Congressional Record: March 14, 2002 (Extensions)
Page E360-E361                        

                            REMARKS ON CHINA


                           HON. BOB SCHAFFER

                              of colorado

                    in the house of representatives

                        Thursday, March 14, 2002

  Mr. SCHAFFER. Mr. Speaker, our government's consideration of China as 
a force for peace among its neighbors is impossible to substantiate and 
is overwhelmingly refuted by the facts. Our own good intentions are not 
sufficient to overcome the fact that China is a force for war, building 
up its military strength in warlike preparations aimed at its Asian 
neighbors such as Taiwan, and extending to the United States.
  Policies of engagement with China do not excuse a lack of diligence 
by the United States over China's ballistic missile threat and arms 
buildup, as well as its failure to abide by non-proliferation 
agreements such as the one it signed in November 2000 to halt the sale 
of ballistic missiles and technology for the delivery of weapons of 
mass destruction.
  In February 2002 Secretary of State Colin Powell noted how China's 
proliferation of ballistic missiles remained "an irritation in the 
relationship" between it and the United States. This irritation 
understates China's reliance on ballistic missiles as a key component 
of its military power, including their use as precision weapons capable 
of deep penetration without the delivery of weapons of mass 
destruction--conventional warfare.
  In February 2002 CIA Director George Tenet, in testimony before the 
U.S. Senate, warned about China's increasing military power, saying,

       Over the past year, Beijing's military training exercises 
     have taken on an increasingly real-world focus, emphasizing 
     rigorous practice in operational capabilities and improving 
     the military's actual ability to use force.

  Mr. Tenet added,

       This is aimed not only at Taiwan but also at increasing the 
     risk to the United Stats itself in any future Taiwan 
     contingency. China also continues to upgrade and expand the 
     conventional short-range ballistic missile force it has 
     arrayed against Taiwan.

  Mr. Tenet noted the link between China's threat to Taiwan and its 
threat to the United States.
  I believe this House and our nation's president recognize the link 
between China's threat to Taiwan and the United States. In his 
question-and-answer session with Chinese students at Qinghua University 
in Beijing, when asked why he did not use the term "reunification" 
with China and Taiwan, President George W. Bush responded by referring 
to the Taiwan Relations Act, "which says we will help Taiwan defend 
herself if provoked."
  The United States must be wary of China's subtle rhetoric. The PLA 
understands only one language--the language of military strength to 
force one's will upon another, just as communism was forced on China 
through the barrel of a gun as stated by Mao Zedung. While China may 
cloak its intent in soft words of diplomacy, in 1995 and 1996 it 
launched ballistic missiles off the coast of Taiwan in a show of force 
to intimidate it and the Far East.
  China's diplomatic overtures to Taiwan lack sincerity. Vice Premier 
Qian Qichen's remarks on Taiwan in January 2002, supposedly extending 
goodwill to Taiwan and interest in holding talks, were apparently 
intended as propaganda to divide Taiwan's president from his party, and 
create an impression of goodwill in advance of our president's visit.
  Shortly after Qian's remarks, China's Vice Foreign Minister Li Zhao-
xing firmly repeated China's demand that Taiwan accept China's view of 
"one China" before it would negotiate with Taiwan's duly elected 
democratic government. He suggested how Qian's remarks did not 
represent a major softening of China's position and demand for eventual 
reunification. He further noted how Taiwan would be the most important 
topic of our Bush's visit.
  China's overtures to Taiwan need to be understood in the context of 
its United Front strategy seeking to isolate Taiwan, and divide 
Taiwan's ruling DPP party by playing on the economic interests of DPP 
members who may have business relations with China. In addition, China 
is continuing to entice Taiwan to invest in it, seeking economic and 
technological growth.
  In his February Senate testimony, Mr. Tenet warned how China's arms 
buildup directed at Taiwan represented an increasing risk to the United 
States. What may not be as apparent is how China's buildup of 
intermediate and long-range ballistic missiles, including the road-
mobile, solid-fuel DF-31 ICBM, threaten the United States and U.S. 
forces in the Pacific.
  These intermediate and long-range ballistic missiles form part of 
China's Long Wall Project as explained by the Taipei Times in May 2001:

       The Long Wall Project is aimed at the US, not Taiwan. The 
     Chinese military leadership plans to put longer-range 
     ballistic missiles in the southwestern provinces so that they 
     can cover US military targets in the Pacific . . .
       They can fire, for instance, a Dong Feng-31 at a US navy 
     battle group shortly after the group leaves its base in 
     Hawaii. The Long Wall Project is basically a deterrent 
     against the US' fighting forces in the Pacific . . .

