Congressional Record: December 12, 2001 (House)
Page H9246-H9254
CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 2883, INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2002
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call
up House Resolution 312 and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:
H. Res. 312
Resolved, That upon adoption of this resolution it shall be
in order to consider the conference report to accompany the
bill (H.R. 2883) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year
2002 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of
the United States Government, the Community Management
Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and
Disability System, and for other purposes. All points of
order against the conference report and against its
consideration are waived.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) is
recognized for 1 hour.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the
customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings),
pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During
consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purpose
of debate only.
Mr. Speaker, H. Res. 312 is a standard rule that allows the House to
consider the conference report to accompany H.R. 2883, the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002. The rule waives all points of
order against the consideration of the conference report. The rule is
the normal rule we have for conference reports.
The intelligence authorization bill is a critical piece of
legislation in any average year, but this year, given the recent
September 11 tragedies and the war we are waging against terrorism as
we speak, it is absolutely essential that we get this bill to the
President's desk without any further delay. As Members are aware, the
National Security Act requires that Congress authorize each dollar the
U.S. spends on intelligence and intelligence-related activities. We are
unique in that respect. The war on terrorism means that there has
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been a fundamental shift in intelligence and defense priorities, as the
President has stated, and these authorities must be reflected in law.
While we will discuss the conference report in greater detail during
the general debate, I would like to highlight a few of the ways that
the legislation will tackle both critical counterterrorism challenges
as well as the long-term problems facing America's intelligence
community.
The conference report increases funding for foreign language
capability. Obviously this is a critical requirement in the fight
against terrorism because it is all over the world and we need the
language capability. It certainly is also a basic, core competency for
our intelligence community. The Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence has pushed this issue for several years and we are going
to continue to push it in the future until we get better results.
Another core intelligence capability this conference report bolsters
is human intelligence. In addition to providing the necessary resources
for this, the conference report includes a version of the House
language directing the Director of Central Intelligence to repeal the
so-called Deutch 1995 guidelines on the recruitment of human sources.
These guidelines may have been issued with the best of intentions, and
no doubt were, but in practice, they have had a chilling effect on our
ability to gain vital intelligence from sources with access to unsavory
characters, particularly such as terrorists.
Finally, this conference report includes a House provision requiring
an accounting from the Director of Central Intelligence concerning
whether and to what extent the intelligence community has implemented
the recommendations of the Bremer, the Hart-Rudman and the Gilmore
commissions. All of those were reports on terrorism and the
vulnerabilities and threats to our security and the security of
Americans at home and abroad. As Members are aware, these independent
commissions examined the United States' measures for prevention of and
preparedness for terrorist attacks. All of the provisions are
essentially components to the health of the intelligence community and
our country.
I urge the House to adopt the rule and embrace the conference report.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank my good friend and colleague from
Florida for yielding me the time. It is a pleasure for me to serve with
Chairman Goss on both the Committee on Rules and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this rule, providing for the
consideration of H.R. 2883, the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2002. H. Res. 252 is a modified open rule requiring that
amendments be preprinted in the Congressional Record. However, Mr.
Speaker, the preprinting requirement has been the accepted practice for
a number of years because of the sensitive nature of much of the bill
and the need to protect its classified documents. The bill is not
controversial and was reported from the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence by a unanimous vote.
Members who wish to do so, and I urge Members to pay attention to
this, can go to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Office
to examine the classified schedule of authorizations for the programs
and activities of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the national intelligence program, which includes the Central
Intelligence Agency as well as the foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence programs within, among others, the Department of
Defense, the National Security Agency, the Departments of State,
Treasury and Energy and the FBI.
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Also included in the classified documents are the authorizations for
the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities and Joint Military
Intelligence Program of the Department of Defense. Members can go to
the committee and review those matters.
Mr. Speaker, last week the House considered and passed the
authorization for the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2002. The
intelligence bill we consider today is another critical component in
our national defense. Today, more than ever, we need to be vigilant
about the myriad threats to our national security.
Mr. Speaker, while there will be debate on some worthy amendments,
this is a noncontroversial bill providing authorizations for important
national security programs. I urge my colleagues to support this rule
and to support the underlying bill.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I
move the previous question on the resolution.
The previous question was ordered.
The resolution was agreed to.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 312 just passed,
I call up the conference report on the bill (H.R. 2883) to authorize
appropriations for fiscal year 2002 for intelligence and intelligence-
related activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and
Disability System, and for other purposes.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). Pursuant to rule XXII, the
conference report is considered having been read.
(For conference report and statement, see proceedings of the House of
December 6, 2001, at page H9057).
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and
the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi) each will control 30
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss).
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support today of the conference report
before us. Before I begin the main part of my statement, let me first
acknowledge and thank the Members of the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, each and every one of them, but especially
our ranking member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), for
hard work, dedication, showing up and doing the business that needed to
be done, and doing it intelligently and with a good deal of
thoughtfulness.
I also want to specifically thank the committee staff on both sides
of the aisle for their untiring efforts that have gotten us to this
point. I very much appreciate the way they work in a nonpartisan way.
Obviously, I need to thank the Senate Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence Members and their staffs as well, especially under the
steady hand of the chairman, my good friend, Senator Graham, and the
vice chairman, my good friend, Senator Shelby. We appreciate the
efforts they have put in.
Mr. Speaker, by definition a conference is a time when the two bodies
come together to settle whatever differences there may be between the
bills, often including resolution of differences of opinion and
viewpoints on how money is needed, how it should be spent, what laws
should be changed, what direction the administration should go, those
kinds of things. But in this case, we are talking about protecting our
Nation's security at a time when this is very much in the forefront of
everybody's attention.
Ironically, Mr. Speaker, this conference found very, very few
differences of opinion between the two bodies, and, frankly, between
the points of view on either side of the aisle, on these and other
areas. When it comes to national security, we seem to be pulling
together very strongly in the area of intelligence.
