[DOCID: f:hr1054.106]
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106th Congress Report
2d Session HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 106-1054
_______________________________________________________________________
Union Calendar No. 616
SURVEY OF ACTIVITIES OF THE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
DURING THE 106TH CONGRESS
__________
R E P O R T
of the
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
January 2, 2001.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
89-006 WASHINGTON : 2001
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
House of Representatives,
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC, January 2, 2001.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House,
The Capitol, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: Pursuant to the Rules of the House, I am
pleased to transmit herewith an activity report of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, titled ``Committee
Activity Report for the 106th Congress.'' The report includes a
summary of oversight activities and findings of the Committee
during the course of the 106th Congress.
Sincerely yours,
Porter J. Goss, Chairman.
Union Calendar No. 616
106th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session 106-1054
======================================================================
SURVEY OF ACTIVITIES OF THE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
DURING THE 106TH CONGRESS
_______
January 2, 2001.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Goss, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
This report covers the activities of the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence during the One Hundred Sixth
Congress. Porter J. Goss (Republican, Florida) served as
Chairman; Julian C. Dixon (Democrat, California) served as the
Ranking Member.
The stated purpose of H. Res. 658 of the 95th Congress,
which created the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, was to establish a committee ``to oversee and
make continuing studies of the intelligence and intelligence-
related activities and programs of the United States Government
and to submit to the House appropriate proposals for
legislation and report to the House concerning such
intelligence and intelligence-related activities and
programs.''
H. Res. 658 also indicated that the Committee ``shall make
every effort to assure that the appropriate departments and
agencies of the United States provide informed and timely
intelligence necessary for the executive and legislative
branches to make sound decisions affecting the security and
vital interests of the Nation. It is further the purpose of
this resolution to provide vigilant legislative oversight over
the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the
United States to assure that such activities are in conformity
with the Constitution and the laws of the United States.''
In carrying out this mandate, the Committee divided its
responsibilities among two subcommittees:
Subcommittee on Human Intelligence, Analysis, and Counterintelligence
Bill McCollum (R-Florida), Chairman Alcee L. Hastings (D-Florida),
Ranking Member
Charles F. Bass (R-New Hampshire) Nancy Pelosi (D-California)
Norman Sisisky (D-Virginia)
Jerry Lewis (R-California) Gary A. Condit (D-California)
Jim Gibbons (R-Nevada)
Ray LaHood (R-Illinois)
Heather Wilson (R-New Mexico)
Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence
Michael N. Castle (R-Delaware),
Chairman Sanford D. Bishop, Jr. (D-Georgia),
Ranking Member
Sherwood L. Boehlert (R-New York) Tim Roemer (D-Indiana)
Gary A. Condit (D-California)
Charles F. Bass (R-New Hampshire) Norman Sisisky (D-Virginia)
Jim Gibbons (R-Nevada)
Ray LaHood (R-Illinois)
Heather Wilson (R-New Mexico)
SCOPE OF COMMITTEE REVIEW
U.S. intelligence and intelligence-related activities under
the jurisdiction of the Committee include the National Foreign
Intelligence Program (NFIP), the Joint Military Intelligence
Program (JMIP), and the Department of Defense Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA).
The National Foreign Intelligence Program consists of
activities in the following departments, agencies, or other
intelligence elements of the government: (1) the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA); (2) the Department of Defense (DOD);
(3) the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); (4) the National
Security Agency (NSA); (5) the National Reconnaissance Office
(NRO); (6) the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA); (7)
the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; (8) the
Department of State; (9) the Department of Treasury; (10) the
Department of Energy; and (11) the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI).
The JMIP was established in 1995 to provide integrated
program management of defense intelligence elements that
support defense-wide or theater-level consumers. Included
within JMIP are aggregations created for management efficiency
and characterized by similarity, either in intelligence
discipline (e.g., Signals Intelligence and Imagery
Intelligence) or function (e.g., satellite support and aerial
reconnaissance). the jurisdiction in programs comprising JMIP
also fall within the jurisdiction of the House Committee on
Armed Services.
The TIARA programs are a diverse array of reconnaissance
and target acquisition programs that are a functional part of
the basic military force structure and provide direct
information support to military operations. TIARA, as defined
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense,
include those military intelligence activities outside the
defense intelligence programs that respond specifically to
requirements of military commanders for operational support
information, as well as to national command, control, and
intelligence requirements. The programs comprising TIARA also
fall within the jurisdiction of the House Committee on Armed
Services.
OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES
During the 106th Congress, the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), under the leadership of
Chairman Porter J. Goss and Ranking Member Julian C. Dixon,
has--
Promoted a bipartisan effort to continue rebuilding
and refining the nation's intelligence capabilities to
meet increasingly complex geopolitical and
technological challenges to national security;
Advanced the education of Members of Congress and the
public on matters of vital interest to national
security and the distinct role intelligence plays in
its defense;
Worked to promote cooperation and trust with other
committees in performing oversight of issues that
implicate matters of joint jurisdiction such as
terrorism, narcotics, proliferation, etc.; and
Worked diligently to address security and
counterintelligence weaknesses that were apparent
within the Intelligence Community and other components
of Executive Branch Departments.
The Committee is concerned that our intelligence
capabilities have become increasingly fragile since the breakup
of the Soviet Union, and we have failed to invest in new
capabilities that are now critical. American interests have
expanded, new threats have evolved, and the priority placed on
intelligence and the role of the Intelligence Community has
grown significantly. For the President and senior policymakers,
intelligence forms the basis for key foreign policy strategies
and decisions and allows insight into whether those policies
are working. Intelligence is also meant to supply the necessary
indication and warning information that allows the President to
forestall problems rather than simply react to crises. For the
military, intelligence not only provides information critical
to a commander, but also is now a critical part of military
operations, including the functioning of some of the weapon
systems themselves.
Intelligence is the first line of defense. Human
intelligence (HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT), in
particular, provide direct and immediate threat data to
personnel who risk their lives on a daily basis. Numerous
examples include: our ground forces in Kosovo, our pilots
conducting Northern and Southern watch missions in Iraq, our
troops on the border between North and South Korea, our forces
engaged in counter-narcotics operations in Latin American, and
our Naval forces deployed across the oceans.
The Committee's budget authorizations and recommendations
reflect the Committee's concern that the U.S. is placing undue
risks on its armed forces and its national security interests
by not redressing the many crucial problems facing the
Intelligence Community. The Committee has highlighted not only
areas of greatest immediate priority, but also stressed the
need for enhancing global coverage areas to rebuild important
indications and warning capabilities. In particular, the
Committee applied considerable focus and provided several
recommendations in the following areas: recapitalizing SIGINT
and promoting NSA modernization initiatives; building a
stronger and more extensive clandestine HUMINT capability and
increasing funding in operations, training, and technical
capabilities; furthering efforts to utilize effectively the
capabilities of new imagery satellites in the next decade and
promoting successful use of commercial resources; and,
developing a new strategy for the U.S. Intelligence Community
to increase the efficiency and interoperability of costly
communications systems.
In its efforts to increase investment in vital elements of
the Intelligence Community, the Committee finds that it is
imperative that the Administration take greater responsibility
in forming a sound intelligence budget. In particular, the
Committee has recommended that the President, the DCI, and the
Secretary of Defense reexamine the basic processes used to put
together the yearly budget request in an effort to better
address national security needs. Along with a new approach to
budgeting by the Administration, it is the hope of the
Committee that efforts will be made for better communication
and coordination among the departments and agencies of our
intelligence apparatus, allowing them to successfully function
as a true ``community.''
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000 AND 2001
During the 106th Congress, the Committee furthered its
objectives of rebuilding and revitalizing our national
intelligence capabilities to better meet the threats of the
21st century. With bipartisan support, the Committee sought to
provide the resources necessary to ensure that our policymakers
and military commanders have timely and reliable intelligence
support that is crucial to our nation's security.
The Committee reviewed extensively the President's budget
submissions for Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001, fulfilling its
responsibility to closely examine the nation's intelligence
programs and proposed expenditures. These reviews included
substantive and programmatic hearings, Member briefings, and
numerous staff briefings. Testimony on the President's budget
submission was taken from the Director of Central Intelligence
(DCI); the Director of Central Intelligence for Community
Management (DDCI/CM); the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD/C31);
the Directors of DIA, NSA, NIMA, NRO, and the FBI; and other
major intelligence program managers.
