107th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session 107-219
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INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002
_______
September 26, 2001.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on
the State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Goss, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
[To accompany H.R. 2883]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 2883) to authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 2002 for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes,
having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an
amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence community management account.
Sec. 105. Codification of the Coast Guard as an element of the
intelligence community.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Sense of the Congress on intelligence community contracting.
Sec. 304. Requirements for lodging allowances in intelligence community
assignment program benefits.
Sec. 305. Technical amendment.
Sec. 306. Commission on September 11 government preparedness and
performance.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Sec. 401. Modifications to Central Intelligence Agency's central
services program.
Sec. 402. Extension of CIA Voluntary Separation Pay Act.
Sec. 403. Guidelines for recruitment of certain foreign assets.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 501. Authority to purchase items of nominal value for recruitment
purposes.
Sec. 502. Funding for infrastructure and quality-of-life improvements
at Menwith Hill and Bad Aibling stations.
Sec. 503. Continuation of Joint Interagency Task Force at current
locations in Florida and California.
Sec. 504. Modification of authorities relating to interdiction of
aircraft engaged in illicit drug trafficking.
Sec. 505. Undergraduate training program for employees of the National
Imagery and Mapping Agency.
Sec. 506. Technical amendments.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2002
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the following elements of the United States Government:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Department of Defense.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(6) The Department of State.
(7) The Department of the Treasury.
(8) The Department of Energy.
(9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(10) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(11) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
(12) The Coast Guard.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts
authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized
personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2002, for the conduct of the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed
in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 2883 of the One
Hundred Seventh Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The
Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on
Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the
President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the
Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the
executive branch.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central
Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess
of the number authorized for fiscal year 2002 under section 102 when
the Director of Central Intelligence determines that such action is
necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions,
except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number
authorized under such section may not, for any element of the
intelligence community, exceed two percent of the number of civilian
personnel authorized under such section for such element.
(b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of Central
Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate whenever the Director exercises the
authority granted by this section.
SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the
Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 2002 the sum of
$152,776,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for the
Advanced Research and Development Committee shall remain available
until September 30, 2003.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of Central
Intelligence are authorized 313 full-time personnel as of September 30,
2002. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of
the Intelligence Community Management Account or personnel detailed
from other elements of the United States Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts
authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community
Management Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized
to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account for fiscal year 2002 such additional amounts as are
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred
to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts shall remain
available until September 30, 2003.
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel
authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence
Community Management Account as of September 30, 2002, there
are hereby authorized such additional personnel for such
elements as of that date as are specified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations.
(d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2002, any
officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed
Forces who is detailed to the staff of the Intelligence Community
Management Account from another element of the United States Government
shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such
officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis
for a period not to exceed one year for the performance of temporary
functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence.
(e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
(1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated
in subsection (a), $27,000,000 shall be available for the
National Drug Intelligence Center. Within such amount, funds
provided for research, development, test, and evaluation
purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2003, and
funds provided for procurement purposes shall remain available
until September 30, 2004.
(2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central Intelligence
shall transfer to the Attorney General funds available for the
National Drug Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The
Attorney General shall utilize funds so transferred for the
activities of the National Drug Intelligence Center.
(3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug
Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the
provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)).
(4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the
operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center.
SEC. 105. CODIFICATION OF THE COAST GUARD AS AN ELEMENT OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Section 3(4)(H) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
401a(4)(H) is amended--
(1) by striking ``and'' before ``the Department of Energy'';
and
(2) by inserting ``, and the Coast Guard'' before the
semicolon.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2002 the sum of
$212,000,000.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY
LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement,
and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in
such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed
to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity
which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of
the United States.
SEC. 303. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTING.
It is the sense of the Congress that the Director of Central
Intelligence should continue to direct that elements of the
intelligence community, whenever compatible with the national security
interests of the United States and consistent with operational and
security concerns related to the conduct of intelligence activities,
and where fiscally sound, should competitively award contracts in a
manner that maximizes the procurement of products properly designated
as having been made in the United States.
SEC. 304. REQUIREMENTS FOR LODGING ALLOWANCES IN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
ASSIGNMENT PROGRAM BENEFITS.
Section 113(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
404(h)) is amended--
(1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``An employee''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2) The head of an agency of an employee detailed under subsection
(a) may pay a lodging allowance for the employee subject to the
following conditions:
``(A) The allowance shall be the lesser of the cost of the
lodging or a maximum amount payable for the lodging as
established jointly by the Director of Central Intelligence
and--
``(i) with respect to detailed employees of the
Department of Defense, the Secretary of Defense; and
``(ii) with respect to detailed employees of other
agencies and departments, the head of such agency or
department.
``(B) The detailed employee maintains a primary residence for
the employee's immediate family in the local commuting area of
the parent agency duty station from which the employee
regularly commuted to such duty station before the detail.
``(C) The lodging is within a reasonable proximity of the
host agency duty station.
``(D) The distance between the detailed employee's parent
agency duty station and the host agency duty station is greater
than 20 miles.
``(E) The distance between the detailed employee's primary
residence and the host agency duty station is 10 miles greater
than the distance between such primary residence and the
employees parent duty station.
``(F) The rate of pay applicable to the detailed employee
does not exceed the rate of basic pay for grade GS-15 of the
General Schedule.''.
SEC. 305. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT.
Section 106(b)(2)(C) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
403-6(b)(2)(C)) is amended by striking ``Nonproliferation and National
Security'' and inserting ``Intelligence and the Director of the Office
of Counterintelligence''.
SEC. 306. COMMISSION ON SEPTEMBER 11 GOVERNMENT PREPAREDNESS AND
PERFORMANCE.
(a) Establishment.--There is established a commission to be known as
the ``Commission on Preparedness and Performance of the Federal
Government for the September 11 Acts of Terrorism'' (in this section
referred to as the ``Commission'').
(b) Duty.--
(1) Assessment of agency performance.--The Commission shall,
with respect to the acts of terrorism committed against the
United States on September 11, 2001, assess the performance of
those agencies and departments of the United States charged
with the responsibility to prevent, prepare for, or respond to
acts of terrorism up to and including that date. For purposes
of the preceding sentence, those agencies and departments
include--
(A) the Department of Defense (including the
intelligence elements of the Department),
(B) the Department of Justice (including the
intelligence elements of the Department),
(C) the Department of State (including the
intelligence elements of the Department),
(D) the Department of the Transportation (including
the intelligence elements of the Department),
(E) the Department of the Treasury (including the
intelligence elements of the Department),
(F) the Central Intelligence Agency, and
(G) the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
(2) Report.--The Commission shall submit the report described
in subsection (g).
(d) Membership.--
(1) Number and appointment.--The Commission shall be composed
of 10 members appointed as follows:
(A) The President shall appoint 4 members.
(B) The Speaker of the House of Representatives shall
appoint 2 members.
(C) The majority leader of the Senate shall appoint 2
members.
(D) The minority leader of the House of
Representatives shall appoint 1 member.
(E) The minority leader of the Senate shall appoint 1
member.
(2) Terms.--
(A) In general.--Each member shall be appointed for
the life of the Commission.
(B) Vacancies.--Any member appointed to fill a
vacancy occurring before the expiration of the term for
which the member's predecessor was appointed shall be
appointed only for the remainder of that term. A member
may serve after the expiration of that member's term
until a successor has taken office. A vacancy in the
Commission shall be filled in the manner in which the
original appointment was made.
(3) Basic Pay.--
(A) Rates of pay.--Members shall serve without pay.
(B) Travel Expenses.--Each member shall receive
travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of
subsistence, in accordance with applicable provisions
under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United
States Code.
(4) Quorum.--6 members of the Commission shall constitute a
quorum but a lesser number may hold hearings.
(5) Chairperson.--The Chairperson of the Commission shall be
elected by the members.
(e) Director and Staff of Commission.--
(1) Director.--The Commission shall have a Director who shall
be appointed by the Chairperson.
(2) Staff.--The Chairperson may appoint and fix the pay of
additional personnel as the Director considers appropriate.
(3) Applicability of certain civil service laws.--The
Director and staff of the Commission shall be appointed subject
to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing
appointments in the competitive service, and shall be paid in
accordance with the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III
of chapter 53 of that title relating to classification and
General Schedule pay rates, except that an individual so
appointed may not receive pay in excess of the annual rate of
basic pay for GS-15 of the General Schedule.
(4) Experts and consultants.--With the approval of the
Chairperson, the Director may procure temporary and
intermittent services under section 3109(b) of title 5, United
States Code, but at rates for individuals not to exceed the
daily equivalent of the maximum annual rate of basic pay for
GS-15 of the General Schedule.
(5) Staff of federal agencies.--Upon request of the
Chairperson, the head of any Federal department or agency may
detail, on a reimbursable basis, any of the personnel of that
department or agency to the Commission to assist it in carrying
out its duties under this section.
(f) Powers of Commission.--
(1) Hearings and sessions.--The Commission may, for the
purpose of carrying out this section, hold hearings, sit and
act at times and places, take testimony, and receive evidence
as the Commission considers appropriate. The Commission may
administer oaths or affirmations to witnesses appearing before
it.
(2) Powers of members and agents.--Any member or agent of the
Commission may, if authorized by the Commission, take any
action which the Commission is authorized to take by this
section.
(3) Obtaining official data.--The Commission may secure
directly from any department or agency of the United States
information, including classified information, necessary to
enable it to carry out this Act. Upon request of the
Chairperson of the Commission, the head of that department or
agency shall furnish that information to the Commission.
(4) Mails.--The Commission may use the United States mails in
the same manner and under the same conditions as other
departments and agencies of the United States.
(5) Administrative Support Services.--Upon the request of the
Commission, the Administrator of General Services shall provide
to the Commission, on a reimbursable basis, the administrative
support services necessary for the Commission to carry out its
responsibilities under this section.
(6) Subpoena power.--
(A) In general.--The Commission may issue subpoenas
requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and
the production of any evidence relating to any matter
under investigation by the Commission. The attendance
of witnesses and the production of evidence may be
required from any place within the United States at any
designated place of hearing within the United States.
(B) Failure to obey a subpoena.--If a person refuses
to obey a subpoena issued under subparagraph (A), the
Commission may apply to a United States district court
for an order requiring that person to appear before the
Commission to give testimony, produce evidence, or
both, relating to the matter under investigation. The
application may be made within the judicial district
where the hearing is conducted or where that person is
found, resides, or transacts business. Any failure to
obey the order of the court may be punished by the
court as civil contempt.
(C) Service of subpoenas.--The subpoenas of the
Commission shall be served in the manner provided for
subpoenas issued by a United States district court
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the
United States district courts.
(D) Service of process.--All process of any court to
which application is made under subparagraph (B) may be
served in the judicial district in which the person
required to be served resides or may be found.
(E) Immunity.--Except as provided in this paragraph,
a person may not be excused from testifying or from
producing evidence pursuant to a subpoena on the ground
that the testimony or evidence required by the subpoena
may tend to incriminate or subject that person to
criminal prosecution. A person, after having claimed
the privilege against self-incrimination, may not be
criminally prosecuted by reason of any transaction,
matter, or thing which that person is compelled to
testify about or produce evidence relating to, except
that the person may be prosecuted for perjury committed
during the testimony or made in the evidence.
(7) Contract authority.--The Commission may contract with and
compensate government and private agencies or persons for
supplies and services, without regard to section 3709 of the
Revised Statutes (41 U.S.C. 5).
(g) Report.--The Commission shall transmit a report to the President
and the Congress not later than 6 months after the date by which the
Director has been appointed by the Chairperson. The report shall
contain a detailed statement of the findings and conclusions of the
Commission, together with its recommendations for legislation and
administrative actions the Commission considers appropriate.