Let me briefly review some of the areas of agreement. First,
intelligence is our first line of defense; and it must be treated as
such, especially on our war on terrorism, one of the new transnational
threats we are, regrettably, beginning to understand a lot better.
Although it may get lost in the continuous CNN optic of the coverage
going on in Afghanistan and the Pentagon releases of bombs exploding
and troops on the move, none of the activity that is actually happening
would be possible without good intelligence.
Second, there are four key areas where the administration and
Congress must immediately address themselves
[[Page H9248]]
if we are to properly protect the country's rights and freedoms. They
are revitalizing the National Security Agency and the signals
intelligence system, upon which we have had such wonderful production
and service over the years and now needs upgrading; correcting
deficiencies in conducting and collecting human intelligence, a matter
which we all understand very well, something we cannot do without;
providing a more appropriate balance between intelligence collection
and analysis to better achieve a global awareness capability, something
we have been talking about for years; and rebuilding a robust research
and development program across the intelligence communities.
We have been so lucky and so well helped by the innovation and
creativity that our country produces and the applications we have been
able to use in the intelligence community over the last 50 years, and
we need to have more of that in the days ahead.
There are other areas of concern besides these four, but these are
the most critical for the types of threats that we face now and that we
are going to face, we think, over the next few years; and they are
certainly the areas that we are in full agreement with the other body
on.
Thirdly, the intelligence community has got to be better focused on
strategic intelligence and better positioned to be able to get access
to so-called plans and intentions, that is, what is going on in the
minds of the evil-doers, the mischief makers, in order to prevent the
crisis. We do not want to be just great at sweeping up after the
tragedy; we want to stop the tragedy before it happens. In short, we
must have an intelligence community culture that is less risk averse.
My last example is that the conferees believe that any effort to
invest in and expand intelligence capabilities, and such efforts
clearly must be made, will only be marginally successful if it does not
also include provision for a more appropriate management structure for
the intelligence community. We are talking here basic architecture and
the appropriate management overlay to make the system work.
Today's intelligence structure is insufficient for today's and
tomorrow's challenges. We know it, and we have to get about the job of
dealing with that; and I am pleased that the administration is taking
up that challenge. We look forward to working with the President and
his administration on these issues. They simply cannot wait.
Mr. Speaker, this does not mean that there were not differences
between the bodies during our conference. There were. I am happy to
report that there were few and that they were worked out successfully
and the result is a conference report that was approved by a vast
bipartisan majority of the conferees. There are a couple of areas where
I would have liked things to have turned out differently personally,
but that did not happen; and in the spirit of compromise, I am happy to
support what I think is a very good conference report which will serve
this country well. Again, I commend my colleagues for working in that
spirit.
Mr. Speaker, on Monday we paused to remember the 3-month anniversary
of the horrible and tragic attacks on America by the terrorists, those
the President has referred to as the "evil-doers." Also on Monday we
laid to rest the first combat casualty of our war on terrorism, Mike
Spann.
The fact that the first casualty was a CIA officer speaks to the fact
that intelligence is in fact in the lead in this war. There is no
argument about that. But some have questioned how our Nation got into
this position, how these attacks could have occurred in the first
place; and frankly, there is no easy answer to that question, as there
are many facets.
For one thing, terrorists took advantage of the basic rights and
freedoms that we so openly and charitably give to our citizens and
visitors alike in this country. They abused those privileges.
Another point is that communications between the entities and
agencies assigned the responsibility for protecting our borders was
simply not adequate. We know that.
But there is also certainly an intelligence story here. Put simply,
we do not have an intelligence community that is properly structured to
collect the types of intelligence that would have prevented such
attacks had the information been available. In part, this is of our own
doing as a country and a Congress.
After the Cold War, a decision was made to "build down"
intelligence. Many thought that we were at peace, perhaps this would be
part of the peace dividend. We did not have a single major threat that
people really could identify, and we could afford to spend intelligence
monies elsewhere. Congress acted. Money was shifted, indeed.
Beginning in the 104th Congress, the Intelligence Committees of
Congress on both sides, both Houses and both sides of the aisle,
recognized the risks of the looming threats of transnational issues and
year after year attempted to put more investment into intelligence.
However, the administration's efforts were more focused on domestic
issues and had little interest in that kind of investment at that time.
Consequently, we ended up with a much-reduced intelligence capability,
less access around the world, and a risk-averse environment, and,
frankly, a growing threat.
This is not to say that those brave men and women in the rank and
file of the intelligence community were not doing their jobs. They were
playing the hand they were dealt, and they were doing very well under
the circumstances. This is also not to say that Congress was not aware
of the risks. We certainly were, and we talked about them a lot.
Recently, I had occasion to review the intelligence bills and
conference reports since the 104th Congress. In the 104th Congress, we
noted that there was a growing threat and a growing vulnerability to
terrorism. We sent that message. We talked about the need to share
information better between intelligence and law enforcement. Remember,
this is back in the 104th Congress. We talked about the need to invest
more robustly in intelligence resources.
Then in the 105th Congress we noted that the intelligence community
must "keep a watchful eye on the areas that are likely to be
tomorrow's crises." I would point out that we mentioned the
transnational threats.
We also mentioned that our national security was being affected by a
broader set of issues that have not been identified with our global
interests. We needed to rebuild our intelligence capabilities, and we
expressed concern over the growing apathy toward national security and
intelligence.
Again these issues were raised in the 106th Congress, where we stated
that there was a growing possibility that a rogue nation or group would
acquire the ability to attack U.S. interests with nuclear, biological,
chemical, or some other weapon of mass destruction.
Mr. Speaker, I am not pointing these facts out to say "we told you
so." Far from it. The point is that we must engage with this
administration now, and we must put significant effort into quickly
rebuilding our intelligence capabilities. We cannot wait. The events of
September 11, sadly, stand as a reminder of what happens when we let
our intelligence guard down.
