APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002.
(a) Authorization.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated
for fiscal year 2002 under section 101 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law 107-108)
for the conduct of the intelligence activities of elements of
the United States Government listed in such section are
hereby increased, with respect to any such authorized amount,
by the amount by which appropriations pursuant to such
authorization were increased by the following:
(1) The Emergency Supplemental Act, 2002 (contained in
division B of Public Law 107-117), including section 304 of
such Act (115 Stat. 2300).
(2) An emergency supplemental appropriation in a
supplemental appropriations Act for fiscal year 2002 that is
enacted after May 1, 2002, amounts as are designated by
Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to section
251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985 (2 U.S.C. 901(b)(2)(A)).
(b) Ratification.--For purposes of section 504 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414), any obligation
or expenditure of those amounts deemed to have been
specifically authorized by the Act referred to in subsection
(a)(1) and by the supplemental appropriations Act referred to
in subsection (a)(2) is hereby ratified and confirmed.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal
year 2003 the sum of $351,300,000.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be
increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may
be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not
be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by
the Constitution or the laws of the United States.
SEC. 303. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
CONTRACTING.
It is the sense of Congress that the Director of Central
Intelligence should continue to direct that elements of the
intelligence community, whenever compatible with the national
security interests of the United States and consistent with
operational and security concerns related to the conduct of
intelligence activities, and where fiscally sound, should
competitively award contracts in a manner that maximizes the
procurement of products properly designated as having been
made in the United States.
SEC. 304. SEMIANNUAL REPORT ON FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE ON
TERRORIST ASSETS (FITA).
(a) Semiannual Report.--
(1) In general.--Title I of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end
the following new section:
"semiannual report on financial intelligence on terrorist assets
"Sec. 118. (a) Semiannual Report.--On a semiannual basis,
the Secretary of the Treasury (acting through the head of the
Office of Intelligence Support) shall submit a report to the
appropriate congressional committees (as defined in
subsection (c)) that fully informs the committees concerning
operations against terrorist financial networks. Each such
report shall include with respect to the preceding six-month
period--
"(1) the total number of asset seizures, designations, and
other actions against individuals or entities found to have
engaged in financial support of terrorism;
"(2) the total number of applications for asset seizure
and designations of individuals or entities suspected of
having engaged in financial support of terrorist activities,
that were granted, modified, or denied;
"(3) the total number of physical searches of offices,
residences, or financial records of individuals or entities
suspected of having engaged in financial support for
terrorist activity; and
"(4) whether the financial intelligence information seized
in these cases has been shared on a full and timely basis
with the all departments, agencies, and other entities of the
United States Government involved in intelligence activities
participating in the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Unit
(managed and coordinated by the Counterterrorism Center of
the Central Intelligence Agency).
"(b) Immediate Notification for Emergency Designation.--In
the case of a designation of an individual or entity, or the
assets of an individual or entity, as having been found to
have engaged in terrorist activities, the Secretary of the
Treasury shall report such designation within 24 hours of
such a designation to the appropriate congressional
committees.
"(c) Definition.--In this section, the term `appropriate
congressional committees' means the following:
"(1) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Financial
Services of the House of Representatives.
"(2) The Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee
on Appropriations, and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs of the Senate.".
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents contained in
the first section of such Act is amended by inserting after
the item relating to section 117 the following new item:
"Sec. 118. Semiannual report on financial intelligence on terrorist
assets.".
(b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 501(f) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413(f)) is amended by
inserting before the period the following: ", and includes
financial intelligence activities".
SEC. 305. MODIFICATION OF EXCEPTED AGENCY VOLUNTARY LEAVE
TRANSFER AUTHORITY.
(a) In General.--Section 6339 of title 5, United States
Code, is amended--
(1) by striking subsection (b);
(2) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (b); and
(3) by inserting after subsection (b) (as so redesignated
by paragraph (2)) the following:
"(c)(1) Notwithstanding any provision of subsection (b),
the head of an excepted agency may, at his sole discretion,
by regulation establish a program under which an individual
employed in or under such excepted agency may participate in
a leave transfer program established under the provisions of
this subchapter outside of this section, including provisions
permitting the transfer of annual leave accrued or
accumulated by such employee to, or permitting such employee
to receive transferred leave from, an employee of any other
agency (including another excepted agency having a program
under this subsection).
"(2) To the extent practicable and consistent with the
protection of intelligence sources and methods, any program
established under paragraph (1) shall be consistent with the
provisions of this subchapter outside of this section and
with any regulations issued by the Office of Personnel
Management implementing this subchapter.".
(b) Conforming Amendments.--Section 6339 of such title is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (2) of subsection (b) (as so redesignated
by subsection (a)(2)), by striking "under this section" and
inserting "under this subsection"; and
(2) in subsection (d), by striking "of Personnel
Management".
SEC. 306. ADDITIONAL ONE-YEAR SUSPENSION OF REORGANIZATION OF
DIPLOMATIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROGRAM
OFFICE.
Section 311 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law 107-108; 22 U.S.C. 7301 note;
115 Stat. 1401) is amended--
(1) in the heading, by striking "ONE-YEAR" and inserting
"TWO-YEAR"; and
(2) in the text, by striking "October 1, 2002" and
inserting "October 1, 2003".
SEC. 307. PROHIBITION ON COMPLIANCE WITH REQUESTS FOR
INFORMATION SUBMITTED BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS.
Section 552(a)(3) of title 5, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A) by inserting "and except as
provided in subparagraph (E)," after "of this
subsection,"; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
"(E) An agency, or part of an agency, that is an element
of the intelligence community (as that term is defined in
section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
401a(4))) shall not make any record available under this
paragraph to--
"(i) any government entity, other than a State, territory,
commonwealth, or district of the United States, or any
subdivision thereof; or
"(ii) a representative of a government entity described in
clause (i).".
SEC. 308. COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NATIONAL
SECURITY EDUCATION PROGRAM AND THE FOREIGN
LANGUAGE CENTER OF THE DEFENSE LANGUAGE
INSTITUTE.
Section 802 of the David L. Boren National Security
Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1902) is amended by adding
at the end the following new subsection:
"(h) Use of Awards To Attend the Foreign Language Center
of the Defense Language Institute.--(1) The Secretary shall
provide for the admission of award recipients to the Foreign
Language Center of the Defense Language Institute
(hereinafter in this subsection referred to as the `Center').
An award recipient may apply a portion of the applicable
scholarship or fellowship award for instruction at the Center
on a space-available basis as a Department of Defense
sponsored program to defray the additive instructional costs.
"(2) Except as the Secretary determines necessary, an
award recipient who receives instruction at the Center shall
be subject to the same regulations with respect to
attendance, discipline, discharge, and dismissal as apply to
other persons attending the Center.
"(3) In this subsection, the term `award recipient' means
an undergraduate student who has been awarded a scholarship
under subsection (a)(1)(A) or a graduate student who has been
a fellowship under subsection (a)(1)(B) who--
"(A) is in good standing;
"(B) has completed all academic study in a foreign
country, as provided for under the scholarship or fellowship;
and
"(C) would benefit from instruction provided at the
Center.".
[[Page H5427]]
SEC. 309. ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL FLAGSHIP LANGUAGE
INITIATIVE WITHIN THE NATIONAL SECURITY
EDUCATION PROGRAM.
(a) National Flagship Language Initiative.--
(1) Expansion of grant program authority.--Subsection
(a)(1) of section 802 of the David L. Boren National Security
Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1902) is amended--
(A) by striking "and" at the end of subparagraph (B)(ii);
(B) by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (C)
and inserting "; and"; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
"(D) awarding grants to institutions of higher education
to carry out a National Flagship Language Initiative
(described in subsection (i)).".
(2) Provisions of national flagship language initiative.--
Such section, as amended by section 308, is further amended
by adding at the end the following new subsection:
"(i) National Flagship Language Initiative.--(1) Under the
National Flagship Language Initiative, institutions of higher
learning shall establish, operate, or improve activities
designed to train students in programs in a range of
disciplines to achieve advanced levels of proficiency in
those foreign languages that the Secretary identifies as
being the most critical in the interests of the national
security of the United States.
"(2) An undergraduate student who has been awarded a
scholarship under subsection (a)(1)(A) or a graduate student
who has been awarded a fellowship under subsection (a)(1)(B)
may participate in the activities carried out under the
National Flagship Language Initiative.
"(3) An institution of higher education that receives a
grant pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(D) shall give special
consideration to applicants who are employees of the Federal
Government.
"(4) For purposes of this subsection, the Foreign Language
Center of the Defense Language Institute and any other
educational institution that provides training in foreign
languages operated by the Department of Defense or an agency
in the intelligence community is deemed to be an institution
of higher education, and may carry out the types of
activities permitted under the National Flagship Language
Initiative.".
(3) Waiver of funding allocation rules.--Subsection (a)(2)
of such section is amended by adding at the end the following
flush sentences:
"The funding allocation under this paragraph shall not apply
to grants under paragraph (1)(D) for the National Flagship
Language Initiative described in subsection (i). For the
authorization of appropriations for the National Flagship
Language Initiative, see section 811.".
(4) Board requirement.--Section 803(d)(4) of such Act (50
U.S.C. 1904(d)(4)) is amended--
(A) by striking "and" at the end of subparagraph (C);
(B) by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (D)
and inserting "; and"; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
"(E) which foreign languages are critical to the national
security interests of the United States for purposes of
section 802(a)(1)(D) (relating to grants for the National
Flagship Language Initiative).".
(b) Funding.--The David L. Boren National Security
Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) is amended by
adding at the end the following new section:
"SEC. 811. ADDITIONAL ANNUAL AUTHORIZATION OF
APPROPRIATIONS.
"(a) In General.--In addition to amounts that may be made
available to the Secretary under the National Security
Education Trust Fund (under section 804 of this Act) for a
fiscal year, there is authorized to be appropriated to the
Secretary for each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year
2003, $10,000,000, to carry out the grant program for the
National Flagship Language Initiative under section
802(a)(1)(D).
"(b) Availability of Appropriated Funds.--Amounts
appropriated pursuant to the authorization under subsection
(a) shall remain available until expended.".
SEC. 310. DEADLINE FOR SUBMITTAL OF VARIOUS OVERDUE REPORTS.
(a) Deadline.--The reports described in subsection (c)
shall be submitted to Congress not later than 180 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act.
(b) Noncompliance.--(1) If all the reports described in
subsection (c) are not submitted to Congress by the date
specified in subsection (a), amounts available to be
obligated or expended after that date to carry out the
functions or duties of the following offices shall be reduced
by \1/3\:
(A) The Office of the Director of Central Intelligence.
(B) The Office of Community Management Staff.
(2) The reduction applicable under paragraph (1) shall not
apply if the Director of Central Intelligence certifies to
Congress by the date referred to in subsection (a) that all
reports referred to in subsection (c) have been submitted to
Congress.
(c) Reports Described.--The reports referred to in
subsection (a) are reports mandated by law for which the
Director of Central Intelligence has sole or primary
responsibility to prepare, or coordinate, and submit to
Congress which, as of the date of the enactment of this Act,
have not been submitted to Congress by the date mandated by
law.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SEC. 401. TWO-YEAR EXTENSION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
VOLUNTARY SEPARATION PAY ACT.
Section 2 of the Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary
Separation Pay Act (50 U.S.C. 403-4 note) is amended--
(1) in subsection (f), by striking "September 30, 2003"
and inserting "September 30, 2005"; and
(2) in subsection (i), by striking "or 2003" and
inserting "2003, 2004, or 2005".
SEC. 402. PROHIBITION ON IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPENSATION
REFORM PLAN.
No plan by the Director of Central Intelligence that would
revise the manner in which employees of the Central
Intelligence Agency, or employees of other elements of the
United States Government that conduct intelligence and
intelligence-related activities, are compensated may be
implemented until the plan has been specifically authorized
by statute.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 501. USE OF FUNDS FOR COUNTER-DRUG AND COUNTERTERRORISM
ACTIVITIES FOR COLOMBIA.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, funds
designated for intelligence or intelligence-related purposes
for assistance to the Government of Colombia for counter-drug
activities for fiscal years 2002 and 2003, and any
unobligated funds available to any element of the
intelligence community for such activities for a prior fiscal
year, shall be available to support a unified campaign
against narcotics trafficking and against activities by
organizations designated as terrorist organizations (such as
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the
National Liberation Army (ELN), and the United Self-Defense
Forces of Colombia (AUC)), and to take actions to protect
human health and welfare in emergency circumstances,
including undertaking rescue operations.
SEC. 502. PROTECTION OF OPERATIONAL FILES OF THE NATIONAL
RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.
(a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by inserting after
section 105C (50 U.S.C. 403-5c) the following new section:
"protection of operational files of the national reconnaissance office
"Sec. 105D. (a) Exemption of Certain Operational Files
From Search, Review, Publication, or Disclosure.--(1) The
Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, with the
coordination of the Director of Central Intelligence, may
exempt operational files of the National Reconnaissance
Office from the provisions of section 552 of title 5, United
States Code, which require publication, disclosure, search,
or review in connection therewith.
"(2)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), for the purposes of
this section, the term `operational files' means files of the
National Reconnaissance Office (hereafter in this section
referred to as `NRO') that document the means by which
foreign intelligence or counterintelligence is collected
through scientific and technical systems.
"(B) Files which are the sole repository of disseminated
intelligence are not operational files.
"(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), exempted operational
files shall continue to be subject to search and review for
information concerning--
"(A) United States citizens or aliens lawfully admitted
for permanent residence who have requested information on
themselves pursuant to the provisions of section 552 or 552a
of title 5, United States Code;
"(B) any special activity the existence of which is not
exempt from disclosure under the provisions of section 552 of
title 5, United States Code; or
"(C) the specific subject matter of an investigation by
any of the following for any impropriety, or violation of
law, Executive order, or Presidential directive, in the
conduct of an intelligence activity:
"(i) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives.
"(ii) The Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
"(iii) The Intelligence Oversight Board.
"(iv) The Department of Justice.
"(v) The Office of General Counsel of NRO.
"(vi) The Office of the Director of NRO.
"(4)(A) Files that are not exempted under paragraph (1)
which contain information derived or disseminated from
exempted operational files shall be subject to search and
review.
"(B) The inclusion of information from exempted
operational files in files that are not exempted under
paragraph (1) shall not affect the exemption under paragraph
(1) of the originating operational files from search, review,
publication, or disclosure.
"(C) The declassification of some of the information
contained in exempted operational files shall not affect the
status of the operational file as being exempt from search,
review, publication, or disclosure.
"(D) Records from exempted operational files which have
been disseminated to and referenced in files that are not
exempted under paragraph (1) and which have been returned to
exempted operational files for sole retention shall be
subject to search and review.
"(5) The provisions of paragraph (1) may not be superseded
except by a provision of law which is enacted after the date
of the enactment of this section, and which specifically
cites and repeals or modifies its provisions.
"(6)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), whenever
any person who has requested agency records under section 552
of title 5, United States Code, alleges that NRO has withheld
records improperly because of failure to comply with any
provision of this section, judicial review shall be available
under the terms set forth in section 552(a)(4)(B) of title 5,
United States Code.
"(B) Judicial review shall not be available in the manner
provided for under subparagraph (A) as follows:
"(i) In any case in which information specifically
authorized under criteria established by
[[Page H5428]]
an Executive order to be kept secret in the interests of
national defense or foreign relations is filed with, or
produced for, the court by NRO, such information shall be
examined ex parte, in camera by the court.
"(ii) The court shall, to the fullest extent practicable,
determine the issues of fact based on sworn written
submissions of the parties.
"(iii) When a complainant alleges that requested records
are improperly withheld because of improper placement solely
in exempted operational files, the complainant shall support
such allegation with a sworn written submission based upon
personal knowledge or otherwise admissible evidence.
"(iv)(I) When a complainant alleges that requested records
were improperly withheld because of improper exemption of
operational files, NRO shall meet its burden under section
552(a)(4)(B) of title 5, United States Code, by demonstrating
to the court by sworn written submission that exempted
operational files likely to contain responsible records
currently perform the functions set forth in paragraph (2).
"(II) The court may not order NRO to review the content of
any exempted operational file or files in order to make the
demonstration required under subclause (I), unless the
complainant disputes NRO's showing with a sworn written
submission based on personal knowledge or otherwise
admissible evidence.
"(v) In proceedings under clauses (iii) and (iv), the
parties may not obtain discovery pursuant to rules 26 through
36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except that
requests for admissions may be made pursuant to rules 26 and
36.
"(vi) If the court finds under this paragraph that NRO has
improperly withheld requested records because of failure to
comply with any provision of this subsection, the court shall
order NRO to search and review the appropriate exempted
operational file or files for the requested records and make
such records, or portions thereof, available in accordance
with the provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States
Code, and such order shall be the exclusive remedy for
failure to comply with this subsection.
"(vii) If at any time following the filing of a complaint
pursuant to this paragraph NRO agrees to search the
appropriate exempted operational file or files for the
requested records, the court shall dismiss the claim based
upon such complaint.
"(viii) Any information filed with, or produced for the
court pursuant to clauses (i) and (iv) shall be coordinated
with the Director of Central Intelligence prior to submission
to the court.
"(b) Decennial Review of Exempted Operational Files.--(1)
Not less than once every 10 years, the Director of the
National Reconnaissance Office and the Director of Central
Intelligence shall review the exemptions in force under
subsection (a)(1) to determine whether such exemptions may be
removed from the category of exempted files or any portion
thereof. The Director of Central Intelligence must approve
any determination to remove such exemptions.
"(2) The review required by paragraph (1) shall include
consideration of the historical value or other public
interest in the subject matter of the particular category of
files or portions thereof and the potential for declassifying
a significant part of the information contained therein.
"(3) A complainant that alleges that NRO has improperly
withheld records because of failure to comply with this
subsection may seek judicial review in the district court of
the United States of the district in which any of the parties
reside, or in the District of Columbia. In such a proceeding,
the court's review shall be limited to determining the
following:
"(A) Whether NRO has conducted the review required by
paragraph (1) before the expiration of the 10-year period
beginning on the date of the enactment of this section or
before the expiration of the 10-year period beginning on the
date of the most recent review.
"(B) Whether NRO, in fact, considered the criteria set
forth in paragraph (2) in conducting the required review.".
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents contained in
the first section of such Act is amended by inserting after
the item relating to section 105C the following new item:
"Sec. 105D. Protection of operational files of the National
Reconnaissance Office.".
SEC. 503. ELIGIBILITY OF EMPLOYEES IN INTELLIGENCE SENIOR
LEVEL POSITIONS FOR PRESIDENTIAL RANK AWARDS.
