107th Congress S. Prt.
COMMITTEE PRINT
1st Session 107-43
_________________________________________________________________________
STRATEGIES FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE
__________
A COMPILATION
BY THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota BILL FRIST, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
Virginia
Edwin K. Hall, Staff Director
Patricia A. McNerney, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, Letter of Transmittal to the
United States Senate........................................... v
"Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism,"
Executive Summary from the report of the National Commission on
Terrorism, June 5, 2000........................................ 1
"Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change," the
Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/
21st Century, Excerpt on "Securing the National Homeland,"
February 15, 2001.............................................. 17
"A Report Card on the Department of Energy's Nonproliferation
Programs With Russia," Executive Summary, by Howard Baker and
Lloyd Cutler, Co-Chairs, Russia Task Force, the Secretary of
Energy Advisory Board, January 10, 2001........................ 41
"The Threat of Bioterrorism and the Natural Spread of Infectious
Diseases," U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
hearing of September 5, 2001 55
Nunn, Sam, former United States Senator, Co-Chairman of the
Nuclear Threat Initiative, prepared statement............ 57
Henderson, Dr. Donald A., MD, MPH, director, Center for
Civilian Biodefense Studies, Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, MD, prepared statement........................ 69
"Report of the Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy
Bombings in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam," January 1999.
Executive Overview............................................. 77
"First Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for
Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction: I. Assessing
the Threat," December 15, 1999. Executive Summary............. 89
"Second Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for
Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction: II. Toward a
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism," December 15, 2000.
Executive Summary.............................................. 99
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC, September 26, 2001.
Dear Colleague:
The tragic and unconscionable attacks of September 11 have
awakened all Americans to the very real threat posed by
international terrorism. As Congress works to ensure that the
awful events of September 11th will never be repeated, it is
instructive for us to review several recent studies of the
issue. In recent years, a number of major commissions and
distinguished witnesses before Congress have highlighted the
emergence of both nation-states and sub-national groups with
the desire and the capability to employ asymmetric means,
including weapons of mass destruction, to strike at the United
States homeland. Their reports and statements have underscored
the real vulnerability of the United States in responding to
such attacks and mitigating their consequences.
The Committee on Foreign Relations has reprinted the
executive summaries and key excerpts from some of the leading
reports on emerging threats to U.S. national security. For your
benefit, I include a brief summary of each of the six reports
included in this Committee reprint:
I. The National Commission on Terrorism (June 2000)
The final report of the National Commission on Terrorism,
chaired by L. Paul Bremer III, declares in no uncertain terms,
"Today's terrorists seek to inflict mass casualties, and they
are attempting to do so both overseas and on American soil.
They are less dependent on state sponsorship and are, instead,
forming loose, transnational affiliations based on religious or
ideological affinity and a common hatred of the United
States."
The National Commission urged the U.S. intelligence and law
enforcement communities to use the full scope of their
authorities to collect information regarding terrorist plans
and attack. Some of the specific measures suggested, including
loosened restrictions on CIA recruitment methods and expanded
electronic surveillance capabilities, are now being considered
in the current environment. It encouraged the United States to
firmly target all states that support terrorists through
diplomatic, financial, economic, and military means, including
the imposition of sanctions on states not fully cooperative
with counter-terrorism efforts.
II. The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century: Excerpt on
Homeland Defense (February 2001)
This commission, known as "Hart-Rudman" after its co-
chairs, former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, concluded
that "attacks against American citizens, possibly causing
heavy casualties, are likely over the next quarter century."
Citing a growing diffusion of technology and an abundance of
actors with grievances against the United States, the Hart-
Rudman commission urged making the security of the American
homeland the primary national security mission of the U.S.
government.
To begin carrying out this mission, the commission
recommends creation of a National Homeland Security Agency to
coordinate all U.S. government activities on homeland defense.
The commission urges the United States to rely on three main
instruments in deterring and defending against threats to the
homeland: (1) diplomacy, (2) the overseas U.S. diplomatic,
intelligence, and military presence, and (3) vigilant border
security and surveillance.
III. A Report Card on the Department of Energy's Non-Proliferation
Programs with Russia ("Baker-Cutler Task Force") (January 2001)
This bipartisan task force called on the President to
quickly formulate a strategic plan to secure and/or neutralize
in the next eight to ten years all nuclear weapons-usable
material located in Russia. To carry out this goal, the task
force suggested that the U.S. government set aside
approximately $30 billion over the next eight to ten years.
Co-chaired by former U.S. Senator Howard Baker and former
White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler, the task force declared that
the most urgent threat facing the United States is the danger
that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material,
i.e., plutonium and highly enriched uranium, could be stolen
and sold to terrorists or hostile nation-states. The task force
concluded that current U.S. government efforts, including the
Nunn-Lugar programs and the Department of Energy nuclear non-
proliferation programs, were on the right track but were
insufficient to meet the enormity of this threat.
IV. Statements by former Senator Sam Nunn and Dr. D.A. Henderson before
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on "The Threat of
Bioterrorism and the Natural Spread of Infectious Diseases" (September
2001)
According to Senator Nunn, "Biological terrorism is one of
our greatest national security threats, and one that cannot be
addressed by Department of Defense standard operating
procedures." Both he and Dr. D.A. Henderson, an architect of
the global campaign to eradicate smallpox more than twenty
years ago, testified before the Committee on Foreign Relations
earlier this month on their participation in "Dark Winter," a
recent exercise simulating the U.S. government's response to a
smallpox attack on three American cities.
Senator Nunn and Dr. Henderson drew a number of lessons
from the Dark Winter exercise. First, the measures we can take
to deter or prevent bioterrorism are cost effective measures in
countering natural epidemics. Second, the United States must
recognize the central role of public health and medicine and
seek to recapitalize our medical infrastructure. These efforts
should include an adequate surge capability to handle
emergencies and a strong surveillance and monitoring network,
both domestic and international, to detect, track, and contain
epidemics and provide evidence of biological weapons attacks.
Third, we should build our national pharmaceutical stockpile to
capacity, including extra production capability for drugs and
vaccines, and increase funding for biomedical research to
develop new medicines and diagnostic tests.
V. Crowe Report on Embassy Security (January 1999)
The Crowe Report called for the appropriation of $1.4
billion per year over ten years to fund capital building
programs, security operations, and personnel to ensure maximum
security at U.S. embassies around the world. The final report
of the Department of State Accountability Review Boards, better
known as the Crowe Report after the former Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff William J. Crowe, examined the August
1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. It
criticized the State Department for an "institutional
failure" in not fully recognizing the threat posed by
transnational terrorism and the particular use of large car
bombs.
VI. The Gilmore Commission: Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response
Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
(December 1999 and December 2000)
The so-called "Gilmore Commission," named for its chair,
Virginia Governor James Gilmore III, recognized terrorism
employing weapons of mass destruction as a serious threat to
homeland defense and focused on the need to improve domestic
capabilities in responding to such attacks. The Gilmore
Commission called upon the U.S. government to develop a viable
strategy on national domestic preparedness plans to combat
terrorism. To carry out this national strategy, the Commission
recommends that the President should establish a National
Office for Combating Terrorism in the Executive Office of the
President. The director of this office, a Senate-confirmed
appointee, would exercise program and budget authority over all
federal efforts to fight terrorism.
Certainly, we should not rush to adopt all of these
recommendations; some of these proposals, under closer
scrutiny, may not advance our objectives in the war on
terrorism. But it is my hope that these reports will help frame
our debate on comprehensive legislation to counter terrorism
and other emerging threats to U.S. national security in coming
weeks and months. I welcome the chance to speak in further
detail with each of you on these critical issues.
Sincerely,
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman.
=======================================================================
COUNTERING THE CHANGING THREAT OF
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
Report of the National Commission on Terrorism
June 5, 2000
=======================================================================
Commission Members and Staff
----------
Commissioners
L. Paul Bremer III, Chairman, is the Managing Director of
Kissinger Associates. During a 23-year career in the
American diplomatic service, Ambassador Bremer served
in Asia, Africa, Europe and Washington, D.C. He was
Ambassador to the Netherlands from 1983 to 1986. From
1986-1989, he served as Ambassador-at-large for
Counter-Terrorism, where he was responsible for
developing and implementing America's global polices to
combat terrorism.
Maurice Sonnenberg, Vice Chairman, is the senior international
advisor to the investment banking firm of Bear, Stearns
& Co. Inc. and the senior international advisor to the
law firm of Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP. He is a
member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board. He recently served as a member of the U.S.
Commission on Reducing and Protecting Government
Secrecy and as the senior advisor to the U.S.
Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S.
Intelligence Community.
Richard K. Betts is Leo A. Shifrin Professor of War and Peace
Studies in the political science department, Director
of the Institute of War and Peace Studies, and Director
of the International Security Policy program in the
School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia
University. He is also Director of National Security
Studies and Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations, and author of Surprise Attack: Lesson for
Defense Planning.
Wayne A. Downing, General, U.S. Army, retired in 1996 after a
34-year career, where he served in a variety of command
assignments in infantry, armored, special operations
and joint units culminating in his appointment as the
Commander-in-Chtef of the U.S. Special Operations
Command. Since retirement, he was appointed to assess
the 1996 terrorist attack on the U.S. base at Khobar
Towers, Saudi Arabia, and to make recommendations to
protect people and facilities world wide from terrorist
attack. General Downing serves on several boards and
panels in both the private and government sectors.
Jane Harmon just completed a year as Regents Professor at
U.C.L.A. where she taught at the Department of
Political Science and Center for International
Relations. Harmon represented California's 36th
Congressional District from 1992-1998 where she served
on the National Security, Science and Intelligence
Committees. Prior government experience includes
Senate Counsel, White House Deputy Cabinet Secretary
and DoD Special Counsel. Harmon is currently seeking
election to her former seat.
Fred C. Ikle is a Distinguished Scholar, Center for Strategic
and International Studies. Dr. Ikle is Chairman of the
Board of Telos Corporation and a Director of the
Zurich-American Insurance Companies and of CMC Energy
Services. Prior to joining the Center, Dr. Ikle served
as Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and Director
for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
Juliette N. Kayyem is an Associate of the Executive Session on
Domestic Preparedness, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University. She writes and teaches
courses on counter-terrorism policy and the law. Ms.
Kayyem has most recently served as a legal advisor to
the Attorney General at the U.S. Department of Justice
and as Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General for
Civil Rights.
John F. Lewis, Jr. is Director of Global Security for Goldman,
Sachs & Co., New York. Previously, he was Assistant
Director-in-Charge of the National Security Division of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Mr. Lewis managed
the FBI's national counterintelligence and
counterterrorism programs. Mr. Lewis has held a variety
of positions, including an appointment as Director of
Intelligence and CI Programs, National Security Staff
and previous Chairman of the International Association
of Chiefs of Police Committee on Terrorism.
Gardner Peckham is Managing Director of the government
relations firm of Block, Kelly, Scruggs & Healey with a
practice focused on international trade, defense and
foreign policy issues. Prior to joining the firm, Mr.
Peckham served as Senior Policy Advisor to the Speaker
of the United States House of Representatives. He also
held several other senior positions in Congress and
during the Bush Administration served as Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs at the U.S.
Department of State and Director for Legislative
Affairs at the National Security Council Staff.
R. James Woolsey is a partner at the law firm of Shea & Gardner
with a practice in the fields of civil litigation,
alternative dispute resolution, and corporate
transactions; he also serves on several corporate
boards. Previous to returning to the firm, Mr. Woolsey
served as Director of Central Intelligence. His U.S.
Government service includes Ambassador to the
Negotiations on CFE, Under Secretary of the Navy, and
General Counsel of the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed
Services. He has served on many Presidential and
Congressional delegations, boards, and commissions.
Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism
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Executive Summary
International terrorism poses an increasingly dangerous and
difficult threat to America. This was underscored by the
December 1999 arrests in Jordan and at the U.S./Canadian border
of foreign nationals who were allgedly planning to attack
crowded millennium celebrations. Today's terrorists seek to
inflict mass casualties, and they are attempting to do so both
overseas and on American soil. They are less dependent on state
sponsorship and are, instead, forming loose, transnational
affiliations based on religious or ideological affinity and a
common hatred of the United States. This makes terrorist
attacks more difficult to detect and prevent.
Countering the growing danger of the terrorist threat
requires significantly stepping up U.S. efforts. The government
must immediately take steps to reinvigorate the collection of
intelligence about terrorists' plans, use all available legal
avenues to disrupt and prosecute terrorist activities and
private sources of support, convince other nations to cease all
support for terrorists, and ensure that federal, state, and
local officials are prepared for attacks that may result in
mass casualties. The Commission has made a number of
recommendations to accomplish these objectives:
Priority one is to prevent terrorist attacks. U.S.
intelligence and law enforcement communities must use the full
scope of their authority to collect intelligence regarding
terrorist plans and methods.
CIA guidelines adopted in 1995 restricting
recruitment of unsavory sources should not apply when
recruiting counterterrorism sources.
The Attorney General should ensure that FBI is
exercising fully its authority for investigating
suspected terrorist groups or individuals, including
authority for electronic surveillance.
Funding for counterterrorism efforts by CIA, NSA,
and FBI must be given higher priority to ensure
continuation of important operational activity and to
close the technology gap that threatens their ability
to collect and exploit terrorist communications.
FBI should establish a cadre of reports officers to
distill and disseminate terrorism-related information
once it is collected.
U.S. policies must firmly target all states that support
terrorists.
Iran and Syria should be kept on the list of state
sponsors until they stop supporting terrorists.
Afghanistan should be designated a sponsor of
terrorism and subjected to all the sanctions applicable
to state sponsors. The President should
impose sanctions on countries that, while not direct
sponsors of terrorism, are nevertheless not cooperating
fully on counterterrorism. Candidates for consideration
include Pakistan ond Greece.
Private sources of financial and logistical support for
terrorists must be subjected to the full force and sweep of
U.S. and international laws.
All relevant agencies should use every available
means, including the full array of criminal, civil, and
administrative sanctions to block or disrupt
nongovernmental sources of support for international
terrorism.
Congress should promptly ratify and implement the
International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism to enhance international
cooperative efforts.
Where criminal prosecution is not possible, the
Attorney General should vigorously pursue the expulsion
of terrorists from the United States through
proceedings which protect both the national security
interest in safeguarding classified evidence and the
right of the accused to challenge that evidence.
A terrorist attack involving a biological agent, deadly
chemicals, or nuclear or radiological material, even if it
succeeds only partially, could profoundly affect the entire
nation. The government must do more to prepare for such an
event.
The President should direct the preparation of a
manual to guide the implementation of existing legal
authority in the event of a catastrophic terrorist
threat or attack. The President and Congress should
determine whether additional legal authority is needed
to deal with catastrophic terrorism.
The Department of Defense must have detailed plans
for its role in the event of a catastrophic terrorist
attack, including criteria for decisions on transfer of
command authority to DoD in extraordinary
circumstances.
Senior officials of all government agencies involved
in responding to a catastrophic terrorism threat or
crisis should be required to participate in national
exercises every year to test capabilities and
coordination.
Congress should make it illegal for anyone not
properly certified to possess certain critical
pathogens and should enact laws to control the transfer
of equipment critical to the development or use of
biological agents.
The President should establish a comprehensive and
coordinated long-term research and development program
for catastrophic terrorism.
The Secretary of State should press for an
international convention to improve multilateral
cooperation on preventing or responding to cyber
attacks by terrorists.
The President and Congress should reform the system for
reviewing and funding departmental counterterrorism programs to
ensure that the activities and programs of various agencies are
part of a comprehensive plan.
The executive branch official responsible for
coordinating counterterrorism efforts across the
government should be given a stronger hand in the
budget process.
Congress should develop mechanisms for a
comprehensive review of the President's
counterterrorism policy and budget.
The International Terrorism Threat is Changing
Who are the international terrorists?
What are their motives and how do they get their
support?
How can we stop them?
The answers to these questions have changed significantly
over the last 25 years. There are dramatically fewer
international terrorist incidents than in the mid-eighties.
Many of the groups that targeted America's interests, friends,
and allies have disappeared. The Soviet bloc, which once
provided support to terrorist groups, no longer exists.
Countries that once excused terrorism now condemn it. This
changed international attitude has led to 12 United Nations
conventions targeting terrorist activity and, more importantly,
growing, practical international cooperation.
However, if most of the world's countries are firmer in
opposing terrorism, some still support terrorists or use
terrorism as an element of state policy. Iran is the clearest
case. The Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Ministry of
Intelligence and Security carry out terrorist activities and
give direction and support to other terrorists. The regimes of
Syria, Sudan, and Afghanistan provide funding, refuge, training
bases, and weapons to terrorists. Libya continues to provide
support to some Palestinian terrorist groups and to harass
expatriate dissidents, and North Korea may still provide
weapons to terrorists. Cuba provides safehaven to a number of
terrorists. Other states allow terrorist groups to operate on
their soil or provide support which, while falling short of
state sponsorship, nonetheless gives terrorists important
assistance.
The terrorist threat is also changing in ways that make it
more dangerous and difficult to counter.
International terrorism once threatened Americans only when
they were outside the country. Today international terrorists
attack us on our own soil. Just before the millennium, an alert
U.S. Customs Service official stopped Ahmad Ressam as he
attempted to enter the United States from Canada--apparently to
conduct a terrorist attack. This fortuitous arrest should not
inspire complacency, however. On an average day, over one
million people enter the United States legally and thousands
more enter illegally. As the World Trade Center bombing
demonstrated, we cannot rely solely on existing border controls
and procedures to keep foreign terrorists out of the United
States.
Terrorist attacks are becoming more lethal. Most terrorist
organizations active in the 1970s and 1980s had clear political
objectives. They tried to calibrate their attacks to produce
just enough bloodshed to get attention for their cause, but not
so much as to alienate public support. Groups like the Irish
Republican Army and the Palestine Liberation Organization often
sought specific political concessions.
Now, a growing percentage of terrorist attacks are designed
to kill as many people as possible. In the 1990s a terrorist
incident was almost 20 percent more likely to result in death
or injury than an incident two decades ago. The World Trade
Center bombing in New York killed six and wounded about 1,000,
but the terrorists' goal was to topple the twin towers, killing
tens of thousands of people. The thwarted attacks against New
York City's infrastructure in 1993--which included plans to
bomb the Lincoln and Holland tunnels--also were intended to
cause mass casualties. In 1995, Philippine authorities
uncovered a terrorist plot to bring down 11 U.S. airliners in
Asia. The circumstances surrounding the millennium border
arrests of foreign nationals suggest that the suspects planned
to target a large group assembled for a New Year's celebration.
Overseas attacks against the United States in recent years have
followed the same trend. The bombs that destroyed the military
barracks in Saudi Arabia and two U.S. Embassies in Africa
inflicted 6,059 casualties. Those arrested in Jordan in late
December had also planned attacks designed to kill large
numbers.
The trend toward higher casualties reflects, in part, the
changing motivation of today's terrorists. Religiously
motivated terrorist groups, such as Usama bin Ladin's group,
al-Qaida, which is believed to have bombed the U.S. Embassies
in Africa, represent a growing trend toward hatred of the
United States. Other terrorist groups are driven by visions of
a post-apocalyptic future or by ethnic hatred. Such groups may
lack a concrete political goal other than to punish their
enemies by killing as many of them as possible, seemingly
without concern about alienating sympathizers. Increasingly,
attacks are less likely to be followed by claims of
responsibility or lists of political demands.
The shift in terrorist motives has contributed to a change
in the way some international terrorist groups are structured,
Because groups based on ideological or religious motives may
lack a specific political or nationalistic agenda, they have
less need for a hierarchical structure. Instead, they can rely
on loose affiliations with like-minded groups from a variety of
countries to support their common cause against the United
States.
Al-Qaida is the best-known transnational terrorist
organization. In addition to pursuing its own terrorist
campaign, it calls on numerous militant groups that share some
of its ideological beliefs to support its violent campaign
against the United States, But neither al-Qaida's extremist
politico-religious beliefs nor its leader, Usama bin Ladin, is
unique. If al-Qaida and Usama bin Ladin were to disappear
tomorrow, the United States would still face potential
terrorist threats from a growing number of groups opposed to
perceived American hegemony. Moreover, new terrorist threats
can suddenly emerge from isolated conspiracies or obscure cults
with no previous history of violence.
These more loosely affiliated, transnational terrorist
networks are difficult to predict, track, and penetrate. They
rely on a variety of sources for funding and logistical
support, including self-financing criminal activities such as
kidnapping, narcotics, and petty crimes. Their networks of
support include both front organizations and legitimate
business and nongovernment organizations. They use the Internet
as an effective communications channel.
Guns and conventional explosives have so far remained the
weapons of choice for most terrorists. Such weapons can cause
many casualties and are relatively easy to acquire and use. But
some terrorist groups now show interest in acquiring the
capability to use chemical, biological, radiological, or
nuclear (CBRN) materials. It is difficult to predict the
likelihood of a CBRN attack, but most experts agree that
today's terrorists are seeking the ability to use such agents
in order to cause mass casualties.
Still, these kinds of weapons and materials confront a non-
state sponsored terrorist group with significant technical
challenges. While lethal chemicals are easy to come by, getting
large quantities and weaponizing them for mass casualties is
difficult, and only nation states have succeeded in doing so.
Biological agents can be acquired in nature or from medical
supply houses, but important aspects of handling and dispersion
are daunting. To date, only nation states have demonstrated the
capability to build radiological and nuclear weapons.
The 1995 release of a chemical agent in the Tokyo subway by
the apocalyptic Aum Shinrikyo group demonstrated the
difficulties that terrorists face in attempting to use CBRN
weapons to produce mass casualties. The group used scores of
highly skilled technicians and spent tens of millions of
dollars developing a chemical attack that killed fewer people
than conventional explosives could have. The same group failed
totally in a separate attempt to launch an anthrax attack in
Tokyo.
However, if the terrorists' goal is to challenge
significantly Americans' sense of safety and confidence, even a
small CBRN attack could be successful.
Moreover, terrorists could acquire more deadly CBRN
capabilities from a state. Five of the seven nations the United
States identifies as state sponsors of terrorism have programs
to develop weapons of mass destruction. A state that knowingly
provides agents of mass destruction or technology to a
terrorist group should worry about losing control of the
terrorists' activities and, if the weaoons could be traced back
to that state, the near certainty of massive retaliation.
However, it is always difficult and sometimes dangerous to
attempt to predict the actions of a state. Moreover, a state in
chaos, or elements within such a state, might run these risks,
especially if the United States were engaged in military
conflict with that state or if the United States were
distracted by a major conflict in another area of the world.
The Commission was particularly concerned about the
persistent lack of adequate security and safeguards for the
nuclear material in the former Soviet Union (FSU). A Center for
Strategic International Studies panel chaired by former Senator
Sam Nunn concluded that, despite a decade of effort, the risk
of "loose nukes" is greater than ever. Another ominous
warning was given in 1995 when Chechen rebels, many of whom
fight side-by-side with Islamic terrorists from bin Ladin's
camps sympathetic to the Chechen cause, placed radioactive
material in a Moscow park.
Cyber attacks are often considered in the same context with
CBRN. Respectable experts have published sobering scenarios
about the potential impact of a successful cyber attack on the
United States. Already, hackers and criminals have exploited
some of our vulnerabilities.
Certainly, terrorists are making extensive use of the new
information technologies, and a conventional terrorist attack
along with a coordinated cyber attack could exponentially
compound the damage. While the Commission considers cyber
security a matter of grave importance, it also notes that the
measures needed to protect the United States from cyber attack
by terrorists are largely identical to those necessary to
protect us from such an attack by a hostile foreign country,
criminals, or vandals.
Not all terrorists are the same, but the groups most
dangerous to the United States share some characteristics not
seen 10 or 20 years ago:
They operate in the United States as well as abroad.
Their funding and logistical networks cross borders,
are less dependent on state sponsors, and are harder to
disrupt with economic sanctions.
They make use of widely available technologies to
communicate quickly and securely.
Their objectives are more deadly.
This changing nature of the terrorist threat raises the
stakes in getting American counterterrorist policies and
practices right.
Good Intelligence is the Best Weapon Against International Terrorism
Obtaining information about the identity, goals, plans, and
vulnerabilities of terrorists is extremely difficult. Yet, no
other single policy effort is more important for preventing,
preemepting, and responding to attacks.
The Commission has identified significant obstacles to the
collection and distribution of reliable information on
terroriswm to analysts and policymakers. These obstacles must
be removed.