Mr. Speaker, this conference report is a good start toward rebuilding
what the Nation needs. But it is only a start. It is a snapshot in
time. Many of us refer to it as the first year of a 5-year plan. We
look forward to working with the administration to secure our national
freedom. We look forward to working in a nonpartisan way to do this
with the passage of this conference report. I am fully supportive of
the report. I encourage its passage.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Our chairman has very well explained how we got to the point we are
at today. I want to commend him for the leadership he has provided to
the committee, not only at the conference meeting but throughout what
has turned out to be a very challenging year. I thank the chairman.
The House version of the intelligence authorization bill came to the
floor a little over 3 weeks after the terrorist attacks on New York
City, Washington, and Pennsylvania. Active and retired intelligence
community personnel were killed in the World Trade Center and at the
Pentagon.
In the weeks since, the United States has begun to strike back at
those who
[[Page H9249]]
were involved in the September attacks, and at those who support them.
On Monday, the first combat fatality of the struggle against terrorism
in Afghanistan was buried at Arlington National Cemetery. Mike Spann
was a CIA officer. We eulogized him yesterday on this floor with the
suspension vote in the presence of his family: his wife, Shannon; his
parents, and his children.
Timely and reliable intelligence, as we know, is crucial to the
successful conclusion of this campaign, and it is already clear that
intelligence officers will be deeply involved, at home and in the
field, in the difficult and dangerous job of ensuring that our
policymakers and military commanders have the information on which they
will increasingly depend.
The emergency supplemental appropriations bill passed in the wake of
the September attacks provided a large amount of additional resources
for intelligence programs and activities. This conference report
provides more; substantially more, than was provided last year, and
significantly more than was requested by the President.
Our chairman has gone over some of the priorities in the bill, and I
want to associate myself with those. That would be human intelligence
capabilities that he talked about and TPED, the tasking, processing,
exploitation and dissemination of intelligence. It is very important
for us to put more resources there. Another priority for us in the bill
was the investment in advanced research and development projects
necessary to keep pace with changes in technology, and, of course, the
technology necessary to improve the process of collecting and
processing intelligence.
Some of these funds that are in this bill will continue improvements
as the chairman emphasized, in our human intelligence capabilities, to
ensure that case officers receive the kind of training they need,
particularly in foreign languages, to enable them to do their jobs
effectively.
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Some of these funds will make investments in the kinds of systems
required if agencies like the National Security Agency and the National
Reconnaissance Office are to keep pace with rapid technological change.
The modernization of NSA remains a top priority of the committee and
measurable progress is expected in the coming year. As steadfast as the
committee has been in advocating more spending on intelligence, it must
now be equally engaged in conducting the kind of oversight necessary to
make certain that these additional funds are spent efficiently on
programs that will really make a difference, not only in the current
effort against terrorism, but on the demands of an uncertain future as
well.
Although I am satisfied with the disposition made by the conferees on
most of the items which separated the two bodies, I was disappointed
with the resolution of the provision in the House bill which would have
established an independent commission to review the Nation's security
posture immediately preceding September 11. Our colleagues in the other
body insisted that the two intelligence committees could undertake an
inquiry into the readiness of the intelligence community, and other
committees of jurisdiction could examine the other elements of the
executive branch.
The issue was never whether the committees had the resources to do
this job, it was whether it made sense for them to do it. I am
concerned that an independent review would have had credibility with
the American people that a congressional review, no matter how
professionally done, will not.
The House version of the bill, when it left our committee stated, Mr.
Speaker, "The committee believes that the Commission will only be
successful if it is seen to be truly independent of any preconceived
notions about the effectiveness of the activities of the departments
and agencies it will review. Appointing members with a reputation for
challenging conventional wisdom, wide perspective, bold and innovative
thought, and broad experience in dealing with complex problems will
contribute directly to instilling the Commission with an independence
of spirit which will enhance the credibility of its work."
It goes on further. I want to put these words on the record. This
body chose to modify the Commission and change its nature, but when we
got to the conference, the Commission was eliminated all together. I
want to put on the record the spirit of independence that I hoped the
review would have.
This is not about fingerpointing or assigning blame; it really is
more about understanding whatever government shortcomings may have
contributed to the events of September 11. An independent inquiry will
one day be commissioned, I am certain, although perhaps without the
congressional input that we tried to do in our committee.
We need to know if there were gaps and where they were, again, not to
assess blame, but to be sure that they are addressed. Our constituents
must have confidence that an assessment of future needs is based on
solid judgments about past performance. This will be especially
important if we are to consider changing the structure of the
intelligence community, and that is the challenge our chairman and our
committee will have in the next year. Some of these reforms may be
called for by President Bush, as is his right.
On another important issue the conference report more faithfully
reflects the position of the House, and that was a compromise that the
gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter) took the lead in shaping and I
was pleased to support. It was necessary because in 1995, in response
to concerns that there was insufficient CIA headquarters involvement in
decisions to recruit as assets individuals with poor records of
respecting human rights or the law, guidelines were issued to ensure
that senior officials were aware of and approved, certain recruitments.
The intent of these guidelines was to protect relatively junior
officers in the field from later charges that they acted unilaterally,
and unwisely, in entering into relationships with certain individuals.
Despite repeated assurances to the committee from high-level
intelligence officials of two administrations that the guidelines had
not prevented the recruitment of a single, identifiable, worthwhile
asset, concerns were raised that the bureaucratic process through which
the guidelines were administered was so time consuming that it provided
a disincentive to case officers. This controversy has obscured the fact
that encouraging a potential asset on a hard target, like a terrorist
cell, to betray his or her country or cause is tremendously time
consuming, difficult and dangerous. That we have had uneven success
against these targets is more a reflection of those facts than it is
the fault, in my view, of any guidelines.
Nevertheless, to make clear that Congress wants the recruitment
process to be as aggressive as possible given the totality of the
circumstances involved, the House approved a provision in the
committee's bill which would have required a rescission of the existing
guidelines and their replacement with new guidelines which achieve
balance that "recognized concerns about egregious human rights
behavior, but provides the much needed flexibility to seize upon
opportunities as they present themselves." The House made clear that
in striking this balance, "clearly there is a certain class of
individuals who, because of their unreliability, instability, or nature
of past misconduct, should be avoided." Again, the gentleman from
Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter) led the way on this compromise that was in the
House bill.