(h) Termination.--The Commission shall terminate on 30 days after
submitting the report required under subsection (g).
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SEC. 401. MODIFICATIONS TO CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'S CENTRAL
SERVICES PROGRAM.
Section 21 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C.
403u) is amended as follows:
(1) Subsection (g)(1) is amended--
(A) by striking ``December'' and inserting
``January''; and
(B) by striking ``conduct'' and inserting
``complete''.
(2) Subsection (h) is amended--
(A) by striking paragraph (1) and redesignating
paragraphs (2) and (3) as paragraphs (1) and (2),
respectively;
(B) in paragraph (1), as so redesignated, by striking
``(3)'' and inserting ``(2)''; and
(C) in paragraph (2), as so redesignated, by striking
``(2)'' and inserting ``(1)''.
SEC. 402. EXTENSION OF CIA VOLUNTARY SEPARATION PAY ACT.
(a) Extension of Authority.--Section 2(f) of the Central Intelligence
Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act (Public Law 103-36, 50 U.S.C. 403-4
note) is amended by striking ``September 30, 2002'' and inserting
``September 30, 2003''.
(b) Remittance of Funds.--Section 2(i) of that Act is amended by
striking ``or 2002'' and inserting ``2002, or 2003''.
SEC. 403. GUIDELINES FOR RECRUITMENT OF CERTAIN FOREIGN ASSETS.
Recognizing dissatisfaction with the provisions of the guidelines of
the Central Intelligence Agency (promulgated in 1995) for handling
cases involving foreign assets or sources with human rights concerns,
the Director of Central Intelligence shall--
(1) rescind the provisions of the guidelines for handling
such cases; and
(2) provide for provisions for handling such cases that more
appropriately weigh and incentivize risks to achieve successful
operations.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 501. AUTHORITY TO PURCHASE ITEMS OF NOMINAL VALUE FOR RECRUITMENT
PURPOSES.
(a) Authority.--Section 422 of title 10, United States Code, is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``(b) Promotional Items for Recruitment Purposes.--The Secretary of
Defense may use funds available for an intelligence element of the
Department of Defense to purchase promotional items of nominal value
for use in the recruitment of individuals for employment by that
element.''.
(b) Clerical Amendments.--(1) The heading of such section is amended
to read as follows:
``Sec. 422. Use of funds for certain incidental purposes''.
(2) Such section is further amended by inserting at the beginning of
the text of the section the following: ``(a) Counterintelligence
Official Reception and Representation Expenses.--''.
(3) The item relating to such section in the table of sections at the
beginning of subchapter I of chapter 21 of such title is amended to
read as follows:
``422. Use of funds for certain incidental purposes.''.
SEC. 502. FUNDING FOR INFRASTRUCTURE AND QUALITY-OF-LIFE IMPROVEMENTS
AT MENWITH HILL AND BAD AIBLING STATIONS.
Section 506(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1996 (Public Law 104-93; 109 Stat. 974), as amended by section 502 of
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law
105-107; 111 Stat. 2262) and by section 502 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106-120; 113 Stat.
1619), is further amended by striking ``for fiscal years 2000 and
2001'' and inserting ``for fiscal years 2002 and 2003''.
SEC. 503. CONTINUATION OF JOINT INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE AT CURRENT
LOCATIONS IN FLORIDA AND CALIFORNIA.
(a) Main Location.--The Secretary of Defense shall continue to
maintain the Joint Interagency Task Force at Key West, Florida, with
the responsibility for coordinating drug interdiction efforts in the
Western Hemisphere and with such additional responsibilities regarding
worldwide intelligence for counterdrug operations as the Secretary may
assign.
(b) Component Location.--The Secretary of Defense shall convert the
Joint Interagency Task Force located at Alameda, California, to be a
component site of the main location specified in subsection (a).
(c) Director.--The Director of the Joint Interagency Task Force shall
be a flag officer of the Coast Guard.
SEC. 504. MODIFICATION OF AUTHORITIES RELATING TO INTERDICTION OF
AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING.
(a) Certification Required for Immunity.--Subsection (a)(2) of
section 1012 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1995 (Public Law 103-337; 108 Stat. 2837; 22 U.S.C. 2291-4) is amended
by striking ``, before the interdiction occurs, has determined'' and
inserting ``has, during the 12-month period ending on the date of the
interdiction, certified to Congress''.
(b) Annual Reports.--That section is further amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new
subsection:
``(c) Annual Reports.--(1) Not later than February 1 each year, the
President shall submit to Congress a report on the assistance provided
under subsection (b) during the preceding calendar year. Each report
shall include for the calendar year covered by such report the
following:
``(A) A list specifying each country for which a
certification referred to in subsection (a)(2) was in effect
for purposes of that subsection during any portion of such
calendar year, including the nature of the illicit drug
trafficking threat to each such country.
``(B) A detailed explanation of the procedures referred to in
subsection (a)(2)(B) in effect for each country listed under
subparagraph (A), including any training and other mechanisms
in place to ensure adherence to such procedures.
``(C) A complete description of any assistance provided under
subsection (b).
``(D) A summary description of the aircraft interception
activity for which the United States Government provided any
form of assistance under subsection (b).
``(2) Each report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.''.
SEC. 505. UNDERGRADUATE TRAINING PROGRAM FOR EMPLOYEES OF THE NATIONAL
IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY.
(a) Authority To Carry Out Training Program.--Subchapter III of
chapter 22 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the
end the following new section:
``Sec. 462. Financial assistance to certain employees in acquisition of
critical skills
``The Secretary of Defense may establish an undergraduate training
program with respect to civilian employees of the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency that is similar in purpose, conditions, content, and
administration to the program established by the Secretary of Defense
under section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C.
402 note) for civilian employees of the National Security Agency.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of
such subchapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item:
``462. Financial assistance to certain employees in acquisition of
critical skills.''.
SEC. 506. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS.
Section 2555 of title 10, United States Code, as added by section
1203(a) of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2001 (as enacted by Public Law 106-398; 114 Stat. 1654,
1654A-324), is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) by striking ``Convey or'' in the subsection
heading and inserting ``Transfer Title to or
Otherwise'';
(B) in paragraph (1)--
(i) by striking ``convey'' and inserting
``transfer title''; and
(ii) by striking ``and'' after
``equipment;'';
(C) by striking the period at the end of paragraph
(2) and inserting ``; and''; and
(D) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(3) inspect, test, maintain, repair, or replace any such
equipment.''; and
(2) in subsection (b)--
(A) by striking ``conveyed or otherwise provided''
and inserting ``provided to a foreign government'';
(B) by inserting ``and'' at the end of paragraph (1);
(C) by striking ``; and'' at the end of paragraph (2)
and inserting a period; and
(D) by striking paragraph (3).
Purpose
The bill would:
(1) Authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2002 for
(a) the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the U.S. Government, (b) the Community
Management Account, and (c) the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability System;
(2) Authorize the personnel ceilings on September 30,
2002 for the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the U.S. Government and permit the
Director of Central Intelligence to authorize personnel
ceilings in Fiscal Year 2002 for any intelligence
element up to two percent above the authorized levels,
with the approval of the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget;
(3) Authorize $27 million for the National Drug
Intelligence Center in Johnstown, Pennsylvania;
(4) Establishes the United States Coast Guard as a
National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) agency
under the National Security Act;
(5) Creates an independent commission to review the
performance of those federal public safety, law
enforcement, and national security departments and
agencies responsible for preventing and/or responding
to acts of terrorism in the period prior to and
including September 11, 2001;
(6) Rescinds the 1995 guidelines on recruitment of
foreign assets and sources;
(7) Supports confirmation of Joint Inter-Agency Task
Force operations and facilities at current locations in
California and Florida;
(8) Amends current law relating to official immunity
for employees and agents of the United States and
foreign countries engaged in the interdiction of
aircraft used in illicit drug trafficking.
Overall Perspective on the Intelligence Budget and Committee Intent
The classified Annex to this public report includes the
classified Schedule of Authorizations and its associated
language. The committee views the classified Annex as an
integral part of this legislation. The classified Annex
contains a thorough discussion of all budget issues considered
by the committee, which underlies the funding authorization
found in the Schedule of Authorizations. The Committee intends
that all intelligence programs and intelligence-related
activities discussed in the classified Annex to this report be
conducted in accord with the guidance and limitations set forth
as associate language therein. The classified Schedule is
incorporated directly into this legislation by virtue of
section 102 of the bill. The classified Annex is available for
review by all Members of the House of Representatives, subject
to the requirements of clause 13 of Rule XXIV of the House.
Scope of Committee Review
U.S. intelligence and intelligence-related activities under
the jurisdiction of the committee include the National Foreign
Intelligence Program (NFIP), and the Tactical Intelligence and
Related Activities (TIARA) and the Joint Military Intelligence
Program (JMIP) of the Department of Defense.
The NFIP consists of all programs of the Central
Intelligence Agency, as well as those national foreign
intelligence and/or counterintelligence programs conducted by:
(1) the Department of Defense; (2) the Defense Intelligence
Agency; (3) the National Security Agency; (4) the Departments
of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; (5) the Department of State;
(6) the Department of the Treasury; (7) the Department of
Energy; (8) the Federal Bureau of Investigation; (9) the
National Reconnaissance Office; (10) the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency.
The Department of Defense TIARA is a diverse array of
reconnaissance and target acquisition programs that are a
functional part of the basic military force structure and
provide direct information support to military operations.
TIARA, as defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Secretary of Defense, include those military intelligence
activities outside the General Defense Intelligence Program
that respond to the needs of military commanders for
operational support information, as well as to national
command, control, and intelligence requirements. The Armed
Services Committee in the House Committee in the House of
Representatives has joint oversight and authorizing
jurisdiction of the programs compromising TIARA.
The JMIP was established in 1995 to provide integrated
program management of defense intelligence elements that
support defense-wide or theater-level consumers. Included
within JMIP are aggregations created for management efficiency
and characterized by similarity, either in intelligence
discipline (e.g., Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Imagery
Intelligence (IMINT)), or function (e.g., satellite support,
aerial reconnaissance). The following aggregations are included
in the JMIP: (1) the Defense Cryptologic Program (DCP); (2) the
Defense Imagery and Mapping Agency (DIMAP); (3) the Defense
General Intelligence Applications Program (DGIAP), which itself
includes (a) the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program
(DARP), (b) the Defense Intelligence Tactical Program (DITP),
(c) the Defense Intelligence Special Technologies Program
(DISTP), (d) the Defense Intelligence Counterdrug Program
(DICP), and (e) the Defense Space Reconnaissance Program
(DSRP). As with TIARA programs, the Armed Services Committee in
the House of Representatives has joint oversight and
authorizing jurisdiction of the programs compromising the JMIP.
Overall Committee Findings and Recommendations
The Committee completed its review of the President's
fiscal year 2002 budget, carrying out its annual responsibility
to prepare an authorization based on close examination of
intelligence programs and proposed expenditures. The review
reflected the Committee's continuing belief that intelligence
activities must be examined by function, as well as by program.
Due to the late delivery of the details of the President's
amended budget request and to circumstances caused by the
deplorable terrorist attacks against the United States on
September 11, 2001, the Committee conducted only a limited
number of budget-related hearings. The Committee's membership
also had numerous discussions and briefings with the White
House and the IntelligenceCommunity leadership to examine the
views and plans for the future of intelligence and the Intelligence
Community. There were, in addition, numerous individual briefings to
Members and over one hundred staff briefings on programs, specific
activities, and budget requests.
