Congressional Record: February 28, 2002 (Extensions)
Page E242
CHINA'S LONG-RANGE MISSILE PROGRAM
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HON. BOB SCHAFFER
of colorado
in the house of representatives
Thursday, February 28, 2002
Mr. SCHAFFER. Mr. Speaker, on several occasions I have addressed this
House on the matter of National Security and the threat to it posed by
China's aggressive arms buildup. Particularly, with regard to China's
long-range missile program, America's vulnerability is growing, not
shrinking.
While I applaud the leadership of our President to advance a national
missile defense program, Congress must rely upon complete, accurate,
and candid assessments of the threat posed by China, or any other
nation. Without such candid assessments, Americans are burdened by
excessive risk.
I hereby submit for the Record, a letter I have today posted to Mr.
George Tenant, who heads America's Central Intelligence Agency. I urge
each of our colleagues to review this letter and respond to its
contents or reinforce its sentiments to the Director, and to the
President.
Mr. Speaker, I respectfully submit the following for the Record.
Dear Mr. Tenet: Last month, your agency produced the
assessment of China's ballistic missile threat to the United
States in the unclassified summary of the January 2002
National Intelligence Estimate "Foreign Missile Developments
and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015." The lack of
attention to the pronounced and growing danger caused by
China's ballistic missile buildup, and its aggressive
strategy for using its ballistic missiles cannot go
unchallenged. The report is misleading, and, because it
understates the magnitude of threat, is profoundly dangerous.
Perhaps the unclassified National Intelligence Estimate was
meant to conceal from foreign eyes what the CIA really thinks
or knows. But this government has a duty to defend the lives
and freedom of its citizens. A large part of that defense is
informing the American people of the threats they face rather
than downplaying, for example, China's ballistic missile and
military buildup.
In this regard, I protest the inferior quality and lack of
information compared to Department of Defense reports such as
the Soviet Military Power series initiated by Secretary of
Defense Caspar Weinberger in the 1980's, which addressed the
Soviet military threat in detail, providing numbers of
missile, bombers, and warheads, and location of forces.
Your report is an issue because China has focused on a
buildup of ballistic missiles to defeat the United States. In
addition to its ballistic missile and information warfare
buildup, you yourself have noted the threat posed by China's
growing anti-satellite capabilities. China is engaged in
economic and surrogate terrorism, and diplomatic initiatives
using its mouth to promise friendship while preparing for
war. America needs to be informed and warned.
Without adequate intelligence about the ballistic missile
threat, or the courage to act on the intelligence it has, the
United States will not be able to defend itself. President
Bush's proposed defense budget understates the need to
accelerate ballistic missile defense programs, and emphasizes
a poor design for a ballistic missile defense using
groundbased defenses over space-based defenses that can
provide boost phase interception, global coverage, and
multiple opportunities for interception.
One point is how China's program for multiple reentry
vehicles for its road-mobile ICBMs and SLBMs is
"encountering significant technical hurdles and would be
costly," giving an impression that China may not develop a
MIRV capability, at least in the near future.
In contrast, in 1999 defense analyst Richard D. Fisher,
Jr., could convincingly write, "Both the DF-31 and DF-41
ICBMs are expected to incorporate multiple independently
targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) warheads." Fisher further
noted China has been suspected of trying to develop MIRVs for
years, and that in 1998 Air force General Eugene Harbinger
said China is developing MIRVs for its ICBMs. One would
suspect that China would have made some progress since
Fisher's analysis in 1999, especially given technological
assistance from the United States and Russia. In January 2002
Fisher noted the CIA report appeared to be too low in its
estimates of China's threat.