Section 1607 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following new subsection:
"(c) Award of Rank to Employees in Intelligence Senior
Level Positions.--The President, based on the recommendations
of the Secretary of Defense, may award a rank referred to in
section 4507a of title 5 to employees in Intelligence Senior
Level positions designated under subsection (a). The award of
such rank shall be made in a manner consistent with the
provisions of that section.".
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. No amendment to that amendment shall be in
order except those printed in the designated place in the Congressional
Record and pro forma amendments for the purpose of debate. Amendments
printed in the Record may be offered only by the Member who caused it
to be printed or his designee and shall be considered read.
Are there any amendments to the bill?
Amendment No. 9 Offered by Mr. Roemer
Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 9 offered by Mr. Roemer:
At the end (page 30, after line 7), add the following new
title:
TITLE VI--NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED
STATES.
SEC. 601. ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMISSION.
There is established the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States (in this title referred to as
the "Commission").
SEC. 602. COMPOSITION OF THE COMMISSION.
(a) Members.--Subject to the requirements of subsection
(b), the Commission shall be composed of 10 members, of
whom--
(1) 3 members shall be appointed by the majority leader of
the Senate;
(2) 3 members shall be appointed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives;
(3) 2 members shall be appointed by the minority leader of
the Senate; and
(4) 2 members shall be appointed by the minority leader of
the House of Representatives.
(b) Qualifications.--
(1) Political party affiliation.--Not more than 5 members
of the Commission shall be from the same political party.
(2) Nongovernmental appointees.--No member of the
Commission shall be an officer or employee of the Federal
Government or any State or local government.
(3) Other qualifications.--It is the sense of Congress that
individuals appointed to the Commission should be prominent
United States citizens, with national recognition and
significant depth of experience in such professions as
governmental service and intelligence gathering.
(c) Chairperson; Vice Chairperson.--
(1) In general.--Subject to the requirement of paragraph
(2), the Chairperson and Vice Chairperson of the Commission
shall be elected by the members.
(2) Political party affiliation.--The Chairperson and Vice
Chairperson shall not be from the same political party.
(d) Initial Meeting.--If 60 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, 6 or more members of the Commission
have been appointed, those members who have been appointed
may meet and, if necessary, select a temporary Chairperson
and Vice Chairperson, who may begin the operations of the
Commission, including the hiring of staff.
(e) Quorum; Vacancies.--After its initial meeting, the
Commission shall meet upon the call of the Chairperson or a
majority of its members. Six members of the Commission shall
constitute a quorum. Any vacancy in the Commission shall not
affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same manner in
which the original appointment was made.
SEC. 603. FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSION.
(a) In General.--The functions of the Commission are to--
(1) review the implementation by the intelligence community
of the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of--
(A) the Joint Inquiry of the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives regarding the
terrorist attacks against the United States which occurred on
September 11, 2001;
(B) other reports and investigations of the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives and the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate; and
(C) other such executive branch, congressional, or
independent commission investigations of such the terrorist
attacks or the intelligence community;
(2) make recommendations on additional actions for
implementation of the findings, recommendations and
conclusions referred to in paragraph (1);
(3) review resource allocation and other prioritizations of
the intelligence community for counterterrorism and make
recommendations for such changes in those allocations and
prioritization to ensure that counterterrorism receives
sufficient attention and support from the intelligence
community;
(4) review and recommend changes to the organization of the
intelligence community, in particular the division of
agencies under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Defense
and the Director of Central Intelligence, the dual
responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence as
head of the intelligence community and as head of the Central
Intelligence Agency, and the separation of agencies with
responsibility for intelligence collection, analysis, and
dissemination; and
(5) determine what technologies, procedures, and
capabilities are needed for the intelligence community to
effectively support and conduct future counterterrorism
missions, and recommend how these capabilities should be
developed, acquired, or both from entities outside the
intelligence community, including from private entities.
(b) Definition of Intelligence Community.--In this section,
the term "intelligence community" means--
(1) the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence,
which shall include the Office of the Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence and the National Intelligence Council;
(2) the Central Intelligence Agency;
(3) the National Security Agency;
[[Page H5429]]
(4) the Defense Intelligence Agency;
(5) the National Imagery and Mapping Agency
(6) the National Reconnaissance Office;
(7) other offices within the Department of Defense for the
collection of specialized national intelligence through
reconnaissance programs;
(8) the intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the
Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Department of the Treasury, the Department
of Energy, and the Coast Guard;
(9) the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the
Department of State; and
(10) such other elements of any other department or agency
as are designated by the President, or designated jointly by
the Director of Central Intelligence and the head of the
department or agency concerned, as an element of the
intelligence community under section 3(4)(J) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)(J)).
SEC. 604. POWERS OF THE COMMISSION.
(a) Hearings and Evidence.--The Commission may, for
purposes of carrying out this title--
(1) hold hearings, sit and act at times and places, take
testimony, receive evidence, and administer oaths; and
(2) require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and
testimony of witnesses and the production of books, records,
correspondence, memoranda, papers, and documents.
(b) Subpoenas.--
(1) Service.--Subpoenas issued under subsection (a)(2) may
be served by any person designated by the Commission.
(2) Enforcement.--
(A) In general.--In the case of contumacy or failure to
obey a subpoena issued under subsection (a)(2), the United
States district court for the judicial district in which the
subpoenaed person resides, is served, or may be found, or
where the subpoena is returnable, may issue an order
requiring such person to appear at any designated place to
testify or to produce documentary or other evidence. Any
failure to obey the order of the court may be punished by the
court as a contempt of that court.
(B) Additional enforcement.--Sections 102 through 104 of
the Revised Statutes of the United States (2 U.S.C. 192
through 194) shall apply in the case of any failure of any
witness to comply with any subpoena or to testify when
summoned under authority of this section.
(c) Closed Meetings.--Notwithstanding any other provision
of law which would require meetings of the Commission to be
open to the public, any portion of a meeting of the
Commission may be closed to the public if the President
determines that such portion is likely to disclose matters
that could endanger national security.
(d) Contracting.--The Commission may, to such extent and in
such amounts as are provided in appropriation Acts, enter
into contracts to enable the Commission to discharge its
duties under this title.
(e) Information From Federal Agencies.--The Commission may
secure directly from any department, agency, or
instrumentality of the United States any information related
to any inquiry of the Commission conducted under this title.
Each such department, agency, or instrumentality shall, to
the extent authorized by law, furnish such information
directly to the Commission upon request.
(f) Assistance From Federal Agencies.--
(1) General services administration.--The Administrator of
General Services shall provide to the Commission on a
reimbursable basis administrative support and other services
for the performance of the Commission's functions.
(2) Other departments and agencies.--In addition to the
assistance prescribed in paragraph (1), departments and
agencies of the United States are authorized to provide to
the Commission such services, funds, facilities, staff, and
other support services as they may determine advisable and as
may be authorized by law.
(g) Gifts.--The Commission may, to such extent and in such
amounts as are provided in appropriation Acts, accept, use,
and dispose of gifts or donations of services or property.
(h) Postal Services.--The Commission may use the United
States mails in the same manner and under the same conditions
as departments and agencies of the United States.
(i) Powers of Subcommittees, Members, and Agents.--Any
subcommittee, member, or agent of the Commission may, if
authorized by the Commission, take any action which the
Commission is authorized to take by this section.
SEC. 605. STAFF OF THE COMMISSION.
(a) Director.--The Commission shall have a Director who
shall be appointed by the Chairperson and the Vice
Chairperson, acting jointly.
(b) Staff.--The Chairperson, in consultation with the Vice
Chairperson, may appoint additional personnel as may be
necessary to enable the Commission to carry out its
functions.
(c) Applicability of Certain Civil Service Laws.--The
Director and staff of the Commission may be appointed without
regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code,
governing appointments in the competitive service, and may be
paid without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and
subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to
classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that no
rate of pay fixed under this subsection may exceed the
equivalent of that payable for a position at level V of the
Executive Schedule under section 5316 of title 5, United
States Code. Any individual appointed under subsection (a) or
(b) shall be treated as an employee for purposes of chapters
63, 81, 83, 84, 85, 87, 89, and 90 of that title.
(d) Detailees.--Any Federal Government employee may be
detailed to the Commission without reimbursement from the
Commission, and such detailee shall retain the rights,
status, and privileges of his or her regular employment
without interruption.
(e) Consultant Services.--The Commission is authorized to
procure the services of experts and consultants in accordance
with section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, but at
rates not to exceed the daily rate paid a person occupying a
position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section
5315 of title 5, United States Code.
SEC. 606. COMPENSATION AND TRAVEL EXPENSES.
(a) Compensation.--Each member of the Commission may be
compensated at not to exceed the daily equivalent of the
annual rate of basic pay in effect for a position at level IV
of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5,
United States Code, for each day during which that member is
engaged in the actual performance of the duties of the
Commission.
(b) Travel Expenses.--While away from their homes or
regular places of business in the performance of services for
the Commission, members of the Commission shall be allowed
travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence,
in the same manner as persons employed intermittently in the
Government service are allowed expenses under section 5703(b)
of title 5, United States Code.
SEC. 607. SECURITY CLEARANCES FOR COMMISSION MEMBERS AND
STAFF.
The appropriate executive departments and agencies shall
cooperate with the Commission in expeditiously providing to
the Commission members and staff appropriate security
clearances in a manner consistent with existing procedures
and requirements, except that no person shall be provided
with access to classified information under this section who
would not otherwise qualify for such security clearance.
SEC. 608. REPORTS OF THE COMMISSION; TERMINATION.
(a) Initial Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date
of the first meeting of the Commission, the Commission shall
submit to the President and Congress an initial report
containing--
(1) such findings, conclusions, and recommendations for
corrective measures as have been agreed to by a majority of
Commission members; and
(2) such findings, conclusions, and recommendations
regarding the scope of jurisdiction of, and the allocation of
jurisdiction among, the committees of Congress with oversight
responsibilities related to the scope of the investigation of
the Commission as have been agreed to by a majority of
Commission members.
(b) Final Report.--Not later than 6 months after the
submission of the initial report of the Commission, the
Commission shall submit to the President and Congress a final
report containing such updated findings, conclusions, and
recommendations described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of
subsection (a) as have been agreed to by a majority of
Commission members.
(c) Noninterference With Congressional Joint Inquiry.--
Notwithstanding subsection (a), the Commission shall not
submit any report of the Commission until a reasonable period
after the conclusion of the Joint Inquiry of the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives regarding the terrorist attacks against the
United States which occurred on September 11, 2001.
(d) Termination.--
(1) In general.--The Commission, and all the authorities of
this title, shall terminate 60 days after the date on which
the final report is submitted under subsection (b).
(2) Administrative activities before termination.--The
Commission may use the 60-day period referred to in paragraph
(1) for the purpose of concluding its activities, including
providing testimony to committees of Congress concerning its
reports and disseminating the second report.
SEC. 609. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There are authorized to be appropriated to the Commission
to carry out this title $3,000,000, to remain available until
expended.
Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment which is bipartisan,
by Democrats and Republicans, to create a bipartisan commission, a blue
ribbon commission, to look back at what happened prior to 9-11 and fix
the problems, not through a political witch hunt, not through blame,
but looking back to fix mistakes so we can move forward and prevent
future terrorist attacks.
This is a bipartisan amendment offered by the gentleman from New
Jersey (Mr. Smith), the gentlewoman from New Jersey (Mrs. Roukema), the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Quinn), the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr.
Ferguson), the gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher), the
gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. Taylor), the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Pelosi),
[[Page H5430]]
the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. Shows), and a host of other 108
Members, including the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks),
distinguished former chairman; and the gentleman from Missouri (Mr.
Skelton), distinguished ranking member from Defense.
Back on 9-11, I distinctly remember just a few days after our Twin
Towers were hit in New York City, going up to that site with members of
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. We were talking to
emergency workers, family members, people affected in New York directly
by these attacks. It is one of the most difficult things I think
anybody can do in public life, and I can only imagine what the people
themselves have been through, losing wives and husbands, brothers and
sisters.
Now, we might say, why should we create this blue ribbon commission?
The United States, after Pearl Harbor was attacked, it took them 11
days to create a commission to look into what happened. President
Roosevelt acted and acted immediately. After Kobar Towers were
attacked, we put a commission together. When the Marines were killed in
Lebanon, we put a commission together. When the embassies were attacked
in Africa, we put a commission together.
Why have we not put a commission together yet after we lose 3,000
Americans in the worst terrorist attack in the Nation's history? That
is what I am asking. We need to do it.
Second, we will hear some arguments, maybe from some of my
colleagues, that we are doing a joint inquiry with the House and the
Senate. I serve on that joint inquiry, and I am very proud of it. But
when we have lost 3,000 people, when this report that we read today on
the House floor says that we see a host of different intelligence
problems out there, language, human intelligence, analytical
capabilities, too much stovepiping, not enough communications between
Departments, not enough good communication between Washington and field
offices, a host of problems across the board, we are not going to take
another 18 months to look at these and fix them? We cannot get Lee
Hamilton or George Schultz or people that know the right answers and
questions and have worked on these things without elections
intervening, without timelines in the way, without politics, to look at
this, when we have done it almost every other time?
I think we need two looks. The joint inquiry will do a nice job, and
so can this blue ribbon commission.
We also, thirdly, Mr. Chairman, will be creating a Homeland Security
Department tomorrow or the next day; 170,000 people, $20 billion, $30
billion. We should get it right. We should make sure that that can
attack our enemy who is not a sovereign state, but comprised of cells
across the world, of four people. Let us make sure this commission can
get it right.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me conclude. I recently met with a woman,
Kristen Breitweiser, who lost her husband in the attacks in 9-11. In my
office, she handed me a ring that was around her finger, just like the
one I have. And she said, Mr. Roemer, I want you to help create this
commission. This is my husband's ring who died at the World Trade tower
when it collapsed. This is all I have left. Congress has not done
anything yet to answer the questions. My daughter does not have the
answers. You have done it every time in U.S. history. Why not now? Why
not today, and why not build better intelligence for the future?
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this bipartisan blue
ribbon commission.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the gentleman's
amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I wish I could agree with everything that my colleague,
the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer), just said. I agree with a
great deal of what he just said. The problem is, this is the wrong
vehicle, and this is the wrong type of blue ribbon committee.
{time} 0000
In fact, in order to be germane to this bill, this blue ribbon
committee will be limited in what it can do to just what the oversight
and intelligence committees actually do. Otherwise, this would be a
nongermane amendment, as we all know, and actually the intelligence
committees are planning to continue doing just what they are doing.
And, in fact, they are not only doing their daily job but we are doing
a joint bicameral 9-11 review.
So virtually actually everything that the gentleman from Indiana (Mr.
Roemer) said this blue ribbon commission could do, is being done by the
committee in their daily work and the joint committee, the 9-11 review.
I would also point out that while I agree with the gentleman's idea
to have a genuine bona fide blue ribbon national committee that has
much broader scope to deal with this as they did in Pearl Harbor, that
would include such thing as Presidential appointees in addition to the
congressional appointees, that would include such things as looking
into the oversight of how Congress does its job. We should be held
accountable too on the oversight committees. And a true blue ribbon
commission could do that. This commission is not going to be able to do
that.
What we basically have is a proposal that is a little strangulated in
order to comply with the germaneness rules. So what we have is a lot of
duplication to what we are already doing. In fact, a lot of work that
the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss) and the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Harmon) and their subcommittee did so well and so
proudly, and I think it is being digested now. So we have duplicative
work in part of this. Then we have a part of this that talks about a
lot of provisions that I do not think are very well crafted. I am not
sure how the noninterference provision works, and we do not want to
have interference with the 9-11 work that is ongoing because it is
extremely important.
I know a good faith effort was made to make sure there is no
interference but I am not sure that is actually the result. I think
there does need to be an executive branch appointment to this. I do not
think Congress should reserve the right to make all the appointees.
I think back to the Aspen Brown Commission and how it profited from
having outsiders come in. I think that was a valuable lesson that I
learned because that is sort of what we are looking for here, another
9-11.
I would also point out there are other committees of jurisdiction
that should be involved in appointing a blue ribbon committee. We have
not had hearings on that. I know there is a freestanding bill which I
believe deserves to be heard by those committees. They should go
through the process, and we should come out with a blue ribbon
committee that actually provides the views of the working standing
committees of this House and all of those who have equity in it, rather
than to try at midnight on this lovely day to put together what is
really sort of a jury-rigged proposal. Well-intended, I take nothing
away from that.
I think, finally, the one thing I want to congratulate the gentleman
for is I agree entirely with him. He is doing something which is very
important here which is requiring that there be a look at intelligence
architectural reform. I totally support him in that effort. I think
that part of this is good, but when you add it all up, I do not think
this is the right place to do what he wants to do. And I am afraid his
co-sponsors from New Jersey are going to be very disappointed. They are
going to be delivering a product to those survivors who are also
talking to me, believe me, and we have some in my district. This is not
going to do the job they want because it does not have the scope to do
it.
Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.
Mr. ROEMER. As the Chairman knows, if we had crafted the amendment
the way the gentleman would have suggested to be a bit broader, he
probably would have objected to it on a point of order. And the
Committee on Rules did not protect my amendment to do those very
things. Does the gentleman have a suggestion?
Mr. GOSS. Reclaiming my time, there are four other chairmen and four
other ranking committee members, and all the members of those
committees who are counting on the rules of the House to make sure that
they get their equities protected in what the gentleman is trying to
propose.
And the gentleman knows, and as we have talked before, I am not
opposed to
[[Page H5431]]
what he is trying to do. I am opposed to trying to do it in this
restricted scope way that does not accomplish his purpose and adds a
burden to my bill and which, frankly, I do not think will serve the
purpose either of us wants.
Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Mr. Chairman, last fall the committee approved a creation of an
independent commission to examine all aspects of the September 11
attacks. In the course of the legislative process, that proposal was
first weakened and ultimately eliminated. I supported the commission
concept not because I was concerned that the intelligence committees
could not review adequately the performance of the intelligence
agencies in the months leading up to September 11, but because I knew
that review would be limited necessarily to those agencies.
The September 11 story extends beyond the intelligence agencies, and
to be told comprehensively, needs to assess the performance of agencies
outside the intelligence community. A commission that is unencumbered
by jurisdictional concerns could take that kind of comprehensive look
at September 11.
I would hope that the House tonight would have a chance to again
consider a commission proposal like the one that was approved by the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence last year. Although that
will apparently not be the case, I believe the commission amendment
offered by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) will make a valuable
contribution to a better national understanding of the September 11
events and what is being done within the intelligence community to
respond to them. Therefore, I urge the adoption of the amendment.
Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
We have a blue ribbon commission. It has already been established.
The gentleman is a member of it. We are standing around here for an
hour praising each other about what great experts we are, what a great
chairman we have, what a great ranking member we have. Does the
gentleman know why? Because they are all experienced people. Some of
the people having doing the work for years.