In the classified schedule of authorizations and the
accompanying explanatory language, the Committee has addressed
numerous specific matters related to the fiscal year 2002
budget. In the following section, the Committee addresses many
issues that it believes are particularly important although
there may have been no direct budgetary action. It should be
noted that, because of the extraordinary circumstances with
respect to the national security environment in the aftermath
of the terrorist attacks, the Committee made a determination to
make very few modifications to the President's request. Those
changes that are made primarily are focused on responding to
deficiencies that could quickly impact the Community's ability
to provide warning against future such attacks.
Taken as a whole, the Committee's budgetary actions and
general provisions reflect the Committee's concern that the
United States has placed, and continues to place, undue risks
on its national security interests by not redressing the many
critical problems facing the Intelligence Community. Many of
these are enduring issues that the Committee has repeatedly
highlighted in the past. However, the ominous message sent by
the terrorist actions in New York and Washington D.C.
demonstrates an urgency to correct these Intelligence Community
deficiencies like no other time in our Nation's history.
The United States cannot continue to use the same processes
and priorities to build the intelligence budgets of the 21st
century that were used in the Cold War. American interests have
changed, new threats, particularly the elusive and unrestricted
terrorist threat, have evolved and the priorities placed on
intelligence and the role of the Intelligence Community have
grown. For the President and senior policymakers, intelligence
often forms the basis for key foreign policy strategies and
decisions, and can provide insights as to the effect of such
decisions. At its best, intelligence provides key indications
and warning (I&W) information that can direct national command
authority attention to issues and areas before crises occur.
When fully successful, such intelligence support allows for
appropriate actions to provide regional stability or,
hopefully, ward off an attack or larger conflict. Yet, despite
the Committee's repeated direction to more broadly provide this
information on the myriad threats world-wide, the nation's
intelligence resources remain highly focused on only the
highest priority military support issues and nations, leaving
few resources for the critical I&W functions, especially
against transnational, non-nation state actors or against areas
of the world that could erupt overnight.
For the military, intelligence is now the basis for, and
organic to everything it does. HUMINT and SIGINT, in
particular, provide direct and immediate threat data to
personnel engaged in activities that risk their lives on a
daily basis: our ground forces in Kosovo, our pilots conducting
Northern and Southern Watch missions in Iraq, our forces on the
border between North and South Korea, our forces engaged in
counternarcotics operations in Latin America, and our Special
Operations personnel who may have to enter a country
unannounced and undetected, and require the on-scene
intelligence officer to give them ``ground truth.''
It must be pointed out that the requirements for
intelligence support have grown at a rapid pace, making the
relatively status quo intelligence budget more and more
inadequate. Increasingly, existing resources are being siphoned
off to meet day-to-day tactical requirements. Global coverage
and predictive, strategic intelligence have suffered as a
result, contributing to shortfalls such as the lack of warning
of recent nuclear tests, the lack of information on the New
York and Washington D.C. terrorist attacks, the inability to
monitor key facilities suspected of producing weapons of mass
destruction, the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade,
and the shortage of ISR assets around the world.
Intelligence should be the first line of defense, yet, it
is not treated as such. Remedying this situation, however, is
not a task that Congress can, or should, take on alone. Along
with a new focus on intelligence budgeting and conduct by the
Administration, there also must be a Community-wide effort
actually to work as a ``community.'' Although there have been
some areas of progress, not nearly enough is apparent.
The Committee's review of this year's budget request
included in-depth discussions with, or testimony from, the
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), the Community's senior
leadership the managers of individual programs and agencies, as
well as leaders from the Department of Defense and the military
services who produce intelligence or who use or rely on
intelligence systems and information on a daily basis. Their
message continues to be that, despite the increases in the
President's amended request for the Intelligence Community's
people and programs, there are insufficient intelligence
resources to meet the immediate national security intelligence
needs, let alone future needs. Although the Committee does not
believe that additional funding alone will correct all the
Community's deficiencies, indeed the Committee believes that
there is a fundamental need for both a cultural revolution
within the Intelligence Community as well as significant
structural changes, the Committee is concerned that the
additional funding sought for the Community constitutes a
misjudgment in national security priorities. As an example, the
Committee notes that intelligence funding constituted a
significantly lower percentage of the overall amended defense
request for fiscal year 2002. This amount is inconsistent with
the overall Intelligence Community funding percentage relative
to national defense and does not seem to comport with the
Administration's or the Secretary of Defense's emphasis on
intelligence. Moreover, the fact that intelligence must
continue to compete with other defense needs is a Cold War
legacy that does not reflect the new national security
definitions nor encompass the realities of today's and
tomorrow's threats. The Committee is also concerned that
increasing requirements for greater volume, higher fidelity,
and more timely intelligence, especially by the military, is
forcing the Intelligence Community to ``accomplish much more,
with much less.'' The lack of long-term analysis to provide
predictive warningagainst acts of war against the United
States, such as that perpetrated by the attacks on the World Trade
Center and Pentagon, is indicative of this problem.
For the past six years, the Committee and Congress have
sought to increase the ``top line,'' or overall funding level
for the Intelligence Community. The President's amendment to
the fiscal year 2002 request was welcomed as a recognition that
the congressional priorities for national defense, and
particularly intelligence operations, were justified. However
the extremely modest increase to the request does not
demonstrate to this Committee the full commitment by the
Administration to build a healthy, future years' intelligence
budget that meets national security needs. The Committee does
understand that the Administration's request that resulted in
the ``The Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery and
Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States'' includes
resources for the Intelligence Community. Further, the
Committee recognizes that the new Administration is attempting
to conduct a full review of the Intelligence Community to
determine its future needs. The Committee must assume that the
supplemental appropriation is not a long-term ``fix,'' and must
caution that the requested increase in this single fiscal year
must be sustained in the future years' request so that no
future unfunded bills will result. The Committee is compelled
to highlight this issue, since it is our understanding that the
preliminary budget guidance for fiscal year 2003 appears to
fall into the same, status quo, bureaucratic construct that
will result in, at best, having intelligence on a flat-line
funding track. With this in mind, the Committee has made some
adjustments and recommendations in this bill in order to
implore and to prod the President, the Director of Central
Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense to re-examine the
basic process used to put the yearly budget request together.
It is imperative that the Executive Branch address these
critical shortfalls in planning and its intelligence
capabilities, especially to include the following areas:
<bullet> In the Human Intelligence (HUMINT) arena, ill-
advised reductions of resources after the Cold War, combined
with poor planning, infrastructure problems, extended
requirements for military force protection, and unexpected
contingency operations have all worked to take resources from
the ``front line'' field officers, thus limiting our efforts to
rebuild our ``eyes and ears'' around the globe. In stark
contrast to the Community's budget request that actually cuts
manpower, it is imperative that the Intelligence Community
increase its efforts to add to its HUMINT capabilities,
particularly in the areas of increasing the number of
clandestine case officers and defense attaches around the
world, improving language and specialized skills training, and
creating and fostering a positive career culture for
specialists.
<bullet> Also critical is the rebuilding and restructuring
of the Community's all-source analytic resources and tools. The
number of analysts needs to increase, and collaboration across
the Community and across intelligence disciplines must occur.
The Committee believes that physical collocation of analysts
may well serve to create a better, stronger analytic base for
the Community.
<bullet> Despite the oversight committees' exhortations,
the Intelligence Community is still faced with totally
inadequate planning and investment for systems to correct the
Community's multi-intelligence tasking, processing,
exploitation, and dissemination (TPED) problems. This is
particularly true for current imagery intelligence collection
capabilities, and more so for planned capabilities. The
Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2002 has begun
to address imagery tasking, processing, exploitation, and
dissemination deficiencies by providing the initial funding for
the National Imagery and Mapping Agency's modernization. The
funding will enable the initiation of acquisition reform,
improved information management capabilities, new business
processes to better produce innovative imagery and geo-spatial
products, and greater access to all imagery sources.
<bullet> As the Committee stated last year, in the area of
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets, we
continue to see extensive over-utilization of very limited, but
critical airborne assets, with little relief in sight. While
planning for deployment of new ISR airborne capabilities, the
Department of Defense has taken money from existing, supposedly
complementary, platforms to pay for future capabilities. The
aging manned reconnaissance fleets are in clear need of
recapitalization with no funded plan to do so. The result: our
overall ISR capabilities and resources, in practical terms, are
decreasing at a time when our military forces are relying on
them more and more.
<bullet> The most serious and immediate problems continue
to be with signals intelligence (SIGINT) resources. The
Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) has a new team
in place to correct many of the significant infrastructure and
modernization problems caused by nearly a decade of decline in
resources and severe internal mismanagement. In the same decade
the signals targets increased dramatically in both number and
technological sophistication. The problems have been daunting:
infrastructure needs went unfunded and major interruptions of
service occurred, Information Technology (IT) resources were
mismanaged and collection and analysis efforts suffered, and
the lack of sufficient acquisition processes and expertise
brought critical modernization efforts to a crawl. This did not
come as a surprise: indeed, the Committee has, for over four
years, warned the NSA and the Director of Central Intelligence
about these problems. As stated, the Director of NSA has begun
efforts to address these issues, and his efforts have the
Committee's support. However, the Committee is concerned about
NSA internal management's willingness to fully understand the
need for radical change and to get behind these programs.
The Committee recognizes that the men and women who work in
the Intelligence Community are taking the events of September
11 very hard and personally. These extremely hard working,
dedicated, and courageous individuals are doing good work with
what they have. Terrorism is an extremely difficult target, and
the resources that the Community has appear inadequate. This
reason alone should compel the Administration and Congress to
heavily invest in our intelligence disciplines. The government
cannot, however, stop by responding to terrorism alone. There
are many other issues that theIntelligence Community also must
attend to in order to assure that our nation's security is best
maintained.
Heavy investments alone also will not sufficiently address
the national security challenge and needs. As we sit today, it
appears that many of the questions that are being asked after
the attacks on September 11, 2001, are similar to those asked
in the aftermath of the attack on U.S. forces at Pearl Harbor.
As was done after Pearl Harbor, the Committee believes, that
the Government must conduct a thorough review of our national
security structures to determine whether these are the right
structures to address the security challenges of the future.
The Committee will be discussing this issue in greater
detail in the next few months, and stands ready to work with
the Administration to undertake this review and make whatever
changes are deemed appropriate. This is not a time to preserve
the status quo, although there will be a tendency to do so as
we embark on this war on terrorism. Now, more than ever, we
must be bold in addressing our needs for intelligence--our
first line of defense--and for our overall security.
areas of special interest
In the following several pages, the Committee has chosen to
highlight areas of special interest that it believes must be
addressed by the Intelligence Community and the Administration
if our country is to have sufficient intelligence resources to
protect our national security. The Committee has chosen to
identify those issues that address the Intelligence Community
as a whole or that cross bureaucratic boundaries of the various
programs. These primarily relate to broader investment and
management policies rather than individual programs and
projects within the NFIP, JMIP or TIARA that are addressed with
these accounts.
The order of these issues is, by and large, irrelevant in
terms of priority for the Committee--all are important.
Moreover, these provisions, along with others in this bill, are
intended to highlight for the new Administration the critical
need for intelligence, the critical state in which the
Intelligence Community finds itself, and to emphasize that the
Administration must broadly address the shortfalls and needs of
the Community, least we continue to suffer attacks such as
those inflicted on September 11, 2001--or worse!
Terrorism threat analysis
In the wake of the USS Cole bombing, senior Defense
intelligence officials were directed to devise and initiate
sweeping structural and procedural changes to strengthen the
Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA) counterterrorism analysis
and threat warning efforts. The focus of this task was to
improve long-term threat analysis, reduce duplication of
effort, more precisely apply all-source intelligence, expand
the base of source information to include location and
disposition of U.S. forces, and sharpen the focus of threat
warning intelligence to those forces. The result was the
formation of a new terrorism analysis center within the DIA.