Although the DCI chose to rescind and reissue the guidelines before
the legislative process was complete, the heart of the language which I
was pleased to work with the gentleman from Nebraska on was retained in
conference. The conferees want the current, more streamlined guidelines
reviewed again to make certain that they provide appropriate
encouragement to case officers to do their jobs well. As the statement
of managers makes clear, however, whatever the results of that review,
any guidelines issued "must balance concerns about human rights
behavior and law-breaking" with the efforts to provide flexibility to
take advantage of opportunities to gather information. That balance is
the proper interpretation of the phrase "more appropriately weigh and
incentivize risk" which appears in
[[Page H9250]]
clause (2) of section 403 of the conference report.
Mr. Speaker, our President, when he came to the House on September
14, three days after the tragedy, said that we will bring the
perpetrators of that tragedy to justice, or we will bring justice to
them, but justice will be done. We want to be sure that our
intelligence capabilities help the President reach that goal, a goal
that we all share. Hopefully, this bill will take us closer to that.
I believe the conference agreement will contribute significantly to
meeting the intelligence needs of the Nation, and I urge its adoption.
I again associate myself with many of the remarks made by my chairman,
particularly those about sharing of information by the FBI. Once again,
I want to extend the sympathies of my constituents and I know all of
our colleagues, to the family of Mike Spann and the Special Forces
soldiers, the Green Berets who lost their lives. If I may, I would like
to put their names in the Record also: Master Sergeant Jefferson Davis;
Staff Sergeant Brian Cody Prosser; and Sergeant First Class Daniel
Petithory. God bless them. God bless America.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 6 minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter), the vice chairman
of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the chairman of
the Subcommittee on Intelligence Policy and National Security.
(Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time.
Mr. Speaker, this Member congratulates and commends the exemplary
bipartisan effort of the chairman, the distinguished gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Goss), and his counterpart in the other body, the
distinguished senior Senator from Florida, Senator Graham. I also want
to extend my congratulations and appreciation to the distinguished
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), for continuing to give us the
leadership for a bipartisan conference report.
I rise, of course, in strong support of the conference report. Under
the leadership of the people I have just mentioned, the legislative
branch continues to move rapidly to address a number of long-standing
deficiencies in our intelligence collection and analysis programs. The
chairman's comments about the high quality work and dedication of the
committee's first-rate staff are exactly on the mark, and I express my
personal appreciation for their expertise, dedication, and hard work
throughout the year.
Mr. Speaker, it is important to note that the Select Permanent
Committee on Intelligence has not suddenly awakened to the very real
funding deficiencies and program matter inadequacies of the
intelligence agencies. For years, the intelligence committee has worked
to reorient and enhance the effectiveness of the intelligence community
and, of course, that has not received much public attention. But now,
more than ever before, the American people understand through tragedy
that our intelligence and counterterrorism programs are extremely
important. As the distinguished chairman, the gentleman from Florida
(Mr. Goss) has frequently noted, "The message is not new; the audience
for the message is now new."
I want to express my appreciation for the fact that he has gone back
a few minutes ago to previous Congresses, back at least to the 104th
Congress, to give some indication that the committee for some period of
time has recognized and tried to address these transnational problems
that are relatively new in the national focus.
Responsibly addressing the Nation's intelligence requirements now
clearly has become a recognized national priority across the country in
the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attack. One result is a
natural tendency to seek a simple solution, a quick fix. Certainly the
conference report provides much-needed additional funds to improve our
intelligence capabilities and to wage the war against terrorism, but at
a more fundamental level, H.R. 2883 continues to aim even more
aggressively to respond to serious underlying policy inadequacies and
structural problems. I know all members of the committee would agree
our work is not done, that we are looking forward to taking on this
task during the next year.
In some cases, these are problems that have been years in the making
and will take a number of years to reverse. For example, the conference
report continues support for additional capacity in human intelligence
collection. Human intelligence, or HUMINT, is the placement of highly-
trained, language-capable officers in positions where they can acquire
information vital to our national interests. Our HUMINT capacity was
substantially downgraded in the years following the end of the Cold
War. Also, our human intelligence collection efforts was understandably
directed during the Cold War period at collection of the Soviet Union
and its client states. Not in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East,
South Asia, and especially not in the problems of transnational
terrorism and narcotics trafficking. The conference report continues
this body's efforts at addressing these deficiencies and the new
priorities.
Addressing another reason for the HUMINT inadequacies, this Member is
particularly gratified that the conferees agreed to reverse the 1995
limitations on asset recruitment, and I especially appreciate the
cooperation and assistance of the gentlewoman from California (Ms.
Pelosi) for the committee in working with me, and the chairman. These
restrictions, called "the Deutsch guidelines," were promulgated as a
means to limit our association with unsavory individuals, with human
rights or other criminal problems. While the concerns underlying these
guidelines were understandable, resulting from revelations about the
problems of the 1970s and early 1980s, the reality is that the Deutsch
guidelines have had a chilling effect on the recruitment of people who
can actually and efficiently penetrate the inner circles of terrorist
networks and narcotics rings. The recruitment of assets with unique
knowledge or access to these terrorists and drug cartels is the key to
successful HUMINT against these targets. The regrettable, real-world
reality is that especially in the crucial battle against terrorism, we
must allow our foreign officers to recruit assets that sometimes are
rather unsavory characters. To win the war on terrorism, we have to end
the cycle of risk aversion by our intelligence operatives and their
superiors in headquarters. Recruiting Boy Scouts will not give us the
penetration and intelligence we need.