In addition, this information, often collected at great
risk to agents and officers in the field, must be safeguarded.
Leaks of intelligence and law enforcement information reduce
its value, endanger sources, alienate friendly nations and
inhibit their cooperation, and jeopardize the U.S. Government's
ability to obtain further information.
Eliminate Barriers to Aggressive Collection of Information on
Terrorists
Complex bureaucratic procedures now in place send an
unmistakable message to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
officers in the field that recruiting clandestine sources of
terrorist information is encouraged in theory but discouraged
in practice.
Pursue a More Aggressive Strategy Against Terrorism
Since the 1980s, the United States has based its
counterterrorism policy on four pillars:
Make no consessions to terrorists and strike no
deals:
Bring terrorists to justice for their crimes:
Isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor
terrorism to force them to cange their behavior; and
Bolster the counterterrorism capabilities of
countries that work with the United States and require
assistance.
The government uses multiple tools to pursue this strategy.
Diplomacy is an important instrument, both in gaining the
assistance of other nations in particular cases and convincing
the international community to condemn and outlaw egregious
terrorist practices. Law enforcement is often invaluable in the
investigation and apprehension of terrorists. Military force
and covert action can often preempt or disrupt terrorist
attacks. But meeting the changing terrorist threat requires
more aggressive use of these tools and the development of new
policies and practices.
Prepare to Prevent or Respond to Catastrophic Terrorist Attacks
A terrorist attack in the United States using a biological
agent, deadly chemicals, or nuclear or radiological material,
even if only partially successful, would profoundly affect the
entire nation, as would a series of conventional attacks or a
single bombing that caused thousands of deaths. Given the trend
toward more deadly terrorist attacks and indications that mass
casualties are an objective of many of today's terrorists, it
is essential that America be fully prepared to prevent and
respond to this kind of catastrophic terrorism.
Over the past few years, the U.S. Government has taken a
number of positive steps. Several Presidential Directives have
effected major changes in organizational responsibilities and
improved cooperation. The Department of Health and Human
Services' Strategic Plan, the Attorney General's Five-Year
Plan, the establishment of a military Joint Task Force for
Civil Support, and improvement in first responders'
capabilities are valuable efforts, but there is still more to
do.
There is a risk that, in preventing or responding to a
catastrophic terrorist attack, officials may hesitate or act
improperly because they do not fully understand their legal
authority or because there are gaps in that authority.
There is some statutory authority that does not now exist
that should be considered for catastrophic conditions. For
example:
Federal quarantine authority cannot be used in a
situation that is confined to a single state.
Not all cities or states have their own quarantine
authority.
There is no clear federal authority with regard to
compelling vaccinations, or rationing scarce
vaccinations, or requiring autopsies when necessary for
a terrorism investigation.
The Constitution permits extraordinary measures in the face
of extraordinary threats, To prevent or respond to catastrophic
terrorism, law enforcement and public health officials have the
authority to conduct investigations and implement measures that
temporarily exceed measures applicable under non-emergency
conditions. These may include cordoning off of areas, vehicle
searches, certain medical measures, and sweep searches through
areas believed to contain weapons or terrorists.
Determining whether a particular measure is reasonable
requires balancing privacy and other rights against the public
interest in coping with a terrorist threat which may lead to
massive casualties. Advance preparation is the best way to deal
successfully with a terrorist incident without jeopardizing
individuals' Constitutional rights.
Recommendations:
The President should direct the preparation of a
manual on the implementation of existing legal
authority necessary to address effectively a
catastrophic terrorist threat or attack. The manual
should be distributed to the appropriate federal,
state, and local officials and be used in training,
exercises, and educational programs.
The President should determine whether any
additional legal authority is needed to deal with
catastrophic terrorism and make recommendations to
Congress if necessary.
The U.S. Government's plans for a catastrophic terrorist
attack on the United States do not employ the full range of the
Department of Defense's (DoD's) capabilities for managing large
operations. Additionally the interagency coordination and
cooperation required to integrate the DoD properly into
counterterrorism planning has not been accomplished.
The Department of Defense's ability to command and control
vast resources for dangerous, unstructured situations is
unmatched by any other department or agency. According to
current plans, DoD involvement is limited to supporting the
agencies that are currently designated as having the lead in a
terrorism crisis, the FBI and the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA). But, in extraordinary circumstances, when a
catastrophe is beyond the capabilities of local, state, and
other federal agencies, or is directly related to an armed
conflict overseas, the President may want to designate DoD as a
lead federal agency. This may become a critical operational
consideration in planning for future conflicts. Current plans
and exercises do not consider this possibility.
An expanded role for the DoD in a catastrophic terrorist
attack will have policy and legal implications. Other federal
agencies, the states, and local communities will have major
concerns. In preparing for such a contingency, there will also
be internal DoD issues on resources and possible conflicts with
traditional military contingency plans. These issues should be
addressed beforehand.
Effective preparation also requires effective organization.
The DoD is not optimally organized to respond to the wide range
of missions that would likely arise from the threat of a
catastrophic terrorist attack. For example, within DoD several
offices, departments, Unified Commands, the Army, and the
National Guard have overlapping responsibilities to plan and
execute operations in case of a catastrophic terrorist attack.
These operations will require an unprecedented degree of
interagency coordination and communication in order to be
successful.
There are neither plans for the DoD to assume a lead agency
role nor exercises rehearsing this capability. Hence, these
demanding tasks would have to be accomplished on an ad hoc
basis by the military.
Recommendations:
The President should direct the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the
Attorney General, to develope and adopt detailed
contingency plans that would transfer lead federal
agency authority to the Department of Defense if
necessary during a catastrophic terrorist attack or
prior to an imminent attack.
The Secretary of Defense should establish a unified
command structure that would integrate all catastrophic
terrorism capabilities and conduct detailed planning
and exercises with relevant federal, state, and local
authorities.
The interagency program and plan for exercising the
government's preparedness to respond to a catastrophic
terrorist attack is inadequate.
In addition to DoD exercises, a realistic interagency
exercise program, with full participation by all relevant
federal agencies and their leaders, is essential for national
preparedness to counter a catastrophic terrorist attack. In
June 1995, the President established an interagency
counterterrorist Exercise Subgroup and program which included
preparation for a catastrophic terrorist attack. However, not
all federal agencies have participated in or budgeted for these
exercises.
Additionally, in September 1998, Congress funded and
mandated the Department of Justice and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency to conduct a counterterrorism and consequence
management exercise, called TOPOFF, involving relevant federal
agencies and their senior leadership, with select state and
local governments participating, to evaluate the U.S.
Government's preparedness for a catastrophic terrorist
incident. However, sufficient funding was not provided and
there is no requirement to exercise on a regular schedule.
Recommendation:
The President should direct (1) the Exercise
Subgroup, under the direction of the national
coordinator for counterterrorism, to exercise annually
the government's responses to a catastrophic terrorism
crisis, including consequence management; and (2) all
relevant federal agencies to plan, budget and
participate in counterterrorism and consequence
management exercises coordinated by the Exercise
Subgroup and ensure senior officer level participation,
particularly in the annual exercises.
Given the urgency of near-term needs, long-term research
and development (R&D) projects on technologies useful to
fighting terrorism will be short-changed unless Congress and
the President can agree on special procedures and institutional
arrangements to work on research that is risky and has more
distant payoffs.
Research and Development spending for new technologies to
cope with catastrophic terrorism has significantly increased
over the past three years. Most of the funds, however, are
targeted on near-term improvements to meet immediate needs for
better detectors, more vaccines, and requirements of first
responders.
To prevent or cope with terrorist attacks in the future, in
particular attacks using CBRN agents, the U.S. Government must
make greater use of America's dominance in science and
technology. No other country, much less any subnational
organization, can match U.S. scientific and technological
prowess in biotechnology and pharmaceutical production and
quality control, electronics, computer science and other
domains that could help overcome and defeat the technologies
used by future terrorists. But this kind of R&D requires time--
five to ten years or more--to develop new ideas, test
hypotheses, craft preliminary applications, and test them.
Developing mass production for successful applications further
delays getting products into the hands of users.
The following list illustrates, but by no means exhausts,
the type of projects that could constitute a long-term R&D
program.
New sensors to detect nuclear weapons in transit
(e.g., gamma-ray imaging systems, including stimulation
to elicit detectable emissions).
High power ultraviolet beams to destroy BW agents
and to clean up contaminated areas.
New types of "tripwires" suitable for many
different entry-points (e.g., expolsive-sniffers, body-
scanners, and their proto-typing for mass-production.
Advanced development of anti-virals for smallpox.
The Commission considered several institutional
arrangements to manage long-term R&D. One option is
establishing a large program at one of the Department of Energy
(DoE) or other national laboratories to conduct in-house
research, contract for external research, initiate prototyping
for production, and involve qualified outside experts. This
last task is particularly important in the fields of
biotechnology and pharmaceutical production techniques. The
goal would be to attract talented biotechnology and
pharmaceutical industry scientists and engineers to work with
the government for one or two years on high priority projects.
Recommendation:
The President should establish a comprehensive and
coordinated long-term Research and Development program
to counter catastrophic terrorism.
Current controls on transfers of pathogens that could be
used in biological terrorism are inadequate and controls on
related equipment are nonexistent. In addition, current
programs of the Department of Health and Human Services are not
adequate to ensure physical security of pathogens or to monitor
disease outbreaks overseas.
Terrorists, without serious risk of detection, could obtain
pathogens from domestic natural sources, steal them, or import
them into the United States. Most pathogens in the United
States are tightly controlled, but regulation of laboratories
as well as of dangerous agents during transport are designed to
prevent accidents, not theft. Moreover, these controls are not
as rigorous as controls over nuclear material.
Creating pathogens small and sturdy enough to disperse
broadly over a target population for an effective period of
time remains, fortunately, a complex process. Thus, regulating
the sophisticated equipment required to turn pathogens into
weapons could hamper terrorist efforts to acquire this
capability.
However, no regulatory scheme is foolproof. Moreover,
contagious diseases do not require sophisticated dispersion
devices. Thus, it is important to have the ability to detect
outbreaks of infectious diseases and to distinguish
bioterrorist attacks from natural outbreaks. Some detection and
analytical systems are in place domestically, but the
international community's ability to distinguish natural
disease from terrorism lags far behind even these modest U.S.
efforts.
Recommendations:
The Secretary of Health and Human Services should
strengthen physical security standards applicable to
the storage, creation, and transport of pathogens in
research laboratories and other certified facilities in
order to protect against theft or diversion. These
standards should be as rigorous as the physical
protection and security measures applicable to critical
nuclear materials.
The Congress should:
--Make possession of designated critical pathagens illegal
for anyone who is not properly certified.
--Control domestic sale and transfer of equipment critical
to the development or use of biological agents by
certifying legitimate users of critical equipment and
prohibiting sales of such equipment to non-certified
entities.
--Require tagging of critical equipment to enable law
enforcement to identify its location.
The Secretary of Health and Human Services, working
with the Department of State, should develop an
international monitoring program to provide early
warning of infectious disease outbreaks and possible
terrorist experimentation with biological substances.
=======================================================================
ROAD MAP FOR NATIONAL SECURITY: IMPERATIVE FOR CHANGE
The Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st
Century
Excerpt on "Securing the National Homeland"
February 15, 2001
=======================================================================
U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Disclaimer: This Commission has striven successfully to achieve
consensus on all major issues, and each Commissioner stands by all the
major recommendations made in this report. However, as is to be
expected when discussing complex issues, not every Commissioner agrees
completely with every statement in the text that follows.
Gary Hart Warren B. Rudman
Co-Chair Co-Chair
Anne Armstrong Norman R. Augustine
Commissioner Commissioner
John Dancy John R. Galvin
Commissioner Commissioner
Leslie H. Gelb Newt Gingrich
Commissioner Commissioner
Lee H. Hamilton Lionel H. Olmer
Commissioner Commissioner
Donald B. Rice James Schlesinger
Commissioner Commissioner
Harry D. Train Andrew Young
Commissioner Commissioner
Charles G. Boyd, Executive Director
Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change
----------
I. Securing the National Homeland
One of this Commission's most important conclusions in its
Phase I report was that attacks against American citizens on
American soil, possibly causing heavy casualties, are likely
over the next quarter century.\7\ This is because both the
technical means for such attacks, and the array of actors who
might use such means, are proliferating despite the best
efforts of American diplomacy.
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\7\ See New World Coming, p. 4, and the Report of the National
Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st
Century (Washington, DC: December 1997), p. 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These attacks may involve weapons of mass destruction and
weapons of mass disruption. As porous as U.S. physical borders
are in an age of burgeoning trade and travel, its "cyber
borders" are even more porous--and the critical infrastructure
upon which so much of the U.S. economy depends can now be
targeted by non-state and state actors alike. America's present
global predominance does not render it immune from these
dangers. To the contrary, U.S. preeminence makes the American
homeland more appealing as a target, while America's openness
and freedoms make it more vulnerable.
Notwithstanding a growing consensus on the seriousness of
the threat to the homeland posed by weapons of mass destruction
and disruption, the U.S. government has not adopted homeland
security as a primary national security mission. Its structures
and strategies are fragmented and inadequate. The President
must therefore both develop a comprehensive strategy and
propose new organizational structures to prevent and protect
against attacks on the homeland, and to respond to such attacks
if prevention and protection should fail.
Any reorganization must be mindful of the scale of the
scenarios we envision and the enormity of their consequences.
We need orders-of-magnitude improvements in planning,
coordination, and exercise. The govemment must also be prepared
to use effectively--albeit with all proper safeguards--the
extensive resources of the Department of Defense. This will
necessitate new priorities for the U.S. armed forces and
particularly, in our view, for the National Guard.
The United States is today very poorly organized to design
and implement any comprehensive strategy to protect the
homeland. The assets and organizations that now exist for
homeland security are scattered across more than two dozen
departments and agencies, and all fifty states. The Executive
Branch, with the full participation of Congress, needs to
realign, refine, and rationalize these assets into a coherent
whole, or even the best strategy will lack an adequate vehicle
for implementation.
This Commission believes that the security of the American
homeland from the threats of the new century should be the
primary national security mission of the U.S. government. While
the Executive Branch must take the lead in dealing with the
many policy and structural issues involved, Congress is a
partner of critical importance in this effort. It must find
ways to address homeland security issues that bridge current
gaps in organization, oversight, and authority, and that
resolve conflicting claims to jurisdiction within both the
Senate and the House of Representatives and also between them.
Congress is crucial, as well, for guaranteeing that
homeland security is achieved within a framework of law that
protects the civil liberties and privacy of American citizens.
We are confident that the U.S. government can enhance national
security without compromising established Constitutional
principles. But in order to guarantee this, we must plan ahead.
In a major attack involving contagious biological agents, for
example, citizen cooperation with government authorities will
depend on public confidence that those authorities can manage
the emergency. If that confidence is lacking, panic and
disorder could lead to insistent demands for the temporary
suspension of some civil liberties. That is why preparing for
the worst is essential to protecting individual freedoms during
a national crisis.
Legislative guidance for planning among federal agencies
and state and local authorities must take particular cognizance
of the role of the Defense Department. Its subordination to
civil authority needs to be clearly defined in advance.
In short, advances in technology have created new
dimensions to our nation's economic and physical security.
While some new threats can be met with traditional responses,
others cannot. More needs to be done in three areas to prevent
the territory and infrastructure of the United States from
becoming easy and tempting targets: in strategy, in
organizational realignment, and in Executive-Legislative
cooperation. We take these areas in turn.
A. THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
A homeland security strategy to minimize the threat of
intimidation and loss of life is an essential support for an
international leadership role for the United States. Homeland
security is not peripheral to U.S. national security strategy
but central to it. At this point, national leaders have not
agreed on a clear strategy for homeland security, a condition
this Commission finds dangerous and intolerable. We therefore
recommend the following:
1: The President should develop a comprehensive
strategy to heighten America's ability to prevent and protect
against all forms of attack on the homeland, and to respond to
such attacks if prevention and protection fail.
In our view, the President should:
Give new priority in his overall national security
strategy to homeland security, and make it a central
concern for incoming officials in all Executive Branch
departments, particularly the intelligence and law
enforcement communities;
Calmly prepare the American people for prospective
threats, and increase their awareness of what federal
and state governments are doing to prevent attacks and
to protect them if prevention fails;
Put in place new government organizations and
processes, eliminating where possible staff duplication
and mission overlap; and
Encourage Congress to establish new mechanisms to
facilitate closer cooperation between the Executive and
Legislative Branches of government on this vital issue.
We believe that homeland security can best be assured
through a strategy of layered defense that focuses first on
prevention, second on protection, and third on response.
Prevention.--Preventing a potential attack comes first.
Since the occurrence of even one event that causes catastrophic
loss of life would represent an unacceptable failure of policy,
U.S. strategy should therefore act as far forward as possible
to prevent attacks on the homeland. This strategy has at its
disposal three essential instruments.
Most broadly, the first instrument is U.S. diplomacy. U.S.
foreign policy should strive to shape an international system
in which just grievances can be addressed without violence.
Diplomatic efforts to develop friendly and trusting relations
with foreign governments and their people can significantly
multiply America's chances of gaining early warning of
potential attack and of doing something about impending
threats. Intelligence-sharing with foreign governments is
crucial to help identify individuals and groups who might be
considering attacks on the United States or its allies.
Cooperative foreign law enforcement agencies can detain,
arrest, and prosecute terrorists on their own soil. Diplomatic
success in resolving overseas conflicts that spawn terrorist
activities will help in the long run.
Meanwhile, verifiable arms control and nonproliferation
efforts must remain a top priority. These policies can help
persuade states and terrorists to abjure weapons of mass
destruction and to prevent the export of fissile materials and
dangerous dual-use technologies. But such measures cannot by
themselves prevent proliferation. So other measures are needed,
including the possibility of punitive measures and defenses.
The United States should take a lead role in strengthening
multilateral organizations such as the International Atomic
Energy Agency.
In addition, increased vigilance against international
crime syndicates is also important because many terrorist
organizations gain resources and other assets through criminal
activity that they then use to mount terrorist operations.
Dealing with international organized crime requires not only
better cooperation with other countries, but also among
agencies of the federal government. While progress has been
made on this front in recent years, more remains to be done.\8\
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\8\ See International Crime Threat Assessment (Washington, DC: The
White House, December 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The second instrument of homeland security consists of the
U.S. diplomatic, intelligence, and military presence overseas.
Knowing the who, where, and how of a potential physical or
cyber attack is the key to stopping a strike before it can be
delivered. Diplomatic, intelligence, and military agencies
overseas, as well as law enforcement agencies working abroad,
are America's primary eyes and ears on the ground. But
increased public-private efforts to enhance security processes
within the international transportation and logistics networks
that bring people and goods to America are also of critical and
growing importance.
Vigilant systems of border security and surveillance are a
third instrument that can prevent those agents of attack who
are not detected and stopped overseas from actually entering
the United States. Agencies such as the U.S. Customs Service
and U.S. Coast Guard have a critical prevention role to play.
Terrorists and criminals are finding that the difficulty of
policing the rising daily volume and velocities of people and
goods that cross U.S. borders makes it easier for them to
smuggle weapons and contraband, and to move their operatives
into and out of the United States. Improving the capacity of
border control agencies to identify and intercept potential
threats without creating barriers to efficient trade and travel
requires a sub-strategy also with three elements.
First is the development of new transportation security
procedures and practices designed to reduce the risk that
importers, exporters, freight forwarders, and transportation
carriers will serve as unwitting conduits for criminal or
terrorist activities. Second is bolstering the intelligence
gathering, data management, and information sharing
capabilities of border control agencies to improve their
ability to target high-risk goods and people for inspection.
Third is strengthening the capabilities of border control
agencies to arrest terrorists or interdict dangerous shipments
before they arrive on U.S. soil.
These three measures, which place a premium on public-
private partnerships, will pay for themselves in short order.
They will allow for the more efficient allocation of limited
enforcement resources along U.S. borders. There will be fewer
disruptive inspections at ports of entry for legitimate
businesses and travelers. They will lead to reduced theft and
insurance costs, as well. Most important, the underlying
philosophy of this approach is one that balances prudence, on
the one hand, with American values of openness and free trade
on the other.\9\ To shield America from the world out of fear
of terrorism is, in large part, to do the terrorists' work for
them. To continue business as usual, however, is irresponsible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Note in this regard Stephen B. Flynn, "Beyond Border
Control," Foreign Affairs (November/December 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The same may be said for our growing cyber problems.
Protecting our nation's critical infrastructure depends on
greater public awareness and improvements in our tools to
detect and diagnose intrusions. This will require better
information sharing among all federal, state, and local
governments as well as with private sector owners and
operators. The federal government has these specific tasks:
To serve as a model for the private sector by
improving its own security practices;
To address known government security problems on a
system-wide basis;
To identify and map network interdependencies so
that harmful cascading effects among systems can be
prevented;
To sponsor vulnerability assessments within both the
federal government and the private sector; and
To design and carry out simulations and exercises
that test information system security across the
nation's entire infrastructure.
Preventing attacks on the American homeland also requires
that the United States maintain long-range strike capabilities.
The United States must bolster deterrence by making clear its
determination to use military force in a preemptive fashion if
necessary. Even the most hostile state sponsors of terrorism,
or terrorists themselves, will think twice about harming
Americans and American allies and interests if they fear direct
and severe U.S. attack after--or before--the fact. Such
capabilities will strengthen deterrence even if they never have
to be used.
Protection.--The Defense Department undertakes many
different activities that serve to protect the American
homeland, and these should be integrated into an overall
surveillance system, buttressed with additional resources. A
ballistic missile defense system would be a useful addition and
should be developed to the extent technically feasible,
fiscally prudent, and politically sustainable. Defenses should
also be pursued against cruise missiles and other sophisticated
atmospheric weapon technologies as they become more widely
deployed. While both active duty and reserve forces are
involved in these activities, the Commission believes that more
can and should be done by the National Guard, as is discussed
in more detail below.
Protecting the nation's critical infrastructure and
providing cyber-security must also include:
Advanced indication, warning, and attack
assessments;
A warning system that includes voluntary, immediate
private-sector reporting of potential attacks to enable
other private-sector targets (and the U.S. government)
better to take protective action; and
Advanced systems for halting attacks, establishing
backups, and restoring service.
Response.--Managing the consequences of a catastrophic
attack on the U.S. homeland would be a complex and difficult
process. The first priority should be to build up and augment
state and local response capabilities. Adequate equipment must
be available to first responders in local communities.
Procedures and guidelines need to be defined and disseminated
and then practiced through simulations and exercises.
Interoperable, robust, and redundant communications
capabilities are a must in recovering from any disaster.
Continuity of government and critical services must be ensured
as well. Demonstrating effective responses to natural and
manmade disasters will also help to build mutual confidence and
relationships among those with roles in dealing with a major
terrorist attack.
All of this puts a premium on making sure that the
disparate organizations involved with homeland security--on
various levels of government and in the private sector--can
work together effectively. We are frankly skeptical that the
U.S. government, as it exists today, can respond effectively to
the scale of danger and damage that may come upon us during the
next quarter century. This leads us, then, to our second task:
that of organizational realignment.
B. ORGANIZATIONAL REALIGNMENT
Responsibility for homeland security resides at all levels
of the U.S. government--local, state, and federal. Within the
federal government, almost every agency and department is
involved in some aspect of homeland security. None have been
organized to focus on the scale of the contemporary threat to
the homeland, however. This Commission urges an organizational
realignment that:
Designates a single person, accountable to the
President, to be responsible for coordinating and
overseeing various U.S. government activities related
to homeland security;
Consolidates certain homeland security activities to
improve their effectiveness and coherence;
Establishes planning mechanisms to define clearly
specific responses to specific types of threats; and
Ensure that the appropriate resources and
capabilities are available.
Therefore, this Commission strongly recommends the
following:
2: The President should propose, and Congress should
agree to create, a National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA)
with responsibility for planning, coordinating, and integrating
various U.S. government activities involved in homeland
security. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) should
be a key building block in this effort.
Given the multiplicity of agencies and activities involved
in these homeland security tasks, someone needs to be
responsible and accountable to the President not only to
coordinate the making of policy, but also to oversee its
implementation. This argues against assigning the role to a
senior person on the National Security Council (NSC) staff and
for the creation of a separate agency. This agency would give
priority to overall planning while relying primarily on others
to carry out those plans. To give this agency sufficient
stature within the government, its director would be a member
of the Cabinet and a statutory advisor to the National Security
Council. The position would require Senate confirmation.