On the issue of MIRVs, the report appears to understate how
China's spy and intelligence gathering program, highlighted
by the 1999 Congressional Cox Committee report, was focused
on obtaining information on U.S. nuclear warheads and
ballistic missile technology, which makes extensive use of
MIRVs. In addition to U.S. missile, nuclear warhead, and
satellite technology that could be used for MIRVs, China has
obtained considerable technological help from Russia. China
is one of Russia's largest arms customers and has signed a
strategic partnership with it. Russia has perfected the
technology for multiple warheads in its advanced rail and
road-mobile ICBMs--the SS-24 and SS-27 Topol-M, and
reportedly transferred to China SS-18 technology that would
presumably include MIRV technology as the SS-18 was designed
to carry 10 nuclear warheads, and could be fitted with even
more.
Of surprise is the CIA statement that "China could begin
deploying the DF-31 ICBM during the first half of the
decade." In contrast to the uncertainties contained in the
CIA report, in May 2001 Taipei Times defense reporter Brian
Hsu noted China has built two bases for housing the DF-31 and
plans to build more. It would be very reasonable to assume
that these bases house DF-31s. In addition, according to a
story by Washington Times reporter Bill Gertz, China was
expected to obtain an operational capability for the DF-31 by
the end of 2001, before the release of the CIA report.
If China's deployment of the DF-31 ICBM follows its pattern
of deploying short-range road-mobile ballistic missiles over
a number of bases as it has done with its ballistic missile
buildup aimed at Taiwan, the United States should expect
China to deploy the DF-31 over more than two bases to blunt
the effect of any potential counterattacks or preemptive
strikes.
The CIA report, rather than telling the American people how
China is taking steps to deploy the DF-31 and apparently has
achieved an operational capability, is content to word its
analysis as a possibility. In addition, it overlooks why
China is building the DF-31--its ballistic missile strategy.
The Taipei Times noted that China's buildup of the DF-31 is
part of its "Long Wall Project" that "is aimed at the US,
not Taiwan," and said that "The Chinese military leadership
plans to put longer-range ballistic missiles in the
southeastern provinces so that they can cover US military
targets in the Pacific."
The CIA report, moreover, appears remiss with respect to
China's buildup of intermediate-range ballistic missiles such
as the DF-21-X and DF-25, which can attack U.S. forces and
bases in the Far East and Pacific. The report also projects
that by 2005 China will have a force of short-range ballistic
missiles that will number "several hundred missiles." Yet,
throughout 2000 and 2001 China was reported as having massed
300-350 short-range ballistic missiles against Taiwan in a
number of news accounts, and increased production to more
than 50 per year. China already has an arsenal exceeding
"several hundred missiles."
China's view on using its long-range ballistic missiles is
very aggressive. It does not believe in a "balance of
power" dictated by equal numbers of missiles or nuclear
warheads. Rather, according to one Chinese analyst, China
believes that "It is not necessary for China to seek a
nuclear balance with the US. If we have the capacity to
launch a nuclear counterattack, there will be no difference
between 10 and 10,000 nuclear warheads." This same view
appeared in an August 1999 planning document of China's
Central Military Commission headed by President Jiang Zemin.
In May 2000, the late Congressman Floyd Spence, quoting the
Liberation Army Daily, noted that China "is a country that
has certain abilities of launching a strategic counterattack
and the capacity of launching a long-distance strike . . .
It is not a wise move to be at war with a country such as
China, a point which the U.S. policymakers know fairly well
also." In 1995 PLA General Xiong Guangkai issued a similar
threat.
China has used its ballistic missiles to intimidate, seen
in its launch of ballistic missiles off Taiwan in 1995 and
1996. While the diplomatic failure which occurred resulted in
the tempering of its diplomacy, the fact that China has
changed its diplomatic tactics toward Taiwan and the United
States should not obscure its strategy for using its
ballistic missiles for aggression. China's words of
friendship are a mask for its ballistic missile and military
buildup.
American should be concerned with its defense. The
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 showed what can
happen with a lack of vigilance. The United States needs to
realize that China is engaged in a military and ballistic
missile buildup pointed at Americans. We must take the
necessary steps to defend our citizens, and we should build a
space-based ballistic missile defense. We must have better
information about China's ballistic missile threat.
Regrettably, your report on this matter is insufficient.
Very truly yours,
Bob Schaffer,
Member of Congress from Colorado.
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