In many cases, there will be difficult decisions to make, but the
U.S. has professionals in the intelligence and law enforcement fields
who can and must make those decisions. This conference report makes
clear that our foreign intelligence personnel must recruit as agents
those who possess the detailed and timely information which the United
States needs to defend its people and its interests. Admittedly, there
are risks with such recruited agents, but if the risks are
realistically weighed against the benefits, the enhanced chances of
operational success, this body must not rashly second-guess those
decisions or fail to replace the Deutsch guidelines where they are
detrimental to effective intelligence-gathering.
Mr. Speaker, this Member urges adoption of the conference report on
the intelligence authorization for fiscal year 2002.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Bishop), who is the ranking
member on the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence of
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me this
time.
As the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical
Intelligence, I rise in support of this conference report. It is a good
work product. I want to thank and to congratulate the chairman and the
ranking member, and especially our staff, who worked so hard and who
did an extraordinary job to make sure that this package will serve to
improve our country's ability to provide the best real-time information
possible to our war-fighters and our policymakers, so as to protect
Americans wherever they may be situated in the world.
[[Page H9251]]
The intelligence systems and activities that are funded by this
conference report are a prominent and indispensable element of the war
on terrorism. In the short time between September 11 and the time when
the committee marked up the authorization bill, this committee worked
extremely hard in a completely nonpartisan manner to develop proposals
to correct shortfalls and to establish a basis for continued reform and
innovation.
{time} 1145
Most of these proposals are reflected in this conference report. The
human element in this war on terrorism is fundamental, and it is an
appropriate focus of our attention. But American technological prowess
will greatly determine how effective our soldiers and intelligence
officers will be, how many casualties our forces suffer, and how many
innocent lives will be lost or protected.
The precision of our air campaign in Afghanistan is wondrous, and we
must always remember that it depends as much on precise intelligence as
on the guidance system of the missiles or the bombs. Developing these
technical intelligence capabilities is expensive, and it is often
difficult. Sometimes we make mistakes; but usually we, the government,
and American industry get it right in the end. I am gratified to be
part of this process.
Mr. Speaker, this bill is a good start on correcting the problems in
the intelligence community, but there is clearly much more that must be
done. I speak, I believe, for all of my colleagues on the committee in
again commending the chairman and our ranking member for their
dedication, and also the gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Castle), my own
counterpart, in assuring that our intelligence organizations can
protect Americans against the new menace.
Mr. Speaker, I urge adoption of this report.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 4 minutes to the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), a distinguished member of our
committee and the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Terrorism and
Homeland Security.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for yielding time to
me, and I join in saluting American heroes who have given their lives
in the fight against terrorism in the aftermath of September 11.
Mr. Speaker, I commend the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the
ranking member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), for their
leadership in bringing this conference report to the House.
I also commend the hard work of our committee colleagues and staff,
whose bipartisan approach attempts to ensure that this Nation has the
best intelligence capabilities.
I love serving on this committee and as ranking member of the
Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security. It is a high honor,
and it honors the constituents of California's 36th Congressional
District, who design and build most of our Nation's intelligence
satellites.
Yesterday, Mr. Speaker, President Bush spoke to 1,900 cadets at the
Citadel and laid out three priorities for national defense: first,
speeding the transformation of the military to face 21st century
threats; second, protecting against proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction; and third, strengthening our intelligence capability. All
these goals are important, and I strongly support them.
This bill goes a long way toward accomplishing the third: this bill
provides increased funding for human, technical, and tactical
counterterrorist activities; it rescinds the CIA guidelines that may
have restricted recruitment of some people with critical information on
terrorist groups; and it requires the issuance of new guidelines to
rebalance the recruitment process.
Also, it requires the administration to explain why it has not
implemented the recommendations of three national commissions that
studied terrorism and homeland security. I served on one of those
commissions, the congressionally mandated Commission on Terrorism. All
three produced good ideas that are still good today.
Our committee has served notice that it will do even more to push
restructuring of the intelligence community next year; but meanwhile,
this restructuring cannot happen in a vacuum. I believe the lesson
learned from 9-11 is that good people had poor tools, and that our
homeland security effort needs a leader with adequate power to conduct
a unified threat assessment, develop a national plan, and compel
agencies at all levels to share information and coordinate seamlessly
to prevent or respond to acts of terrorism.
Governor Tom Ridge has this top job. Ridge is charged with
coordinating all Federal efforts related to homeland security with
those of State and local governments. The President's executive order
also makes Ridge the chief communicator of homeland security policy.
Two months have passed since Tom Ridge started as director of the
Office of Homeland Security; but in my view, he is losing power every
day. He is a capable man with the skills and resume needed; but without
the authority to influence Federal budgets, Ridge cannot enforce the
changes that this committee has required and that this country needs. A
bipartisan bill, H.R. 3026, would give him that authority.
Finally, Mr. Speaker, as I stated in a letter to the President on
Monday, I continue to be concerned that the release of the new bin
Laden videotape could prove damaging to American security. Those who do
not believe bin Laden is guilty will not be persuaded by this tape. To
me, the benefit of showing the tape is outweighed by the risks that
secret messages, signals, or facial expressions of bin Laden or in the
background are embedded in the tape. I would have preferred that its
distribution be limited to those with a need to know, possibly
including foreign leaders.
But Mr. Speaker, returning to this conference report, it gives the
right tools to good people in our intelligence community. I thank them
for working 24-7 before and after September 11 to protect this country
from terrorist attacks.
Mr. Speaker, I urge strong bipartisan support for this bill.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Castle), who is also the
chairman of our Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence.
Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to
me.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the conference report to
accompany H.R. 2883, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2002. Before I get to my statement, I wish to acknowledge the superb
leadership, and I mean this very sincerely, of our chairman, the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), and our ranking member, the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), and the Senate Intelligence
Committee's chairman, Senator Graham, and the vice chairman, Senator
Shelby. Their support and guidance brought the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence through a very difficult year, culminating in
this fine piece of legislation. I think it is fitting to thank them for
all of their efforts in support of our Nation.