Although the Committee applauded the innovative thinking of
Defense Department officials with respect to the development of
this center, the Committee was concerned that the initiative
was moving forward without the resolution of significant
implementation issues, particularly those involving information
sharing of sensitive source data, and how such data might be
reported--and more importantly protected in such a way as to be
effective. Further, the Committee questioned the rationale for
such a capability within DoD, since the CIA's existing center
was designed to provide the all-source analysis needed by the
Defense Department. The Committee has determined to support
both capabilities, but in a much more community wide sense.
The events of September 11, 2001, highlighted why and how
the Intelligence Community, as a whole, must respond to the
myriad national security requirements, especially to the war on
terrorism. The Committee believes there can no longer be any
cultural, bureaucratic or other artificial barriers to impede
the flow and analysis of information related to countering this
threat. Information must be ubiquitous and available to all-
source analysts. The artificial, but existing barriers to true
information sharing must be overcome. Security issues must be
resolved such that source identifying information that needs
protecting is protected and information that is needed to piece
together terrorist activities be made available. Additionally,
all technological impediments, such as on-line accesses to
databases, must be immediately overcome. Existing data mining
tools must be put to full use and additional tools must be
developed. Most importantly, the concepts of the two centers
must be adopted as a community-wide inter-agency approach. The
war against terrorism necessarily crosses all boundaries. The
Intelligence Community must, therefore, support all of its
customers equally well--from the President, to the ``soldier,''
to those in law enforcement. Thus, the Committee has supported
a new construct; one that leverages all the concepts of the
military and civilian analytical functions, and that is
Intelligence Community-wide in composition and in service.
Focusing on people as long-term intelligence needs
Congress has provided an initial response to the horrific
terrorist attacks suffered by the United States on September
11. Emergency funds and grants of authority to the President
have been provided. Additional responses will be necessary in
the weeks ahead as the international effort against terrorism
proceeds and as assessments are made about the performance of
those federal agencies charged with safeguarding national
security in the period before and during the September 11
attacks.
The Committee believes it critical that a comprehensive
examination be conducted independently of the federal
government. Section 306 of the bill establishes a ten member
commission to conduct such a review of the activities of the
Departments of Defense, Justice, State, Transportation, and
Treasury (including the intelligencecomponents of those
departments), the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Central
Intelligence Agency. The report of the commission is to include
recommendations on changes in activities and programs, structure, and/
or responsibilities of the departments and agencies reviewed.
This Committee conducts oversight of the Intelligence
Community and has been concerned for some time that
intelligence agencies were not well positioned to respond to
the national security challenges of the 21st century, including
terrorism. Despite a succession of congressionally-provided
funding increases to spur investment in all areas of
intelligence, including human intelligence, the Committee is
not satisfied that the Intelligence Community is moving quickly
enough. There is a shortage of intelligence officers with the
linguistic, operational, and analytic skills, as well as
foreign area expertise and cultural background to discharge
effectively the foreign intelligence mission.
Although a start has been made in increasing the ranks of
officers, the Committee is not convinced that there is an
Intelligence Community-wide strategy for ensuring that
recruited persons have the diverse mix of skills and background
necessary to enhance mission effectiveness. Accordingly, the
Committee requests that the DCI submit a report to the
congressional intelligence committees, by April 1, 2002,
detailing employment and training initiatives within the
Community, including spending plans, through which a diverse
workforce will be recruited and trained. The report shall
comment specifically on those spending and policy plans
designed to enhance language training and cultural expertise.
The Committee acknowledges that there is no quick fix to
remedying skills mix problems, but believes that a commitment
to their solution needs a well considered strategy to be
successful. The Committee expects the DCI's report to present
that strategy so that the authorization bill for fiscal year
2003 can provide resources against well defined objectives. In
the Committee's view, those objectives must include: aggressive
recruitment of case officer candidates, particularly those with
ethnic and language backgrounds needed by the Community; more
overseas-based operations officers; increases in the numbers of
civilian and military analysts; a greater emphasis on improving
language skills through training and language proficiency
incentives; a higher priority attached to building and
maintaining expertise in foreign areas and cultures; and
greater support for improving technological and operational
disciplines. The Committee recommends consideration of the
creation of a scholarship program, similar to the Former
Defense Language Scholarship program, to assist in the
recruitment of undergraduate and graduate students with
proficiencies of use to the Community in areas such as foreign
language and area studies, foreign cultural studies, and
appropriate technical disciplines. The DCI's assessment of such
a program will be expected in the report.
Emergency supplemental funding
The emergency supplemental appropriations measure passed in
response to the September 11 terrorist attacks contains
significant sums to support Intelligence Community needs. The
Committee expects to be notified promptly by the DCI when
decisions are made as to how these funds are allocated to
specific intelligence programs and activities. A considered
allocation of these funds could greatly enhance intelligence
capabilities against terrorism. The Committee believes that
priority should be given in the use of supplemental funds to:
improving the effectiveness of human intelligence, particularly
through language training and proficiency; improving the
effectiveness of signals intelligence, particularly in the
analysis function; and improving the effectiveness of
measurement and signature intelligence, particularly in the
fielding of new technologies to discover weapons of mass
destruction, including chemical and biological agents which may
be employed by terrorists. It is the Committee's expectation
that all measures taken by the Intelligence Community in
response to acts of terrorism will preserve a balance between
the preservation of civil liberties and the need to improve the
effectiveness of intelligence and law enforcement agencies.
Intelligence Community for the 21st century
The Committee continues to believe that there is a need for
a fundamental review of the Intelligence Community's
authorities, structure, funding levels, procedures, areas of
mission emphasis, security procedures, depth and breadth of
analytic expertise, and inter-agency relationships. The
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon
provided tragic emphasis for that position. The Committee does
not, in any way, lay blame to the dedicated men and women of
the U.S. Intelligence Community for the success of these
attacks. If blame must be assigned, the blame lies with a
government, as a whole, that did not fully understand nor
wanted to appreciate the significance of the new threats to our
national security, despite the warnings offered by the
Intelligence Community. In many respects, however, the Nation
now has witnessed another Pearl Harbor event, and the President
has called for all means at our disposal, including placing a
great responsibility on the Intelligence Community, to wage the
worldwide war on terrorism. The Committee believes that there
are both short-term and long-term issues that must be addressed
if the nation is to win this war.
The Committee is fully aware of the ongoing internal and
external reviews of the Intelligence Community under NSPD-5.
The outcomes of those reviews are not yet determined, and may
result in some recommendations for changes. If history serves,
however, no major substantive changes will occur after these
reviews are complete. The Committee believes that major changes
are necessary. They were necessary in 1996 when the Committee
released its Intelligence Community for the 21st Century
report, and they are necessary today. The only thing that has
changed is the cause for immediate emphasis.
The Committee's response to the President's fiscal year
2002 National Foreign Intelligence Program budget request is in
many ways modest, but focused. The time and ability for change,
however, is now. Programs that the Committee believes warrant a
``fresh'' look include the establishment of a separate
Clandestine Service that would combine all HUMINT resources
under a similar tasking and operating structure; a Technical
Collection Agency that would operate all technical collectors
under a singlemanagement structure to eliminate ``stove-
piping'' and enhance cross-collection capabilities; a Technology
Development Office that provides Community Research and Development and
a new, all-source analytic effort that enhances collaboration and,
thus, analysis. These are but some of the options. Clearly, changes in
funding processes, authorities, and mechanisms are also warranted. The
Committee had planned to address many of these issues prior to
September 11th, in order to serve notice to the Administration that the
Intelligence Community is in dire need of attention and investment,
that structure and management changes may well be necessary, and that
it is a time for the Administration to be bold, innovative, and to
think ``out of the box''. The Committee retains these views, especially
given the war on terrorism. Thus, the Committee requests that the
Administration begin to make such changes with the fiscal year 2003
budget submission.
The Committee believes the Director of Central Intelligence
must take the lead in making these changes, working closely
with Congress to effect the right changes.
Foreign language expertise
There continues to be a great need throughout the
Intelligence Community for increased expertise in a number of
intelligence-related disciplines and specialties. However, the
Committee believes the most pressing such need is for greater
numbers of foreign language-capable intelligence personnel,
with increased fluency in specific and multiple languages. The
Committee has heard repeatedly from both military and civilian
intelligence producers and consumers that this is the single
greatest limitation in intelligence agency personnel expertise
and that it is a deficiency throughout the Intelligence
Community. The principle agencies dealing with foreign
intelligence--CIA, NSA, FBI, DIA and the military services--
have all admitted they do not have the language talents, in
breadth or in depth, to fully and effectively accomplish their
missions. Too often, the Committee has seen these organizations
focus on developing ``intelligence generalists,'' rather than
intelligence professionals with strong linguistic capabilities
and extensive expertise in a specific foreign language, culture
and area.
This has certainly long been the trend in CIA's Directorate
of Operations. Too often CIA, and other intelligence agencies
have neglected long-term priorities, such as building in-depth
expertise in the intelligence collection and analysis cadres.
Rather, people are readily assigned and reassigned to confront
the burning issues of the day. At the NSA and CIA, thousands of
pieces of data are never analyzed, or are analyzed ``after the
fact,'' because there are too few analysts; even fewer with the
necessary language skills. Written materials can sit for
months, and sometimes years, before a linguist with proper
security clearances and skills can begin a translation.
Intelligence officers overseas often cannot contact and recruit
key potential sources because they do not possess the requisite
language skills. This language skill limitation dramatically
affects our national security posture. The key to minimizing
terrorist and other threats is clear: build a professional
intelligence cadre with the requisite linguistic skills and in-
depth expertise, with a long-term focus on areas of
specialization. Advanced knowledge of the plans and intentions
of America's enemies, who almost never use the English language
to conduct their deadly business, requires trained and
experienced specialists, not generalists. This is not to say
that some generalists are not needed. Indeed, given the
complexity of many transnational targets and issues,
individuals who can place a broader view on intelligence that
is collected can be critical to assuring quality reporting.
There must be a balance struck.
The Committee is so concerned about foreign language
capabilities that it believes the Intelligence Community must
make major changes in policies and funding regarding foreign
language proficiency for the HUMINT services, and for analysts
at CIA, DIA, NSA, and elsewhere. The Committee believes that
the DCI and the Secretary of Defense must enhance the current
system of bonuses to provide additional positive incentives for
employees to achieve and maintain proficiency, especially in
the languages of the toughest and most important targets,
particularly state sponsors and other nations that support
terrorism. The size of the bonuses should be established based
on the level of proficiency and the value of the language, as
reflected in the CIA and DoD Operating Directives. Language
specialists should be afforded the same or better opportunities
for advancement as managers and other intelligence
professionals enjoy. The Committee also believes that the IC
and DoD should establish a policy, to be phased in
appropriately to reflect current workforce realities that
personnel engaged in foreign areas or subjects must demonstrate
appropriate levels of proficiency in at least one foreign
language relevant to their area of expertise in order to gain
promotion. The Committee recognizes that such demands and
requirements will probably exceed the infrastructure in place
for instruction and proficiency testing. There is every
indication that the Community requirements cannot be met by
existing schools. Therefore, the Committee believes that it is
time to consider a dedicated Intelligence Community school that
addresses future language needs as well as allowing
Intelligence Community officers the ability to keep and build
proficiency. The Committee directs the Director of Central
Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, to
develop a plan to implement these concepts/changes, conveying
the plan to the congressional intelligence committees within
120 days after the date of enactment of this Act. The Committee
urges the Director and the Secretary to implement the plan as
rapidly as possible, and thus would fully support use of
supplemental appropriations for these important efforts,
recognizing that sustaining funding would have to be included
in future years' budget requests.
