Congressional Record: March 14, 2002 (Extensions)
Page E360-E361
REMARKS ON CHINA
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HON. BOB SCHAFFER
of colorado
in the house of representatives
Thursday, March 14, 2002
Mr. SCHAFFER. Mr. Speaker, our government's consideration of China as
a force for peace among its neighbors is impossible to substantiate and
is overwhelmingly refuted by the facts. Our own good intentions are not
sufficient to overcome the fact that China is a force for war, building
up its military strength in warlike preparations aimed at its Asian
neighbors such as Taiwan, and extending to the United States.
Policies of engagement with China do not excuse a lack of diligence
by the United States over China's ballistic missile threat and arms
buildup, as well as its failure to abide by non-proliferation
agreements such as the one it signed in November 2000 to halt the sale
of ballistic missiles and technology for the delivery of weapons of
mass destruction.
In February 2002 Secretary of State Colin Powell noted how China's
proliferation of ballistic missiles remained "an irritation in the
relationship" between it and the United States. This irritation
understates China's reliance on ballistic missiles as a key component
of its military power, including their use as precision weapons capable
of deep penetration without the delivery of weapons of mass
destruction--conventional warfare.
In February 2002 CIA Director George Tenet, in testimony before the
U.S. Senate, warned about China's increasing military power, saying,
Over the past year, Beijing's military training exercises
have taken on an increasingly real-world focus, emphasizing
rigorous practice in operational capabilities and improving
the military's actual ability to use force.
Mr. Tenet added,
This is aimed not only at Taiwan but also at increasing the
risk to the United Stats itself in any future Taiwan
contingency. China also continues to upgrade and expand the
conventional short-range ballistic missile force it has
arrayed against Taiwan.
Mr. Tenet noted the link between China's threat to Taiwan and its
threat to the United States.
I believe this House and our nation's president recognize the link
between China's threat to Taiwan and the United States. In his
question-and-answer session with Chinese students at Qinghua University
in Beijing, when asked why he did not use the term "reunification"
with China and Taiwan, President George W. Bush responded by referring
to the Taiwan Relations Act, "which says we will help Taiwan defend
herself if provoked."
The United States must be wary of China's subtle rhetoric. The PLA
understands only one language--the language of military strength to
force one's will upon another, just as communism was forced on China
through the barrel of a gun as stated by Mao Zedung. While China may
cloak its intent in soft words of diplomacy, in 1995 and 1996 it
launched ballistic missiles off the coast of Taiwan in a show of force
to intimidate it and the Far East.
China's diplomatic overtures to Taiwan lack sincerity. Vice Premier
Qian Qichen's remarks on Taiwan in January 2002, supposedly extending
goodwill to Taiwan and interest in holding talks, were apparently
intended as propaganda to divide Taiwan's president from his party, and
create an impression of goodwill in advance of our president's visit.
Shortly after Qian's remarks, China's Vice Foreign Minister Li Zhao-
xing firmly repeated China's demand that Taiwan accept China's view of
"one China" before it would negotiate with Taiwan's duly elected
democratic government. He suggested how Qian's remarks did not
represent a major softening of China's position and demand for eventual
reunification. He further noted how Taiwan would be the most important
topic of our Bush's visit.
China's overtures to Taiwan need to be understood in the context of
its United Front strategy seeking to isolate Taiwan, and divide
Taiwan's ruling DPP party by playing on the economic interests of DPP
members who may have business relations with China. In addition, China
is continuing to entice Taiwan to invest in it, seeking economic and
technological growth.
In his February Senate testimony, Mr. Tenet warned how China's arms
buildup directed at Taiwan represented an increasing risk to the United
States. What may not be as apparent is how China's buildup of
intermediate and long-range ballistic missiles, including the road-
mobile, solid-fuel DF-31 ICBM, threaten the United States and U.S.
forces in the Pacific.
These intermediate and long-range ballistic missiles form part of
China's Long Wall Project as explained by the Taipei Times in May 2001:
The Long Wall Project is aimed at the US, not Taiwan. The
Chinese military leadership plans to put longer-range
ballistic missiles in the southwestern provinces so that they
can cover US military targets in the Pacific . . .
They can fire, for instance, a Dong Feng-31 at a US navy
battle group shortly after the group leaves its base in
Hawaii. The Long Wall Project is basically a deterrent
against the US' fighting forces in the Pacific . . .
While the use of ballistic missiles against U.S. naval vessels may
seem implausible, it forms part of China's asymmetrical military
strategy, seeking to counter U.S. strengths by exploiting its
vulnerabilities. Moreover, it is feasible as should be realized by the
accuracies the United States obtained from its Pershing II
intermediate-range ballistic missile equipped with a radar-guided
terminal seeker.
