S. Hrg. 106-880
IRANIAN WEAPONS PROGRAMS: THE RUSSIAN CONNECTION
=======================================================================
HEARING AND PUBLIC MEETING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 5, 2000
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
69-750 WASHINGTON : 2001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri BARBARA BOXER, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas, Chairman
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon, Chairman
RICHARD LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
American Jewish Committee's, June 2000 report entitled ``Iran and
Weapons of Mass Destruction''.................................. 30
Brownback, Hon. Sam, U.S. Senator from Kansas, news release...... 3
Einhorn, Hon. Robert J., Assistant Secretary of State for
Nonproliferation, Department of State, Washington, DC.......... 14
Prepared statement........................................... 18
Lauder, John A., Director, DCI Nonproliferation Center, Central
Intelligence Agency............................................ 9
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Smith, Hon. Gordon H., U.S. Senator from Oregon, prepared
statement...................................................... 7
(iii)
IRANIAN WEAPONS PROGRAMS: THE RUSSIAN CONNECTION
----------
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 5, 2000
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs, and
Subcommittee on European Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 11:07 a.m. in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam Brownback
(chairman of the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs) presiding and Hon. Gordon H. Smith (chairman of the
Subcommittee on European Affairs) presiding.
Present: Senators Brownback and Smith.
Senator Brownback. The hearing will come to order. Welcome.
Assistant Secretary Einhorn, welcome. Mr. Lauder, welcome.
Delighted to have you here. It is a pleasure to have both of
you here to testify in front of this joint hearing of the Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs and European Affairs
Subcommittees.
We are here today to discuss Iran's continuing aggressive
efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction. Although the
Clinton-Gore administration is in the midst of a charm
offensive toward Iran, going so far as to grant a visa for the
Iranian Foreign Minister to tour American college campuses last
month, it is obvious to most of us that Iran remains a danger
to the world and to its own people. For those of you looking
for evidence, ten Jews are languishing in Iranian prisons as I
speak on false charges, probably still praying that the world's
greatest democracy cares enough to do something for them.
On March 14 of this year, President Clinton signed the Iran
Nonproliferation Act of 2000. Now, I assume, perhaps
incorrectly, that when a President signs a bill into law he
intends to carry out the terms of that bill. Accordingly,
Congress was to receive a report on foreign entities or persons
that provide assistance to Iran's missile and nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons programs on June 12 of this
year. That report never came.
A second report was due on September 14. It too never came.
One reason why: The State Department did not even bother to ask
the CIA for the relevant documents for the report until the
third week of May, 3 weeks before the first report was due and
a full 2\1/2\ months after the President signed the bill into
law.
But perhaps the administration's lack of urgency relates to
improvements on the Iran proliferation front. Mr. Einhorn, has
WMD proliferation to Iran ended, will be a key point and
question that I will want to hear from you. All the evidence
that I see suggests to the contrary. Transfers to Iran from the
very countries with whom this act is concerned, Russia in
particular, continue unabated.
Just last month, Tehran again test fired its Shahab-3
missile. That missile would be sitting in a box somewhere if it
was not for the assistance of Russia to Iran.
To my mind, we are facing a major crisis in the coming
years and responsibility can largely be laid at the feet of
this administration. In 1993 the Clinton administration turned
the Nation's Russian policy over to Vice President Al Gore, who
set up a commission with Victor Chernomyrdin, then the Russian
Vice Premier. This so-called GCC was supposedly the place where
U.S. concerns over Russian proliferation were to be resolved.
Let us take, for example, the matter of Russia's massive
arming of Iran with advanced conventional weaponry, which began
in earnest in 1992. In June 1995, Vice President Al Gore
negotiated a deal with the Russians supposedly to bring this
trade to a halt. In exchange for Russia's pledge not to
conclude any new contracts, the United States let Russia into
the Wassenaar Arrangement, changed U.S. regulations to allow
U.S. defense contractors and satellite companies to do business
with Russian firms, and pledged to avoid any sanctions that
would upset this relationship. In other words, because of this
deal that was struck by Vice President Gore Russia is eligible
for all sorts of defense cooperation. Indeed, according to
recent State Department estimates, Russia has made $7.7 billion
over the past few years just from launching U.S. satellites.
It really should not have come as any surprise to anyone
that, despite the 1995 agreement, Russia continued to sell
advanced conventional weapons to Iran. Indeed, the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency in their most recent
proliferation report stated: ``Russia, along with its sister
republics in the FSU, also remains an important source of
conventional weapons and spare parts for Iran.''
Then of course there are the ineffectual efforts by this
administration to terminate Russia's nuclear cooperation with
Iran. Despite all sorts of pledges by Russia not to go beyond
limited construction at the Bushehr facility, recent press
accounts indicate that Russia is now engaging in the sale of
sophisticated laser technology that will speed Iran's ability
to enrich nuclear materials from weapons.
Russia is doing this despite its promise made under the
Nonproliferation Treaty not to assist foreign nations in
acquiring nuclear weapons. Russia is doing it despite all
manner of pledges to Vice President Gore and despite the fact
that it is receiving hundreds of millions of dollars of foreign
aid from programs run by the Department of Energy and the
Department of State.
We all remember the administration's efforts from 1998 to
1999 to prevent the Senate from approving the Iran
Nonproliferation Act. Various officials assured Senators time
and again that Russia had turned the corner or that President
Yeltsin had issued a critical directive or that the Duma would
soon consider changes to export laws to solve these
proliferation problems.
But looking back over the past 8 years, the truth of the
matter is that this administration has not solved the
proliferation problem. The problem has grown decidedly worse,
and the world is a far more dangerous place because of that.
The next administration will inherit a diplomatic situation
chockful of broken promises and a commercial situation where
Russian companies are profiting not only from the multi-billion
dollar trade with the United States, but are doing a healthy
business with the Iranians on the side.
Mr. Einhorn, I look forward to hearing you tell me that I
am wrong on these matters, that the Iranian proliferation
problem has abated, and that the reason our reports are not
here is that you have nothing to report. I look forward to that
testimony and to hearing what is taking place with these
reports and in this proliferation area.
[A news release of Senator Brownback follows:]
News Release--For Immediate Release October 5, 2000
Sam Brownback U.S. Senator from Kansas
GORE-RUSSIA-IRAN ARMS CONNECTION TROUBLING
Washington.--Vice President Al Gore's connection to arms from
Russia to Iran was a topic of concern today at a Senate Foreign
Relations joint subcommittee hearing, U.S. Senator Sam Brownback said.
Brownback's statement follows.
``We are facing a major crisis in the coming years, and
responsibility can largely be laid at the feet of this
Administration,'' Brownback said. ``In 1993, the Clinton Administration
turned the nation's Russia policy over to Al Gore, who set up a
Commission with Victor Chernomyrdin (then the Russian Vice Premier).
This so-called ``GCC'' was supposedly the place where U.S. concerns
over Russian proliferation were to be resolved.
``Let us take for example the matter of Russia's massive arming of
Iran with advanced conventional weaponry, which began in earnest in
1992. In June, 1995, Al Gore negotiated a deal with the Russians
supposedly to bring this trade to a halt. In exchange for Russia's
pledge not to conclude any new contracts, the United States let Russia
into the Waasenaar Arrangement, changed U.S. regulations to allow U.S.
defense contractors and satellite companies to do business with Russian
firms, and pledged to avoid any sanctions that would upset this
relationship. In other words, because of this deal that was struck by
Vice President Gore, Russia is eligible for all sorts of defense
cooperation. Indeed, according to recent State Department estimates,
Russia has made $7.7 billion over the past few years just from
launching U.S. satellites.
``Despite the 1995 agreement, Russia continued to sell advanced
conventional weapons to Iran. Indeed, the Director of Central
Intelligence's most recent proliferation report states: `Russia (along
with its sister republics in the FSU) also remains an important source
of conventional weapons and spare parts for Iran . . .'
``Then, of course, there are the ineffectual efforts by this
administration to terminate Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran.
Despite all sorts of pledges by Russia not to go beyond limited
construction at the Bushehr facility, recent press accounts indicate
that Russia is now engaging in the sale of sophisticated laser
technology that will speed Iran's ability to enrich nuclear material
for weapons. Russia is doing this despite its promises made under the
Nonproliferation Treaty not to assist foreign nations in acquiring
nuclear weapons.
``Russia is doing it despite all manner of pledges to Vice
President Gore, and despite the fact that it is receiving hundreds of
millions of dollars in foreign aid from programs run by the Department
of Energy and the Department of State.
``We all remember the administration's efforts from 1998 to 1999 to
prevent the Senate from approving the Iran Nonproliferation Act.
Various officials assured Senators, time and again, that Russia had
`turned the corner', or that President Yeltsin had issued a critical
directive, or that the Duma would soon consider changes to export laws
to solve the proliferation problem.
``But--looking back over the past eight years--the truth of the
matter is that this administration has not solved the proliferation
problem. The problem has grown decidedly worse, and because of that the
world is a far more dangerous place.
``The next administration will inherit a diplomatic situation
chock-full of broken promises, and a commercial situation where Russian
companies are profiting not only from multi-billion dollar trade with
the U.S., but are doing a healthy business with the Iranians on the
side.
``Although the Clinton-Gore Administration is in the midst of a
charm offensive toward Iran--going so far as to grant a visa for the
Iranian Foreign Minister to tour American college campuses last month--
it is obvious to most of us that Iran remains a danger to the world,
and to its own people. And for those of you looking for evidence: ten
Jews are languishing in Iranian prisons on false charges, probably
still praying that the world's greatest democracy cares enough to do
something for them.
``On March 14 of this year, President Clinton signed the Iran
Nonproliferation Act of 2000. Now I assume, perhaps incorrectly, that
when a President signs a bill into law, he intends to carry out the
terms of that law. Accordingly, Congress was due to receive a report on
foreign entities or persons that provide assistance to Iran's missile
and nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs on June 12 of
this year. It never came.
``A second report was due on September 14. It too never came. One
reason it didn't--the State Department did not even bother to ask the
CIA for the relevant documents for the report until the third week of
May, three weeks before the first report was due, and a full two-and-a-
half months after the President signed the bill into law.
``Transfers to Iran from the very countries with whom this Act is
concerned, Russia in particular, continue unabated. Just last month,
Tehran again test-fired its Shahab-3 missile. That missile would be
sitting in a box somewhere if it weren't for Russian aid to Iran.
``Perhaps the administration's lack of urgency relates to
improvements on the Iran proliferation front. All the evidence I see
suggests the contrary,'' Brownback said.
Today's hearing was a Senate Foreign Relations Committee joint
subcommittee hearing. Senator Brownback is Chairman of the Subcommittee
on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. Senator Gordon Smith is
Chairman of the Subcommittee on European Affairs.
Senator Brownback. We will first hear from Mr. Lauder and
his testimony and then to Mr. Einhorn. First, though, I want to
turn the microphone over to the co-chair of this hearing, Mr.