  While the use of ballistic missiles against U.S. naval vessels may 
seem implausible, it forms part of China's asymmetrical military 
strategy, seeking to counter U.S. strengths by exploiting its 
vulnerabilities. Moreover, it is feasible as should be realized by the 
accuracies the United States obtained from its Pershing II 
intermediate-range ballistic missile equipped with a radar-guided 
terminal seeker.
  The United States has no defense against DF-31 ICBM. The U.S. Navy 
has no defense against the DF-31, nor does it have any defense against 
China's short and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, which can 
threaten American forces and bases in the Far East and Pacific.
  China's probable attainment of an operational capability with its DF-
31 ICBM by the end of December 2001, and its probable deployment of the 
DF-31 at two or more base in 2001 should be of grave concern to the 
United States.
  China recognizes how the United States and its armed forces are 
undefended from ballistic missiles, with the exception of the short-
range Patriot, which is inadequate against intermediate and long-range 
ballistic missiles. China plans to exploit this weakness with a maximum 
of surprise.
  To support its use of ballistic missiles in conventional warfare, 
even against ships, China has not only developed accurate ballistic 
missiles, it is building reconnaissance satellites. These satellites 
include the Ziyuan-1 and Ziyuan-2 earth resource satellites believed to 
be for observingforeign military forces. The ZY-2, launched on 
September 1, 2000, is credited with a photographic resolution of about 
nine feet. Other reconnaissance satellites include the Haiyang-1 (HY-1) 
ocean color surveillance satellite expected to be launched by June 
2002, and its follow on Haiyang-2 (HY-2).
  Accurate ballistic missiles and the ability observe U.S. forces from 
space will give China the potential ability to attack U.S. ships at sea 
and in port. This capability is being enhanced by China's development 
of an integrated command and control system called Qu Dian, which 
relies on its Feng Huo-1 military communications satellite launched on 
January 26, 2000. Qu Dian, considered a major force multiplier, is 
similar to the U.S. Joint Tactical Information Distribution System, or 
JTIDS, and boasts a secure, jam-resistant, high capacity data link 
communication system for use in tactical combat. In addition to its 
potential use GPS and Glossnas satellite navigation, has developed its 
won Beidou navigation satellites.
  Along with a integrated command and control system, China's 
improvements in inertial and satellite-aided navigation of ballistic 
missiles with potential breakthroughs in ballistic missile terminal 
guidance will give it a new form of precision attack, faster than 
relying of cruise missiles or aircraft.
  The effect of China's ballistic missiles delivering a surprise blow 
must not be underemphasized. This type of attack, capable of being 
carried out with non-nuclear warheads, represents a new form of 
conventional warfare for the 21st century. Such an attack could occur 
in an hour. It could not only result in a major loss of U.S. military 
strength, It could create a sudden tide of momentum for China's regular 
forces to successfully challenge the United States.
  The only comparison would be the German blitzkrieg unleashed against 
France in 1940. U.S. forces would be unlikely to respond in an 
effective manner, especially as the United States has not taken 
vigorous steps to counter its vulnerability to ballistic missiles.
  The January 2002 CIA Report on Foreign Ballistic Missile Threats and 
Developments noted the transforming effect of China's ballistic missile 
forces as applied to its buildup of short-range ballistic missiles near 

       China's leaders calculate that conventionally armed 
     ballistic missiles add a potent new dimension to Chinese 
     military capabilities, and they are committed to continue 
     fielding them at a rapid pace. Beijing's growing short-range 
     ballistic missile force provides China with a military 
     capability that avoids the political and practical 
     constraints associated with the use of nuclear-armed 
     missiles. The latest Chinese SRBMs provide a survivable and 
     effective conventional strike force and expand conventional 
     ballistic missile coverage.

  This transformation applies to China's intermediate and long-range 
ballistic missiles as well, providing China with a capability for 
threatening the United States and its armed forces.
  This development of China's military strategy was noted in the June 
2000 Department of Defense Report on China's military power:

       Chinese strategists believe that if a war against a 
     technologically superior foe breaks

[[Page E361]]

     out, the enemy likely will deploy forces rapidly and then 
     launch a massive air campaign. While the enemy is assembling 
     its forces, there exists a window of opportunity for pre-
     emptive strike. This approach--"gaining the initiative by 
     striking first"--is viewed as an effective method to offset 
     or negate the advantages possessed by a more advanced 
     military foe.