The United States has no defense against DF-31 ICBM. The U.S. Navy
has no defense against the DF-31, nor does it have any defense against
China's short and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, which can
threaten American forces and bases in the Far East and Pacific.
China's probable attainment of an operational capability with its DF-
31 ICBM by the end of December 2001, and its probable deployment of the
DF-31 at two or more base in 2001 should be of grave concern to the
United States.
China recognizes how the United States and its armed forces are
undefended from ballistic missiles, with the exception of the short-
range Patriot, which is inadequate against intermediate and long-range
ballistic missiles. China plans to exploit this weakness with a maximum
of surprise.
To support its use of ballistic missiles in conventional warfare,
even against ships, China has not only developed accurate ballistic
missiles, it is building reconnaissance satellites. These satellites
include the Ziyuan-1 and Ziyuan-2 earth resource satellites believed to
be for observingforeign military forces. The ZY-2, launched on
September 1, 2000, is credited with a photographic resolution of about
nine feet. Other reconnaissance satellites include the Haiyang-1 (HY-1)
ocean color surveillance satellite expected to be launched by June
2002, and its follow on Haiyang-2 (HY-2).
Accurate ballistic missiles and the ability observe U.S. forces from
space will give China the potential ability to attack U.S. ships at sea
and in port. This capability is being enhanced by China's development
of an integrated command and control system called Qu Dian, which
relies on its Feng Huo-1 military communications satellite launched on
January 26, 2000. Qu Dian, considered a major force multiplier, is
similar to the U.S. Joint Tactical Information Distribution System, or
JTIDS, and boasts a secure, jam-resistant, high capacity data link
communication system for use in tactical combat. In addition to its
potential use GPS and Glossnas satellite navigation, has developed its
won Beidou navigation satellites.
Along with a integrated command and control system, China's
improvements in inertial and satellite-aided navigation of ballistic
missiles with potential breakthroughs in ballistic missile terminal
guidance will give it a new form of precision attack, faster than
relying of cruise missiles or aircraft.
The effect of China's ballistic missiles delivering a surprise blow
must not be underemphasized. This type of attack, capable of being
carried out with non-nuclear warheads, represents a new form of
conventional warfare for the 21st century. Such an attack could occur
in an hour. It could not only result in a major loss of U.S. military
strength, It could create a sudden tide of momentum for China's regular
forces to successfully challenge the United States.
The only comparison would be the German blitzkrieg unleashed against
France in 1940. U.S. forces would be unlikely to respond in an
effective manner, especially as the United States has not taken
vigorous steps to counter its vulnerability to ballistic missiles.
The January 2002 CIA Report on Foreign Ballistic Missile Threats and
Developments noted the transforming effect of China's ballistic missile
forces as applied to its buildup of short-range ballistic missiles near
Taiwan:
China's leaders calculate that conventionally armed
ballistic missiles add a potent new dimension to Chinese
military capabilities, and they are committed to continue
fielding them at a rapid pace. Beijing's growing short-range
ballistic missile force provides China with a military
capability that avoids the political and practical
constraints associated with the use of nuclear-armed
missiles. The latest Chinese SRBMs provide a survivable and
effective conventional strike force and expand conventional
ballistic missile coverage.
This transformation applies to China's intermediate and long-range
ballistic missiles as well, providing China with a capability for
threatening the United States and its armed forces.
This development of China's military strategy was noted in the June
2000 Department of Defense Report on China's military power:
Chinese strategists believe that if a war against a
technologically superior foe breaks
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out, the enemy likely will deploy forces rapidly and then
launch a massive air campaign. While the enemy is assembling
its forces, there exists a window of opportunity for pre-
emptive strike. This approach--"gaining the initiative by
striking first"--is viewed as an effective method to offset
or negate the advantages possessed by a more advanced
military foe.
The only possible defense against China's ballistic missile threat is
a strong and effective U.S. ballistic missile defense. This defense, to
be effective against China's development of decoys, multiple warheads,
and other countermeasures, needs to focus on the deployment of a space-
based defense building on the research and development conducted under
the Strategic Defense Initiative during the Reagan administration and
his successor's administration.
The advantages of a space-based ballistic missile defense include
global coverage, boost phase interception, and multiple opportunities
for intercepting a ballistic missile. These advantages are not inherent
with a ground-based interceptor defense, which is currently under
development, which will have limited coverage, no opportunity for boost
phase defense, and fewer opportunities for intercepting a missile.
