106th Congress
Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session
106-620
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001
May 16, 2000.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
Mr. Goss , from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
REPORT
[To accompany H.R. 4392]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was referred
the bill (H.R. 4392) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2001
for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United
States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an
amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.
CONTENTS
The bill as reported 2
Purpose 6
Overall perspective on the intelligence budget and committee inte7
Scope of committee review 7
Committee findings and recommendations 8
Areas of Special Interest 10
State Department Security Concerns 10
Analyst Collocation 14
Oversight of NSA Modernization 15
Collaboration 17
Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination 18
IC Communications Architect/Architecture 19
State of Defense Human Intelligence 22
Military Pay and Civilian Pay 23
NFIP Congressional Budget Justification Books (CBJBs) 24
Reprogramming and Transfers Within CIA 25
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 27
Joint Military Intelligence Program 27
Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities 35
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Bill as Reported 40
Title I--Intelligence Activities 40
Section 101--Authorization of Appropriations
Section 102--Classified Schedule of Authorizations
Section 103--Personnel Ceiling Adjustments
Section 104--Community Management Account
Section 105--Transfer Authority of the Director of Central Intelligence
Title II--Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and
Disability System
Section 201--Authorization of Appropriations
Title III--General Provisions
Section 301--Increase in Employee Compensation and Benefits
Authorized by Law
Section 302--Restriction on Conduct of Intelligence Activities
Section 303--Sense of Congress on Intelligence Community Contracting
Section 304--Authorization for Travel on any Common Carrier for
Certain Intelligence Collection Personnel
Section 305--Reports on Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons
of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions
Title IV--Central Intelligence Agency
Section 401--Modifications to Central Intelligence Agency's Central
Services Program
Section 402--Technical Corrections
Title V--Department of Defense
Section 501--Three-year Extension of Authority to Engage in
Commercial Activities as Security for Intelligence Activities
Section 502--Contracting Authority for the National Reconnaissance
Office
Committee Position and Record Votes Taken
Findings and Recommendations of the Committee on Government Reform
Oversight Findings
Fiscal Year Cost Projections
Congressional Budget Office Estimates
Committee Cost Estimates
Specific Constitutional Authority for Congressional Enactment of this
Legislation
Changes to Existing Law
The amendment is as follows:
Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu thereof
the following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the "Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001".
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence community management account.
Sec. 105. Transfer authority of the Director of Central Intelligence.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits
authorized by law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Sense of the Congress on intelligence community contracting.
Sec. 304. Authorization for travel on any common carrier for
certain intelligence collection personnel.
Sec. 305. Reports on acquisition of technology relating to weapons
of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Sec. 401. Modifications to Central Intelligence Agency's central
services program.
Sec. 402. Technical corrections.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 501. Three-year extension of authority to engage in
commercial activities as security for intelligence collection
activities.
Sec. 502. Contracting authority for the National Reconnaissance Office.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2001
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the following elements of the United States Government:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Department of Defense.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the
Department of the Air Force.
(6) The Department of State.
(7) The Department of the Treasury.
(8) The Department of Energy.
(9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(10) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(11) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts
authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized
personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2001, for the conduct of the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed
in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 4392 of the One
Hundred Sixth Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The
Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on
Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the
President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the
Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the
executive branch.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central
Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of
the number authorized for fiscal year 2001 under section 102 when the
Director of Central Intelligence determines that such action is
necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except
that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized
under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence
community, exceed two percent of the number of civilian personnel
authorized under such section for such element.
(b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of Central
Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate whenever the Director exercises the authority
granted by this section.
SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the
Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 2001 the sum of
$144,231,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for the
Advanced Research and Development Committee shall remain available until
September 30, 2002.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of Central
Intelligence are authorized 356 full-time personnel as of September 30,
2001. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of
the Intelligence Community Management Account or personnel detailed from
other elements of the United States Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts
authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized to be appropriated
for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2001
such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts
shall remain available until September 30, 2002.
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel
authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community
Management Account as of September 30, 2001, there are hereby authorized
such additional personnel for such elements as of that date as are
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations.
(d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2001, any
officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces
who is detailed to the staff of the Intelligence Community Management
Account from another element of the United States Government shall be
detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer,
employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a
period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions
as required by the Director of Central Intelligence.
(e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
(1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated in
subsection (a), $28,000,000 shall be available for the National Drug
Intelligence Center. Within such amount, funds provided for research,
development, test, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until
September 30, 2002, and funds provided for procurement purposes shall
remain available until September 30, 2003.
(2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall
transfer to the Attorney General funds available for the National Drug
Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall
utilize funds so transferred for the activities of the National Drug
Intelligence Center.
(3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug
Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the provisions
of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403
3(d)(1)).
(4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
Attorney General shall retain full authority over the operations of the
National Drug Intelligence Center.
SEC. 105. TRANSFER AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Limitation on Delegation of Authority of Departments To Object to
Transfers.--Section 104(d)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 403 4(d)(2)) is amended--
(1) by inserting "(A)" after "(2)";
(2) by redesignating subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), (D), and (E) as
clauses (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), and (v), respectively;
(3) in clause (v), as so redesignated, by striking "the Secretary
or head" and inserting "subject to subparagraph (B), the Secretary or
head"; and
(4) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
"(B)(i) Except as provided in clause (ii), the authority to object
to a transfer under subparagraph (A)(v) may not be delegated by the
Secretary or head of the department involved.
"(ii) With respect to the Department of Defense, the authority to
object to such a transfer may be delegated by the Secretary of Defense,
but only to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.
"(iii) An objection to a transfer under subparagraph (A)(v) shall
have no effect unless submitted to the Director of Central Intelligence
in writing.".
(b) Limitation on Delegation of Duties of Director of Central
Intelligence.--Section 104(d)(1) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 403 4(d)(1)) is
amended--
(1) by inserting "(A)" after "(1)"; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
"(B) The Director may only delegate any duty or authority given the
Director under this subsection to the Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence for Community Management.".
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2001 the sum of
$216,000,000.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement,
and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in
such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed
to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity
which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the
United States.
SEC. 303. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTING.
It is the sense of the Congress that the Director of Central
Intelligence should continue to direct that elements of the intelligence
community, whenever compatible with the national security interests of
the United States and consistent with operational and security concerns
related to the conduct of intelligence activities, and where fiscally
sound, should competitively award contracts in a manner that maximizes
the procurement of products properly designated as having been made in
the United States.
SEC. 304. AUTHORIZATION FOR TRAVEL ON ANY COMMON CARRIER FOR
CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PERSONNEL.
(a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
"travel on any common carrier for certain intelligence collection
personnel
" Sec. 116. (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, the Director of Central Intelligence may authorize travel on any
common carrier that, in the discretion of the Director, would by its use
maintain or enhance the protection of sources or methods of intelligence
collection or maintain or enhance the security of personnel of the
intelligence community carrying out intelligence collection activities.
"(b) Authorized Delegation of Duty.--The Director may only delegate
the authority granted by this section to the Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence, or with respect to employees of the Central Intelligence
Agency the Director may delegate such authority to the Deputy Director
for Operations.".
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the National
Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to
section 115 the following new item:
"Sec. 116. Travel on any common carrier for certain intelligence
collection personnel.".
SEC. 305. REPORTS ON ACQUISITION OF TECHNOLOGY RELATING TO
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS.
Section 721(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1997 (50 U.S.C. 2366) (Public Law 104 293, 110 Stat. 3474) is amended--
(1) by striking "Not later than 6 months after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and every 6 months thereafter," and inserting
"Not later than March 1, 2001, and every March 1 thereafter,"; and
(2) in paragraph (1), by striking "6 months" and inserting "year".
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SEC. 401. MODIFICATIONS TO CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'S
CENTRAL SERVICES PROGRAM.
Section 21(c)(2) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C. 403u(c)(2)) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subparagraph (F) as subparagraph (G); and
(2) by inserting after subparagraph (E) the following new subparagraph:
"(F) Receipts from miscellaneous reimbursements from individuals
and receipts from the rental of property and equipment to employees and
detailees.".
SEC. 402. TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS.
(a) Reporting Requirement.--Section 17(d)(1) of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)(1)) is amended--
(1) by adding "and" at the end of subparagraph (D);
(2) by striking subparagraph (E); and
(3) by redesignating subparagraph (F) as subparagraph (E).
(b) Terminology with respect to Government Agencies.--Section
17(e)(8) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C.
403q(e)(8)) is amended by striking "Federal" each place it appears and
inserting "Government".
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 501. THREE-YEAR EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY TO ENGAGE IN
COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES AS SECURITY FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
ACTIVITIES.
Section 431(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by
striking "December 31, 2000" and inserting "December 31, 2003".
SEC. 502. CONTRACTING AUTHORITY FOR THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.
(a) In General.--The National Reconnaissance Office ("NRO") shall
negotiate, write, and manage vehicle acquisition or launch contracts
that affect or bind the NRO and to which the United States is a party.
(b) Effective Date.--This section shall apply to any contract for NRO
vehicle acquisition or launch, as described in subsection (a), that is
negotiated, written, or executed after the date of the enactment of this
Act.
(c) Retroactivity.--This section shall not apply to any contracts, as
described in subsection (a), in effect as of the date of the enactment
of this Act.
PURPOSE
The bill would:
(1) Authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2001 for (a) the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government,
(b) the Community Management Account, and (c) the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability System;
(2) Authorize the personnel ceilings on September 30, 2001 for the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government
and permit the Director of Central Intelligence to authorize personnel
ceilings in Fiscal Year 2001 for any intelligence element up to two
percent above the authorized levels, with the approval of the Director
of the Office of Management and Budget;
(3) Authorize $28 million for the National Drug Intelligence Center
in Johnstown, Pennsylvania;
(4) Authorize intelligence collection personnel of the Intelligence
Community to use any common carrier for travel during the course of
their intelligence collection activities;
(5) Permit deposit of certain miscellaneous receipts into the
Central Intelligence Agency's Working Capital Fund of the Central
Services Program;
(6) Extend the Department of Defense's authority to engage in
commercial activities as security for intelligence collection
activities;
(7) Limit the authority of the National Reconnaissance Office to use
external contracting offices to negotiate, write, and manage launch
vehicle acquisition and launch services contracts.
OVERALL PERSPECTIVE ON THE INTELLIGENCE BUDGET AND COMMITTEE INTENT
The classified Annex to this public report includes the classified
Schedule of Authorizations and its associated language. The committee
views the classified Annex as an integral part of this legislation. The
classified Annex contains a thorough discussion of all budget issues
considered by the committee, which underlies the funding authorization
found in the Schedule of Authorizations. The committee intends that all
intelligence programs and intelligence-related activities discussed in
the classified Annex to this report be conducted in accord with the
guidance and limitations set forth as associate language therein. The
classified Schedule is incorporated directly into this legislation by
virtue of section 102 of the bill. The classified Annex is available for
review by all Members of the House of Representatives, subject to the
requirements of clause 13 of Rule XXIV of the House.
SCOPE OF COMMITTEE REVIEW
U.S. intelligence and intelligence-related activities under the
jurisdiction of the committee include the National Foreign Intelligence
Program (NFIP), and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities
(TIARA) and the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) of the
Department of Defense.
The NFIP consists of all programs of the Central Intelligence Agency,
as well as those national foreign intelligence and/or
counterintelligence programs conducted by: (1) the Department of
Defense; (2) the Defense Intelligence Agency; (3) the National Security
Agency; (4) the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; (5) the
Department of State; (6) the Department of the Treasury; (7) the
Department of Energy; (8) the Federal Bureau of Investigation; (9) the
National Reconnaissance Office; and (10) the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency.
The Department of Defense TIARA is a diverse array of reconnaissance
and target acquisition programs that are a functional part of the basic
military force structure and provide direct information support to
military operations. TIARA, as defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the Secretary of Defense, include those military intelligence activities
outside the General Defense Intelligence Program that respond to the
needs of military commanders for operational support information, as
well as to national command, control, and intelligence requirements. The
Armed Services Committee in the House of Representatives has joint
oversight and authorizing jurisdiction of the programs comprising TIARA.
The JMIP was established in 1995 to provide integrated program
management of defense intelligence elements that support defense-wide or
theater-level consumers. Included within JMIP are aggregations created
for management efficiency and characterized by similarity, either in
intelligence discipline (e.g., Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Imagery
Intelligence (IMINT)), or function (e.g., satellite support, aerial
reconnaissance). The following aggregations are included in the JMIP:
(1) the Defense Cryptologic Program (DCP); (2) the Defense Imagery and
Mapping Program (DIMAP); (3) the Defense General Intelligence
Applications Program (DGIAP), which itself includes (a) the Defense
Airborne Reconnaissance Program (DARP), (b) the Defense Intelligence
Tactical Program (DITP), (c) the Defense Intelligence Special
Technologies Program (DISTP), (d) the Defense Intelligence Counterdrug
Program (DICP), and (e) the Defense Space Reconnaissance Program (DSRP).
As with TIARA programs, the Armed Services Committee in the House of
Representatives has joint oversight and authorizing jurisdiction of the
programs comprising the JMIP.
COMMITTEE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Committee completed its review of the President's fiscal year
2001 intelligence budget, carrying out its annual responsibility to
prepare an authorization based on close examination of intelligence
programs and proposed expenditures. The review reflected the Committee's
continuing belief that intelligence activities must be examined by
program, as well as by function. The committee held eleven committee
budget-related hearings, principally on a program level, including
Covert Action. A separate hearing was on support to military operations.
Likewise, a hearing was held addressing the Director of Central
Intelligence's (DCI) overall budget submission, the state of health of
the Intelligence Community, and to examine the DCI's views and plans for
the future of intelligence and the Intelligence Community. There were,
in addition, numerous individual briefings of Members and over 200 staff
briefings on programs, specific activities, and budget requests.