I have only been on it for 2\1/2\ years. I know the gentleman from
Indiana (Mr. Roemer) has been on it longer than that. You are an
expert. In certain areas you are an expert. Yes, you are. You know you
are.
I certainly think the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) and
the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss) are experts after the work
they did on the anti-terrorism report that they just came out with. And
no one would deny that the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi) are experts.
We have a blue ribbon commission and it has been working. We have 25
professional staff people from both sides that are working very hard on
this. And the last thing we need to do is establish another commission
that would take a year to establish, to hire staff. You talk about
being behind the eight ball and getting answers for people, it is not
going to happen.
What about the leaks? The two chairmen just sent a letter to the FBI
asking for an investigation of leaks. So what are we going to do? Share
information with the world? Under the Roemer amendment, they can
subpoena people. They will have public hearings. They can bring in the
CIA director, the FBI director, they will testify before the whole
world. What purpose will that serve, particularly when we are trying to
help the intelligence community become better at what they are doing?
Not by sharing it with the world, not by having subpoena power, not by
allowing people to hold public meetings.
This is a ridiculous idea, particularly given the fact that we have a
blue ribbon commission by the people that are already experts in it
anyway.
We had this debate a year ago in the committee. We had a real, real
spirited debate and we had it here on the floor. And eventually when
the bill, the conference committee from the Intelligence Committee came
forward, this was not included because I think people realize what a
bad idea it is. There is really a bad idea.
The gentleman talked about four commissions, and he cited them very
well but what did they accomplish? I guarantee that their reports are
sitting on shelves somewhere around here. What the recommendations they
made, nobody could probably really cite. So I do not know what purpose
they really have served.
This is a bad idea because it would take too long to establish, to
hire the staff. This is a bad idea because they do have good people
working on this. And the last thing I think we want is to really
infringe on the ability of the intelligence community, to be
subpoenaed, to testify in public, to reveal the secrets.
If people wanted to see the bill that we are going to pass here, it
is not here. Do you know why? If you want to go up to the committee you
can see it, but it is not here because we do not want people to know
how much money we are spending, how many more people we are going to
hire because that really infringes on the ability of the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence to do their work. And yet the
gentleman wants to have a commission established to shine light on 9-
11.
We all want answers, and I think we will get answers. We have gotten
some answers from the good report that was done by the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Harman) and the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss).
We will get answers from our joint staff committee. We have great staff
people working on that. I think the last thing we need to do is ask
distinguished Americans, who would take a long time to appoint, to come
forward and do this.
I really ask Members to think about this. This is very bad for the
intelligence community. It is very bad for our ability to keep secrets.
It is very bad for the professional people who would have to come and
testify and swear under oath, the CIA director, the FBI director,
people who work in these agencies. This is just unworkable. We are
going to get the answers we want. We are going to get the answers for
the families of victims. I have no doubt of that because we have good
people working on this. And I think in the end, we will come out with a
report that will shed light and give answers to many of the things that
we need to know.
{time} 0010
I hope Members will vote against this; and I hope when we do vote it
down, this will be the end of it, and we will not have to revisit this
again because this just does not make any sense for the kind of work
that we do in the intelligence-gathering community.
So I ask Members to vote against this very, very bad amendment. It is
a lousy amendment. It is not going to serve any purpose, and it really
does not make any sense in light of all the other things we are doing
around here, all the activity that is going on, all the staff that are
hired and collecting information and trying to figure out what is
happening.
All the members of the committee have been sitting through those 2-
day-a-week full-day hearings that are going on by our joint committee.
There is a lot of information. Members really have to pay attention,
and to think that some blue ribbon group from around the country is
going to get up to speed on this, it is going to take a year to appoint
them, and then to get up to speed, it will be another 2 years with a
recommendation.
Bad idea, bad amendment. Vote it down. My colleagues will be doing a
favor to the intelligence community.
Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
I rise in very strong support of this well-thought-out amendment. Let
me preface my remarks by saying how much respect and admiration I have
for the members of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. I
want to acknowledge the hours and hours of work they have put in, their
integrity, their dedication to this process. I think they have done
their country a great service, and I commend each and every member of
the committee for that.
Many Members of the Chamber will remember a lot about the events of
September 11, 2001, as do I. I also remember how I felt on the morning
of September 12, 2001. I woke up, and the first thought that came to my
mind
[[Page H5432]]
was that in the 11 years that I had served in this body I had voted to
spend about a half a trillion dollars' worth of taxpayers' money on
building an intelligence establishment; and I asked myself what role I
had, what responsibility I had in what seemed to me to be a failure of
that establishment to defend our country against the calamities of
September 11.
I am not here tonight to point any fingers at any agency or any
person. I do not know what the chain of causation was that led to the
events of September 11, but here is one thing that I do know. I do know
that each one of us and each Member in the other body and each
institution in American government has questions that need to be asked
about it and about its role.
I want to reemphasize, the leadership and work of the individuals who
served on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence is not the
point of my remarks. I wish that we all had the degree of expertise and
effort that these individuals have put in, but I think we have to ask
some hard questions about the House and about the other body, about
what we have done, about what we have failed to do, about what policy-
making institutions in this country have done dating back to 1995 and
some of the other controversial decisions and policies that have been
implemented.
I think we are never going to be able to go forward and put together
a prospective strategy to do everything we can to avoid another
calamity like the one we saw last September unless every institution is
subjected to scrutiny; and with all due respect to my colleagues in
this House, I do not believe that we can subject ourselves to that same
kind of scrutiny because we have a vested interest in the answer to
that question.
No impugning of anyone's integrity or ability, but I would simply
make the point that part of this assessment of the future strategy of
success for our intelligence capability must include answering the hard
question, What responsibility do we have to bear for the decisions that
led up to September 11? I think the question needs to be evaluated by
people outside of this institution who do not stand for election and do
not stand for the back and forth of the legislative process that we do.
So, again, in full respect for and commendation for the work of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and its various
subcommittees, I believe we need the gentleman from Indiana's (Mr.
Roemer) proposal. I think we need to have people outside of our own
structure take a look at our own responsibility, and I think is the way
to do it.
I would urge a "yes" vote in favor of this amendment.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, today we have an opportunity to take an important step
for the security of our Nation to establish an independent, and I want
to emphasize that, bipartisan, and I want to emphasize that,
commission, external commission that will determine where our defense
and intelligence systems failed on September 11, so that we can prevent
future tragedies and we can say with assurance that there were defense
and intelligence system failures on September 11, and in order to
identify those, we need help, for people to step back and look at it.
There is a place for the kinds of studies that the committee has
done. There is a place for internal evaluations in each of the Federal
agencies involved, but with the Roemer amendment, we would establish an
independent commission consisting of, say, 10 Members, appointed in a
bipartisan way, and the commission would report its findings and
conclusions in a way that would earn the trust of the American public;
and believe me, we need to do that if we are going to come up with
conclusions that will be useful to America in preventing future
calamities.
Some would say that investigations will be used to play politics, but
this amendment is not about politics. This independent commission is
about fact finding, not fault finding. We need to look at our
government's weaknesses and correct them. It is our duty as
legislators.
A few weeks ago, I joined a group of central New Jerseyians,
principally widows and surviving family members of those who were
killed in the attack on the World Trade Center. I joined them at a
rally here in Washington where they were calling for just this kind of
commission, and I would say any of my colleagues who spoke with those
family members that day or since would understand why passing this
amendment is so important.
Our government leaders from the White House keep telling the public
that another terrorist attack is inevitable. It is not a question of
whether, but when, they say. Well, another attack would be inevitable
only if we do not learn from our previous mistakes, if we do not fully
examine what went wrong prior to September 11, 2001.
I urge my colleagues to pass this amendment.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I may be in a minority of one on this floor on this
subject. I was not a fan of the broad commission proposal. I am a fan
of the narrower version that the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) is
offering. I believe I am the only person on this floor and I may be the
only person in the House to have served on an independent, bipartisan,
external national commission on terrorism.
I was appointed by the minority leader in 1999 to serve on a 10-
member commission, sounds a lot like this one, that was to investigate
the terrorist threat. It was ably chaired by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer,
called the Bremer Commission, and I became one of the 10 commissioners.
We reported in 2000 that we believed there could be a major terrorist
attack on U.S. soil in the near future. We recommended suspending the
guidelines on recruiting human assets, that have been discussed
earlier, that we thought hampered their recruitment. We recommended
strengthening legal authorities for FBI investigations. We recommended
better monitoring of students in the U.S.
Guess what, Mr. Chairman. These were good recommendations. We
testified to them in the Senate. They were printed up all over and
praised on the editorial pages, and they were ignored. So I would say
to the survivors of the horrific September 11 attacks that setting up a
new commission may be a good idea, but it may also raise expectations
that will ultimately be dashed.
That is why I like the narrow version of the commission because what
the narrow version says is this commission, if it is enacted, will
focus on whether the recommendations of prior commissions and the joint
inquiry and the Chambliss subcommittee will be implemented.
{time} 0020
That, it seems to me, is a function we ought to be undertaking.
It also will talk about additional ways to make certain that the
counterterrorism mission is central to all our intelligence agencies.
And then it will do the thing that our chairman has just said needs
doing, which is tackle the tough organizational questions of our
intelligence community, which too often get ignored because they are
long range and they are too hard for anyone to deal with.
So I would say to this body that in its narrower form, this
commission makes a very good contribution to our work. It is not
duplicative. It will not disappoint people. And I think that the
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) has been very flexible here in
revising it so that, at least in the view of this Member, it performs a
more useful function than his earlier drafts. And so I am going to
support the Roemer amendment.
Mr. BURR of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the
requisite number of words.
Mr. Chairman, I truly believe tonight that none of the debate will
change people's minds about how they vote on this amendment, but I
think it is important that we read from the amendment itself.
In fact, this amendment says that the responsibility of this
commission is to review the implementation by the intelligence
community of the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of, A, the
Joint Inquiry of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and
the Permanent Select Committees on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives regarding the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001;
B, other reports and investigations of the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of
[[Page H5433]]
Representatives and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate;
C, other such executive branch, congressional, or independent
commission investigations of such terrorist or the intelligence
community; and make recommendations on additional actions for
implementation of such findings, recommendations and conclusions. In
fact, the mission of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
It goes on in point (2) to say, review resource allocation and other
prioritizations of the intelligence community for counterterrorism,
which are current missions of the House and Senate intelligence
committees;
(3) to review and recommend changes to the organization of the
intelligence community, in particular the division of agencies under
the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Defense and the Director of
Central Intelligence. In fact, now current responsibilities of the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence.
(4) determine what technologies, procedures and capabilities are
needed for the intelligence community to effectively support and
conduct future counterterrorism missions, and recommend how these
capabilities should be developed, acquired, or both from entities
outside the intelligence community, including from private entities.
Again, a current mission of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
Let me just say to my colleagues that I commend the gentleman from
Indiana (Mr. Roemer). The gentleman is impassioned on this. We have a
joint inquiry currently in progress of the House and Senate committees.
Our hope is that by the end of the year to come to this body, the
Senate, and the American people with a report, and it will be the
responsibility, then, of the House and Senate committees to make sure
the recommendations, to make sure the findings, to make sure the
changes, to make sure the resources, and to make sure the technologies
that have been identified are incorporated.
It is the core responsibility of the House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence today
to take up practically every point of this amendment. I would urge my
colleagues, let us do our work on the House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence without the burden of people looking over our
shoulders, questioning what we are doing. Let us get to the facts, let
us keep the focus that we have, let us make progress at fixing those
things that we find are broken, and we will air it to the American
people in the correct way.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in very strong support of this amendment by the
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer). I served for 8 years on the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and I have no doubt that
the chairman, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), and the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi) can do a fine investigation.
What I think is important for the credibility for the American people
is an independent commission, standing alone, with experts who can take
a longer view. We all know what the schedule around here is like, and
that Members have multiple responsibilities, and we understand the time
it takes to do one of these jobs, to focus in on this and get it right.
President Roosevelt understood this after Pearl Harbor. He set up a
commission, a public commission. I think that is a very good model for
this.
And I would say to my friends tonight, late in the evening, does
anyone have a doubt that this debate might be reversed if Al Gore were
the President of the United States or if Bill Clinton were still
President? I can remember all of the investigations of President
Clinton, one after another. There was great energy on the other side of
the aisle to have every imaginable investigation.
I can remember the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence looking
into Haiti, looking into Iranian arms to Bosnia, technology transfer to
China, campaign finance reform, and impeachment.
I think the American people understand the politics of this body, and
I think we will do ourselves a great service to have an independent
commission looking at this so that the people of this country will have
confidence that objective people have looked at it not from a political
perspective.
The gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) and I did a great job with
our select subcommittee regarding the transfer of technology. We had a
unanimous recommendation. But I could still see a commission having
dealt with that. And I think on this issue, because of its importance
to the country, the importance to our history, having a commission look
at this that the American people can have complete faith in, I believe,
is the right way to go, and I think we should all support the Roemer
amendment.
Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words, and I apologize to my colleagues, because the time is getting
late.
Mr. Chairman, I have 80 families who lost loved ones in 9-11; sons,
daughters, fathers, mothers, sisters, brothers, husbands, wives, best
friends, and they want to know why. And I want to know why.
I know it is beyond just a little part. It is Congress, it is the
White House, it is a whole host of things that have to be looked at.
And with no disrespect, no disrespect to the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence, they are one part of this issue. And, frankly, they
are a part of it. They are not independent.
I chair the Subcommittee on National Security, and we had 19 hearings
before 9-11. We tried as hard as we could to get someone from the CIA
to testify. They came with a permission slip from the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence that said they did not have to testify. We
wanted them to come testify because we wanted to know how was the CIA
talking to the FBI. My committee has jurisdiction of terrorism at home
and abroad. We had jurisdiction. We wanted to know how did they
communicate, and we could not get them before the committee because
they had a permission slip from one of our committees saying they did
not have to come.
We need an independent commission. And the gentleman from Indiana
(Mr. Roemer) is on target in what he wants to accomplish.
Unfortunately, his amendment does not allow him to offer the kind of
amendment he needs to, given its jurisdiction. We need a presidential
commission that is independent that will tell us ultimately what we all
know.
If we had just listened to what the terrorists said in Arabic, we
would have known about this attack.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SHAYS. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, on the point that the gentleman made about
that this amendment is not perfect. This amendment could be perfected
in the conference committee between the House and the Senate.
I would suggest to the chairman and the ranking member, if they have
some problems with this particular amendment, work it out in the
conference committee. That is what we have done over the years.
Mr. SHAYS. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I think there are many
ways to work it out. I ultimately believe this should be a commission
of people outside Congress and outside working for the administration.
It needs to be people totally independent; people like a Sam Nunn or a
Warren Rudman, or some others of that status.
{time} 0030
There should not be so many from the Speaker or the minority leader.
We should not be saying these are our people and the other side of the
aisle's people.
I believe the victims, the families of September 11, are ultimately
going to get a commission because they deserve it, and so do the
American people. I salute my colleague for bringing this forward, but
it is not the kind of commission that I would hope we would have.
Mr. KIND. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I too want to voice my strong support of the Roemer
amendment being offered this evening. I believe it is the right thing
to do because this is what great democracies
[[Page H5434]]
do; they let the sunshine in. It is never easy to air dirty laundry for
anyone, or to admit to certain shortcomings or failings, but there are
still many unanswered questions that the American people have.
A great democracy that derives our power by the consent of the
people, that can only function if we have the faith and confidence of
the people, need an independent review of what happened to our Nation
on September 11. This is not without precedence. Prior Presidents have
called for this when great tragedy was visited upon this country. As
the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) acknowledged, 11 days after the
attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt called for an independent
commission based on the sneak attack at Pearl Harbor. President Reagan
did the same thing after the Marine barracks incident in Lebanon.
Let me also state that this is not an easy amendment for the
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) to bring. He is a distinguished
member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. He, as do I,
has a great deal of respect for all of our colleagues serving and
working on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, along with
the very capable and bright staff working on that committee. This is
not an indictment or questioning the work that they are doing. Yes,
there is a joint review and an investigation taking place between the
Senate and the House looking into the events of September 11. We should
be doing that, and it is being done.
But what is a little bit sad in the course of this debate this
evening is that we are having to have this discussion at 12:30 in the
morning within the House of Representatives when the President of the
United States himself should have been calling for the establishment of
a nonpartisan, outside independent commission looking into the events
of September 11. That is the type of leadership that we need right now
in this country, and it can only be provided by the President of the
United States.
I appreciate the concerns of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss)
regarding the wording of this amendment and certain restrictions that
the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) had to meet in order to make
this amendment germane so we could at least have a discussion of this
important topic this evening; but if the President were to move forward
by calling for a commission, certain accommodations can be made so that
the commission can be comprised of a distinguished group of
individuals, and we all have a list of who those people could be
serving on it, that could approach this subject in a cool,
dispassionate, and nonpartisan fashion.
They could conduct their work without interfering with the ongoing
duties and responsibilities taking place in the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence. They could also conduct their work so that
it protects the basic operation and methods of intelligence gathering
so we do not air to the rest of the world, especially our enemies and
future terrorists, how we gather this type of information.
These things can be done because they have been done in the past.
That is why I think this amendment has merit. I think ultimately the
American people will not be satisfied unless they get an objective
answer by a distinguished panel of outside experts that can come in,
take a look at this, take the time that they need to analyze what
happened on September 11, not with the purpose to assess blame or point
fingers, but to find answers so the changes that we have to make will
be made.
In the next 24 hours we may be debating the greatest single change of
the Federal Government in the last 55 years. The President is
requesting $40 billion for a new homeland security agency. I agree with
that. We need to restructure the government to deal with current
threats; but all of this will not matter if we do not get the
intelligence aspect of defending our Nation and preventing future
terrorist attacks right.
That has to be done. I think there is a great deal of wisdom in
calling upon a group of outside experts, those who have served in the
Congress, those who have devoted a lifetime of study and analysis of
intelligence gathering, to give them the authority on a parallel track
along with the investigation, the review that is currently taking place
between the Permanent Select Committees on Intelligence, and working
with the administration to learn from the mistakes of the past and then
recommend the policy changes, the structural changes that we have to
make and move forward on in order to enhance our intelligence-gathering
capabilities in order to prevent another tragedy from occurring against
the United States of America. I encourage my colleagues to support the
Roemer amendment.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in very strong support of the Roemer amendment.
I hope that our colleagues will join a bipartisan group of Members in
voting "aye" at the end of this debate. This is a very important
debate for our country. Not only do I support the Roemer amendment for
an independent commission, I authored legislation for an independent
commission last year. Indeed, that commission was accepted by the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. It was not until we came to
the floor when others chimed in that my commission was changed and then
struck from the bill in conference.