The Committee's examination of the President's Fiscal Years
2000 and 2001 intelligence budgets included 20 full committee
budget-related hearings, including sessions on Covert Action
and Support to Military Operations. Additional hearings
addressed the DCI's overall budget submission, the state of
health of the Intelligence Community, and the DCI's views and
plans for the future of intelligence and the Intelligence
Community. In addition to budget-related hearings, the
Committee held 19 full committee hearings and 29 full committee
briefings on various issues vital to our Intelligence Community
and national security. Among the subjects examined by the
Committee were: developments in Russia, Colombia, and Iraq;
lessons learned from Kosovo; intelligence collection issues;
and State Department and Department of Energy security and
counterintelligence practices.
The Committee believes that intelligence needs to be a
higher priority in the competition for budgetary resources
within the Executive Branch and the Congress. Increasing
resources for and emphasis on intelligence will ensure that the
nation is better prepared for the global challenges that will
confront us in the years to come.
The Committee's immediate concern continues to be the
health and welfare of our signals intelligence (SIGINT)
resources and capabilities. The January 2000 ``crash'' of
National Security Agency computers highlighted the
infrastructure deficiencies, failed management, and lack of
sufficient acquisition processes and expertise that have
plagued the NSA. The Director of NSA has undertaken important
efforts to address these critical issues. The Committee, in
general, supports these initiatives, and has taken specific
steps within the budget authorizations of this Congress to
support the Director of NSA and help rectify these problem
areas.
In the last two budget authorization bills, the Committee
invested significant resources in human intelligence (HUMINT)
and signals intelligence (SIGINT). In the area of imagery
intelligence (IMINT), the Committee directed the defense and
intelligence communities to develop and fund the tasking,
processing, exploitation, and dissemination (TPED) activities
necessary to utilize the Future Imagery Architecture (FIA)
program under development by the National Reconnaissance Office
(NRO). In addition, during the 106th Congress, the Committee
has sought to correct the serve counterintelligence and
security failures that had become shockingly evident at the
Departments of Energy and State.
The ``Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2000
(P.L. 106-120)'' in addition to authorizing generally the
activities of the U.S. Intelligence Community included a
provision to protect the identity of retired covert agents.
This provision increased penalties imposed upon those who
willfully disclose agents' identities. In addition, P.L. 106-
120 required a joint report from the Directors of the CIA, the
NSA, and the Attorney General providing a detailed analysis of
the legal standards employed by elements of the intelligence
community in conducting signals intelligence activities,
including electronic surveillance. The bill also required a
report from the Director of Central Intelligence on the
activities of the CIA in Chile.
The ``Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2001
(P.L. 106-567)'' in addition to authorizing the intelligence
activities of the U.S. Intelligence Community included a
provision requiring the DCI to certify that the State
Department is in full compliance with all applicable Director
of Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDS) relating to the
handling, retention, or storage of classified information. In
addition, the bill contained a subtitle addressing management
reorganization of the Diplomatic Telecommunications Service
Program Office (DTS-PO), including the creation of a Diplomatic
Telecommunications Service Oversight Board. Title VI, the
``Counterintelligence Reform Act of 2000'' is intended to
improve coordination within and among the U.S. Government
agencies investigating and prosecuting espionage cases and
other cases affecting national security. Title VII of the bill,
the ``Public Interest Declassification Act'' provides for a
systematic, coordinated, and comprehensive review of policy for
declassification of records and materials that are of
extraordinary public interest. Of key significance for the
transformation of NSA, a provision was included that provided
the Director of NSA with the ability to offer early retirement
incentives to NSA personnel, including senior employees.
Finally, the initial conference report submitted to the
President for signature, contained a provision that would have
provided additional criminal penalties for unauthorized
disclosure by U.S. government employees and former U.S.
government employees of classified information, and a provision
that restricted the manner in which the NRO contracted for
launch vehicles.
On November 4, 2000, the President vetoed the initial
conference report (H. Rept. No. 106-969) expressing concern
regarding the provision on unauthorized disclosure (the so-
called ``leaks'' provision). This veto came despite support for
the provision by the Department of Justice and an articulation
of support for the Senate's managers amendment containing the
provision in the statement of Administration Policy dated
October 10, 2000. The House referred the vetoed conference
report back to HPSCI. Chairman Goss, Vice-Chairman Lewis, and
Ranking Democrat Dixon introduced a new intelligence
authorization bill (H.R. 5630) that was identical to H.R. 4392,
absent the ``leaks'' provision. Subsequently, the Senate passed
H.R. 5630, but amended it by removing the provision related to
NRO launch contracts, despite the previous agreement of the
conferees. Ultimately, the House passed the amended version of
H.R. 5630, as adopted by the Senate, and the President signed
the bill on December 27, 2000 (P.L. 106-567).