In the schedule of authorizations and the accompanying explanatory
language, the Committee has discussed numerous specific matters related
to the fiscal year 2001 budget. In the following section, the Committee
addresses several issues that it believes are particularly important
where it has been no direct budgetary action.
Taken as a whole, the Committee's budgetary actions and general
provisions reflect the Committee's concern that the United States is
placing undue risks on its armed forces and its national security
interests by not redressing the many crucial problems facing the
Intelligence Community.
In the Human Intelligence (HUMINT) arena, poor planning,
infrastructure problems, extended requirements for military force
protection, and unexpected contingency operations have all worked to
take money from the "front line" field officers, thus limiting our
efforts to rebuild our "eyes and ears" around the globe.
In the area of imagery intelligence (IMINT), despite the oversight
committees' exhortations, we are still faced with totally inadequate
systems planning and investment for the tasking, processing,
exploitation, and dissemination (TPED) of the imagery collection
capabilities we are building, let alone the capabilities of other future
collectors.
In the area of space-based collection, unanticipated technical
problems with some satellite programs in development will likely cause
scheduling delays and cost increases. Moreover, an insufficient priority
on developing cutting-edge technologies ensures that the core mission of
space intelligence--to collect secrets--will continue to languish and
become increasing limited.
In the area of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)
assets, we continue to see extensive over-utilization of very limited,
but critical airborne assets, with little relief in sight. While
planning for deployment of new ISR airborne capabilities into the
theaters, the Department of Defense has taken money from existing,
supposedly complementary, platforms to pay for future capabilities. The
result: our overall ISR capabilities and resources are decreasing at a
time when our military forces are relying on them more and more.
The most serious, immediate problem is with signals intelligence
(SIGINT) resources. The January "crash" of National Security Agency
(NSA) computers was not the result of a terrorist attack or hacker
gamesmanship. The problem resulted from NSA's lack of resources for new
infrastructure needs, the mismanagement of outdated Information
Technology (IT) resources, and the lack of sufficient acquisition
processes and expertise. This should have come as a surprise to no one.
Indeed, the Committee has, for at least three years, warned NSA and the
Intelligence Community of concerns in these areas. The Director of NSA
has begun efforts to address these issues, and his efforts have the
Committee's support. Likewise, the Committee has taken specific actions
within this bill to begin to address these issues.
The Committee's review of this year's budget request has included
testimony from the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), his senior
leadership and the managers of individual programs and agencies, as well
as leaders from the Department of Defense and the military services who
use and rely on intelligence systems and information on a daily basis.
Their message has been unanimous and crystal clear: there are not enough
intelligence resources to meet the immediate needs of national security,
let alone future needs.
For the past five years, the Committee and Congress have sought to
increase the "top line," or overall funding level for the Intelligence
Community. These increases have ranged from significant, to more modest
amounts, such as that found in this year's recommended authorization.
Although Congress has acted, it is the Administration's responsibility
to build each year a healthy intelligence budget that meets national
security needs. With this in mind, the Committee has also attempted to
prod the President, the Director of Central Intelligence and the
Secretary of Defense to re-examine the basic process used to put the
yearly budget request together.
The United States cannot continue to use the same processes to build
the intelligence budgets of the 21st century that were used in the Cold
War. American interests have changed, new threats have evolved and the
priority placed on intelligence and the role of the Intelligence
Community has grown. For the President and senior policymakers,
intelligence often forms the basis for key foreign policy strategies and
decisions, and can provide insights as to the effect of such decisions.
At its best, intelligence provides key indications and warning (I&W)
information that can direct attention to issues and areas before crises
occur, to allow for appropriate actions to provide stability and,
hopefully, deter or avoid conflict. Yet, despite the need to supply this
information, our intelligence resources are primarily directed toward
the most important issues, leaving fewer resources for the critical I&W
function, especially in areas of the world that could erupt overnight.
For the military, intelligence is now the basis for and organic to
everything it does. HUMINT and SIGINT, in particular, provide direct and
immediate threat data to personnel engaged in activities that risk their
lives on a daily basis: our ground forces in Kosovo, our pilots
conducting Northern and Southern Watch missions in Iraq, our troops on
the border between North and South Korea, our forces engaged in
counternarcotics operations in Latin America, and our Special Operations
personnel who must enter an area unannounced and undetected, and require
the friendly face of an intelligence officer to give them "ground
truth."
As these critical requirements have grown at a rapid pace, the
intelligence budget has become more and more inadequate, with existing
resources increasingly drawn off to meet day-to-day tactical
requirements. Global coverage and predictive, strategic intelligence
have, as a result, suffered. This translates into the lack of warning of
nuclear tests in India, our inability to monitor key facilities
suspected of producing weapons of mass destruction because assets are
focused on crisis areas, the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade,
the extreme shortage of ISR assets in key areas of the world.
Intelligence should be the first line of defense, yet, it is not
treated as such. Remedying this situation, however, is not a task that
Congress can, or should, take on alone. Along with a new approach to
budgeting by the Administration, there also must be a Community-wide
effort actually to work as a "community."
AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST
STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY CONCERNS
The Committee is deeply disturbed over the loss of a laptop computer
from the allegedly secure workspace of the Office of Strategic
Proliferation and Military Affairs of the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research of the Department of State (INR). The laptop contained highly
classified compartmented information.
The State Department failed to notify the FBI about the loss of the
computer until March 22, 2000. On April 17, 2000, an article appeared in
the Washington Post detailing the disappearance of the laptop. Prior to
the news story, neither the House, nor the Senate, intelligence
committees were notified of the loss and the potential compromise of
highly classified intelligence information, as required by 502(1) of the
National Security Act of 1947, as amended. The delayed notice (up to two
months) to the FBI hindered the Bureau's investigation. The Committee
does not believe that the failure by the Department of State and the
Central Intelligence Agency to provide the required notification was
justified.
The Committee is also troubled by a pattern of problems at the
Department of State regarding matters of security.
In February 1998, an unknown man in a tweed sport coat was watched as
he entered the "secure" area of the office of the Executive Secretary,
which is physically located within the Secretary of State's office
suite, and walked away with more than a few documents containing
Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) material. Although the FBI was
advised in a timely manner of that theft, the intelligence oversight
committees were notified by INR of the matter only after news stories
concerning the incident were published by Time magazine and the
Washington Post.
In September 1998, the State Department's Inspector General
documented a failure of the State Department to protect classified
intelligence information. State Department officials have not responded
fully to the Inspector General's recommendations. In the Intelligence
Authorization Act for fiscal year 1999, Congress directed the Inspector
General to perform a review of the Department's procedures for
protecting intelligence information within headquarters. The Inspector
General was also asked to make recommendations based on her findings to
enhance security.
In September 1999, the intelligence committees received that report.
The Inspector General concluded that "the Department of State is
substantially not in compliance with the DCIDs (Director of Central
Intelligence Directives) that govern the handling of SCI." The
Inspector General described a situation where unescorted foreign
visitors are permitted access to the Department. Uncleared maintenance,
repair, and char force personnel were permitted unescorted access to
areas where classified intelligence information is handled, processed,
stored, and discussed.
Substantial security enhancements were recommended by the Inspector
General. Most significantly, the Inspector General urged the
implementation of a visitor escort policy. It was noted in the September
1999 audit that although the Bureau of Diplomatic Security published
visitor escort requirements on November 17, 1998, these were rescinded
on November 23, 1998, on the direct order of the Undersecretary of State
for Political Affairs. By the time of the publication of the Inspector
General report, a new escort policy was in effect, but the Committee has
continuing concerns about its scope and enforcement. Additionally, the
Inspector General called for better control mechanisms for intelligence
information, noting that the State Department was not in full compliance
with the applicable DCIDs regarding SCI material.
In December 1999, a Russian diplomat was arrested outside the State
Department in connection with the discovery of a Russian bugging device
in the chairrail of a seventh floor conference room in the Main State
building.
Were intelligence information not so important for the State
Department for the conduct of informed foreign policy, the Committee
would likely be advocating drastic measures cutting off access to highly
classified materials. After all, the unauthorized disclosure of
intelligence information jeopardizes lives of intelligence officers and
assets and compromise multi-billion dollar secret intelligence
capabilities. Nevertheless, the Committee is hopeful that measured
responses can accomplish the objective of improving security practices
at Main State and throughout the Department. Serious and meaningful
action, however, must be taken and compliance with DCID procedures by
State Department employees and officials must be verified. Moreover,
accountability for security failures must be real.
In this regard, the Committee notes that on April 24, 2000, Secretary
Albright transferred responsibility for protection of SCI material from
INR to the Diplomatic Security Bureau, which was suggested by the State
Inspector General in September 1999. This step, and others announced by
the Secretary, may need to be reviewed, but they are at least a
recognition that a serious situation exists at the State Department with
respect to its cavalier attitude toward security generally and
particularly toward intelligence information. It is unconscionable that,
as the Inspector General found, security of intelligence information
within INR was not a priority.
Although ample criticism can be directed toward State Department
officials, the Committee also notes that the DCI has not exercised his
authorities in this regard to his utmost. The Committee finds it
necessary to emphasize again that the DCI is obligated under law to
protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure
(50 U.S.C. 403 3(c)(6)) and, further, is responsible for ensuring the
establishment of security and access standards for managing and handling
foreign intelligence systems, information, and products (Exec. Order
12333 Part 1.5(g) and (h), respectively). In this regard, the Committee
appreciates the DCI's recent commitment to form "an Agency task force
to conduct a prompt and thorough inventory, review, and risk-assessment
of the information resident on the missing laptop's hard-drive." (DCI
letter to the Secretary of State, 2 May 2000). Additionally, the
Committee looks forward to
the DCI's evaluation of "the need for additional improvements
in the handling and accountability for classified information,
particularly Sensitive Compartmented Information, in the Intelligence
Community." The Committee fully expects the DCI to focus considerable
attention on the State Department, in this regard.
The Committee also expects the DCI, as part of this evaluation, to
review and make recommendations about the number of positions at the
State Department that require SCI-level clearances and the appropriate
number of SCI facilities (SCIF) within the State Department. The
Committee requests that the DCI submit these recommendations to the
Committee prior to conference on this bill.
The Committee also requests that the DCI certify to the Committee, in
writing, that the State Department is in full compliance with all of the
DCIDs concerning information security, counterintelligence measures, and
personnel security, as well as any executive orders, regulations, or
policy directives affecting the protection and handling of classified
intelligence information.
Pending the receipt of the DCI's report, including the results of his
review and recommendations, and receipt of the certification of
compliance with the DCIDs, the Committee recommends a fence of a portion
of those funds authorized to be appropriated for INR's activities in
this bill, and a fence of a portion of those funds authorized to be
appropriated by this bill to the Office of the DCI. The Committee,
likewise, recommends that additional funding be transferred to the CIA
to help fund infrastructure needs associated with the detailing of INR
analysts to the Directorate of Intelligence of the CIA, and to reimburse
the Department of State for such analysts who will be co-located at the
CIA. For further elucidation of the issues relating to the detailing and
colocation of INR analysts, see the budget language relating to the CIAP
and the general provisions section, supra. Finally, because of the
attitudes related to security procedures and awareness, as previously
described, and based on several Committee inquiries while visiting
diplomatic posts throughout the world, the Committee is also taking
steps to reorganize the management, operations and security of
diplomatic telecommunications. A discussion of these steps can be found
within the classified annex.
It should be noted that the Committee will be conducting an
investigation of security of classified intelligence information at the
Department of State. Indeed, the Committee has engaged the services of a
security and counter-intelligence expert to assist in this
investigation. The consultant and other participants in the
investigation will:
1. Undertake field inspection visits on behalf of the Committee to
those State Department components responsible for counterintelligence,
protection of intelligence sources and methods, and related security
issues;
2. Review compliance by the State Department with applicable laws,
regulations, executive orders, and policy guidance pertaining to
counterintelligence, protection of intelligence sources and methods, and
related security issues;
3. Interview personnel from the State Department and other
intelligence community elements concerning the effectiveness of
counterintelligence, protection of intelligence sources and methods, and
related security issue reforms being implemented by the Department of
State;
4. Provide a written report on the materials, measures, and
capabilities currently available, and planned to be made available, to
the State Department concerning counterintelligence, protection of
intelligence sources and methods, and related security issues;
5. Provide a written report on the status of and implementation of
reforms concerning counterintelligence, protection of intelligence
sources and methods, and related security issues at the Department of
State; and
6. Recommend to the Committee, in writing, any additional measures
that would improve counterintelligence, protection of intelligence
sources and methods, and related security issues at the State
Department.
The Committee expects that the report of the investigation will
consider whether an intelligence information security office (IISO)
should be established within INR to manage intelligence information
security practices. Such an office could perform the following
functions: ensure compliance with the DCIDs and all other laws,
regulations, and executive orders relating to the protection of
intelligence information; implement and enforce necessary control
mechanisms relating to access to classified intelligence information;
undertake counterintelligence measures that enhance the protection of
the intelligence information and the sources and methods of intelligence
collection, such as the implementation of counterintelligence polygraph
examinations; report in a timely fashion to the appropriate government
entities, including the intelligence oversight committees, of any
violation of security measures that are designed to protect SCI material
and sources and methods. The office could report to the Secretary and
the DCI through the Assistant Secretary for INR and be comprised of
officers detailed from CIA, NSA, and the FBI, who are experienced
professionals with significant backgrounds in security and
counterintelligence matters.
The Committee looks forward to the conclusion in the report on
whether the creation of an IISO is useful or wise, and whether, if
created, it would be effective at improving what has been characterized
by the DCI and Secretary of State as a "cultural attitude" of
disinterest in security within the Department of State. Such an attitude
has over time minimized the importance of security, which is "an
inherent, inextricable, and indispensable component of all jobs" at the
Department of State (Secretary Albright at DoS, 3 May 2000).
The Secretary of State declared to the employees of the Department of
State on May 3, 2000, "If you are not a professional about security,
you are a failure." The Committee could not agree more strongly.