  The only possible defense against China's ballistic missile threat is 
a strong and effective U.S. ballistic missile defense. This defense, to 
be effective against China's development of decoys, multiple warheads, 
and other countermeasures, needs to focus on the deployment of a space-
based defense building on the research and development conducted under 
the Strategic Defense Initiative during the Reagan administration and 
his successor's administration.
  The advantages of a space-based ballistic missile defense include 
global coverage, boost phase interception, and multiple opportunities 
for intercepting a ballistic missile. These advantages are not inherent 
with a ground-based interceptor defense, which is currently under 
development, which will have limited coverage, no opportunity for boost 
phase defense, and fewer opportunities for intercepting a missile.
  Space-based defenses such as the Brilliant Pebbles space-based 
interceptor and Space Based Laser were shown to be technologically 
feasible a decade ago, but their programs were either terminated or 
cutback because of intense political opposition from Congress during 
your father's administration, or because of opposition from President 
Clinton who cutback U.S. missile defense programs, especially for 
space-based defenses like Brilliant Pebbles, which he terminated in 
  Mr. Speaker, our President's decision to withdraw from the obsolete 
and violated 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty should have opened the 
door for the United States to build the most effective ballistic 
missile defense possible using space as that treaty was especially 
intended to cutback advanced U.S. ballistic missile defense programs 
employing space-based defenses such as lasers or interceptors.
  In this respect, the amendment by Congress at the end of 2001 that 
reduced funding for space-based defenses, and cut the Space Based Laser 
program for fiscal year 2002 from $170 million to $50 million must be 
viewed in a shameful light, a case of seeking an inferior defense at 
greater cost.
  The failure of the Missile Defense Agency to pursue space-based 
defenses and emphasize their value to Congress is inexcusable. These 
defenses are not far off into the future. They were shown to be 
technologically feasible years ago.
  In March 2002 China increase its official defense budget by 17.6 
percent. This follows a 17.7 percent increase in 2001. These increases 
follow its five-year plan increasing its stated defense budget 15-20 
percent annually. China's actual defense budget has been estimated at 
three to five times the size of its official budget. These increases 
are aimed at the United States. China is modernizing its forces to a 
high-tech military deploying accurate ballistic missiles as the edge of 
its military transformation.
  In contrast, the United States is only beginning to rebuild its 
military after a protracted decline lasting more than a decade, and 
this year's increase is largely attributable to housekeeping matters 
rather than an effort to modernize U.S. forces, or research and 
development, or the acquisition of a space-based ballistic missile 
  The United States must recognize the peril it faces from China's 
transformational military strategy built around the ballistic missile, 
a transformation that can be seen in its DF-31 ICBM apparently aimed at 
U.S. forces.
  Mr. Speaker, such an attack from China directed at U.S. forces could 
come before the end of this year. I would strongly urge you and our 
colleagues to take immediate action to overcome our vulnerability and 
include steps toward the support of a space-based ballistic missile 
  Mr. Speaker, I hereby submit for the Record various sources 
supporting my remarks.
  Mr. Speaker, I have also submitted these identical observations and 
conclusions to the President by letter which I have posted today.

                              Works Cited

       1. Mike Allen and Philip P. Pan, "Bush Begins China Visit; 
     No Accord On Weapons," Washington, Post, February 21, 2002.
       2. David E. Sanger, "China Is Treated More Gently Than 
     North Korea for Same Sin," New York Times, February 21, 
       3. Mike Allen, "Powell Says China's Sale of Arms 
     Technology Still Hinder Relations," Washington Post, 
     February 23, 2002.
       4. Charles Snyder, "CIA director warns US of China 
     threat," Taipei Times, February 8, 2002.
       5. John Gittings, "Bush tells China that he will defend 
     Taiwan," Guardian, February 23, 2002.
       6. Tung Li-wen, "China's new propaganda strategy," Taipei 
     Times, February 9, 2002.
       7. Charles Snyder, "Taiwan at top of Sino-US agenda," 
     Taipei Times, February 6, 2002.
       8. Monique Chu, "Taiwan welcomes Bush's comments," Taipei 
     Times, February 22, 2002.
       9. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "Trade Ties Taiwan to China's 
     Leash,", January 29, 2002.
       10. AP, "Chinese Ponder Bush Statements," Las Vegas Sun, 
     February 22, 2002.
       11. Brian Hsu, "China builds new missile platforms to 
     deter US forces," Taipei Times, May 7, 2001.
       12. National Intelligence Council (CIA), Foreign Missile 
     Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United 
     States Through 2015, January 2002, p. 10.
       13. "China's Spacecraft," Space Today Online, August 
       14. Wei Long, "Ambitious Space Effort Challenges China In 
     Next Five Years,", September 18, 2001.
       15. AP, "China Launches Observation Satellite," September 
     1, 2000.
       16. Bill Gertz, "China's Military Links Forces to Boost 
     Power," Washington Times, March 16, 2000.
       17. Mark A. Stokes, "Space, Theater Missiles, and 
     Electronic Warfare: Emerging Force Multipliers for the PLA 
     Aerospace Campaign," October 26-27, 2000.
       18. Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military 
     Power of the People's Republic of China, June 2000, p. 8.
       19. Bill Gertz, "China Ready to Deploy its First Mobile 
     ICMBs," Washington Times, September 6, 2001.
       20. AP, "China Space Test Has Military Role," November 
     22, 1999.
       21. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "China's Military Set for Budget 
     Boost,", February 8, 2002.
       22. John Pomfret, "China Raises Defense Budget Again," 
     Washington Post, March 5, 2002.