Smith, who heads the Subcommittee on European Affairs.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Senator Brownback, for taking the
initiative to hold this hearing on Russia's role in Iran's
weapons program. I am grateful we are conducting this hearing
as a joint session of your subcommittee and my own.
I would like to also welcome Bob Einhorn and John Lauder,
to welcome you both. These gentlemen are the point men of our
Government's efforts to curb the proliferation of destructive
weapons technologies. In addition to Assistant Secretary
Einhorn and Mr. Lauder's testimonies, I want to thank the
American Jewish Committee for its vigilance on this issue. The
AJC has provided the Foreign Relations Committee with copies of
the June 2000 report ``Iran and Weapons of Mass Destruction.''
I would like to ask that this report in its entirety be
submitted for the record and thank the American Jewish
Committee for its efforts.
Senator Brownback. Without objection.
[The report referred to begins on page 30:]
Senator Smith. There are few issues of more pressing
concern than the Government of Iran's vehement anti-Western
policy. Its support for international terrorist organizations
and its sustained efforts to develop and deploy weapons of even
greater reach and destructiveness is unbelievable. But I do not
believe that this is the wish of the Iranian people, whose rich
history at one time included a close and warm relationship with
America.
I am hopeful that the recent profound and far-reaching
changes that we have been witnessing in Iran will open the
barriers the Iranian Government imposed upon that partnership
that once existed between our countries. However, despite our
hope that Iran's internal dynamics will yield a change in our
two countries' relationships, we cannot yet be confident that
these dynamics will generate a significant change in Iran's
conduct abroad in the foreseeable future.
The unfortunate reality today is that Tehran adamantly
opposes the U.S.-led Middle East peace process and toward that
end provides material and financial support to Hezbollah,
Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other violent,
radical Islamic groups. For these and other activities, Iran
has been identified by the Department of State as the most
active state sponsor of terrorism.
The urgency of the threat posed by Iran's foreign policy
has been increased exponentially by Tehran's efforts to develop
and deploy missiles of increasing range and accuracy and its
efforts to complement that offensive capacity with the full
spectrum of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. Just
this last summer, Iran successfully tested the 800-mile Shahab-
3 missile, the same missile that paraded through Tehran not too
long ago on a carrier emblazoned with the inscription ``Israel
should be wiped off the map''--a phrase that underscores Iran's
destabilizing role in that part of the world.
But these programs could soon directly affect our own
security. Iran is in the latter stages of developing a 1,200-
mile range Shahab-4 missile and other ICBM's of potentially
even greater range. This past March, CIA Director George Tenet
testified that in the next few years Iran's ICBM's will
probably be able to reach the United States.
As the title of this hearing suggests, the progress Iran
has made in developing its military capabilities has not been
without outside support. Far from it, the fact is that the
Iranian military has benefited greatly from foreign suppliers,
and among these Russia has been second to none. Russian
equipment, training, technology, and know-how permeate the
entire Iranian military. The Iranian army is equipped with
modern Russian tanks and Russian air defense systems. The
Iranian navy deploys a Russian diesel submarine. In January
Iran began to mass produce the Russian-developed Konkurs anti-
tank missile.
Experts predict that Russia will provide Iran some $4
billion in military equipment in the coming years. Equally
disturbing has been the assistance Russia has provided Iran's
missile programs. According to the administration's latest
unclassified report to Congress on the Acquisition of
Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced
Conventional Munitions--this report is dated the 1st of July
through the 31st of December 1999: ``Russian entities during
the 6 months of 1999 have provided substantial missile-related
technology, training, and expertise to Iran that almost
certainly will continue to accelerate Iranian efforts to
develop new ballistic missile systems.''
On top of helping Iran obtain advanced conventional
weaponry, Russia has been a significant source of assistance to
Russia's WMD program. The symbol of that cooperation are the
power plants at Bushehr, where Russia is building two nuclear
reactors, and Moscow seeks to expand that cooperation. Moscow
and Tehran are considering the construction of three more
facilities that are potentially capable of producing weapons-
grade plutonium.
More recently, the press reported that Moscow agreed to
send tritium gas to the Nuclear Research Center in Tehran.
Tritium gas is primarily used to enhance the explosive power of
nuclear warheads. Now there are indications that Russia is
pursuing the sale of laser-enriched technology to Iran which
could be used to make higher grades of nuclear material.
Let us not forget the fact that Iran will spend close to $1
billion on the Bushehr nuclear power plant, an expenditure by a
country that both faces financial difficulty, yet is awash in
oil. Clearly, Russia cannot be blind to the fact that Bushehr
is not tied to Iran's energy needs, but is instead a
cornerstone to its efforts to develop, manufacture, and deploy
nuclear weapons.
This sustained and lethal relationship between Russia and
Iran has not gone unnoticed in Congress. Curbing this
relationship has been a longstanding bipartisan foreign policy
priority on the Hill. In the 105th Congress we passed the Iran
Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act that would have denied U.S.
Government assistance to those who assist Iran's ballistic
missile program. Unfortunately, this bill, sponsored by
Senators Lott and Lieberman, was vetoed by the Clinton-Gore
administration.
Congress did pass and the President did sign the Iran
Nonproliferation Act last March. It authorizes, as opposed to
mandating, the President to impose such sanctions against those
sharing these technologies with Iran. The point of these two
bills, which passed with overwhelming margins, is clear:
Curbing Russia's support of Iran's weapons programs should be a
top priority of U.S. policy. The Kremlin's refusal to curb this
relationship should prompt a substantive change in how the
United States engages Russia.
To date the administration has treated this Iranian-Russian
technology cooperation not as a policy priority, but as a
nuisance to its own strategy of engaging the Government of the
Russian Federation. As a result, the administration's response
to Russia's cooperation with Iran has been more symbolic than
substantive, a fact clearly evident to the Kremlin.
As I mentioned, the administration reported that during the
first half of 1999 Russia was a major supplier of missile
technology to Iran. There is ample evidence today that this
cooperation continues, and Russia recently agreed to provide
Iran technologies and materials that Tehran can use to further
its development of nuclear weapons.
What has been the Iran response? It is true that the
administration sanctioned the specific Russian institutes and
companies known to have been the most immediate source of
technology obtained by Iran, and it is true that this has
denied these specific entities access to U.S. assistance and
cooperation. However, at the same time, the administration
expanded both the depth and breadth of U.S.-Russian cooperation
involving sensitive missile and space technology. Over the last
year it expanded U.S.-Russia space cooperation involving
technology-sharing and assistance dollars.
There is great concern about the possibility of technology
sharing in this area. It is a mistake for the administration to
conclude that one can draw a clear line between the Russian
Government and these Russian so-called entities that have been
the direct source of dangerous technologies given to Iran. Such
an inference reflects a naive understanding, I believe, of the
economic and political power in Russia today.
As we approach an important Presidential election, now is
the appropriate time to evaluate, refine, and if necessary
restructure how our Government approaches the challenges and
dangers consequent to Russia's role in Iran's missile and WMD
programs. The track record clearly indicates that our current
strategy has not sufficiently convinced the Government of the
Russian Federation to curb the flow of its dangerous weapons
and technologies to Iran and, for that matter, to other states
whose policies jeopardize American national security interests.
Again I thank our witnesses, Bob and John, for appearing
before us today. I am interested in your evaluation of what
role Russia plays in Iran's weapons program, the role that it
likely is to play in the foreseeable future, and what the
United States can do to more effectively curb this lethal
partnership.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Smith follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Gordon Smith
Thank you, Senator Brownback, for taking the initiative to hold
this hearing on Russia's role in Iran's weapons programs. I am grateful
that we are conducting this hearing as a joint session of my
Subcommittee on European Affairs and your Subcommittee on Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs.
Ambassador Einhorn, Mr. Lauder, I welcome you as a friend and,
respectively, as our Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation
and our Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for
Non-Proliferation. These gentlemen are the point-men of our
government's effort to curb the proliferation of destructive weapons
technologies.
In addition to Ambassador Einhorn's and Mr. Lauder's testimonies, I
want to thank the American Jewish Committee for its vigilance on this
issue. The AJC has provided the Foreign Relations Committee with copies
of the June 2000 report, ``Iran and Weapons of Mass Destruction.''
There are few issues of greater pressing national security concern
than the Government of Iran's vehemently anti-Western policy, its
support for international terrorist organizations, and its sustained
efforts to develop and deploy weapons of ever greater reach and
destructiveness. I do not believe that this is the wish of the Iranian
people, whose rich history at one time included a close and warm
relationship with America. I am hopeful that the recent profound and
far-reaching changes we may be witnessing in Iran today will open the
barriers the Iranian Government imposed upon that partnership.
However, despite our hope that Iran's internal dynamics will yield
a change in our two countries' relationship, we cannot yet be confident
that these dynamics will generate a significant change in Iran's
conduct abroad in the foreseeable future. The unfortunate reality today
is that Tehran adamantly opposes the U.S.-led Middle East peace process
and, toward that end, provides material and fmancial support to
Hizballah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other violent, radical
Islamic groups.
For these and other activities, Iran has been identified by the
Department of State as ``THE'' most active state sponsor of terrorism.
The urgency of the threat posed by Iran's foreign policy has been
increased exponentially by Tehran's efforts to develop and deploy
missiles of increasing range and accuracy and its efforts to complement
that offensive capacity with the full spectrum of chemical, biological,
and nuclear weapons. Just this last summer, Iran successfully tested
the 800 mile Shahab-3 missile--the same missile it paraded through
Tehran not too long-ago on a carrier emblazoned with the inscription
``Israel should be wiped off the map''--a phrase that underscores
Iran's destabilizing role in that part of the world.
But these programs could soon directly affect our own security.
Iran is in the latter stages of developing a 1,200-mile range Shahab-4
missile and other ICBMs of potentially even greater ranges. This past
March, CIA Director George Tenet testified that in the next few years
Iran's ICBMs will probably be able to reach the United States.
As the title of this hearing suggests, the progress Iran has made
in developing its military capabilities has not been without outside
support. Far from it. The fact is that the Iranian military has
benefitted greatly from foreign suppliers--and, among these, Russia has
been second-to-none. Russian equipment, training, technology, and know-
how permeate the entire Iranian military. The Iranian army is equipped
with modern Russian tanks and Russian air defense systems. The Iranian
navy deploys Russian diesel submarines.
In January, Iran began to mass produce the Russian developed
Konkurs anti-tank missile. Experts predict that Russia will provide
Iran some $4 billion in military equipment in the coming years. Equally
disturbing has been the assistance Russia has provided Iran's missile
programs. According to the Administration's latest Unclassified Report
to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of
Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions. 1 July Through 31
December 1999:
Russian entities during the second six months of 1999 have
provided substantial missile related technology, training, and
expertise to Iran that almost certainly will continue to
accelerate Iranian efforts to develop new ballistic missile
systems.