Actions, however, will be the true test of the Department's commitment
to improve security, a commitment to which the Secretary has personally
associated herself.
Analyst Collocation
All-source analysis is the sine qua non of intelligence production.
This category includes intelligence products that have been written by
analysts who have access to all available intelligence information
collected on a particular issue or area, including human intelligence,
imagery, signals intelligence, open-source information, and any other
data collected through other specific technical programs or special
platforms. All-source intelligence can provide the highest quality, most
complete assessment of a situation for the military commanders and
policy makers who face critical decisions.
Within the NFIP, all-source analysis is concentrated within the
Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency,
although the National Intelligence Council, the National Drug
Intelligence Center, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, and the Department of Energy all maintain all-source analysis
capabilities. In addition, many analysts at the so-called "stovepipe"
agencies--such as the National Security Agency and the National Imagery
and Mapping Agency--perform many all-source analytical functions, even
if they are not classified specifically as "all source analysts."
The Committee has for many years promoted the concept of Intelligence
Community "corporateness." In the 1996 study IC21: Intelligence
Community in the 21st Century, the Committee recommended a more
corporate, consolidated approach to intelligence, and the reinforcement
of the CIA's role as the premier all-source analytical agency.
In order to foster a more corporate approach to all-source analysis
and to support the DCI's goals for developing new analytic methods and
investing in people and knowledge, the Committee has transferred funds
into the Central Intelligence Agency Program for the collocation of
analysts from State/INR at CIA. These analysts are to be located within
the CIA's DI on a reimbursable basis.
The Committee also believes that the Community's all-source
capabilities and expertise may also be enhanced with the collocation of
NSA SIGINT analysts within the CIA's DI, in a similar fashion to NIMA
imagery analysts who are deployed there today. Therefore, the Committee
directs the DCI and the Director, NSA, to study the concept of moving
some NSA analysts to the CIA's DI and to report to the Committee, prior
to the submission of the fiscal year 2002 budget request, on steps that
can be taken to effect this. The Committee would prefer that such a
program be implemented no later than in fiscal year 2002.
The Committee believes that all parties will benefit from this
collocation. The CIA's DI will benefit from the expertise in SIGINT and
diplomatic collection that the NSA and INR analysts will bring with
them. Likewise, the NSA and INR analysts and analysis can draw upon the
knowledge and resources of the DI.
Oversight of NSA Modernization
As the Committee's own investigations clearly indicate, and as the
analyses of the DCI's Senior Acquisition Executive (SAE), outside
experts, and the new NSA Director confirm, NSA is in very serious need
of acquisition reform. Acquisition problems, in fact, may prevent NSA
from developing a good modernization plan, implementing, properly
estimating the cost of modernization, and determining whether more money
than currently programmed is needed for the Agency and, if so, how much.
NSA was obviously extremely successful for many decades against Cold
War foes. The telecommunications sectors of these adversaries, however,
tended to evolve relatively slowly, and older forms of communication
were rarely, if ever, discarded altogether. The U.S. SIGINT enterprise
successfully attacked these threats with a decentralized resource
management and allocation process; decentralized, distributed tasking
and processing; and sometimes with large development programs involving
industry. During the 1980's budget increases, NSA decided to build up
its in-house government scientists and engineers and the Agency now
seems to believe that in-house talent can address the rapidly evolving
signals environment better than outsiders can. Budget problems and
processes also contributed to the proliferation of small independent
activities, and this evolution accentuated the traditional high degree
of local program autonomy, with virtually no effort to integrate systems
across the SIGINT architecture. The culture demanded compartmentation,
valued hands-on technical work, and encouraged in-house prototyping. It
placed little value on program management, contracting development work
to industry, and the associated systems engineering skills.
Today, an entirely new orientation is required. NSA now faces new,
more robust challenges, thanks to the explosion of the technology and
telecommunications industries. Each type of communication--radio,
satellite, microwave, cellular, cable--is becoming connected to all the
others. Each new type of traffic shows up on every type of
communication. Unfortunately, as the global network has become more
integrated, NSA's culture has evolved so that it is seemingly incapable
of responding in an integrated fashion.
To tackle this target, NSA cannot remain split into multiple,
separate collection "stovepipes." It cannot afford to allow multiple
subcomponents to decide what capabilities to build, because the result
today can be wasteful duplication and crippling gaps in capability. NSA
must be organized and operated as a single, cohesive enterprise, within
a common tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination framework.
Building this new system is, by definition, a major undertaking that
requires careful preparation. NSA must overcome its instinct to try to
solve all its problems at once, by launching out with a series of
development efforts without first doing the laborious work of defining
requirements and developing an architecture, end-to-end program
planning, life-cycle costing, and developing an acquisition strategy.
NSA's modernization must result in a highly integrated system, and will
require a very sophisticated systems engineering and program management
capability--the like of which NSA has not experienced in a very long
time, if ever. The acquisition model used by NSA must include spiral
development to manage risk and keep up with the rapidly changing signals
environment. NSA must also take a hard look at the extent to which a
relatively small number of government
engineers, however talented, can be expected to keep up with
the massive and dynamic commercial industry.
In summary, it seems clear to the Committee that NSA must prepare
itself for complex, prioritized, carefully timed and integrated systems
acquisitions that, in aggregate, rival the complexity of programs
commonly managed by the NRO, the Defense Department, and commercial
industry. NSA must quickly and effectively position itself to make
ruthlessly honest assessments about in-house development versus
contracting out. This effort will require a very well thought out
acquisition plan, so that capabilities can be developed, delivered, and
integrated as quickly and effectively as possible. The Agency must
rapidly enhance its program management and systems engineering skills
and heed the dictates of these disciplines, including looking at options
to contract out for these skills.
The Committee believes that the NSA Director and other elements of
the Agency grasp these imperatives. General Hayden has already taken
some initial but important steps to implement them. The Committee does
not underestimate the complexity and sheer magnitude of the problems
involved in remaking an insular institution that has always prided
itself, with reason, on its ability to get the job done its own way.
Due to the formidable nature of this problem and the potential costs
required, and given the stakes involved for the nation's security, the
Committee believes that a structure of competent external oversight must
be brought to bear on NSA's modernization program. The Committee
requests that the DCI's SAE prepare and report to the congressional
intelligence and defense committees, a plan for review, approval and
continued monitoring of NSA's integrated modernization program. This
plan should incorporate the views and recommendations of the Independent
Architecture Panel, which should advise on the appropriate acquisition
model, and the SAE should participate in relevant panel deliberations.
The Committee expects this oversight to include review of requirements
definition, architecture, cost estimates, acquisition strategy
(including the role of industry), and program milestones. The Committee
believes that such standing oversight should be tailored to NSA's needs
and should be streamlined to a degree commensurate with NSA's
demonstrated competence and internal controls. The acquisition model
selected should enable rapid, perhaps sequential, fielding of the
integrated architecture, bearing in mind the shortcomings in NSA's
current development methodology. Given the fast turnover in technology,
the Committee believes that proven commercial model could provide the
basis for NSA's approach. This report is requested by November 1, 2000.
This external oversight serves two major purposes. One, it can help
to force NSA to come to grips with its challenges and actually make the
reforms that most agree are necessary.
And two, with such an oversight structure in place, Congress and the
Executive Branch leadership can allocate scarce resources to NSA with
more confidence that funds will be expended effectively.
COLLABORATION
The Committee is frustrated with the Intelligence Community's
funereal pace in the area of electronic collaboration. In startling
testimony, the DCI stated flatly that collaboration, which is one of the
major thrusts of his strategic intent, is being stymied by the parochial
interests of the intelligence agencies.
The Committee understands that there are real security issues that
must be resolved before the DCI's goal of unfettered collaboration
across the Intelligence Community can be achieved. However, the
Committee agrees with the DCI and his senior advisor for intelligence
production, that these security issues are being used as an excuse for
inaction. In fact, the agencies' torpor seems to be due more to fears
about sharing information and the possibility of relinquishing some
bureaucratic control over the intelligence production process. In all
probability, another factor is the disregard organizations habitually
display for techniques and systems that were invented or sponsored by
others.
The Committee notes that DIA has a very successful and capable
collaboration system embedded in the Joint Intelligence Virtual
Architecture (JIVA) that is being fielded within the defense
intelligence community. A National Intelligence Council study from two
years ago all but endorsed this system as a Community standard, and all
analyses since clearly indicate that JIVA is the best of breed and
mature and affordable enough for proliferation across the rest of the
Intelligence Community. JIVA is based on COTS tools, and is structured
to ensure that the government can always shift to the best commercial
product and reap the benefits of commercial investment and competition.
The Committee does not have confidence that the current approach of
attempting to engineer "interoperability" between disparate systems
will produce more than minimal capabilities. In fact, the Community's
current concept of waiting and working towards a "standard-based
interoperability," in the Committee's view, ignores the realities of
commercial technology and its pace of development. As a result of these
attitudes, the Committee doubts that universal standards can be
developed using the current approach.
The Committee is even less impressed with arguments promoting
long-term operational use of the CVW system built upon tools developed
by the Mitre Corporation. Its president has indicated clearly that
Mitre's product is not suitable for an operational capability, certainly
not on an enterprise-wide basis.
Based on these factors, the Committee has taken specific actions that
can be found in the classified annex. The JIVA program manager is
encouraged to pursue all reasonable means to meet the special needs of
each customer, based on these actions, and to explore all avenues for
incorporating all the best commercial tools within the JIVA suite, to
provide customers, on a cost-effective basis, with as many choices as
possible for collaboration tools to meet their needs, and to seek every
possible means to reduce the cost of virtual collaboration. The JIVA
program manager also needs to explore with industry ideas to overcome
legitimate security issues and to enable management to retain
appropriate control over the activities of subordinates and the
quality of products. In this regard, the Committee notes that
new business models, such as so- called application service provider
schemes, might indeed provide means to allow users to use multiple
tools, as they see fit, while at the same time greatly reducing
enterprise-wide costs, security risks, and the erosion of management
controls over analyst interactions.
tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination
The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 directed the
DCI and the Secretary of Defense to restructure the Future Imagery
Architecture (FIA) satellite program by reducing the number of
satellites in the planned constellation. Congress directed this action
because ample testimony, briefings, and reports showed that current
plans for improving imagery tasking, processing, exploitation, and
dissemination (TPED) fell far short of the planned expansion of
collection capacity, from both aircraft and satellites. The report
accompanying the Act pointed out that it would be a waste of the
taxpayers' money to buy expensive satellites whose product could not be
fully utilized. The report indicated that the intelligence committees
would reconsider the requirement to restructure the FIA program based on
the administration's budget planning for TPED as reflected in the fiscal
year 2001 amendment to the fiscal year 2000 Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP), and in preliminary plans for the new fiscal year 2002 FYDP.
The administration has, indeed, added funding to the current FYDP in
the fiscal year 2001 budget request. The Committee agrees that this
figure represents a substantial investment. However, it is well short of
the range of necessary investment reported to Congress by the
administration both last year and in testimony this year. Moreover, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense testified that, despite general
acknowledgment of the need for greater TPED investment, it will be
difficult for the administration to come up with the money, owing to
competing priorities within the military services and the Intelligence
Community. In addition, the Deputy Secretary noted that the last budget
of an outgoing administration can be expected to lack some rigor, and
that in the last analysis it will be up to the new President and his
team to resolve difficult issues. A final complicating factor is the
DCI's reticence about additional major investment in imagery TPED. The
DCI and his senior staff have expressed concern about competing
priorities, NIMA's ability to manage a large and complex systems
acquisition, the share of the TPED funding burden that should be
assigned to the intelligence community vice the rest of the defense
budget, and whether the TPED requirements are, as yet, adequately
defined.
With respect to NIMA's acquisition management capabilities, the DCI's
Senior Acquisition Executive, in conjunction with staff from the Office
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence, have concluded that NIMA has a solid
plan and foundation in place to remedy its weaknesses, and that, if this
plan is faithfully executed, NIMA should be able to manage the TPED
modernization program effectively. Executing such a plan, however, is no
small task as NIMA does not now have the expertise required, and hiring
this expertise will require significant effort and some changes to
legislation.
The Committee expects that the DCI and the Secretary of Defense will
ensure that imagery TPED funding requirements will be a priority issue
for their joint review in the IPRG and EDRB processes. The Committee
expects also to be informed of the administration's intentions with
respect to TPED funding in the fiscal year 2002 FYDP prior to
conference. Finally, the Committee hopes that the new administration
will take note of the seriousness of the TPED issue, and will place a
priority on increased investments in this, and other, areas.
IC communications architect/architecture
The Committee continues to be frustrated by the lack of a coherent,
cohesive, and productive approach to solving the Intelligence
Community's (IC) systems interoperability and communications problems.
It is clear that the IC's office of Chief Information Officer has not
been able to force the disparate IC organizations to work together to
develop a communications architecture plan that provides for a truly
integrated communications network that relies on commercial industry
infrastructure, protocols and enforced standards.
The Committee believes the importance of a networked and
interoperable IC cannot be overstated. Every function of intelligence
tasking, processing, exploitation and dissemination (TPED) relies on
communications. The IC must have a communications architecture that
provides the basis for inter-IC collaboration and the framework from
which intelligence consumers, such as the Department of Defense, can
seamlessly "reach into" the community for intelligence support to
their missions. The Committee believes that the IC must rapidly adopt
commercial systems and technologies to create a common interoperable
wide-area information transport network to meet all Community needs.
Clearly, before the Community can bring together the various IC
organizations into such a network, a professional communications
architect must be designated and assigned. This architect must be
provided with the necessary resources and authorities to design,
construct and enforce the standards of an IC communications network.
Such an architect's responsibilities should include providing the
Community with a detailed communications architecture plan, complete
with transmission and interoperability standards, within which each IC
organization must operate.