Notwithstanding NHSA's responsibilities, the National
Security Council would still play a strategic role in planning
and coordinating all homeland security activities. This would
include those of NHSA as well as those that remain separate,
whether they involve other NSC members or other agencies, such
as the Centers for Disease Control within the Department of
Health and Human Services.
We propose building the National Homeland Security Agency
upon the capabilities of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), an existing federal agency that has performed
well in recent years, especially in responding to natural
disasters. NHSA would be legislatively chartered to provide a
focal point for all natural and manmade crisis and emergency
planning scenarios. It would retain and strengthen FEMA's ten
existing regional offices as a core element of its
organizational structure.
While FEMA is the necessary core of the National Homeland
Security Agency, it is not sufficient to do what NHSA needs to
do. In particular, patrolling U.S. borders, and policing the
flows of peoples and goods through the hundreds of ports of
entry, must receive higher priority. These activities need to
be better integrated, but efforts toward that end are hindered
by the fact that the three organizations on the front line of
border security are spread across three different U.S. Cabinet
departments. The Coast Guard works under the Secretary of
Transportation, the Customs Service is located in the
Department of the Treasury, and the, Immigration and
Naturalization Service oversees the Border Patrol in the
Department of Justice. In each case, the border defense agency
is far from the mainstream of its parent department's agenda
and consequently receives limited attention from the
department's senior officials. We therefore recommend the
following:
3: The President should propose to Congress the
transfer of the Customs Service, the Border Patrol, and Coast
Guard to the National Homeland Security Agency, while
preserving them as distinct entities.
Bringing these organizations together under one agency will
create important synergies. Their individual capabilities will
be molded into a stronger and more effective system, and this
realignment will help ensure that sufficient resources are
devoted to tasks crucial to both public safety and U.S. trade
and economic interests. Consolidating overhead, training
programs, and maintenance of the aircraft, boats, and
helicopters that these three agencies employ will save money,
and further efficiencies could be realized with regard to other
resources such as information technology, communications
equipment, and dedicated sensors. Bringing these separate, but
complementary, activities together will also facilitate more
effective Executive and Legislative oversight, and help
rationalize the process of budget preparation, analysis, and
presentation.
Steps must be also taken to strengthen these three
individual organizations themselves. The Customs Service, the
Border Patrol, and the Coast Guard are all on the verge of
being overwhelmed by the mismatch between their growing duties
and their mostly static resources.
The Customs Service, for example, is charged with
preventing contraband from entering the United States. It is
also responsible for preventing terrorists from using the
commercial or private transportation venues of international
trade for smuggling explosives or weapons of mass destruction
into or out of the United States. The Customs Service, however,
retains only a modest air, land, and marine interdiction force,
and its investigative component, supported by its own
intelligence branch, is similarly modest. The high volume of
conveyances, cargo, and passengers arriving in the United
States each year already overwhelms the Customs Service's
capabilities. Over $8.8 billion worth of goods, over 1.3
million people, over 340,000 vehicles, and over 58,000
shipments are processed daily at entry points. Of this volume,
Customs can inspect only one to two percent of all inbound
shipments. The volume of U.S. international trade, measured in
terms of dollars and containers, has doubled since 1995, and it
may well double again between now and 2005.
Therefore, this Commission believes that an improved
computer information capability and tracking system--as well as
upgraded equipment that can detect both conventional and
nuclear explosives, and chemical and biological agents--would
be a wise short-term investment with important long-term
benefits. It would also raise the risk for criminals seeking to
target or exploit importers and cargo carriers for illicit
gains.\10\
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\10\ See the Report of the Interagency Commission on Crime and
Security in U.S. Seaports (Washington, DC: Fall 2000).
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The Border Patrol is the uniformed arm of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service. Its mission is the detection and
prevention of illegal entry into the United States. It works
primarily between ports of entry and patrols the borders by
various means. There has been a debate for many years about
whether the dual functions of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service--border control and enforcement on the
one side, and immigration facilitation on the other--should be
joined under the same roof. The U.S. Commission on Immigration
Reform concluded that they should not be joined.\11\ We agree:
the Border Patrol should become part of the NHSA.
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\11\ See the Report of the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform
(Washington, DC: 1997).
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The U.S. Coast Guard is a highly disciplined force with
multiple missions and a natural role to play in homeland
security. It performs maritime search and rescue missions,
manages vessel traffic, enforces U.S. environmental and fishery
laws, and interdicts and searches vessels suspected of carrying
illegal aliens, drugs, and other contraband. En a time of war,
it also works with the Navy to protect U.S. ports from attack.
Indeed, in many respects, the Coast Guard is a model
homeland security agency given its unique blend of law
enforcement, regulatory, and military authorities that allow it
to operate within, across, and beyond U.S. borders. It
accomplishes its many missions by routinely working with
numerous local, regional, national, and international agencies,
and by forging and maintaining constructive relationships with
a diverse group of private, non-governmental, and public
marine-related organizations. As the fifth armed service, in
peace and war, it has national defense missions that include
port security, overseeing the defense of coastal waters, and
supporting and integrating its forces with those of the Navy
and the other services.
The case for preserving and enhancing the Coast Guard's
multi-mission capabilities is compelling. But its crucial role
in protecting national interests close to home has not been
adequately appreciated, and this has resulted in serious and
growing readiness concerns. U.S. Coast Guard ships and aircraft
are aging and technologically obsolete; indeed; the Coast Guard
cutter fleet is older than 39 of the world's 41 major naval
fleets. As a result, the Coast Guard fleet generates excessive
operating and maintenance costs, and lacks essential
capabilities in speed, sensors, and interoperability. To
fulfill all of its missions, the Coast Guard requires updated
platforms with the staying power, in hazardous weather, to
remain offshore and fully operational throughout U.S. maritime
economic zones,\12\
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\12\ See Report of the Interagency Task Force on U.S. Coast Guard
Roles and Missions, A Coast Guard for the Twenty First-Century
(Washington, DC: December 1999).
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The Commission recommends strongly that Congress
recapitalize the Customs Service, the Border Patrol, and the
Coast Guard so that they can confidently perform key homeland
security roles.
NHSA's planning, coordinating, and overseeing activities
would be undertaken through three staff Directorates. The
Directorate of Prevention would oversee and coordinate the
various border security activities, as discussed above. A
Directorate of Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) would
handle the growing cyber threat. FEMA's emergency preparedness
and response activities would be strengthened in a third
directorate to cover both natural and manmade disasters. A
Science and Technology office would advise the NHSA Director on
research and development efforts and priorities for all three
directorates.
Relatively small permanent staffs would man the
directorates. NHSA will employ FEMA's principle of working
effectively with state and local governments, as well as with
other federal organizations, stressing interagency
coordination. Much of NHSA's daily work will take place
directly supporting state officials in its regional offices
around the country. Its organizational infrastructure will not
be heavily centered in the Washington, DC area.
NHSA would also house a National Crisis Action Center
(NCAC), which would become the nation's focal point for
monitoring emergencies and for coordinating federal support in
a crisis to state and local governments, as well as to the
private sector. We envision the center to be an interagency
operation, directed by a two-star National Guard general, with
full-time representation from the other federal agencies
involved in homeland security.
NHSA will require a particularly close working relationship
with the Department of Defense. It will need also to create and
maintain strong mechanisms for the sharing of information and
intelligence with U.S. domestic and international intelligence
entities. We suggest that NHSA have liaison officers in the
counter-terrorism centers of both the FBI and the CIA.
Additionally, the sharing of information with business and
industry on threats to critical infrastructures requires
further expansion.
NHSA will also assume responsibility for overseeing the
protection of the nation's critical infrastructure.
Considerable progress has been made in implementing the
recommendations of the President's Commission on Critical
Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) and Presidential Decision
Directive 63 (PDD-63). But more needs to be done, for the
United States has real and growing problems in this area.
U.S. dependence on increasingly sophisticated and more
concentrated critical infrastructures has increased
dramatically over the past decade. Electrical utilities, water
and sewage systems, transportation networks, and communications
and energy systems now depend on computers to provide safe,
efficient, and reliable service. The banking and finance
sector, too, keeps track of millions of transactions through
increasingly robust computer capabilities.
The overwhelming majority of these computer systems are
privately owned, and many operate at or very near capacity with
little or no provision for manual back-ups in an emergency.
Moreover, the computerized information networks that link
systems together are themselves vulnerable to unwanted
intrusion and disruption. An attack on any one of several
highly interdependent networks can cause collateral damage to
other networks and the systems they connect. Some forms of
disruption will lead merely to nuisance and economic loss, but
other forms will jeopardize lives. One need only note the
dependence of hospitals, air-traffic control systems, and the
food processing industry on computer controls to appreciate the
point.
The bulk of unclassified military communications, too,
relies on systems almost entirely owned and operated by the
private sector. Yet little has been done to assure the security
and reliability of those communications in crisis. Current
efforts to prevent attacks, protect against theft most damaging
effects, and prepare for prompt response are uneven at best,
and this is dangerous because a determined adversary is most
likely to employ a weapon of mass disruption during a homeland
security or foreign policy crisis.
As noted above, a Directorate for Critical Infrastructure
Protection would be an integral part of the National Homeland
Security Agency. This directorate would have two vital
responsibilities. First would be to oversee the physical assets
and information networks that make up the U.S. critical
infrastructure. It should ensure the maintenance of a nucleus
of cyber security expertise within the government, as well.
There is now an alarming shortage of government cyber security
experts due in large part to the financial attraction of
private-sector employment that the government cannot match
under present personnel procedures.\13\ The director's second
responsibility would be as the Critical Information Technology,
Assurance, and Security Office (CITASO). This office would
coordinate efforts to address the nation's vulnerability to
electronic or physical attacks on critical infrastructure.
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\13\ We return to this problem below in Section IV.13
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Several critical activities that are currently spread among
various government agencies and the private sector should be
brought together for this purpose. These include:
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs),
which are government-sponsored committees of private-
sector participants who work to share information,
plans, and procedures for information security in their
fields;
The Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO),
currently housed in the Commerce Department, which
develops outreach and awareness programs with the
private sector;
The National Infrastructure Protection Center
(NIPC), currently housed in the FBI, which gathers
information and provides warnings of cyber attacks; and
The Institute for Information Infrastructure
Protection (I3P), also in the Commerce Department,
which is designed to coordinate and support research
and development projects on cyber security.
In partnership with the private sector where most cyber
assets are developed and owned, the Critical Infrastructure
Protection Directorate would be responsible for enhancing
information sharing on cyber and physical security, tracking
vulnerabilities and proposing improved risk management
policies, and delineating the roles of various government
agencies in preventing, defending, and recovering from attacks.
To do this, the government needs to institutionalize better its
private-sector liaison across the board--with the owners and
operators of critical infrastructures, hardware and software
developers, server/service providers, manufacturers/producers,
and applied technology developers.
The Critical Infrastructure Protection Directorate's work
with the private sector must include a strong advocacy of
greater government and corporate investment in information
assurance and security. The CITASO would be the focal point for
coordinating with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
in helping to establish cyber policy, standards, and
enforcement mechanisms. Working closely with the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) and its Chief Information Officer
Council (CIO Council), the CITASO needs to speak for those
interests in government councils.\14\ The CITASO must also
provide incentives for private-sector participation in
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers to share information
on threats, vulnerabilities, and individual incidents, to
identify interdependencies, and to map the potential cascading
effects of outages in various sectors.
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\14\ The Chief Information Officer Council is a government
organization consisting of all the statutory Chief Information Officers
in the government. It is located within OMB under the Deputy Director
for Management.
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The directorate also needs to help coordinate cyber
security issues internationally. At present, the FCC handles
international cyber issues for the U.S. government through the
International Telecommunications Union, As this is one of many
related international issues, it would be unwise to remove this
responsibility from the FCC. Nevertheless, the CIP Directorate
should work closely with the FCC on cyber issues in
international bodies.
The mission of the NHSA must include specific planning and
operational tasks to be staffed through the Directorate for
Emergency Preparedness and Response. These include:
Setting training and equipment standards, providing
resource grants, and encouraging intelligence and
information sharing among state emergency management
officials, local fast responders, the Defense
Department, and the FBI;
Integrating the various activities of the Defense
Department, the National Guard, and other federal
agencies into the Federal Response Plan; and
Pulling together private sector activities,
including those of the medical community, on recovery,
consequence management, and planning for continuity of
services.
Working with state officials, the emergency management
community, and the law enforcement community, the job of NHSA's
third directorate will be to rationalize and refine the
nation's incident response system. The current distinction
between crisis management and consequence management is neither
sustainable nor wise. The duplicative command arrangements that
have been fostered by this division are prone to confusion and
delay. NHSA should develop and manage a single response system
for national incidents, in close coordination with the
Department of Justice (DoJ) and the FBI. This would require
that the current policy, which specifies initial DoJ control in
terrorist incidents on U.S. territory, be amended once Congress
creates NHSA. We believe that this arrangement would in no way
contradict or diminish the FBI's traditional role with respect
to law enforcement.
The Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate should
also assume a major resource and budget role. WIth the help of
the Office of Management and Budget, the directorate's first
task will be to figure out what is being spent on homeland
security in the various departments and agencies. Only with
such an overview can the nation identify the shortfalls between
capabilities and requirements. Such a mission budget should be
included in the President's overall budget submission to
Congress. The Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate
will also maintain federal asset databases and encourage and
support up-to-date state and local databases.
FEMA has adapted well to new circumstances over the past
few years and has gained a well-deserved reputation for
responsiveness to both natural and manmade disasters. While
taking on homeland security responsibilities, the proposed NHSA
would strengthen FEMA's ability to respond to such disasters.
It would streamline the federal apparatus and provide greater
support to the state and local officials who, as the nation's
first responders, possess enormous expertise. To the greatest
extent possible, federal programs should build upon the
expertise and existing programs of state emergency preparedness
systems and help promote regional compacts to share resources
and capabilities.
To help simplify federal support mechanisms, we recommend
transferring the National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO),
currently housed at the FBI, to the National Homeland Security
Agency. The Commission believes that this transfer to FEMA
should be done at first opportunity, even before NHSA is up and
running.
The NDPO would be tasked with organizing the training of
local responders and providing local and state authorities with
equipment for detection, protection, and decontamination in a
V/MD emergency. NUSA would develop the policies, requirements,
and priorities as part of its planning tasks as well as oversee
the various federal, state, and local training and exercise
programs. In this way, a single staff would provide federal
assistance for any emergency, whether it is caused by flood,
earthquake, hurricane, disease, or terrorist bomb.
A WMD incident on American soil is likely to overwhelm
local fire and rescue squads, medical facilities, and
government services. Attacks may contaminate water, food, and
air; large-scale evacuations may be necessary and casualties could be extensive.
Since getting prompt help to those who need it would be a
complex and massive operation requiring federal support, such
operations must be extensively planned in advance.
Responsibilities need to be assigned and procedures put in
place for these responsibilities to evolve if the situation
worsens.
As we envision it, state officials will take the initial
lead in responding to a crisis. NHSA will normally use its
Regional Directors to coordinate federal assistance, while the
National Crisis Action Center will monitor ongoing operations
and requirements. Should a crisis overwhelm local assets, state
officials will turn to NHSA for additional federal assistance.
In major crises, upon the recommendation of the civilian
Director of NHSA, the President will designate a senior
figure--a Federal Coordinating Officer--to assume direction of
all federal activities on the scene. If the situation warrants,
a state governor can ask that active military forces reinforce
National Guard units already on the scene. Once the President
federalizes National Guard forces, or if he decides to use
Reserve forces, the Joint Forces Command will assume
responsibility for all military operations, acting through
designated task force commanders. At the same time, the
Secretary of Defense would appoint a Defense Coordinating
Officer to provide civilian oversight and ensure prompt civil
support. This person would work for the Federal Coordinating
Officer.
To be capable of carrying out its responsibilities under
extreme circumstances, NHSA will need to undertake robust
exercise programs and regular training to gain experience and
to establish effective command and control procedures. It will
be essential to update regularly the Federal Response Plan. It
will be especially critical for NHSA officials to undertake
detailed planning and exercises for the full range of potential
contingencies, including ones that require the substantial
involvement ofmililary assets in support.
NHSA will provide the overarching structure for homeland
security, but other government agencies will retain specific
homeland security tasks. We take the necessary obligations of
the major ones in turn.
Intelligence Community. Good intelligence is the key to
preventing attacks on the homeland and homeland security should
become one of the intelligence community's most important
missions.\15\ Better human intelligence must supplement
technical intelligence, especially on terrorist groups covertly
supported by states. As noted above, fuller cooperation and
more extensive information-sharing with friendly governments
will also improve the chances that would-be perpetrators will
be detained, arrested, and prosecuted before they ever reach
U.S. borders.
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\15\ We return to this issue in our discussion of the Intelligence
Community in Section IlI.F., particularly in recommendation 37.
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The intelligence community also needs to embrace cyber
threats as a legitimate mission and to incorporate intelligence
gathering on potential strategic threats from abroad into its
activities.
To advance these ends, we offer the following
recommendation:
4: The President should ensure that the National
Intelligence Council: include homeland security and asymmetric
threats as an area of analysis; assign that portfolio to a
National Intelligence Officer; and produce National
Intelligence Estimates on these threats.
Department of State. U.S. embassies overseas are the
American people's first line of defense. U.S. Ambassadors must
make homeland security a top priority for all embassy staff,
and Ambassadors need the requisite authority to ensure that
information is shared in a way that maximizes advance warning
overseas of direct threats to the United States.
Ambassadors should also ensure that the gathering of
information, and particularly from open sources, takes full
advantage of all U.S. government resources abroad, including
diplomats, consular officers, military officers, and
reptesentatives of the various other departments and agencies.
The State Department should also strengthen its efforts to
acquire information from Americans living or travelling abroad
in private capacities.
The State Department has made good progress in its overseas
efforts to reduce terrorism, but we now need to extend this
effort into the Information Age. Working with NHSA's CIP
Directorate, the State Department should expand cooperation on
critical infrastructure protection with other states and
international organizations. Private sector initiatives,
particularly in the banking community, provide examples of
international cooperation on legal issues, standards, and
practices. Working with the CIP Directorate and the FCC, the
State Department should also encourage other governments to
criminalize hacking and electronic intrusions and to help track
hackers, computer virus proliferators, and cyber terrorists.
Department of Defense. The Defense Department, which has
placed its highest priority on preparing for major theater war,
should pay far more attention to the homeland security mission.
Organizationally, DoD responses are widely dispersed. An
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support has
responsibility for WMD incidents, while the Department of the
Army's Director of Military Support is responsible for non-WMD
contingencies. Such an arrangement does not provide clear lines
of authority and responsibility or ensure political
accountability. The Commission therefore recommends the
following:
5: The President should propose to Congress the
establishment of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Security within the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
reporting directly to the Secretary.
A new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security
would provide policy oversight for the various DoD activities
within the homeland security mission and ensure that mechanisms
are in place for coordinating military support in major
emergencies. He or she would work to integrate homeland
security into Defense Department planning, and ensure that
adequate resources are forthcoming. This Assistant Secretary
would also represent the Secretary in the NSC interagency
process on homeland security issues.
Along similar lines and for similar reasons, we also
recommend that the Defense Department broaden and strengthen
the existing Joint Forces Command/Joint Task Force-Civil
Support (JTF-CS) to coordinate military planning, doctrine and
command and control for military support for all hazards and
disasters.
This task force should be directed by a senior National
Guard general with additional headquarters personnel. JTF-CS
should contain several rapid reaction task forces, composed
largely of rapidly mobilizable National Guard units. The task
force should have command and control capabilities for multiple
incidents. Joint Forces Command should work with the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security to ensure the
provision of adequate resources and appropriate force
allocations, training, and equipment for civil support.
On the prevention side, maintaining strong nuclear and
conventional forces is as high a priority for homeland security
as it is for other missions. Shaping a peaceful international
environment and deterring hostile military actors remain sound
military goals. But deterrent forces may have little effect on
non-state groups secretly supported by states, or on
individuals with grievances real or imagined. In cases of clear
and imminent danger, the military must be able to take
preemptive action overseas in circumstances where local
authorities are unable or unwilling to act. For this purpose,
as noted above, the United States needs to be prepared to use
its rapid, long-range precision strike capabilities. A decision
to act would obviously rest in civilian hands, and would depend
on intelligence information and assessments of diplomatic
consequences. But even if a decision to strike preemptively is
never taken or needed, the capability should be available
nonetheless, for knowledge of it can contribute to deterrence.
We also suggest that the Defense Department broaden its
mission of protecting air, sea, and land approaches to the
United States, consistent with emerging threats such as the
potential proliferation of cruise missiles. The department
should examine alternative means of monitoring approaches to
the territorial United States. Modern information technology
and sophisticated sensors can help monitor the high volumes of
traffic to and from the United States. Given the volume of
legitimate activities near and on the border, even modern
infonnation technology and remote sensors cannot filter the
good from the bad as a matter of routine. It is neither wise
nor possible to create a surveillance umbrella over the United
States. But Defense Department assets can be used to support
detection, monitoring, and even interception operations when
intelligence indicates a specific threat.
Finally, a better division of labor and understanding of
responsibilities is essential in dealing with the connectivity
and interdependence of U.S. critical infrastructure systems.
This includes addressing the nature of a national
transportation network or cyber emergency and the Defense
Department's role in prevention, detection, or protection of
the national critical infrastructure. The department's sealift
and airlift plans are premised on largely unquestioned
assumptions that domestic transportation systems will be fully
available to support mobilization requirements. The department
also is paying insufficient attention to the vulnerability of
its information networks. Currently, the department's computer
network defense task force (JTF-Computer Network Defense) is
underfunded and understaffed for the task of managing an actual
strategic information warfare attack. It should be given the
resources to carry out its current mission and is a logical
source of advice to the proposed NHSA Critical Information
Technology, Assurance, and Security Office.
National Guard. The National Guard, whose origins are to be
found in the state militias authorized by the U.S.
Constitution, should play a central role in the response
component of a layered defense strategy for homeland security.
We therefore recommend the following:
6: The Secretary of Defense, at the President's
direction, should make homeland security a primary mission of
the National Guard, and the Guard should be organized, properly
trained, and adequately equipped to undertake that mission.
At present, the Army National Guard is primarily organized
and equipped to conduct sustained combat overseas. In this the
Guard fulfills a strategic reserve role, augmenting the active
military during overseas contingencies. At the same time, the
Guard carries out many state-level missions for disaster and
humanitarian relief, as well as consequence management. For
these, it relies upon the discipline, equipment, and leadership
of its combat forces. The National Guard should redistribute
resources currently allocated predominantly to preparing for
conventional wars overseas to provide greater support to civil
authorities in preparing for and responding to disasters,
especially emergencies involving weapons of mass destruction.
Such a redistribution should flow from a detailed
assessment of force requirements for both theater war and
homeland tecurity contingencies. The Department of Defense
should conduct such an assessment, with the participation of
the state governors and the NHSA Director. In setting
requirements, the department should minimize forces with dual
missions or reliance on active forces detailed for major
theater war. This is because the United States will need to
maintain a heightened deterrent and defensive posture against
homeland attacks during regional contingencies abroad. The most
likely timing of a major terrorist incident will be while the
United States is involved in a conflict overseas.\16\
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\16\ See the Report of the National Defense University Quadrennial
Defense Review 2001 Working Group (Washington, DC: Institute for
National Strategic Studies, November 2000), p. 60.
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The National Guard is designated as the primary Department
of Defense agency for disaster relief. In many cases, the
National Guard will respond as a state asset under the control
of state governors. While it is appropriate for the National
Guard to play the lead military role in managing the
consequences of a WMD attack, its capabilities to do so are
uneven and in some cases its forces are not adequately
structured or equipped. Twenty-two WMD Civil Support Teams,
made up of trained and equipped full-time National Guard
personnel, will be ready to deploy rapidly, assist local first
responders, provide technical advice, and pave the way for
additional military help. These teams fill a vital need, but
more effort is required.
This Commission recommends that the National Guard be
directed to fulfill its historic and Constitutional mission of
homeland security. It should provide a mobilization base with
strong local ties and support. It is already "forward
deployed" to achieve this mission and should:
Participate in and initiate, where necessary, state,
local, and regional planning for responding to a WMD
incident;
Train and help organize local first responders;
Maintain up-to-date inventories of military
resources and equipment available in the area on short
notice;
Plan for rapid inter-state support and
reinforcement; and
Develop an overseas capability for international
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
In this way, the National Guard will become a critical
asset for homeland security.