But I want to read from the committee bill from last year because I
think it is important for the committee to know why an independent
commission is necessary. The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
said, "The committee believes that the commission will only be
successful if it is seen to be truly independent of any perceived
notions about the effectiveness of the activities of the departments
and agencies it will review. Appointing members with a reputation for
challenging conventional wisdom, wide perspective, bold and innovative
thought and broad experience in dealing with complex problems will
contribute directly to instilling the commission with an independent
spirit which will enhance the credibility of its work. Those given the
authority to appoint members of the commission are urged to be
especially sensitive to the committee's concerns in this regard."
I read this, Mr. Chairman, because I think it speaks directly to the
difference between what this commission's product could be and the work
of our joint inquiry. As one who has served 10 years, longer than
anyone on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and I do not
mean to equate longevity with expertise, certainly our distinguished
chairman's reputation for knowledge in the intelligence community is
unsurpassed, but that does not mean that we cannot have a disagreement
about how we should go forward.
In our committee we are engaged in a joint inquiry into September 11.
We owe the families affected by that tragedy some answers. We need to
reduce risk to the American people, and finding out how September 11
happened will help us protect the American people.
Tomorrow we will start debate on the floor on the Department of
Homeland Security which too has as its goal to reduce risk and increase
safety for the American people. But there is more that we can do to
give some answers to the families affected and indeed to every person
in America about how we can increase safety as much as is humanly
possible in the world that we live in today.
What is the harm, I ask Members, of finding out more? What is the
disadvantage of having fresh eyes look at a situation? When we have had
some of the family members come to visit us about the September 11
tragedy, they tell us that just a simple thing like a plane flying
overhead or a warning of a suspected terrorist attack, and that is not
ordinary, fills them with terror.
{time} 0040
That is the goal of terrorists, of course, to fill people with
terror, so that a country changes the way it conducts itself. We are a
strong country. We will protect and defend the American people as we
protect and defend the Constitution. In order to do that, we need the
best possible information. Our joint inquiry is an excellent inquiry.
Great people are at work on it. I know that we will produce an
excellent
[[Page H5435]]
report, largely because of the leadership of the gentleman from Florida
(Mr. Goss) in the House and Senator Graham in the Senate and the rest
of us working closely in a bipartisan fashion. We know firsthand the
excellent work of the people in the intelligence community. They need
answers, too, I believe, from an independent commission with fresh eyes
and an entrepreneurial look at what the possibilities are.
We have reviewed in our committee the intelligence aspects. That is
what the gentleman from Indiana's amendment serves to do as well. I
would have hoped that he could have gotten a waiver from the Committee
on Rules for a broader investigation so that we could assess the
performance of every agency of government which had every
responsibility. Since that is not the case, I urge our colleagues to
support this narrower commission, fresh eyes, more safety. Vote "aye"
on the Roemer amendment.
Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment. There has been
some comparison with what happened at Pearl Harbor and what happened in
another number of incidents around the world in recent decades,
comparing that to September 11.
September 11 was not a military failure. September 11 was a massive
intelligence failure. There is a marked difference. There is a
difference because our intelligence community operates behind closed
doors. It operates in a fashion where it needs to operate in order to
gather information on terrorist groups and criminal organizations
around the world. The terrorist groups around the world would love for
us to open up our intelligence community to their eyes. I think that is
a terrible mistake that we would be making and a bad precedent that we
would be setting.
Our subcommittee has been working for the last 8 months on a report.
We have a 142-page classified report on record in the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence. We issued a nine-page summary of that
report. That is the difference. There are nine pages out of 142 pages
that we can talk to the American public about. In our report, we did
not pat the intelligence community on the back. We criticized the
intelligence community where they needed to be criticized and we
pointed out where their shortfalls existed leading up to September 11.
The current bicameral committee, the joint inquiry committee, is
focusing now on the plot. Our committee was a broader investigation,
but the joint committee is focusing on the plot of September 11. The 19
hijackers involved, we are looking into exactly where they came from,
how they got here, what their mindset was and what they did leading up
to September 11.
I assure you at the end of the day when that inquiry is completed,
there will be another classified report that will be a massive
document. But there will also be a summary report that the American
people will have that will focus on the plot and the American people
will have a very good idea of what happened leading up to September 11
in the minds of those 19 hijackers.
There has been conversation, also, publicly and it has been stated
over and over here tonight that we may be subject to another attack.
God forbid that we are, and our intelligence community is working
better than ever today to ensure that we are not. But what if we are?
Are we going to have another commission? Where is this going to lead?
How many commissions are we going to wind up having for any number of
particular incidents? Suppose we have successes. Are we going to have a
commission to look into what we did right to disrupt a terrorist act
that might have been prevented? I think we are asking ourselves tonight
for the setting of a bad precedent if we do have this commission
established and this commission moves towards looking at what the joint
inquiry is looking at today.
I think at the end of the day when the joint inquiry is completed,
every single family is going to get satisfaction out of that report in
knowing what did happen leading up to September 11 and why we were
unable to prevent it more so than what we were able to see in the
report that was issued last week. I urge a "no" vote on this
amendment, even though my friend the gentleman from Indiana (Mr.
Roemer) is very passionate and I respect his opinion on this, but I
think it is the wrong way to go.
Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the
requisite number of words.
I appreciate the chants of my colleagues, but I think you do
disservice to the families when we discuss this when you suggest that
somehow we should vote without a discussion of the Roemer proposal.
I cannot think of anything more important to the American people with
the loss that they suffered, that all of us suffered on 9/11, than an
effort to determine what happened, an effort to determine what happened
by, as Ranking Member Pelosi said, fresh eyes. To simply have the same
community looking at itself to make those determinations is
insufficient.
The Roemer proposal is not new, radical or mysterious because the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has commissioned many
independent studies. The gentleman suggested if you have the Roemer
proposal, then everything has to be public. No, we would have
classified annexes just like you have a classified annex in the report
that the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) and others put out
the other day.
The suggestion is that it is not perfect. Gee, it has been on the
table for 4 months and I have not seen anybody reach across and say,
this is what we could do, this would be better, we will help you, we
could get a waiver because this would be an improvement. Maybe you do
not see that as your burden. But those are all institutional arguments
for not doing this and they are the arguments of great institutions in
decline because great institutions in decline become more and more
insular. They refuse to listen to the outside. They refuse to seek
outside knowledge.
The suggestion was that this would be one more report that Congress
would ignore. Maybe this report would tell us that Congress failed in
its duty to the American people by ignoring Hart-Rudman. Maybe there
was negligence in this body by not addressing Hart-Rudman, because
apparently it indicated a lot of things that we should have been paying
attention to in the intelligence community but we were not.
Think of when NASA lost the space shuttle and the argument was, in
and out of NASA, how this was going to be done and what had to be done
to correct it and get the fleet back up and get it flying and return to
our missions; all laudable goals. But think of the moment when the
member of the independent commission, Dr. Feynman, took the O-ring and
put it into the ice water. Think of that moment and what that meant to
the American people about what was wrong with the shuttle program and
assumptions that were made about temperature and launches and weather
conditions, all of which could be justified but turned out to be
catastrophically wrong. When other great systems, complicated systems
and sophisticated systems suffer catastrophic failures, in the business
world they generally turn immediately to outside experts.
When we suffered the catastrophic failure of the oil rigs in the
North Sea, we immediately turned to outside experts. The Alaska
pipeline. The catastrophic fire in the London subway. You say, well,
that is not 9/11. But when they turned to outside experts, they found
everyday practices that every day put people's lives at risk in the
subway. I think it was a Georgia company that did the studies, experts
in catastrophic failures. Why? Because over time they had built up
practices that were at odds with the safe passage of people in the
subway and it had to be redesigned.
What is the other reason this is important? There are a number of
them. One, an obligation to the families as has been mentioned by so
many already. There is also another obligation to the American people.
The American people have a lot at stake. They have a lot on the table
with the outcome of this study. What do they have on the table? They
have their freedoms, because there has been much suggestion that this
is simply a failure of laws, new laws that need to be enacted or old
laws, and that is simply the failure.
[[Page H5436]]
{time} 0050
That may be the case. But we do not know that yet. Yet people are
being asked to given up their freedoms, people are being asked to let
their neighbors spy on them, people are being asked to have their
freedom of travel changed, all of which appears necessary to me. But we
do not know that, because we do not know the threat assessment versus
those freedoms and the failures of the system prior to that.
But somehow we cannot do this. Somehow we are told that if we have an
independent review, that would be catastrophic for this system, because
all of the arguments are interesting, they just do not go to the point
of whether or not we are going to participate.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Whitfield). The time of the gentleman
from California (Mr. George Miller) has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. George Miller of California was allowed to
proceed for 2 additional minutes.)
Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Chairman, the suggestion that
somehow when we all know the list of Americans who could participate in
this system and their credentials and their experiences and their
expertise, to suggest that somehow those Americans would be less loyal,
more subject to leaks, than the existing system, I mean, the best kept
secret apparently was Hart-Rudman, the best kept secret in the Nation
until 9/11.
So I think we have to think about what this means. I think we have to
think about what it means for the American people, what it means for
the families and what it means for this institution. The day we start
to suggest after a catastrophic failure like 9/11 that we cannot have
an independent review of that event is the day that democracy is in
decline.
We all know the mechanisms are in place to provide for the secrecy
and the classification and the right to know and all the rest of that,
and we all respect the importance of what that means. But those cannot
be excuses for failing to discharge our obligation to the American
people.
We need the Roemer amendment. We need the Roemer amendment to be
perfected. That is within the purview of the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence. I would not pretend that I could perfect it, but that
is your expertise. But it is that expertise applied to the notion of a
public independent review that is so important to the families of
victims of 9/11, to the American people, and, ultimately, to this
institution, to this institution, because it is about whether or not we
will have the credibility to proceed with the very difficult choices
that we have yet to make about our homeland security, about our
national defense and about our intelligence capabilities.
I urge support of the Roemer amendment.
Amendment Offered by Mr. Smith of New Jersey to the Amendment No. 9
Offered by Mr. Roemer
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the
amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Smith of New Jersey to Amendment
No. 9 offered by Mr. Roemer:
At the end of section 602(b), as proposed to be added by
the amendment, insert the following:
(4) Representation of family members of victims of
terrorist attacks.--Of the members appointed under paragraphs
(1) and (2) of subsection (a), at least one member appointed
under each such paragraph shall be a member of the family, or
a representative designated by such a family or families, of
an individual who died in the terrorist attacks against the
United States which occurred on September 11, 2001.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask
unanimous consent that the amendment to the amendment be considered as
read and printed in the Record.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from New Jersey?
There was no objection.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, this amendment is a friendly
amendment that I offer to the Roemer amendment. It modifies the makeup
of the blue ribbon commission to ensure that at least two members of
the commission are family members of those who lost their lives because
of the murderous attacks on September 11. This idea came out of
meetings that I had and my staff had with specific widows, Kristen
Breitweiser, who lost her husband Ronald, Patty Casazza, who lost her
husband John, Mindi Kleinberg, who lost her husband Alan, and Lorie Van
Auken, who lost her husband Kenneth.
They have asked, as have other family members, to be included, to be
a part of this investigation. Why wait until conference, or some later
time that may or may not materialize. The families should be included
right at the passage of this legislation. They are part of this and
should not be left on the outside.
They feel, frankly, after numerous meetings, that they have been
neglected, that their concerns have not been adequately addressed. That
is why I am offering this amendment.
I support the Roemer amendment. As a matter of fact, I just testified
before the Committee on Rules asking that the more expansive version
that he has proposed to be made part of the Homeland Security Act.
I would say to my colleagues, I chaired the Subcommittee on
International Operations and Human Rights for 6 years. We did the
Embassy Security Act. I was a prime sponsor of the bill, a $6 billion
authorization to try to beef up our embassies. That came out of the
specific recommendations that Admiral Crowe made as part of the
Accountability Review Board that met after the two terrible bombings of
our embassies in Africa.
What we found was there were all kinds of mistakes that were made,
ones that should have been anticipated, some that had been anticipated
by Admiral Inman, many, many years before that, but had not been acted
upon.
A blue ribbon commission, I would respectfully suggest, will give us
the opportunity to bring it all together.
I was just in Berlin heading up the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly there
with many Members on both sides of the aisle. I met with one of our
consulars who worked in Bangladesh. He told me that 31 people had come
to our consulars in Bangladesh and had requested visas for flight
training. They wanted to come to the United States to learn how to fly.
That was in 1999. We do not know who they are. Those records were done
away with 2 years later, because of the statute of limitations on
retaining those records. They may have been the very same people who
found their way into this country and ended up doing the terrible deeds
they did on 9/11.
This is a good amendment. Still I do not think it goes far enough. I
would disagree with the gentlewoman from California about narrowing the
scope. We need to expand it. We need to investigate other law
enforcement agencies, the FAA, INS and all of the others. Then we could
come up with a very, very comprehensive set of recommendations so there
is a lesson learned.
Let me also tell my colleagues the anthrax problem hit my district,
in Hamilton Township, New Jersey. Hamilton was shut down and is still
shut down. I am amazed how much we still have not done in follow-up to
what happened as a result of the anthrax.
I sat in on those meetings. The left hand did not know what the right
hand was doing time and again. Very, very competent people, but, again,
the left hand very often was unaware of what the right hand was doing,
whether it be CDC, NIH, or other agencies of government. This is a good
amendment. I hope you will back it.
Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.
Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I thank my good friend from New Jersey for
sponsoring our amendment, for supporting it, and take his amendment not
only as a friendly amendment, but a family amendment that represents
many of the victims of this, and I would encourage my colleagues to
support this amendment.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, just let
me conclude, I hope that this language in this amendment grows, is
expanded upon, and is more inclusive as it relates to other agencies of
government. For purposes of germaneness, it had to be narrow, but this
is a good place holder and a good first step.
Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
[[Page H5437]]
Mr. Chairman, I represent the district that had perhaps the most
impact here. The World Trade Center used to stand in the middle of it,
and the catastrophe that was visited on my district and on the entire
country represented, among other things, a monumental and catastrophic
failure of intelligence. When such a thing happens, I think it behooves
us to take a complete and fresh look at it.
Look at every aspect of it. Look at every aspect of every
establishment that we have to deal with that, and that includes,
frankly, the way this Congress and its intelligence and other
committees that are relevant deal with it. That is why I support the
Roemer amendment for an independent blue ribbon commission.
Now, maybe we have not spent enough on intelligence. I have joined in
the past in voting for amendments to cut the intelligence budget. Maybe
we were wrong. Maybe, on the other hand, we have spent enough but we
have not spent it properly. Maybe we spent too much on electronic
intelligence and not enough on human intelligence. Maybe people were
not talking to each other who should have been. Maybe the analytical
capability was neglected in favor of just collecting huge amounts of
information which could not then be analyzed in time. I do not know.
Maybe the Permanent Select Committees on Intelligence of this
Congress have functioned perfectly and wonderfully, and maybe they have
not, and maybe there are changes we could make in our own establishment
and how we set up things. That is why we need a totally new and outside
and independent look and why I support the Roemer amendment.
{time} 0100
Let me also say one word in opposition to the amendment by the
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith). There are plenty of survivors
and family members of victims in my district, and they certainly have a
very great interest in all of this. I have supported the role of
victims in commissions and on committees and so forth in determining
the type of memorial to be erected in New York and the rebuilding and
so forth. But the fact that someone is a relative of someone who died
in the World Trade Center does not make that person an expert on
intelligence, does not make that person an expert on the military; and,
frankly, this commission ought to be not a commission of people who we
put there sentimentally because we sympathize with their loss. It ought
to be a commission of people who are experts in the things that have to
be examined, experts determined by the President, by the leadership of
the House and the Senate, the other body, and so forth.
So I urge Members, do not add sentimentality to this commission which
will not really accomplish anything, but do approve the Roemer
amendment.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words, and I rise in opposition to the Roemer amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I think I know the direction of the debate here, but I
think it is important that we not deceive ourselves. All of the
impassioned comments that I have heard here in the last few minutes are
for a commission that would not be created by the Roemer amendment. The
Roemer amendment is a very narrow shadow of the commission that the
gentlewoman from California described, a broad-based commission. And I
would say, to the gentleman's credit, he understands this, because he
had to craft something that would be germane to this legislation.
This legislation, if we take a look at the four points that are
covered here, focuses exclusively on the intelligence community. The
first element is to make sure that the inquiry, the joint inquiry under
way is implemented. Well, that can take place only after we have seen
it; but I will tell my colleagues one thing, a joint committee, or a
joint inquiry by the two intelligence committees' recommendations to
itself cannot be ignored by the two intelligence committees.
Now, what happened on 9-11 was certainly representative of
deficiencies in the intelligence community, no doubt about that; and
there may be some failures. But the biggest deficiencies, the biggest
failures were in the law enforcement community, I say to my colleagues,
and the relationship of the law enforcement community to the domestic
agencies.
In the particular terrorist event that ravished this country on that
day, both here across the river and in New York City, of course, it was
the failure, the link between the FAA and the commercial airlines and
the law enforcement agencies, at least the Federal law enforcement
agencies. That was the failure.
The gentleman from New Jersey, just a few minutes ago, said some
things that he would like to see it broadened. Well, if we are going to
have a commission here, and I am not opposed to it, it is going to have
to look at the whole array of problems that we had. We cannot simply
look at the intelligence community. We have to look at where the
response to information would be acted upon.
If we take a look at all of the agencies, a part of which are being
merged under the proposed homeland security agency or department, those
are all of the elements of domestic response and law enforcement that
have to be there to do something with the intelligence we hope we have.
We were surprised. We had deficiencies in intelligence.
I say to my colleagues, it is not going to give us the Commission
that everybody here is talking about. It is not going to give us that
comprehensive examination. I say it is a cruel hoax to suggest to the
families of the victims of what happened across the river and in New
York City that such a commission is going to give us those answers. It
is too narrowly focused. It had to be, to be offered by way of this
amendment. So we may vote for it, but let us not kid each other. This
is not going to do it, I say to my colleagues. It is a part of it; it
is not the significant part, in my judgment.
The biggest failures that took place on 9-11 were in the law
enforcement and domestic agency fronts.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BEREUTER. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
Mr. DICKS. But does the gentleman not agree, Mr. Chairman, that we
could fix it in the conference committee between the House and Senate
committees? We have done that many times in the past. If the committee
wants to change this commission and make it broader, make it more
effective, and cover the broad range, we could do that in the
conference between the House and the Senate, and we could agree to it
when the conference report comes back.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, the gentleman from
Florida has already pointed out the problems that this creates for the
other committees of this Congress, that they should have some input in
the preparation of a conference report.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite
number of words.
