Congressional Record: July 31, 2001 (Senate)
Page S8481-S8482


          STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS


      By Mr. CORZINE:
  S. 1285. A bill to provide the President with flexibility to set
strategic nuclear delivery system levels to meet United States national
security goals; to the Committee on Armed Services.
  Mr. CORZINE. Mr. President, today I am introducing legislation, the
Strategic Arms Flexibility Act of 2001, that would restore the
President's authority to manage the size of our Nation's nuclear
stockpile by repealing an obsolete law that now prevents him from
reducing the number of nuclear weapons. The Strategic Arms Flexibility
Act of 2001 would reduce the risk of a catastrophic accident or
terrorist incident, reduce tensions throughout the world, and save
substantial taxpayer dollars.
  We have far more nuclear weapons than would ever be necessary to win
a war. Based on START counting rules, we have 7,300 strategic nuclear
weapons. Yet, as Secretary of State Colin Powell has said, we could
eliminate more than half of these weapons and still, ``have the
capability to deter any actor.'' Furthermore, the U.S. nuclear arsenal
is equipped with sophisticated guidance and information systems that
make our nuclear weapons much more accurate and effective than those of
our adversaries. This is one reason why we should not be overly
influenced by calls for maintaining strict numerical parity.
  While the huge number of nuclear arms in our arsenal is not necessary
to fight a war, maintaining these weapons actually presents significant
risks to national security.
  First, it increases the risk of a catastrophic accident. The more
weapons that exist, the greater chance that a sensor failure or other
mechanical problem, or an error in judgment, will lead to the
detonation of a nuclear weapon. In fact, there have been many times
when inaccurate sensor readings or other technical problems have forced
national leaders to decide within minutes whether to launch nuclear
weapons. In one incident, a Russian commander deviated from standard
procedures by refusing to launch, even though an early detection system
was reporting an incoming nuclear attack, a report that was inaccurate.
  The second reason why maintaining excessive numbers of nuclear
weapons poses national security risks is that it encourages other
nations to maintain large stockpiles, as well. The more weapons held by
other countries, the greater the risk that a rogue faction in one such
country could gain access to nuclear weapons and either threaten to use
them, actually use them, or transfer them to others. Such a faction
could obtain weapons through force. For example, there are many poorly
guarded intercontinental ballistic missiles that are easy targets for
terrorists. Senator Bob Kerrey, who introduced this legislation in the
last Congress, speculated that a relatively small, well-trained group
could overtake the few personnel who guard some of the smaller
installations in Russia.
  Alternatively, a hostile group might be able simply to purchase
ballistic missiles on the black market. This risk may be especially
relevant in Russia, where many military personnel are poorly paid and a
few may feel financial pressure to collaborate with those hostile to
the United States. In addition, some have speculated that the high cost
of maintaining a large nuclear stockpile could encourage some nuclear
powers themselves to sell weapon technologies as a mean of financing
their nuclear infrastructure.
  By reducing our own stockpile, we can encourage Russia to reduce its
stockpile and discourage other nuclear states from expanding theirs. In
particular, Russia is faced with the exorbitant annual cost of
maintaining thousands of unnecessary ICBMs. The present state of
Russia's economy leaves it ill-equipped to handle these costs, a fact
readily admitted by Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev. Russia has
expressed an interest in reducing its stockpile dramatically, from
about 6,000 weapons to fewer than 1,000. However, Russia is unlikely to
make such reductions without a commensurate reduction by the United
States. If the United States takes the first step, it would provide
Russia with a face-saving way to do the same, without waiting for START
II, which now appears unlikely to be ratified in the short term.
  Beyond the benefits to national security of reducing our nuclear
stockpile, such a reduction also would save taxpayers significant
amounts of money. According to the Center for Defense Information, in
FY 01, the United States spent $26.7 billion on operations,
maintenance, and development related the United States' nuclear
program. Of that $26.7 billion, $12.4 billion, just under half, goes to
build, maintain, and operate our arsenal of tactical and strategic
nuclear weapons. Although a precise cost estimate is not available, it
seems clear that reducing the stockpile of nuclear weapons would
provide major cost savings.
  While a reduction in the nuclear stockpile would improve national
security and reduce costs, the 1998 defense authorization act now
prevents the President from reducing such weapons until the Russian
Duma approves the START II treaty. The Bush Administration has made it
clear that it wants this law repealed, and would like the authority to
unilaterally reduce the nuclear stockpile. In hearings before various
Senate Committees, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, have expressed the
Administration's desire to retire immediately 50 unnecessary MX
peacekeeper missiles with some 500 warheads. The Administration is
still conducting a more comprehensive review and may well propose
additional reductions. However, as Secretary Wolfowitz has testified,
``we will need the support of the Congress to remove the current
restrictions that prohibit us from getting rid of a nuclear system that
we no longer need.''
  Some might question whether it is appropriate to reduce the United
States stockpile without a direct assurance that other nations would
reduce theirs by the same amount. However, this is flawed Cold War
thinking. As Secretary Powell has stated, we have far more weapons than
necessary to devastate any opponent, real or imagined, many times over.
Clearly, we can reduce our stockpile without in any way reducing our
nuclear deterrent, or our national security.
  Having said this, reducing the stockpile is not enough. We also need
to encourage and assist others in doing so. In particular, it is
important that we help Russia by providing aid for dismantling weapons
and by offering other economic assistance. We also need to continue to
negotiate arms reductions and non-proliferation agreements with other
countries, including, but not limited to Russia. Unilateral action can
provide many benefits, but we need multilateral agreements to more
fully reduce the nuclear threat, and prevent the spread of nuclear
technology. Ultimately, the nuclear threat is a threat to all of
humanity, and all nations need to be part of a coordinated effort to
reduce that threat.

  In recent months, we have renewed a long-standing debate about
whether to deploy a national missile defense. Proponents of such a
system argue that it would reduce the threat posed by nuclear weapons
by giving us the capacity to deflect incoming nuclear weapons. However,
many have raised serious concerns about this approach, and the risk
that it actually could reduce our national security by creating a new
arms race and heightening international tensions.
  The bill I am introducing today offers a proven way to reduce the
nuclear

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threat that can be accomplished quickly and without the controversy
associated with a national missile defense system.
  There are few issues more important than reducing the risks posed by
nuclear weapons. For the past half century, the world has lived with
these weapons, and it is easy to underestimate the huge threat they
represent. Yet it is critical that we remain vigilant and do everything
in our power to reduce that threat. The fate of the world, quite
literally, is at stake.
  I urge my colleagues to support this simple but powerful measure.

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