Medical Community. The medical community has critical roles
to play in homeland security. Catastrophic acts of terrorism or
violence could cause casualties far beyond any imagined
heretofore. Most of the American medical system is privately
owned and now operates at close to capacity. An incident
involving WMD will quickly overwhelm the capacities of local
hospitals and emergency management professionals.
In response, the National Security Council, FEMA, and the
Department of Health and Human Services have already begun a
reassessment of their programs. Research to develop better
diagnostic equipment and immune-enhancing drugs is underway,
and resources to reinvigorate U.S. epidemiological surveillance
capacity have been allocated. Programs to amass and regionally
distribute inventories of antibiotics and vaccines have
started, and arrangements for mass production of selected
pharmaceuticals have been made. The Centers for Disease Control
has rapid-response investigative units prepared to deploy and
respond to incidents.
These programs will enhance the capacities of the medical
community, but the momentum and resources for this effort must
be extended. We recommend that the NHSA Directorate for
Emergency Preparedness and Response assess local and federal
medical resources to deal with a WMD emergency. It should then
specify those medical programs needed to deal with a major
national emergency beyond the means of the private sector, and
Congress should fund those needs.
C. EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE COOPERATION
Solving the homeland security challenge is not just an
Executive Branch problem. Congress should be an active
participant in the development of homeland security programs,
as well. Its hearings can help develop the best ideas and
solutions. Individual members should develop expertise in
homeland security policy and its implementation so that they
can fill in policy gaps and provide needed oversight and advice
in times of crisis. Most important, using its power of the
purse, Congress should ensure that government agencies have
sufficient resources and that their programs are coordinated,
efficient, and effective.
Congress has already taken important steps. A bipartisan
Congressional initiative produced the U.S. effort to deal with
the possibility that weapons of mass destruction could "leak"
out of a disintegrating Soviet Union.\17\ It was also a
Congressional initiative that established the Domestic
Preparedness Program and launched a 120-city program to enhance
the capability of federal, state, and local first responders to
react effectively in a WMD emergency.\18\ Members of Congress
from both parties have pushed the Executive Branch to identify
and manage the problem more effectively. Congress has also
proposed and funded studies and commissions on various aspects
of the homeland security problem.\19\ But it must do more.
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\17\ Sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Luger.
\18\ Public Law 104-201, National Defense Authorization Act for FY
1997: Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction. This legislation,
known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Amendment, was passed in July 1996.
\19\ We note: the Rumsfeld Commission [Report of the Commission to
Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (Washington,
DC: July 15, 1998)]; the Deutch Commission [Combating Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington. DC: July 14, 1999)]; Judge
William Webster's Commission [Report on the Advancement of Federal Law
Enforcement (Washington, DC: January 2000)]; the Bremer Commission
[Report of the National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the
Changing Threat of International Terrorism (Washington, DC: June
2000)]; and an advisory panel led by Virginia Governor James Gilmore
[First Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory
Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving
Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: December 15, 1999)].
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A sound homeland security strategy requires the overhaul of
much of the legislative framework for preparedness, response,
and national defense programs. Congress designed many of the
authorities that support national security and emergency
preparedness programs principally for a Cold War environment.
The new threat environment--from biological and terrorist
attacks to cyber attacks on critical systems--poses vastly
different challenges. We therefore recommend that Congress
refurbish the legal foundation for homeland security in
response to the new threat environment.
In particular, Congress should amend, as necessary, key
legislative authorities such as the Defense Production Act of
1950 and the Communications Act of 1934, which facilitate
homeland security functions and activities.\20\ Congress should
also encourage the sharing of threat, vulnerability, and
incident data between the public and private sectors--including
federal agencies, state governments, first responders, and
industry.\21\ In addition, Congress should monitor and support
current efforts to update the international legal framework for
communications security issues.\22\
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\20\ The Defense Production Act was developed during the Korean War
when shortages of critical natural resources such as coal, oil, and gas
were prioritized for national defense purposes. [See Defense Production
Act of 1950, codified at 50 USC App. Sec. 2061 et seq. Tide I includes
delegations to prioritize and allocate goods and services based on
national defense needs.] Executive Order 12919, National Defense
Industrial Resources Preparedness, June 6, 1994, implements Title I of
the Defense Production Act. Congressional review should focus on the
applicability of the Defense Production Act to homeland security needs,
ranging from prevention to restoration activities. Section 706 of the
Communications Act of 1934 also needs revision so that it includes the
electronic media that have developed in the past two decades. [See 48
Stat. 1104, 47 USC Sec. 606, as amended.] Executive Order 12472,
Assignment of National Security and Emergency Preparedness
Telecommunications Functions, April 3, 1984, followed the breakup of
AT&T and attempted to specify anew the prerogatives of the Executive
Branch in accordance with the 1934 Act in directing national
communications media during a national security emergency. It came
before the Internet, however, and does not clearly apply to it.
\21\ For more than four years, multiple institutions have called on
national leadership to support laws and policies promoting security
cooperation through public-private partnerships. See, for example, the
President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, Critical
Foundations, Protecting America's Infrastructures (Washington, DC:
October 1997), pp. 86-88 and Report of the Defense Science Board Task
Force on Information Warfare (Washington, DC: November 1996).
\22\ This includes substantial efforts in multiple forums, such as
the Council of Europe and the G8, to fight transnationsl organized
crime. See Communique on principles to fight transnational organized
crime, Meeting of the Justice and Interior Ministers of the Eight,
December 9-10, 1997.
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Beyond that, Congress has some organizational work of its
own to do. As things stand today, so many federal agencies are
involved with homeland security that it is exceedingly
difficult to present federal programs and their resource
requirements to the Congress in a coherent way. It is largely
because the budget is broken up into so many pieces, for
example, that counter-terrorism and information security issues
involve nearly two dozen Congressional committees and
subcommittees. The creation of the National Security Homeland
Agency will redress this problem to some extent, but because of
its growing urgency and complexity, homeland security will
still require a stronger working relationship between the
Executive and Legislative Branches. Congress should therefore
find ways to address homeland security issues that bridge
current jurisdictional boundaries and that create more
innovative oversight mechanisms.
There are several ways of achieving this. The Senate's Arms
Control Observer Group and its more recent NATO Enlargement
Group were two successful examples of more informal Executive-
Legislative cooperation on key multi-dimensional issues.
Specifically, in the near term, this Commission recommends the
following:
7: Congress should establish a special body to deal
with homeland security issues, as has been done effectively
with intelligence oversight. Members should be chosen for their
expertise in foreign policy, defense, intelligence, law
enforcement, and appropriations. This body should also include
members of all relevant Congressional committees as well as ex-
officio members from the leadership of both Houses of Congress.
This body should develop a comprehensive understanding of
the problem of homeland security, exchange information and
viewpoints with the Executive Branch on effective policies and
plans, and work with standing committees to develop integrated
legislative responses and guidance. Meetings would often be
held in closed session so that Members could have access to
interagency deliberations and diverging viewpoints, as well as
to classified assessments. Such a body would have neither a
legislative nor an oversight mandate, and it would not eclipse
the authority of any standing committee.
At the same time, Congress needs to systematically review
and restructure its committee system, as will be proposod in
recommendation 48. A single, select committee in each house of
Congress should be given authorization, appropriations, and
oversight responsibility for all homeland security activities.
When established, these committees would replace the function
of the oversight body described in recommendation 7.
In sum, the federal government must address the challenge
of homeland security with greater urgency. The United States is
not immune to threats posed by weapons of mass destruction or
disruption, but neither is it entirely defenseless against
them. Much has been done to prevent and defend against such
attacks, but these efforts must be incorporated into the
nation's overall security strategy, and clear direction must be
provided to all departments and agencies. Non-traditional
national security agencies that how have greater relevance than
they did in the past must be reinvigorated. Accountability,
authority, and responsibility must be more closely aligned
within government agencies. An Executive-Legislative consensus
is required, as well, to convert strategy and resources into
programs and capabilities, and to do so in a way that preserves
fundamental freedoms and individual rights.
Most of all, however, the government must reorganize itself
for the challenges of this new era, and make the necessary
investments to allow an improved organizational structure to
work. Through the Commission's proposal for a National Homeland
Security Agency, the U.S. government will be able to improve
the planning and coordination of federal support to state and
local agencies, to rationalize the allocation of resources, to
enhance readiness in order to prevent attacks, and to
facilitate recovery if prevention fails. Most important, this
proposal integrates the problem of homeland security within the
broader framework of U.S. national security strategy. In this
respect, it differs significantly from issue-specific
approaches to the problem, which tend to isolate homeland
security away from the larger strategic perspective of which it
must be a part.
We are mindful that erecting the operational side of this
strategy will take time to achieve. Meanwhile, the threat grows
ever more serious. That is all the more reason to start right
away on implementing the recommendations put forth here.
=======================================================================
A REPORT CARD ON THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY'S NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS
WITH RUSSIA
Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler, Co-Chairs, Russia Task Force
The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board
January 10, 2001
=======================================================================
Task Force Members
Howard Baker (Co-Chair), Baker, Donelson, Bearman & Caldwell,
Former United States Senator
Lloyd Cutler (Co-Chair), Wilmer Cutler & Pickering, Former
White House Counsel
Graham T. Allison, Director, The Belfer Center, Kennedy School
of Government, Harvard University
Andrew Athy, Chairman, Secretary of Energy Advisory Board,
Partner, O'Neill, Athy & Casey PC
J. Brian Atwood, Executive Vice President, Citizens Energy,
Former Administrator, USAID
David Boren, President, University of Oklahoma, Former United
States Senator from Oklahoma
Lynn Davis, Senior Fellow, RAND Corporation
Butler Derrick, Partner, Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy,
LLP, Former Member of Congress from South Carolina
Susan Eisenhower, President, The Eisenhower Institute, Founder,
Center for Political and Strategic Studies
Lee Hamilton, Director, Woodrow Wilson Center, Former Member
of Congress from Indiana
Robert I. Hanfling, Senior Advisor, Putnam, Hayes and Bartlett
Gary Hart, \1\ Of Counsel, Coudert Brothers, Former United
States Senator from Colorado
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Senator Hart has been prevented from full participation in the
Task Force's deliberations by other government service.
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Daniel Mayers, Of Counsel, Wilmer, Cutler, & Pickering
Jim McClure, McClure, Gerard & Neuenschwander, Inc., Former
United States Senator from Idaho
Sam Nunn, Senior Partner, King & Spalding, Former United States
Senator from Georgia
Alan Simpson, Director, Institute of Politics, Harvard
University, Former United States Senator from Wyoming
David Skaggs, Executive Director, Democracy and Citizenship
Program, The Aspen Institute, Former Member of Congress
from Colorado
John Tuck, Senior Advisor, Baker, Donelson, Bearman & Caldwell,
Former Under Secretary of Energy
A Report Card on the Department of Energy's Nonproliferation Programs
with Russia
----------
Executive Summary
Introduction
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, we have witnessed
the dissolution of an empire having over 40,000 nuclear
weapons, over a thousand metric tons of nuclear materials, vast
quantities of chemical and biological weapons materials, and
thousands of missiles. This Cold War arsenal is spread across
11 time zones and lacks the Cold War infrastructure that
provided the control and financing necessary to assure that
chains of command remain intact and nuclear weapons and
materials remain securely beyond the reach of terrorists and
weapons-proliferating states. This problem is compounded by the
existence of thousands of weapons scientists who, not always
having the resources necessary to adequately care for their
families, may be tempted to sell their expertise to countries
of proliferation concern.
In order to assess the Department of Energy's part of
current U.S. efforts to deal with this critical situation, in
February 2000 Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson asked former
Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker and former White House
Counsel Lloyd Cutler to co-chair a bipartisan task force to
review and assess DOE's nonproliferation programs in Russia and
to make recommendations for their improvement. After nine
months of careful examination of current DOE programs and
consideration of related nonproliferation policies and programs
of the U.S. Government, the Task Force reached the following
conclusions and recommendations.
1. The most urgent unmet national security threat to the
United States today is the danger that weapons of mass
destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could be
stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used
against American troops abroad or citizens at home.
This threat is a clear and present danger to the
international community as well as to American lives and
liberties.
2. Current nonproliferation programs in the Department of
Energy the Department of Defense, and related agencies have
achieved impressive results thus far, but their limited mandate
and funding fall short of what is required to address
adequately the threat.
The Task Force applauds and commends Secretary Richardson,
his predecessors and colleagues for their dedication,
commitment and hard work in seeking to address this issue. The
cooperation of the Russian Federation has also been a critical
and significant factor in the work carried out to date.
But the Task Force concludes that the current budget levels
are inadequate and the current management of the U.S.
Government's response is too diffuse. The Task Force believes
that the existing scope and management of the U.S. programs
addressing this threat leave an unacceptable risk of failure
and the potential for catastrophic consequences.
3. The new President and leaders of the 107th Congress face
the urgent national security challenge of devising an enhanced
response proportionate to the threat.
The enhanced response should include: a net
assessment of the threat; a clear achievable mission
statement; the development of a strategy with specific
goals and measurable objectives; a more centralized
command of the financial and human resources required
to do the job; and an identification of criteria for
measuring the benefits for Russia, the United States,
and the entire world.
The Task Force offers one major recommendation to the
President and the Congress. The President, in consultation with
Congress and in cooperation with the Russian Federation, should
quickly formulate a strategic plan to secure and/or neutralize
in the next eight to ten years all nuclear weapons-usable
material located in Russia and to prevent the outflow from
Russia of scientific expertise that could be used for nuclear
or other weapons of mass destruction. Accomplishing this task
will be regarded by future generations as one of the greatest
contributions the United States and Russia can make to their
long-term security and that of the entire world.
While emphasizing that enhanced efforts are needed from the
U.S., the Task Force underscores that enhanced efforts are also
required from Russia. Ultimately, Russia will be responsible
for securing its remaining nuclear arsenal. If this program is
conceived in full cooperation with the Russian Federation, is
adequately financed, and is implemented as part of a growing,
open and transparent partnership, then the Task Force believes
that Russia should be positioned to take over any work
remaining at the end of the eight to ten year period. If Russia
is not prepared for such a partnership, then full success will
not be achieved.
Bearing this in mind, the Task Force report outlines an
enhanced national security program as described above. This
program could be carried out for less than one percent of the
U.S. defense budget, or up to a total of $30 billion over the
next eight to ten years.\1\ The Russian Government would, of
course, be expected to make a significant contribution
commensurate with its own financial ability. The national
security benefits to U.S. citizens from securing and/or
neutralizing the equivalent of more than 80,000 nuclear weapons
and potential nuclear weapons \2\ would constitute the highest
return on investment in any current U.S. national security and
defense program. The new President should press other major
powers such as the European Union, Japan and Canada to assume a
fair share of the costs of these efforts designed also to
enhance the security of these countries. Contributions from
other countries could significantly reduce U.S. costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ This plan is based on the assumption that both countries will
maintain a core nuclear weapons program sufficient to meet defense
needs and to provide for naval fuel requirements. A detailed budget for
this program would be developed on the basis of the strategic plan
called for above. The Task Force believes a budget of approximately $3
billion annually would be appropriate, recognizing that it would not be
possible to ramp up to that level immediately. A suggestive outline is
attached as Appendix A.
\2\ Assuming approximately 4 kg of plutonium or 20 kg of highly
enriched uranium per weapon. David Albright, Frans Berkhout and William
Walker. "Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World
Inventories, Capabilities and Policies." SIPRI (Oxford Press: 1997),
page 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Background
As two former adversaries adapting to the end of the Cold
War, the United States and Russia both have a responsibility to
examine and address the dangers posed by the massive nuclear
arsenal built up over the past five decades. In Russia, this
review must examine the many dangers and challenges posed by
the more than 40,000 nuclear weapons produced by the former
Soviet Union and the large quantities of highly enriched
uranium (HEU) and plutonium that could be used to make more
than 40,000 additional nuclear weapons.
Important steps have already been taken with many ambitious
milestones being met over the past decade. Former President
Bush negotiated and President Clinton implemented what some
have called the "contract of the century" with President
Yeltsin. Under this agreement, the U.S. is purchasing 500
metric tons of HEU removed from former Soviet nuclear weapons,
and this material is being converted to low enriched uranium
fuel that is then used in civilian power reactors. To date,
more than 110 metric tons of HEU, enough to build some 5,000
nuclear weapons, have been blended down and rendered impotent
for nuclear weapons use. In its blended-down form, this
material has been delivered to the international market to fuel
civilian power reactors. Through close cooperation among the
U.S., Russia, and other countries of the former Soviet Union,
we have also succeeded in eliminating strategic nuclear
arsenals left in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus--preventing
the potential emergence of three major new nuclear weapon
states. The elimination of these arsenals has greatly increased
U.S. and international security, particularly since these
nuclear weapons were mounted on strategic intercontinental
ballistic missiles aimed at the United States.
Since the Nunn-Lugar legislative initiative of 1991,\3\ the
U.S. Government has established an array of threat reduction
programs in both the Departments of Defense and Energy to
assist in dismantling Russian nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction and to improve significantly the security of such
weapons and materials. Together, these programs have helped to
protect, secure, and begin disposition of strategic weapons
delivery systems as well as hundreds of metric tons of nuclear
weapons-usable material--preventing the emergence of a virtual
"Home Depot" for would-be proliferators. Additional work,
under the aegis of the Department of State, has addressed what
is known as the "brain drain problem" both in Russia and
other countries of the former Soviet Union through programs
such as the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC)
Program. This program, together with DOE's Initiatives for
Proliferation Prevention and its Nuclear Cities Initiative, has
helped to redirect weapons scientists and engineers from
defense work to civilian employment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The Soviet Nuclear Threar Reduction Act of 1991 was created
under Public Law Number 102-228.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These U.S. programs have reduced the threat of diversion of
nuclear weapons materials. To the best of our knowledge, no
nuclear weapons or quantity of nuclear weapons-usable material
have been successfully stolen and exported, while many efforts
to steal weapons-usable material have been intercepted by
Russian and international police operations.
Much more remains to be done, however. The Task Force
observes that while we know a good deal about the size and
state of the Russian weapons complex, there is still much that
we do not know. More than 1,000 metric tons of HEU and at least
150 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium exist in the Russian
weapons complex. Most of the cases involving the successful
seizure and recovery of stolen nuclear weapons-usable material
have occurred on the western border of Russia. The southern
border is less secure. Materials may be diverted through
centuries old trade routes along Russia's mountainous border.
In addition, many of the Russian nuclear sites remain
vulnerable to insiders determined to steal enough existing
material to make several nuclear weapons and to transport these
materials to Iran, Iraq, or Afghanistan. At some sites, one
well-placed insider would be enough. The Task Force was advised
that buyers from Iraq, Iran and other countries have actively
sought nuclear weapons-usable material from Russian sites.
In a worst-case scenario, a nuclear engineer graduate with
a grapefruit-sized lump of HEU or an orange-sized lump of
plutonium, together with material otherwise readily, available
in commercial markets, could fashion a nuclear device that
would fit in a van like the one the terrorist Yosif parked in
the World Trade Center in 1993. The explosive effects of such a
device would destroy every building in the Wall Street
financial area and would level lower Manhattan.
In confronting this danger, the Russian Government has
recognized that theft of nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons-
usable material threatens Moscow or St. Petersburg as surely as
it threatens Washington, DC or New York. Chechen terrorists
have already threatened to spread radioactive material around
Moscow; if they were armed with a nuclear device, the situation
would be much worse. Success in countering this threat to both
nations rests on a bedrock of shared vital interests.
The Threat Today
Russia today wrestles with a weakened ability to protect
and secure its Cold War legacy. A number of factors have come
together to present an immediate risk of theft of potential
weapons of mass destruction: delays in payments to guards at
nuclear facilities; breakdowns in command structures, including
units that control weapons or guard weapons-usable material;
and inadequate budgets for protection of stockpiles and
laboratories housing thousands of potential nuclear weapons.
Such threats are not hypothetical. Consider the following:
In late 1998, conspirators at a Ministry of Atomic
Energy (MinAtom) facility in Chelyabinsk were caught
attempting to steal fissile material of a quantity just
short of that needed for one nuclear device. The head
of MinAtom's nuclear material accounting confirmed the
attempted theft and warned that, had the attempt been
successful, it would have caused "significant damage
to the Russian State."
Early in 1998, the mayor of Krasnoyarsk-45, a closed
Russian "nuclear city" that stores enough HEU for
hundreds of nuclear weapons, wrote to Krasnoyarsk
Governor Alexander Lebed warning that a social
explosion in his city was unavoidable unless urgent
action was taken. Nuclear scientists and other workers
in the city remained unpaid for several months, and
basic medical supplies could not be purchased. General
Lebed, a former National Security Advisor to President
Yeltsin, had earlier proposed to Moscow that his region
take responsibility for the nuclear forces and
facilities on its territory, pay salaries for these
military officers and atomic workers, and take command
of the structures. The Russian Government has never
agreed to the proposal.
In December 1998, an employee at Russia's premier
nuclear weapons laboratory in Sarov (formerly Arzamas-
16) was arrested for espionage and charged with
attempting to sell documents on nuclear weapons designs
to agents of Iraq and Afghanistan for $3 million. The
regional head of the Federal Security Bureau, when
reporting the case, confirmed that this was not the
first case of nuclear theft at Sarov and explained that
such thefts were the result of the "very difficult
financial position" of workers at such defense
enterprises.
In January 2000, Federal Security Bureau agents
arrested four sailors at the nuclear submarine base in
Vilyuchinsk-3 on the Kamchatka Peninsula with a stash
of precious metals and radioactive material they had
stolen from an armored safe in their nuclear submarine.
After the sailors' arrest, investigators discovered at
their homes additional stashes of stolen radioactive
material and submarine components containing gold,
platinum, silver, and palladium.
These are a sample of dozens of actual incidents. Imagine
if such material were successfully stolen and sold to a
terrorist like Osama bin Laden, who reportedly masterminded the
bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and is the
chief suspect in the recent attack on the U.S. destroyer Cole.
Democracies like ours are inherently messy, frequently
distracted, and often bogged down in partisanship. Our
government historically finds it difficult to mobilize without
the catalyst of an actual incident. The new President and
leaders of the 107th Congress face no larger challenge than to
mobilize the nation to precautionary action before a major
disaster strikes.
Assessing Current DOE Nonproliferation Programs
The Task Force had the benefit of briefings by both
government and non-government experts and reviews of written
materials. Members of the Task Force also visited seven sites
in Russia in July 2000, reviewing DOE programs and meeting with
13 organizations over the course of a week. The Task Force was
able to visit only a few sites of the vast nuclear complex, and
it recognizes that those sites were probably in better economic
and physical condition than others in the complex. The dire
state of those sites gave the Task Force members cause for
grave concern about the overall condition of the Russian
nuclear complex.
The Task Force applauds the accomplishments of current DOE
programs and related programs of other U.S. Government
agencies. The Task Force commends in particular the dedication
to duty exhibited by the hundreds of DOE and national
laboratory employees involved in these programs. The Task Force
was also impressed by the high quality of cooperation extended
by most of DOE's Russian counterparts during the course of its
vist to Russia. Both MinAtom and the Russian Navy provided
access to all of the facilities requested, as well as some
additional sites that were thought to be inaccessible. Despite
difficulties in the overall implementation of the DOE programs,
the Task Force found Russia's cooperation to be a significant
and positive factor. The United States and the Soviet Union
competed in creating nuclear weapons of mass destruction; now
the U.S. and Russia are cooperating to dismantle them. The Task
Force believes that the record of progress demonstrates it is
far better for the United States to be on the inside working
with Russia than on the outside with no capability to affect
Russia's actions.
However, the Task Force finds very disturbing the ongoing
Russian trade with Iran in dual-use nuclear technology and
missile technology and Russia's apparent intention to supply
new conventional weapons systems to Iran. Despite the fact that
these issues have been raised with Russia at the highest levels
of both governments, the problem has not yet been resolved. The
Task Force views the failure to resolve these issues as very
serious and believes the lack of satisfactory resolution will
increase the difficulties inherent in continued cooperation
with Russia and in carrying out the Task Force's
recommendations. While the Task Force affirms that the DOE
nonproliferation programs are unequivocally in the U.S.
national security interest, the Task Force is particularly
concerned that if Russian cooperation with Iran continues in a
way that compromises nuclear nonproliferation norms, it will
inevitably have a major adverse effect on continued cooperation
in a wide range of other ongoing nonproliferation programs.