Mr. Chairman, I have not heard much that I disagree with. As one of
the more recent persons to serve on the Committee on Intelligence, I
certainly would not come here to the floor of the House of
Representatives and suggest that the joint select committee or the
joint committee of the House and Senate that is doing the work now of
looking back with reference to what happened on 9-11 will not do a good
job. But a good job is not good enough in this particular situation. We
need the very best.
The fact of the matter is that this group of persons who are doing
the work are from inside this body and the other body. We tend to think
we know everything, and no one else can tell us that we do not know
everything. It is sort of like as an aside and not meant to impugn
either of the States, but I lived in New York and California, and I
left California thinking that Californians thought they knew
everything, but I knew that New Yorkers knew they knew everything.
The fact is, we do not. And in this instance when the report is
finished, which will be a magnificent work, it can become the starting
point for an independent group.
Now, let me give my colleagues three things that have taken place in
our history in addition to those that have pointed out how swiftly
President Roosevelt, after Pearl Harbor, appointed an independent
commission. We have
[[Page H5438]]
had in our lifetimes three significant, and there are others kinds of
reports about what happens, in our government. When President Kennedy
was killed, we had a select committee to do an investigation. When we
found ourselves with President Nixon's problems in Watergate, we had a
select committee of the House and Senate. But when we had civil rights
disturbances and immense destruction in this country, we went to an
independent commission that is called the Kernell Report that all of us
that are old enough to remember know as the seminal report on race in
America that is still looked to by all intellectuals in academia and
otherwise.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I object. The Committee is not in order. The
gentleman deserves to be heard. He is making a very eloquent statement
and I think the Members ought to pay attention.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Whitfield). The gentleman is correct.
The House will be in order.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I thank my good friend and
colleague from Washington and the Speaker for seeing to it that this
debate itself is carried on in a manner consistent with all of our
thoughts. Everybody has made major contributions and has had something
here to say, and our feelings and passions run high.
What I was saying is that the Kernell Commission became the seminal
report for all in America and is still looked to as the most definitive
matter that has undergone a survey of race in America. That said, what
have we from Watergate from our inside baseball select committee still
puzzled by what transpired? I do not even have to begin to tell my
colleagues the conspiracy theories that have been spawned by virtue of
yet another of those inside groups of people who made a determination.
Now, I do not think we have anything to hide, and I do not think we
should try to hide anything, and none of us are going to do that. None
of the Members of the committee that is presently working for the House
and the Senate are going to do anything other than the best that they
can. These are the finest Americans that anybody could possibly expect
that will look at this matter. But I can assure my colleagues that when
they finish, they will not have made a determination that an
independent commission of people could make, and it will not allow for
the kind of credibility that all of us deserve in this country.
What happened to us is mind-numbing. It boggles the mind, as the
gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) is fond of saying, and all of us
are stunned by what transpired. We need to get beyond ourselves, and
the only way to do that is to allow some other people who have an
approach to this situation that may not be one that is politically
motivated in some respects, yet out of the conviction of our beliefs,
we think that we will have done all that is necessary.
{time} 0110
We will do something, and the American public will still have
questions. Let us give them more input than just those of us who
represent them.
I urge this body to help us learn how we can identify and fix the
problems that all of us know have been created by virtue of this awful
tragedy.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number
of words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Roemer amendment. Let us note
tonight the gravity of what we are talking about. America has been
relying on an arrogant, bloated and incompetent intelligence
bureaucracy to protect us against foreign threats. We spend billions of
dollars and the likes of bin Laden blindsides us and slaughters our
people; 3,000 Americans were slaughtered on 9-11. And it was not a
tragedy not beyond our control. It was a failure of the system and a
failure of the people in the system.
bin Laden was, let us note, the number one target of American
intelligence prior to that attack, the number one target of American
intelligence for a year or more before that attack. Yet this operation,
an operation of this magnitude with millions of dollars being spent,
being transferred from one account to another, hundreds of people being
involved in many different countries, yet it went undetected. The FBI,
the CIA, the National Security Agency, the DIA, our intelligence
community let us down.
And let us note this, they let us down in such a way that we deserve
to know that everything has been done to straighten the situation up so
it cannot happen again. We should all know about a major house-cleaning
that has been going on in our intelligence community. I know nothing
about a major house-cleaning. In fact, it appears to me that the same
people are in charge in the intelligence community today as were in
charge before.
We cannot go on with business as usual; and I am sorry, relying on
those in this body, in the legislative branch, whose job it was to
oversee American intelligence before 9-11, is not good enough. We need
some outside people of prestige who we can trust to focus on this, who
are not part of the system and do not feel compelled to watch out for
whose turf they are standing on in terms of getting on this committee
or that committee.
A new homeland defense committee is not business as usual. A new
homeland defense department is not business as usual. A blue ribbon
commission is not business as usual.
Tonight we heard in this discussion we heard that this proposal by
the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) described as not a favor to the
intelligence community. Well, I am not interested in doing favors to
the intelligence community. The CIA and the State Department played
down the threat that the Taliban posed to the United States and to the
free world. They have played down the importance of the heroin crop
that was being harvested every year in Afghanistan. They have played
down the role of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan with bin Laden and his
terrorist gang that was becoming a fixture in Afghanistan.
And let us note, we all had briefings during that time period. Over
the last several years we all had briefings by the CIA and over there
in our secret room up here. How many of us felt insulted by those
intelligence briefings because there was nothing secret given to us?
There was nothing that gave us any more insight than what we could read
in the newspaper. It is time for Congress to reassert that we are not
going to stand by with "business as usual" after a tragedy of this
magnitude.
This was a catastrophic failure of American intelligence. Those
people who have been running American intelligence should have the
decency to step down, but at the very least we need to hold them
accountable. You hear time and again people saying, oh, this commission
will not be assigning blame or pointing fingers? Oh, yeah. Why not? We
should be assigning blame and pointing fingers. Three thousand of our
citizens have been slaughtered. We have let the intelligence community
keep us at arm's length for too long.
This is a free society and we will remain free as long as they know
that we, as the elected officials of this land that make the policy,
and not the intelligence community that will lead us around like they
think we were dumb bells.
Tonight, by passing the Roemer amendment, whether or not it is the
specific wording and the specific outline, we send a message that we
will do something about this failure.
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the
requisite number of words.
Might I thank the Chairman for the leadership he is showing this
evening on a very important debate.
Mr. Chairman, might I associate myself with the words of my colleague
from California (Mr. George Miller), that there can be no time limit on
expressing the need to tell the truth to the American people; and that
is what this debate is about, Mr. Chairman. The American people need to
know and deserve to know the truth. And whether or not this amendment
is narrowly drawn, I agree with the gentleman from Washington (Mr.
Dicks) that the wise people who will be assigned to the conference
committees can expand the definition of this commission.
And might I read to my colleagues the definition or the establishment
of this commission. The language says, "There is established a
national commission on terrorist attacks upon the United States."
It is important that we realize that after September 11, and even
before
[[Page H5439]]
that, we turned a new page in American history. We are subject to
terrorist attacks. Before I came to this Congress I represented the
family of someone who was lost in Pan Am 103, before we even understood
about the terrorism that struck America through that explosion and that
airplane crash. Today the family does not know all the details as to
what happened and whether or not that was a terrorist attack on the
United States of America.
The family of those Marines who were lost in Beirut, Lebanon, today
do not know the facts about that terrorist attack.
We are in need, Mr. Chairman, of the truth. We are in need of
understanding the impact on families, if you will, by investigation on
what happens or what the follow-up is, if you will, on families who
have been subjected to terrorist attacks by those who they lost. We
need to know that. We need to understand what Coleen Rowley was
speaking about.
And even though my good friend indicated that the way this is framed
we will not find about why law enforcement agencies did not communicate
with each other, I have confidence we can decide that in the conference
committee. We need to understand why the FBI and CIA were not talking
to each other, and we have the procedures in a commission structure to
make sure that classified documents are not released.
Mr. Chairman, some few years ago I served as a staff person on the
Select Committee on Assassination because the people wanted to know
about the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. And they wanted to
understand even better the assassination of one of their dearest
Presidents, President John F. Kennedy. The American people wanted to
know, and even today we realize that there are still questions about
those two terrible acts.
I do not believe we get anything, Mr. Chairman, by hiding the ball.
And the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) has drafted a very
reasonable, very reasonable amendment that frames this commission
seeking the expertise of those in America who understand intelligence
but understand societal issues, understand psychological issues that
deal with the failing that we have experienced.
{time} 0120
So, Mr. Chairman, I believe that this legislation will add to that
question, though I had different legislation and still believe that the
Committees of Armed Services, Judiciary and International Relations
should have their opportunity to review this question.
We need to know the truth, Mr. Chairman, and let me share something
with my colleagues for a moment that went almost unnoticed a few days
ago or maybe a week ago.
About a week ago, the U.S. attorney decided in the Virginia District
to agree to a plea bargain by John Walker Lindh. It was under the
pretense that his trial would open up his opportunities or the
opportunities for the American people to see and hear issues that they
should not hear, that the intelligence community would be paraded
before the American people in an open court. They know full well, Mr.
Chairman, that they could have prevented classified information and
witnesses that should not have been shown from being shown.
A decision was made. They gave Mr. John Walker Lindh 20 years. Right
after that decision was made or that plea bargain was accepted, to the
shock of the judge, it leaked out that he may not know that much
anyhow.
What do we say to the Spann family, a member of the CIA who lost his
life? What do we say to those who could have benefited from
understanding and getting information that might have been helpful to
us by an open airing of what happened?
I understand that this young man's family loves him and I expect for
them to support him, but when his father came out and suggested that
this young man was Nelson Mandela, I think we stretched it beyond
recognition. It is important, Mr. Chairman, that we support this
commission, support the gentleman from Indiana's (Mr. Roemer)
amendment, because the American people need to know the truth.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the
requisite number of words.
Mr. Chairman, I was not going to speak on this issue, but as my
colleagues know, I devote a great deal of time to our national security
and issues in emerging threats, and I have done so for the past 16
years.
I heard some accusations made earlier that the problem with 9/11 was
basically a domestic problem of the FBI. That is just not true, Mr.
Chairman, and therefore, I rise to support this amendment.
We think we have all the answers. Let me tell my colleagues
something. I think back to NIE 95-19 where the intelligence community
told us that the emerging threat to our security was 15 years away. We
challenged that. We challenged that through an independent commission.
It was not challenged through our intelligence committee. It was
challenged through the Rumsfeld Commission, five members appointed by
the Republican side and four Members appointed by the Democrat side,
and what did they prove? They proved the intelligence community was
wrong, that NIE 95-19 was politicized, that the threat was going to be
much sooner than 15 years.
The Rumsfeld Commission shared by Donald Rumsfeld led to the passage
of H.R. 4, my bill on missile defense, which passed with bipartisan
support and a veto-proof margin. What does that have to do with the
issue at hand?
As far back as 1997, Mr. Chairman, the Committee on Armed Services
proposed that we merge together 33 Federal classified systems into one
integrated national operations and analysis center or national
collaborative capability. We proposed it in writing. Two successive
defense bills had language in those bills, telling the Defense
Department, the CIA and the FBI to lead the other agencies, the NRO,
the NSA, Commerce State Justice, DIA to have a collaborative capability
to do massive data mining, using new software tools like Starlight and
Spires to do analysis, including unclassified information.
What would that have given us? Let me give my colleagues an example.
When the CIA does analysis, Mr. Chairman, the CIA does an analysis but
do not include open source information. In September of 2000, there was
an interview in an Italian newspaper of an al Qaeda leader who publicly
said that they were training Kamikaze pilots. If we would have had a
data mining capability, that open source information would have been
fused with the raw data of the immigration service, of the Customs
Department, of the CIA and the FBI, and we would have seen the picture
of what was about to occur, and this Congress called for that for three
years.
Why did we not do it? Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre said to
me, Curt, I agree with you; the problem is the CIA and the FBI will not
go along with it. He said, So I have a suggestion for you, why do you
not bring over the CIA and the FBI counterparts to me and let us have a
meeting in your office. So I did in 1999.
The deputy director of the CIA and the deputy director of the FBI and
John Hamre, deputy director of Defense, and John Hamre said I will pay
the bill, I will foot the bill for this new data fusion center but the
agencies have to go along. The CIA's response was we are doing CI 21,
that is all we need and that was not what we were talking about. We
were talking about an integrated capability of all 33 Federal
classified systems.
When General Downing just stepped down at the White House, the top
adviser to President Bush, what did General Downing say? He said that
his top priority when he was there was to build a national data fusion
center. What did he say when he left? The FBI and the CIA did not want
it. So General Downing left his job and walked away.
The CIA is not above this institution. I have held myself back for
too long because I have seen on the inside the agencies manipulating
the process, and as someone who cares desperately about emerging
threats, I am not satisfied that we in this body can do service to an
investigation of our intelligence, and therefore, I come to the
conclusion that the gentleman from Indiana's (Mr. Roemer) idea is a
good one because we need to send a signal to the CIA and the FBI. They
are not the end all and the cure-all. They do not determine the end
result of analysis and they can fuse
[[Page H5440]]
data and they can do it and vet information so that we do not affect an
individual's civil liberties of people whose names may surface.
In fact, every major defense company, Lockheed Martin, Northup-
Grumman, Boeing, the Army at their LIWA Center down at Fort Belvoir,
the Air Force, Navy and SPAWAR, special forces command down in Florida
all have data fusion capabilities. They are all doing it now, but do my
colleagues know who does not do it? The CIA and the FBI because they do
not want to share their data. They do not want raw intercepts being
provided to other agencies, and that does not give us the best
intelligence analysis for the war fighter or the policy-makers.
So I urge my colleagues to do the right thing and support the Roemer
amendment.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
I rise in support of the Roemer amendment. Mr. Chairman, 3,000
Americans died on September 11, and I think that the gravity of this
situation requires the kind of an approach that the gentleman from
Indiana (Mr. Roemer) has taken in asking for the creation of a national
commission on terrorist attacks upon the United States.
I have been listening to this debate both in the Chamber and from my
office, and as the ranking Democrat on the oversight subcommittee that
has jurisdiction over national security, I well understand the concerns
that have been articulated here this evening regarding an intelligence
failure, but I will also say to my friends who have advanced that
position here tonight, that they can support this amendment even if
they strongly believe in the capabilities of our intelligence
community.
As a matter of fact, I am certain that the Roemer amendment does not
stem from lack of appreciation for the work of the men and women of the
CIA and the FBI. I happen to believe that our FBI and our CIA are
actually very competent, and it may be and they may be working under
constraints which would be of interest to the American people which
could be determined by this kind of a commission.
So this debate does not have to be interpreted as an attack on our
intelligence community, and I do not seek to attack those agencies. It
would be helpful to determine how they can function more effectively.
One of the things that I would hope that would come from not only
this debate but also the Roemer amendment, if passed, is a renewed
sense of what we can do to help heal our country because I think one of
the things we have to come to a conclusion about is that Americans do
not need to attack each other. We have already been attacked. Let us
not attack each other. If there have been failures, we can face those.
We are strong enough.
One of the things that has concerned me, Mr. Chairman, is there seems
to have been some kind of a disconnect on matters of causality relating
to 9/11. There are people who seem to have an aversion to looking at
the actual reasons behind 9/11, and in a sense, the homeland security
bill, which this House will vote on, has been brought to this House
without a strategy, without a risk assessment, but with a raft of
legislative initiatives preceding it such as the PATRIOT Act and acts
that deal with cyber security which have caused broad-based
restructuring of criminal justice principles in our society and in a
challenge to civil liberties themselves, even without the analysis that
a commission could offer.
{time} 0130
So I certainly think that such a commission is warranted. And then
maybe we can take another look at proposals to create a national spy
network through the TIPS program, the proposal that the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Armey) fortunately rejected for a national ID card through
drivers licenses; raise questions about cameras that have been put all
over this campus and in other cities; questions about barricades that
go up everywhere; questions about military tribunals and suspension of
habeas corpus.
I mean, our way of life has been dramatically changed, and we have
lacked a sufficient evaluation as to whether or not those changes have
been essential to be able to challenge the root causes of 9-11. The
approach has been totally reactive.
Now, I say America is a Nation of strength, and it is weakness which
does not seek to know the truth. America is a Nation of courage, and it
is fear which seeks not to know the truth. America is a Nation of
light, and it is darkness where the truth is not asked. You shall know
the truth and the truth shall set you free.
Freedom is what we seek. Freedom is what we seek to protect, freedom
is what we seek to reclaim, and we will reclaim our freedom when we
have a commission that will enable us to get to the truth.
Mr. WU. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.
The hour is late, Mr. Chairman, and I am sicker than a dog, so brevity
will have to substitute for eloquence.
It has been an aphorism in American culture, at least since the days
of Benjamin Franklin, that those who will not learn from the past are
doomed to repeat it. If we do not support this common sense amendment
to form an independent commission to investigate exactly what happened
around September 11, will we have done everything within our power to
learn what happened and to avert future tragedies?
I would like each Member who is considering voting against this
amendment to ask themselves to search in their heart. If there is a
future recurrence, will you be able to look in your heart and say to
yourself we did everything we could to learn from the past and to
prevent future recurrences?
I ask you to vote for this commonsense amendment to fully investigate
September 11 and prevent future tragedies from occurring.
Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. WU. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.
Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
As the gentleman from Washington started to say, it is time to vote.
We have had a good lively debate for 1:30 in the morning. We started
out on a bipartisan bill in a bipartisan way with comity and respect
toward one another. We have had bipartisan agreement with much of this
amendment. And, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the honorable way you have
conducted yourself in the chair at this late hour and this long day.
Mr. Chairman, I put the question on the Smith amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Whitfield). The question is on the
amendment offered by the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith) to the
amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer).
The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by
the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer), as amended.
The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.