COMMITTEE INVESTIGATIONS
CIA Drug Trafficking Investigation
In August 1996, the San Jose Mercury News published a
series of articles regarding the introduction and distribution
of crack cocaine into communities of Los Angeles. The article
alleged that one of the drug trafficking rings responsible was
operated by a Nicaraguan who used some of his drug profits to
provide lethal and non-lethal assistance to the Contras.
Furthermore, the Mercury News articles implied that CIA either
backed, or at least condoned, the drug trafficking activity.
Allegations of drug trafficking by individuals within the
Contra movement were not new in August, 1996; however, the
Mercury News articles brought these allegations into sharp
focus and galvanized public opinion. For this reason, the
Committee believed it needed to examine the charges raised by
the Mercury News articles thoroughly and objectively.
In performing its examination of the allegations and
implications raised in the ``Dark Alliance'' series, the
Committee reviewed CIA Inspector General Reports, Volume I and
II, the DOJ Inspector General Report, the Los Angeles County
Sheriff's Department investigation; tasked the Congressional
Research Service for background data related to the Iran-Contra
investigations; reviewed massive quantities of raw classified
CIA files and reporting; conducted interviews in Washington,
Los Angeles, and Nicaragua; attended and participated in two
``town hall'' meetings in South Central Los Angeles; received a
number of briefings; and held hearings.
On May 11, 2000, the Committee released a detailed report,
which concluded that evidence was not found to support the
allegations put forth in the Mercury News ``Dark Alliance''
series. The Committee report was adopted unanimously (Committee
Print, 106th Congress, February 2000, Report on the Central
Intelligence Agency's Alleged Involvement in Crack Cocaine
Trafficking in the Los Angeles Area.)
In summarizing its findings, the Committee stated: ``The
allegations of the Dark Alliance series warranted an
investigation, and this Committee performed its role mindful of
the tens of thousands of American lives that have been lost to
the scourge of crack cocaine. Based on its investigation,
involving numerous interviews, reviews of extensive
documentation, and a thorough and critical reading of other
investigative reports, the Committee has concluded that the
evidence does not support the implications of the San Jose
Mercury News--that the CIA was responsible for the crack
epidemic in Los Angeles or anywhere else in the United States
to further the cause of the Contra war in Central America.''
(HPSCI Press Statement, May 11, 2000.)
DOE Counterintelligence Failures
In the wake of the report by the so-called Cox Committee
\1\ on Chinese nuclear espionage and by the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) on security lapses at the
Department of Energy's (DOE's) nuclear weapons laboratories,
and in response to Presidential Decision Directive NSC 61 (PDD-
61),\2\ a comprehensive reform of counterintelligence (CI) at
DOE was undertaken. This was accelerated and significantly
refined in response to legislation proposed by Congress which,
among other things, created the National Nuclear Security
Agency (NNSA).
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\1\ House Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/
Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China.
\2\ PDD-61 was issued on February 11, 1998 in response to reports
from the General Accounting Office and from the Intelligence Community
that found serious CI and security problems at DOE and its constituent
laboratories.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee established a bipartisan investigative team
in the first quarter of FY 2000 to examine the DOE's plan to
improve its counterintelligence posture at its headquarters in
Washington and its three key weapons laboratories. The purpose
of the examination was to review the status of reforms and to
examine issues still unresolved or under consideration. The
team was headed by a special staff consultant, Mr. Paul
Redmond, one of America's leading experts in CI and a former
head of CI at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
In general, the review determined that DOE had made a good
but inconsistent start in improving its CI capabilities. The
most progress had been made in building an operational CI
capability to identify and neutralize insider penetrations. The
two areas of greatest shortcoming, either of which could derail
the whole CI program, were in CI awareness training and in
gaining employee acceptance of the polygraph program.
The Review Panel's report was entitled: House Report No.