On top of helping Iran attain advanced conventional weaponry,
Russia has been a significant source of assistance to Iran's WMD
programs. The symbol of that cooperation are the powerplants at Bushehr
where Russia is building two nuclear reactors--and Moscow seeks to
expand that cooperation. Moscow and Tehran are considering the
construction of three more facilities that are potentially capable of
producing weapons-grade plutonium.
More recently, the press reported that Moscow agreed to send
tritium gas to a nuclear research center in Tehran. Tritium gas is
primarily used to enhance the explosive power of nuclear warheads. And,
now there are indications that Russia is pursuing the sale of laser
enrichment technology to Iran which can be used to make grade nuclear
material.
Let us not forget the fact that Iran will spend close to $1 billion
on the Bushehr nuclear power plant--an expenditure by a country that
both faces financial difficulty, yet is awash in oil. Clearly, Russia
cannot be blind to the fact that Bushehr is not tied to Iran's energy
needs but is instead a cornerstone to its efforts to develop,
manufacture, and deploy nuclear weapons. This sustained and lethal
relationship between Russia and Iran has not gone unnoticed in
Congress. Curbing this relationship has been a long-standing, bi-
partisan foreign policy priority here on the Hill.
The 105th Congress passed the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions
Act that would have denied U.S. Government assistance to those who
assist Iran's ballistic missile program. Unfortunately, this bill
sponsored by Senators Lott and Lieberman, was vetoed by the
Administration. Congress did pass and the President did sign the Iran
Nonproliferation Act last March. It authorizes, as opposed to mandates,
the President to impose such sanctions against those sharing these
technologies with Iran.
The point of these two bills, which passed with overwhelming
margins, is clear. Curbing Russia's support of Iran's weapons programs
should be a top priority of U.S. policy. The Kremlin's refusal to curb
this relationship should prompt a substantive change in how the United
States engages Russia.
To date, the Administration has treated this Iranian-Russian
technology cooperation not as a policy priority, but as a nuisance to
its own strategy of engaging the Government of the Russian Federation.
As a result, the Administration's response to Russia's cooperation with
Iran has been more symbolic than substantive, a fact clearly evident to
the Kremlin.
As I mentioned, the Administration reported that during the first
half of 1999, Russia was a major supplier of missile technology to
Iran. There is ample evidence that this cooperation continues today,
and Russia recently agreed to provide Iran technologies and materials
that Tehran can use to further its development of nuclear weapons. What
has been the U.S. response?
It is true that the administration sanctioned the specific Russian
institutes and companies known to have been the most immediate source
of technology attained by Iran. And it is true that this has denied
these specific entities access to U.S. assistance and cooperation.
However, at the same time, the Administration expanded both the depth
and breadth of U.S.-Russian cooperation involving sensitive missile and
space technology. Over the last year it expanded U.S.-Russia space
cooperation involving technology sharing and assistance dollars. There
is great concern about the possibility of technology sharing in this
area.
It is a mistake for the Administration to conclude that one can
draw a clear line between the Russian Government and these Russian so-
called ``entities'' that have been the direct source of dangerous
technologies to Iran. Such an inference reflects a naive understanding
of economic and political power in Russia today.
As we approach an important Presidential election, now is the
appropriate time to evaluate, refine and, if necessary, restructure how
our Government approaches the challenges and dangers consequent to
Russia's role in Iran's missile and WMD programs. The track record
clearly indicates that our current strategy has not sufficiently
convinced the Government of the Russian Federation to curb the flow of
its dangerous weapons technologies to Iran and, for that matter, to
other states whose policies jeopardize American national security
interests.
I thank our witnesses for appearing before us today. I am
interested in your evaluation of what role Russia plays in Iran's
weapons programs, the role it is likely to play in the foreseeable
future, and what the United States can do to more effectively curb this
lethal partnership.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Senator Smith.
I have been told that there is objection to hearings going
forward, that the Democrats have objected after 11:30. So at
11:30 we will need to turn the transcriber off, not transcribe,
and we will take--we will go from a hearing to a public
meeting, and we will have a videotape and be able to take the
record from that. So I want to inform all present about that.
Mr. Lauder, thank you very much for joining us and I look
forward to your testimony. The floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF JOHN LAUDER, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NONPROLIFERATION, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY
Mr. Lauder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Chairman, thank
you for inviting us to testify on this important topic.
As you both noted in your opening statements, Iran has
ambitious development programs for missiles and weapons of mass
destruction. Iran is seeking technologies related to missiles,
as well as technology related to nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons, from a number of foreign sources. The
development of these weapons in Iran and the extent to which
foreign assistance is advancing Iranian weapons programs are
among our toughest intelligence challenges and among our
highest priorities in the intelligence community.
In my testimony today I will provide a summary of Russian
assistance to Iran's weapons of mass destruction programs and
its ballistic missile delivery systems. The Iranians regard
these programs and the assistance to them as among their
highest state secrets and go to great lengths to hide them from
us. As a result, our knowledge of these programs is based on
extremely sensitive intelligence sources and methods, and this
precludes me from providing many details in this open session.
But I hope the summary itself will be of use to the committee,
and we will continue to keep the committee informed of
additional details in classified briefings.
I would like to begin with a few comments on Iran's nuclear
power and nuclear weapons programs. The intelligence community
judges that Iran is actively pursuing the acquisition of
fissile material and the expertise and technology necessary to
form that material into nuclear weapons. As part of this
process, Iran is attempting to develop the capability to
produce both plutonium and highly enriched uranium.
Iran is seeking nuclear-related equipment, material, and
technical assistance from a variety of foreign sources, most
notably in Russia. Tehran claims that it seeks foreign
assistance to master nuclear technology for civilian research
and nuclear energy programs. However, the expertise and
technology gained, along with the contacts established, could
be used to advance Iran's nuclear weapons effort.
Work continues on the construction of a 1,000-megawatt
nuclear power reactor at Bushehr that will be subject to
International Atomic Energy safeguards. This project will not
directly support a weapons effort, but it affords Iran broad
access to Russia's nuclear industry.
Russian entities are interacting with Iranian nuclear
research centers on a wide variety of activities beyond the
Bushehr project. Many of these projects, ostensibly for
civilian nuclear uses, have direct application to the
production of weapons-grade fissile material, and the United
States has levied trade restrictions against two Russian
entities for providing nuclear assistance to Iran.
I would like to touch briefly on assistance by Russian
entities to Iran that could contribute to Tehran's chemical
warfare program. Iran launched its offensive chemical warfare
program or CW program in the early 1980's in response to
Baghdad's use of CW during the Iran-Iraq War. We believe the
program remains active despite Tehran's decision to ratify the
Chemical Weapons Convention.
Iran has a large and growing CW production capacity and
already has produced a number of CW agents, including nerve,
blister, choking, and blood agents. We believe it possesses a
stockpile of at least several thousand metric tons of
weaponized and bulk agent. Tehran's goals for its CW program
for the past decade have been to expand its production
capability and stockpile, reach self-sufficiency by acquiring
the means to manufacture chemical production equipment and
precursors, and diversify its CW arsenal by producing more
sophisticated and lethal agents and munitions.
Numerous Russian entities have been providing Iran with
dual use industrial chemicals, equipment, and chemical
production technology that could be diverted to Tehran's
offensive CW program. In 1999, for example, Russian entities
provided production technology, training, and expertise that
Iran could use to create a more advanced and self-sufficient CW
infrastructure.
Turning now to Iran's biotechnology programs. Iran is
pursuing both civilian biotech activities and a biological
warfare [BW] program. Assistance by Russian activities to the
former, the biotech activities, could further Iran's pursuit of
biotechnology for military applications. Iran's biological
weapons program or warfare program was initiated in the 1980's
during the Iran-Iraq War. The program is in the late stages of
research and development, but we believe Iran already holds
some stocks of biological agents and weapons.
Tehran probably has investigated both toxins and live
organisms as BW agents and for BW dissemination could use many
of the same delivery systems, such as artillery and aerial
bombs, that it has in its CW inventory. Iran has the technical
infrastructure to support a significant BW program. It conducts
top-notch legitimate biomedical research at various institutes,
which we suspect also provide support to the BW program.
Iran is seeking expertise and technology from Russian
entities that could advance Tehran's biological warfare effort.
Russia has several government to government agreements with
Iran in a variety of scientific and technical fields. Because
of the dual use nature of much of this technology, Tehran can
exploit these agreements to procure equipment and expertise
that could be diverted to its BW effort.
Turning finally to missiles, Iran's ballistic missile
program is one of the largest in the Middle East. Tehran
already has deployed hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles
covering most of Iraq and many strategic targets in the Persian
Gulf. It is developing and may soon deploy the 1,300-kilometer
range Shahab-3 medium range ballistic missile, which would
allow Iran to reach Israel and most of Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
Tehran probably has a small number of Shahab-3's available now
for use in a conflict. It has announced that production and
deployment has begun and it publicly displayed three Shahab-3's
along with a mobile launcher and other ground support
equipment.
Iran's public statements indicate that it plans to develop
longer range delivery systems. Although Tehran stated that the
Shahab-3 is Iran's last military missile, we are concerned that
Iran will use future systems in a military role.
Iran's defense minister announced the development of the
Shahab-4, originally calling it a more capable ballistic
missile than the Shahab-3, but later characterizing it as a
space launch vehicle with no military applications. Tehran has
also mentioned plans for a Shahab-5, strongly suggesting that
it intends to develop even longer-range ballistic missiles in
the near future. And Iran has displayed a mockup satellite and
space launch vehicle, an SLV, suggesting it plans to develop an
SLV to deliver Iranian satellites to orbit. However, Iran could
convert an SLV into a ballistic missile by developing a reentry
vehicle.
[Whereupon, at 11:33 a.m., the hearing was adjourned and a
public meeting was conducted.]
Mr. Lauder. In this context, cooperation between Tehran and
Russian aerospace entities has been a matter of proliferation
concerns since the mid-1990's. Iran is acquiring Russian
technology which could significantly accelerate the pace of its
ballistic missile development program. Assistance by Russian
entities has helped Iran save years of development of Shahab-3,
which was flight-tested in 1998 and twice again this year.
Russian assistance also is playing a crucial role in Iran's
ability to develop more sophisticated and longer range
missiles. Russian entities have helped the Iranian missile
effort in areas such as training, testing, and components.
These entities vary in size and cover a wide range of
specialties. The scope of the assistance is illustrated by the
variety of organizations that have been the subject of U.S.
trade restrictions. Such restrictions have been levied against
Russia's Government-owned space technology marketing agency,
Glavkosmos, the aerospace materials research institute,
NIIGrafit, the guidance technology developer, Polyus, and
several smaller and less prominent entities. Further trade
actions have been imposed against two major entities, the
Moscow Aviation Institute, and the Baltic State Technical
University.
Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time I have skipped over a
few points in my statement, but I have submitted it for the
record. I will attempt to answer the committee's questions
within the constraints imposed on us by the need to protect
sensitive sources and methods, and we would be delighted to
present committee members with a more detailed assessment of
these issues in a closed setting, and our intelligence
reporting and analysis also provides the underpinnings for the
policy effort to stop the flow of weapons-related technology to
Iran that Assistant Secretary Einhorn will address in his
testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lauder follows:]
Prepared Statement of John A. Lauder
Thank you Mr. Chairman for inviting me to testify on this important
topic. Iran has ambitious development programs for missiles and weapons
of mass destruction (WMD). It is seeking technologies related to
missiles, as well as technology related to nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons, from a number of foreign sources. The development
of these weapons in Iran, and the extent to which foreign assistance is
advancing Iranian weapons programs, are among our toughest intelligence
challenges and among our highest priorities.
Mr. Chairman, in my testimony today I will provide a summary of
Russian assistance to Iran's weapons of mass destruction programs and
its ballistic missile delivery systems. The Iranians regard these
programs--and assistance to them--as among their highest state secrets
and go to great lengths to hide them from us. As a result, our
knowledge of these programs is based on extremely sensitive sources and
methods. This precludes me from providing many details in open session.
But I hope this summary will be of use to the Committee, and we will
continue to keep the Committee informed of additional details in
classified briefings.
NUCLEAR
Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin with a few comments on Russian
aid to Iran's nuclear power and nuclear weapons program. The
Intelligence Community judges that Iran is actively pursuing the
acquisition of fissile material and the expertise and technology
necessary to form the material into nuclear weapons. As part of this
process, Iran is attempting to develop the capability to produce both
plutonium and highly-enriched uranium.
As part of this effort, Iran is seeking nuclear-related equipment,
material, and technical expertise from a variety of foreign sources,
most notably in Russia. Tehran claims that it seeks foreign assistance
to master nuclear technology for civilian research and nuclear energy
programs. However, the expertise and technology gained--along with the
contacts established--could be used to advance Iran's nuclear weapons
effort.
Work continues on the construction of a 1,000-megawatt
nuclear power reactor at Bushehr that will be subject to
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. This
project will not directly support a weapons effort, but it
affords Iran broad access to Russia's nuclear industry.
Russian entities are interacting with Iranian nuclear
research centers on a wide variety of activities beyond the
Bushehr project. Many of these projects, ostensibly for
civilian nuclear uses, have direct application to the
production of weapons-grade fissile material.
The United States has levied trade restrictions against two Russian
entities--NIKIET and Mendeleyev University--for providing nuclear
assistance to Iran.
CHEMICAL
I would like to touch briefly on assistance by Russian entities to
Iran that could contribute to Tehran's chemical warfare (CW) program.
Iran launched its offensive CW program in the early 1980s in response
to Baghdad's use of CW during the Iran-Iraq war. We believe the program
remains active despite Tehran's decision to ratify the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC). Iran has a large and growing CW production capacity
and already has produced a number of CW agents, including nerve,
blister, choking, and blood agents. We believe it possesses a stockpile
of at least several hundred metric tons of weaponized and bulk agent.
Tehran's goals for its CW program for the past decade have been to
expand its production capability and stockpile, reach self-sufficiency
by acquiring the means to manufacture chemical production equipment and
precursors, and diversify its CW arsenal by producing more
sophisticated and lethal agents and munitions.
Numerous Russian entities have been providing Iran with dual-use
industrial chemicals, equipment, and chemical production technology
that could be diverted to Tehran's offensive CW program.
In 1999, for example, Russian entities provided production
technology, training, and expertise that Iran could use to
create a more advanced and self-sufficient CW infrastructure.
BIOLOGICAL
I would like to now turn to assistance by Russian entities to
Iran's biotechnical programs. Iran is pursuing both civilian biotech
activities and a biological warfare (BW) program. Assistance by Russian
entities to the former could further Iran's pursuit of biotechnology
for military applications.
Iran's BW program was initiated in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq
war. The program is in the late stages of research and development, but
we believe Iran already holds some stocks of BW agents and weapons.
Tehran probably has investigated both toxins and live organisms as BW
agents, and for BW dissemination could use many of the same delivery
systems--such as artillery and aerial bombs--that it has in its CW
inventory.
Iran has the technical infrastructure to support a
significant BW program. It conducts top-notch legitimate
biomedical research at various institutes, which we suspect
also provide support to the BW program.
Iran is seeking expertise and technology from Russia that could
advance Tehran's biological warfare effort. Russia has several
government-to-government agreements with Iran in a variety of
scientific and technical fields.
Because of the dual-use nature of much of this technology,
Tehran can exploit these agreements to procure equipment and
expertise that could be diverted to its BW effort.
Iran's BW program could make rapid and significant advances
if it has unfettered access to BW expertise resident in Russia.
MISSILE
I will now discuss Russian aid to Iran's ballistic missile program.
Iran's ballistic missile program is one of the largest in the Middle
East. Tehran already has deployed hundreds of short-range (150-500 km)
ballistic missiles, covering most of Iraq and many strategic targets in
the Persian Gulf. It is developing and may soon deploy the 1,300 km
range Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile, which would allow Iran
to reach Israel and most of Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Tehran probably
has a small number of Shahab-3s available for use in a conflict; it has
announced that production and deployment has begun, and it publicly
displayed three Shahab-3s along with a mobile launcher and other ground
support equipment.
Iran's public statements indicate that it plans to develop longer
range delivery systems. Although Tehran stated that the Shahab-3 is
Iran's last military missile, we are concerned that Iran will use
future systems in a military role.
Iran's Defense Minister announced the development of the
Shahab-4, originally calling it a more capable ballistic
missile than the Shahab-3, but later categorizing it as a space
launch vehicle with no military applications.
Tehran has also mentioned plans for a Shahab-5, strongly
suggesting that it intends to develop even longer range
ballistic missiles in the near future.
Iran has displayed a mock-up satellite and space launch
vehicle (SLV), suggesting it plans to develop an SLV to deliver
Iranian satellites to orbit. However, Iran could convert an SLV
into a ballistic missile by developing a reentry vehicle.
In this context, cooperation between Tehran and Russian aerospace
entities has been a matter of proliferation concern since the mid-
1990s. Iran is acquiring Russian technology which could significantly
accelerate the pace of its ballistic missile development program.
Assistance by Russian entities has helped Iran save years in
its development of the Shahab-3, which was flight-tested in
1998 and twice again this year.
Russian assistance also is playing a crucial role in Iran's
ability to develop more sophisticated and longer-range
missiles.
Russian entities have helped the Iranian missile effort in areas
such as training, testing, and components. These entities vary in size
and cover a wide range of specialties. The scope of assistance is
illustrated by the variety of organizations that have been subjects of
U.S. trade restrictions.
Such restrictions have been levied against Russia's
government-owned space-technology marketing agency Glavkosmos,
the aerospace materials research institute NIIGrafit, the
guidance technology developer Polyus, and several smaller and
less prominent entities.
Further, trade actions have been imposed against two major
educational entities, the Moscow Aviation Institute and the
Baltic State Technical University.
RUSSIAN OVERSIGHT
Finally, I would like to turn to the issue of Russian efforts to
curb the transfers of WMD and missile technology to Iran. Beginning in
January 1998, the Russian Government took a number of steps to increase
its oversight of entities involved in dealings with Iran and other
states of proliferation concern. In 1999, it passed a new export
control law intended to strengthen restrictions on the export of
weapons of mass destruction, missile systems, and related technologies.
However, the government's weak enforcement of export control
legislation has facilitated some Russian companies' efforts to
circumvent export controls in the interest of financial gains.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared statement. I will attempt
to answer the Committee's questions within the constraints imposed on
us by the need to protect sensitive sources and methods. We would be
delighted to present Committee Members with a more detailed assessment
of Russian assistance to Iran's WMD and ballistic missile programs in a
closed setting.
Our intelligence reporting and analysis also provides the
underpinnings for policy efforts to stop the flow of weapons-related
technology to Iran. Assistant Secretary Einhorn will address these
efforts in his testimony.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Lauter. I appreciate
that.
Mr. Einhorn, we look forward to your testimony. What Mr.
Lauder put forward is a very troubling set of expansion of
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that has been in
that relationship between Russia and Iran. I hope you will
enlighten us to how that is not occurring or is not going to
occur in the future.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. EINHORN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR NONPROLIFERATION, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Einhorn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator
Smith for giving me the opportunity to appear before the
subcommittees this morning. I have a prepared statement that
overlaps substantially with Mr. Lauter's statement in
describing Iran's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic
missile programs. With your permission, I would like to submit
that prepared statement for the record.
Senator Brownback. Absolutely.
Ambassador Einhorn. I will proceed to summarize the
administration's policy response to this problem, but if you
compare the two statements you will see that we really do agree
on all fundamentals as far as what Iran is up to in this field.
In view of the serious risks to U.S. interests posed by
Iran's WMD and----
Senator Brownback. Mr. Einhorn, if I could ask you to pull
that microphone up a bit closer to you.
Mr. Einhorn. Sure.
Senator Brownback. It is pretty directional and a lot of
people cannot hear you very well.
Mr. Einhorn. Sure.
Senator Brownback. Thank you.
Mr. Einhorn. In view of the serious risks to U.S. interests
posed by Iran's WMD and missile programs, the administration
has given a very high priority to impeding these programs, and
we have sought to do so through a variety of means. We have
strengthened the multilateral export control regimes, thereby
denying Iran and other proliferators access to the world's best
sources of sensitive technology and forcing them to resort to
elaborate and uncertain procurement methods that can result in
slowing the pace, driving up the costs, and reducing the
quality of their acquisitions. With Iran actively looking for
weak links in the chain of control, we have provided
substantial assistance to countries that are potential targets
of Iranian procurement efforts in order to help them bolster
their national export control systems and their border
security.
When we have received information about troublesome
transactions involving Iran's weapons programs, we have been
able on a number of occasions to intervene diplomatically and
persuade the governments of supplying countries to take steps
to halt a pending transfer.
To help secure sensitive materials and know-how at their
source, we have provided large-scale support for Russia's
efforts to protect, store, and account for its nuclear
materials, and have funded civilian scientific work by over
20,000 former Soviet weapons specialists to reduce their
incentives for assisting countries like Iran.
Impeding Iran's nonconventional procurement efforts has
figured prominently in recent years in our bilateral relations
with China, North Korea, and Russia. In 1997, China agreed to
phaseout all of its nuclear cooperation with Iran, even
cooperation carried out under International Atomic Energy
Agency safeguards. We believe the Chinese have made good on
this pledge.
In 1997, we imposed sanctions on seven Chinese entities for
providing dual-use chemicals and chemical production equipment
and production technology to Iran's chemical weapons program.
Subsequently, Chinese authorities took steps to tighten their
system of chemical controls, although enforcement remains
uneven.