Mr. Speaker, today we are voting on a bill that authorizes spending
for the Nation's intelligence organizations, operations, and the brave
men and women, such as our fallen CIA officer Mike Spann, who are
stationed all around the globe collecting and analyzing information to
provide our true first line of defense.
Tragically, the events of September 11 have made crystal clear what
many of us in the Congress have been saying for sometime, that we need
to significantly improve our intelligence-gathering, analysis, and
dissemination capabilities.
I do not for one moment blame the attacks in New York, Washington,
and Pennsylvania on an intelligence failure. Indeed, that blame can
only be assigned to radical fanatics who would see America fall. But I
do assign some blame on our collective lack of attention for
maintaining a robust, properly resourced, and forward-leaning
intelligence community that is not unduly restricted from collecting
information on foreign threats to our country.
The authorization levels in this bill were determined by the
conference committee as appropriate for beginning to rebuild our
Nation's intelligence defenses. In the wake of 9-11, our intelligence
organizations and
[[Page H9252]]
their professionals have been asked to do more than ever before, to
provide more detailed information on an elusive but omnipresent enemy
that directly threatens our country and our citizens.
Indeed, President Bush, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Attorney
General Ashcroft, and Director of Homeland Security Governor Ridge have
all made statements about the increased need for and reliance upon our
intelligence service in the wake of terrorist attacks.
There is no question in my mind that intelligence is now, more than
ever, a critical function of national security worthy of this body's
full funding support. It is in that spirit, Mr. Speaker, that I urge my
House colleagues to support this conference report. We elected Members
of Congress have no greater duty to the people of the United States of
America than to protect their safety, their freedoms, and their way of
life.
To do that in a world populated with any number of terrorists who
have no remorse for loss of American lives and property we must go on
the offensive. We must discover and take action against the people who
would do us harm.
That requires knowledge. Before the FBI can arrest a single al Qaeda
member, the Bureau must know who and where that person is. Before a B-
52 bomber can effectively drop a single bomb, its crew must be given
the information on what target to attack. Before we can better defend
against an intended terrorist attack, we need forewarning of the attack
location and timing. All of these require intelligence, intelligence
for national defense. There is no higher priority.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this measure.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. Condit), the ranking
member on the Subcommittee on Intelligence Policy and National
Security.
(Mr. Condit asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. CONDIT. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the conference
committee today. This is a very powerful tool in arming our
intelligence agency in a campaign against terrorism.
Though I am disappointed the conference report does not include an
outside commission to assess our national security readiness since
September 11, it is still a very good conference report. It does
increase human intelligence, and it improves foreign language skills
and translation capabilities.
We face an extraordinary challenge now to collect information and
preserve our national security, and we must focus now on the security
of our homeland. We cannot sit back and think about the future in the
out years; we must address security needs now. This conference report
does just that.
Yesterday, we passed a resolution honoring Johnny Spann, the first
American to die in combat in Afghanistan. We pledged to continue to
support our men and women, to ensure the safety to all of our citizens.
This conference report makes good on that pledge.
Mr. Speaker, I would like to commend and congratulate the chairman of
the committee, as well as the ranking member, the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Pelosi), for this product, because I think it is a
product that helps build a better and safer Nation. I congratulate them
and thank them for their leadership.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 3 minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Gibbons), the chairman of our
Subcommittee on Human Intelligence, Analysis, and Counterintelligence,
our subcommittee on hacking. I will let him explain what that stands
for.
Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to
me. I thank the chairman of the full committee and the ranking member,
the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), for bringing before this
House what I feel is probably one of the best intelligence
authorization conference report bills we have had in a long time. As a
result, I do stand here in strong support of the conference report.
Mr. Speaker, since September 11, all Americans have witnessed, I
believe, our intelligence community working at its best. America,
unfortunately, did witness its first loss, our first combat loss of an
American hero in our war on terrorism, CIA agent Johnny Mike Spann. Now
we must provide the resources needed to combat terrorism at the most
basic level for intelligence.
This, Mr. Speaker, is a good bill. It provides significant resources
to the intelligence community which, during the last decade, went
underfunded, understaffed, and underappreciated.
The 1990s were a risk-averse period during which the bullies of the
world began to get the idea that the United States had gone soft and no
longer had the will to defend American lives and American interests.
The intelligence community often was not performing aggressively
enough, though this was by no means the fault of the dedicated men and
women who constitute the intelligence agencies' rank and file. They are
now doing a terrific job, a wonderful job of catch-up, and they deserve
the best support that we can give them.
Regarding today's needs, we are providing logistical and technical
resources for a worldwide campaign to root out terrorism. Our
intelligence officers are working on the ground in Afghanistan, as the
American public is now very much aware, sadly aware, with the news of
our fallen CIA hero.
What the American public will probably never know is that American
intelligence officers are working around the clock worldwide to
neutralize terrorist cells and otherwise diminish the possibility of
future attacks on innocent American citizens.
As for the needs and future needs, this bill provides resources for
greater foreign language expertise, increased specialized training,
increased analytical expertise, to include measures to restore the
intelligence community's ability to provide worldwide analytical
coverage.
This administration and this Congress are acutely aware of the need
for a strong intelligence capability. We on the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence have done our utmost to give the intelligence
agencies what they need to do their job.
Mr. Speaker, I want to ask all my colleagues to support this bill,
and I urge an "aye" vote.
{time} 1200
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the
very distinguished gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer), a member of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
(Mr. ROEMER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Speaker, I join in the accolades and the compliments
to our chairman and to our ranking member, who have brought the
committee together in a bipartisan way. When we do have differences in
the committee, they are settled in an inclusive way and in an
intelligent manner that I think benefits the bipartisan nature of the
final product. They both do this institution well by their working
together.
I also want to thank the staff. The staff has been through an
exceedingly difficult year, working in an environment in the United
States Capitol that has often been target or a suspected target, has
been evacuated a number of times. It is a very difficult environment;
and they do an excellent job creating an excellent product, and we are
grateful for their hard work.