The Committee believes that the resulting network must integrate all
IC organizations and provide the physical and virtual framework for the
IC to conduct its various intelligence missions and interface with its
external customers. The Committee further believes that the architect
should determine whether the existing Advanced Telecommunications
Network (ATN) is compatible with the future network architecture and
whether it should be established quickly as a common initial
communications baseline for all National Foreign Intelligence Program
(NFIP) agencies. However, the Committee believes that the Intelligence
Community Communications Architect (ICCA) should devise the most cost
and performance effective communications
network possible, using commercial telecommunications
infrastructures where possible and logical. In this regard, the
Committee urges the ICCA to examine outsourcing the ATN network.
The Committee's recommendations are based on the impressive work done
by the Defense Science Board task force on DoD communications. Their
report of February 2000, concludes that existing and future military
communications will be incapable of meeting DoD customer needs and makes
a case that the government should rapidly and competitively outsource
its communications to commercial service providers, laying the
foundation for full interoperability and improving capabilities
enormously. The task force report contends that the commercial sector is
rapidly converging to a fully integrated, interoperable, multi-media
(voice, data, video, etc.) network based on Internet Protocols (IP). The
implication is that packet-switching technology and protocols will soon
enable high-quality real-time services (such as voice and video) and
thereby eliminate the need for any vestiges of point-to-point circuit-
switched technology. In the words of the task force, "the shift from a
point-to-point to a common-user infrastructure has become more
aggressive. As the Internet provides services to support both real-time
and non-real-time applications, the convergence of our national and
international telecommunications infrastructure to a common-user,
packet-switched, dynamically shared network of networks will
accelerate."
The task force argues that this single dominant internet is robust
and redundant, and that adequate security can be achieved through the
application of modern information security technology and the use of
virtual private networks.
Therefore, the Committee directs the DCI to create and staff the
position of IC Communications Architect (ICCA), providing this
individual direction to determine whether and how the IC should
implement the DSB's commercial communications recommendations. The DCI
is to provide the necessary formal governance authorities to the ICCA to
plan the IC communications network and its associated commercially based
standards and protocols. The ICCA is authorized to create a professional
communications team.
No later than six months after the enactment of this act, no funds
for wide area communications shall be obligated or expended by any
program manager without the approval of the ICCA. A formal IC network
design and plan to achieve such will be provided to the Congress not
later than February 1, 2002.
Although the Committee is not prepared, at this time, to direct the
DCI to empower the ICCA with specific responsibilities and authorities,
it requests the DCI to provide the Committee with his recommendations
for such, prior to conference on the fiscal year 2001 bill. The
Committee believes the ICCA, at a minimum, should:
1. Have complete authority and control over expenditures for any and
all NFIP communications infrastructures to ensure the coordinated
development and maintenance of an integrated IC communications network.
The ICCA should, to the maximum extent possible, work with and include
all tactical intelligence entities in the development of the IC
communications infrastructure.
2. Have complete authority and control over policies for any and all
Intelligence Community information management policies, relating to the
wide area network.
3. Maintain and update the IC's communications architectural plan.
The Architect should direct the commercial teams to develop the initial
architecture in close coordination with the NIMA TPED Pre-Acquisition
activities and with the CIA (see related text in the classified annex),
but should ensure the network solution satisfies the broader SIGINT,
MASINT, and other intelligence related communications requirements.
4. Address the Information Management requirements for the community
and include a plan for implementation.
5. Develop and implement central control authorities, management
structures, processes, and mechanisms that ensure authorities and
control can be effectively maintained. This should include execution of
commercial communications contracts for the common good of the
community.
6. Develop governing policies, promulgate guidance, and ensure
compliance with an IC Information Management System. The Architect
should have the requisite authorities to carry out these duties for all
aspects of Information Management for the network and should ensure
information can be efficiently exchanged and that collaboration is
enabled, etc.
7. Establish a senior advisory board that includes representatives of
ASD/C3I, CMS, CIO Executive Council, NSSA, NRO, NIMA, NSA, DIA, and CIA
to ensure all communications network requirements are considered.
8. Establish a team to review expenditures for communications between
and among all intelligence community facilities. These funds will be
identified for consolidation and centralized execution.
9. Develop a centralized process for requirements development and
programmatic planning for the community.
The Committee believes this issue is a critical one and will monitor
efforts in this area closely. Additional details related to this issue
can be found in the classified annex.
State of Defense Human Intelligence
The Defense HUMINT Service was established in 1995, consolidating
almost all Department of Defense human intelligence activities--both
clandestine and overt--into a single service. Five years later, DHS has
progressed beyond the "growing pains" stage and can be considered an
established, if not yet mature, organization.
Overall, the Committee finds that the state of defense HUMINT is
"acceptable" and improving. The Committee agrees with the authors of
the recently released "Clapper Study"*
that DHS has overcome many organizational and resource-related hurdles
to become greater than the sum of its parts--although there are still
many problems and challenges facing defense HUMINT that the Intelligence
Community must address.
*Office of the Secretary of Defense, Command, Control, Communications
and Intelligence (OSD/C31) Review of Defense Human Intellligence, March
2000. Lt. Gen. James R. Clapper (USAF, Ret.) led the study team.
On the positive side, DHS has provided a single point of planning and
coordination for almost all clandestine defense HUMINT. Several years
ago, the Committee issued a study (IC21: Intelligence Community in the
21st Century) that included a recommendation to consolidate all U.S.
clandestine human intelligence--including clandestine defense
HUMINT--into a single Clandestine Service. Neither CIA nor DoD has taken
the initiative to create such an organization, but the Committee has
noticed a gradually improving level of cooperation between the
operational elements of CIA and DHS--particularly among officers in the
field.
The Committee believes, however, that in order to maintain a viable
defense human intelligence collection activity (not to mention improve
its performance), a host of current and future problems must be
resolved. Included in this list are issues specific to DHS and DoD that
were addressed in the Clapper Study--the Committee believes that these
are currently being addressed by the appropriate elements within
DoD--and the Committee will continue to follow the progress made on the
75 individual recommendations.
Further, the Committee believes there are several issues falling
outside the sole jurisdiction of DHS and DoD that the Intelligence
Community must address in order to ensure defense HUMINT viability.
The first of these is the level of support defense HUMINT provides to
the military. As the testimony of the unified command J 2's before the
Committee earlier this year indicates, human intelligence is highly
valued, but HUMINT coverage is nonexistent or in short supply in many
areas of the world where the United States may find it necessary to
deploy troops.
Efforts to enhance HUMINT coverage are steps in the right direction,
but, as testimony demonstrates, it's just a start. The Committee
believes that the need for additional DHS resources can be better
articulated and defended. At a time when some in Congress are
questioning the need for new DAOs and the coverage they will provide,
the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, and
other seniors in the Intelligence Community must provide the leadership
that has been lacking to this point.
Finally, the Committee believes that there needs to be a long-term
strategic plan for defense human intelligence, and that this must be
part of the overall Intelligence Community strategic plan for HUMINT. On
one level, this involves DHS and DIA working with the Secretary of
Defense, the unified commands, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But the
Director of Central Intelligence and the CIA's Deputy Director for
Operations must fulfill their own responsibilities for leadership of the
Intelligence Community and U.S. HUMINT, respectively, and working with
the Director of DHS develop a strategic plan for HUMINT that fully
incorporates the requirements and collection capabilities of defense
human intelligence.
Military Pay and Civilian Pay
The fiscal year 2001 budget request for the NFIP includes requests
for military and civilian pay that are grossly misleading.
Military pay costs are based on a specific authorized strength.
However, the actual fill rate of these billets has reached unacceptable
levels, and the forecast is for continued decline. The Committee has
examined in detail the fill rates in two accounts: the General Defense
Intelligence Program (GDIP), and the Consolidated Cryptographic Program
(CCP). In the GDIP, the March 2000 reported fill rate was 85.6
percent--a significant decline from the 1998 level (94.2 percent). In
the CCP, the March 2000 reported fill rate was 88 percent, and the
actual assigned rate was 81 percent. The costs to the programs of these
empty billets--which must still be paid for--is significant.
In both accounts, the percentage of filled billets will continue to
decline due to decisions by the services to fill joint billets at
substantially the same level as regular service positions.
National-level intelligence agencies draw a significant portion of their
military support from joint billets--billets the services had previously
filled at a higher level. The Committee is under no illusions that the
intelligence community is alone in bearing the impact of hollow
personnel authorizations--finding the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air
Force personnel to staff authorized positions is a serious problem for
the services themselves and all of the defense-related organizations
they support.
The Committee can accept--has accepted in the past--that authorized
military positions within the NFIP will always outnumber the actual
personnel that fill them. An average fill rate of 90 percent or above is
a risk that can be managed. The Committee will not accept fill rates
that are moving to the 75 percent level, or lower, across the
Intelligence Community.
In response to the current problem (and the future trend) in this
area, the Director of Central Intelligence has directed those
intelligence programs with large numbers of military personnel to look
at converting military billets into civilian billets where that is
feasible. Although this action may be necessary to address the immediate
crisis, the Committee is concerned about its long-term impact on the
Intelligence Community.
One problem associated with lowering the percentage of military
positions within the NFIP is the resulting loss of military knowledge
and lines of communication (both official and unofficial). Any erosion
in these areas will only lead to intelligence gaps and future failures.
A second problem with the proposed remedy is the civilian system
itself. The Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community are
finding it increasingly difficult to recruit and retain civilian
personnel--especially in this economy. Add to this the fact that the
existing intelligence workforce is now crowded at the top of the
government grade scale, the rising costs of the Federal Employee
Retirement System (FERS) and health insurance--and the result is a bill
for civilian pay that is approaching (or in some cases, exceeding) 50
percent of the total budget. This trend in civilian pay is not
sustainable.
The Committee believes that a long-term effort is required to address
this problem. Therefore, in order to assist its oversight in this area
the Committee has requested a report from the Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence for Community Management on: (1) the scope of the current
problems in the NFIP associated with military and civilian personnel
structures; (2) the future trends for both; (3) all possible remedies;
and (4) the pros and cons of each. This report is due no later than 1
January 2001.
nfip congressional budget justification books (cbjbs)
The Committee has become increasingly frustrated with the lack of
detail provided in the project descriptions in the National Foreign
Intelligence Program (NFIP) CBJBs. Further, the Committee believes that
the financial management practices at some NFIP agencies are so
inadequate that specific project-level financial information is not even
well known corporately. For example, in preparation for the budget
authorization, the Committee had to, once again ask representatives from
CIA and NSA to provide additional programmatic information on their
systems development activities--basic information that apparently was
not readily available.
If NFIP agencies are unable to provide detailed financial data for
the congressional oversight process, the Committee questions whether
they have the detail necessary to make sound investment decisions.
Clearly, the NFIP agencies need greater insight into their financial
obligations and the capabilities that they are developing. NSA's
baseline activity, for example, identified many areas of duplicative
development, as well as lack of investment in key strategic areas. Yet,
due to the lack of detail, the CBJB did not provide this information.
The Committee notes that, at least at some agencies, internal financial
management practices seriously complicate this process (see item on
Reprogramming and Transfers). Yearly submission of a more detailed
description of systems development activities and their associated
budget will benefit congressional oversight, the DCI budget management
process, and internal agency investment processes. The Committee
believes the NFIP CBJBs should more closely mirror the level of detail
provided in the Joint Military Intelligence Program Congressional
Justification Books and in the Department of Defense Justification of
Estimates documents.
The Committee, therefore, expects a change to the format and content
of the NFIP budget submission. Specifically, the Committee wants all
future NFIP CBJBs to provide the following information on each project
valued at $1.0 million or more (including systems developed by
government personnel):
project mission description and budget item justification;
key performance characteristics and requirements;
organizations providing management oversight;
customers and products associated with the project;
contract information;
budget breakout by program element number (RDT&E, Procurement, O&M)
for the two proceeding fiscal years, the budget year, the FYDP, and cost
to complete;
civilian and military manpower numbers and costs;
program highlights/planned program by type of funding (RDT&E,
Procurement, O&M) for the two preceding years, the budget year, and one
year beyond the budget year;
project budgetary change summary and explanation;
related program funding summary; and,
the project milestone schedule.
REPROGRAMMING AND TRANSFERS WITHIN CIA
This year, during the course of the Committee's oversight of CIA
stations and bases overseas, significant and deleterious movements of
money from activities at stations and bases for initiatives at CIA
headquarters were discovered. The cumulative impact of these actions
substantially changed the intent and the effect of the budget for fiscal
year 2000 as enacted.
The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.), which
created CIA, imposed restrictions upon the movement of appropriated
funds within and between intelligence accounts. The Committee is
concerned that the practices of CIA may not comply with the letter or
the spirit
of the Act. The Committee notes that similar problems also are
evident in other NFIP programs; however, the impact seems to be most
pervasive within the CIA, especially in terms of the effect on "core"
mission.
Reprogramming
For movement of funds from one intelligence activity to another
within an account, section 504(a)(3) (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)) of the
National Security Act requires that:
(A) the activity to be funded is a higher priority intelligence or
intelligence-related activity;
(B) the need for funds for such activity is based on unforeseen
requirements; and
(C) the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense,
or the Attorney General, as appropriate, has notified the appropriate
congressional committees of the intent to make such funds available for
such activity.
The movement of money from one activity to another within an
intelligence account has been made subject to some accommodation between
the agencies and Congress. Heretofore, for example, Congress has allowed
the reprogramming of money below a certain dollar threshold to proceed
without formal notification to Congress. The agencies, in turn, have
solicited the approval of Congress for certain reprogrammings that
involve matters of specific congressional interest. On occasion,
furthermore, Congress has exercised its discretion to approve the
reprogramming of funds under circumstances that do not meet the strict
requirements of section 504. Unlike the agencies, which are bound by the
terms of that section, Congress has constitutional authority for
exercising such discretion.