Among other consequences, there will be little support in
Congress and the Executive Branch for the major new initiatives
the Task Force is recommending.
Unquestionably, much has been accomplished by the array of
programs now being operated by DOE and other U.S. Government
agencies. Nonetheless, the Task Force believes it is time for
the U.S. Government to perform a risk assessment based on input
from all relevant agencies to estimate the total magnitude of
the threat posed to U.S. national secutity. The Task Force also
believes there is a strong need to create greater synergies
among the existing nonproliferation programs, hence its call
for government-wide coordination of the current programs and
direct White House involvement.
The Task Force Specifically Finds
1. By and large, current DOE programs are having a
significant and positive effect. The strategic plan recommended
by the Task Force should review the needs of each of these
programs and, where appropriate, provide for a substantial
increase in funding. Expansions of program scope and increases
in funding, however, must take careful account of the pace at
which funds can usefully be expended in each individual
program.
2. The strategic plan and the associated budgets should
identify specific goals and measurable objectives for each
program, as well as provide criteria for success and an exit
strategy. These should be factored into the five-year budget
plan currently being developed for the National Nuclear
Security Administration.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ On March 1, 2000, in accordance with Public Law 106-65, the
National Nuclear Security Administration was formally established as a
semi-autonomous entity within the Department of Energy. The NNSA is
comprised of four preexisting component organizations: defense
programs, nuclear nonproliferation, fissile materials disposition, and
naval reactors. With the establishment of the NNSA, the Office of
Nonproliferation and National Security became Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation and incorporated the Office of Fissile Materials
Disposition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. A major obstacle to further expansion and success of
current programs is the continuation of differences between the
U.S. and Russia over transparency and access. As a condition
for a substantially expanded program, the U.S. and Russia
should agree at a high level on the degree of transparency
needed to assure that U.S.-funded activity has measurable
impacts on program objectives and that U.S. taxpayer dollars
are being spent as intended.
4. Given the gravity of the existing situation and the
nature of the challenge before us, it is imperative that the
President establish a high-level leadership position in the
White House with responsibility for policy and budget
coordination for threat reduction and nonproliferation programs
across the U.S. Government. The President should appoint a
person of stature who commands the respect and attention of
relevant Cabinet officers and Congressional leaders to lead
this program.
5. The U.S. administration of these programs should seek to
eliminate any unnecessary and overly restrictive controls that
hamper swift and efficient action. To overcome potential
impediments that often arise from "business as usual"
practices within the Russian and U.S. bureaucracies, DOE and
related agencies should take practical steps, including further
enlargement of the DOE team working with the U.S. Ambassador in
Moscow, to ensure the most efficient on-the-ground
implementation of the programs in Russia.
6. It is imperative to mobilize the sustained interest and
concern of the Congress. The Task Force urges the Congress to
consider the creation of a joint committee on weapons of mass
destruction, nuclear safety and nonproliferation, modeled after
the former Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Creation of such a
committee would ensure that the issues receive adequate high-
level attention and that Member and staff expertise is
developed and preserved.
Accomplishing the Task
The major recommendation of the Task Force is that one of
the first national security initiatives of the new President be
the formulation of a comprehensive, integrated strategic plan,
done in cooperation with the Russian Federation, to secure and/
or neutralize in the next eight to ten years all nuclear
weapons-usable material located in Russia and to prevent the
outflow from Russia of scientific expertise that could be used
for nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. The Task
Force's vision is a world in which all such weapons-usable
materials are safe, secure, and accounted for, with
transparency sufficient to assure the world that this is the
case. The path toward this vision begins by securing all
existing nuclear weapons-usable material and eliminating excess
stockpiles of uranium and plutonium in Russia.
The Task Force has reviewed many promising proposals but
does not claim to have a complete grasp of the universe of good
solutions to this set of problems. While it recognizes that the
new President will wish to consider other options, the Task
Force proposes a strategic plan with specific goals and
measurable objectives to eliminate the danger of inadequate
controls over weapons of mass destruction and weapons-usable
materials. The Task Force recognizes that the quantities of
excess material in Russia are so large that they cannot be
completely eliminated even within an eight to ten year period.
This is especially true of the plutonium stockpile, elimination
of which is directly linked to the progress of U.S. efforts to
eliminate its own excess plutonium. This plan is designed to
bring the material under effective control, to reduce
drastically the threat posed by such materials, and to reach a
position where Russia can take over any remaining work at the
end of the eight to ten year period. Consultation and
collaboration with Russia will be critical to success. The
proposed strategic plan follows.
1. Secure Russian nuclear weapons and material by:
drastically shrinking the number of sites where the
material is held;
accelerating security upgrades for the remaining
buildings in use;
assisting the Russians as they identify, tag, and
seal all their warheads and materials as part of a
reliable accounting system;
securing the return of HEU from Soviet-built
research reactors, primarily in Eastern Europe, to
Russia for downblending and disposition; and
developing a plan, after a joint U.S.-Russian
examination of the extent of the threat, to be
implemented by DOE and DOD, to minimize potential
proliferation threats posed by decommissioned Russian
general-purpose submarines and their fuel.
2. Eliminate excess Russian HEU by:
demilitarizing all remaining excess Russian HEU
through the development of art expanded capacity for
downblending in Russia; and
accelerating the purchase of the approximately 400
metric tons of HEU remaining to be downblended under
the current HEU agreement, while ensuring that the
material not flood and depress the world market. This
could require the Russian or U.S. Government to hold
the material for an indefinite period of time.
3. Manage excess Russian plutonium, accelerating existing disposition
commitments and emphasizing safe and secure storage, by:
storing up to 100 metric tons of plutonium at Mayak
if additional storage wings are built there, or at
other highly secure sites;
eliminating up to 100 metric tons of excess Russian
plutonium by blending fuel as mixed oxide fuel and
burning it in civilian reactors, building on what the
U.S. and Russia have agreed to do for an initial 34
metric tons;
reinvigorating verifiable efforts to halt additional
Russian production of plutonium; and
preparing an inventory of the total Russian
stockpile.
4. Downsize the nuclear complex, building on existing Russian plans and
accomplishments, by:
facilitating Russian efforts to accelerate the
shutdown of its weapons facilities, ensuring the
identification of the highest-value targets for
cooperation;
funding "contract research" by Russian nuclear
scientists to develop efficient, low-cost environmental
technologies of benefit to the U.S., while
simultaneously preventing the outflow of scientific
expertise from Russia that could be used for nuclear or
other weapons of mass destruction;
working with Russia to ensure that nuclear weapons
scientists and workers are provided financial
incentives for early retirement from the weapons
complex;
overhauling foreign and domestic lending practices
to new businesses in the nuclear cities; and
enhancing communication between the municipalities
and the weapons institutes or facilities that are co-
located with them to increase efficiency in the
expenditure of resources.
5. Plan for Russian financing of sustainable security by
seeking specific commitments from Russia to fund
adequate levels of security and accounting for its
nuclear material and a slimmed-down nuclear complex;
exploring, in consultation with Russian officials,
an array of concepts fur developing new revenue streams
for financing projects in an accountable and
transparent manner; and
working with Russian officials to begin detailed
planning for the transition away from U.S. financial
support.
The Task Force believes it is quite feasible that the
Russian Federation and the United States could together carry
out an intensive, well-conceived and well-funded strategic plan
as outlined above over the next eight to ten years.
=======================================================================
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Hearing on
THE THREAT OF BIOTERRORISM AND THE NATURAL SPREAD OF INFECTIOUS
DISEASES
September 5, 2001
Former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, the former Chair of the
Senate Armed Services Committee, continues to play an active
role in national security and non-proliferation affairs as the
co-chair of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. Senator Nunn
recently carried out the duties of the President of the United
States in an exercise titled "Dark Winter," which simulated a
smallpox attack carried out against three U.S. cities.
------
Dr. D.A. Henderson, one of the leading experts in the world
on bioterrorism, served for 20 years with the Centers for
Disease Control, including assignments as Chief of Surveillance
and Chief of the Epidemic Intelligence Service; 11 years with
the World Health Organization as Director of the successful
Smallpox Eradication Program; and 16 years as Chairman of the
Pan-American Health Organization's Technical Advisory Group
which advised on the design and development of the polio
eradication program. Dr. Henderson is now the director of the
Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies. Dr.
Henderson's data formed the technical basis for the "Dark
Winter" scenario exercise in which Senator Nunn participated.
=======================================================================
Prepared Statement of Hon. Sam Nunn, Former U.S. Senator, Co-Chairman
of the Nuclear Threat Initiative
Chairman Biden and members of the Committee, it is a
privilege and honor for me to come back to the United States
Senate where I spent so much of my life. I thank you for
dedicating the first of these hearings to the threats of
bioterrorism and the spread of infectious diseases. Biological
terrorism is one of our greatest national security threats, and
one that cannot be addressed by Department of Defense standard
operating procedures. The specter of a biological weapons
attack--and the parallel peacetime threat of a naturally
occurring infectious disease outbreak--are unique, and they
deserve the time and focus you are devoting to them today.
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, as you may know,
this past June at Andrews Air Force Base, I was a participant
in the exercise Dark Winter--which simulated a biological
weapons attack on the United States. It's a lucky thing for the
United States that this was just a test and not a real
emergency. But, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, our
lack of preparation is a real emergency.
During my 24 years on the Senate Armed Services Committee,
I saw scenarios and satellite photos and Pentagon plans for
most any category of threat you can imagine. But a biological
weapons attack on the United States fits no existing category
of security threats. Psychologist Abraham Maslow once wrote:
"When all you have is a hammer, everything starts to look like
a nail." This is not a nail; it's different from other
security threats; and to fight it, we need a different set of
tools than the ones we've been using.
Our exercise involved an intentional release of smallpox.
Experts today believe that a single case of smallpox anywhere
in the world would constitute a global medical emergency. As
Members of this committee know, a wave of smallpox was touched
off in Yugoslavia in 1972 by a single infected individual. The
epidemic was stopped in its fourth wave by quarantines,
aggressive police and military measures, and 18 million
emergency vaccinations to protect a population of 21 million
that was already highly vaccinated.
Mr. Chairman, we have effectively only 12 million doses of
vaccine in America to protect a highly vulnerable population of
275 million that is essentially not vaccinated. The Yugoslavia
crisis mushroomed from one case; our Dark Winter exercise began
with 20 confirmed cases in Oklahoma City, 30 suspected cases
spread out in Oklahoma, Georgia, and Pennsylvania, and
countless more cases of individuals who were infected but
didn't know it. We did not know the time, place or size of the
release, so we had no way of judging the magnitude of the
crisis. All we knew was that we had a big problem and a small
range of responses. One certainty was that it would get worse
before it would get better. Our medical experts told us that we
had only two strategies for effective smallpox containment: (1)
isolating those who are sick, and (2) vaccinating those who
have been exposed. Isolation is difficult when you're not sure
who has it; vaccination cannot stop the spread if you don't
have enough of it.
Dark Winter Overview
Dark Winter simulated a series of National Security Council
(NSC) meetings dealing with a terrorist attack involving the
covert release of smallpox in three American cities. The
exercise was conducted by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian
Biodefense Studies, and the ANSER Institute for Homeland
Defense, under the leadership of John Hamre, Tara O'Toole and
Randy Larsen, respectively. Many of the participants in Dark
Winter had served previous Presidents in cabinet or sub-cabinet
positions. Most knew how the NSC worked, and they were all
individuals with considerable expertise and perspective in the
security, law enforcement and health fields.
I will not take the Committee's time with a complete replay
of the events, but will share with you the highlights.
In the opening minutes of Dark Winter, we learned from the
Secretary of Health and Human Services that cases of smallpox
had just been diagnosed by the Centers for Disease Control.
Given the infectious nature of the disease, we were facing the
start of a smallpox epidemic--an event with devastating, if not
catastrophic, potential.
Like all of you, I received a smallpox vaccination when I
was a child, but I had forgotten the honor of the disease. In
the 20th century, more than 300 million people died from
smallpox--more than those killed in all wars of the century
combined. Thanks to a massive and highly collaborative
international campaign, smallpox as a naturally occurring
disease was eradicated. But once eradicated, the consequences
of a smallpox outbreak has become more dangerous with each
passing year as new generations of unvaccinated citizens are
born and the potency of the previous vaccinations diminishes
with time. Unfortunately, we know that smallpox was made into a
weapon by the Soviet Union; we do not know if any other nations
or groups have successfully pursued a similar goal, and this
should be a matter of keen intelligence forces.
Over a 24-hour period at Andrews Air Force Base, our NSC
"war gamers" dealt with three weeks of simulated shock,
stress and horror. I was given the role of President of the
United States, and Jim Woolsey was the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
We learned that on December 9, 2002, some dozen patients
reported to the Oklahoma City Hospital with a strange illness
confirmed quickly by the CDC to be smallpox. While we only knew
about the Oklahoma cases the first day, we later learned the
scope of the initial infections and the sites of three
simultaneous attacks in shopping centers in Oklahoma, Georgia
and Pennsylvania. The initial infection quickly spread to five
states and 3,000 victims although most infected individuals had
not displayed symptoms or gone to the hospital in the first few
days so we did not know who they were or where they were.
We quickly learned that we had only two tools available to
deal with a smallpox attack--vaccination and isolation, and we
had only enough vaccine for one out of every 23 Americans.
I denied the Secretary of Defense's demand that all 2.3
million of U.S. military personnel be immediately vaccinated
wherever they were in the world. Instead, we administered
vaccine to U.S. military, including the National Guard, and
security and medical service personnel who were on the front
lines locally and also those who were in areas of the world
where a smallpox attack was more likely to occur. Our initial
decision was to use our limited vaccine supply to protect
health care workers, local police and fire officials, National
Guard on the scene and local, state and federal officials in
the line of fire. We also devised a strategy to try and put a
firewall around the infections that were being reported, but
that strategy was largely ineffective because of the rapid
spread of the disease and our limited supply of vaccine.
So, on the first night of decision-making, we designed a
vaccination strategy, and we ordered accelerated production of
new stock. We asked the Secretary of State to try to find
surplus stock from other countries. I will skip the agonizing
details and get to the conclusions.
On Day Six of the crisis, we had very little vaccine left.
We quickly faced the only alternative--forced isolation with
large numbers of exposed citizens whose locations and
identities remained guesswork. We were down to the really tough
questions. Do we force whole communities and cities to stay in
their homes? How? With force? Do we physically prevent citizens
in high-risk areas from fleeing their communities when they
themselves may already be infected? Who provides food and care
for those in forced isolation, particularly when we can no
longer provide vaccine to essential providers?
On Day Twelve, when our war game ended and my brief tenure
as President concluded, we were beginning the next stage of the
epidemic--those who caught smallpox from the original 3,000
people who were infected in the initial terrorist attack. Our
health experts told us that every two to three weeks the number
of cases would increase ten-fold. To give you a glimpse of how
the exercise ended, here are a few highlights from a simulated
CNN broadcast:
On Day Twelve of the worst public health crisis in
America's history, demonstrations for more vaccine in
hard-hit communities disintegrated into riots and
looting around the nation. Interstate commerce has
stopped in several regions of the nation. A suspension
of trading on America's stock exchanges takes effect
tomorrow. International commerce with the U.S. has
virtually ceased.
The Centers for Disease Control reports that efforts to
stem the smallpox epidemic have depleted America's
inventory of smallpox vaccine. While the CDC may be out
of vaccine, at least 45 Internet websites are offering
what they claim are safe, effective vaccines from
previously forgotten stocks. These claims have not--
repeat not--been independently verified, and
authorities urge caution.
At least 25 more states and 10 foreign countries are
reporting smallpox infections. At the United Nations,
China has sponsored a resolution to censure the U.S.,
blaming America for reintroducing smallpox to the
world. It is demanding that the U.S. supply the world
with vaccine.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, I determined from our war game
that public health has become a national security issue, but
that we are unprepared. We were out of vaccine. We were
discussing martial law. Interstate commerce was eroding
rapidly. The members of our simulated NSC, as well as state and
local officials, were desperate. We came to realize too late
that our country:
Had not produced sufficient vaccine.
Had not prepared top officials to cope with this new
type of security crisis.
Had not invested adequately in the planning and
exercises absolutely necessary for coordinated
response.
Had not ensured that the public health
infrastructure was adequate, with built in surge
capacity.
Had not educated the American people, or developed
strategies to constructively engage the media in
educating the public, about what was happening and what
to do.
Had not practiced what few plans there were in
place.
Had not ranked biological terrorism or infectious
diseases as high national priorities.
Dilemmas and Insights
Most participants in our exercise would have been much more
in their element if we had been dealing with a terrorist
bombing. The effects of a bomb are bounded in time and place.
After the explosion, the nation's leadership knows the
geography and the extent of the damage. You know where to
start, and how much it will take to respond and rebuild.
Smallpox, on the other hand, is a silent, ongoing, invisible
attack. It is highly contagious, and spreads in a flash--each
smallpox victim can infect ten to twenty others. It incubates
for two weeks before physically appearing--it comes in waves.
The most insidious effect of a biological weapons attack is
that it can turn Americans against Americans. Once smallpox is
released, it is not the terrorists anymore who are the threat;
our neighbors and family members can become the threat. If
they've been exposed, they can kill you by talking to you. The
scene could match the horror of the Biblical description in
Zechariah (8:10): "Neither was there any peace to him that
went out or came in
. . . for I set all men every one against his neighbour."
A biological weapons attack cuts across categories and
mocks old strategies. For more than two thousand years the most
important rule of war has been to know your enemy.
In military language, this means that when you face a
battlefield scenario, you draw up an order of battle--you
estimate the number of enemy tanks and planes and troops, their
intelligence and logistics capabilities, and other resources. A
biological weapon, however, is an invisible killer. An attack
may go unrecognized for days, only becoming evident after large
numbers of people become sick. In the case of a contagious
disease, our own people would become the enemy's weapons as
they transmit the disease to others, creating ever-widening
circles of exposure.
Even after you know there has been an attack, there still
are few reliable numbers--because you don't know who initially
released it, how much more they have, or where they are. And
the usual responses to an attack are impossible: "Engage the
enemy; open fire; stop their advance; bring out the wounded."
You can hardly know who is wounded.
For the participants, this exercise was filled with many
such horrible dilemmas and unpleasant insights.
Number one: We have a fragmented and under-funded public
health system--at the local, state, and federal levels--that
does not allow us to effectively detect and track disease
outbreaks in real time.
Two: Lab facilities needed to diagnose the disease are
inadequately supported and laboring with outdated technology.
Three: There is insufficient partnership and communication
across federal agencies and among local, state, and federal
governments.
Four: The only way to deal with smallpox is with isolation
and vaccination, but we don't have enough vaccines, and we
don't have enough dedicated facilities, resources, or
information for effective isolation.
Five: A biological weapons attack will be a local event
with national implications, and that guarantees tension between
local, state and national interests. In our exercise, Governor
Keating of Oklahoma asked for vaccine for every one of his
citizens--as he had to in the interests of his state. The
President said no, as he had to in the interests of the nation.
Naturally, this demands a high degree of advanced planning and
coordination, because of the diverging interests, and because
key players and partners are answerable to different leaders.
Six: Most hospitals run at or near full capacity all the
time: a surge in patients from smallpox, combined with the
inevitable infections of hospital personnel, and the flight of
some fearful health care professionals, would create a
catastrophic overload.
Seven: There will be a dearth of information on this kind
of event. My staff and cabinet could not tell me ten percent of
what I wanted to know: "How many cases are there right now?
How many more cases can we expect? Will there be more attacks?
When and where did the first infections take place? Who
released it? What's the worst-case scenario? Is our vaccine
supply secure and safe for use? Will other countries loan us
emergency vaccine to keep the disease from spreading all over
the world?
And there are many tradeoffs. One of the biggest: We have
12 million vaccines; that's enough for one out of every 23
Americans. How do we decide whom to vaccinate?
Do we take power from the Governors and federalize the
National Guard? Do we seize hotels and convert them into
hospitals? Do we close borders and block all travel? What level
of force do we use to keep someone sick with smallpox in
isolation? Do we keep people known or thought to be exposed
quarantined in their homes? Do we guarantee 2.3 million doses
of vaccine to the military; or do we first cover all health
care providers? Do we take strong measures that protect health,
but could undermine public support or destroy the economy?
Finally: How do you talk to the public in a way that is
candid, yet prevents panic--knowing that panic itself can be a
weapon of mass destruction? My staff had two responses: "We
don't know" and "You're late for your press conference."
I told people in the exercise: "I would never go before
the press with this little information," and Governor
Keating--who knows about dealing with disaster, said: "You
have no choice." And I went, even though I did not have
answers for the public's most urgent questions: "How do you
plan to protect our families?" "How rapidly and how far will
it spread?" And "Why isn't there enough vaccine?"
Naturally, there are some skeptics anytime you describe a
dire threat to the United States. I want to tell the Committee:
I am convinced the threat of a biological weapons attack on the
United States is as urgent as it is real. As Secretary Rumsfeld
said in his confirmation hearings: "I would rank bioterrorism
quite high in terms of threats . . . It does not take a genius
to create agents that are enormously powerful, and they can be
done in mobile facilities, in small facilities." An experiment
some years ago showed that a scientist whose specialty was in
another field was able to weaponize anthrax on his first
attempt for less than $250,000.
Hundreds of labs and repositories around the world sell
biological agents for legitimate research--and the same
substances used in legitimate research can be turned into
weapons research. In addition, the massive biological weapons
program of the former Soviet Union remains a threat, at least
to the extent that materials and know-how could flow to hostile
forces. At its peak, the program employed 70,000 scientists and
technicians and made twenty tons of smallpox. One Russian
official was quoted some years ago in The New Yorker saying:
"There were plenty of opportunities for staff members to walk
away with an ampule." There still are.
According to a very prominent press report, former Soviet
biological weapons scientists have been aggressively--and in
some eases successfully--recruited by Iran. And Ambassador Rolf
Ekeus, who headed the United Nations special commission that
investigated Iraq's arsenal after the Gulf War, and who we are
lucky to have on the Board of Directors of NTI, had testified
before Congress that in 1991 Iraq had 300 biological bombs.
So the ability of people to acquire or create biological
weapons should be clear beyond any doubt. And no one should
doubt how lethal biological weapons could be. In 1979, a small
amount of anthrax escaped from a Soviet biological weapons lab
in Sverdlovsk. Seventy-seven cases of human anthrax occurred in
the city surrounding the lab. Sixty-six died, and new cases
were appearing as late as 47 days after the leak. All this
resulted from only a tiny amount of anthrax being released--on
the order of ounces. It doesn't take much imagination to
envision the catastrophe that would result if someone
deliberately released a much larger quantity.
It is important not to overstate this threat. But it is not
an overstatement to say it is real, it is dangerous, and if it
occurred today, it would catch us unprepared.
Michael Osterholm and John Schwartz, in their book Living
Terrors, told about the experience of one doctor who knew his
state was one of the best-trained areas of the country for a
biological weapons attack. One day he conducted some
unscientific research. He discovered that the total city
stockpile for dealing with an anthrax attack would not cover
even 600 patients. He found that a doctor trained in biological
weapons failed to diagnose anthrax when the classic symptoms
were described; a doctor in the radiology department failed to
recognize inhalation anthrax when shown an X-ray; and a voice
mail message describing a bioterrorism concern went unreturned
by the state health department for three days.
Next Steps
In fairness, we are making progress. The Clinton
Administration deserves credit for recognizing that a
biological weapons attack is different from warfare or other
terrorist threats and for targeting funds to address it. That
initiative includes strengthening the public health
infrastructure, creating a pharmaceutical stockpile for
civilian use, a contract to develop and produce a new smallpox
vaccine, research to develop new and improved diagnostics,
drugs and vaccines, programs to train first responders (police
and fire departments as well as public health and medical
professionals) across the United States, and investments in new
technologies to help detect biological agents.
Under the Bush Administration, these efforts are continuing
and in some eases, funding is increasing. It is also heartening
that Secretary Thompson has named a senior advisor on
bioterrorism who previously directed the program on
bioterrorism at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
These are positive steps. Still, we have to do more--and
quickly.