The intelligence budget and the reforms that are needed are now
confronted with three different challenges. Certainly, we have the
September 11 challenge, the attack on our country. We have the
challenge of changing the culture in the intelligence community over
the last 10 years from one that is targeted in an old-fashioned way,
guards, guns and gates, to now trying to go after transnational
targets, tents, technology, terrorism; and that is a slow and sometimes
difficult push into the future.
We also have the difficult challenge of latching up the intelligence
with the military capability as we are doing now in Afghanistan. Our
intelligence personnel, our intelligence equipment become more and more
important in the future.
How do we address that in this bill? We could do it with a quick fix,
we could do it with bold reform, or we could construct the platform for
[[Page H9253]]
change into the future. We have mostly settled on the latter, platform
for change, constructive change; and I think that has been a good,
healthy approach. I do, however, wish that we would have taken steps
for bold change in two or three areas, like, as our ranking member
mentioned, an independent commission to look at what happened on
September 11. We have the same people always looking at the same
problems, and we do not have enough new eyes on old problems, giving us
new solutions.
We need to work more on the information and collaboration in our
intelligence community, and we need to look at the cultural changes.
Moving to transnational targets, rather that than being comfortable
going at just other countries' intelligence capability, we need to look
at going after biological and chemical weapons and nuclear weapon
capabilities of terrorist groups.
We have accomplished a lot, Mr. Speaker. We not only have more money
for language and fluency capabilities; we have specifically said that
there is congressional interest in this area and the intelligence
communities cannot move this money away from language and fluency
requirements.
We have improved human intelligence in this bill; and as I said
before, we are improving the latching up of the military and the
intelligence capabilities.
Finally, our hearts and our prayers go out to Johnny Mike Spann and
to Shannon Spann for the sacrifices that they and their family have
made and the three children who Shannon now raises with the help of
that family.
Support this bipartisan conference report, and we look forward to
bolder changes next year.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 4 minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss), who is the
chairman of our effort on counter terrorist efforts.
Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr.
Goss) for yielding me the time, and I particularly thank him for his
strong leadership, along with the gentlewoman from California (Ms.
Pelosi) for bringing this bill to the floor in such great fashion and
to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), the ranking member of
my committee, for all who have worked in a very bipartisan way to
ensure that we are improving our intelligence community. And to the
staff, they have been under such great pressure. The staff on both
sides of the aisle have worked close together to ensure that we are
going to win this battle against terrorism.
Mr. Speaker, I do rise in support of the conference report for H.R.
2883. Yesterday, America paused to remember the terrorist acts that
shook our Nation and the many acts of heroism and courage that
followed. In the intervening 3 months, America has been fighting back
and we are winning.
As the President has said on numerous occasions, this is a war that
will extend far beyond the conventional battlefield in Afghanistan; and
it is a war that will take years, not days, weeks or months. It is a
war that will be fought on American soil and on the soil of our friends
and enemies alike. It will be fought in the electronic air waves and
the bazaars of the Mideast and north Africa, on the streets of London,
Paris, Rome and Bangkok, right across the globe.
Conventional weapons will not be enough to safeguard our public from
the long-term threat from terrorism. Smart bombs and Special Forces can
only be used against targets that have first been identified as posing
a threat.
Intelligence is the weapon most capable of identifying terrorists,
their plans and intentions, operating methods, whereabouts and targets
of terrorist attack. When 9-11 happened, the world changed but the
threat from the terrorists stayed the same. What changed most of all
was the recognition that intelligence is critical to our Nation's
defense against terror. In fact, a whole new constituency for
intelligence has arisen from the ashes of 9-11, and this constituency
was far too long in coming.
As chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security, I
am here to tell the American people that the Intelligence Authorization
Act lays the groundwork for fixing many of the problems that have
plagued our intelligence professionals. We have sought to address
systemic problems within the intelligence community and to begin to
correct some of the funding deficiencies of years past that have
crippled our ability to achieve true global coverage in intelligence
collection and analysis.
This conference report provides the resources and direction necessary
to overhaul the intelligence community language training programs and
to begin to build a workforce that can operate effectively in the
languages and environments used by terrorists. In addition, the report
addresses in a more decisive fashion than ever before the chronic
shortfall in language exploitation capabilities across the community.
The 9-11 attacks also highlighted shortcomings in the way in which
information is shared and analyzed. This conference report provides
significant new funding to establish additional joint terrorism task
forces across the country, and it enables accelerated construction of
analytic capability in the law enforcement, military and intelligence
spheres that will aid in untangling the complex of webs of terrorist
financing, support, movement, training, and operations, both through
enhanced resources and cooperation.
This analytic capability, as a result of the report under
consideration, will be applied more rigorously and in a more focused
manner to raw threat reporting on terrorism matters. Such analysis,
coupled with direction that the intelligence community establish a
reasonable threshold for disseminating raw threat reporting, should
vastly improve our ability to make sense of the many scraps of
intelligence, real and fabricated, that are collected on a daily basis
on terrorist threat activities.
Mr. Speaker, I urge the adoption of this conference report and ask
that it proceed.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I believe that we have completed our roster of Members who wish to
speak on the Democratic side, and I would like to just say in a few
closing remarks how appreciative we are to our distinguished chairman
for the bipartisan nature of our proceedings, to extend to my
Republican colleagues, again, thanks for their cooperation.
I want to acknowledge the good work of the gentleman from Georgia
(Mr. Bishop), the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), the
gentleman from California (Mr. Condit), the gentleman from Indiana (Mr.
Roemer), the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings), the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Reyes), the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Boswell), the gentleman
from Minnesota (Mr. Peterson), the Democratic members of the committee
for their attention to the important work of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence.
It is like signing up when you join the committee. It is very
demanding and Members on both sides have made a strong commitment of
time, enthusiasm, and dedication to these important issues so that we
can have the force protection that is one of the main goals of
intelligence and that we can have mission success on whatever we set
out to do.