This year, unfortunately, various CIA officials have attempted to
assert that the substantive requirements of section 504 may not apply to
reprogrammings below the monetary threshold for notification to
Congress; that the exercise of congressional discretion in certain
reprogrammings has somehow excused CIA from compliance with section 504
in its own movements of money; and that the plain meaning of the terms
"unforeseen requirements" and "higher priority" is beyond the ken of
those in CIA charged with moving money. These assertions threaten to
disrupt the system for compliance with section 504 that, until recently,
had appeared to work easily and well. These assertions also challenge
the ability of Congress to oversee the execution of an intelligence
budget as enacted. They invite a strong, corrective response.
The Committee has asked CIA's Inspector General to investigate
whether CIA has complied with section 504 in its reprogramming practices
and procedures. In the meantime, to provide additional clarification in
this matter, the Committee notes that (a) at no time has Congress
authorized the CIA or any other intelligence agency to ignore the
requirements of section 504 that a reprogramming be for a higher
priority activity and that it be based upon unforeseen requirements; (b)
at no time has Congress designated the movement of money within the
agencies as an "internal" matter beyond congressional oversight
authority; and (c) Congress remains responsible for ensuring that
appropriated funds are executed by the intelligence agencies in a manner
that is effective and lawful.
Transfers
The National Security Act also restricts the movement of appropriated
funds between intelligence accounts. To transfer funds between accounts
within the National Foreign Intelligence Program, section 104(d) of that
Act requires, among other things, that
(A) the funds * * * are being transferred to an activity that is a
higher priority intelligence activity; and
(B) the need for funds * * * for such activity is based on
unforeseen requirements * * *.
Like reprogramming under section 504, transfers also require notice
to Congress. The requirements for transfers, like those for
reprogramming, provide some check on the movement of money and some
means of ensuring that Congress is aware of what movements take place.
The procedures for transfers under section 104(d) have, until recently,
worked easily and well.
This year, the Intelligence Community attempted to transfer funds to
CIA and to another agency under standards other than those of section
104(d). The Committee received first notice of the proposed transfer as
a part of the general budget request for fiscal year 2001. In a
subsequent letter, the Community Management Staff described the
transfers as necessary for various "high priority" activities and
requested that the Committee "formally endorse" the transfer in its
report on the authorization bill for fiscal year 2001. Nowhere in these
communications, or in briefings on the transfer, was there a basis
provided for concluding, as required under section 104(d), that these
transfers are in response to unforeseen requirements. There was also no
evidence provided that the additional, procedural requirements of
section 104(d) have been satisfied.
The circumstances of this particular transfer are complicated and
unique. Some of this movement of money, for example, may actually be a
reprogramming under section 504 and not a transfer. As already noted,
however, the National Security Act provides standards for the movement
of funds within and between intelligence accounts. The standards for
transfer, like those for reprogramming, facilitate congressional
oversight. Their abrogation in this case is unjustified. For these
reasons, and on substantive grounds, the Committee has not approved this
movement of money.
defense advanced research projects agency (darpa)
In response to a question from the Committee, the Department of
Defense stated "it may be appropriate to reexamine the reporting of
selected DARPA projects under JMIP or TIARA, so as to gain a better
understanding of impending technologies and their possible impacts on
current programs. We would need to do an evaluation to see what has
changed and whether this would be beneficial to all users."
The Committee agrees with this position and requests the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence)
to conduct such an evaluation and report back to the defense and
intelligence committees no later than December 1, 2000. If the
Department decides that it is appropriate to report DARPA
intelligence-related projects within the JMIP or TIARA accounts, the
Committee asks these be appropriately identified in the fiscal year 2002
intelligence budget request.
JOINT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
RC 135 and U 2 operations and maintenance: No budgetary change
The budget request contained a total of $373.1 million for operations
and maintenance of the RC 135 and U 2 aircraft fleets.
The committee is concerned that funding for many Intelligence
Community programs, including intelligence surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft are regularly transferred from the
programs for which funds were authorized and appropriated to fund
shortfalls in other programs, often not related to ISR requirements. The
committee understands the theater and functional Commanders in Chief
have stated that their number one shortfall is in ISR aircraft and
systems. The committee is concerned that transferring funding,
particularly O&M funding, from ISR aircraft to fund non-intelligence
programs exacerbates the CINCs' ISR shortfalls.
Therefore the committee designates the RC 135 and U 2 programs as
congressional interest items.
Commercial off-the-shelf-receiver development: +$1.0 million
The budget request included $95.7 million in PE 35885G for
development of tactical cryptologic systems.
The committee is concerned by the lack of a true commercial
off-the-shelf (COTS) signals intelligence (SIGINT) receiver that is
based on open-architecture standards established by the American
National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the 6U Versa Module Europa (VME)
backplane. The Department of Defense has stated that all future signals
intelligence systems will be COTS based. However, most SIGINT
developments the Department is pursuing are based wholly, or in part, on
custom approaches that are not interchangeable at the board level. The
committee is further concerned that use of these customized approaches
discourages competition, minimizes the impetus to utilize the COTS
marketplace, reduces the industrial base and forces more expensive
solutions.
The committee is aware of a small business development that has
produced a true COTS receiver solution for several Defense Cryptologic
Program needs. The committee notes that this solution is cost-effective
and based completely on ANSI and VME standards, thereby allowing for
true "plug and play" use between systems. The committee also notes
that the Joint SIGINT Avionics Program Office has sought to use this
technology as a commercial replacement for one of its custom
applications. However, there is no funding in the budget request to
pursue or procure this commercial solution.
The committee is aware of another innovative small business
development using emerging commercial silicon germanium technology and
supports rapid application of this leading-edge commercial technology
for defense applications.
Therefore, the committee recommends an authorization of $97.7 million
in PE 35885G, an increase of $1.0 million for development of the COTS
VME receiver technology for SIGINT applications, and an increase of $1.0
million for development of commercial silicon germanium integrated
circuits for defense and intelligence applications.
Eagle vision commercial imagery: +$6.0 million
The budget request contained $10.0 million in operations and
maintenance, defense-wide, for the National Imagery and Mapping Agency
(NIMA) to purchase commercial data.
The committee notes the successful Air Force operation of the Eagle
Vision commercial imagery ground station, which has resulted in timely,
unclassified imagery support to the theater commanders-in-chief (CINCs).
Much of this imagery has been unique and could not be provided by other
technical means due to higher priorities. The committee believes that
there are insufficient funds to meet the CINCs' commercial image and
mapping needs and, therefore, recommends $16.0 million in operations and
maintenance, defense-wide, an increase of $6.0 million, for purchasing
Eagle Vision commercial imagery.
Defense airborne reconnaissance program (DARP), line 56: +$78.1 million
The budget request contained $165.5 million for various RC 135 and U
2 aircraft modifications but included no funds for RC 135 trainer
aircraft, an updated C 135 operational flight trainer, RC 135 global air
traffic management (GATM) upgrades, or the theater airborne warning
system (TAWS) for the RC 135 Rivet Joint (RJ).
The committee notes that the theater and functional
commanders-in-chief (CINCs) have repeatedly testified that their
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) requirements,
particularly those met by ISR aircraft such as the RC 135 and U 2, are
not being satisfied due to the limited number of these aircraft. The
committee understands that the Air Force does not have
a dedicated RC 135 aircrew training aircraft and that this
deficiency contributes to the limited number of aircraft available to
meet CINC requirements. To increase the availability of RC 135 mission
aircraft to the CINCs, the committee recommends an increase of $44.0
million to modify two C 135 aircraft into an RC 135 trainer aircraft
configuration.
The current C 135 operational flight trainer (OFT I) is the aircraft
simulation training device for the RC-, OC-, WC-, and TC 135 pilots at
Offutt Air Force Base. The committee understands that OFT I is obsolete
due to its outdated engine and aircraft avionics configurations, and
that an OFT II would provide training for aircrews to operate the
re-engined and updated avionics C 135 model aircraft. The committee
notes that the Air Force Chief of Staff has included the procurement of
OFT II among his top five unfunded requirements for fiscal year 2001.
Therefore, the committee recommends an increase of $6.5 million for OFT
II and $2.5 million to equip OFT II with motion simulation thereby
improving aircrew training and readiness on the various C 135 aircraft
models.
RC 135 GATM upgrades include: interference resistant navigational
receivers, global positioning system upgrades, a traffic collision and
avoidance system, radios to permit reduced vertical separation between
aircraft during Atlantic Ocean transit, cockpit voice recorders, and
flight management system upgrades. The committee understands that,
without these upgrades, RC 135 aircraft will be restricted from flying
the most direct and fuel-efficient ocean routes and altitudes, will be
subject to critical landing-phase navigational radio interference, and
will not be equipped with the Secretary of Defense-directed safety
modifications until after fiscal year 2005. To meet these vital needs,
the committee notes that the Air Force Chief of Staff has included
RC-135 GATM upgrades among his unfunded requirements for fiscal year
2001, and consequently, recommends an increase of $28.4 million for this
purpose.
The TAWS significantly improves the accuracy of ballistic missile
warning on RC 135 RJ, a tactical reconnaissance aircraft. In its report
on H.R. 1401 (H. Rept. 106 162) for fiscal year 2000, the committee
recommended an increase of $17.3 million for the RC 135 RJ TAWS and
believes that continued integration of these suites is critical to
tactical missile defense warning. Therefore, the committee recommends an
increase of $10.0 million for continued procurement and installation of
TAWS suites on the RC 135 RJ aircraft.
To consolidate RC 135 modifications in DARP, line 56, and U 2
modifications in DARP, line 80, the committee recommends a transfer of
the $5.1 million budgeted for RC 135 aircraft modifications in DARP,
line 80 into this budget line; and a transfer of the $18.3 million
budgeted for U 2 aircraft modifications in this line into DARP, line 80.
This transfer results in a $13.2 million decrease to this line and an
increase of $13.2 million in DARP, line 80.
In total, the committee recommends $243.7 million for DARP, line 56,
an increase of $78.1 million for RC 135 modifications.
Finally, the committee is concerned about the Department of the Air
Force's budget plan for the RC 135's joint signals intelligence avionics
family (JSAF) upgrades and notes that the request would budget for a
single JSAF suite for the RC 135 but that additional suites are not
planned until fiscal year 2005. Without full and continuous funding for
this upgrade, the committee understands the first system, if installed
onto the RC 135, would result in a unique RC 135 aircraft configuration
which would increase unit support costs for that aircraft. Accordingly,
the committee believes the new JSAF system should continue development
and testing in the RC 135 systems integration laboratory and on the U 2
aircraft until the Department of the Air Force budgets to upgrade all 16
RC 135 aircraft.
Rivet joint mission trainer: +$15.5 million
The budget request contained $12.8 million for RC 135 equipment
procurement but included no funds to provide an enhanced field
exportable training system (EFETS). The committee understands that the
procurement of an EFETS would improve training and readiness by allowing
RC 135 crews at forward operating bases to use existing post-mission
ground data processing system equipment to function as a Rivet Joint
Missions Trainer (RJMT). Since procurement of an additional RJMT for
these forward locations would not be required, the committee notes that
EFETS would save the Air Force $27.4 million. The committee notes that
the Air Force Chief of Staff has included $15.5 million for the EFETS
among his top five unfunded requirements for fiscal year 2001.
Consequently, the committee recommends $28.3 million, an increase of
$15.5 million for procurement of an EFETS.
Army tactical unmanned aerial vehicles: +$4.0 million
The budget request contained $29.4 million in PE 35204A for tactical
unmanned aerial vehicles (TUAV).
The committee notes that the Army just completed a successful
competitive selection for an off-the-shelf TUAV. The committee notes
that the Army will place increasing reliance on its TUAV and needs to
field the best possible system including sensors.
The committee recommends authorization of $33.4 million in PE 35204A,
an increase of $4.0 million for preplanned product improvements and
sensor development.
Marine corps dragon warrior unmanned aerial vehicle: +$5.0 million
The budget request contained no funding in PE 35204M for Marine Corps
close range tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV).
The committee notes that the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory
(MCWL) is developing the Dragon Warrior, a low cost, small UAV that
combines the speed of a fixed-wing UAV with some operational
characteristics of a rotary wing UAV. The committee is aware that Dragon
Warrior is being developed to carry a variety of payloads that are
currently being examined by the MCWL to provide the Marine Corps with a
highly flexible, close range reconnaissance capability that will enlarge
the area of influence of a small expeditionary force.
The committee recommends authorization of $5.0 million in PE 35204M,
an increase of $5.0 million, for Dragon Warrior.
Manned reconnaissance systems: +$8.0 million
The budget request contained $27.5 million in PE 35207N for manned
reconnaissance systems, including $25.3 million for the development of
the Shared airborne reconnaissance pod (SHARP) electro-optic system and
technologies.
The committee has fully supported the SHARP program to dramatically
increase real-time tactical reconnaissance capabilities. The committee
is aware of commercial developments in large focal length optics that
will increase standoff ranges for tactical reconnaissance systems and
developments in EO framing processing techniques that will provide for
real-time precision strike targeting. The committee is also aware that
emerging solid-state shutter technology can replace existing mechanical
focal plane shutters to increase further existing and future EO camera
performance and reliability while reducing operations and maintenance
costs. The committee believes this technology should be incorporated
into all SHARP camera applications.
Therefore, the committee recommends $35.5 million in PE 35207N, an
increase of $5.0 million for long-range optical sensor technology and
precision strike improvements, and $3.0 million for development of a
solid-state shutter mechanism that can be retrofitted on current and
built into future framing array cameras.
18 Shared airborne reconnaissance pod: +$18.0 million
The budget request contained $248.1 million in PE 24136N for
continued development of capabilities for the F/A 18 aircraft.