Our current efforts with China focus primarily on missile
exports. We have held several rounds of talks this year aimed
at encouraging Beijing to augment its missile-related export
control system and prevent Chinese entities from transferring
equipment and technology that contribute to Iranian missiles
capable of delivering nuclear weapons. We have made progress,
but more work remains.
Halting missile-related exports to Iran and other countries
is a high priority of our engagement with North Korea. In our
several rounds of missile talks with the North Koreans we have
repeatedly sought to gain their agreement to ban all missile
exports, and we will continue to do so. We have made clear that
continued missile exports would subject them to additional
economic sanctions, and that such sanctions would place a major
obstacle in the way of economic normalization between the
United States and the DPRK. We have imposed missile sanctions
on North Korea six times.
Assistance by Russian entities to Iran's missile and
nuclear programs has been a persistent problem in U.S.-Russian
relations for over half a decade. Both the President and the
Vice President, as well as other senior administration
officials, have engaged on this issue on an almost continuous
basis. Every Presidential summit meeting and every meeting of
the U.S.-Russian Binational Commission has placed these
nonproliferation concerns at the top of the agenda.
In our bilateral engagement we have made clear that
stopping highly sensitive cooperation with Iran would expand
opportunities for mutually beneficial and potentially lucrative
cooperation between the two countries, including in the areas
of commercial space and nuclear energy, but we have also
stressed that failure to solve the problem would inevitably
create obstacles to such cooperation.
So far, we have used the administration's Executive order
authorities to impose penalties on 10 Russian entities for
assisting Iran's missile and nuclear programs. Our intensive
efforts with the Russians over the last few years have produced
some significant positive steps.
Russia passed a new export control law in 1999 providing
for the first time legal authority to control the export of any
item that could contribute to a program of proliferation
concern. It has reorganized export control responsibilities
within the Government to make the bureaucracy more effective in
implementing Russia's laws and policies.
At U.S. urging, it has instituted internal compliance
programs in key Russian entities and so far over 500 firms
manufacturing items of proliferation concern have received
training in their export control obligations.
It has established seven export control working groups with
the United States in such areas as law enforcement, and dual
use licensing, to help strengthen the Russian export control
system. It has carried out investigations of problem cases we
have brought to Russia's attention, and in a number of those
cases it has halted Russia's cooperation with Iran, enabling us
last April to announce our intention to lift U.S. penalties
against two of those entities.
While we have imposed penalties on organizations engaged in
sensitive cooperation with Iran, we have also made important
headway by holding out benefits for responsible behavior. In
this connection, our Russian partners in the international
space station and in the major U.S.-Russian commercial space
launch joint venture understand the value of their cooperation
with us, and are on guard to avoid the kinds of interactions
with countries of concern that could put that cooperation in
jeopardy.
It is clear that key players in the Russian Government such
as the Russian Aviation and Space Agency and the new Department
of Export Controls of the Ministry of Economic Development and
Trade see an important stake in stopping assistance to Iran's
nonconventional programs, and are working hard to get their
arms around a very difficult problem.
However, enforcement of its export control laws and
policies has been very uneven. While some Russian aerospace
entities have severed their cooperation with Iran, other
individuals and entities have been far too willing to take
their place.
The situation is even worse in the nuclear area. Unlike in
the aerospace field, where many of the entities assisting Iran
have little relationship to the Russian Government, almost all
nuclear cooperation with Iran is carried out by MINATOM, the
Ministry of Atomic Energy, or one of its many subsidiaries and
affiliates. We have made clear to the Russians that we will not
go forward with collaboration on advanced nuclear power
reactors or other new cooperation in the nuclear field until
our concerns are resolved.
Clearly, many of the remaining problems involve
shortcomings of the relatively new Russian system of export
control. Even with greater resources and the best of intention,
it would be hard for Moscow authorities to detect and stop all
attempts to circumvent Russian controls, but equally clearly,
part of the problem is a lack of determination.
We are convinced that if Russian leaders gave the matter
sufficient priority, Iran's nuclear and missile procurement
efforts in Russia could be stopped. We do not doubt that
Russians, when they say their interests would be harmed at
least as much as ours by Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons
deliverable by long-range nuclear--let me say that again.
We do not doubt the Russians when they say their interests
would be harmed at least as much as ours by Iran's acquisition
of these capabilities, but if the Russians believe that the
nuclear and missile cooperation now underway will not actually
contribute materially to and accelerate Iran's acquisition of
such a capability, they are engaging in wishful or short-
sighted thinking.
Recently, we have seen some encouraging signs. At their
July meeting at the Okinawa G-8 summit President Putin assured
President Clinton that he would take personal responsibility
for ensuring that Russia's laws and commitments with respect to
these nonproliferation issues are carried out faithfully.
Subsequently, when provided with information that Russia's
Yefremov Institute was providing Iran with laser isotope
separation technology for enriching uranium, Russian
authorities suspended the transaction pending a thorough
investigation of its implications. We hope that this action
will be a forerunner of concrete and decisive steps to halt
assistance by Russian entities to missile and nuclear programs
in Iran.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, impeding Iran's WMD and
missile delivery systems will remain at the top of the U.S.
national security agenda for sometime to come. We cannot
predict the direction of political events in Tehran, but should
Iranian authorities accept the U.S. offer of an official
bilateral dialog, nonproliferation will be a key focus of the
dialog.
We would seek in those discussions to persuade the Iranians
that their legitimate security and other broad national
interests would best be served by verifiably and reliably
renouncing WMD and the long-range ballistic missiles that can
carry them. In the meantime, we have no alternative but to
continue an active strategy of seeking to thwart Iranian
efforts to procure the materials and technologies they need for
their nonconventional programs.
We will use a variety of means to pursue that strategy,
including strengthening multilateral regimes, carrying out
energetic diplomatic efforts with key supplier governments and,
when warranted, utilizing our legal and other authorities to
penalize those responsible for assisting nonconventional
programs of states of proliferation concern.
By the standards one must judge nonproliferation efforts,
our policies with respect to Iran have been effective. They
have succeeded in slowing and complicating Iran's programs and
driving up their costs. They have closed off many of the
world's best sources of advanced technology to Iranian
procurement efforts and have forced Iran to rely on
technologies less sophisticated and reliable than would
otherwise be the case and, critically, we have bought
additional time.
Despite the gains Iran has made, we do not consider it
inevitable that Iran will acquire nuclear weapons deliverable
by long-range missiles, but avoiding that highly destabilizing
outcome will require the continued leadership of the United
States and the concerted efforts of the international
community, including the cooperation of Russia, China, and
North Korea. We will consult closely with the committee as our
efforts proceed.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Assistant Secretary Einhorn
follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Robert J. Einhorn
Mr. Chairman, thank you for giving me this opportunity to discuss
Iran's continuing efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction and
missile delivery systems, foreign assistance to those programs, and the
status of U.S. efforts to halt them.
Today Iran is undergoing important political developments. The
United States welcomed the Iranian public's clear call for greater
freedom and democracy in recent parliamentary elections. We hope that
such encouraging developments are a sign of a transition to a more open
and democratic society.
However, as in any diverse society, there are many currents
swirling about in Iran. Some are driving the country forward; others
are holding it back. Despite the momentum toward democracy, freedom,
and openness, most of the elements of Tehran's foreign policy about
which we are most concerned--including the acquisition of destabilizing
weapons systems--have not improved.
Indeed, Iran's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic
missile delivery systems continues unabated, and has even accelerated
in the last few years. Despite its formal adherence to international
arms control and nonproliferation treaties, Iran maintains active
programs to acquire nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as
the long-range missiles to deliver them. Iran is seeking aggressively
to acquire equipment, material, and technology from abroad in an effort
to establish the capability to produce non-conventional weapons
indigenously and thereby to insulate those weapons programs from
outside pressures.
Even if democracy succeeds in Iran, there is little to suggest that
its quest for weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems
will end. As long as Iran believes that its arch-rival Iraq is pursuing
WMD, that U.S. forces in the region constitute a major threat, and that
its own non-conventional programs bolster its aspirations for influence
in the Gulf region and leadership in the Islamic world, there will be
pressures in Tehran, whoever is in power, to persist on the dangerous
course on which it is now headed. We will watch closely for any changes
in Iranian proliferation policies as Iran's domestic evolution
continues. But so far we have seen none.
Iran's WMD and missile programs constitute a serious threat to the
region and to U.S. interests more broadly. Impeding those programs has
therefore been a top priority of U.S. policy. It is a subject we would
like to take up with Iranian officials directly. But in the absence so
far of a willingness in Tehran to establish an authoritative U.S.-Iran
dialogue, we have had to rely almost exclusively on a strategy of
seeking to deny Iran the material and technological wherewithal to
acquire WMD and missiles. We have had a few public--and a number of
private--successes in that effort. But as with any nonproliferation
effort focused primarily on denial of technology, we have managed to
slow Iran's programs, but we have not stopped them.
IRAN'S BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM
Iran has one of the developing world's most active and ambitious
ballistic missile programs. It is important to recall, in this regard,
that Iran was the first victim of Iraq's development of missiles and
chemical weapons. But Iran's ballistic missile programs have long since
gone beyond responding to Iraq, and now threaten much of the Middle
East and soon could threaten locations more distant.
Iran already has deployed hundreds of SCUD missiles and can now
produce SCUDs indigenously. Not stopping at short-range missiles,
however, Iran has conducted three tests of the 1,300 kilometer-range
Shahab-3 missile, once in 1998 and twice this year, including just last
month. As National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear
Programs Robert Walpole testified just two weeks ago, ``Tehran probably
has a small number of Shahab-3s available for use in a conflict; it has
announced that production and deployment have begun.'' In addition to
the medium-range Shahab-3, Iran is working on longer-range missiles.
Its defense minister has spoken of Shahab-4 and -5, claiming those
rocket systems would be used solely as peaceful, space-launch vehicles
(SLVs). But given that any SLV has inherent military missile capability
and can relatively easily be adapted to that role, few knowledgeable
observers take those claims at face value.
Iran's acquisition of long-range ballistic missile delivery
capability, coupled with its continued pursuit of nuclear weapons and
other weapons of mass destruction, poses a significant threat to U.S.
forces and friends in the region, and to regional stability generally.
Iran's ballistic missile program is heavily dependent on assistance
from other countries. North Korea has been a major supplier to Iran,
transferring SCUDs, SCUD production technology, and No Dongs. While we
do not believe Russia has transferred long-range missiles to Iran, we
judge that wide-ranging assistance from Russian aerospace organizations
and individuals has enabled Iran to make the Shahab-3 an improved
version of the No Dong as well as to make substantial headway on
longer-range missile systems. Chinese transfers to Iran's missile
programs have largely been intended for tactical systems below the
Missile Technology Control Regime control level or have been dual-use
items not specifically covered on international control lists. But as
we have told the Chinese many times, such transfers can make--and
indeed have made--significant contributions to Iran's long-range
missile programs.
IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
We remain convinced that Iran maintains an active nuclear weapons
development program, despite its status as an NPT party. Among the
persistent indicators that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons
development program is the fact that Iran is attempting to obtain
capabilities to produce both highly enriched uranium and plutonium--the
critical materials for a nuclear weapon. Neither of these capabilities
is necessary to meet Iran's declared desire to have a civil nuclear
power program to generate electricity, which is itself suspicious in
light of Iran's abundant oil resources.
For the time being, Iran's nuclear program remains heavily
dependent on external sources of supply. Because of this, the United
States has played the leading role in developing and maintaining a
broad international consensus against assisting Iran's foreign
procurement efforts. We deny Iran access to U.S. nuclear technology and
material, and all major Western suppliers have agreed not to provide
nuclear technology to Iran.
A number of supplier states have abandoned potentially lucrative
sales to Iran's nuclear program. In 1997 China terminated work on a
uranium conversion facility in Iran and agreed not to engage in any new
nuclear cooperation with Iran after completing two small projects that
posed no direct proliferation concern. As a result of efforts by Vice
President Gore and Secretary Albright, Ukraine likewise took a major
step when it determined that it would not supply electricity-generating
turbines originally contracted for by a Russian firm and destined for
the new Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran. The Czech Government also
recently made a decision not to supply components for the turbine hall
of this plant.
Russia remains the one significant exception to this virtual
embargo on nuclear cooperation with Iran. The most visible nuclear
cooperation between the two countries is Russia's construction of a
1000-megawatt nuclear power reactor at Bushehr, Iran. We have opposed
this project, not because we believe such a light-water reactor under
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards itself poses a serious
proliferation threat, but because of our concern that the Bushehr
project would be used by Iran as a cover for maintaining wide-ranging
contacts with Russia nuclear entities and for engaging in more
sensitive forms of cooperation with more direct applicability to a
nuclear weapons program.
While refusing to halt the power reactor sale, the Russians have
argued that they are just as opposed as we are to an Iranian nuclear
weapons capability. At the highest levels, they committed to limiting
their nuclear cooperation with Iran to the Bushehr reactor project
during the period of its construction.
Despite these repeated assurances, we are aware that Russian
entities--most of them subordinate to MINATOM, the Russian Ministry of
Atomic Energy--have engaged in extensive cooperation with Iranian
nuclear research centers that is outside the bounds of the Bushehr
project. Much of this assistance involves technologies with direct
application to the production of weapons-grade fissile materials,
including research reactors, heavy-water production technology, and
laser isotope separation technology for enriching uranium. Russian
assistance to Iran's nuclear program has accelerated in the last few
years and could significantly shorten the time Iran would need to
acquire weapons-usable fissile material.
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
Iran's chemical weapons (CW) program is one of the largest in the
developing world. Iran began its offensive program during the Iran-Iraq
war in response to Iraq's use of CW. By 1987 Iran was able to deliver
limited quantities of blister (mustard) and blood (cyanide) agents
against Iraqi troops using artillery shells. Since then Iran's CW
production capability has grown and become more sophisticated. It has
already produced a number of CW agents, including nerve, blister,
choking and blood agents. Despite its 1997 ratification of the CWC, we
believe Iran's CW program continues and that it possesses a substantial
stockpile of weaponized and bulk agent.
Throughout the life of its CW program, Iran has sought the ability
to produce indigenously more sophisticated and lethal agents. This
trend toward self-sufficiency is worrisome, since it means that Iran
could eventually become a supplier of CW-related materials to other
nations.
Over the past several years, Iran's procurement efforts have
dwindled in countries of the Australia Group, the multilateral export
control regime responsible for chemical and biological exports, as that
Group's controls have become more effective. Instead, Iran has
concentrated on suppliers in countries outside of the Australia Group.
As Iran moves to suppliers outside the major industrialized countries
and seeks less specialized (and hence less strictly controlled) items,
our ability to stop Iran's CW-related procurement efforts has also
decreased.
Iran has been in the vanguard of efforts by some countries to
weaken multilateral export controls, especially on dual-use
commodities. It has instigated attempts to delegitimize and even to
abolish the nonproliferation export control regimes. The United States
has worked closely with our partners in those regimes to rebut the
Iranian arguments and to strengthen those regimes in the face of these
efforts to weaken them.
We believe that Iran also has an offensive biological weapons
program at least since the Iran-Iraq War, notwithstanding the fact that
it has been a party to the Biological Weapons Convention since August
1973. The pace of Iran's biological weapons program probably has
increased since the 1995 revelations about the extent of Iraq's
biological weapons program.
While we assess that the Iranian BW program is largely still in the
research and development stage, we believe Iran already holds some
stocks of biological agents and toxins. It has considerable expertise
in the infrastructure needed to produce basic BW agents, and can make
some of the hardware needed to manufacture those agents. Iran conducts
top-notch legitimate biomedical research at various institutes, which
we suspect also provide support to the BW program. It appears that Iran
is actively seeking to acquire materials, equipment and expertise from
foreign suppliers--primarily from entities in Russia and Western
Europe.
U.S. POLICY RESPONSES
In view of the serious risks to U.S. interests posed by Iran's WMD
and missile programs, we have given high priority to impeding those
programs and have sought to do so through a wide variety of means. We
have worked to strengthen and tighten the multilateral export control
regimes, thereby denying Iran and other proliferators access to most of
the world's best sources of sensitive technology and forcing them to
resort to elaborate and uncertain covert procurement methods that can
result in slowing the pace, driving up the costs, and reducing the
quality of their acquisitions. With Iran actively looking for weak
links in the chain of control, we have provided substantial assistance
to countries that are potential targets of Iranian procurement efforts
in order to help them bolster their national export control systems and
their border security. When we have received information about
troublesome transactions involving Iran's weapons programs, we have
been able on a number of occasions to intervene diplomatically and
persuade the governments of supplying countries to step in and halt a
pending transfer.
To help secure sensitive materials and know-how at their source, we
have provided large-scale support for Russia's efforts to protect,
store, and account for its nuclear materials and have funded civilian
scientific work by over 20,000 former Soviet weapons specialists to
reduce their incentives for assisting countries like Iran. We have also
sought to strengthen international arms control arrangements to promote
our nonproliferation goals--by supporting the International Atomic
Energy Agency's strengthened safeguards system, promoting an effective
Chemical Weapons Convention inspection system, and pressing for a
protocol to enhance confidence in compliance with the Biological
Weapons Convention.
Impeding Iranian non-conventional procurement efforts has figured
prominently in recent years in our bilateral relations with China,
North Korea, and Russia. As noted earlier, China agreed to phase out
all of its nuclear cooperation with Iran, even cooperation carried out
under IAEA safeguards. We believe the Chinese have made good on this
pledge. In 1997 we imposed sanctions on seven Chinese entities for
providing dual-use chemicals and chemical production equipment and
technology to Iran's chemical weapons program. Subsequently, Chinese
authorities took steps to tighten their system of chemical controls,
although enforcement remains uneven. Our current efforts with China
focus primarily on missile exports. We have held several rounds of
talks this year aimed at encouraging Beijing to augment its missile-
related export control system and prevent Chinese entities from
transferring equipment and technology that contribute to Iranian
missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. We have made progress,
but more work remains.
Halting missile-related exports, to Iran and other countries, is a
high priority of our engagement with North Korea. In our several rounds
of missile talks with the North Koreans, we have repeatedly sought to
gain its agreement to ban all missile exports and we will continue to
do so. We have also made clear that continued missile exports would
subject them to additional economic sanctions (which we have imposed
six times on the DPRK, three for transfers to Iran), and that such
sanctions would place a major obstacle in the way of economic
normalization between the U.S. and DPRK.
Assistance by Russian entities to Iran's missile and nuclear
programs has been a persistent problem in U.S.-Russian relations for
over half a decade. Both the President and the Vice President, as well
as the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Energy, and numerous other
senior Administration officials, have engaged on this issue on an
almost continuous basis. Every Presidential Summit meeting, and every
meeting of the U.S.-Russian Bi-national Commission, as well as numerous
letters, telephone calls, and meetings in between, has placed these
nonproliferation concerns at the top of the agenda. The Vice President,
in particular, using the institutional machinery afforded by the Bi-
national Commission, has played a central role in pursuing such
nonproliferation goals as fissile material security, the purchase of
high enriched uranium, disposition of plutonium, and the destruction of
chemical weapons--all of which are crucial to denying Iran and other
states of concern access to these WMD-related materials. These efforts
began in the very first year of the Administration, when the Commercial
Space Launch Agreement was signed by the Vice President and the Russian
Prime Minister as an incentive to Russian aerospace entities to forgo
dangerous missile proliferation.
In our bilateral engagement, we have stressed the high stakes
involved in resolving the Russia-Iran proliferation issue, both for the
stability of the Middle East and the world at large and for the
bilateral relationship. We have made clear that stopping highly
sensitive cooperation with Iran would expand opportunities for mutually
beneficial and potentially lucrative cooperation between the two
countries, including in the areas of commercial space and nuclear
energy. But we have also stressed that failure to solve the problem
would inevitably create obstacles to such cooperation. So far we have
used the Administration's executive authority to impose penalties on 10
Russian entities for assisting Iran's nuclear or missile programs.
Our intensive efforts with the Russians over the last few years
have produced some significant positive steps. We are beginning to see
the emergence of a more effective Russian effort at export control.
Russia passed a new export control law in 1999 providing legal
authority to control the export of any item that could contribute to a
program of proliferation concern. It has reorganized export control
responsibilities within the government to make the bureaucracy more
effective in implementing Russia's laws and policies. At U.S. urging,
it has instituted internal compliance programs in key Russian entities,
and so far over 500 firms manufacturing items of proliferation concern
have received training in their export control obligations. It has
established seven export control working groups with the U.S. in such
areas as law enforcement and dual-use licensing to help strengthen the
Russian system. It has carried out investigations of problem cases we
have brought to its attention and, in a number of those cases, halted
Russian entities' cooperation with Iran, enabling us last April to
announce our intention to lift U.S. penalties against two of them.
While we have imposed penalties on organizations engaged in
sensitive cooperation with Iran, we have also made important headway by
holding out benefits for responsible behavior. In this connection, we
have used the commercial space launch quota as an incentive to
encourage important changes in Russia's legal and regulatory
environment, and to make improvements in its export control system and
practices. Moreover, our Russian partners in the International Space
Station and in the major U.S.-Russian commercial space launch joint
venture well understand the value of their profitable cooperation with
us, and they are on guard to avoid the kind of interactions with
countries of concern that could put that cooperation in jeopardy. It is
clear that key players in the Russian government, such as the Russian
Aviation and Space Agency and the new Department of Export Controls of
the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, see an important stake
in stopping assistance to Iran's non-conventional programs and are
working hard to get their arms around a very difficult challenge.