Before detailing the issues that I believe deserve the
greatest attention, we should keep in mind that the results of
biological attacks would vary according to the specific agent
used. Technology and training for early recognition of the type
of pathogen are essential. This exercise gave us valuable
lessons about a possible smallpox attack. The circumstances
would be very different in the case of an anthrax attack, for
example. In the event of an attack using anthrax, vaccination
and isolation would be irrelevant, but antibiotics would need
to be administered on the scene immediately.
For the participants, the Dark Winter exercise instilled in
all of us that there is much work to be done:
Number one: Clearly, measures that will deter or prevent
bioterrorism are the most cost effective means to counter
threats to public health and social order. We need to prevent
the proliferation of biological weapons, in part by
strengthening intelligence gathering against such threats, but
also by providing peaceful research options to scientists in
the former Soviet Union. Efforts to fight proliferation require
a global approach, including finding a way to strengthen and
enforce the Biological Weapons Convention.
Two: We need to focus more attention, concern and resources
on the specific threat of bioterrorism--understanding that it
is different from other threats we face. Biological weapons
must be countered with new protocols for securing dangerous
pathogens, with increased vigilance and surveillance, as well
as with increased supplies of medicines and vaccines and
significantly increased training.
Three: We need to recognize the central role of public
health and medicine in this effort and engage these
professionals fully as partners on the national security team.
We must act on the understanding that public health is an
important pillar in our national security framework. In the
event of a biological weapons attack--millions of lives will
depend on how quickly doctors diagnose the illness, communicate
their findings, and bring forth a fast and effective response
at the local and federal level. This means, clearly, that
public health and medical professionals must be part of the
national security team. Planning for an event like this is not
the exclusive purview of the Department of Defense, the
National Security Council, the CIA and the Department of
Energy. The Department of Health and Human Services (CDC, FDA,
NIH, etc.) must also be included.
This may seem obvious enough. But several years ago, when
Administration officials were meeting to discuss supplemental
funding legislation for defense against biological weapons--the
presiding official from the Office of Management and Budget
greeted the officials from the NSC, and FBI and CIA and DOD,
then saw the Assistant Secretary from Health and Human Services
at the table, did a double-take and said: "What are you doing
here?" Health officials should not need to be given directions
to the White House Situation Room in an emergency.
Four: We need to identify and put into practice the
mechanisms by which all levels of government will interact and
work together. It is critical that we understand our differing
roles, responsibilities, capabilities, and authorities, and
plan on how we will work together before an act of terrorism
occurs.
Five: We need to reexamine and modernize the legal
framework for epidemic control measures and the appropriate
balance with civil liberties--the laws that would apply if we
were to find ourselves managing the crisis that would come with
a biological weapons attack. These laws vary from state to
state and many are antiquated. We need to make sure that they
are up-to-date, consistent with our current social values and
priorities, and we need to reacquaint high-level officials in
all areas of response with the specific authorities these laws
provide, and how they can implement them.
Six: There should be a clear plan for providing the news
media with timely and accurate information to help save lives
and prevent panic.
Seven: We need to increase the core capacities of our
public health system to detect, track and contain epidemics, by
providing resources for effective surveillance systems,
diagnostic laboratory facilities, and communication links to
other elements of the response effort.
Eight: The national pharmaceutical stockpile should be
built to capacity, including extra production capability for
drugs and vaccines, with heightened security at the various
dispersal sites. We must not fall victim to a twin attack that
releases a bio-agent and simultaneously destroys our drugs and
vaccines.
Nine: We need to develop plans for a surge of patients in
the nation's hospitals to make the best use of existing
resources in the event of an emergency. This will require
careful advance planning, including how to utilize ancillary
facilities such as gymnasiums or armories, since most hospitals
are operating at or near capacity right now.
Ten: We need to increase funding for biomedical research to
develop new vaccines, new therapeutic drugs, and new rapid
diagnostic tests for bioweapon agents.
Eleven: We need to encourage the scientific community to
confront the sinister potential of modern biological research,
and help them devise systems and practices that ensure the
safe, secure storage of, and access to, dangerous pathogens.
Twelve: Officials at the highest levels of the federal,
state, and local government need to participate in exercises
like Dark Winter to understand the importance of advance
preparation. Plans must be exercised, evaluated, and understood
by decision-makers if they are to prove useful in a time of
crisis.
I know how difficult it is to find funding for new
initiatives, and public health is often left behind. We need to
think about supporting public health activities in the same way
we think about our national defense. Congress and the public
should understand that expanding disease surveillance, creating
additional lab capacity and enhancing vaccine production
capabilities will benefit the United States not only in
responding to a biological weapons attack, but also by
improving our responses to natural disease outbreaks. We have a
chance to defend the nation against its adversaries and improve
the public health system with the same steps.
The Nuclear Threat Initiative--A New Foundation
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, encouraging and
helping our government to deter, prevent, and defend against
biological terrorism is a central part of our mission at the
Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)--the organization founded by
Ted Turner and guided by an experienced board that Ted and I
co-chair. We are dedicated to reducing the global threat from
biological, nuclear, and chemical weapons by increasing public
awareness, encouraging dialogue, catalyzing action, and
promoting new thinking about these dangers in this country and
abroad.
We fully recognize that only our government can provide the
leadership and resources to achieve our security and health
priorities. But within that context, NTI is:
Seeking ways to reduce the threat from biological
weapons and their consequences.
Exploring ways to increase education, awareness and
communication among public health experts, medical
professionals, and scientists, as well as among policy
makers and elected officials--to make sure more and
more people understand the nature and scope of the
biological weapons threat.
Considering ways to improve infectious disease
surveillance around the globe--including rapid and
effective detection, investigation, and response. This
is a fundamental defense against any infectious disease
threat, whether it occurs naturally or is released
deliberately.
Stimulating and supporting the scientific community
in its efforts to limit inappropriate access to
dangerous pathogens and to establish standards that
will help prevent the development and spread of
biological agents as weapons.
And finally, NTI is searching for ways to help our
government and the Russian government to facilitate the
conversion of Russian bioweapons facilities and know-
how to peaceful purposes, to secure biomaterials for
legitimate use or destruction, and to improve security
of dangerous pathogens worldwide.
Concluding Remarks
Mr. Chairman, enemies don't normally attack us where we are
strong; they target us where we are weak. Enemies of the United
States are not eager to engage us militarily; they saw what
happened in Desert Storm. They will attack us where they
believe we are vulnerable. Today, we are vulnerable to
biological terrorism and those who perpetuate such an act are
not likely to be quickly identified or leave a return address.
It is critical that we prepare with all possible speed, because
if an attack occurs, and succeeds, there will be others.
Preparing is deterring.
Our first priority must be prevention. Whether the enemy
achieves its objectives in an attack depends, to a large
extent, on how the American people respond. Panic is as great a
danger as disease. Some will respond like saints--doing
whatever they can, exhibiting brave and selfless patriotism--to
meet the needs of family and community. Others will respond
with panic, perhaps even using violence to obtain vaccines or
drugs, or try to protect themselves or their loved ones from
exposure. The distance between these two is broad. How most of
our citizens will respond will depend largely on what they hear
from the President and their elected leaders, and how they see
our government respond. This means we must be prepared.
When America faced possible financial panic in March of
1933, President Roosevelt did three things immediately upon
taking office: he ordered the banks to close temporarily, he
proposed emergency banking legislation, and he explained his
plan to the public in the first of his regular national radio
broadcasts.
If he had not talked reassuringly to the American people,
his plan might not have worked. But if he had talked, and had
no plan, his talk would not have been reassuring. In the event
of a biological weapons attack, no President, no matter how
great his natural gifts, will be able to reassure the public
and prevent panic unless we are better prepared than we are
right now.
If we are well prepared--with the ability to detect the
disease quickly, report it swiftly, and implement the
appropriate infection control measures, including the provision
of necessary drugs or vaccines for all those who came in
contact with it--then the President of the United States will
address the American people with knowledge, with courage, and
with confidence, and the people will respond in kind. Whether
this or a future President will exert this essential leadership
will depend in large part on how we all address this issue now.
I commend the Committee for tackling such a difficult but
important matter. Our country's protection and safety depend on
your leadership. Thank you.
Prepared Statement of Dr. Donald A. Henderson, MD, MPH
Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the Committee, thank
you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
the realities of the threat posed by biological weapons, our
capabilities to secure an early warning of an attack, our
potential for response and, finally, measures that might be
taken nationally and internationally to lessen the probability
of an attack.
It is generally agreed that the 21st century brings with it
a new era in the biological sciences with advances in molecular
biology and biotechnology that promise longer, healthier lives
and the effective control, perhaps elimination of a host of
acute and chronic diseases. The prospects are bright but there
is a dark side--the possibility that infectious agents might be
developed and produced as offensive weapons; that new or
emergent infections, like HIV/AIDS, might overwhelm available
preventive and therapeutic measures or that laboratory
scientists, perhaps inadvertently, might create and release a
new and lethal agent. These concerns are as relevant to Europe,
to Africa, to Asia as they are to America, In today's world of
rapid travel and large migrant populations, epidemic disease,
wherever it occurs and of whatever origin, threatens the
security of all nations. We are, today, ill-prepared to deal
with these challenges.
Throughout the 45 years of my professional career, my
principal concern has been the control of infectious diseases
both in the United States and abroad. My experience has
included 20 years with the Centers for Disease Control,
including assignments as Chief of Surveillance and Chief of the
Epidemic Intelligence Serve; 11 years with WHO as Director of
the Smallpox Eradication Program; and 16 years as Chairman of
the Pan-American Health Organization's Technical Advisory Group
which counseled PAHO experts on the design and development of
the polio eradication program. Enormous strides in epidemic
disease control have been made over the past quarter century
and more is promised. Four years ago, however, it became
apparent to me that these accomplishments and more were
jeopardized by the growing threat of biological weapons as well
as by new and emergent infections. This led to our founding
three years ago of the Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense
Studies. Our energies are directed ultimately toward preventing
biological disasters that potentially could become global in
scope, such as epidemic smallpox could readily be and which
AIDS is rapidly becoming.
The Threat from Biological Weapons
Nothing in the realm of natural catastrophes or man-made
disasters rivals the complex problems of response that would
follow a bioweapons attack against a civilian population. The
consequence of such an attack would be an epidemic and, in this
country, we have had little experience in coping with
epidemics. In fact, no city has had to deal with a truly
serious epidemic accompanied by large numbers of cases and
deaths since the 1918 influenza epidemic, more than two
generations ago.
Senators Hart and Rudman, chairs of the United States
Commission on National Security in the Twenty-first Century,
singled out bioweapons as perhaps the greatest threat that the
U.S. might face in the next century. Admiral Stansfield Turner
pointed out that, besides nuclear weapons, the only other
weapons with the capacity to take the nation past the "point
of non-recovery" are the biological ones.
The Dark Winter scenario dramatizes the catastrophic
potential of smallpox as a weapon. It is, of course, not the
only possible organism that might be used. In 1993, the Office
of Technology Assessment estimated that 100 grams of anthrax
released upwind of a large American city--the model being
Washington, DC--could cause between 130,000 and 3 million
deaths, depending on the weather and other variables. This
degree of carnage is in the same range as that forecast for a
hydrogen bomb. Although there is legitimate concern as well
about the possible use of chemical weapons, they are far less
effective pound for pound and extremely difficult to deploy
over large areas. Ten grams of anthrax can produce as many
casualties as a ton of a chemical nerve agent.
The insidious manner by which a biological attack would
unfold is itself alarming. The fact of an attack using an
explosive or chemical weapon would be recognized immediately
and resources summoned quickly to deal with the consequences
and to begin to remediate the situation. A biological agent
would, in all probability, be released clandestinely as an
aerosol spray, odorless and invisible, which would drift slowly
throughout a building or across a city. Not until days to weeks
later would people begin to fall ill; new cases would continue
to occur over a period of one to several weeks. Some of those
exposed, in all likelihood, would be hundreds of miles away
when they develop symptoms--in other cities, in other
countries. Thus, the consequence of the attack would extend
well beyond the immediate area of release.
Biological weapons have not been used since WWII but this
is not because of concern that they might not work. The U.S.
program was abandoned in 1969 not for technical but for
political reasons. As Gradon Carter has pointed out, the
utility of bioweapons had been demonstrated by all possible
means short of war. By the 1960s, the U.S. knew how to grow and
process many microorganisms in a form usable for mass casualty
biological weapons. Trials that modeled dispersion of simulant
agents as aerosols were conducted in many cities and scores of
tests with live biological agents using animals as targets were
performed at the Johnson Atoll from 1963 to 1969. There is now
no doubt and there was then no doubt, of the capacity of these
weapons to cause widespread casualties. A World Health
Organization (WHO) analysis, now 30 years old, supported the
belief that biological weapons are strategic, population-
destroying weapons. Since then, the technology needed to create
and disperse these weapons has advanced significantly.
The year 1972 was a significant one in the history of
bioweapons. That year, the Biological Weapons Convention was
agreed upon, calling for all signatory countries to cease
research on biological weapons and to destroy existing stocks.
The Soviet Union and Iraq were both parties to the Convention.
The Soviet Union, however, began immediately to greatly expand
and modernize its existing biological weapons program and to
develop genetically engineered pathogens and other organisms
that could serve as strategic weapons. A new organization was
created called Biopreparat. Ostensibly a civilian operation, it
recruited some of the most capable of Russian biologists. At
its peak, it employed over 30,000 persons. There was also a
military program of at least 15,000 people and an agricultural
program making crop pathogens that employed 10,000 people. The
overall complement of staff was equivalent in size to that of
its nuclear program. Biopreparat's agenda included the
manipulation of viruses and micro-organisms to render them
capable of surviving delivery on missile warheads; the
development of particularly virulent strains of organisms that
are resistant to vaccines and antibiotics; the creation of
peptides that could alter moods and heart biorhythms; and the
manufacture of tons of anthrax, as well as smallpox virus and
antibiotic-resistant strains of plague.
Although the Soviet program was of prodigious size and
sophistication, the infrastructure that is actually necessary
to make a biological weapon is, in fact, comparatively simple
and inexpensive, especially compared to that required to make a
nuclear weapon. To make one kilogram of plutonium requires 100
tons of uranium ore; a substantial quantity of specialized
equipment; and an enormous facility readily visible from the
air. A biological weapon can be produced with the same
equipment one uses to produce an ordinary vaccine; it can be
readily housed in a building the size of a two-ear garage;
nothing on the exterior would identify its use. Moreover, the
room and the equipment could be sufficiently cleansed within 24
hours so that no one, on inspection, would be able to determine
whether it had been used to make vaccines or biological
weapons.
The intelligence agencies have estimated that at least a
dozen states possess or are actively seeking an offensive
biological weapons capacity. Most of these states are those
named by the State Department as sponsors of terrorism.
Expertise for operating these facilities is readily available
from now poorly funded laboratories of the Russian biological
weapons complex. For these countries, biological weapons have a
special appeal. They are inexpensive, they occupy little
volume, they are readily transportable from place to place and
they are capable of being disseminated covertly so that
attribution may be impossible.
It is also important to appreciate that the technologies
needed to build biological weapons are available in the open
literature and on the Internet. This is not knowledge that is
limited to a few hundred scientists isolated in a laboratory in
the western desert. There are many scientists who have this
knowledge and are capable of putting together a biological
weapon. Some have argued that preparing a biological weapon is
complicated and have been mistakenly reassured by the failure
of Aum Shinrikyo's efforts to aerosolize anthrax throughout
Tokyo. In fact, although the sect did include some with
experience in microbiology, those who actually worked on the
project were not well-trained microbiologists. Nonetheless,
they came very close to succeeding.
Implications of Advances in Biotechnology
A key reason for being concerned about biological weapons
is the remarkable progress now being made in biotechnology and
genomics research. Bioscience is moving at a much faster pace
than did physics in the 1950s, partly because of computers and
the more ready accessibility of knowledge, and partly because
of the money that is being invested by large corporations in
the biological sciences. In 1998, the U.S. biotechnology
industry employed 150,000 people and had a market
capitalization of $97 billion with product sales of $13.4
billion. Last April, the Harvard Business Review predicted that
the ability to manipulate the genetic codes of living things
will dwarf the business transformation propelled by the
Internet. Indeed, it is generally acknowledged that the life
sciences will be the most important technology of this century.
But, as the understanding of molecular biology increases
and as we develop the ability to manipulate cellular processes,
we are also creating the tools and knowledge for building more
powerful and more diverse weapons. When we discover why a
particular virus or bacteria is especially virulent or why it
has become resistant to antibiotics, we create an opening for
building a new drug or a new vaccine. At the same time, we
facilitate the creation of tools needed to build more virulent
weapons.
The Effects of a Biological Weapons Attack
The consequences of a biological weapon attack would be an
epidemic, most likely following an unannounced attack. In all
probability, we would know that something had happened only
when people started appearing in the emergency rooms and
doctors' offices with strange maladies. Depending on the
biological agent and its incubation period, it could be days or
weeks after release of the organism before people first became
ill. Identification of the cause could be problematical.
American physicians today are not trained to diagnose illnesses
due to the pathogens thought to be the ones most likely to be
used as bioweapons. Few physicians have ever seen cases of
anthrax or smallpox or pneumonic plague.
It is difficult to imagine how the public might respond in
today's world to a fast-moving lethal epidemic. In recent
decades, there have been few such epidemics in industrialized
cities. One of the more recent occurred in India in 1994.
Plague broke out in the diamond-polishing district of Surat. It
was reported by the media as a deadly, mysterious fever,
possibly plague. Within hours, panic reigned. People began
streaming from the city. Many in the medical community were
among the first to leave. Eventually half a million fled,
leaving the city a ghost town. It is estimated that India lost
some two billion dollars in lost trade, embargoes, and
production as a consequence of this outbreak. How many actually
died of plague is still not clear but the total was not more
than 50.
Epidemics have the potential to spread internationally as
we have observed with the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The disease is
contagious but it is not easily transmitted from one person to
another. Nevertheless, it spread across the globe and is
changing the population demographics in some African countries
to a degree comparable to that caused by the Black Death of the
1300s, which killed a third of the European population.
Addressing the Biological Weapons Threat
The status of national preparations to deal with
bioterrorism is difficult to summarize. The diverse initiatives
taken by different agencies of government are not well
coordinated, even within the agencies themselves and many have
been designed with little comprehension of what is implied for
the civilian population when a biological weapon is used.
Beginning in 1995, when the first Presidential Decision
Directive was issued, preparations to respond to terrorism
focussed almost exclusively on training and equipping "first
response" teams to counter the effects of a nuclear or
conventional explosive device or a chemical attack. Training
programs in 120 cities were targeted to include police, fire
and emergency rescue personnel in a "lights and sirens" type
of response and special full-time units of the National Guard
were constituted whose function is not clear but certainly have
little to do with bioterrorism.
Not for several years was there a beginning comprehension
that the consequences of use of a biological weapon would be an
epidemic and that those first detecting its presence and those
primarily responsible for controlling the disease would be
public health personnel and physicians. Accordingly, in most
cities, public health, medical and hospital personnel were not
included either in planning or training. Finally, in FY 99,
significant funds began to be made available to the Department
of Health and Human Services, primarily the Centers for Disease
Control (CDC), whose traditional responsibility, with state and
local health departments, has been the surveillance and control
of infectious diseases. Some two years ago an Office dealing
with Bioterrorism was established at CDC; modest funds began to
be made available to the states for development of programs
both for response and surveillance; stockpiles of antibiotics
were procured; smallpox vaccine was ordered; and a national
network of laboratories was established that is capable of
diagnosing the organisms of principal concern. Unfortunately,
little has yet been done to provide for the training of public
health and medical professionals and hospitals remain woefully
unprepared.
Current Vulnerabilities
We are today ill-prepared to deal with an epidemic of any
sort. There is, as yet, no comprehensive national plan nor an
agreed strategy for dealing with the problem of biological
weapons. There is little inter-agency coordination at the
federal level and nationally funded programs appear to be as
often competitive as cooperative. Particularly serious are the
vulnerabilities in our medical health care system and our
public health infrastructure.
Hospitals
When Americans are seriously ill, they expect to be cared
for in hospitals. If the hospitals became overwhelmed and were
paralyzed by chaos, it would have serious implications for
public morale and for the potential for containing an epidemic,
let alone treating those who were already sick. The likelihood
of public anxiety rising to civil disorder would rise
substantially.
Hospitals are under serious pressure today. Of the 5000
hospitals in the U.S., 30% are losing money; over the last
decade, 1000 have closed because of financial reasons. They
face a host of regulatory issues including those dealing with
health insurance portability, safer needles, medical and
medication error reduction, limits on medical device reuse,
ergonomic standards for employees, requirements for patient
restraints and seclusion, and many more. At the same time, the
numbers of the uninsured are increasing and the population is
aging and in need of more medical services. The hospitals have
struggled to become ever more efficient but, in their quest to
eliminate inefficiencies, they have basically wiped out their
surge capacity. Even minor increases in patient demand, such as
that of the 1999 brief and mild flu season strained most
hospitals.
This lack of elasticity is also seen in the pharmaceutical
field as companies have focussed on just-in-time production and
delivery. The result is that reserve supplies are few and
temporary problems in production are regularly manifested in
country-wide spot shortages of such as antibiotics and other
critical drugs.
There is an increasing shortage of emergency rooms what
with the loss of a thousand hospitals in the past decade and a
desire on the part of hospitals to close ERs, if possible,
because of their drain on resources. The amount of time that
Baltimore's hospitals have been on "diversion" of ambulances
because of over crowding has doubled every year for the past
three years. Ventilators to aid respiration are in short
supply. Baltimore, home to two major medical centers and
medical schools, could not handle an acute situation that
produced as many as 50 casualties requiring ventilators. A
handful of highly contagious patients would cause havoc, there
being in the Baltimore-Washington area, no more than 100 beds
in negative pressure rooms that could handle highly contagious
patients.
However, the most intractable problem for hospitals is
likely to be staffing. As we have been told, only half of all
nurses work in hospitals and the average age of a nurse in
America is 53. More are now retiring than are being recruited
to the field. Hospital administrators report that, even if they
had more open beds, they doubt that they would have staff to
care for the patients.
The Public Health System
The public health system is in even worse shape. Public
health is a long-neglected stepchild to modern medicine. It is
a sector that has been understaffed and under funded for
several decades.
It is believed that, in most states, there is ample
authority for public health officials to respond aggressively
and effectively to protect the public health. However, many of
the relevant laws were written between the time of the Civil
War and the 1930s. A more critical problem is knowing what to
do and how to do it. With sharp reductions in the number of
cases of the major infectious diseases, processes and knowledge
about when and how to use quarantine and isolation procedures,
how to organize large scale vaccination programs and how to
communicate effectively with a concerned public have been lost.
A major problem is that there really is no public health
"system" for dealing with infectious diseases in this
country, but, rather, a fragmented pattern of activities. The
federal system, which for the most part is in the federal
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is itself comprised
of a number of Centers and activities that are themselves
independent fiefdoms. State and local health departments
reflect a similar pattern and there is a major disconnect
between the public health and medicine. Doctors rarely
communicate with local public health officials and often, when
they try to do so, they find no one with needed competence. In
New York City, a city with one of the best public health
departments in the country, the report of two eases of
encephalitis to the health department led to the unraveling of
the West Nile epidemic. This was a laudable and important
response. However, it was later discovered that at the time the
first two cases were reported, there were 20 other patients
already hospitalized with encephalitis, a clearly recognizable
and legally reportable disease.
In most areas, public health is not treated as an emergency
service as are police, fire and utilities. The concept of a 24
hour per day, 7 day per week "hot line" is little known. Yet,
public health officials will be the ones who will be obliged to
organize a response to an epidemic, to communicate with the
public and to orchestrate a city and state's response resources
Increasing Preparedness
What can be done to diminish our vulnerability to
bioweapons.
First, we have got to better prepare our public health and
medical care services to respond to outbreaks and epidemics and
to mass casualty situations whatever their origin. They are at
the core of any response and yet, only recently have they even
begun to be involved in the necessary planning and training
activities. Significant resources will be required for this
purpose, perhaps one billion dollars per year or more. Although
a large sum, this would represent less than 10% of government
expenditures for counter-terrorist activities. This investment,
however, would serve a far broader utility than bioterroism
alone.