Recorded Vote
Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 219,
noes 188, not voting 27, as follows:
[Roll No. 347]
AYES--219
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Andrews
Baca
Baird
Baldacci
Baldwin
Barcia
Barr
Barrett
Bartlett
Becerra
Bentsen
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop
Blagojevich
Blumenauer
Borski
Boswell
Brady (PA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Burton
Capito
Capps
Capuano
Cardin
Carson (IN)
Carson (OK)
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Conyers
Costello
Coyne
Cramer
Crowley
Cummings
Davis (CA)
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Deutsch
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Dooley
Doyle
Duncan
Edwards
Ehrlich
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Ferguson
Filner
Ford
Frank
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Ganske
Gephardt
Gilchrest
Gilman
Gonzalez
Green (TX)
Gutknecht
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Hill
Hilleary
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hoeffel
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (NC)
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
[[Page H5441]]
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind (WI)
Kleczka
Kucinich
Lampson
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
LaTourette
Leach
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Lofgren
Lowey
Lucas (KY)
Luther
Lynch
Maloney (CT)
Maloney (NY)
Markey
Mascara
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Menendez
Millender-McDonald
Miller, George
Mink
Mollohan
Moore
Moran (VA)
Morella
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Nethercutt
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Phelps
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reyes
Rivers
Rodriguez
Roemer
Rohrabacher
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanchez
Sanders
Sandlin
Sawyer
Schakowsky
Schiff
Scott
Serrano
Sherman
Shows
Skelton
Smith (NJ)
Snyder
Solis
Spratt
Stark
Stenholm
Strickland
Stupak
Tancredo
Tauscher
Taylor (MS)
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thurman
Tierney
Towns
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Velazquez
Visclosky
Waters
Watson (CA)
Watt (NC)
Waxman
Weiner
Weldon (PA)
Wexler
Wolf
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
NOES--188
Aderholt
Akin
Armey
Bachus
Baker
Ballenger
Barton
Bass
Bereuter
Biggert
Bilirakis
Boehlert
Bonilla
Bono
Boozman
Boyd
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Bryant
Burr
Buyer
Calvert
Camp
Cannon
Cantor
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Coble
Collins
Cooksey
Crane
Crenshaw
Cubin
Culberson
Cunningham
Davis, Jo Ann
Deal
DeLay
DeMint
Diaz-Balart
Doolittle
Dreier
Dunn
Ehlers
Emerson
English
Everett
Flake
Fletcher
Foley
Forbes
Fossella
Gallegly
Gekas
Gibbons
Gillmor
Goode
Goodlatte
Goss
Graham
Granger
Graves
Green (WI)
Greenwood
Grucci
Hall (TX)
Hart
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Herger
Hobson
Hoekstra
Horn
Hostettler
Houghton
Hulshof
Hunter
Hyde
Isakson
Istook
Jenkins
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, Sam
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
Kerns
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kolbe
LaHood
Latham
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lucas (OK)
Manzullo
McCrery
McHugh
McInnis
McKeon
Mica
Miller, Dan
Miller, Gary
Miller, Jeff
Moran (KS)
Myrick
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nussle
Osborne
Ose
Oxley
Paul
Pence
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Pombo
Pomeroy
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Reynolds
Riley
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Ros-Lehtinen
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Saxton
Schaffer
Schrock
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shuster
Simmons
Simpson
Skeen
Smith (MI)
Smith (TX)
Souder
Sullivan
Sununu
Sweeney
Tanner
Tauzin
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thornberry
Thune
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Toomey
Upton
Vitter
Walden
Walsh
Wamp
Watkins (OK)
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weller
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Young (FL)
NOT VOTING--27
Blunt
Boehner
Bonior
Boucher
Callahan
Clay
Combest
Condit
Cox
Davis, Tom
Gordon
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hansen
Issa
Knollenberg
LaFalce
McCarthy (MO)
Murtha
Otter
Roukema
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Stearns
Stump
Turner
Young (AK)
{time} 0158
Mr. Walsh, Mr. Ehlers and Mrs. Kelly changed their vote from "aye"
to "no."
Mr. Hill changed his vote from "no" to "aye."
So the amendment, as amended, was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated for:
Ms. McCARTHY of Missouri: Mr. Speaker, during rollcall vote No. 347,
I was unavoidably detained. Had I been present, I would have voted,
"aye."
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
The motion was agreed to.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
Simpson) having assumed the chair, Mr. Whitfield, Chairman pro tempore
of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported
that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R.
4628) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2003 for intelligence
and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government,
the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, had come to
no resolution thereon.
[...]
[Congressional Record: July 24, 2002 (House)]
[Page H5441-H5450]
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 497 and rule
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill,
H.R. 4628.
{time} 0201
In the Committee of the Whole
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of
the bill (H.R. 4628) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2003
for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United
States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes, with Mr. Whitfield (Chairman pro tempore) in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. When the Committee of the Whole rose earlier today,
Amendment No. 9 printed in the Congressional Record offered by the
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) had been disposed of.
Pursuant to the order of the House of today, no further amendment to
the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute may be offered
after the legislative day of July 24, 2002, except pro forma amendments
offered by the chairman or ranking minority member of the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence or their designees for the purpose of
debate.
Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. Chambliss
Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
[[Page H5442]]
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 3 offered by Mr. Chambliss:
At the end (page 30, after line 7), add the following new
title:
TITLE VI--INFORMATION SHARING
SEC. 601. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the "Homeland Security
Information Sharing Act".
SEC. 602. FINDINGS AND SENSE OF CONGRESS.
(a) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:
(1) The Federal Government is required by the Constitution
to provide for the common defense, which includes terrorist
attack.
(2) The Federal Government relies on State and local
personnel to protect against terrorist attack.
(3) The Federal Government collects, creates, manages, and
protects classified and sensitive but unclassified
information to enhance homeland
(4) Some homeland security information is needed by the
State and local personnel to prevent and prepare for
terrorist attack.
(5) The needs of State and local personnel to have access
to relevant homeland security information to combat terrorism
must be reconciled with the need to preserve the protected
status of such information and to protect the sources and
methods used to acquire such information.
(6) Granting security clearances to certain State and local
personnel is one way to facilitate the sharing of information
regarding specific terrorist threats among Federal, State,
and local levels of government.
(7) Methods exist to declassify, redact, or otherwise adapt
classified information so it may be shared with State and
local personnel without the need for granting additional
security clearances.
(8) State and local personnel have capabilities and
opportunities to gather information on suspicious activities
and terrorist threats not possessed by Federal agencies.
(9) The Federal Government and State and local governments
and agencies in other jurisdictions may benefit from such
information.
(10) Federal, State, and local governments and
intelligence, law enforcement, and other emergency
preparation and response agencies must act in partnership to
maximize the benefits of information gathering and analysis
to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks.
(11) Information systems, including the National Law
Enforcement Telecommunications System and the Terrorist
Threat Warning System, have been established for rapid
sharing of classified and sensitive but unclassified
information among Federal, State, and local entities.
(12) Increased efforts to share homeland security
information should avoid duplicating existing information
systems.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
Federal, State, and local entities should share homeland
security information to the maximum extent practicable, with
special emphasis on hard-to-reach urban and rural
communities.
SEC. 603. FACILITATING HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION SHARING
PROCEDURES.
(a) Procedures for Determining Extent of Sharing of
Homeland Security Information.--
(1) The President shall prescribe and implement procedures
under which relevant Federal agencies determine--
(A) whether, how, and to what extent homeland security
information may be shared with appropriate State and local
personnel, and with which such personnel it may be shared;
(B) how to identify and safeguard homeland security
information that is sensitive but unclassified; and
(C) to the extent such information is in classified form,
whether, how, and to what extent to remove classified
information, as appropriate, and with which such personnel it
may be shared after such information is removed.
(2) The President shall ensure that such procedures apply
to all agencies of the Federal Government.
(3) Such procedures shall not change the substantive
requirements for the classification and safeguarding of
classified information.
(4) Such procedures shall not change the requirements and
authorities to protect sources and methods.
(b) Procedures for Sharing of Homeland Security
Information.--
(1) Under procedures prescribed by the President, all
appropriate agencies, including the intelligence community,
shall, through information sharing systems, share homeland
security information with appropriate State and local
personnel to the extent such information may be shared, as
determined in accordance with subsection (a), together with
assessments of the credibility of such information.
(2) Each information sharing system through which
information is shared under paragraph (1) shall--
(A) have the capability to transmit unclassified or
classified information, though the procedures and recipients
for each capability may differ;
(B) have the capability to restrict delivery of information
to specified subgroups by geographic location, type of
organization, position of a recipient within an organization,
or a recipient's need to know such information;
(C) be configured to allow the efficient and effective
sharing of information; and
(D) be accessible to appropriate State and local personnel.
(3) The procedures prescribed under paragraph (1) shall
establish conditions on the use of information shared under
paragraph (1)--
(A) to limit the redissemination of such information to
ensure that such information is not used for an unauthorized
purpose;
(B) to ensure the security and confidentiality of such
information;
(C) to protect the constitutional and statutory rights of
any individuals who are subjects of such information; and
(D) to provide data integrity through the timely removal
and destruction of obsolete or erroneous names and
information.
(4) The procedures prescribed under paragraph (1) shall
ensure, to the greatest extent practicable, that the
information sharing system through which information is
shared under such paragraph include existing information
sharing systems, including, but not limited to, the National
Law Enforcement Telecommunications System, the Regional
Information Sharing System, and the Terrorist Threat Warning
System of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(5) Each appropriate Federal agency, as determined by the
President, shall have access to each information sharing
system through which information is shared under paragraph
(1), and shall therefore have access to all information, as
appropriate, shared under such paragraph.
(6) The procedures prescribed under paragraph (1) shall
ensure that appropriate State and local personnel are
authorized to use such information sharing systems--
(A) to access information shared with such personnel; and
(B) to share, with others who have access to such
information sharing systems, the homeland security
information of their own jurisdictions, which shall be marked
appropriately as pertaining to potential terrorist activity.
(7) Under procedures prescribed jointly by the Director of
Central Intelligence and the Attorney General, each
appropriate Federal agency, as determined by the President,
shall review and assess the information shared under
paragraph (6) and integrate such information with existing
intelligence.
(c) Sharing of Classified Information and Sensitive but
Unclassified Information With State and Local Personnel.--
(1) The President shall prescribe procedures under which
Federal agencies may, to the extent the President considers
necessary, share with appropriate State and local personnel
homeland security information that remains classified or
otherwise protected after the determinations prescribed under
the procedures set forth in subsection (a).
(2) It is the sense of Congress that such procedures may
include one or more of the following means:
(A) Carrying out security clearance investigations with
respect to appropriate State and local personnel.
(B) With respect to information that is sensitive but
unclassified, entering into nondisclosure agreements with
appropriate State and local personnel.
(C) Increased use of information-sharing partnerships that
include appropriate State and local personnel, such as the
Joint Terrorism Task Forces of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Anti-Terrorism Task Forces of the
Department of Justice, and regional Terrorism Early Warning
Groups.
(d) Responsible Officials.--For each affected Federal
agency, the head of such agency shall designate an official
to administer this Act with respect to such agency.
(e) Federal Control of Information.--Under procedures
prescribed under this section, information obtained by a
State or local government from a Federal agency under this
section shall remain under the control of the Federal agency,
and a State or local law authorizing or requiring such a
government to disclose information shall not apply to such
information.
(f) Definitions.--As used in this section:
(1) The term "homeland security information" means any
information (other than information that includes
individually identifiable information collected solely for
statistical purposes) possessed by a Federal, State, or local
agency that--
(A) relates to the threat of terrorist activity;
(B) relates to the ability to prevent, interdict, or
disrupt terrorist activity;
(C) would improve the identification or investigation of a
suspected terrorist or terrorist organization; or
(D) would improve the response to a terrorist act.
(2) The term "intelligence community" has the meaning
given such term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
(3) The term "State and local personnel" means any of the
following persons involved in prevention, preparation, or
response for terrorist attack:
(A) State Governors, mayors, and other locally elected
officials.
(B) State and local law enforcement personnel and
firefighters.
(C) Public health and medical professionals.
(D) Regional, State, and local emergency management agency
personnel, including State adjutant generals.
[[Page H5443]]
(E) Other appropriate emergency response agency personnel.
(F) Employees of private-sector entities that affect
critical infrastructure, cyber, economic, or public health
security, as designated by the Federal government in
procedures developed pursuant to this section.
(4) The term "State" includes the District of Columbia
and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United
States.
SEC. 604. REPORT.
(a) Report Required.--Not later than 12 months after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit
to the congressional committees specified in subsection (b) a
report on the implementation of section 603. The report shall
include any recommendations for additional measures or
appropriation requests, beyond the requirements of section
603, to increase the effectiveness of sharing of information
between and among Federal, State, and local entities.
(b) Specified Congressional Committees.--The congressional
committees referred to in subsection (a) are the following
committees:
(1) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.
(2) The Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee
on the Judiciary of the Senate.
SEC. 605. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be
necessary to carry out section 603.
SEC. 606. AUTHORITY TO SHARE GRAND JURY INFORMATION.
Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (2), by inserting ", or of guidelines
jointly issued by the Attorney General and Director of
Central Intelligence pursuant to Rule 6," after "Rule 6";
and
(2) in paragraph (3)--
(A) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by inserting "or of a foreign
government" after "(including personnel of a state or
subdivision of a state";
(B) in subparagraph (C)(i)--
(i) in subclause (I), by inserting before the semicolon the
following: "or, upon a request by an attorney for the
government, when sought by a foreign court or prosecutor for
use in an official criminal investigation";
(ii) in subclause (IV)--
(I) by inserting "or foreign" after "may disclose a
violation of State";
(II) by inserting "or of a foreign government" after "to
an appropriate official of a State or subdivision of a
State"; and
(III) by striking "or" at the end;
(iii) by striking the period at the end of subclause (V)
and inserting "; or"; and
(iv) by adding at the end the following:
"(VI) when matters involve a threat of actual or potential
attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power, domestic or international sabotage,
domestic or international terrorism, or clandestine
intelligence gathering activities by an intelligence service
or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign
power, within the United States or elsewhere, to any
appropriate federal, state, local, or foreign government
official for the purpose of preventing or responding to such
a threat."; and
(C) in subparagraph (C)(iii)--
(i) by striking "Federal";
(ii) by inserting "or clause (i)(VI)" after "clause
(i)(V)"; and
(iii) by adding at the end the following: "Any state,
local, or foreign official who receives information pursuant
to clause (i)(VI) shall use that information only consistent
with such guidelines as the Attorney General and Director of
Central Intelligence shall jointly issue.".
SEC. 607. AUTHORITY TO SHARE ELECTRONIC, WIRE, AND ORAL
INTERCEPTION INFORMATION.
Section 2517 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following:
"(7) Any investigative or law enforcement officer, or
other Federal official in carrying out official duties, who
by any means authorized by this chapter, has obtained
knowledge of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic
communication, or evidence derived therefrom, may disclose
such contents or derivative evidence to a foreign
investigative or law enforcement officer to the extent that
such disclosure is appropriate to the proper performance of
the official duties of the officer making or receiving the
disclosure, and foreign investigative or law enforcement
officers may use or disclose such contents or derivative
evidence to the extent such use or disclosure is appropriate
to the proper performance of their official duties.
"(8) Any investigative or law enforcement officer, or
other Federal official in carrying out official duties, who
by any means authorized by this chapter, has obtained
knowledge of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic
communication, or evidence derived therefrom, may disclose
such contents or derivative evidence to any appropriate
Federal, State, local, or foreign government official to the
extent that such contents or derivative evidence reveals a
threat of actual or potential attack or other grave hostile
acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power,
domestic or international sabotage, domestic or international
terrorism, or clandestine intelligence gathering activities
by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or
by an agent of a foreign power, within the United States or
elsewhere, for the purpose of preventing or responding to
such a threat. Any official who receives information pursuant
to this provision may use that information only as necessary
in the conduct of that person's official duties subject to
any limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of such
information, and any State, local, or foreign official who
receives information pursuant to this provision may use that
information only consistent with such guidelines as the
Attorney General and Director of Central Intelligence shall
jointly issue.".
SEC. 608. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.
(a) Dissemination Authorized.--Section 203(d)(1) of the
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA
PATRIOT ACT) of 2001 (Public Law 107-56; 50 U.S.C. 403-5d) is
amended by adding at the end the following: "Consistent with
the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence to
protect intelligence sources and methods, and the
responsibility of the Attorney General to protect sensitive
law enforcement information, it shall be lawful for
information revealing a threat of actual or potential attack
or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of
a foreign power, domestic or international sabotage, domestic
or international terrorism, or clandestine intelligence
gathering activities by an intelligence service or network of
a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power, within the
United States or elsewhere, obtained as part of a criminal
investigation to be disclosed to any appropriate Federal,
State, local, or foreign government official for the purpose
of preventing or responding to such a threat. Any official
who receives information pursuant to this provision may use
that information only as necessary in the conduct of that
person's official duties subject to any limitations on the
unauthorized disclosure of such information, and any State,
local, or foreign official who receives information pursuant
to this provision may use that information only consistent
with such guidelines as the Attorney General and Director of
Central Intelligence shall jointly issue.".
(b) Conforming Amendments.--Section 203(c) of that Act is
amended--
Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. Chairman, this amendment is a very simple
amendment. It is an amendment that was debated very thoroughly on the
House floor some 3 weeks ago. It is an information sharing bill
coauthored by the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), myself and
the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Shays), who has now joined us in
offering this amendment.
Basically what this amendment does, it is in response to some
information that we discovered as the Subcommittee on Terrorism and
Homeland Security during our hearing process about the lack of
information sharing that exists between the intelligence gatherers at
the Federal level and State and local officials, who are the first
responders on the site of any terrorist attack that may be perpetrated
against the United States.
This bill basically requires the administration to develop an
information sharing plan such that they take the individual
intelligence gatherers, whether it is NSA, FBI, CIA or whoever, put it
into a common funnel, and that information be redacted and declassified
and disseminated out to State and local officials in real time so that
those first responders on the ground can have the information necessary
to be on the lookout to hopefully disrupt any terrorist activity that
may be forthcoming.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Mr. Chairman, I am proud to be a coauthor of this amendment, which
passed the House by a vote of 422 to 2 several weeks ago. I believe
that every member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence was
an original cosponsor of the amendment. It has been a pleasure to work
on it with the gentleman from Georgia, the gentleman from Connecticut
and many others, and to see it become such an important legislative
action of this season. By attaching it to this bill, we ensure that it
becomes law sooner.
We are looking at every vehicle we can find to make certain that it
will pass the Senate and be agreed upon in conference, and we do know
that we have support from the administration.
I would just add that at 2 o'clock in the morning, Mr. Chairman,
somewhere in America there is a terrorist cell that intends to do us
harm. By having this mechanism that will share information with first
responders and help them know what to look for, we are protecting the
citizens of that part of America who are under threat. So I am very
pleased to stand here tonight in support of this amendment. I urge its
adoption quickly.
[[Page H5444]]
Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. HARMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Connecticut.
Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to join the authors of this
legislation, the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss) and the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman). I am not an author, but I am
a cosponsor, because at the 30 hearings my Subcommittee on National
Security has had, this issue has shown up almost at every instance.
Protecting the safety and security of the Nation against terrorist
attacks requires unprecedented cooperation between Federal, State and
local agencies. Timely information sharing is an absolutely
indispensable element of the Nation's ability to detect and preempt,
disrupt or respond to any terrorist attack.
I absolutely am amazed at how stubborn the procedural process has
been, the cultural barriers that have blocked the information sharing
on the local level. These individuals on the local level need to have
the ability to gain security clearance. We need to encourage the
Federal and State to interact better.