However, Russian enforcement of its export control laws and
policies has been very uneven. While some Russian aerospace entities
have severed their cooperation with Iran, other individuals and
entities have been far too willing to take their place. The situation
is even worse in the nuclear area. Unlike in the aerospace field, where
many of the entities assisting Iran have little relationship to the
Russian government, almost all nuclear cooperation with Iran is carried
out by MINATOM or one of its many subsidiaries and affiliates. We have
made clear to the Russians that we will not go forward with
collaboration on advanced power reactors or other new cooperation in
the nuclear area until our concerns are resolved.
Clearly, many of the remaining problems involve shortcomings of the
relatively new Russian system of export control. Even with greater
resources and the best of intentions, it would be hard for Moscow
authorities to detect and stop all attempts to circumvent Russian
controls. But equally clearly, part of the problem is a lack of
determination in Moscow. We are convinced that, if Russia's leaders
gave the matter sufficient priority, Iran's nuclear and missile
procurement efforts in Russia could be stopped.
Why does Moscow not seem to give the matter the priority we do? The
answer is complicated. Part of the explanation seems to be that Russian
entities that no longer receive adequate budgetary support from the
central government have strong incentives to export. The number of
Russian entities with technical experts out of work is overwhelming,
and they will do virtually anything to stay afloat. Russia also
believes it has strategic reasons for not wanting to jeopardize
bilateral relations with Iran. Moreover, the Russians tend to take a
more narrow view of their nonproliferation responsibilities than we do
and are more inclined to support transactions we would regard as too
risky, especially if they do not violate any Russian international
treaty obligations.
Whatever the mix of motives for a less-than-fully-resolute approach
to the challenge of stopping dangerous Russian interactions with Iran,
we do not doubt the Russians when they say their interests would be
harmed at least as much as ours by Iran's acquisition of nuclear
weapons deliverable by long-range missiles. But if the Russians believe
that the nuclear and missile cooperation now underway will not actually
contribute materially to, and accelerate, Iran's acquiring such a
capability, they are engaging in wishful or shortsighted thinking.
Recently we have seen some encouraging signs. At their July meeting
at the Okinawa G8 summit, President Putin assured President Clinton
that he would take personal responsibility for ensuring that Russia's
laws and commitments with respect to these nonproliferation matters are
faithfully carried out. Subsequently, when provided with information
that Russia's Yefremov Institute was providing Iran with laser isotope
separation technology for enriching uranium, Russian authorities
suspended the transaction pending a thorough investigation of its
implications. We hope that this action will be a forerunner of concrete
and decisive steps to halt assistance by Russian entities to missile
and nuclear programs in Iran.
IRAN NONPROLIFERATION ACT
Recently Congress gave us new legislation intended to impede Iran's
WMD and missile programs--the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000. The
Act establishes new criteria--legal standards and procedures--for
evaluating activities of proliferation concern and imposing
nonproliferation sanctions. The Administration has made significant
progress toward completing the review of the intelligence material
necessary to make the report to Congress required by the Act. However,
we have found that the information that must be reviewed in order to
make the required report is considerably more detailed and voluminous
than was contemplated when the bill was passed, and it has therefore
been impossible for us to submit our initial report by the dates
specified in the Act. A more detailed explanation of where we stand on
this matter has already been conveyed to the Committee.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, impeding Iran's WMD and missile delivery systems
will remain at the top of the U.S. national security agenda for some
time to come. We cannot predict the direction political events in
Tehran will take, but should Iranian authorities accept the U.S. offer
of an official bilateral dialogue, nonproliferation will be a key
focus. We would seek in those discussions to persuade the Iranians that
their legitimate security and other broad national interests would best
be served by verifiably and reliably renouncing WMD and the long-range
ballistic missiles that can deliver them.
In the meantime, we have no alternative but to continue an active
strategy of seeking to thwart Iranian efforts to procure the material
and technologies they need for their nonconventional programs. We will
use a variety of means to pursue that strategy, including strengthening
multilateral regimes, carrying out energetic diplomatic efforts with
key supplier governments, and, when warranted, utilizing our legal and
other authorities to penalize those responsible for assisting the non-
conventional programs of states of proliferation concern.
By the standards one must judge nonproliferation efforts, our
policies with respect to Iran have been effective. They have succeeded
in slowing and complicating Iran's programs and driving up their costs.
They have closed off many of the world's best sources of advanced
technology to Iranian procurement efforts, and forced Iran to rely on
technologies less sophisticated and reliable than would otherwise be
the case. And critically, we have bought additional time. Despite the
gains Iran has made, we do not consider it inevitable that Iran will
acquire nuclear weapons deliverable by long-range missiles. But
avoiding that highly destabilizing outcome will require the continued
leadership of the United States and the concerted efforts of the
international community, including the cooperation of Russia, China,
and North Korea. We will consult closely with this Committee as our
efforts proceed.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Einhorn, although I come
to the exact opposite conclusion that you do, that our efforts
have not been very successful at all in impeding their
development of weapons of mass destruction and proliferation
that have taken place in Iran, and particularly in regards to
Russia and the Russian assistance that has been provided that
we heard from Mr. Lauter's testimony what has occurred with
Iran, so I think our standards of success and measurements of
success are substantially different here.
Mr. Einhorn, the so-called Gore-McCain act calls for
sanctions on anyone who assists Iran in acquiring destabilizing
numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons. The Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 also calls for sanctions on countries
that transfer weaponry to terrorist nations.
Now, since 1992, Russia has supplied a large number of
conventional armaments to Iran. Why have neither of these
sanction laws been applied to any aspect of this enormous
volume of trade?
Mr. Einhorn. Mr. Chairman, we have, in fact, been very
active in implementing both of the laws you mentioned,
including the law that deals with provision of lethal military
equipment to state sponsors of terrorism.
As the committee is aware, we have pursued these questions
actively with the governments concerned, the supplier
governments concerned, and in a number of cases imposed
penalties on the entities responsible for these transactions,
and in the process have been able to persuade supplier
governments to adopt new controls that have limited further
future shipments of this lethal military equipment, so we have
taken advantage of the law and used it as a tool to try to
reduce lethal military equipment sales to these state sponsors
of terrorism.
Senator Brownback. Have you implemented that law on Russia?
Mr. Einhorn. We have, in fact, done so. As the committee is
aware, I believe, we have invoked that law with respect to
Russian transfers of conventional equipment to Syria and a
number of the----
Senator Brownback. Have you done it toward Iran?
Mr. Einhorn. I will have to check the record on Iran, but
there have been a number of cases, not necessarily involving
Russia, in addition to the Syria case I mentioned before, where
we have utilized the law to extract new commitments in the area
of nonproliferation.
Senator Brownback. I believe the record will show that you
have used it on Syria, but you have not used it on Iran.
Mr. Einhorn, if domestic United States law requires the
imposition of sanctions, do you think that the executive branch
can nevertheless avoid imposing sanctions if it has concluded
an agreement with a foreign nation to do so?
Mr. Einhorn. Well, it depends on the particulars of the
sanctions laws. The purpose of the sanction laws is a good
purpose. It is to change behavior. It is to encourage
governments such as Russia, such as North Korea, such as China,
to practice responsible export behavior. We have utilized the
law for that purpose.
Sometimes it has involved actually imposing the sanctions,
but often the threat of the imposition of sanctions has been as
effective or more effective than the actual imposition. We have
used the leverage that the law has provided to encourage more
responsible behavior, certainly in the case of China and in the
case of Russia.
Senator Brownback. If domestic law required imposition of
sanctions for an action, would it be appropriate for the
executive branch to commit to a foreign nation to avoid such
penalties even if the foreign nation made commitments of its
own?
Mr. Einhorn. Well, let us take the Iran Nonproliferation
Act, for example. Here, there are cases where, if an entity has
provided reportable items to Iran, there is an obligation by
the administration to report that fact to the Congress, but if
it is determined that that transfer was made under the
guidelines of multilateral export control regimes, duly
authorized by a government that is a participant in those
regimes, then that transfer is exempt from any penalties. That
is an element of the Iran Nonproliferation Act. So there is a
case where the administration is not compelled to impose
sanctions under the law.
Senator Brownback. Well, I am not sure I have understood
your answer completely, and I think it can come with a yes or
no. Let me try this again. If domestic law required impositions
of sanctions for an action, would it be appropriate--
appropriate--for the executive branch to commit to a foreign
nation to avoid such penalties, even if the foreign nation made
commitments of its own?
So in other words, we have a domestic law that requires the
imposition of a sanction, and then the administration
negotiates a separate agreement that they think, well, OK,
maybe this is the way we want to go, regardless of what the law
says. Would that be appropriate?
Mr. Einhorn. If the law requires the imposition of
sanctions, then sanctions must be imposed, but if the law
provides, for example, a waiver authority that suggests that
the penalties may be waived if in the administration's judgment
it can extract new commitments from a foreign government, then
that is entirely permissible, and that in fact has been done on
a number of occasions, but it would depend upon the law.
Senator Brownback. All right, but if it does not have the
waiver authority, it would not be appropriate.
Mr. Einhorn. No, clearly, you know, one has to implement
the law, whatever it says.
Senator Brownback. Is Russia abiding by its 1995 commitment
not to transfer conventional arms to Iran?
Mr. Einhorn. The commitment that Russia made at the time
was not to engage in new conventional arms contracts with Iran.
It agreed that it would complete shipments under existing
contracts in a limited period of time.
We are having discussions with the Russian Government now
about the length of time it would need to fulfill its existing
contracts, but in terms of the specifics of current
transactions, it would be very difficult to comment in detail
in an open session like this.
Senator Brownback. So if I am understanding you, you are
saying that it agreed to make shipments of weapons, and it is
needing more than 5 years to get this done, and you are letting
them go with that, saying OK, you can go ahead and keep
shipping these because you are deeming these part of some
agreement prior to 1995?
Mr. Einhorn. Mr. Chairman, I am not saying we are letting
these go. What I am saying is that we have sought from the
Russian Government information about the shipments they would
like to continue to make under existing contracts, that they
have not been able to make by the time specified in our
understanding.
Senator Brownback. And you will not comment in open session
as to whether there are additional sales that are taking place
that were not committed to prior to 1995?
Mr. Einhorn. I think it is best to deal with that issue in
closed session, and I would be happy to do that.
Senator Brownback. I hope you are pushing the Russians
quite hard on the issue. Five years would seem to be a
sufficient period of time for them to complete transactions.
Now, I do not know the nature of which these you are commenting
about.
And Mr. Einhorn, my whole problem here is, it seems as if
from what Mr. Lauder described there is an aggressive
development program continuing to take place in Iran with
Russian-supplied technology, information, and then we also have
conventional areas, and the administration is seemingly looking
the other way in spite of a very clear desire by the Congress,
laws that have been signed, reports that are required, for you
to keep the Congress informed, that the Congress has stated
this is not the will of the people, and that you have seemed to
conclude your own sidebar agreements and the development
continues to take place, with alarming speed and progress,
alarming.