Second, we need to mount a robust research and development
program for bio-defense. It would seem logical for this to be a
joint DOD-DHHS effort. We need to engage the genius of the
universities, the pharmaceutical firms and the biotechnology
companies, few of whom are now involved. The bioscience
community does not have a history of engagement with defense
projects and, by and large, they have not been eager to work
with government in this field. For this to happen will require
inventive structures and incentives. Three areas of research
and development would be especially important: (1) More
definitive, rapid, automated means of diagnosing major
pathogens, basically building microchips that could identify
specific pathogens by deciphering the molecular genomes. (2)
Mechanisms for being able to rapidly develop and produce new
antibiotics and antiviral drugs for new and emergent diseases.
(3) Mechanisms for enhancing the immune response generally, so
as to get beyond the one organism-one drug approach.
Third, public health has to identify those critical
capacities that are needed to fight epidemics of contagious
disease. These include surveillance and reporting systems,
particularly the ability to track an epidemic once it occurs.
But what we must do, even in normal times, is to track
outbreaks once they arc identified. Communications systems that
connect health care providers and the public health system are
critical.
Fourth, in cooperation with WHO and other countries, we
need to strengthen greatly our intelligence gathering
capability. A focus on international surveillance and on
scientist-to-scientist communication will be necessary if we
are to have an early warning about the possible development and
production of biological weapons by rogue nations or groups
and, likewise, to have the earliest possible warning and
longest possible lead time to develop drugs and vaccines to
deal with new or emergent organisms.
Fifth, a concerted effort by the medical, public health
and, broadly, the biological sciences community to condemn
participation in research or development of biological weapons
is clearly indicated. Such a response would provide no certain
guarantees that misbehavior would not occur but then, there is
as yet no other satisfactory deterrent to deal with these
troublesome weapons.
Summary
Biological weapons are a significant threat, and because of
the rapidly growing power of biotechnology and biological
knowledge, the urgency and the diversity of this threat will
only increase. The nature of biological weapons and the
epidemics that they could create is such that preventing them
will be far more challenging than preventing the catastrophic
use of chemical or nuclear weapons. It is going to be hard to
detect biological weapons production facilities, it is going to
be hard to track the weapons before they are used, and it is
going to be very hard to interdict them before they are
released.
If we do nothing more than strengthen the public health and
medical care systems, we can significantly decrease the
suffering and death that would follow a bioweapons attack. By
being able to mitigate the consequences of such an attack, we
can make ourselves less attractive targets to would-be
perpetrators. As important, we could improve the everyday
functioning of the health care and the public health system for
the general good.
=======================================================================
REPORT OF THE ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW
BOARDS ON THE EMBASSY BOMBINGS IN
NAIROBI AND DAR ES SALAAM
Chairman: Admiral William Crowe, Jr.
January 1999
=======================================================================
Report of the Accountability Review Boards
----------
Board Members
Admiral William J. Crowe, Chairman
------
Nairobi Board
Amb. Michael H. Armacost
Amb. Philip C. Wilcox, Jr.
Dr. Janne E. Nolan
Mr. Arthur W. Donahue
Amb. Richard C. Brown--Executive Secretary
------
Dar Es Salaam Board
Amb. Terence A. Todman
Mr. David Busby
Dr. Lynn E. Davis
Mr. Montgomery L. Rogers
Mr. Kenneth R. McKune--Executive Secretary
Report of the Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings in
Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam--January 1999
----------
Executive Overview
The near simultaneous vehicular bombings of the US
Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya. and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, on
August 7, 1998. were terrorist incidents costing the lives of
over 220 persons and wounding more than 4,000 others. Twelve
American USG employees and family members, and 32 Kenyan and 8
Tanzanian USO employees, were among those killed. Both
chanceries withstood collapse from the bombings, but were
rendered unusable, and several adjacent buildings were severely
damaged or destroyed. In examining the circumstances of these
two bombings, the Accountability Review Boards for Nairobi and
Dar Es Salaam determined that:
1. The terrorists intended to destroy the chanceries; to
kill or injure US Government employees and others in the
chanceries; and to damage US prestige, morale, and diplomacy.
Thus, according to P.L. 99-399, the incidents were security
related.
2. The security systems and procedures for physical
security at the embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam as a
general matter met and, in some cases, exceeded the systems and
procedures prescribed by the Department of State for posts
designated at the medium or low threat levels. However, these
standard requirements had not sufficiently anticipated the
threat of large vehicular bomb attacks and were inadequate to
protect against such attacks.
The Department of State, in fact, does not apply its
security standards fully. For far too many* (Note: Passages
here and elsewhere in this document marked with an asterisk (*)
indicate more details can be found in the classified version of
the report.) of its overseas facilities it implements them only
"to the maximum extent feasible," applying "risk
management." For example, neither the chancery in Nairobi nor
in Dar Es Salaam met the Department's standard for a 100 ft.
(3Om) setback/standoff zone. Both were "existing office
buildings" occupied before this standard was adopted; so a
general exception was made. The widespread use of such
exceptions worldwide with respect to setback and other non-
feasible security standards reflects the reality of not having
adequate funds to replace all sub-standard buildings within a
short period of time. Thus in the interim before Inman
buildings could be constructed, exceptions were granted. In
light of the August 7 bombings, these general exceptions to the
setback requirement in particular mask a dangerous level of
exposure to similar attacks elsewhere.
3. The security systems and procedures relating to actions
taken at Embassies Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam were, for the most
part, properly implemented. In Nairobi, the suicide bomber
failed in his attempt to penetrate the embassy's outer
perimeter, thanks to the refusal of local guards to open the
gates. In Dar Es Salaam, the suicide bomber likewise failed to
penetrate the perimeter, apparently stopped by guards and
blocked by an embassy water truck.
However, neither post's Emergency Action Plan anticipated a
car bomb scenario. Nor were there explicit Department
requirements for dealing with such contingencies in EAP
worldwide guidelines, despite clear Inman Report
recommendations. While car bombs are often immediately preceded
by some types of as was the case in Nairobi, personnel Side
embassies are not trained to react properly, nor do perimeter
guards have appropriate equipment
4. There was no credible intelligence that provided
immediate or tactical warning of the August 7 bombings.
A number of earlier intelligence reports cited
alleged threats against several U.S. diplomatic and
other targets, including the embassies in Nairobi and
Dar Es Salaam. All of these reports were disseminated
to the intelligence community and to appropriate posts
abroad, but were largely discounted because of doubts
about the sources. Other reporting--while taken
seriously--was imprecise, changing and non-specific as
to dates, diminishing its usefulness. Additionally,
actions taken by intelligence and law enforcement
authorities to confront suspect terrorist groups
including the Al-Haramayn non-governmental organization
and the Usama Bin Laden (UBL) organization in Nairobi,
were believed to have dissipated the alleged threats.
Indeed, for eight months prior to the August 7
bombings, no further intelligence was produced to warn
the embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam.*
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
investigation of the bombings is still underway but,
thus far, has uncovered no information indicating that
the earlier intelligence reporting could have predicted
the time or place of the attacks. Information from FBI
and intelligence sources could yet be developed,
however, to implicate some of the individuals or groups
cited in the earlier intelligence reporting, or more
likely, to further amplify understanding of the UBL
organization's role in the bombings.
5. The Boards found that both the intelligence and policy
communities relied excessively on tactical intelligence to
determine the level of potential terrorist threats to posts
worldwide. The Inman Report noted and previous experience
indicates that terrorist attacks are often not preceded by
warning intelligence. The establishment of the Counter
Terrorism Center with an inter-agency team of officers has
produced tactical intelligence that has enabled the US to
thwart a number of terrorist threats.* But we cannot count on
having such intelligence to warn us of such attacks.
6. The Boards did not find reasonable cause to believe that
any employee of the United States Government or member of the
uniformed services was culpable of dereliction of his or her
duties in connection with the August 7 bombings. The Boards did
find, however, an institutional failure of the Department of
State and embassies under its direction to recognize threats
posed by transnational terrorism and vehicle bombs worldwide.
Policy-makers and operational officers were remiss in not
preparing more comprehensive procedures to guard against
massive truck bombs. This combined with lack of resources for
building more secure facilities created the ingredients for a
deadly disaster. Responsibility for obtaining adequate
resources for security programs is widely dispersed throughout
the US government as is decision making for determining
security policies and procedures. No one person or office is
accountable for decisions on security policies, procedures and
resources. Ambassadors who are specifically charged with
responsibility for the security of US diplomatic personnel
assigned to their posts lack adequate authority and resources
to carry out this responsibility.
7. The Boards were especially disturbed by the collective
failure of the US government over the past decade to provide
adequate resources to reduce the vulnerability of US diplomatic
missions to terrorist attacks in most countries around the
world. Responsibility for this failure can be attributed to
several Administrations and their agencies, including the
Department of State, the National Security Council, and the
Office of Management and Budget, as well as the US Congress.
8. The US response to the August bombings was resourceful
and often heroic. However, in the absence of significant
training and contingency planning to deal with mass casualties
and major destruction from terrorist bombs, the response was
occasionally chaotic and marred by a host of planning and
logistical failures, especially in the area of military
transportation. The Foreign Emergency Support Teams (FESTs)
arrived in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam about 40 hours after the
bombings, having experienced delays of 13 hours. There was
disjointed liaison between the State Department, as the lead
agency, and the Defense Department, FBI and other agencies. The
personnel selection of the FESTs was ad hoc and not ideal.
Medical and other emergency equipment was not always ready and
available for shipment.
9. In the wake of these two terrorist acts, the Department
of State and other US government organizations focused quickly
on the lessons learned. They immediately reviewed the
vulnerabilities of our embassies and missions abroad and took
steps to strengthen perimeter security at all posts, to re-
prioritize the construction and upgrades necessary to bring our
overseas US facilities up to what are referred to as "Inman
standards," and Congress appropriated over $1 billion in
supplemental funds.
10. This is only the first step in what is required to
provide for the security of Americans in embassies overseas. We
must undertake a comprehensive and long-term strategy for
protecting American officials overseas, including sustained
funding for enhanced security measures, for long-term costs for
increased security personnel, and for a capital building
program based on an assessment of requirements to meet the new
range of global terrorist threats. This must include
substantial budgetary appropriations of approximately $1.4
billion per year maintained over an approximate ten-year
period, in addition to savings from the closure of overseas
installations where increased capital and security costs
outweigh the magnitude of overall US interests. Additional
funds for security must be obtained without diverting funds
from our major foreign affairs programs.
Key Recommendations
The 1986 Omnibus Diplomatic and Anti-Terrorism Act
established the legal basis for the Accountability Review Board
and specifically requires that acts of terrorism against US
diplomatic installations abroad, wherein the loss of life or
significant property damage occurs, be investigated with a
view, among other factors, toward determining whether security
systems and procedures were adequate and were implemented.
After addressing these issues in this report, the Boards will
propose and elaborate on a number. of recommendations aimed at
improving security systems and procedures. We provide a listing
of the recommendations below.* The bulk of them are
necessitated by the use of large vehicular bombs, a threat that
has not been fully appreciated in recent years. The first 15
recommendations deal with adjustments in systems and procedures
to enhance security of the work place. The final six
recommendations address how to improve crisis management
systems and procedures. All are directed toward achieving the
objective of saving lives. They are urgent and need to be acted
upon immediately. No single measure will accomplish the
objective but, taken together, they should substantially
improve the security for US personnel serving abroad.
Three additional recommendations deal with intelligence and
information availability, matters the Boards are also enjoined
to address under the law.* (Details and rationale for all of
the recommendations are contained in the classified version of
the report.)
I. Improving Security Systems and Procedures
A. Work Place Security Enhancements
1. Emergency Action Plans for all posts should be revised
to provide a "special alarm signal" for Large exterior bombs
and duck-and-cover practice drills in order to reduce
casualties from vehicular bombs. Special equipment should be
provided to perimeter guards.*
2. Given the worldwide threat of transnational terrorism
which uses a wide range of lethal weapons, including vehicle
bombs, every post should be treated as a potential target and
the Department of State's Physical Security Standards and
policies should be revised to reflect this new reality.
3. For those US diplomatic buildings abroad not meeting
Inman standards, essential physical security upgrades should be
made immediately and should include a number of specific
measures involving perimeters and counter-surveillance.*
4. The Secretary of State should personally review the
security situation of embassy chanceries and other official
premises, closing those which are highly vulnerable and
threatened but for which adequate security enhancements cannot
be provided, and seek new secure premises for permanent use, or
temporary occupancy, pending construction of new buildings.
5. Demarches to all governments with whom we have relations
should be made regularly to remind them of their obligation to
provide security support for our embassies. For those
governments whose police forces need additional training to
enable them to provide more adequate protection, the Department
should provide training under the Anti-Terrorism Assistance
(ATA) program. The Department should also explore ways to
provide any necessary equipment to host governments to upgrade
their ability to provide adequate protection. Failure by a host
government to honor its obligations should trigger an immediate
review of whether a post should be closed.
6. The Department of State should radically reformulate and
revise the "Composite Threat List" and, as a part of this
effort, should create a category exclusively for terrorism with
criteria that places more weight on transnational terrorism.
Rating the vulnerability of facilities must include factors
relating to the physical security environment, as well as
certain host governmental and cultural realities.* These
criteria need to be reviewed frequently and all elements of the
intelligence community should play an active role in
formulating the list. The list's name should be changed to
reflect its dual purpose of prioritizing resource allocation
and establishing security readiness postures.
7. The Department of State should increase the number of
posts with full time Regional Security Officers, seeking
coverage of as many chanceries as possible. The Department
should also work with the Marine Corps to augment the number of
Marine Security Guard Detachments to provide coverage to a
larger number of US diplomatic missions.
8. The Department of State should provide all Regional
Security Officers comprehensive training on terrorism,
terrorist methods of operation, explosive devices, explosive
effects, and other terrorist weapons to include weapons of mass
destruction such as truck bombs, nuclear devices and chemical/
biological weapons.*
9. The Department of State should define the role and
functions of each of the US embassies abroad for the coming
decade with a view toward exploiting technology more fully,
improving their efficiency, ensuring their security, and
reducing their overall cost. The Department should look
specifically at reducing the number of diplomatic missions by
establishing regional embassies located in less threatened and
vulnerable countries with Ambassadors accredited to several
governments.
10. The physical security standards specified in the State
Department's Security Standards and Policy Handbook should be
reviewed on a priority basis and revised as necessary in light
of the August 7 and other large bombings against US
installations.
11. When building new chanceries abroad, all US government
agencies, with rare exceptions, should be located in the same
compound.
12. The Department of State should work within the
Administration and with Congress to obtain sufficient funding
for capital building programs and for security operations and
personnel over the coming decade (estimated at $1.4 billion per
year for the next 10 years), while ensuring that this funding
should not come at the expense of other critical foreign
affairs programs and operations. A failure to do so will
jeopardize the security of US personnel abroad and inhibit
America's ability to protect and promote its interests around
the world.
13. First and foremost, the Secretary of State should take
a personal and active role in carrying out the responsibility
of ensuring the security of US diplomatic personnel abroad. It
is essential to convey to the entire Department that security
is one of the highest priorities. In the process, the Secretary
should reexamine the present organizational structure with the
objective of clarifying responsibilities, encouraging better
coordination, and assuring that a single high-ranking officer
is accountable for all protective security matters and has the
authority necessary to coordinate on the Secretary's behalf
such activities within the Department of State and with all
foreign affairs USG agencies.
14. The Department of State should expand its effort to
build public support for increased resources for foreign
affairs, and to add emphasis on the need to protect US
representatives abroad from terrorism, without sacrificing
other important foreign policy programs.
15. The Department of State, in coordination with the
intelligence community, should advise all posts concerning
potential threats of terrorist attacks from the use of
chemical, biological or nuclear materials, should establish
means of defending against and minimizing the effect of such
attacks through security measures and the revision of EAP
procedures and exercises, and should provide appropriate
equipment, medical supplies, and first responder training.
B. Better Crisis Management Systems and Procedures
1. Crisis management training for mass casualty and mass
destruction incidents should be provided to Department of State
personnel in Washington to improve Task Force operations to
assure a cadre of crisis managers.
2. A revitalized program for on-site crisis management
training at posts abroad should be funded, developed, expanded,
and maintained.
3. The FEST should create and exercise a team and equipment
package configured to assist in post blast crises involving
major casualties and physical damage (while maintaining the
package now deployed for differing counter terrorism missions).
Such a new configuration should include personnel to assist in
medical relief, public affairs, engineering and building
safety.
4. A modern, reliable, air-refuelable FEST aircraft with
enhanced seating and cargo capacity to respond to a variety of
counter terrorism and emergency missions should be acquired
urgently for the Department of State. Clearly defined
arrangements for a backup aircraft are also needed.
5. The Department of State should work closely with the
Department of Defense to improve procedures in mobilizing
aircraft and adequate crews to provide more rapid, effective
assistance in times of emergency, especially in medical
evacuations resulting from mass casualty situations. The
Department of State should explore as well, chartering
commercial aircraft to transport personnel and equipment to
emergency sites, if necessary to supplement Department of
Defense aircraft.
6. The Department of State should ensure that all posts
have emergency communications equipment, basic excavation
tools, medical supplies, emergency documents, next of kin
records, and other safety equipment stored at secure off-site
locations in anticipation of mass destruction of embassy
facilities and heavy US casualties.
II. Intelligence and Information
1. In order to enhance the flow of intelligence that
relates to terrorism and security, all such intelligence should
normally be disseminated to concerned levels of the policy and
analytic community; compartmentalization of such information
should be limited to extraordinary situations where there is a
clear national security need for limited dissemination;
2. The Department of State should assign a qualified
official to the DCI's Counter Terrorism Center; and
3. The FBI and the Department of State should consult on
ways to improve information sharing on international terrorism
to ensure that all relevant information that might have some
bearing on threats against or security for US missions or
personnel abroad is made available.*
=======================================================================
First and Second Annual Reports to the President and the Congress
of the
ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC
RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR TERRORISM
INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
I. ASSESSING THE THREAT
December 1999
II. TOWARD A NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM
December 2000
=======================================================================
Panel Chair and Members
----------
Project Director: Mike Wermuth
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Name and Affiliation Expertise
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Honorable James S. Gilmore, III, State perspective
Governor of the Commonwealth of
Virginia, Chair
James Clapper, Jr. (Lieutenant General, Intelligence
U.S. Air Force, Retired), Private
Consultant, and Former Director,
Defense Intelligence Agency, Vice
Chair
L. Paul Bremer, Private Consultant, and Terrorism, counterterrorism
Former Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-
Terrorism, U.S. Department of State
Raymond Downey, Commander, Special Emergency response--local
Operations, City of New York Fire
Department
George Foresman, Deputy State Emergency response--state
Coordinator, Department of Emergency
Management, Commonwealth of Virginia
William Garrison (Major General, U.S. Special operations
Army, Retired), Private Consultant,
and Former Commander, U.S. Army
Special Operations Command's Delta
Force
Ellen M. Gordon, Administrator, Emergency response--state
Emergency Management Division,
Department of Public Defense, State of
Iowa, and President, National
Emergency Management Association
James Greenleaf, Independent Law enforcement--federal
Consultant, and Former Associate
Deputy for Administration, Federal
Bureau of Investigation
Dr. William Jenaway, Corporate Emergency response--local
Executive, and Chief of Fire and
Rescue Services, King of Prussia,
Pennsylvania
William Dallas Jones, Director, Office Emergency response--state
of Emergency Services, State of
California
Paul M. Maniscalco, Past President, Emergency response--local
National Association of Emergency
Medical Technicians, and Deputy Chief/
Paramedic, City of New York Fire
Department, EMSC
John O. Marsh, Jr., Attorney at Law, Interagency coordination and
and former Secretary of the Army legal aspects
Kathleen O'Brien, City Coordinator, Local perspective
City of Minneapolis, Minnesota
M. Patricia Quinlisk, M.D., Medical Health--state
Director/State Epidemiologist,
Department of Public Health, State of
Iowa
Patrick Ralston, Executive Director, Emergency response--state
Indiana State Emergency Management
Agency; Executive Director, Department
of Fire and Building Services; and
Executive Director, Public Safety
Training Institute, State of Indiana
William Reno (Lieutenant General, U.S. NGOs
Army, Retired), Former Senior Vice
President of Operations, American Red
Cross
Joseph Samuels, Jr., Chief of Police, Law enforcement--local,
Richmond, California terrorism
Kenneth Shine, M.D., President, Health--federal
Institute of Medicine, National
Academy of Sciences
Hubert Williams, President, The Police Law enforcement and civil
Foundation liberties
Ellen Embry, U.S. Department of Defense
Representative
------------------------------------------------------------------------
First Annual Report to The President and The Congress--Assessing the
Threat
----------
Executive Summary
The possibility that terrorists will use "weapons of mass
destruction (WMD)" \6\ in this country to kill and injure
Americans, including those responsible for protecting and
saving lives, presents a genuine threat to the United States.
As we stand on the threshold of the twenty-first century, the
stark reality is that the face and character of terrorism are
changing and that previous beliefs about the restraint on
terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear (CBRN) devices may be disappearing. Beyond the
potential loss of life and the infliction of wanton casualties,
and the structural or environmental damage that might result
from such an attack, our civil liberties, our economy, and
indeed our democratic ideals could also be threatened. The
challenge for the United States is first to deter and, failing
that, to be able to detect and interdict terrorists before they
strike. Should an attack occur, we must be confident that
local, state, and Federal authorities are well prepared to
respond and to address the consequences of the entire spectrum
of violent acts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ For reasons of clarity and precision, the report uses the term
CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) terrorism, in
preference to the more commonly used, yet potentially misleading term,
"weapons of mass destruction" or WMD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In recent years, efforts have clearly been focused on more
preparations for such attacks. The bombings of the World Trade
Center in New York and Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City, coupled with the 1995 sarin nerve gas attack in
Tokyo and the U.S. embassy bombings this past summer, have
heightened American concern and have already prompted an array
of responses across all levels of government. At the same time,
the country's seeming inability to develop and implement a
clear, comprehensive, and truly integrated national domestic
preparedness strategy means that we may still remain
fundamentally incapable of responding effectively to a serious
terrorist attack.
The vast array of CBRN weapons conceivably available to
terrorists today can be used against humans, animals, crops,
the environment, and physical structures in many different
ways. The complexity of these CBRN terrorist threats, and the
variety of contingencies and critical responses that they
suggest, requires us to ensure that preparedness efforts are
carefully planned, implemented, and sustained among all
potential responders, with all levels of government operating
as partners. These threats, moreover, will require new ways of
thinking throughout the entire spectrum of local, state, and
Federal agencies. Effecting true change in the culture of a
single government agency, much less achieving fundamental
changes throughout and among all three, presents formidable
hurdles. Nonetheless, the nature of these threats and their
potential consequences demands the full commitment of officials
at all levels to achieve these goals. Indeed, the need to
ensure that a strategic national vision regarding domestic
preparedness is in place, so that the country is better able to
counter these threats and to respond effectively to the
challenges that they present, is among the reasons that this
congressionally mandated Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic
Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass
Destruction was established.
The enabling legislation\7\ directs the Panel to assess
Federal efforts to enhance domestic preparedness, the progress
of Federal training programs for local emergency responses, and
deficiencies in Federal programs for response to terrorist
incidents involving WMD; to recommend strategies for ensuring
effective coordination of Federal agency response efforts and
for ensuring fully effective local response capabilities for
WMD terrorism incidents; and to assess appropriate state and
local funding for response to WMD terrorism.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Section 1405 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 105-261 (HR. 3616. 105th Congress, 2nd
Session) (October 17, 1998).
\8\ For purposes of the Panel's activities and recommendations, it
has included the state level within the scope of its mandate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To meet those objectives, the Panel determined that it must
first understand the full range of potential CBRN threats from
terrorists, based on the belief that without a fundamental
understanding of the threats, preparedness efforts by Federal,
state, and local entities could be misguided, uncoordinated,
and wasteful.
The Panel's analysis of such threats points out that CBRN
terrorism has emerged as a U.S. national security concern for
several reasons:
There has been a trend toward increased lethality in
terrorism in the past decade.
There is an increasing focus on the apparent dangers
posed by potential CBRN terrorism.
Terrorists may now feel less constrained to use a
CBRN device in an attempt to cause mass casualties,
especially following the precedent-setting attack in
1995 by the Aum Shinrikyo.
The reasons terrorists may perpetrate a WMD attack include
a desire to kill as many people as possible as a means "to
annihilate their enemies," to instill fear and panic to
undermine a governmental regime, to create a means of
negotiating from a position of unsurpassed strength, or to
cause great social and economic impact.