I just commend the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss), and I
commend the chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
and ranking member for their recognizing the need for this legislation
and their past support.
Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, as has been noted, this amendment is substantially the
same as the Homeland Security Information Sharing Act which was
overwhelmingly passed and endorsed by the House last month. I was
pleased to be a cosponsor of that bill.
I commend the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), the gentleman
from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss), the gentleman from Michigan (Mr.
Conyers), the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner), the
gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Shays) and the gentleman from New York
(Mr. Weiner) again for their hard work on it.
Timely and effective information is one of the most important tools
in the fight against terrorism. Local communities need to be able to
count on receiving that kind of information.
This amendment will help in that effort, and I certainly urge its
adoption.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank those involved in this amendment. I
know that this has been a success story already on the floor, but I am
pleased it is added to the bill. I think it is important as it has been
explained. I congratulate the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman),
the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss) and the gentleman from
Connecticut (Mr. Shays). The committee accepts the amendment offered by
the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss).
{time} 0210
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Whitfield). The question is on the
amendment offered by the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 8 Offered by Ms. Pelosi
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 8 offered by Ms. Pelosi:
Amend section 501 to read as follows:
SEC. 501. USE OF FUNDS FOR COUNTER-DRUG AND COUNTERTERRORISM
ACTIVITIES FOR COLOMBIA.
(a) Authority.--Funds designated for intelligence or
intelligence-related purposes for assistance to the
Government of Colombia for counter-drug activities for fiscal
years 2002 and 2003, and any unobligated funds available to
any element of the intelligence community for such activities
for a prior fiscal year, shall be available to support a
unified campaign against narcotics trafficking and against
activities by organizations designated as terrorist
organizations (such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the
United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)), and to take
actions to protect human health and welfare in emergency
circumstances, including undertaking rescue operations.
(b) Requirement for Certification.--(1) The authorities
provided in subsection (a) shall not be exercised until the
Secretary of Defense certifies to the Congress that the
provisions of paragraph (2) have been complied with.
(2) In order to ensure effectiveness of United States
support for such a unified campaign, prior to the exercise of
the authority contained in subsection (a), the Secretary of
State shall report to the appropriate committees of Congress
that the newly elected President of Colombia has--
(A) committed, in writing, to establish comprehensive
policies to combat illicit drug cultivation, manufacturing,
and trafficking (particularly with respect to providing
economic opportunities that offer viable alternatives to
illicit crops) and to restore government authority and
respect for human rights in areas under the effective control
of paramilitary and guerrilla organizations;
(B) committed, in writing, to implement significant
budgetary and personnel reforms of the Colombian Armed
Forces; and
(C) committed, in writing, to support substantial
additional Colombian financial and other resources to
implement such policies and reforms, particularly to meet the
country's previous commitments under "Plan Colombia".
In this paragraph, the term "appropriate committees of
Congress" means the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Committee on Appropriations of the House
of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence
and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
(c) Termination of Authority.--The authority provided in
subsection (a) shall cease to be effective if the Secretary
of Defense has credible evidence that the Colombian Armed
Forces are not conducting vigorous operations to restore
government authority and respect for human rights in areas
under the effective control of paramilitary and guerrilla
organizations.
(d) Application of Certain Provisions of Law.--Sections
556, 567, and 568 of Public Law 107-115, section 8093 of the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2002, and the
numerical limitations on the number of United States military
personnel and United States individual civilian contractors
in section 3204(b)(1) of Public Law 106-246 shall be
applicable to funds made available pursuant to the authority
contained in subsection (a).
(e) Limitation on Participation of United States
Personnel.--No United States Armed Forces personnel or United
States civilian contractor employed by the United States will
participate in any combat operation in connection with
assistance made available under this section, except for the
purpose of acting in self defense or rescuing any United
States citizen to include United States Armed Forces
personnel, United States civilian employees, and civilian
contractors employed by the United States.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, just briefly, this amendment, which I am
offering with the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), has a simple
purpose: to harmonize the intelligence authorization bill and the
emergency supplemental appropriations conference report passed
yesterday on an issue relating to Colombia. That issue is the use to
which funds designated for counterdrug activities for Colombia in
fiscal year 2003 and made available but not expended in previous fiscal
years can be put.
When this matter was considered by the Select Committee on
Intelligence, it was clear that we intended to mirror actions taken by
the Committee on Appropriations in the emergency supplemental. Section
501 of the bill, which is nearly identical to the provision in the
emergency supplemental as reported by the Committee on Appropriations,
reflects that intention.
In conference, the Colombia provisions in the emergency supplemental
were modified. These modifications condition the use of
counternarcotics money for counterterrorism purposes in Colombia on
certain certifications being made by the Secretaries of State and
Defense and limit participation of U.S. personnel in combat operations
in Colombia to instances of self-defense or the rescue of U.S.
citizens. The task which remains is to bring the intelligence bill in
line with the emergency supplemental on this matter. This amendment
acknowledges that purpose. I am pleased to have the chairman's support
for it, and I urge its adoption by the House.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Mr. Chairman, as stated in our report language, section 501 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2003 regarding the use
of funds for counterdrug and counterterrorism activities for Colombia
is intended to be consistent with similar language included in fiscal
year 2002 Defense Department appropriations bills. The gentlewoman from
California has properly, rightly and helpfully offered an amendment to
replace section 501 in order to conform with the language in H.R. 4775,
[[Page H5445]]
as voted out of conference and approved by the House on July 23, 2002.
Therefore, the Committee accepts the amendment and thanks the
gentlewoman for the gracious and harmonizing effort to make this all
work better.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by
the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Goss
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 5 offered by Mr. Goss:
At the end of title I (page 9, after line 4), insert the
following new section:
SEC. 106. LIMITATION ON USE OF CERTAIN APPROPRIATIONS FOR
INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE-RELATED
ACTIVITIES.
(a) In General.--Subject to subsection (b), the amounts
requested for the Defense Emergency Response Fund that are
designated for the incremental costs of intelligence and
intelligence-related activities for the war on terrorism may
only be obligated or expended for the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities specified in the letter dated
July 19, 2002 of the Deputy Director for Central Intelligence
to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives.
(b) Limitations.--The amounts referred to in subsection
(a)--
(1) may only be obligated or expended for activities
directly related to identifying, responding to, or protecting
against acts or threatened acts of terrorism;
(2) may not be obligated or expended to correct
programmatic or fiscal deficiencies in major acquisition
programs which have not achieved initial operational
capabilities within two years of the date of the enactment of
this Act; and
(3) may not be obligated or expended until the end of the
10-day period that begins on the date notice is provided to
the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Appropriations
of the House of Representatives.
Modification to Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Goss
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be
modified in the form at the desk, and that the modification be
considered as read and printed in the Record.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) to dispense with the reading?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the modification.
The text of the modification is as follows:
Modification to amendment No. 5 offered by Mr. Goss:
The amendment is modified as follows:
Strike the heading and subsection (a) of section 106, as
proposed to be added by the amendment, and insert the
following:
SEC. 106. LIMITATION ON INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE-RELATED
ACTIVITIES.
(a) In General.--Subject to subsection (b), the amounts
requested in the letter dated July 03, 2002, of the President
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, related to
the Defense Emergency Response Fund and that are designated
for the incremental costs of intelligence and intelligence-
related activities for the war on terrorism are authorized.
In subsection (b)(1) of such section, strike "may only be
obligated or expended" and insert "are authorized only".
In subsection (b)(2) of such section, strike "may not be
obligated or expended" and insert "are not authorized".
In subsection (b)(3) of such section--
(1) strike "may not be obligated or expended" and insert
"are not available"; and
(2) insert "written" before "notice is provided".
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the modification
offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss)?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The amendment is modified.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to have the ranking member as a
cosponsor of the amendment as modified. This language has been
coordinated with the gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis) on the
Committee on Appropriations, and I wish to express my gratitude for his
support as well.
The committee is concerned about a recent budgetary trend to use
supplemental funding to cover intelligence needs not met through the
regular budget process. The committee believes the practice of seeking
and receiving large supplemental appropriations has become part of the
expected yearly process and only grown worse with a new type of
"emergency fund" created in the wake of the tragedy of September 11.
By continuing to rely on supplemental appropriations year after year,
the intelligence community risks fostering a budget process that is
ripe for abuse and long-term funding gaps. Moreover, the creation of
the Defense Emergency Response Fund, the DERF, has further complicated
matters. The Defense Emergency Response Fund was originally created to
pay for emergency items that arose due to the war on terrorism, but it
has now turned into just another vehicle to fund items that the
intelligence community did not receive funding for through the regular
budget and planning process.
It is bad budget practice and bad government to do it that way.
Congressional oversight is minimized, and finally, the committee
believes that the supplemental gravy train will not last.
In any sustained "crisis" action, there comes a point where short-
term stopgap practices must be phased out and long-term strategic plans
put into place. This amendment is meant to highlight this concern to
the administration.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to join Chairman Goss on this amendment.
As he has explained, the amendment seeks to ensure that money
authorized for intelligence activities in the Defense Emergency
Response Fund is used for the war on terrorism. The amendment makes
clear that the DERF funds are not to be used to address shortfalls in
the intelligence programs not directly related to the terrorism
campaign, and requires Congress to be notified before these funds are
obligated or expended. I understand that the language in the amendment
as modified has been worked out with the Committee on Appropriations.
Congress needs to oversee carefully the operations of the DERF. This
amendment will contribute to effective oversight and I support it, and
I commend the gentleman for his amendment and am pleased to join in it.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment, as
modified, offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss).
The amendment, as modified, was agreed to.
Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Engel
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the
amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 4 offered by Mr. Engel:
At the end of title III (page 21, after line 11), insert
the following new section:
SEC. 311. LIMITATIONS ON ASSISTANCE TO THE PALESTINIAN
SECURITY SERVICES.
(a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end
the following new section:
"limitations on assistance to the palestinian security services
"Sec. 118. (a) Prohibition on Lethal Assistance.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no assistance in
the form of lethal military equipment may be provided, either
directly or indirectly, by any element of the intelligence
community to the security services of the Palestinian
Authority, or to any officials, employees or members thereof.
"(b) Requirements for Other Forms of Assistance.--With
respect to forms of assistance other than the provision of
lethal military equipment, provided by any element of the
intelligence community to the security services of the
Palestinian Authority, or to any officials, employees or
members thereof, such assistance may only be provided if the
assistance is designed to--
"(1) reduce the number of security services of the
Palestinian Authority to no more than two; and
"(2) reform such security services so that its officials,
employees, and members--
"(A) respect the rule of law and human rights;
"(B) no longer fall under the command of, or report to,
Yasir Arafat; and
"(C) are not compromised by, and will not support,
terrorism.
"(c) Quarterly Reports on Assistance Provided Since
1993.--(1) Not later than 3 months after the date of the
enactment of this section, the Director of Central
Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress a report that describes all forms of assistance that
have been provided to the security services of the
Palestinian Authority since the date on which the Declaration
of Principles was signed, including the dates on which such
assistance was
[[Page H5446]]
provided and whether any member of the security services of
the Palestinian Authority who received any such assistance
has committed an act of terrorism.
"(2) After the submittal of the report under paragraph
(1), the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress quarterly reports on the
forms of assistance under paragraph (1) provided during the
preceding calendar quarter and progress toward--
"(A) reducing the number of security services of the
Palestinian Authority to no more than two;
"(B) ensuring that officials, employees, and members of
such security services are not compromised by, and will not
support, terrorism;
"(C) reforming the security services of the Palestinian
Authority so that they respect the rule of law and human
rights; and
"(D) ensuring that the security services of the
Palestinian Authority are no longer under the control of
Yasir Arafat.
"(3) Reports shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
may include a classified annex.
"(d) Definitions.--In this section--
"(1) the term `lethal military equipment' has the meaning
given the term for purposes of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961; and
"(2) the term "appropriate committees of Congress" means
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.".
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the
National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after
the item relating to section 117 the following new item:
"Sec. 118. Limitations on assistance to the security services of the
Palestinian Authority.".
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, at the conclusion of offering this
amendment, I will request to withdraw it by unanimous consent.
Mr. Chairman, 1 month ago today, President Bush, I guess 1 month ago
yesterday now, President Bush made a very important speech on the
Middle East. He said that the United States would support the
establishment of a Palestinian state, but only if Palestinian leaders
meet specific benchmarks, including reformed, noncorrupted political
processes, a new leadership not compromised by terror, and a unified
restructured security force.
I strongly supported the President's speech and his plan. The
Palestinians need new leaders. Yasar Arafat is too compromised by
terrorism, not only to fight Hamas and Islamic jihad, but to stand up
to elements of the PLO itself. Under Arafat's watch, his own PLO Fatah
faction, which includes the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, has established a
long track record of terror attacks against innocent Israeli civilians.
The Palestinians deserve leaders who will stand up for their interests,
not turn down peace plans like the one presented at Camp David 22
months ago.
I agree with the President that the Palestinian Authority's security
apparatus must be reformed so that it can effectively fight terrorism,
and I am glad that CIA Director Tenet will take personal hold of this
project. The amendment I offer, and will shortly withdraw, is in line
with U.S. policy and designed to support Tenet's effort to create a
functional, unified Palestinian security network by providing
guidelines for his efforts.
First, the amendment would prohibit lethal assistance to the
Palestinian security officials, employees or members. I have seen
report after report of PA security personnel participating in or
inciting acts of violence. There are some very unsavory characters
throughout the Palestinian Authority, and we should not arm its
security apparatus. Although I will withdraw my amendment, we must be
very careful that we do not try to create a security force of people
who have been behind the violence of the last 22 months or even those
who have known and looked the other way.
Secondly, my amendment states that other types of U.S. assistance
must be designed to promote reform in the PA security services. This is
precisely what President Bush called for in his June 24 speech, and in
my amendment American assistance should reduce the number of PA
security services to a unified command structure and, by all means, not
more than two separate units. As my colleagues are likely aware, the PA
has more than 10 security services which Arafat plays off against each
other for his own purposes. In fact, some have competed as to which can
more effectively fight and kill innocent Israelis.
American training and other help must further be designed to reform
the security service so that its members or employees respect the rule
of law on human rights, are no longer commanded by Yasar Arafat, and
are not compromised by terrorism. These guidelines for U.S. assistance
are in line with the policy laid out by President Bush and should be
the basis for CIA Director Tenet's program.
Finally, my amendment would direct the Central Intelligence Agency to
report about the assistance we give the Palestinian Authority security
services in the 1990s, and every 3 months thereafter, the progress we
are making in reforming the Palestinian Authority security services.
Even after I withdraw this amendment, consultation with Congress about
our program to reform the Palestinian security services should be
expanded.
Once again, I support the President's policy of reforming the
Palestinian Authority and security services. The Palestinians need
better leadership and a security force which will actually and
faithfully strive to halt terror. While I strongly support this effort,
it should not proceed without boundaries.
{time} 0220
I believe that my amendment would have passed today. However, in a
few days, CIA Director Tenet will send an assessment team to the region
to begin analysis of what reform might require. As this process is just
beginning, I have decided that now is not the time to legislate
limitations. Yet, if the process gets off track, I will be back here on
the floor trying to set the program straight. In the meantime, it is my
hope with this amendment, which I now ask unanimous consent to
withdraw, offers a set of practical guidelines which the administration
will take to heart as it works to reform the PA service.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. ENGEL. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, may I congratulate the gentleman from New
York for his attention to this problem and the process. A very
constructive conversation I know has taken place. I have read his
amendment. I understand what he is trying to accomplish, and I
appreciate his understanding and his explanation tonight of the problem
we have doing it that way. I sympathize very much with what the
gentleman is trying to accomplish and I hope that the people who are
working on this problem will be able to get the results we both desire
and I appreciate his understanding.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel) has
expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Engel was allowed to proceed for 2
additional minutes.)
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. ENGEL. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I want to join the distinguished chairman
in congratulating the gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel) for his
leadership, not only tonight but on an ongoing basis on this very
important issue, addressing violence in the Middle East and our desire
for peace there. I appreciate the constructive nature of his amendment
and the more constructive nature of his with drawing it at this time
and look forward to working with him to ensure an end to violence and
promotion of peace in the Middle East.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, I now ask unanimous consent to withdraw my
amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
New York?
There was no objection.
Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Roemer
Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 1 offered by Mr. Roemer:
At the end of title III (page 21, after line 11), insert
the following new section:
SEC. 311. REPORT ON ESTABLISHMENT OF A CIVILIAN LINGUIST
RESERVE CORPS.
(a) Report.--The Secretary of Defense, acting through the
Director of the National Security Education Program, shall
prepare a report on the feasibility of establishing a
Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps comprised of
[[Page H5447]]
individuals with advanced levels of proficiency in foreign
languages who are United States citizens who would be
available upon a call of the President to perform such
service or duties with respect to such foreign languages in
the Federal Government as the President may specify. In
preparing the report, the Secretary shall consult with such
organizations having expertise in training in foreign
languages as the Secretary determines appropriate.
(b) Matters considered.--
(1) In general.--In conducting the study, the Secretary
shall develop a proposal for the structure and operations of
the Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps. The proposal shall
establish requirements for performance of duties and levels
of proficiency in foreign languages of the members of the
Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps, including maintenance of
language skills and specific training required for
performance of duties as a linguist of the Federal
Government, and shall include recommendations on such other
matters as the Secretary determines appropriate.
(2) Consideration of use of defense language institute and
language registries.--In developing the proposal under
paragraph (1), the Secretary shall consider the
appropriateness of using--
(A) the Defense Language Institute to conduct testing for
language skills proficiency and performance, and to provide
language refresher courses; and
(B) foreign language skill registries of the Department of
Defense or of other agencies or departments of the United
States to identify individuals with sufficient proficiency in
foreign languages.
(3) Consideration of the model of the reserve components of
the armed forces.--In developing the proposal under paragraph
(1), the Secretary shall consider the provisions of title 10,
United States Code, establishing and governing service in the
Reserve Components of the Armed Forces, as a model for the
Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps.
(c) Completion of Report.--Not later than 6 months after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall
submit to Congress the report prepared under subsection (a).
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to the Secretary of Defense $300,000 to
carry out this section.
(Mr. ROEMER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, this amendment I think is noncontroversial
and has been worked out previously with the distinguished chairman and
the ranking member who have supported this. It is to establish a
civilian linguist reserve corps. First of all, I am very greatful to
the co-sponsors of the amendments the gentleman from Nevada (Mr.
Gibbons) who is extremely knowledgeable on these linguist issues and
who has been very helpful in crafting this amendment; the gentleman
from California (Mr. Farr) who has worked very diligently on language
issues and has a distinguished institute in his State; the gentleman
from Texas (Mr. Reyes) and a member of our committee; and also Jim
Bamford, who has also come up with some ideas.