The committee has supported the Shared Airborne Reconnaissance Pod
(SHARP) efforts to provide the F/A 18 aircraft with an enhanced tactical
reconnaissance capability that will also be applicable to other combat
aircraft. The committee notes the recent successful demonstration of the
SHARP risk-mitigation project for the F 14 Tactical Airborne
Reconnaissance Podded System (TARPS) Completely Digital (CD) system that
was employed by the battle group U.S.S. John F. Kennedy. This
demonstration clearly indicated the force multiplying capability
provided by real-time imagery system and the committee supports
continuation of this effort.
The committee is concerned, however, that the funding requested for
SHARP is insufficient to support completion of sensors for the fiscal
year 2003 initial operational capability (IOC). The committee notes that
this shortfall in funding results in an increase in cost of tactical
reconnaissance support by extending use of the less capable F 14 TARPS.
Therefore, the committee recommends authorization of $266.1 million
in PE 24136N, an increase of $18.0 million for the development of the
SHARP F 18 tactical reconnaissance capability to maintain the current
IOC.
Global hawk: $12.0 million tuck
The budget request contained $109.2 million in PE 35205F for
endurance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), including $103.2 for continued
development of the Global Hawk UAV.
The committee supports the Global Hawk development and believes that
this air vehicle has the potential for providing intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance support to military customers,
complementing the current U 2 operations.
The committee notes that due to a crash of one air vehicle, and a
runway accident of another, there are no electro-optic/infra-red (EO/IR)
sensors to continue test and evaluation of the UAV. The committee
believes it is important to procure sensor sets to replace those lost to
the accidents. Further, the committee is aware of unobligated and
unexpended funding from prior year endurance UAV appropriations that can
be used to purchase replacement sensors and continue the Global Hawk
engineering and development in fiscal year 2001.
Further, the committee is aware of new generation radar technologies
that could vastly increase Global Hawk synthetic aperture radar (SAR)
imaging and moving target indicator (MTI) capabilities at comparable
costs to the current sensors. The committee is also aware of digital
recording devices that offer superior performance and reliability over
current devices. With respect to SAR and MTI capabilities, current
state-of-the-art active electronically steered array (AESA) antenna
developments offer a two-fold increase in range, resolution, and revisit
performance over the current Global Hawk radar. Further, the cost of
these new radars appears to be comparable to the current phased array
radars. In terms of recording systems for high volume imagery sensors
such as those on the Global Hawk, solid state devices have a major
reliability advantage over current tape recording devices. They have no
moving parts, nor do they require a tape that must be threaded around
capstans. The cost of solid state recording devices is dramatically
decreasing while the data recording rates and density are increasing.
The committee believes that such devices should be integrated into the
Global Hawk at the earliest opportunity.
Therefore, the committee recommends authorization of $109.2 million
in PE 35205F for endurance UAVs. Of the amount authorized, the committee
directs the $12.0 million be used specifically for purchasing two EO/IR
replacement sensors for the Global Hawk aircraft. Further, the committee
directs that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence provide a report to the defense and
intelligence committees assessing the utility of developing and
integrating modular AESA radars and solid state recording devices on the
Global Hawk. This report should be provided no later than 1 February
2001.
Multifunction self-aligned gate active array antenna: +$7.0 million
The budget request contained $113.1 million in PE 35204N for tactical
unmanned aerial vehicles, but included no funding to continue
development of the multi-function self-aligned gate (MSAG).
The committee is aware that the MSAG technology successfully
demonstrated ability to transmit and receive full-motion video and
communication. This new form of antenna, with no moving parts, offers
reduced life-cycle costs and enables production of light, conformal,
multi-beam antennas for tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (TUAV) and
associated systems.
The committee recommends authorization of $126.1 million, an increase
of $7.0 million to construct and test a line-of-sight array for the
tactical control system.
Multi-link antenna system: +$2.0 million
The budget request contained no funding in PE 35207F for manned
reconnaissance systems, including exploitation technologies for RC 135
aircraft.
In the "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000,"
Congress provided funding for development and evaluation of the
multi-function, self-aligned gate (MSAG) active array antenna technology
on the RC 135 aircraft. The conferees were convinced that an MSAG
application, called Multi-link Active System (MLAS), has the potential
for satisfying several RC 135 antenna deficiencies, and also has the
potential for reducing the size and number of antennas for many other
applications. In fact, the committee is aware that the Department of
Defense has determined that the potential for this technology has
merited funding through an advanced concept technology demonstration.
The committee is aware that the fiscal year 2000 funding was
insufficient to complete the fabrication, installation and evaluation of
an MLAS antenna on an RC 135. Therefore, the committee recommends an
authorization of $2.0 million in PE 35207F for this purpose.
Defense airborne reconnaissance program (DARP), line 80: +$34.2 million
The budget request contained $98.4 million in DARP, line 80, for
various U 2 and RC 135 aircraft modifications, including $1.8 million
for Senior Year Electro-optic Reconnaissance System (SYERS) spares and
$17.0 million for a Joint Signals Intelligence Avionics Family (JSAF)
suite for the U 2. The request did not include any funds for additional
U 2ST trainer aircraft.
SYERS is an electro-optic camera system that provides real-time
imagery to national decision-makers and tactical forces. The committee
understands that initial deployment spares for the SYERS upgrade are
underfunded in the budget request by $3.0 million, and recommends an
increase of this amount.
The JSAF provides an upgraded collection capability for the U 2S. The
committee understands that the budget request is insufficient to procure
an entire JSAF suite and required spares and cabling. Accordingly, the
committee recommends an increase of $8.0 million for this purpose.
The U 2ST is a two-seat trainer version of the single-seat U 2S
reconnaissance aircraft. The committee understands that there are only
four U 2STs, and that without an additional U 2ST, the U 2S pilot
production rate does not meet requirements to solve an existing U 2S
pilot shortage. The committee notes that the Air Force Chief of Staff
has included an additional U 2ST among his top five unfunded
requirements in fiscal year 2001, and accordingly, recommends an
increase of $10.0 million to convert a U 2S into a U 2ST aircraft.
Including transfers between DARP lines 56 and 80 for the RC 135 and U
2 respectively, the committee recommends $132.6 million, an increase of
$34.2 million, for U 2 modifications.
Predator: +$12.0 million
The budget request contained $22.1 million for procurement of the
Predator unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) system.
The committee understands that the Air Force is experiencing
vanishing vendor problems with some of the current hardware in the
Predator ground station and that there is a requirement to control
multiple Predator aircraft simultaneously from a single ground station.
The committee is also aware that there are required air vehicle
reliability and maintainability upgrades that have not been funded.
Consequently, the committee recommends $32.1 million for the
Predator, an increase of $12.0 million for upgrading the current ground
stations with commercial hardware, for integrating the capability to
control multiple UAVs simultaneously and for improving air vehicle
reliability and maintainability.
Finally, the committee is aware that a jointly funded effort between
the contractor and NASA has developed a turbo-prop variant of the
Predator, to be followed by a jet-powered variant. Both of these
Predator-B variants use the current Predator ground station, avionics,
datalink, and control software, but provide major performance
improvements over the current aircraft, including a maximum speed in
excess of 200 knots, and a service ceiling to 45,000 feet. While the
current Predator has clearly proven its military worth, given these
performance factors, a Predator-B would appear to satisfy many niche
missions for which the current vehicle is not well-suited. The committee
believes that a Predator-B would be a valuable addition to the Predator
fleet, and that a mix of Predator-A and -B aircraft would cost
effectively satisfy all Predator mission requirements. Therefore, the
committee requests the Secretary of the Air Force to conduct an
assessment of the utility of a Predator-B aircraft, including the
benefits or problems of operating a mixed Predator fleet. The committee
requests the Secretary report his findings to the defense and
intelligence committees before the submission of the fiscal year 2002
budget request.
Defense space reconnaissance program: -$7.1 million
The budget requested contained $45.1 million in PE 35159F for various
projects within the Defense Space Reconnaissance program (DSRP).
The committee recommends an authorization of $38.0 million, a
decrease of $7.1 million. This reduction is taken without prejudice.
TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Cryptologic skills training: +$4.0 million
The budget request contained $1.3 million in operations and
maintenance, Army, for conducting cryptologic and language skills
training at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center (USAIC).
The committee is aware of a unique Korean language training program
developed in-house at the USAIC. The committee believes this
computer-based tool has the potential of providing critical language
maintenance training for many language specialists, and it believes this
effort should be expanded to other languages.
Consequently, the committee recommends $5.3 million in operations and
maintenance, Army, an increase of $4.0 million, for continued
development of this language training program into the service's seven
core language requirements. The committee also recommends that this
program be provided to the other services for language training
maintenance.
Common ground station: -$7.9 million
The budget request contained $17.9 million in PE 64770A for continued
development of the Army's Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar
System (JSTARS) Common Ground Station, including $2.0 million to develop
the Army's Distributed Common Ground Station (DCGS A) and $5.9 million
to develop a next generation wide-band datalink to provide connectivity
to the JSTARS.
The committee notes that the DCGS A development effort duplicates a
similar effort being conducted within the Army's Tactical Exploitation
of National Systems program, a funded program. Further, the committee
notes the Air Force has not yet determined the next generation JSTARS
datalink and will not do so until at least fiscal year 2002, thus making
the Army's development activities for such communications connectivity
premature.
For these reasons, the committee recommends $10.0 million in PE
64770A, a decrease of $7.9 million, to the common ground station
program.
Guardrail common sensor: +$2.0 million
The budget request contained $11.3 million in PE 23744A for continued
development and modification of the Army's Guardrail Common Sensor
aircraft and ground stations.
The committee notes that the Guardrail System 2 was recently
delivered to the Army after nearly ten years of modification.
Unfortunately, this system was returned without being upgraded with the
ability to disseminate tactical intelligence information via the
Tactical Information Broadcast Service (TIBS). TIBS is the baseline for
the Integrated Broadcast Service that is the DoD-mandated world-wide
tactical intelligence dissemination service.
The committee recommends $13.3 million in PE 23744A, an increase of
$2.0 million to install the TIBS capability in this Guardrail system.
Semi-automated imagery processor: +$4.0 million
The budget request contained $57.4 million in PE 64766A, including
funding for development of the Semi-automated imagery processor (SAIP).
The SAIP will provide imagery analysts with an automated target
recognition assistance capability, providing critical relief for a
low-density imagery analyst resources.
The committee recommends authorization of $61.4 million in PE 64766A,
an increase of $4.0 million for continued development and fielding of
the SAIP.
Defense foreign language program: +$3.0 million
The budget request contained $61.9 million in operations and
maintenance, Army, for the Defense Language Institute (DLI).
The committee is very supportive of the DLI training efforts to
provide high quality linguists for the growing requirement of many
agencies and services but believes that its language laboratories are in
need of technical upgrades, to include new equipment and access to the
internet. The committee is aware of local area Marine Corps self-help
efforts that have done similar upgrades very cost effectively. The
committee believes the Army should call on this USMC self-help
assistance to upgrade the DLI language laboratories.
Further, the committee is aware of an unfunded DLI initiative to
provide better language training by issuing laptop computers to
students. These computers would be used to provide language laboratory
access to on-line language training materials, allow "after hours"
access from the institute's dormitories, and access to "live"
world-wide foreign training materials. The committee believes this is a
worthwhile effort that should be properly funded.
Therefore, the committee recommends $64.9 million in operations and
maintenance, Army, an increase of $3.0 million, for the Defense Foreign
Language Program. Of this amount, $1.0 million is for self-help upgrade
of the language laboratories and $2.0 million is for the laptop computer
initiative.
Naval space surveillance: -$600 thousand
The budget request included $2.0 million in PE 35972N for the Navy
Space Surveillance network life extension activities.
The committee is aware of an accounting error that resulted in a
request for design concept activities that were actually funded in
fiscal year 2000. Therefore the committee recommends 1.4 million in PE
35972N, a decrement of $600,000.
Joint tactical terminal: +$ 6.0 million
The budget request contained $32 thousand for the Joint Tactical
Terminal (JTT).
The committee is fully supportive of the Navy's efforts to field the
JTT but is aware that the Navy has a shortfall in purchasing the
required number of terminals.
Accordingly, the committee recommends $6.0 million, an increase of
$6.0 million, to correct this deficiency.
F/A 18 reconnaissance capable: -$23.8 million
The budget request contained $212.6 million for F 18 series aircraft,
including $24.5 million for the procurement of the Advanced Tactical Air
Reconnaissance System (ATARS).
The committee is aware that 14 of the currently planned 18 19 ATARS
systems were purchased under low rate initial production and that the
remaining systems were to be purchased with fiscal year 2000 funds after
the completion of the operational evaluation and milestone III decision.
The committee is also aware that ATARS did not pass its operational
evaluation and understands that this will preclude a procurement of the
final ATARS systems. This frees up the unobligated and unexpended FY2000
funding.
Therefore, the committee recommends $185.1 million, a decrease of
$23.8 million, to be taken only from ATARS procurement.
Tactical air reconnaissance podded system: +$7.0 million
The budget request contained $37.1 million in other production
charges, including $2.6 million for continuation of the F 14 Tactical
Air Reconnaissance Podded System (TARPS) camera system.
The committee is aware of the recent successful deployment of the
TARPS Completely Digital (CD) system with the U.S.S. John F. Kennedy
battle group. TARPS CD is being employed as a risk mitigation effort for
the Shared Airborne Reconnaissance Pod (SHARP) development. SHARP is the
future non-dedicated reconnaissance system for naval tactical
reconnaissance. The committee commends the Navy for its successful
integration of TARPS CD and the demonstration of the force enhancement
capabilities of this a real-time tactical system.
The committee believes the Navy's successful risk-mitigation efforts
for electro-optical sensors provides a sufficient confidence level to
take the next step and move toward integration of a commercial
off-the-shelf synthetic aperture radar (SAR) sensor to provide
all-weather reconnaissance. The committee is aware that several, small,
very high resolution SAR sensors are available to do non-developmental
test on TARPS CD. Since an all-weather reconnaissance is a requirement
for SHARP, the committee believes completing risk mitigation on the
TARPS CD is appropriate and will not affect the current schedule for
fielding SHARP with an EO-only capability.