Airborne signals intelligence recapitalization and modernization
The Committee has been vitally interested in properly
sustaining the nation's tactical airborne reconnaissance
platforms. These aircraft provide the bulk of the real-time,
tactical imagery and signals intelligence to theater
commanders. Included in their numbers are operational RC-135
RIVET JOINT, the EP-3 AIRES II, and the U-2 Dragonlady; and the
future Aerial Common Sensor and Global Hawk aircraft. Longevity
for the operational systems has become an issue. The Committee
learned last year that most of the EP-3 aircraft will soon
reach end of service fatigue life. Although not as urgent a
problem, the RC-135 family of aircraft is aging and becoming
more expensive tomaintain. The U-2 fleet has fewer average
total hours than either of the larger aircraft, and are expected to be
operational beyond 2020.
In addition to the longevity of the airframes, the
Committee remains fully aware of the state of the individual
collection systems, particularly the SIGINT systems, that must
constantly be improved to maintain parity with the threat
environment. Unfortunately, the common SIGINT development, the
Joint SIGINT Avionics Family (JSAF) Lowband Subsystem failed to
produce the expected SIGINT collection system upgrade. Because
the Department of Defense made the management decision to
pursue this single SIGINT upgrade, foregoing most other
airborne SIGINT improvements, the state of the operational
collection systems has suffered tremendously.
Prior to the decision to pursue the single JSAF approach,
the individual Services had effective but disparate upgrade
programs, and technology sharing was sporadic and
uncoordinated. However, the individual collection system
capabilities against the fielded threats remained relatively
good, as the Service program offices pursued mission-specific
requirements and continually upgraded their weapon systems. The
Committee is adamant that the Services must be allowed to
return to constant and incremental system upgrades as the
standard method of modernization. This modernization approach
must be properly overseen by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense to ensure a standardized architectural approach, guided
by detailed standards promulgated by the Director of the
National Security Agency (DIRNSA). Further, in his SIGINT
functional manager's role, the DIRNSA should ensure the service
program offices share technologies consistent with Service
mission requirements, funding, and unique integration
challenges.
However, the state of the airframes themselves continues to
be a concern. The Committee is aware of the discussions within
the Navy to possibly replace the EP-3 aircraft with its future
Multi-Mission Manned Aircraft (MMA). The Air Force, too, is
discussing replacement of its reconnaissance aircraft with the
Multi-Mission Command and Control aircraft (MC2A). Both of
these concepts have positive and negative aspects. For example,
the Committee is concerned that the replacement airframe type
the Navy is currently considering will have severe limitations
as a SIGINT collection platform. Further, the Air Force's
concept may likely limit the number of aircraft available for
world-wide reconnaissance operations. The Committee does not
see budget requests that will make these proposals reality, nor
does it see a coordinated approach that will maximize
operational capability and flexibility while minimizing cost.
The Committee believes that the concept of replacing the
two fleets with two new fleets is not the right direction. The
Committee believes a single manned reconnaissance fleet that is
``owned'' by an ``executive agent'' service, but co-operated by
the two services is the right model for the future. This would
be a concept analogous to the electronic combat EA-6B model in
service today, and would be a concept that allows for the best
operational concepts from each of the services to be put into
use. Further, a combined fleet of dedicated reconnaissance
aircraft could be smaller in number than two separate fleets of
dissimilar aircraft.
From the Committee's perspective, there seems to be a
logical ``way ahead'' for both the multi-place, self-contained
aircraft and the smaller manned or unmanned aircraft that
depend on data-link tethers to ground stations or, in the
future, other ``mothership'' aircraft such as the RC-135 or its
replacement. This ``way ahead'' also appears to have a logical
progression of sensor and sensor developments that would
improve the flexibility and mission capability, while
minimizing costs.
The Committee's concept consists of three basic parts: the
replacement of the RC-135 and EP-3 fleets with a single Boeing
767-sized aircraft fleet, with the first aircraft beginning
delivery as early as 2012; the continuing improvement and
eventual ``cross-decking'' of the RC-135 collection system to
the new reconnaissance aircraft; and the continuing upgrade and
eventual ``cross-decking'' of the U-2 collection system to the
Global Hawk and the Army's ACS programs.
Although, the Committee does not presume to choose the
airframe, it firmly believes that the next generation, manned
reconnaissance aircraft should be based on the same type
airframe that the Air Force chooses for its next tanker
aircraft--likely the B-767 aircraft. The concept for the
development and fielding of this new reconnaissance aircraft
includes the necessary life extension modifications to keep the
EP-3 fleet capable until the first new aircraft can begin
replacing them on a one-for-one basis. Under this concept, the
new would first replace the EP-3s, and then later the RC-135s.
The study for concepts, numbers of aircraft, and the design and
modification of the new aircraft should begin no later than
calendar year 2004, with the first funding provided in the
President's fiscal year 2004 budget request. The modification
of the future aircraft will clearly require an acquisition
process and organization that both understands the airborne
reconnaissance mission and requirements, and has a proven
record of delivering operational systems. The Committee
believes the Air Force's Big Safari program office is the only
logical choice for fielding the new reconnaissance aircraft.
The concept for the future of the new aircraft's sensor
systems is likewise relatively straight-forward. There is
little question that the most sophisticated and capable
collection system today is the 85000 System onboard the RIVET
JOINT aircraft. The Committee's concept would continue the
incremental and continuous sensor improvement to the 85000
System with the goal of ``cross-decking'' it to the new
aircraft in the then-current state of modification when the
first aircraft is ready to accept it. This would require
``new'' equipment purchases for the first number of new
aircraft that replace the EP-3, and the later number of
aircraft would be outfitted with equipment directly transferred
from the RC-135 aircraft as each is retired. The cost savings
realized with this concept would be substantial over the
alternative option to develop an entirely new SIGINT system.
Lastly, the Committee believes the sensor approach outlined
above would work well for the U-2, Global Hawk and ACS
aircraft. the U-2's collection system is very sophisticated,
and moreover, operational. It, too, can be upgraded both
architecturally and technically to maintain capability against
the evolving threat. This needs to be done regardless of the
new aircraft that will augment the U-2. The concept the
Committeeenvisions is to incrementally improve the U-2's sensor
suite and eventually ``cross-deck'' it to the Global Hawk and the ACS
aircraft. For the Global Hawk, this accomplishes several important
tasks. First, and foremost, it provides a single collection system for
the Air Force's two high-altitude collection systems, simplifying both
maintenance and logistics at the single main operating base location.
Secondly, it results in no major ground station modifications to accept
two separate SIGINT systems, thereby saving significant amounts of
money. For the ACS, this would preclude the Army having to develop, on
its own, a new SIGINT collection system, as the Air Force's previous
investments would be completely leveraged. Secondly, this would provide
true interoperability between the Air Force and Army ground stations--
allowing both services to draw on the assets of the other. Lastly, this
would allow both services to share future research and development
costs.
The Committee understands that this concept is a radical
departure from the programs of record within the Services and
that it forces a new way of doing business. However, the future
of airborne reconnaissance systems must be addressed now, and
concrete actions must begin. Therefore, the Committee requests
that the Secretary of Defense conduct a study of this concept
and provide the congressional defense and intelligence
committees a recommendation on the path to recapitalizing the
Department's reconnaissance aircraft. The Committee serves
notice that it will not entertain a status quo answer, and that
it will take direct fiscal action in future years' request to
ensure the nation's reconnaissance capabilities.
Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation
TITLE 1--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 101--authorization of appropriations
Section 101 lists departments, agencies, and other elements
of the United States Government for whose intelligence-related
activities the Act authorizes appropriations for fiscal year
2002.
Section 102--classified schedule of authorizations
Section 102 makes clear that the details of the amounts
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities and personnel ceilings for the
entities listed in section 101 for fiscal year 2002 are
contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. The
Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated as to section 101 by
section 102.
Section 103--personnel ceiling adjustments
Section 103 authorizes the Director of Central
Intelligence, with the approval of the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget, in fiscal year 2002 to exceed the
personnel ceilings applicable to the components of the
Intelligence Community under section 102 by an amount not to
exceed 2 percent of the total of the ceilings applicable under
section 102. The Director may exercise this authority only when
necessary to the performance of important intelligence
functions, and any exercise of this authority must be reported
to the two intelligence committees of the Congress.
Section 104--intelligence community management account
Section 104 provides certain details concerning the amount
and composition of the Community Management Account (CMA) of
the Director of Central Intelligence.
Subsection (a) authorizes appropriations in the amount of
$152,776,000 for fiscal year 2002 for the staffing and
administration of various components under the CMA. Subsection
(a) also authorizes funds identified for the Advanced Research
and Development Committee to remain available for two years.
Subsection (b) authorizes a total of 313 full-time
personnel for elements within the CMA for fiscal year 2002 and
provides that such personnel may be permanent employees of the
CMA element or detailed from other elements of the United
States Government.
Subsection (c) explicitly authorizes the classified portion
of the CMA.
Subsection (d) requires that personnel be detailed on a
reimbursable basis, with certain exceptions. Personnel may be
detailed on a non-reimbursable basis for a period not to exceed
one year.
Subsection (e) authorizes $27,000,000 of the amount
authorized for the CMA under subsection (a) to be made
available for the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) in
Johnstown, Pennsylvania. Subsection (e) requires the Director
of Central Intelligence to transfer $27,000,000 to the
Department of Justice to be used for NDIC activities under the
authority of the Attorney General, and subject to section
103(d)(1) of the National Security Act.
Section 105--codification of the United States Coast Guard as an
element of the intelligence community
Section 105 establishes the United States Coast Guard as a
National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) agency under the
National Security Act. The Commandant of the Coast Guard
recently explained that the definition of national security
``has widened to include many of the things for which the Coast
Guard has been responsible for years. These are the so-called
asymmetric array of threats that are now added to the classical
inventory of nation-state engagement, potentially leading to
armed conflict. It certainly now includes counter-terrorism,
counter-narcotics, illegal alien smuggling, and worrying about
our Exclusive Economic Zone.'' The Coast Guard is the only
organization responsible for law enforcement, intelligence and
military activities simultaneously. As a humanitarian
organization, it has access to ports unreachable by other U.S.
entities and welcomed by foreign navies. Under the aegis of law
enforcement, the Coast Guard can board and search vessels in
our territorial waters, exclusive economic zones or on high
seas.
The Coast Guard is the organization with the primary
responsibility for maritime interdiction and at sea enforcement
of U.S. immigration laws. The Coast Guard routinely intercepts
illegal migrants and returns them to their countries of origin.
As such, the Coast Guard gains particular insight on migration
patterns and pressures.
The Coast Guard is charged with eliminating environmental
damage and natural resource degradation associated with
maritime transportation, fishing, and recreational boating. The
Coast Guard supports important national interests in living
marine resources enforcement, maritime environmental
protection, and maritime pollution enforcement.
Relative to its law enforcement mission, the Coast Guard is
the U.S. Government agency with primary responsibility for
maritime drug interdiction. The strategic goal is to protect
our maritime borders by halting the flow of illegal drugs,
aliens, and contraband into this country through maritime
routes, preventing illegal incursions of our exclusive economic
zone, and suppressing violations of federal law in the maritime
region. Thus, the Coast Guard has particular insight into the
operations of international criminal organizations dealing with
illegal drugs, aliens, and other contraband.
Coast Guard Captains of the Port in major U.S. ports are
intimately aware of the foreign maritime presence and have
ready access to foreign vessels. This allows the Coast Guard to
play a major role in homeland defense, counter-terrorism, and
consequence management in U.S. ports.
In support of military commanders, the Coast Guard has
national security objectives in the areas of maritime
interception operations, port operations security and defense,
military environmental response operations, and peacetime
military engagement. The Coast Guard is an armed service ``at
all times'' and conducts defense missions outlined in the 1995
Department of Transportation/Department of Defense Memorandum
of Agreement.