Space-based defenses such as the Brilliant Pebbles space-based
interceptor and Space Based Laser were shown to be technologically
feasible a decade ago, but their programs were either terminated or
cutback because of intense political opposition from Congress during
your father's administration, or because of opposition from President
Clinton who cutback U.S. missile defense programs, especially for
space-based defenses like Brilliant Pebbles, which he terminated in
1993.
Mr. Speaker, our President's decision to withdraw from the obsolete
and violated 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty should have opened the
door for the United States to build the most effective ballistic
missile defense possible using space as that treaty was especially
intended to cutback advanced U.S. ballistic missile defense programs
employing space-based defenses such as lasers or interceptors.
In this respect, the amendment by Congress at the end of 2001 that
reduced funding for space-based defenses, and cut the Space Based Laser
program for fiscal year 2002 from $170 million to $50 million must be
viewed in a shameful light, a case of seeking an inferior defense at
greater cost.
The failure of the Missile Defense Agency to pursue space-based
defenses and emphasize their value to Congress is inexcusable. These
defenses are not far off into the future. They were shown to be
technologically feasible years ago.
In March 2002 China increase its official defense budget by 17.6
percent. This follows a 17.7 percent increase in 2001. These increases
follow its five-year plan increasing its stated defense budget 15-20
percent annually. China's actual defense budget has been estimated at
three to five times the size of its official budget. These increases
are aimed at the United States. China is modernizing its forces to a
high-tech military deploying accurate ballistic missiles as the edge of
its military transformation.
In contrast, the United States is only beginning to rebuild its
military after a protracted decline lasting more than a decade, and
this year's increase is largely attributable to housekeeping matters
rather than an effort to modernize U.S. forces, or research and
development, or the acquisition of a space-based ballistic missile
defense.
The United States must recognize the peril it faces from China's
transformational military strategy built around the ballistic missile,
a transformation that can be seen in its DF-31 ICBM apparently aimed at
U.S. forces.
Mr. Speaker, such an attack from China directed at U.S. forces could
come before the end of this year. I would strongly urge you and our
colleagues to take immediate action to overcome our vulnerability and
include steps toward the support of a space-based ballistic missile
defense.
Mr. Speaker, I hereby submit for the Record various sources
supporting my remarks.
Mr. Speaker, I have also submitted these identical observations and
conclusions to the President by letter which I have posted today.
Works Cited
1. Mike Allen and Philip P. Pan, "Bush Begins China Visit;
No Accord On Weapons," Washington, Post, February 21, 2002.
2. David E. Sanger, "China Is Treated More Gently Than
North Korea for Same Sin," New York Times, February 21,
2002.
3. Mike Allen, "Powell Says China's Sale of Arms
Technology Still Hinder Relations," Washington Post,
February 23, 2002.
4. Charles Snyder, "CIA director warns US of China
threat," Taipei Times, February 8, 2002.
5. John Gittings, "Bush tells China that he will defend
Taiwan," Guardian, February 23, 2002.
6. Tung Li-wen, "China's new propaganda strategy," Taipei
Times, February 9, 2002.
7. Charles Snyder, "Taiwan at top of Sino-US agenda,"
Taipei Times, February 6, 2002.
8. Monique Chu, "Taiwan welcomes Bush's comments," Taipei
Times, February 22, 2002.
9. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "Trade Ties Taiwan to China's
Leash," CNN.com, January 29, 2002.
10. AP, "Chinese Ponder Bush Statements," Las Vegas Sun,
February 22, 2002.
11. Brian Hsu, "China builds new missile platforms to
deter US forces," Taipei Times, May 7, 2001.
12. National Intelligence Council (CIA), Foreign Missile
Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United
States Through 2015, January 2002, p. 10.
13. "China's Spacecraft," Space Today Online, August
2001.
14. Wei Long, "Ambitious Space Effort Challenges China In
Next Five Years," SpaceDaily.com, September 18, 2001.
15. AP, "China Launches Observation Satellite," September
1, 2000.
16. Bill Gertz, "China's Military Links Forces to Boost
Power," Washington Times, March 16, 2000.
17. Mark A. Stokes, "Space, Theater Missiles, and
Electronic Warfare: Emerging Force Multipliers for the PLA
Aerospace Campaign," October 26-27, 2000.
18. Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military
Power of the People's Republic of China, June 2000, p. 8.
19. Bill Gertz, "China Ready to Deploy its First Mobile
ICMBs," Washington Times, September 6, 2001.
20. AP, "China Space Test Has Military Role," November
22, 1999.
21. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "China's Military Set for Budget
Boost," CNN.com, February 8, 2002.
22. John Pomfret, "China Raises Defense Budget Again,"
Washington Post, March 5, 2002.
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