I am also very grateful to the staff on our committee. We have said
how many times how professional and dedicated and talented they are,
Chris Barton on the majority side and Chris Healey on our side have
been very helpful to us.
This amendment requires the Secretary of Defense acting through the
National Security Education Program to prepare a report on the
feasibility of establishing a civilian linguist reserve corps comprised
of individuals with advanced skill levels in foreign languages.
I am not going to take the time of House at this hour. I am going to
enter my statement into the record.
Mr. Chairman, I hope this is accepted as it was previously worked out
and thank again the committee members for their help.
This amendment requires the Secretary of Defense, acting through the
National Security Education Program, to prepare a report on the
feasibility of establishing a civilian linguist reserve corps comprised
of individuals with advanced skill levels in foreign languages.
The idea behind the amendment is to move forward on a promising
approach to this country's multi-faceted problem of finding qualified
linguists to serve in the Federal Government.
Often, the Federal Government finds it suddenly needs linguists with
skills in relatively obscure languages for a relatively short-term
crisis, but these linguists are not to be found among regular
government employees.
A reserve corps would help ensure that individuals with skills in a
wide variety of languages were trained and ready when needed to come to
the aid of the government.
We would like the Secretary of Defense to give us not just a report,
but an action plan that comprehensively addresses all of the issues
involved in establishing a civilian linguist reserve corps.
We expect the National Security Education Program to utilize
organizations with expertise in language issues to conduct this study,
such as the National Foreign Language Center at the University of
Maryland. This Center is a leading institution on language issues and
has already begun work on how a reserve corps could be made
operational.
The report should also take into account the assets that already
exist in the Federal Government that might facilitate the establishment
of the corps, such as the capability of the Defense Language Institute
to test for language proficiency and maintenance of skills. Foreign
language skill registries, such as the one proposed by the gentlemen
from California, Mr. Farr, could also be the basis for drawing up a
reserve corps.
I am grateful to James Bamford for his work on this issue and for
proposing the idea of a reserve corps. This amendment is co-sponsored
by Messrs. Gibbons, Farr and Reyes.
Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Mr. Chairman, I want to begin by congratulating the gentleman from
Indiana (Mr. Roemer), the gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Gibbons), the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes), the gentleman from New York (Mr.
Boehlert), and the gentleman from California (Mr. Farr) for their work
on this amendment. They have been leaders on the language issue,
constantly seeking creative solutions to what is a very serious
problem.
Looking outside the ranks of current employees for highly skilled
linguists who are willing to bring their talents to bear in an
emergency situation is an idea that is well worth exploring. This
amendment would permit a thorough study of the idea, which would, in
turn, permit a reasoned judgment to be made on the potential.
I urge the adoption of the amendment and I congratulate those who
have offered it. It is very well taken.
Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
(Mr. GIBBONS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Chairman, I also rise in strong support of this
amendment. I want to congratulate my colleague and friend from Indiana
(Mr. Roemer) for his leadership on this issue, as well as my other
colleagues who are in co-sponsor of this and who have worked hard to
provide a rather remarkable amendment that I think is going to do great
work to improve the bill and to improve our linguistic skills. I also
want to thank the chairman of the committee, the gentleman from Florida
(Mr. Goss) and the ranking member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms.
Pelosi) for their work and their help on getting this amendment
through.
I also want to thank one of the staff members who is not here this
evening who has not been mentioned, Mr. Brant Bassett, a staff director
for HUMINT committee, whose work and insight into this amendment has
been very helpful.
Mr. Chairman, I have served for 6 years on the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and throughout that time I have heard a
constant theme, that we lack linguistic skills across the board in
terms of needed languages that are going to help us identify areas that
we can gather intelligence from. And as a result, this amendment is
going to allow us to expand our horizons with the ability to pull
together a cadre of skilled people with languages skills that we need.
Terrorists today are speaking all kinds of languages, many of which
we do not have adequate levels of trained individuals in. Languages
like Pashtu, Urdu, Arabic. These language skills are available out
there if we pull these people together and train them in a cadre of
reserve organization that allow them in a time of crisis to be drawn
together, to be utilized to help this Nation do better with its
intelligence needs and language skills.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude my remarks once
again by thanking the gentleman for his leadership on this issue.
Mr. FARR of California. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite
number of words.
Mr. Chairman, I hope I do not have to consume 5 minutes. I just want
to thank everybody who helped co-sponsor this and the committee members
[[Page H5448]]
who have really focused on what I think is a very important issue. I
think while we are thanking them we also have to thank the desk staff
would have been here all day and they have to be back here early
tomorrow morning. This has been a long day, and the old adage that the
mind cannot comprehend what the seat cannot endure, I hope we can
continue to finish this work.
What this amendment is all about is recognizing, America has
linguists and we have language teachers and we have language
institutions but we have not brought them all together so we can make
them skilled linguists. And in order to do that, I come from a district
where we have a really relevant assets, relevant institutions to do
that, to teach the languages.
The largest foreign language school in the world is the the old Army
language school now called the Defense Language Institute in Monterey,
California, and next to it a private nonprofit called the Monterey
Institute of International Studies which offers the Nation's only
masters degree in translation and interpretation.
The committee has clearly identified one of the most acute problems
in our intelligence collection efforts and that is how do you keep
training and upgrading and learning how to train with the technology
that we have skilled linguists. So I applaud my colleagues on the
committee on their efforts to improve our Nation's assets by calling
for the Intelligence Community Language University. There can be no
doubt that the time is now to stand up this new foreign language
school. It does not necessarily have to be a new place at a new
university so to speak. It could be a university within a university
and that is what the report will inform us.
{time} 0230
The committee adopted another initiative at my suggestion to foster a
cooperative relationship between the National Security Education
program and the Defense Language Institute to enhance the development
of national security professionals and foreign area experts with high
levels of foreign language proficiency.
In the effort to help the Federal Government meet the challenge of
hiring linguists more quickly, I was successful in adding report
language to the DOD appropriations bill and the DOD authorization bill
this year to create the National Language Skills Registry. What happens
is that we train people as linguists, and as long as they are in the
Federal employment, we can keep track of them; but the minute they
leave the Federal employment, we have no knowledge of them.
So by creating this National Foreign Language Skills Registry, it is
a voluntary program where ones with these skills could be kept in a
file and an electronic file, and we would know exactly where our
language assets are around the United States rather than having, as we
saw last year after 9-11, the FBI director having to go out and
advertise for people, people that spoke Farsi and other languages.
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence report will look at
the national foreign language skills registry as a starting point and
consider the resources of the Defense Language Institute in making its
recommendation to create a civilian linguist reserve corps.
Taken together, I think my colleagues on the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence are taking the first real substantial step to
close the gap in language capacity among our intelligence community.
I urge the adoption of this amendment, and I really want to thank our
colleagues. The hour is late. They have done a marvelous job, and I
appreciate their focus on this very important issue.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
I thank the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer), the gentleman from
Nevada (Mr. Gibbons) and the gentleman from California (Mr. Farr) and
several others I suspect have had a hand in this and they have actually
made a very valuable contribution in offering this amendment to
establish a civilian linguist reserve corps.
I think it is a good idea, and I think I read an article not too long
ago by Jeff Porter saying that we had capabilities that were not being
properly utilized in this area, and I think this is a very creative
response and I am very happy to accept it.
The events of September 11, 2001, and the ongoing war against
terrorism has shown us that America must have a linguistic quick
response capability, and there is no reason why we cannot.
On behalf of the committee, I am very pleased to congratulate those
involved in this and to accept the bipartisan amendment that we have.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Whitfield). The question is on the
amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendments No. 6 and No. 7 Offered by Mr. Hastings of Florida
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I offer two amendments, No. 6
and No. 7, and I ask unanimous consent they be considered en bloc.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendments.
The text of the amendments are as follows:
Amendments No. 6 and No. 7 offered by Mr. Hastings of
Florida:
At the end of the title III (page 21, after line 11),
insert the following new section:
SEC. 311. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DIVERSITY IN THE WORKFORCE OF
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AGENCIES.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The United States is engaged in a war against terrorism
that requires the active participation of the intelligence
community.
(2) Certain intelligence agencies, among them the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency,
have announced that they will be hiring several hundred new
agents to help conduct the war on terrorism.
(3) Former Directors of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National
Security Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency have
stated that a more diverse intelligence community would be
better equipped to gather and analyze information on diverse
communities.
(4) The Central Intelligence Agency and the National
Security Agency were authorized to establish an undergraduate
training program for the purpose of recruiting and training
minority operatives in 1987.
(5) The Defense Intelligence Agency was authorized to
establish an undergraduate training program for the purpose
of recruiting and training minority operatives in 1988.
(6) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency was authorized
to establish an undergraduate training program for the
purpose of recruiting and training minority operatives in
2000.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(with respect to the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the Bureau), the Director of Central
Intelligence, the Director of the National Security Agency,
and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency should
make the creation of a more diverse workforce a priority in
hiring decisions; and
(2) the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of
National Security Agency, the Director of Defense
Intelligence Agency, and the Director of National Imagery and
Mapping Agency should increase their minority recruitment
efforts through the undergraduate training program provided
for under law.
Amendment No. 7. At the end of title III (page 21, after
line 11), insert the following new section:
SEC. 311. ANNUAL REPORT ON HIRING AND RETENTION OF MINORITY
EMPLOYEES IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Section 114 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
404i) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new
subsection:
"(c) Annual Report on Hiring and Retention of Minority
Employees.--(1) The Director of Central Intelligence shall,
on an annual basis, submit to Congress a report on the
employment of covered persons within each element of the
intelligence community for the preceding fiscal year.
"(2) Each such report shall include disaggregated data by
category of covered person from each element of the
intelligence community on the following:
"(A) Of all individuals employed in the element during the
fiscal year involved, the aggregate percentage of such
individuals who are covered persons.
"(B) Of all individuals employed in the element during the
fiscal year involved at the levels referred to in clauses (i)
and (ii), the percentage of covered persons employed at such
levels:
"(i) Positions at levels 1 through 15 of the General
Schedule.
"(ii) Positions at levels above GS-15.
"(C) Of individuals hired by the head of the element
involved during the fiscal year involved, the percentage of
such individuals who are covered persons.
"(3) Each such report shall be submitted in unclassified
form, but may contain a classified annex.
"(4) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed as
providing for the substitution
[[Page H5449]]
of any similar report required under another provision of
law.
"(5) In this subsection, the term `covered persons'
means--
"(A) racial and ethnic minorities,
"(B) women, and
"(C) individuals with disabilities.".
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Florida?
There was no objection.
(Mr. HASTINGS of Florida asked and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, let me join those that have
thanked everyone that has been involved in developing this very fine
legislative undertaking, and especially thank all of the staff that
have worked with all of us in developing this. Specifically I would
like to thank Wendy Parker for her efforts in working with my office,
as well as other members of the staff and also to thank the court
reporters and the desk staff from the Clerk's office and all of those
with the Speaker's office who have stayed with us throughout the night.
With the permission of the Chair, and with the ranking member
designee's permission and the Chair's permission, my understanding is
that neither of the amendments that I am offering are likely to be
controversial, and in the interest of time, I am placing my full
statement in the Record, and allow me, since they know that one of
these measures speaks to the subject of diversity and ethnicity and
helps to strengthen our ability to achieve that, as has been stated by
many in the agencies that they wish to accomplish.
The other amendment facilitates the reporting, seguing off of the one
that we just finished in an effort to fill some of the community's gaps
in language and analytical skills, and I am submitting the statement
for the Record.
Mr. Chairman, I rise to introduce the second of two amendments I am
offering to H.R. 4628. The first calls for increased minority
recruitment by the intelligence community, in an effort to fill some of
that community's gaps in language and analytical skills. The second
amendment facilitates Congressional oversight of that process.
Mr. Chairman, the amendment I am offering at the current moment
instructs the Director of Central Intelligence to issue an annual
report to Congress on the hiring and retention of minorities by the
intelligence community. Such a report will allow this body to monitor
the progress of the intelligence community's efforts to recruit and
retain minorities.
Like my previous amendment and the underlying bills, this amendment
is non-controversial. After all, intelligence agencies have been
providing reports on minority hiring and retention to the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence since the early 1990's. My
amendment simply makes the unclassified versions of those reports
available to the larger Congress.
Likewise, this amendment does not in any way jeopardize our national
security by revealing the number of individuals working at our various
intelligence agencies. Figures published in the report would be
percentages, not absolute numbers. This provision is in keeping with
current guidelines for maintaining the integrity of classified
information.
Mr. Chairman, let me reiterate, minority recruitment is critical to
the maintenance of our national security. Congress has a role in the
maintenance of our intelligence infrastructure. That role is to provide
effective oversight. This amendment will allow myself and my colleagues
in this body to do just that.
I urge my colleagues to support my amendment.
Mr. Chairman, it was just 3 years ago that the Director of Central
Intelligence, George Tenet, stated, and I quote:
To combat the threats our country will be facing in the
decades ahead, we will need [intelligence] collectors from
diverse Ethnic backgrounds and with a wide range of expertise
who can think and communicate like our targets and pierce
their human and technical networks. We will also need
analysts whose deep knowledge of other societies, cultures
and languages can bring important perspectives to
intelligence assessments.
At the time that Mr. Tenet made this statement, only 11 percent of
the case officers at the CIA were racial or ethnic minorities.
Tragically, that number has barely changed in the intervening years.
Realize, Mr. Chairman, this country is attempting to gather
information on a world which is 50 percent non-white with an
intelligence apparatus that is barely 11 percent non-white.
How can we expect to understand them if we do not talk like them? How
can we expect to infiltrate them if we do not look like them?
And what has the intelligence community's failure to recruit and
retain minorities brought us? Today, Mr. Speaker, there are large areas
of this globe where the United States is unable to collect intelligence
for want of agents who possess the requisite cultural literacy and
language skills. At the FBI, CIA and NSA, untranslated tapes of
wiretapped conversations pile up, awaiting analysts with the proper
language skills to translate them.
Right now, as we sit here in this chamber, the intelligence operation
in Guantanamo Bay is bogged down by a lack of translators. This sorry
state of affairs must not be allowed to persist.
My amendment expresses the sense of Congress that the directors of
the CIA, DIA, NIMA and the NSA use every means at their disposal to
make minority recruitment and retention a priority in their hiring
decisions. The CIA, DIA, NSA, and NIMA all have Undergraduate Training
Programs; a minority scholarship program introduced by former Chairman
of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Louis Stokes,
in 1987. My amendment urges the directors of these agencies to use this
existing program to increase minority recruitment.
Mr. Chairman, make no mistake, minority recruitment is critical to
the maintenance of our national security. The passing of this amendment
will send a strong message that the House of Representatives supports
the goal of increasing minority representation in the intelligence
community for the purpose of strengthening our intelligence
infrastructure.
I urge my colleagues to support this much needed amendment.
Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, in my view, few things could contribute more to
enhancing the mission success in the intelligence community than
increasing diversity in the workforce. When he was on the committee,
the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings) was a leader working with the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes), me, along with several others, to
encourage efforts by the agencies to place a priority on hiring people
with diverse ethnic, religious and cultural backgrounds.
It is a tribute to his commitment that despite his absence from the
committee the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings) continues to work
hard on this important issue.
With hiring being accelerated in the intelligence agencies, now is
the time to make significant progress on the diversity issues by making
full use of existing recruitment programs targeted on minorities, and
by developing creative new ones, I am confident that such progress can
be made.
The gentleman from Florida's (Mr. Hastings) amendments expressing the
sense of Congress on diversity and in the intelligence community and
requiring an annual report on hiring and retention of minority
employees will contribute to this end. I commend him for this work and
I urge that the amendments be adopted.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
It is true that my colleague from Florida has been a champion on the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and elsewhere on behalf of
the thoughts that these two amendments contain and that is making sure
that we are getting adequate reporting back from the intelligence
community on their efforts on diversification and encouraging a broader
and richer, I think, capability in the community by utilizing
diversification, and we have had a couple of hearings that I think have
been helpful.
I know that the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi) has also
been a champion in this area, and I congratulate all involved and
particularly the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings) this evening.
The fact is the intelligence community does need diversity in a very
bad way. This is a global world and that message needs to continue to
be reinforced. So I am very happy to accept the en bloc amendment
presented by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings).
The one caveat I would offer is a minor caution, and that is, we have
some reporting now and I want to make sure we are not creating a
duplication. I would rather take what we have and make sure it is what
we need and what we want rather than create another requirement. So if
the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings) will help me with that, maybe
we can streamline that a little bit.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
[[Page H5450]]
Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman has my assurance
that I will do everything I can to strengthen it in the way he has put
forward.
Mr. GOSS. The gentleman continues to make a contribution to the
committee, and we hope to see him again.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, the hour is late and I would like to say more, but I do
want to very enthusiastically commend the gentleman for this very
important amendment.
On the committee we have had a tradition of chairman Louis Stokes,
our former colleague, when he was the Chair of the committee, was a
champion for promoting diversity in the intelligence community. That
banner was later carried by our late colleague Congressman Julian Dixon
as ranking member of the committee, and now the gentleman from Florida
(Mr. Hastings) and others on the committee are advancing this.
All of us have worked very hard to impress upon the intelligence
community the value of diversity to mission success. We want the very
best people, and we want to draw upon the knowledge of other cultures,
the language, the possibility, the opportunities, the personalities
that are in our country and that understand the culture of other
countries.
Part of the success of intelligence is understanding plans and
intentions. It takes a great deal of access and imagination. Diversity
brings both of those in a way that I think we are missing and have a
deficit in our current intelligence resources.
{time} 0240
We have tremendous resources, however. We are blessed with courageous
and patriotic people who work every day to protect the American people.
That resource can be improved and enhanced by the work that the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings) is presenting here this evening.
We cannot say it enough. We need to expand the diversity of our
workforce, and we need to expand the language capabilities to another
issue that was addressed here this evening. We hope that the amendment
of the gentleman from Florida will build upon the work of Mr. Stokes
and our dear late colleague Mr. Dixon in a way that will be exponential
in light of the new hires that will have to happen in light of
September 11.
Again, I commend the gentleman and my distinguished chairman for
agreeing to the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Whitfield). The question is on the
amendments offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings).
The amendments were agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Are there other amendments?
If not, the question is on the committee amendment in the nature of a
substitute, as amended.
The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended,
was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Under the rule, the committee rises.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
Portman) having assumed the chair, Mr. Whitfield, Chairman pro tempore
of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported
that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R.
4628) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2003 for intelligence
and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government,
the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, pursuant to
House Resolution 497, he reported the bill back to the House with an
amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is
ordered.
Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the committee
amendment in the nature of a substitute adopted by the Committee of the
Whole? If not, the question is on the amendment.
The amendment was agreed to.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on
the table.
____________________