The current Coast Guard intelligence training program can
better take advantage of available Intelligence Community
intelligence training courses to increase Coast Guard expertise
at negligible cost. Additionally, at negligible cost, the Coast
Guard could elevate the Coast Guard Intelligence Program (CGIP)
to a flag level directorate. An intelligence directorate would
facilitate improved coordination of limited Coast Guard assets,
recognize the increasing value provided by intelligence across
all Coast Guard million areas, and place this organizational
element on a par with those of other armed services and
agencies.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Section 201--authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations authorized by the
conference report for salary, pay, retirement, and other
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for
increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 301--increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized
by law
Section 301 provides that appropriations authorized by the
conference report for salary, pay, retirement, and other
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for
increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
Section 302--restriction on conduct of intelligence activities
Section 302 provides that the authorization of
appropriations by the conference report shall not be deemed to
constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence
activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution
or laws of the United States.
Section 303--Sense of the Congress regarding Intelligence Community
contracting
Section 303 is a Sense of the Congress provision to
encourage the Intelligence Community to maximize the
procurement of U.S.-made products.
Section 304--requirements for lodging allowances in Intelligence
Community Assignment Program benefits
Section 304 enhances benefits paid under the Intelligence
Community Assignment Program (ICAP). ICAP provides
opportunities for Intelligence Community employees to gain
experience and perspective through rotational details to
intelligence-related positions external to an employee's parent
organization. In order to avoid the significant familial impact
of a detail and relocating under ICAP, this section authorizes
the payment of a lodging allowance, subject to conditions, when
an employee leaves his or her immediate family at the permanent
duty station to participate in the ICAP. The section does not
mandate the payment of the lodging allowance. Rather, it
authorizes the detailing agency, within its discretion, to pay
an allowance up to a maximum amount determined by the Secretary
of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence with regard
to detailed employees of the Department of Defense, or by such
other appropriate agency head and the Director of Central
Intelligence, but no more than the actual lodging expense at
the new duty station.
This section sets forth five conditions that must be met
prior to receipt of the lodging allowance under this program.
First, it requires that the employee maintain a primary
residence for his or her immediate family in the local
commuting area of the permanent duty station from which the
employee regularly commuted to the former duty station prior to
the detail. Second, the employee must actually incur lodging
expenses within reasonable proximity of the new duty station.
The third condition limits the payment of the allowance to
circumstances where the new duty station is more than 20 miles
from the employee's former duty station. Fourth, the section
requires that the distance from the employee's primary
residence to the new duty station be at least 10 miles farther
than the distance from the employee's primary residence to the
former duty station. The 10-mile requirement parallels the
current limitation in the federal travel regulations for short
distance transfers. Finally, the section limits the payment of
the lodging allowance to employees compensated at or below the
maximum annual rate of pay for grade GS-15 of the General
Schedule.
Section 305--technical amendment
Section 305 provides a technical correction to the National
Security Act.
Section 306--commission on September 11 government preparedness and
performance
Section 306 of the bill establishes an independent
commission to review the performance of those federal public
safety, law enforcement, and national security departments and
agencies responsible for preventing and/or responding to acts
of terrorism in the period prior to and including September 11,
2001. The review is to include the activities of the
Departments of Defense, Justice, State, Transportation, and
Treasury (including the intelligence components of those
departments), the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the
Central Intelligence Agency. The commission is to submit a
report to the President and the Congress with recommendations
for changes in activities and programs, structure, and/or
responsibilities of the departments and agencies reviewed. The
report is to be submitted no later than six months from the
date the commission's director is appointed. The commission
shall consist of ten members, four of whom are to be appointed
by the President, two by the Majority Leader of the Senate, two
by the Speaker of the House, one by the Minority Leader of the
Senate, and one by the Minority Leader of the House.
The committee believes that the commission will only be
successful if it is seen to be truly independent of any
preconceived notions about the effectiveness of the activities
of the departments and agencies it will review. Appointing
members with a reputation for challenging conventional wisdom,
wide perspective, bold and innovative thought and broad
experience in dealing with complex problems will contribute
directly to instilling the commission with an independence of
spirit which will enhance the credibility of its work. Those
given the authority to appoint members of the commission are
urged to be especially sensitive to the committee's concerns in
this regard.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Section 401--modifications to Central Intelligence Agency's Central
Services Program
Section 401 makes several changes to the Central
Intelligence Agency's Central Services Program (CSP). This
section changes the date the annual audit is required to be
completed from 31 December to 31 January. This brings the
financial audit requirements of the CIA Inspector General in
line with similar requirements placed on other Inspectors
General in the Federal government. Moreover, it eliminates a
sunset date for the CSP.
Section 402--extension of Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary
Separation Pay Act
Section 402 extends to September 30, 2003 the DCI's ability
to offer separation pay incentives, which otherwise would
expire as of September 30, 2002.
The Central Intelligence Agency has used the Central
Intelligence Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act authority over
the past several years to restructure and ``re-skill'' its
workforce to support the Strategic Division that the DCI has
outlined. The use of incentives, and early-outs, has
contributed greatly to Agency efforts to re-tool the Agency
workforce for the challenges of the 21st century, and is a
critical tool in providing the Director of Central Intelligence
the flexibility to adapt the workforce as priorities change.
The changes in the workforce required to support the DCI's
direction have an impact on the number of areas within the
Agency. Authority to offer incentives, and early outs, to
targeted groups of employees to encourage separation,
therefore, remains important to the success of Agency
restructuring. Data from the Agency's exit survey indicate that
the separation incentive pay has accelerated the departure of
employees in targeted groups.
The Agency is engaged in a concerted effort to further
streamline its administrative processes. As that effort bears
fruit, the Agency will need to continue restructuring the CIA
workforce. The recent disestablishment of the Agency's
Directorate of Administration and the creation of five new
Mission Support Offices also may necessitate additional
reconfiguration of Agency staffing.
In addition to the restructuring outlined above, other
ongoing initiatives are intended to better position the Agency
workforce to support the DCI's vision of intelligence
collection, analysis, and dissemination in the coming years. Of
continuing importance is the ability to redirect middle- and
senior-level management positions in the Directorate of
Intelligence and the Directorate of Science and Technology.
Reductions in managerial ranks will make available positions
for senior substantive experts in the analysis and technology
fields. Separation incentive and early out authority will
substantially assist in achieving this transition without
serious adverse impact on the managerial workforce.
Section 403--guidelines for recruitment of certain foreign assets
Section 403 addresses the CIA's 1995 guidelines on
recruitment of foreign assets and sources. The Committee
believes that the 1995 CIA guidelines on the handling of cases
involving foreign assets and sources with human rights concerns
have had the unintended consequence of deterring the effective
recruitment of potentially high-value assets. The Committee has
long been concerned that a culture of ``risk aversion'' has
hindered decision-making across the Intelligence Community, and
especially within the CIA. In the instance of the 1995
guidelines, we are concerned that excessive caution and a
burdensome vetting process have undermined the CIA's ability to
recruit assets. The Committee is concerned that the guidelines
have had a negative impact on the recruitment of sources
against terrorist organizations and other hard targets as well.
Admittedly, in the past, there have been recruitments that have
proved to be inappropriate. Since 1995, CIA's well-intended
effort to address human rights concerns may have significantly
limited the U.S. Government's access to foreign assets and
sources.
Far too often, Committee members have learned of field
officers who have been deterred from recruiting promising
assets or who have lost potential assets to competing
intelligence services, because of a slow and overly litigious
vetting process. Legal and bureaucratic concerns must not be
ignored, but neither should they dictate the asset recruitment
process. New guidelines must rebalance the equation between
potential gain and risk. Clearly, there is a certain class of
individuals who, because of their unreliability, instability,
or nature of past misconduct, should be avoided. A new balance
must be struck that recognizes concerns about egregious human
rights behavior, but provides the much needed flexibility to
seize upon opportunities as they present themselves. The
Committee looks to the Director of Central Intelligence to
promulgate new guidelines that restore equilibrium to the asset
vetting process, satisfactorily address legal questions in a
time-urgent manner, thereby expediting recruitment of foreign
assets and sources, and provide confidence to personnel in the
field that their best judgment will be supported.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 501--authority to purchase items of nominal value for
recruiting purposes
Section 501 helps to align the recruiting practices of
Intelligence Community elements of DoD with those of private
industry in order to assist these agencies in maintaining their
competitiveness for prospective employees in the marketplace.
Express authority is granted to the Secretary of Defense with
respect to the Intelligence Community elements of DoD to use
appropriated funds for the purchase of promotional items of
nominal value for recruitment purposes. Such items would
include hi-liters, mugs, magnets, letter openers, and other
nominal-value items deemed necessary by agency recruiters to
establish an agency presence on campuses and at job fairs. The
provision of such items will assist these agencies in
attracting students on college and university campuses or
prospective applicants at job fairs.
Recruitment give-away items are commonly offered to
prospective applicants by private sector employers as part of
normal recruiting activities. These give-away items help the
employer to establish a presence at recruiting functions by
serving as a reminder to potential applicants of the
prospective employer's name and contact number, and as a means
of attracting attention to the employer's lines of business.
Intelligence Community elements of DoD currently lack the
authority to offer these nominal-value items.
Expressly authorizing Intelligence Community elements of
DoD to use this standard private-sector recruiting practice
will enhance their ability to attract the attention of
prospective job applicants, as well as their ability to
participate in various recruitment activities and at job fairs.
The mission of each of these agencies is largely dependent on
attracting the broadest possible range of potential applicants.
It is therefore necessary that their recruiting activities be
as competitive as possible with those activities practicedby
the private-sector entities with whom they vie most vigorously for
talent, especially in the technical disciplines.
Section 502--fund for infrastructure and quality-of life improvements
at Menwith Hill and Bad Aibling stations
Section 502 would extend through the end of FY 2003
authority granted the Army in the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1996 for the enhancement of capabilities to
include infrastructure and quality of life concerns at Bad
Aibling and Menwith Hill Stations. With respect to Bad Aibling
Station, this authority is requested as an interim measure
pending any final decision on the future operations of this
station.
The Army became the Executive Agent for Bad Aibling Station
in FY 1995 and Menwith Hill Station in FY 1996. Without
congressional action, the Army is prohibited by 31 U.S.C. 1301
from using appropriated funds to support these field sites,
notwithstanding that the Army is the Executive Agent for them.
Language in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1996 provided the necessary flexibility to allow the Army to
transfer or reprogram relatively minor amounts of funds (up to
$2 million in FY 1996 O&M and $2 million in FY 1997 O&M funds)
for necessary enhancements at these stations. However,
sufficient funding has not been available to allow the Army to
meet all of the stations's needs, given financial constraints
and increasing operational tempo. Consequently, in order to
continue addressing enhancements to include infrastructure and
quality of life needs at Menwith Hill Station and to be able to
continue operations on an interim basis at Bad Aibling Station,
the Army requests that its flexible transfer and reprogramming
authority be extended through FY 2003.
Section 503--continuation of Joint Inter-Agency Task Force at current
locations in Florida and California
Section 503 supports retention of Joint Inter-Agency Task
Force intelligence and law enforcement operations in Florida
and California. In 1989, Congress designated the Department of
Defense (DoD) as the ``Lead Agency'' for the detection and
monitoring (D&M) of aerial and maritime trafficking. To carry
out their new mission, the Defense Department built upon the
Unified Command Structure and established several Joint Task
Force operations centers.
Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) East was created as a
result of Presidential Decision Directive 14, which ordered a
review of the nation's command and control intelligence centers
involved in international counter-narcotics operations.
The principal statutory authority of JIATF counterdrug
detection and monitoring activities is set forth in 10 USC 124,
which directs the Defense Department to serve as the single
lead agency of the Federal Government for the detection and
monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into
the United States. JIATF activities implement this Defense
Department authority.