106-687, Report of the Redmond Panel: Improving
Counterintelligence Capabilities at the Department of Energy
and the Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratories, June 21, 2000.
Hearings and Briefings
CLOSED HEARINGS AND BRIEFINGS
Pursuant to the rules of the Committee (Committee Rule
3(b)(c)), the Committee held 32 hearings and 29 briefings
closed to the public on issues involving sensitive information,
intelligence sources and methods, and national security.
OPEN HEARINGS
During the 106th Congress, the Committee held an
unprecedented number of open hearings on issues of concern to
the Intelligence Community and the American people. Although
committed to the protection of sources and methods and ensuring
the security of our nation's secrets, it is the intention of
the Committee, whenever possible, to hold open hearings in an
unclassified setting on issues of vital importance and concern
to the public.
The Committee held seven open hearings on the following
subjects:
Biological Warfare Threats--March 3, 1999
Encryption Legislation--June 9, 1999
Space Launch Failures--June 15, 1999
Encryption Legislation--July 14, 1999
Chinese Embassy Bombing--July 22, 1999
DOE Counterintelligence--February 16, 2000
NSA Legal Authorities--April 12, 2000
Biological Warfare Threats
On March 3, 1999, the Committee held an open hearing on
international biological warfare threats and capabilities.
Chairman Goss and Ranking Democrat Dixon pursued this issue in
open session because they felt there was significant
information that could be made available publicly to inform,
not only Members of Congress but also the American public,
about the significant dangers to national security brought
about by biological weapons and delivery capabilities. The open
hearing presented expert testimony with several witnesses
including John Lauder, special Assistant to the Director of
Central Intelligence for Nonproliferation; and Dr. Ken Alibek,
former Deputy Chief of the civilian branch of the Soviet
Union's offensive biological weapons program. This open hearing
reinforced the Committee's view that robust intelligence is the
key to understanding the threat of biological weapons and is
vital to preventing their disastrous use.
Encryption Legislation
During the 106th Congress, the Committee held two separate
open hearings (June 9 and July 14, 1999) on the public policy
debate surrounding proposed encryption legislation because of
the serious national security and public safety interests at
stake. It was the intention of the Committee to embrace a
compromise approach revising the nation's encryption policies,
balancing the commercial interest for expanded access to
foreign markets with the concerns of national security and law
enforcement. During these hearings, the Committee took
testimony from Attorney General Janet Reno, FBI Director Louis
Freeh, Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre, and several
senior administration officials who expressed national security
concerns with H.R. 850, the ``Security and Freedom through
Encryption Act (SAFE) Act,'' During the Committee's
consideration of H.R. 850, it was determined that the SAFE Act
did not adequately address the negative impact such legislation
would have upon law enforcement and national security despite
the benefits it would bestow on U.S. business interests.
Striking a balance between SAFE Act proponents and
administration officials, the Committee concluded its hearings
with the introduction of H.R. 2616, the ``Encryption for the
National Interest Act,'' cosponsored by fifteen Members,
Republican and Democrat. H.R. 2616 sought to establish a
dynamic and constructive framework for continued cooperation
between government and industry to achieve a workable solution
for the encryption issue. The ``Encryption for the National
Interest Act'' advanced the Committee's position that national
security and the protection of Americans are a principal
obligation of the federal government.
At the same time, Chairman Goss also introduced H.R. 2617,
as a companion bill. The ``Tax Relief for Responsible
Encryption Act of 1999,'' proposed a tax incentive for the
nation's encryption software manufacturers to develop products
with recoverability features.
In an effort to provide leadership on the encryption issue,
and to focus on the important national security and high
technology aspects of the issue, Chairman Goss, Ranking
Democrat Dixon, and twenty-one other Members of the House from
both sides of the aisle delivered a letter to President Clinton
urging him to convene a summit of industry and government
leaders to develop a consensus approach on encryption policy.
However, on September 16, 1999, under mounting Congressional
and industry pressure, the Administration announced new
guidelines for the export of encryption products while
promising to attempt a similar balanced approach to the
concerns of national security and public safety.
The key principles for national security outlined in the
Administration's new proposal for export guidelines included
(1) meaningful technical review of encryption products in
advance of export; (2) a workable process for post-export
reporting on end-use and end-users of encryption; and (3) the
ability to deny exports to certain entities for national
security reasons. The Committee found the new policy guidelines
substantially mirrored the approach it championed on this
issue.