Therefore, the committee recommends $44.1 million, an increase of
$7.0 million for integrating and demonstrating commercial SAR solutions
into the TARPS CD.
Mobile electronic warfare support system: +$8.5 million
The budget request contained $96.2 million in PE 26313M, including
$449 thousand for improvements to the Marine Corps' mobile electronic
warfare support system (MEWSS).
The committee notes that the Marine Corps' MEWSS tactical
reconnaissance system was a cooperative effort with the U.S. Army's
ground based common sensor (GBCS) program. GBCS was terminated for lack
of performance and all residual equipment was transferred to the Marine
Corps for use in the MEWSS. However, no funding was provided to
cross-deck and integrate GBCS components into the MEWSS vehicles or to
maintain the limited rate initial procurement items.
Therefore, the committee recommends authorization of $104.7 million
in PE 26313, an addition of $8.5 million specifically for the purposes
of transferring, integrating and maintaining the equipment gained from
GBCS.
Hyper-spectral imagery system: +$4.0 million
The budget request contained $9.8 million in PE 27247F for Air Force
tactical exploitation of national capabilities (TENCAP) projects.
Congress provides additional funding in fiscal year 2000 for
continuing development of a hyper-spectral sensor for application on
Navy P 3 and Air Force unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). The committee is
aware that this initiative has resulted in a joint effort to integrate
and demonstrate a real-time hyper-spectral sensor on a Predator UAV. The
committee notes that no funding was provided in the budget request to
continue this effort through demonstration. The committee believes that
a hyper-spectral sensor will drastically mitigate the problems of
detecting and targeting camouflaged targets that hampered aerial
targeting in past operations.
Therefore, the committee recommends an authorization of $13.8 million
in PE 27247F, an addition of $4.0 million to continue this demonstration
with the goal of producing an operational real-time hyper-spectral
sensing system on UAVs and other intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance aircraft.
Senior scout: +$8.2 million
The budget request contained $5.5 million for procurement of
intelligence communications equipment, including $2.0 million for
procurement of spares and replacement equipment for the Senior Scout
tactical reconnaissance aircraft.
The committee is pleased that the Air Force has decided to retain the
Senior Scout reconnaissance capability to augment the high demand/low
density airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
fleets in the reserve component. However, the committee is disturbed
that the Air Force has not added funding to upgrade the Senior Scout to
more effectively interoperate with other ISR aircraft and, more
importantly, the combat aircraft it supports.
Therefore, the committee recommends $13.7 million for intelligence
communications equipment, an increase of $8.2 million for Senior Scout
collection and dissemination upgrades and for the addition of a
deployable ground data reduction system.
Air force/national reconnaissance office (NRO) partnership: -$2.0 million
The budget request contained $3.4 million in PE 63856F for the Air
Force/NRO partnership.
The committee understands that $2.0 million of the funding requested
would be used for studies and analysis of synergies between the Air
Force and the NRO. The committee notes that the Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force, Space, also serves as the director of the NRO. The
committee believes that coordination between the two organizations is
inherently institutionalized, and should be a matter of routine.
The committee recommends $1.4 million in PE 63856F, a reduction of
$2.0 million.
Eagle vision: +$9.5 million
The budget request included no funds for procuring the processing
hardware necessary to complete the Eagle Vision 4 imagery system or to
improve the Eagle Vision imagery ground station's capability to receive
and process new commercial imagery sources.
Eagle Vision is a ground station that receives and processes imagery
from commercial remote sensing satellites. The committee fully supports
the Eagle Vision commercial imagery initiative, which has provided
unique, unclassified imagery support to meet theater and service
requirements that, due to higher priorities, cannot be met by other
technical means. The committee believes that this initiative needs to be
fully funded to continue such support. Further, the committee notes the
recent successful launch and initial operations of Ikonos II, the first
high-resolution U.S. commercial imagery satellite, and that two other
U.S. firms are soon to launch their own high-resolution imagery
satellites. The committee understands that the Eagle Vision ground
station is currently capable of receiving and processing relatively
low-resolution imagery from Canadian and French commercial satellites.
It is, however, not able to process imagery from the higher-resolution
U.S. systems in, or soon to be in orbit.
Therefore, the committee recommends an increase of $5.0 million in
other procurement, Air Force, line 39A, for completing the Eagle Vision
4 processor installation and an increase of $4.5 million in PE 27277F to
integrate into the Eagle Vision ground stations a receive and processing
capability necessary to exploit current and future U.S. commercial
satellite imaging systems.
Special operations tactical video system: +$2.0 million
The budget request contained $3.0 million in PE 116405BB for Special
Operations Forces (SOF) intelligence system developments, including
$100,000 for continued development of the Special Operations Tactical
Video System (SOTVS).
SOTVS is a congressional interest item funded in the fiscal year 2000
budget. The committee notes that no commercial solution to the SOF
underwater camera requirements exists, and that a dedicated research and
development program is necessary to satisfy this critical mission
requirement. Therefore, the committee is dismayed that the budget
request is insufficient to develop and procure a replacement to the
aging cameras currently in the inventory.
The committee recommends an authorization of $5.0 million in this PE,
an increase of $2.0 million to expedite the development of the SOTVS
camera.
SECTION-BY-SECTION OF THE BILL
TITLE I.--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 101--authorization of appropriations
Section 101 lists those elements of the United States Government for
whose intelligence and intelligence-related activities the Act
authorizes appropriations for fiscal year 2001.
Section 102--classified schedule of authorizations
Section 102 incorporates by reference the classified Schedule of
Authorizations. That schedule sets forth the specific amounts authorized
to be appropriated for specific intelligence and intelligence-related
activities and personnel ceilings for fiscal year 2001 for those United
States government elements listed in section 101. The details of the
Schedule are explained in the classified annex to this report. The
Schedule of Authorizations correlates to the President's budget request,
which was submitted to Congress in classified form.
Section 103--personnel ceiling adjustments
Section 103 authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence, with the
approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in
fiscal year 2001, to exceed the personnel ceilings applicable to the
components of the intelligence community under section 102 by an amount
not to exceed two percent of the total of the ceilings otherwise
applicable under section 102. The Director may exercise this authority
only when necessary to the performance of important intelligence
functions. Any exercise of this authority must be reported to the two
intelligence committees of the Congress.
The committee emphasizes that the authority conferred by section 103
is not intended to permit the wholesale raising of personnel strength in
any intelligence component. Rather, the section provides the Director of
Central Intelligence with flexibility to adjust personnel levels
temporarily for contingencies, and for overages caused by an imbalance
between hiring of new employees and attrition of current employees. The
committee does not expect the Director of Central Intelligence to allow
heads of intelligence components to plan to exceed levels set in the
Schedule of Authorizations, except for the satisfaction of clearly
identified hiring needs that are consistent with the authorization of
personnel strengths in this legislation. In no case is this authority to
be used to provide for positions otherwise denied by Congress.
Section 104--intelligence community management account
Section 104 details the amount and composition of the Community
Management Account ("CMA") of the Director of Central Intelligence.
Subsection (a) of section 104 authorizes appropriations in the amount
of $144,231,000 for fiscal year 2001 for the staffing and administration
of various components under the CMA. Subsection (a) also authorizes
funds identified for the Advanced Research and Development Committee and
the Environmental Intelligence and Applications Program to remain
available for two years.
Subsection (b) authorizes 356 full-time personnel for elements within
the CMA for fiscal year 2001 and provides that such personnel may be
permanent employees of the CMA element or detailed from other elements
of the United States Government.
Subsection (c) explicitly authorizes the classified portion of the CMA.
Subsection (d) requires that personnel be detailed on a reimbursable
basis, with certain exceptions.
Subsection (e) authorizes $28,000,000 of the amount authorized for
the CMA under subsection (a) to be made available to the Attorney
General through the DCI for the National Drug Intelligence Center
("NDIC") in Johnstown, Pennsylvania. Subsection (e) requires the
Director of Central Intelligence to transfer the $28,000,000 to the
Department of Justice to be used for NDIC activities under the authority
of the Attorney General, and subject to section 103(d)(1) of the
National Security Act. The NDIC is authorized $1,000,000 more than the
amount authorized for the funding of the NDIC for FY 2000. The Committee
of Conference on the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000
directed that $1,000,000 of the funds authorized to be appropriated to
the Attorney General by the Act be made available to the Judicial Review
Commission on Foreign Asset Control, which was established in section
810 of that Act. (P.L. 106 120). The additional $1,000,000 authorized
for Fiscal Year 2001 is intended to replenish NDIC funding made
available to the Commission.
Section 105--transfer authority of the Director of Central Intelligence
Section 105 amends section 104(d)(1) of the National Security Act of
1947 to authorize the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to transfer
funds appropriated for a program within the National Foreign
Intelligence Program (NFIP) to another such program within the NFIP,
with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget, unless the Secretary of Defense, or other cabinet Secretary who
has an affected Intelligence Community element within his or her
department, submits a written objection to the transfer. The Secretary
of Defense may only delegate responsibility under this provision to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense. The other department heads are not
authorized under this provision to delegate the authority to object to
any such transfer sought by the DCI.
The current section 104(d)(1) limits the DCI's authority to transfer
funds and personnel to transfers where the Secretary or head of the
affected department does not object to such transfer.
The committee understands that in practice Defense Department
officials below the level of Secretary have taken action to block
transfers within the NFIP sought by the DCI. The committee intends to
end this practice and require higher-level involvement in decisions that
countermand the DCI's judgment on funding requirements of NFIP programs.
Just as the Secretary of Defense is limited in delegating any authority
to object to these transfers to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the DCI
is limited in his authority to delegate the transfer request authority
only to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community
Management.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Section 201--authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of $216,000,000
for fiscal year 2001 for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and
Disability Fund.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 301--increase in employee compensation and benefits
authorized by law
Section 301 provides that appropriations authorized by this Act for
salary, pay, retirement and other benefits for federal employees may be
increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary
for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
Section 302--restriction on conduct of intelligence activities
Section 302 provides that the authorization of appropriations within
the Act does not constitute authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity that is precluded by the Constitution or other
laws of the United States.
Section 303--Sense of the Congress regarding intelligence
community contracting
Section 303 expresses the sense of Congress that the DCI should
continue to direct elements of the intelligence community to award
contracts in a manner that would maximize the procurement of products
produced in the United States, when such action is compatible with the
national security interests of the United States, consistent with
operational and security concerns, and fiscally sound.
Section 304--authorization for travel on any common carrier
for certain intelligence collection personnel
Section 304 authorizes the DCI to permit intelligence community
employees, officers, or agents, carrying out intelligence collection
activities to utilize any common carrier, either foreign or domestically
owned or operated, in limited circumstances, when flying directly to or
from the United States on official business. The federal government
currently requires, to the extent practicable, government employees,
officers, or agents, travelling directly to or from the United States to
utilize U.S. owned or operated common carriers for such travel. The
committee has found, however, that from time to time it would reduce the
risk of disclosure of sources and methods of intelligence collection if
the DCI were authorized some flexibility with respect to this otherwise
well-founded requirement. The committee notes that situations arise
where the current requirement, and its inflexible application, create
unnecessary risks for intelligence collection activities, including the
risk of compromise of sources and methods. The committee believes that
the DCI should be given some latitude to maintain or enhance the
security of intelligence collection operations and of the intelligence
collectors by waiving the requirement, on an as needed basis. The
committee expects that such a waiver will not be routine, but that this
provision will be invoked from time to time with positive results.
Section 305--reports on acquisition of technology relating to
weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions
Section 305 amends section 721(a) of the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (P.L. 104 293, 110 Stat. 3474). Section 721(a)
required that an unclassified report on the acquisition of technology
relating to weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional
munitions be submitted to Congress every 6 months. This section would
require a report to be submitted on an annual basis. This will give the
public the benefit of a full year of substantive reporting, rather than
a half year, which sometimes can result in an incomplete view of the
activity. The committee will continue to receive classified briefings
and intelligence reporting on an on-going basis.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Section 401--modifications to Central Intelligence Agency's
Central Services Program
Section 401 permits the deposit into the Central Service Program's
Working Capital Fund of the receipts from the miscellaneous
reimbursements of individuals and the rental of property and equipment
to employees and detailees.
Section 402--technical corrections
Section 402 makes technical amendments to section 17 of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949. Section 402(a) strikes subparagraph (E)
of section 17(d)(1), which directs the CIA Inspector General to report
to the intelligence committees those occasions where his office was
constrained from obtaining documentary evidence during the course of a
CIA IG investigation due to the lack of subpoena authority. The CIA IG
was granted subpoena authority to obtain documentary evidence in the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (P.L.
105-107). Thus, the reporting requirement in subparagraph (E)
has been superceded by subsequent legislation.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 501--three year extension of authority to engage in
commercial activities as security for intelligence collection activities
This section amends section 431(a) of title 10, United States Code,
which expire on December 31, 2000. Section 431(a) permits the Department
of Defense to engage in commercial activities as security for
intelligence collection activities. This section extends this authority
until December 31, 2003.
Section 502--contracting authority for the National
Reconnaissance Office
Section 502 directs the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to
negotiate, write, and manage all future vehicle acquisition or launch
contracts that affect or bind the NRO and to which the United States is
a party.
The committee has been very frustrated with aspects of the NRO's
launch program, particularly with Titan IV production. Consistently,
this program has been excessively over-funded and has resulted in large
amounts of funds available for reprogramming. The committee has had
considerable difficulty holding the organization accountable for better
program planning because the NRO has had launch vehicle and launch
services contracts written and managed by non-NRO contracting offices.
As a result, the NRO does not have sufficient management responsibility
for those contracts to be responsive to congressional concerns, or to
take necessary corrective actions.