JIATF operations are also based on the authority of Section
1004 of Public Law 101-510, Division A, Title X, of the
National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1991, as
amended, which provides additional authority for Defense
Department counterdrug activities in support of any Federal
agency or department, and of any State, local, or foreign law
enforcement agency for various purposes, to include the
detection, monitoring, and communication of the movement of air
and sea traffic within 25 miles of and outside the geographic
boundaries of the United States. Other counterdrug support
authorized by Section 1004 includes maintaining and repairing
equipment; transporting personnel and equipment; establishing
bases of operations; providing counterdrug related training;
constructing roads and fences and installing lighting to block
drug smuggling corridors; establishing command, control
communications, and computer networks; providing linguist and
intelligence analysis services; and producing aerial and ground
reconnaissance.
Additionally, JIATF operates under the authority and
restrictions provided for in Chapter 18 of Title 10 of the U.S.
Code (Sections 371-382) governing military support for U.S.
Federal, State, and local civilian law enforcement agencies.
These provisions include authority for the Defense Department
to support civilian law enforcement agencies by various means,
to include sharing information (Section 371), making equipment
available (Section 372), training in operation of equipment
made available and providing expert advice (Section 373), and
making Defense Department personnel available for among other
purposes, to operate equipment for the purposes of detecting,
monitoring, and communicating the movement of air and sea
traffic, and of surface traffic outside the United States in
support of civilian law enforcement agencies (10 USC 374).
JIATFs are ``DoD intelligence components'' within the
meaning of DoD Directive 5240.1, DoD Intelligence Activities
(25 April 1988) and DoD Regulation 5240.1, Procedures Governing
the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that affect
United States Persons (December 1082). These Defense Department
publications implement Executive Order 12333, United States
Intelligence Activities (4 Dec 1981). As a Defense Department
intelligence component, JIATF activities are conducted in
compliance with DoD Directive 5240.1, DoD Regulation 5240.1,
and Executive Order 12333. Procedure 12 of DoD Regulation
5240.1, entitled ``Provision of Assistance to Law Enforcement
Authorities,'' specifically authorizes DoD intelligence
components to cooperate with law enforcement authorities for
the purpose of international narcotics activities. Procedure 12
incorporates the limitations on assistance to law enforcement
authorities contained in Executive Order 12333, and the general
limitations and approval requirements pertaining to the
provision of assistance to civilian law enforcement agencies
set forth in DoD Directive 5525.5. The provisions of 10 USC 371
provide Defense Department authority to share intelligence
information collected during the normal course of military
training or operation that is relevant to a violation of any
Federal or State law with Federal, State, or local civilian law
enforcement officials.
Section 504--modification of authorities relating to interdiction of
aircraft engaged in illicit drug-trafficking
Section 504 amends current law (22 U.S.C. 2291-4) relating
to official immunity for employees and agents of the United
States and foreign countries engaged in the interdiction of
aircraft used in illicit drug trafficking. Under this section,
the President must make an annual certification to Congress
concerning both the existence of a drug threat in the country
at issue and the existence in that country of appropriate
procedures to protect against innocent loss of life. An annual
report to Congress by the President concerning United States
Government assistance to such interdiction programs is also
required by this section.
Section 505--undergraduate training program for employees of the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency
Section 505 amends the National Imagery and Mapping Act of
1996 to authorize the Secretary of Defense to establish a
program to send NIMA civilian employees to accredited
professional, technical, and other institutions of higher
learning for training at the undergraduate level. It is similar
in purpose, content, and administration to the NSA program
established under the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50
USC 402(note)).
Section 506--technical amendments
Section 506 is a technical amendment that deletes the
requirement contained in 10 U.S.C. Section 2555(b)(3) that
foreign governments return transferred nuclear test monitoring
equipment if either the United States or the foreign government
terminate an agreement to share the information collected
through such an agreement. The proposal further clarifies that
the Secretary of Defense has authority to convey, transfer
title to, or otherwise provide such equipment to a foreign
government and may maintain, repair, or replace equipment so
transferred.
Committee Position and Record Votes Taken
On September 24, 2001, in open session, a quorum being
present, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, by a
recorded vote of 18 ayes to 0 noes, approved the bill, H.R.
2883, as amended by an amendment in the nature of a substitute
offered by Chairman Goss. By that vote, the committee ordered
the bill reported favorably to the House. On that vote, the
Members present recorded their votes as follows: Mr. Goss
(Chairman)--aye; Mr. Bereuter--aye; Mr. Castle--aye; Mr.
Boehlert--aye; Mr. Gibbons--aye; Mr. LaHood--aye; Mr.
Cunningham--aye; Mr. Hoekstra--aye; Mr. Burr--aye; Mr.
Chambliss--aye; Ms. Pelosi--aye; Mr. Bishop--aye; Ms. Harman--
aye; Mr. Condit--aye; Mr. Roemer--aye; Mr. Hastings--aye; Mr.
Reyes--aye; Mr. Boswell--aye.
During consideration of the bill, Mr. LaHood offered an
amendment to the legislative provisions. The amendment would
have removed section 306 from the bill. Section 306 establishes
an independent commission to assess the performance of those
agencies and departments of the United States charged with the
responsibility to prevent, prepare for, or respond to acts of
terrorism up to and including the events of September 11, 2001.
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence rejected Mr.
LaHood's amendment by a vote of 7 ayes to 11 noes, a quorum
being present. On that vote, the Members present recorded their
votes as follows: Mr. Goss (Chairman)--no; Mr. Bereuter--aye;
Mr. Castle--aye; Mr. Boehlert--no; Mr. Gibbons--aye; Mr.
LaHood--aye; Mr. Cunningham--aye; Mr. Hoekstra--no; Mr. Burr--
aye; Mr. Chambliss--aye; Ms. Pelosi--no; Mr. Bishop--no; Ms.
Harman--no; Mr. Condit--no; Mr. Roemer--no; Mr. Hastings--no;
Mr. Reyes--no; Mr. Boswell--no.
Findings and Recommendations of the Committee on Government Reform
With respect to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the House of
Representatives, the committee is not subject to this
requirement; therefore, the committee has not received a report
from the Committee on Government Reform pertaining to the
subject of this bill.
Oversight Findings
With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, the committee held three hearings
and numerous briefings on the classified budgetary issues
raised by H.R. 2883. Testimony was taken from senior officials
of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National
Imagery and Mapping Agency, the Department of Defense, the
Department of State, the Department of Treasury, the Department
of Justice, and the Department of Transportation regarding the
activities and plans of the Intelligence Community covered by
the provisions and authorizations, both classified and
unclassified, of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2002. The bill, as reported by the committee, reflects
conclusions reached by the committee in light of this oversight
activity.
Fiscal Year Cost Projections
The committee has attempted, pursuant to clause 3(d)(2) of
rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, to
ascertain the outlays that will occur in fiscal year 2002 and
the five years following, if the amounts authorized are
appropriated. These estimates are contained in the classified
annex and are in accordance with those of the Executive Branch.
Congressional Budget Office Estimates
In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, and pursuant to sections 308
and 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the committee
submits the following estimate prepared by the Congressional
Budget Office:
House of Representatives,
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC, September 24, 2001.
Dr. Dan Crippen,
Director, Congressional Budget Office,
Ford House Office Building, Washington, DC.
Dear Dr. Crippen: In compliance with clause 3 of Rule XIII
of the Rules of the House of Representatives, I am writing to
request a cost estimate of H.R. 2883, the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, pursuant to sections
308 and 403 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. I have
attached a copy of the bill as approved today by the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
As I hope to bring this legislation to the House floor in
the very near term, I would very much appreciate an expedited
response to this request by the CBO's staff. Should you have
any questions related to this request, please contact Chris
Barton, the Committee's Acting Chief Counsel. Thank you in
advance for your assistance with this request.
Sincerely,
Porter J. Goss,
Chairman.
------
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, September 25, 2001.
Hon. Porter J. Goss,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 2883, the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Matthew
Schmit.
Sincerely,
Steven Lieberman
(For Dan L. Crippen, Director).
Enclosure.
H.R. 2883--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002
Summary: H.R. 2883 would authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 2002 for intelligence activities of the United
States government, the Intelligence Community Management
Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and
Disability System (CIARDS).
This estimate addresses only the unclassified portion of
the bill. On that limited basis, CBO estimates that
implementing the bill would cost $156 million over the 2002-
2006 period, assuming appropriation of the necessary funds. The
bill would affect direct spending by insignificant amounts;
thus, pay-as-you-go procedures would apply.
H.R. 2883 contains an intergovernmental and private-sector
mandate as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA).
CBO estimates that the costs of the mandate would not exceed
the thresholds established in that act ($56 million for
intergovernmental mandates and $113 million for private-sector
mandates in 2001, adjusted annually for inflation).
Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated
budgetary impact for the specified authorization of
appropriations in the unclassified portions of H.R. 2883 is
shown in the following table. CBO cannot obtain the necessary
information to estimate the costs for the entire bill because
parts are classified at a level above clearances held by CBO
employees. For purposes of this estimate, CBO assumes that the
bill will be enacted near the start of fiscal year 2002, and
that the necessary amount will be appropriated for that year.
Estimated outlays are based on historical spending patterns.
The costs of this legislation fall within budget function 050
(national defense).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
-----------------------------------------------
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT
Spending Under Current Law
Budget Authority \1\........................................ 149 0 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays........................................... 155 58 15 2 0 0
Proposed Changes
Authorization Level......................................... 0 153 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays........................................... 0 198 43 8 3 0
Spending Under H.R. 2883
Authorization Level \1\..................................... 149 153 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays........................................... 155 156 58 10 3 0
COMMISSION ON TERRORISM PREPAREDNESS
Spending Under Current Law
Budget Authority............................................ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays........................................... 0 0 0 0 0 0
Proposed Changes
Estimated Authorization Level............................... 0 3 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays........................................... 0 3 0 0 0 0
Spending Under H.R. 2883
Estimated Authorization Level............................... 0 3 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays........................................... 0 3 0 0 0 0
SUMMARY OF CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION
Estimated Authorization Level \2\........................... 0 156 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays........................................... 0 101 43 8 3 0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The 2001 level is the amount appropriated for that year.
\2\ In addition to effects on spending subject to appropriations, H.R. 2883 would affect direct spending, but
CBO estimates that such changes would be less than $500,000 a year.
Spending subject to appropriation
The bill would authorize appropriations of $153 million for
the Intelligence Community Management Account, which funds the
coordination of programs, budget oversight, andmanagement of
the intelligence agencies and unspecified amounts for intelligence
activities in fiscal year 2002.
Section 306 would establish a commission to examine the
federal government's preparedness to prevent, prepare for, or
respond to acts of terrorism up to and including the terrorist
acts on September 11, 2001. Based on costs for similar
commissions, CBO estimates implementing this section would cost
about $3 million in fiscal year 2002.
Direct spending and revenues
The bill would authorize $212 million for CIARDS to cover
retirement costs attributable to military service and various
unfunded liabilities. The payment to CIARDS is considered
mandatory, and the authorization under this bill would be the
same as assumed in the CBO baseline. Thus, this estimate does
not ascribe any additional cost to that provision.
Section 401 would provide permanent authority for a program
that authorizes the CIA to provide goods and services on a
reimbursable basis. CBO estimates that the costs of providing
those goods and services would be offset by the reimbursements
and that this provision would have an insignificant net impact
each year and no net budgetary impact over the long run.