Space Launch Failures
In response to a string of space launch failures, the
Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence, under the
leadership of Subcommittee Chairman Michael N. Castle, and
Ranking Member Sanford Bishop, held a public hearing (June 15,
1999) with testimony from NRO director Keith Hall, senior Air
Force managers, and industry representatives from the launch
program. The Committee felt a serious examination of launch
vehicle production, oversight, and operations was necessary to
get the root of these failures.
Furthermore, the Committee had been frustrated with aspects
of the NRO's launch program particularly with Titan IV
production and the launch program's excessive over-funding. The
committee had considerable difficulty holding any organization
accountable for better program planning because the NRO has
launch vehicle and launch services contracts written and
managed by non-NRO contracting offices. As a result, the NRO
did not have sufficient management responsibility for those
contracts and could not be responsive to congressional
concerns, nor take necessary corrective actions.
In the wake of these launch failures and the information
gathered through the public hearing, the Committee introduced
legislation in its mark-up of the ``Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2001,'' which was subsequently agreed upon
by the Senate conferees and included in the conference report
to the bill (See H. Rept. No. 106-969).\3\ Section 501 of the
conference report required that the NRO contract for vehicle
acquisition and launch services directly with launch service
providers. It is the decided view of the Committee that more
direct control by the NRO over its vehicle acquisition and
launch contracts will increase the accountability for such
projects within the NRO. Unfortunately, despite previous
agreement by the House and Senate conferees, the provision was
inexplicably pulled by the Senate from the final bill. Although
this provision was not included in the final version of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, the
Committee intends to pursue the issue in the 107th Congress.
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\3\ This conference report was vetoed by President Clinton on
November 4, 2000, for other reasons. See supra.
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Chinese Embassy Bombing
The Committee felt the accidental bombing of the Chinese
Embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, on May 7, 1999, was extremely
important to discussion in a public forum despite the
reluctance of the Administration so that the public could
understand the complexity of the issue and that the bombing was
the result of flaws in both the intelligence and targeting
processes. The public hearing was held on July 22, 1999. The
Committee provided more than ample time for the Administration,
the Department of Defense, and the Intelligence Community to
finalize their review of the incident and to prepare an
assessment of the bombing that was appropriate for a public
discussion. Meanwhile, to further its investigation and
preparation for this hearing, Committee staff conducted
interviews, sorted through the results of the various agency
investigations, and reviewed the original documents used in the
targeting.
Director of Central Intelligence George Tenent and Deputy
Secretary of Defense John J. Hamre provided testimony before
the Committee and addressed the following key issues: the
intelligence failure that led to the mistaken labeling of the
Chinese Embassy in Belgrade; the flaws in the targeting process
that allowed this initial failure to escape detection; and the
corrective measures that have and can be implemented to prevent
a repeat of a tragedy of this kind in the future. Further, the
Committee questioned the policy underlying the attacks.
DOE Counterintelligence Issues
Upon conclusion of its investigation into DOE security and
counterintelligence issues, the Redmond Panel presented its
conclusions before the Committee and provided its evaluation on
the state of counterintelligence (CI) at the Department of
Energy and its key weapons laboratories at Los Alamos, Sandia,
and Lawrence Livermore. The scope of the team's investigation
was to determine what has been done by the Department of Energy
and its key constituent nuclear weapons laboratories to improve
counterintelligence policy and practices in the wake of the
nuclear espionage investigation at Los Alamos National
Laboratory.
In spite of progress in some areas, the Redmond Panel found
unsettling the statements put forth by DOE Headquarters
claiming that counterintelligence problems had been solved.
Failures and deficiencies caused by decades of misfeasance and
neglect cannot be fixed overnight. The real test for assessing
the CI program will be its future success in catching spies and
security violators. This area will remain a focus point for the
Committee's oversight activities in succeeding Congresses.
NSA Legal Authorities
Over the course of the 106th Congress, a growing amount of
press attention was paid to the SIGINT (signals intelligence)
activities of the National Security Agency. This press
reporting generally focused on an alleged SIGINT collection
program commonly referred to as ``Echelon.'' It was fueled, in
part, by a report issued by the European Parliament,
accusations put forth by the American Civil Liberties Union,
and commentary in the press and elsewhere.
The ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000
(P.L. 106-120, Section 309)'' required the submission of a
classified and unclassified report on the legal authorities
under which the NSA conducts its SIGINT activities. The
Committee is in receipt of that document and its various
appendices (Legal Standards for the Intelligence Community in
Conducting Electronic Surveillance, February 1, 2000).
Because of strong public interest in this matter, the
Committee took the opportunity to discuss, in open session on
April 12, 2000, the strict legal guidelines under which NSA
operates and the role SIGINT has in the defense of our nation's
security. In an unprecedented overview of the NSA's electronic
surveillance activities, NSA Director Lieutenant General
Michael Hayden; DCI George Tenet; and Representative Bob Barr
testified before the Committee and discussed the regulations
and the continued need for executive branch and HPSCI oversight
of SIGINT activities of the NSA. Frances Fragos Townsend,
Counsel for Intelligence Policy in the Office of Intelligence
Policy and Review (OIPR) for the U.S. Department of Justice,
testified as well about her office's role in control and
oversight of the NSA's SIGINT activities under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).
Notwithstanding the wide-ranging criticism of NSA, the
Committee is certain that there is substantial congressional
oversight of the NSA's activities. Likewise, the Committee
found that executive branch regulations and policies, and
administration oversight are appropriately stringent. It is the
Committee's considered judgment that the NSA conducts its
SIGINT mission within established and well-recognized
constitutional limitations and consistently with statutory
requirements.
COMMITTEE FACTFINDING
In addition to the day-to-day oversight activities that the
Committee performs, on-site examination and hands-on inspection
of the Intelligence Community and its activities are essential
in evaluating the Community's strengths and weaknesses.
Monitoring the collection, operations, and military support
elements of the Intelligence Community requires going beyond
the U.S. borders and reviewing the nation's intelligence
capabilities worldwide. During the 106th Congress, Committee
Members and staff visited dozens of intelligence and
intelligence-related facilities both within the U.S. and in
numerous countries abroad.
In February 1999, Committee Chairman Porter Goss traveled
overseas and met with combat pilots aboard the USS Enterprise
in the Mediterranean and at Incirlik Airbase in southern
Turkey. The purpose of his trip was to assess the intelligence
needs of U.S. pilots and to hear firsthand from our war
fighters their view of the type of intelligence helpful to them
in order to succeed in their missions.
In July 1999, Representative Bass accompanied CODEL Young
to South Korea and Japan. In South Korea, the Members
investigated concerns regarding regional security issues
affected by North Korea aggression and proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD). The Members then traveled to Japan,
an important strategic partner, and examined regional security
and defense issues as well as economic cooperation among the
two nations.
In January 2000, Chairman Goss led a delegation of his
Committee colleagues to Australia, New Zealand, and Hawaii. In
Australia, the Members met with the counterparts of our DCI and
our Directors of the FBI, CIA, DIA (Defense Intelligence
Agency) and NIMA (National Imagery and Mapping Agency). In New
Zealand the Members held discussions with the Prime Minister
and the various members of Parliament who provide oversight of
their nation's intelligence functions. In both countries,
Members visited the National Parliaments and met with fellow
Legislators to discuss bi-lateral intelligence issues. Stopping
in Hawaii, the Members attended various briefings related to
U.S. intelligence activities and discussed with U.S. military
commanders national security concerns throughout the Pacific
theater.
In February 2000, Committee Members visited Moscow, Russia,
and held meetings with Russian government officials on
bilateral security issues. Members also met with U.S. Embassy
personnel and discussed with them various aspects of U.S.-
Russia relations within the context of intelligence needs and
requirements. The Members traveled thereafter to Munich,
Germany, to attend an annual conference on security issues.
In August 2000, Chairman Goss participated in the
Presidential visit to Cartagena, Colombia. Accompanying Speaker
Dennis Hastert and other Members of Congress in a show of
support for President Pastrana and ``Plan Colombia'', Chairman
Goss learned firsthand the importance of U.S. support to
Colombia in its on-going struggle against the narco-guerrillas.
In the wake of the signing of a significant U.S. counterdrug
aid package for Colombia, this visit highlighted U.S.
commitment to fostering democracy, regional security, and
economic development in Colombia.