The NRO IG recently completed an investigation that identified the
vehicle acquisition and launch services type of contract, and the
relationship between the external contracting office and the NRO, as the
main factors contributing to the over-funding problem. The committee
notes that a re-negotiation of the contract structure is being
considered that would remove a penalty for future launch failures,
despite the NRO IG's recommendation.
Section 502 will require that the NRO contract for vehicle
acquisition and launch services directly with launch service providers.
The committee recognizes the need for the NRO to work closely with
outside contracting offices in many areas, for example, to develop
standard interfaces and quality control process procedures. The
committee believes that NRO's use of external contracting offices to
negotiate, write, and manage vehicle acquisition and launch contracts
does not provide the NRO, nor the committee sufficient insight into the
contracting process. Additionally, more direct control by the NRO over
its vehicle acquisition and launch contracts is expected to increase the
accountability for such projects within the NRO.
COMMITTEE POSITION AND RECORD VOTES TAKEN
On May 10, 2000, in open session, a quorum being present, the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, by a recorded vote of 12
ayes to 0 noes, approved the bill, H.R. 4392, as amended by an amendment
in the nature of a substitute offered by Chairman Goss. By that vote,
the committee ordered the bill reported favorably to the House, with an
amendment. On that vote, the Members present recorded their votes as
follows: Mr. Goss (Chairman)--aye; Mr. McCollum--aye; Mr. Castle--aye;
Mr. Boehlert--aye; Mr. Bass--aye; Mr. Gibbons--aye; Mr. LaHood--aye; Ms.
Wilson--aye; Mr. Dixon--aye; Ms. Pelosi--aye; Mr. Condit--aye; Mr.
Roemer--aye.
During consideration of the bill, Mr. Roemer offered an amendment to
the legislative provisions. The amendment would have directed the
President to disclose annually the aggregate appropriation for the
Intelligence Community for the previous fiscal year. The Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence rejected Mr. Roemer's amendment by a
vote of 5 ayes to 11 noes, a quorum being present. On that vote, the
Members present recorded their votes as follows: Mr. Goss
(Chairman)--no; Mr. Lewis--no; McCollum--no; Mr. Castle--no; Mr.
Boehlert--no; Mr. Bass--no; Mr. Gibbons--no; Mr. LaHood--no; Ms.
Wilson--no; Mr. Dixon--aye; Ms. Pelosi--aye; Mr. Bishop--no; Mr.
Sisisky--no; Mr. Condit--aye; Mr. Roemer--aye; Mr. Hastings--aye.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
With respect to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the House of
Representatives, the committee is not subject to this requirement;
therefore, the committee has not received a report from the Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight pertaining to the subject of this bill.
OVERSIGHT FINDINGS
With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House
of Representatives, the committee held eleven hearings on the classified
budgetary issues raised by H.R. 4392. Testimony was taken from the
Director of Central Intelligence; the Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence for Community Management; the Director of the National
Security Agency; the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Executive Director,
and the Deputy Directors of the Operations, Intelligence,
Administration, Science and Technology Directorates of the Central
Intelligence Agency; the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office;
and the Director of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency; and various
other knowledgeable witnesses from the Department of Defense, the
Department of Justice, and the Department of State regarding the
activities and plans of the intelligence community covered by the
provisions and authorizations, both classified and unclassified, of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001. The bill, as
reported by the committee, reflects conclusions reached by the committee
in light of this oversight activity.
FISCAL YEAR COST PROJECTIONS
The committee has attempted, pursuant to clause 3(d)(2) of rule XIII
of the Rules of the House of Representatives, to ascertain the outlays
that will occur in fiscal year 2001 and the five years following, if the
amounts authorized are appropriated. These estimates are contained in
the classified annex and are in accordance with those of the executive
branch.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATES
In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) and (3) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, and pursuant to sections 308 and 402 of
the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the committee submits the
following estimate prepared by the Congressional Budget Office:
U.S. House of Representatives,
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC,
May 11, 2000.
Mr. Dan L. Crippen,
Director Congressional Budget Office,
Ford House Office Building,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Crippen: In compliance with the Rules of the House of
Representatives, I am writing to request a cost estimate of H.R. 4392,
the "Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001," pursuant to
sections 308 and 403 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. I have
attached a copy of the bill as approved by the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence on May 10, 2000.
As I hope to bring this legislation to the House floor in the very
near term, I would very much appreciate an expedited response to this
request by the CBO's staff. Should you have any questions related to
this request, please contact Patrick B. Murray, the Committee's Chief
Counsel. Thank you in advance for your assistance with this request.
Sincerely,
Porter J. Goss, Chairman.
Attachment.
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC,
May 12, 2000.
Hon. Porter J. Goss,
Chairman,
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the
enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 4392, the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2001.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased to
provide them. The CBO staff contact is Suinta D'Monte.
Sincerely,
Barry B. Anderson
(For Dan L. Crippen, Director).
Enclosure.
H.R. 4392--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001
Summary: H.R. 4392 would authorize appropriations for fiscal year
2001 for intelligence activities of the United States government, the
Intelligence Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability System (CIARDS).
This estimate addresses only the unclassified portion of the bill. On
that limited basis, CBO estimates that implementing the bill would cost
$144 million over the 2001 2005 period, assuming appropriation of the
authorized amounts. The bill would affect direct spending by
insignificant amounts; thus, pay-as-you-go procedures would apply. H.R.
4392 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined
in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) and would not affect the
budgets of state, local, or tribal governments.
Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated budgetary
impact of the unclassified portions of H.R. 4392 is shown in the
following table. CBO cannot obtain the necessary information to estimate
the costs for the entire bill because parts are classified as a level
above clearances held by CBO employees. For purposes of this estimate,
CBO assumes that the bill will be enacted by October 1, 2000, and that
the authorized amounts will be appropriated for fiscal year 2001.
Estimated outlays are based on historical spending patterns. The costs
of this legislation fall within budget function 050 (national defense).
By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION
Spending Under Current Law for Intelligence Community Management: 157 0 0 0 0 0
Proposed Changes: 0 144 0 0 0 0
Spending Under H.R. 4392 for Intelligence Community Management: 157 144 0 0 0 0
\1\The 2000 level is the amount appropriated for that year.
Spending subject to appropriation
The bill would authorize appropriations of $144 million for the
Intelligence Community Management Account, which funds the coordination
of programs, budget oversight, and management of the intelligence
agencies. Section 501 would extend through December 31, 2003, a program
that allows the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to engage in
commercial activities as security for intelligence collection. CBO does
not have the necessary information to estimate the budgetary impact of
this provision.
Direct spending
The bill would authorize $216 million for CIARDS to cover retirement
costs attributable to military service and various unfunded liabilities.
The payment to CIARDS is considered mandatory, and the authorization
under this bill would be the same as assumed in the CBO baseline.
Section 401 would expand a program that authorizes the CIA to provide
goods and services on a reimbursable basis by allowing the agency to
rent property and equipment to its employees and those on detail from
other agencies. CBO estimates that the costs of providing those services
would be offset by the reimbursement and that this provision would have
an insignificant net impact each year and no net budgetary impact over
the long run.
Pay-as-you-go considerations: The Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Act sets up pay-as-you-go procedures for legislation
affecting direct spending or receipts. CBO estimates that the net change
in outlays that are subject to pay-as-you-go procedures would be
insignificant for each year.
Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: H.R. 4392 contains no
intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in UMRA and
would not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments.
Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Sunita D'Monte; Impact on State,
Local, and Tribal Governments: Leo Lex; and Impact on the Private
Sector: Eric Labs.
Estimate approved by: Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant Director
for Budget Analysis.
COMMITTEE COST ESTIMATES
The committee agrees with the estimate of the Congressional Budget
Office.
SPECIFIC CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY FOR CONGRESSIONAL ENACTMENT OF THIS
LEGISLATION
The intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United
States government are carried out to support the national security
interests of the United States, to support and assist the armed forces
of the United States, and to support the President in the execution of
the foreign policy of the United States. Article I, section 8, of the
Constitution of the United States provides, in pertinent part, that
"Congress shall have power * * * to pay the debts and provide for the
common defence and general welfare of the United States; * * *"; "to
raise and support Armies, * * *" "to provide and maintain a Navy; * *
*" and "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution * * * all other powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof." Therefore, pursuant to such authority,
Congress is empowered to enact this legislation.
CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House
of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as
reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is
enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italic, existing
law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman):
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Sec. 2. Declaration of policy.
* * * * * * *
TITLE I--COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
Sec. 101. National Security Council.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 116. Travel on any common carrier for certain intelligence
collection personnel.
* * * * * * *
TITLE I--COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
* * * * * * *
AUTHORITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Sec. 104. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(d) Transfer of Funds or Personnel Within the National Foreign
Intelligence Program.--(1) (A) In addition to any other authorities
available under law for such purposes, the Director of Central
Intelligence, with the approval of the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, may transfer funds appropriated for a program
within the National Foreign Intelligence Program to another such program
and, in accordance with procedures to be developed by the Director and
the heads of affected departments and agencies, may transfer personnel
authorized for an element of the intelligence community to another such
element for periods up to a year.
(B) The Director may only delegate any duty or authority given the
Director under this subsection to the Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence for Community Management.
(2) (A) A transfer of funds or personnel may be made under this
subsection only if--
(A) (i) the funds or personnel are being transferred to an activity
that is a higher priority intelligence activity;
(B) (ii) the need for funds or personnel for such activity is based
on unforeseen requirements;
(C) (iii) the transfer does not involve a transfer of funds to the
Reserve for Contingencies of the Central 7EIntelligence Agency;
(D) (iv) the transfer does not involve a transfer of funds or
personnel from the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and
(E)] (v) the Secretary or head subject to subparagraph (B), the
Secretary or head of the department which contains the affected element
or elements of the intelligence community does not object to such
transfer.
(B)(i) Except as provided in clause (ii), the authority to object to
a transfer under subparagraph (A)(v) may not be delegated by the
Secretary or head of the department involved.
(ii) With respect to the Department of Defense, the authority to
object to such a transfer may be delegated by the Secretary of Defense,
but only to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.
(iii) An objection to a transfer under subparagraph (A)(v) shall have
no effect unless submitted to the Director of Central Intelligence in
writing.
* * * * * * *
TRAVEL ON ANY COMMON CARRIER FOR CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
PERSONNEL
Sec. 116. (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, the Director of Central Intelligence may authorize travel on any
common carrier that, in the discretion of the Director, would by its use
maintain or enhance the protection of sources or methods of intelligence
collection or maintain or enhance the security of personnel of the
intelligence community carrying out intelligence collection activities.
(b) Authorized Delegation of Duty.--The Director may only delegate
the authority granted by this section to the Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence, or with respect to employees of the Central Intelligence
Agency the Director may delegate such authority to the Deputy Director
for Operations.
* * * * * * *
SECTION 721 OF THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997
SEC. 721. REPORTS ON ACQUISITION OF TECHNOLOGY RELATING TO
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS.
(a) Reports.--Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment
of this Act, and every 6 months thereafter, Not later than March 1,
2001, and every March 1 thereafter, the Director of Central Intelligence
shall submit to Congress a report on--
(1) the acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 6
months year of dual-use and other technology useful for the development
or production of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons,
chemical weapons, and biological weapons) and advanced conventional
munitions; and
(2) trends in the acquisition of such technology by such countries.
* * * * * * *
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949
* * * * * * *
SEC. 17. INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE AGENCY.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(d) Semiannual Reports; Immediate Reports of Serious or Flagrant
Problems; Reports of Functional Problems; Reports to Congress on Urgent
Concerns.--(1) The Inspector General shall, not later than January 31
and July 31 of each year, prepare and submit to the Director of Central
Intelligence a classified semiannual report summarizing the activities
of the Office during the immediately preceding six-month periods ending
December 31 (of the preceding year) and June 30, respectively. Within
thirty days of receipt of such reports, the Director shall transmit such
reports to the intelligence committees with any comments he may deem
appropriate. Such reports shall, at a minimum, include a list of the
title or subject of each inspection, investigation, or audit conducted
during the reporting period and--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(D) a certification that the Inspector General has had full and
direct access to all information relevant to the performance of his
functions; and
(E) a description of all cases occurring during the reporting period
where the Inspector General could not obtain documentary evidence
relevant to any inspection, audit, or
authority to subpoena such information; and
(F) (E) such recommendations as the Inspector General may wish to
make concerning legislation to promote economy and efficiency in the
administration of programs and operations undertaken by the Agency, and
to detect and eliminate fraud and abuse in such programs and operations.
* * * * * * *
(e) Authorities of the Inspector General.--(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(8) Subject to the concurrence of the Director, the Inspector General
may request such information or assistance as may be necessary for
carrying out his duties and responsibilities from any Federal Government
agency. Upon request of the Inspector General for such information or
assistance, the head of the Federal Government agency involved shall,
insofar as is practicable and not in contravention of any existing
statutory restriction or regulation of the Federal Government agency
concerned, furnish to the Inspector General, or to an authorized
designee, such information or assistance.
* * * * * * *
CENTRAL SERVICES PROGRAM
Sec. 21. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(c) Central Services Working Capital Fund.--(1) There is established
a fund to be known as the Central Services Working Capital Fund (in this
section referred to as the "Fund"). The purpose of the Fund is to
provide sums for activities under the program.
(2) There shall be deposited in the Fund the following:
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(F) Receipts from miscellaneous reimbursements from individuals and
receipts from the rental of property and equipment to employees and
detailees.
(F) (G) Such other amounts as the Director is authorized to deposit
in or transfer to the Fund.
* * * * * * *
SECTION 431 OF TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE
431. Authority to engage in commercial activities as security
for intelligence collection activities
(a) Authority.--The Secretary of Defense, subject to the provisions
of this subchapter, may authorize the conduct of those commercial
activities necessary to provide security for authorized intelligence
collection activities abroad undertaken by the Department of Defense. No
commercial activity may be initiated pursuant to this subchapter after
December 31, 2000 December 31, 2003.
* * * * * * *