Section 402 would extend the authority of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) to offer incentive payments to
employees who voluntarily retire or resign. The authority,
which will expire on September 30, 2002, would be extended
through fiscal year 2003. Section 402 also would require the
CIA to make a deposit to the Civil Service Retirement and
Disability Fund equal to 15 percent of final pay for each
employee who accepts an incentive payment. Although the timing
of agency payments and the additional benefit payments would
not match on a yearly basis, CBO believes that these deposits
would be sufficient to cover the cost of any long-term increase
in benefits that would result from induced retirements. CBO
cannot provide a precise estimate of the direct spending
effects because the data necessary for an estimate are
classified.
Pay-as-you-go considerations: The Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act sets up pay-as-you-go procedures
for legislation affecting direct spending or receipts. CBO
estimates that the net change in outlays for section 401 that
are subject to pay-as-you-go procedures would be insignificant
for each year. CBO cannot estimate the precise direct spending
effects of section 402 because the necessary data are
classified.
Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: H.R. 2883
would establish the Commission on Preparedness and Performance
of the Federal Government for the September 11 Acts of
Terrorism and would give it the power to subpoena testimony and
evidence. Such power would constitute an intergovernmental and
private-sector mandate under UMRA. CBO estimates that the costs
of the mandate would not exceed the thresholds established in
UMRA ($56 million for intergovernmental mandates and $113
million for private-sector mandates in 2001, adjusted annually
for inflation). The remaining provisions of the bill contain no
intergovernmental or private-sector mandates and would impose
no costs on state, local, or tribal governments.
Previous CBO estimate: On September 14, 2001, CBO
transmitted a cost estimate for the unclassified portion of S.
1428, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002,
as ordered reported by the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence on September 6, 2001. The differences in the
estimated costs reflect differences in the bills. In
particular, S. 1428 would authorize $238 million for the
Intelligence Community Management Account, while H.R. 2883
would authorize $153 million for that account.
Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Matthew Schmit. Impact
on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Elyse Goldman. Impact
on the Private Sector: Zachary Selden.
Estimate approved by: Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant
Director for Budget Analysis.
Committee Cost Estimates
The committee agrees with the estimate of the Congressional
Budget Office.
Specific Constitutional Authority for Congressional Enactment of This
Legislation
The intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the
United States government are carried out to support the
national security interests of the United States, to support
and assist the armed forces of the United States, and to
support the President in the execution of the foreign policy of
the United States. Article 1, section 8 of the Constitution of
the United States provides, in pertinent part, that ``Congress
shall have power * * * to pay the debts and provide for the
common defence and general welfare of the United States; * *
*''; ``to raise and support Armies, * * *'' ``to provide and
maintain a Navy; * * *'' and ``to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution * * * all
other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.''
Therefore, pursuant to such authority, Congress is empowered to
enact this legislation.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is
proposed is shown in roman):
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
* * * * * * *
DEFINITIONS
Sec. 3. As used in this Act:
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(4) The term ``intelligence community'' includes--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(H) the intelligence elements of the Army,
the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department
of the Treasury, [and] the Department of
Energy, and the Coast Guard;
* * * * * * *
TITLE I--COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
* * * * * * *
appointment of officials responsible for intelligence-related
activities
Sec. 106. (a) * * *
(b) Consultation with DCI in Certain Appointments.--(1) * * *
(2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions:
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(C) The Director of the Office of [Nonproliferation
and National Security] Intelligence and the Director of
the Office of Counterintelligence of the Department of
Energy.
* * * * * * *
detail of intelligence community personnel--intelligence community
assignment program
Sec. 113. (a) * * *
(b) Benefits, Allowances, Travel, Incentives.--(1) An
employee detailed under subsection (a) may be authorized any
benefit, allowance, travel, or incentive otherwise provided to
enhance staffing by the organization from which the employee is
detailed.
(2) The head of an agency of an employee detailed under
subsection (a) may pay a lodging allowance for the employee
subject to the following conditions:
(A) The allowance shall be the lesser of the cost of
the lodging or a maximum amount payable for the lodging
as established jointly by the Director of Central
Intelligence and--
(i) with respect to detailed employees of the
Department of Defense, the Secretary of
Defense; and
(ii) with respect to detailed employees of
other agencies and departments, the head of
such agency or department.
(B) The detailed employee maintains a primary
residence for the employee's immediate family in the
local commuting area of the parent agency duty station
from which the employee regularly commuted to such duty
station before the detail.
(C) The lodging is within a reasonable proximity of
the host agency duty station.
(D) The distance between the detailed employee's
parent agency duty station and the host agency duty
station is greater than 20 miles.
(E) The distance between the detailed employee's
primary residence and the host agency duty station is
10 miles greater than the distance between such primary
residence and the employees parent duty station.
(F) The rate of pay applicable to the detailed
employee does not exceed the rate of basic pay for
grade GS-15 of the General Schedule.
* * * * * * *
----------
SECTION 21 OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949
* * * * * * *
central services program
Sec. 21. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(g) Audit.--(1) Not later than [December] January 31 each
year, the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency
shall [conduct] complete an audit of the activities under the
program during the preceding fiscal year.
* * * * * * *
(h) Termination.--[(1) The authority of the Director to carry
out the program under this section shall terminate on March 31,
2002.]
[(2)] (1) Subject to paragraph [(3)] (2), the Director of
Central Intelligence and the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, acting jointly--
(A) may terminate the program under this section and
the Fund at any time; and
(B) upon such termination, shall provide for the
disposition of the personnel, assets, liabilities,
grants, contracts, property, records, and unexpended
balances of appropriations, authorizations,
allocations, and other funds held, used, arising from,
available to, or to be made available in connection
with the program or the Fund.
[(3)] (2) The Director of Central Intelligence and the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget may not
undertake any action under paragraph [(2)] (1) until 60 days
after the date on which the Directors jointly submit notice of
such action to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate.
* * * * * * *
----------
SECTION 2 OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY VOLUNTARY SEPARATION PAY
ACT
SEC. 2. SEPARATION PAY.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(f) Termination.--No amount shall be payable under this
section based on any separation occurring after September 30,
[2002] 2003.
* * * * * * *
(i) Remittance of Funds.--The Director shall remit to the
Office of Personnel Management for deposit in the Treasury of
the United States to the credit of the Civil Service Retirement
and Disability Fund (in addition to any other payments which
the Director is required to make under subchapter III of
chapter 83 and subchapter II of chapter 84 of title 5, United
States Code), an amount equal to 15 percent of the final basic
pay of each employee who, in fiscal year 1998, 1999, 2000,
2001, [or 2002] 2002, or 2003, retires voluntarily under
section 8336, 8412, or 8414 of such title or resigns and to
whom a voluntary separation incentive payment has been or is to
be paid under this section. The remittance required by this
subsection shall be in lieu of any remittance required by
section 4(a) of the Federal Workforce Restructuring Act of 1994
(5 U.S.C. 8331 note).
----------
TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE
* * * * * * *
Subtitle A--General Military Law
* * * * * * *
PART I--ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL MILITARY POWERS
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 21--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE MATTERS
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER I--GENERAL MATTERS
Sec.
421. Funds for foreign cryptologic support.
[422. Counterintelligence official reception and representation
expenses.]
422. Use of funds for certain incidental purposes.
* * * * * * *
[Sec. 422. Counterintelligence official reception and representation
expenses]
Sec. 422. Use of funds for certain incidental purposes
(a) Counterintelligence Official Reception and Representation
Expenses.--The Secretary of Defense may use funds available to
the Department of Defense for counterintelligence programs to
pay the expenses of hosting foreign officials in the United
States under the auspices of the Department of Defense for
consultation on counterintelligence matters.
(b) Promotional Items for Recruitment Purposes.--The
Secretary of Defense may use funds available for an
intelligence element of the Department of Defense to purchase
promotional items of nominal value for use in the recruitment
of individuals for employment by that element.
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 22--NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER III--PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
Sec.
461. Management rights.
462. Financial assistance to certain employees in acquisition of
critical skills.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 462. Financial assistance to certain employees in acquisition of
critical skills
The Secretary of Defense may establish an undergraduate
training program with respect to civilian employees of the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency that is similar in purpose,
conditions, content, and administration to the program
established by the Secretary of Defense under section 16 of the
National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) for
civilian employees of the National Security Agency.
* * * * * * *
PART IV--SERVICE, SUPPLY, AND PROCUREMENT
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 152--ISSUE OF SUPPLIES, SERVICES, AND FACILITIES
* * * * * * *
Sec. 2555. Nuclear test monitoring equipment: furnishing to foreign
governments
(a) Authority To [Convey or] Transfer Title to or Otherwise
Provide Nuclear Test Monitoring Equipment.--Subject to
subsection (b), the Secretary of Defense may--
(1) [convey] transfer title or otherwise provide to a
foreign government (A) equipment for the monitoring of
nuclear test explosions, and (B) associated equipment;
[and]
(2) as part of any such conveyance or provision of
equipment, install such equipment on foreign territory
or in international waters[.]; and
(3) inspect, test, maintain, repair, or replace any
such equipment.
(b) Agreement Required.--Nuclear test explosion monitoring
equipment may be [conveyed or otherwise provided] provided to a
foreign government under subsection (a) only pursuant to the
terms of an agreement between the United States and the foreign
government receiving the equipment in which the recipient
foreign government agrees--
(1) to provide the United States with timely access
to the data produced, collected, or generated by the
equipment; and
(2) to permit the Secretary of Defense to take such
measures as the Secretary considers necessary to
inspect, test, maintain, repair, or replace that
equipment, including access for purposes of such
measures[; and].
[(3) to return such equipment to the United States
(or allow the United States to recover such equipment)
if either party determines that the agreement no longer
serves its interests.]
* * * * * * *
----------
SECTION 506 OF THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1996
SEC. 506. ENHANCEMENT OF CAPABILITIES OF CERTAIN ARMY FACILITIES.
(a) * * *
(b) Source of Funds.--Funds available for the Army for
operations and maintenance for fiscal years [2000 and 2001]
2002 and 2003 shall be available to carry out subsection (a).
* * * * * * *
----------
SECTION 1012 OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR
1995
SEC. 1012. OFFICIAL IMMUNITY FOR AUTHORIZED EMPLOYEES AND AGENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES ENGAGED IN
INTERDICTION OF AIRCRAFT USED IN ILLICIT DRUG
TRAFFICKING.
(a) Employees and Agents of Foreign Countries.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it shall not be
unlawful for authorized employees or agents of a foreign
country (including members of the armed forces of that country)
to interdict or attempt to interdict an aircraft in that
country's territory or airspace if--
(1) * * *
(2) the President of the United States[, before the
interdiction occurs, has determined] has, during the
12-month period ending on the date of the interdiction,
certified to Congress with respect to that country
that--
(A) interdiction is necessary because of the
extraordinary threat posed by illicit drug
trafficking to the national security of that
country; and
(B) the country has appropriate procedures in
place to protect against innocent loss of life
in the air and on the ground in connection with
interdiction, which shall at a minimum include
effective means to identify and warn an
aircraft before the use of force directed
against the aircraft.
* * * * * * *
(c) Annual Reports.--(1) Not later than February 1 each year,
the President shall submit to Congress a report on the
assistance provided under subsection (b) during the preceding
calendar year. Each report shall include for the calendar year
covered by such report the following:
(A) A list specifying each country for which a
certification referred to in subsection (a)(2) was in
effect for purposes of that subsection during any
portion of such calendar year, including the nature of
the illicit drug trafficking threat to each such
country.
(B) A detailed explanation of the procedures referred
to in subsection (a)(2)(B) in effect for each country
listed under subparagraph (A), including any training
and other mechanisms in place to ensure adherence to
such procedures.
(C) A complete description of any assistance provided
under subsection (b).
(D) A summary description of the aircraft
interception activity for which the United States
Government provided any form of assistance under
subsection (b).
(2) Each report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
[(c)] (d) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