Given any of those potential motives, the report identifies
the "most likely terrorists groups" to use CBRN as
fundamentalist or apocalyptic religious organizations, cults,
and extreme single-issue groups but suggests that such a group
may resort to a smaller-scale attack to achieve its goal. The
analysis, however, indicates two additional possibilities:
A terrorist attack against an agricultural base.
A terrorist use of a CBRN device with the assistance
of state sponsorship.
In the latter case, nevertheless, the Panel concludes that
several reasons work against state sponsorship, including the
prospect of significant reprisals by the United States against
the state sponsor, the potential inability of the state sponsor
to control its surrogate, and the prospect that the surrogate
cannot be trusted, even to the point of using the weapon
against its sponsor.
The Panel concludes that the Nation must be prepared for
the entire spectrum of potential terrorist threats--both the
unprecedented higher-consequence attack, as well as the
historically more frequent, lesser-consequence terrorist
attack, which the Panel believes is more likely in the near
term. Conventional explosives, traditionally a favorite tool of
the terrorist, will likely remain the terrorist weapon of
choice in the near term as well. Whether smaller-scale CBRN or
conventional, any such lower-consequence event--at least in
terms of casualties or destruction--could, nevertheless,
accomplish one or more terrorist objectives: exhausting
response capabilities, instilling fear, undermining government
credibility, or provoking an overreaction by the government.
With that in mind, the Panel's report urges a more balanced
approach, so that not only higher-consequence scenarios will be
considered, but that increasing attention must now also be paid
to the historically more frequent, more probable, lesser-
consequence attack, especially in terms of policy implications
for budget priorities or the allocation of other resources, to
optimize local response capabilities. A singular focus on
preparing for an event potentially affecting thousands or tens
of thousands may result in a smaller, but nevertheless lethal
attack involving dozens failing to receive an appropriate
response in the first critical minutes and hours.
While noting that the technology currently exists that
would allow terrorists to produce one of several lethal CBRN
weapons, the report also describes the current difficulties in
acquiring or developing and in maintaining, handling, testing,
transporting, and delivering a device that truly has the
capability to cause "mass casualties." Those difficulties
include the requirement, in almost all cases, for highly
knowledgeable personnel, significant financial resources,
obtainable but fairly sophisticated production facilities and
equipment, quality control and testing, and special handling.
In many cases, the personnel of a terrorist organization run
high personal safety risks, in producing, handling, testing,
and delivering such a device. Moreover, the report notes, the
more sophisticated a device, or the more personnel, equipment,
facilities, and the like involved, the greater the risk that
the enterprise will expose itself to detection and interdiction
by intelligence and law enforcement agencies--particularly in
light of the increasing attention focused on terrorism today.
The report explains, with some specificity, the challenges
involved in each of the four device or agent topic areas--
biological, chemical, nuclear, and radiological--which suggests
that some public pronouncements and media depictions about the
ease with which terrorists might wreak genuine mass destruction
or inflict widespread casualties do not always reflect the
significant hurdles currently confronting any nonstate entity
seeking to employ such weapons. The report acknowledges,
nevertheless, that the situation now facing a terrorist could
change dramatically because of new discoveries, further
advances in technology, or other material factors. No matter
how difficult or improbable such higher-consequence incidents
may be, prudence requires that appropriate steps be taken
across the broad spectrum of terrorist threats to deter,
prevent, or interdict a terrorist attack before it occurs or
failing that, to respond in a way that will--first and
foremost--minimize human casualties and also mitigate damage to
property and to the environment.
Part of the report focuses on the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo nerve
gas attack on the Tokyo subway, which marked the first time
that a nonstate group had used a chemical weapon against
civilians. The conventional wisdom--that terrorists were not
interested in killing, but rather in publicity, or were
concerned about a loss of popular support or international
recognition--has increasingly been called into question, not
only by the Aum event but also by others, such as the World
Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings.
Nevertheless, Chapter Three, which chronicles Aum's
attempts to develop a variety of lethal agents or devices,
indicates that, despite Aum's considerable resources and the
superior technical expertise and state-of-the-art equipment and
facilities at its disposal, the group could not effect a truly
successful chemical or biological attack. The lesson of Aum is
that any nonstate entity faces organizational and significant
technological difficulties and other hurdles in attempting to
weaponize and deliver chemical and biological weapons, arguably
providing a refutation of the suggestion voiced with increasing
frequency about the ease with which such weapons can be made
and used.
The report contains several conclusions and
recommendations, as a result of the threat analysis and other
information provided to the Panel and the collective expertise
and experience of its members:
The conclusion that the United States needs to have
a viable national strategy to guide the development of
clear, comprehensive, and truly integrated national
domestic preparedness plans to combat terrorism, one
that recognizes that the Federal role will be defined
by the nature and severity of the incident but will
generally be supportive of state and local authorities,
who traditionally have the fundamental responsibility
for response, and the recommendation for promulgation
of a national-level strategy, with a "bottom-up"
perspective--a strategy that clearly delineates and
distinguishes Federal, state, and local roles and
responsibilities and articulates clear direction for
Federal priorities and programs to support local
responders; \9\ and a comprehensive, parallel public
education effort.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ The Panel has chosen to use "local responders"--as opposed to
"first responders"--to characterize those persons and entities that
are most likely to be involved in the early stages following a
terrorist attack. That characterization includes not only law
enforcement, fire services, emergency medical technicians, emergency
management personnel, and others who may be required to respond to the
"scene" of an incident, but also other medical and public health
personnel who may be required to provide their services in the
immediate aftermath of an attack.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The conclusion that initial and continuing,
comprehensive and articulate assessments of potential,
credible, terrorist threats within the United States,
and the ensuing risk and vulnerability assessments are
critical for policymakers and the recommendation that
more attention be paid to assessments of the higher-
probability/lower-consequence threats--not at the
expense of, but in addition to, assessments of the
lower-probability/higher-consequence threats.
The conclusion that the complex nature of current
Federal organizations and programs makes it very
difficult for state and local authorities to obtain
Federal information, assistance, funding, and support;
that a Federal focal point and "clearinghouse" for
related preparedness information and for directing
state and local entities to appropriate Federal
agencies, is needed; and that the concept behind the
National Domestic Preparedness Office is fundamentally
sound.
The conclusion that congressional decisions for
authority and funding to address the issue appear to be
uncoordinated, and the recommendation that Congress
consider forming an ad hoc Joint Special or Select
Committee, to provide more efficiency and effectiveness
in Federal efforts.
The conclusion that much more needs to be and can be
done to obtain and share information on potential
terrorist threats at all levels of government, to
provide more effective deterrence, prevention,
interdiction, or response, using modern information
technology.
The conclusion that many definitions and terms in
this arena are ambiguous or confusing (e.g., "weapons
of mass destruction" and "mass casualties"), and the
recommendation that there be a revision and
codification of universal and easily understood terms.
The conclusion that national standards for
responders at all levels, particularly for planning,
training, and equipment, are critical, and the
recommendation that more emphasis be placed on
research, development, testing, and evaluation in the
adoption of such standards.
The conclusion that, despite recent improvements,
too much ambiguity remains about the issue of "who's
in charge" if an incident occurs, and the
recommendation that efforts be accelerated to develop
and to test agreed-on templates for command and control
under a wide variety of terrorist threat scenarios.
The report concludes with an overview of the activities of
the Panel being undertaken in the current fiscal year:
A comprehensive review of related Federal programs,
placing emphasis on training; communications;
equipment; planning requirements; the needs of maritime
regions; coordination among the various levels of
government; the effectiveness of the structure of
military organizations for responses across a broad
spectrum of potential threats; and research,
development, testing, and evaluation.
A survey of local and state emergency management and
response officials to elicit their views on the
efficacy of current Federal programs, particularly in
the areas of training, equipment, planning,
communications, and Federal agency coordination among
the various levels of government.
Interviews with a number of related Federal, state,
and local officials to obtain more detailed information
on their views of current Federal programs and
activities and their specific proposals or
recommendations to improve or enhance Federal efforts.
Case studies of jurisdictions where such events have
occurred or have been threatened, to review and analyze
lessons learned from the full range of elements and
issues involved in each specific plan or actual
response.
An analysis of the status of existing or the
development of appropriate standards in the areas of
training for responders at all levels, equipment,
notification procedures, communications, and planning.
Consideration of cyber terrorism issue in the future
work of the Panel.
Second Annual Report to The President and The Congress--Toward a
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
----------
Executive Summary
We have been fortunate as a nation. The terrorist incidents
in this country--however tragic--have occurred so rarely that
the foundations of our society or our form of government have
not been threatened. Nevertheless, the potential for terrorist
attacks inside the borders of the United States is a serious
emerging threat. There is no guarantee that our comparatively
secure domestic sanctuary will always remain so. Because the
stakes are so high, our nation's leaders must take seriously
the possibility of an escalation of terrorist violence against
the homeland.
The continuing challenge for the United States is first to
deter and, failing that, to detect and interdict terrorists
before they strike. Should an attack occur, local, State, and
Federal authorities must be prepared to respond and mitigate
the consequences of the attack.
To prepare to manage the consequences of such attacks
effectively, the United States needs changes in the
relationships among all levels of government. Our ability to
respond cannot depend on a single level or agency of
government. Rather we need a national approach, one that
recognizes the unique individual skills that communities,
States, and the Federal government possess and that,
collectively, will give us the "total package" needed to
address all aspects of terrorism.
The Advisory Panel produced a comprehensive assessment, in
its first report, of the terrorist threat. The Panel stands by
its conclusions from one year ago.
In its second year, the Advisory Panel shifted its emphasis
from threat assessment to broad program assessment. The
Advisory Panel addressed specific programs for combating
terrorism and larger questions of national strategy and Federal
organization. While the Advisory Panel found much to commend,
it also found problems at all levels of government and in
virtually every functional discipline relevant to combating
terrorism. The Panel believes these problems are particularly
acute at high levels of the Federal Executive Branch. Hence,
the present report highlights the related issues of national
strategy and Federal organization, and recommends solutions for
these and other problems.
Finding 1: The United States has no coherent, functional
national strategy for combating terrorism.
The United States needs a functional, coherent national
strategy for domestic preparedness against terrorism. The
nation has a loosely coupled set of plans and specific programs
that aim, individually, to achieve certain specific
preparedness objectives. The Executive Branch portrays as its
strategy a compilation of broad policy statements, and various
plans and programs already under way. Many programs have
resulted from specific Congressional earmarks in various
appropriations bills and did not originate in Executive Branch
budget requests; they are the initiatives of activist
legislators. Although Federal agencies are administering
programs assigned to them, the Executive Branch has not
articulated a broad functional national strategy that would
synchronize the existing programs and identify future program
priorities needed to achieve national objectives for domestic
preparedness for terrorism. Given the structure of our national
government, only the Executive Branch can produce such a
national strategy.
Recommendation 1: The next President should develop and
present to the Congress a national strategy for combating
terrorism within one year of assuming office.
A national strategy is a high-level statement of national
objectives coupled logically to a statement of the means that
will be used to achieve these objectives. In a coherent
strategy, program details are analytically derived from the
statement of goals. The next Administration should begin a
process of developing a national strategy by a thoughtful
articulation of national goals, encompassing deterrence,
prevention, preparedness, and response.
Ends. The first step in developing a coherent national
strategy is for the Executive Branch to define a meaningful,
measurable expression of what it is trying to achieve in
combating terrorism. To date, the Federal government's goals
have been expressed primarily in terms of program execution.
Rather, the national strategy must express goals in terms of
the "end state" toward which the program strives. Since there
exists no ready-made measure of a country's preparedness for
terrorism (especially domestically), the Executive Branch must
develop objective measurements for its program to combat
terrorism, to track its progress, to determine priorities and
appropriate funding levels, and to know when the desired "end
state" has been achieved.
Means. With meaningful objectives, logical priorities and
appropriate policy prescriptions can be developed. That is the
essence of any coherent strategy. Setting priorities is
essential and can only be done after specific objectives have
been clearly defined. For instance, should the nation seek a
higher level of preparedness for its large urban centers than
for its rural areas and, if so, how much higher? In the broad
area of terrorism preparedness, what should be the relative
importance of preparing for conventional terrorism,
radiological incidents, chemical weapons, or biological
weapons? With respect to biological weapons, which pathogens
deserve priority? What priority and commensurate resources need
to be devoted to defending against cyber attacks? A proper
national strategy will provide a clear answer to these and many
other questions. With these answers in hand it will be possible
to design and manage an appropriate set of programs. The
country is at a disadvantage, of course, in that a large number
of programs have already been established and may have to be
reconfigured--an inevitable consequence of their ad hoc origins.
Essential Characteristics of a Comprehensive Functional Strategy for
Combating Terrorism
National in scope, not just Federal.
Appropriately resourced and based on measurable
performance objectives.
Focused on the full range of deterrence, prevention,
preparedness, and response across the spectrum of
threats--domestic and international.
For domestic programs, built on requirements from
and fully coordinated with relevant local, State, and
Federal authorities.
Finding 2: The organization of the Federal government's
programs for combating terrorism is fragmented, uncoordinated,
and politically unaccountable.
The lack of a national strategy results in part from the
fragmentation of Executive Branch programs for combating
terrorism. These programs cross an extraordinary number of
jurisdictions and substantive domains: national security, law
enforcement, intelligence, emergency management, fire
protection, public health, medical care, as well as parts of
the private sector.
No one, at any level, is "in charge" of all relevant
capabilities, most of which are not dedicated exclusively to
combating terrorism. The lack of a national strategy is
inextricably linked to the fact that no entity has the
authority to direct all of the entities that may be engaged. At
the Federal level, no entity has the authority even to direct
the coordination of relevant Federal efforts.
Recommendation 2: The next President should establish a
National Office for Combating Terrorism in the Executive Office
of the President, and should seek a statutory basis for this
office.
The office should have a broad and comprehensive scope,
with responsibility for the full range of deterring,
preventing, preparing for, and responding to international as
well as domestic terrorism. The director of this office should
be the principal spokesman of the Executive Branch on all
matters related to Federal programs for combating terrorism and
should be appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate. The office should have a substantial and professional
staff, drawn from existing National Security Council offices
and other relevant agencies. It should have at least five major
sections, each headed by an Assistant Director:
1. Domestic Preparedness Programs
2. Intelligence
3. Health and Medical Programs
4. Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E), and
National Standards
5. Management and Budget
The National Office for Combating Terrorism should exercise
program and budget authority over Federal efforts to combat ter
rorism. It should have the authority to conduct a review of
Federal agency programs and budgets to ensure compliance with
the priorities established in the national strategy, as well as
the elimination of conflicts and unnecessary duplication among
agencies. The National Office should administer a budget
certification/decertification process with the authority to
determine whether an agency's budget complies with the national
strategy and to appeal ultimately to the President to resolve
disputes.
In addition to developing and overseeing the national
strategy, the National Office for Combating Terrorism should
oversee terrorism-related intelligence activities. The office
should coordinate Federal programs designed to assist response
entities at the local and State levels, especially for
planning, training, exercises, and equipment. The office should
provide direction and priorities for research and development,
and related test and evaluation (RDT&E) for combating
terrorism, as well as for developing nationally recognized
standards for equipment and laboratory protocols and
techniques. It should coordinate programs designed to enhance
the capabilities of and coordination among the various health
and medical entities at all levels.
The National Office for Combating Terrorism should not be
an operational entity in the sense of exerting direct control
over Federal assets in operations to combat terrorism.
Finally, the director of the National Office should
establish an Advisory Board for Domestic Programs to assist in
providing broad strategic guidance and to serve as part of the
approval process for the domestic portion of strategy, plans,
and programs of the National Office for Combating Terrorism.
This board should be composed of one or more sitting State
governors, mayors of several U.S. cities, the heads of several
major professional organizations, and nationally recognized
subject matter experts in combating terrorism, in addition to
senior representatives of the major Federal entities that have
responsibility for combating terrorism. The President and the
Congress should each appoint members to this board.
Finding 3: The Congress shares responsibility for the
inadequate coordination of programs to combat terrorism.
The Congress's strong interest in, and commitment to, U.S.
efforts to combat terrorism is readily apparent. The Congress
took the initiative in 1995 to improve the nation's domestic
preparedness against terrorism. But the Congress has also
contributed to the Executive Branch's problems. Over the past
five years, there have been a half-dozen Congressional attempts
to reorganize the Executive Branch's efforts to combat
terrorism, all of which failed. None enjoyed the support of the
Executive Branch. At least 11 full committees in the Senate and
14 full committees in the House--as well as their numerous
subcommittees--claim oversight or some responsibility for
various U.S. programs for combating terrorism. Earmarks in
appropriations bills created many of the Federal government's
specific domestic preparedness programs without authorizing
legislation or oversight. The rapidly growing U.S. budget for
combating terrorism is now laced with such earmarks, which have
proliferated in the absence of an Executive Branch strategy.
The Executive Branch cannot successfully coordinate its
programs for combating terrorism alone. Congress must better
organize itself and exercise much greater discipline.
Recommendation 3: The Congress should consolidate its
authority over programs for combating terrorism into a Special
Committee for Combating Terrorism--either a joint committee
between the Houses or separate committees in each House--and
Congressional leadership should instruct all other committees
to respect the authority of this new committee and to conform
strictly to authorizing legislation.
The creation of a new joint committee or separate
committees in each House is necessary to improve the nation's
efforts to fight terrorism. The committee should have a
substantial standing staff. The new National Office for
Combating Terrorism must establish a close working relationship
with the committee, and propose comprehensive and coherent
programs and budget requests in support of the new national
strategy. The new joint or separate committee should have the
authority to dispose of the Executive Branch request and to
oversee the execution of programs that it authorizes. For this
to work, other Congressional authorizing committees with an
interest in programs for combating terrorism must recognize the
concurrent, consolidated authority of the joint or separate
committee; and relevant appropriations committees must exercise
restraint and respect the authorizing legislation of the new
structure. We recognize that this task is no less daunting than
the Executive Branch reorganization that we propose above, but
it is no less needed.
Finding 4: The Executive Branch and the Congress have not
paid sufficient attention to State and local capabilities for
combating terrorism and have not devoted sufficient resources
to augment these capabilities to enhance the preparedness of
the nation as a whole.
The foundation of the nation's domestic preparedness for
terrorism is the network of emergency response capabilities and
disaster management systems provided by State and local
governments. "Local" response personnel--community and State
law enforcement officers, firefighters, emergency medical
technicians, hospital emergency personnel, public health
officials, and emergency managers--will be the "first
responders" to virtually any terrorist attack anywhere in the
nation. Federal resources may not arrive for many hours--if not
days--after the attack. A disproportionately small amount of
the total funds appropriated for combating terrorism is being
allocated to provide direct or indirect assistance to State and
local response efforts. This level of Federal funding for non-
Federal capabilities is not commensurate with the importance
that State and local capabilities will have in any operational
response to a major terrorist attack inside our borders.
Any coherent national strategy for combating terrorism
domestically must recognize the critical need to build on the
nation's exist
ing emergency response and management systems for the pragmatic
reasons of viability and cost-effectiveness.
Recommendation 4: The Executive Branch should establish a
strong institutional mechanism for ensuring the participation
of high-level State and local officials in the development and
implementation of a national strategy for terrorism
preparedness.
To be consistent with the Federal structure of our
government, the President should work in closer partnership
with State and local governments as they collectively strive to
achieve higher levels of domestic preparedness for terrorism.
The domestic portion of a national strategy for combating
terrorism should emphasize programs and initiatives that build
appropriately on existing State and local capabilities for
other emergencies and disasters. The Executive Branch,
therefore, should develop the national strategy in close
partnership with high-level State and local officials drawn
from key professional communities: elected officials, law
enforcement, fire protection, emergency medical technicians,
public health officials, hospital medical care providers, and
emergency managers. State and local officials should, in
particular, have substantial responsibility for the detailed
design and oversight of the Federal training, equipment, and
exercise programs. The Advisory Board for Domestic Programs,
proposed earlier, should provide advice for these functions,
augmented as necessary by State and local representatives
assigned to the National Office for Combating Terrorism.
Finding 5: Federal programs for domestic preparedness to
combat terrorism lack clear priorities and are deficient in
numerous specific areas.
We have a number of recommendations about selected aspects
of current U.S. programs for domestic preparedness to combat
terrorism. The lack of clear priorities is an obvious byproduct
of the lack of a strategy. Thus, many of our specific
recommendations reflect criticisms that are subordinate to our
macro-critique that the United States lacks a coherent national
strategy. We recognize the problem of offering detailed
programmatic recommendations in advance of a national strategy.
Through its deliberations, the Advisory Panel has,
nevertheless, reached consensus on a number of specific
findings and recommendations, summarized below and detailed in
the full report.
Specific Functional Recommendations: Our focus continues to
be on the needs of local and State response entities. "Local"
response entities--law enforcement, fire service, emergency
medical technicians, hospital emergency personnel, public
health officials, and emergency managers--will always be the
"first response," and conceivably the only response. When
entities at various levels of government are engaged, the
responsibilities of all entities and lines of authority must be
clear.
1. Collecting Intelligence, Assessing Threats, and Sharing
Information. The National Office for Combating Terrorism should
foster
the development of a consolidated all-source analysis and
assessment capability that would provide various response
entities as well as policymakers with continuing analysis of
potential threats and broad threat assessment input into the
development of the annual national strategy. That capability
should be augmented by improved human intelligence collection
abroad, more effective domestic activities with a thorough
review of various Federal guidelines, and reasonable
restrictions on acquisition of CBRN precursors or equipment.
The National Office should also foster enhancements in
measurement and signature intelligence, forensics, and
indications and warning capabilities. To promote the broadest
possible dissemination of useful, timely (and if necessary,
classified) information, the National Office should also
oversee the development and implementation of a protected,
Internet-based single-source web page system, linking
appropriate sources of information and databases on combating
terrorism across all relevant functional disciplines.
2. Operational Coordination. The National Office for
Combating Terrorism should encourage Governors to designate
State emergency management entities as domestic preparedness
focal points for coordination with the Federal government. The
National Office should identify and promote the establishment
of single-source, "all hazards" planning documents,
standardized Incident Command and Unified Command Systems, and
other model programs for use in the full range of emergency
contingencies, including terrorism. Adherence to these systems
should become a requirement of Federal preparedness assistance.
3. Training, Equipping, and Exercising. The National Office
for Combating Terrorism should develop and manage a
comprehensive national plan for Federal assistance to State and
local agencies for training and equipment and the conduct of
exercises, including the promulgation of standards in each
area. The National Office should consult closely with State and
local stakeholders in the development of this national plan.
Federal resources to support the plan should be allocated
according to the goals and objectives specified in the national
strategy, with State and local entities also providing
resources to support its implementation.
4. Health and Medical Considerations. The National Office
for Combating Terrorism should reevaluate the current U.S.
approach to providing public health and medical care in
response to acts of terrorism, especially possible mass
casualty incidents and most particularly bioterrorism. The key
issues are insufficient education and training in terrorism-
related subjects, minimum capabilities in surge capacity and in
treatment facilities, and clear standards and protocols for
laboratories and other activities, and vaccine programs. A
robust public health infrastructure is necessary to ensure an
effective response to terrorist attacks, especially those
involving biologic agents. After consultation with public
health and medical care entities, the National Office should
oversee the establishment of financial incentives coupled with
standards and certification requirements that will, over time,
encourage the health and medical sector to build and maintain
required capabilities. In addition, Federal, State, and local
governments should clarify legal and regulatory authorities for
quarantine, vaccinations, and other prescriptive measures.
5. Research and Development, and National Standards. The
National Office for Combating Terrorism should establish a
clear set of priorities for research and development for
combating terrorism, including long-range programs. Priorities
for targeted research should be responder personnel protective
equipment; medical surveillance, identification, and forensics;
improved sensor and rapid readout capability; vaccines and
antidotes; and communications interoperability. The National
Office must also coordinate the development of nationally
recognized standards for equipment, training, and laboratory
protocols and techniques, with the ultimate objective being
official certification.
6. Providing Cyber Security Against Terrorism. Cyber
attacks inside the United States could have "mass
disruptive," even if not "mass destructive" or "mass
casualty" consequences. During the coming year, the Advisory
Panel will focus on specific aspects of critical infrastructure
protection (CIP), as they relate to the potential for terrorist
attacks. In our discussions thus far, we have identified
several areas for further deliberation, including CIP policy
oversight; standards; alert, warning, and response; liability
and other legal issues, and CIP research. We will make specific
policy recommendations in our next report.