We talked about human intelligence at the beginning. The chairman
mentioned it as a priority in his remarks and I did in mine. We want to
commend all of the people who work in the intelligence community, in
the human intelligence side, and otherwise, for their courage and their
dedication. I also want to note the commitment that our committee has
to bringing diversity to our human intelligence.
There are people in our country who understand the language, the
cultures, the opportunities in other countries and in other cultures
that would serve us well in achieving our mission success and we must
draw upon them. Our HUMINT has to look different as we go into the
future.
So we recognize and express gratitude to all of them, particularly
Mike Spann and the others who lost their lives. We also recognize those
who risk their lives every day for freedom in America and to root out
terrorism wherever it exists.
I want to commend especially, though, the staff of Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence led by Tim Sample on the Republican side. We
do
[[Page H9254]]
not really call it the Republican side. We really have a bipartisan
approach to this. But he is the chief of staff for the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence. I want to acknowledge the Democratic side
staff: Mike Sheehy, Wyndee Parker, Beth Larson, Carolyn Bartholomew,
Chris Healey for her good work on our issues, Kirk McConnell, Bob
Emmett, and Ilene Romack, who work so hard for us.
I want to commend our chairman for his leadership. It was interesting
to work with the Senate on this bill. So I commend the chairman, the
new Democratic chairman, Senator Graham, and Senator Shelby for their
cooperation as well. With that, Mr. Speaker, I urge our colleagues to
support the bill.
Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back
the balance of my time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I have no further speakers and I just wanted to finish
this with some thoughts about how grateful I am and how privileged I
am, indeed honored, to serve with such wonderful members. That is a
select committee. And I mean it. We have heard today from the chairman
and the ranking members of the four subcommittee we now have because we
have so much business on the committee. But the others who did not
speak, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert), the gentleman from
Illinois (Mr. LaHood), the gentleman from California (Mr. Cunningham),
the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra), the gentleman from North
Carolina (Mr. Burr), the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Peterson), the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes), the gentleman from Iowa (Mr.
Boswell), the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings), have all
contributed mightily to this.
It is obviously a wonderful select committee to have and be able to
work with and we are backed up with the kind of staff that we have as
the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi) has said, with Mike Sheehy
and Tim Sample and Chris Barton, our top staff keeping us on the track.
I think we are able to do our job well. And, of course, a big part of
that is the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), who has been
outstanding with her time, her energy, her attention and her leadership
when she has one or two other things to do, I understand, in her
portfolio of responsibilities as well.
It is a very good situation for us. I think the people of the United
States of America sometimes wonder what the job of Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence is and need to be reassured that today we are
talking about advocacy for sure. That is part of our job. We need to
make sure that our folks out there have the tools they need to do the
job, to do national security.
But the other side of our job is oversight. We do it very diligently
and dutifully. And that is to make sure that all of these awesome
capabilities are used in a way that is entirely lawful and within
keeping of character of the goals and wishes and the standards of the
people of the United States of America.
We do not have a 1-800 number to flash across the bottom of the
screen to say if you have a problem. But we are there as your oversight
committee, and if there are problems, we are responsible for dealing
with them. And I think we take that seriously, very seriously indeed.
Having said all of that, I think that we have with all of this
wonderful good will, and responding to the tasks before us, come up
with a good piece of legislation which is urgently needed. I see my
friend, the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks), sitting over there.
A lot of us have taken credit and heaped praise back and forth on the
work that has been done. A lot of the success we are enjoying today
that you are seeing on CNN is coming from the hard work of the people
who went before us on the oversight committees. And I take my hat off
to those people because they too understood the need.
I am very sorry this year my friend Julian Dixon is not with us to be
able to see some of the results of some of his hard work, and I know I
am joined on that from my colleagues on the other side. Fortunately,
there are always people to come along to fill shoes, and the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi) has done that so well. Having
said that, I urge adoption of this particular conference report.
Mr. SIMMONS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this conference
report and commend the conferees and the professional staff for their
hard work.
Specifically, I wanted to express my appreciation for the inclusion
of the language I offered as an amendment that requires that the
Central Intelligence Agency assume 100 percent of the cost of personal
liability insurance for certain CIA employees involved in counter-
terrorism activities.
Mr. Speaker, for 10 years I served with the Central Intelligence
Agency. I spent five years overseas engaged in intelligence collection,
counter-intelligence and, in some cases, counter-terrorism.
The work was difficult and dangerous. This fact has been reaffirmed
by the terrible death of CIA operations officer, Johnny Micheal Spann,
who was the first American to die in combat in Afghanistan in the fight
against terrorism last week. But at no time did I doubt that my
government would protect me from any personal liability if I
encountered a lawsuit as a consequence of my professional duties.
Today, I understand that CIA officers engaged in counter-terrorism
activities are virtually required to have personal liability insurance;
but the CIA pays only half of the premium. What incentive does a CIA
Case Officer have to do the job if he or she is subject to liability
lawsuits? Why would they take any risks if the government were
unwilling to cover the cost of liability?
I understand that I served in a different time. But I did have the
backing of my government--100 percent. It is time to give this
assurance back to our Case Officers, many of whom are on the front
lines of the war on terrorism.
This is not an original idea. In fact, it was a recommendation of the
Report of the National Commission on Terrorism, titled "Countering the
Changing Threat of International Terrorism" submitted to Congress in
June of 2000.
The report states, "The risk of personal liability arising from
actions taken in an official capacity discourages law enforcement and
intelligence personnel from taking bold actions to combat terrorism."
Following the tragic events of September 11th, it is apparent that we
must do better in our counter-terrorism effort. The least that we can
do is guarantee that any CIA officer participating in the war on
terrorism will have the full backing of the federal government. They
deserve no less.
Passage of this conference report will provide this full backing. It
also maintains the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to
designate those CIA employees who qualify for this benefit.
Again, I thank the Members and staff of the House and Senate
Intelligence committees for their hard work on this legislation, and I
urge my colleagues to support the conference report.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I
yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). Without objection, the
previous question is ordered on the conference report.
There was no objection.
The conference report was agreed to.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________