That is not a satisfactory situation, certainly from
Congress' perspective and, more importantly, from the United
States' overall security perspective, and in dealing with a
country such as Iran. There are an alarming set of factors that
are lining up here that lead to quite a troubling conclusion.
Mr. Einhorn. Mr. Chairman, I would agree with you that the
situation with respect to Iranian procurement efforts in Russia
is not satisfactory. The Russians know our frustration and
disappointment about their response, but I would take issue
with your characterization of the administration looking the
other way. We have faced this issue quite squarely, and this
has been a subject of continuing engagement between us and the
Russians, and we have made some progress.
I have mentioned some of the elements of progress in my
statement earlier. The Russians have come quite a distance in
setting up an export control system. We have concrete evidence
that entities that had been engaged in missile cooperation with
Iran have stopped their cooperation. We see signs of
improvement, but the record of enforcement is spotty, and it is
uneven. It is not satisfactory as far as we are concerned, and
we will continue to pursue it.
On the nuclear side, the situation is even worse, and we
have to work at that in a very persistent way to make sure that
Russian assistance to Iran's nuclear program is stopped, but in
terms of the bottom line, I think it is important to step back
and take a look at some of these Iranian programs.
Iran has been seeking nuclear weapons for quite a long
time. They have worked at it very, very aggressively. We have
succeeded, the United States has succeeded in dissuading all
nuclear suppliers other than Russia from continuing to provide
nuclear assistance to Iran, every one, and we have had
important successes, whether it is with China, or Ukraine, or I
can go on and on and on, but it is only Russia that is
continuing to do that, and we have to work with Russia until
they are prepared to stop all nuclear cooperation with Iran.
In the missile area also, we have been very aggressive in
trying to clamp down. Using the missile technology control
regime, it has forced Iran to turn to Korea, with less
sophisticated technology than it could otherwise get.
What the Shahab-3 is, it is a No Dong, which has been
improved with the addition of Russian technology, but this is
not the missile that Iran would have today if it were not for
U.S. efforts. Without U.S. efforts, Iran would be much further
along in its nuclear weapons program. It might even have
nuclear weapons today, and it would be much further along in
its missile program. We would not be talking about basically an
improved No Dong that could go medium ranges. We would be
talking much more reliable and sophisticated missiles. U.S.
efforts really have prevented those developments from
occurring.
Senator Brownback. And without Russian assistance the
Iranians would not be nearly as far along as where they are
today, and those were things that are specifically the concern
of laws that have been passed by the Congress and signed by the
administration, and then the negotiations between Vice
President Gore and Chernomyrdin.
I think this is not satisfactory, particularly as regards
the topic of this hearing, Russian assistance to the
Ukrainians, which is where we are having the most problem, and
I think some of the least progress taking place.
Mr. Lauter, one final question and then I am going to turn
the podium over to Mr. Smith. Some of the DCI's most recent
section 721 report states that Russia, ``remains an important
source of conventional weapons and spare parts for Iran.'' That
report covered activities through December 31, 1999. During
this year, has Russia engaged in any conventional arms-related
transfers to Iran?
Mr. Lauter. Russian officials stated publicly earlier this
year that Russia continues to transfer conventional arms to
Iran under previously signed contracts, and that statement is
consistent with our information.
Senator Brownback. Can you be any more specific of what
transfers have taken place this year?
Mr. Lauter. I do not think I have any detailed unclassified
figures that I can give you right now on that. I would be happy
to provide that later, certainly in a classified forum for the
committee. I do not think I have any figures I can pass over
today.
Senator Brownback. Senator Smith.
Senator Smith. John, I know that you have done some work on
the Yugoslavian situation. I have just been handed a note that
says the Serbian opposition has stormed the parliament building
and reportedly has taken control of the state media. Fires are
raging. Milosevic is nowhere to be seen, and general chaos is
underway--unrelated subject.
Bob, you mention the sanctions that the U.S. Government has
imposed on specific Russian companies and firms for sharing
technology with Iran. Do you believe that these companies or
entities acted independently, or without the knowledge or
consent of the Russian Government in the first place?
Mr. Einhorn. Senator Smith, I think it varies from case to
case. As I pointed out earlier, most of the nuclear assistance
being provided by Russia to Iran is coming from subsidiaries,
affiliates of the Ministry of Atomic Energy in Russia, so I
think it would be hard to imagine that Russian Government
officials, and officials in the nuclear establishment, were not
at least knowledgeable of some of these interactions.
Senator Smith. If this is contrary to Russia's own national
security interests, what was the motive? Was it hard currency?
Mr. Einhorn. That is an important component of it. What has
happened, Senator, is that Russian entities are no longer
receiving the kind of budgetary support from the central
government that they used to, and as a result they are pretty
hard up, and they are looking for ways of staying in business,
and so some of them have very strong incentives to export
equipment, know-how, and so forth, so I think economic
explanations are a very important part of the problem.
Another explanation is that the Russian export control
system is still in its early stage. It is not fully effective,
especially at the enforcement end. It needs a lot more work
before it can effectively police Russian nuclear and missile-
related exports.
Senator Smith. You mentioned Mr. Putin's promises to
President Clinton. Have you seen any results from those
promises? Is, in fact, his administration doing a better job?
Are they getting--do they have control of their government? Do
they now have the cash? With higher oil prices he's
consolidating his power and the ability to actually protect
their own national interest.
Mr. Einhorn. Senator, I think it is probably too early to
judge whether the Putin regime will be more effective in this
area than its predecessors. There are some encouraging signs,
his statement to President Clinton in Okinawa that he is going
to take personal responsibility for these matters, also the
decision by the Russian Government to suspend this contract
Yefremov Institute and Iran on providing laser isotope
separation technology to Iran. They say they will suspend that
while they conduct a thorough investigation of the implications
of that transfer.
Senator Smith. And the whole point of that is to enhance
the yield of a nuclear bomb.
Mr. Einhorn. The laser isotope separation technology is a
technique for enriching uranium to weapons grade. That is what
we believe the equipment and technology was intended for.
Senator Smith. Is the administration going to certify to
Congress that no entities subordinate to the Russian Space
Agency are providing missile systems to Iran?
Mr. Einhorn. Under the Iran Nonproliferation Act, as you
know, Senator, we will be providing a report to the Congress
that provides information on entities that provide certain
transfers to Iran. We regret that we are not in a position to
provide the report at this stage. We have promised to work
toward December 1 in order to get you that information.
But on the specific question you asked me, whether we feel
we can certify that all of the subsidiaries of the Russian
Space Agency have not engaged in missile-related cooperation
with Iran, I doubt very much we are going to be able to make
that assertion. In fact, I feel confident that we will have to
report to you that a number of the entities subordinate to the
Russian Aviation Space Agency have in fact provided support for
Iran's missile program, and we will have to act, then, under
the law.
Senator Smith. And the law requires that you then begin
withholding funds for the purpose of constructing the
international space station, does it not?
Mr. Einhorn. The law has provisions regarding extraordinary
payments to the international space station project, that is
true. There are certain special provisions affecting items such
as support for crew safety, for example, which have to be dealt
with, and we will meet the requirements of the law in dealing
with that question.
Senator Smith. Clearly, the State of Israel has reason to
be alarmed at missiles being paraded in the streets of Iran
that say, ``Israel should be wiped off the map.'' What other
states in the Middle East are likely to bear the brunt of an
Iranian missile?
Mr. Einhorn. Well, I think one has to look back at the
Iran-Iraq war of the 1980's to recognize that the critical
rivalry in that part of the world is between Iraq and Iran. I
believe that is the main reason, I mean, the concern about a
potential future threat from Iraq that motivates Iran to want
to have missiles capable of delivering these WMD capabilities,
but there are other countries in the region that are concerned
about Iranian intentions.
There are countries on the southern shore of the Persian
Gulf who are concerned about Iran's intentions and about Iran's
acquisition of WMD and missiles, and we consult with them quite
frequently, and there is concern in the gulf and, as you
mentioned, you know, Israel is concerned as well about these
developments.
Senator Smith. When you think back to the bloody and
duration of the Iran-Iraq war, had these been available then
they would likely have been used, would they not have? I mean,
they used chemical weapons on each other.
Mr. Einhorn. Yes. I mean, missiles were used. Iraq had
missiles at the time, and used them. Iraq used chemical
weapons. There was some small response by Iran at the time, but
Iran was not heavily into the chemical weapons business then,
but I think that is right, if these capabilities had been
further advanced at that time, there would have been a real
threat that they would have been employed on a much larger
scale.
Senator Brownback. Mr. Lauter, some have suggested that
Iran is changing because of so-called moderates who are being
elected to office. How are decisions made in Tehran regarding
Iran's WMD program? Are they made by hardline clerics, or by
elected government officials?
Mr. Lauter. I think, Senator, when we look at the
institutions in Iran that are most involved in the process of
weapons of mass destruction and missiles, those are probably
institutions that are more dominated by the conservatives. That
said, we assess that Iranian political factions across the
board are united largely in their support for Iran's weapons of
mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. These programs
seem to be viewed across the political spectrum as an integral
part of Iranian national security, and part of Iran's right of
self-defense.
Senator Brownback. So in your view has President Khatemi
moderated his country's interests in obtaining these ballistic
missiles, or is it really just generally felt by the Iranian
people that they need these for their own defense?
Mr. Lauter. I think in our sense, in looking at what has
occurred and at President Khatemi's statements that he has not
appeared to slow down the pace of the ballistic missile
program. Since he has taken office we have actually witnessed
those three tests of the Shahab-3 that we mentioned earlier,
and he himself has been public in his praise of the
accomplishment of the 1998 test.
Senator Brownback. Gentlemen, I believe that concludes the
questions, and we thank you very much for your participation.
Should other colleagues have questions, we will leave the
record open for a period of time, and we would appreciate
response should questions be put to you. Again, we thank you,
and all who have attended here today, and this public meeting
is adjourned.
[Whereupon, the public meeting was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
The American Jewish Committee,
Office of Government and International Affairs,
1156 Fifteenth Street, NW,
Washington, DC, October 3, 2000.
The Honorable Gordon Smith
Chairman, Subcommittee on European Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Smith:
On behalf of the American Jewish Committee, I am writing to applaud
you and Chairman Brownback of the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs for convening a joint subcommittee hearing this
Thursday, October 5, 2000, on the transfer of dangerous Russian
technologies and strategic weapons capabilities to Iran.
The American Jewish Committee, which has provided U.S. policy-
makers with independent research on Iran's weapons programs since 1995,
urges a strong U.S. response to stem the flow of foreign technology and
supplies to Iran. Such transfers are used by Iran to enhance its
nuclear, biological, chemical, and conventional weapons programs, a
clear threat to the security of the United States and its allies. The
United States must remain vigilant in its efforts to restrict the
proliferation of the sophisticated technology necessary for Iran to
advance its strategic weapons programs and to discourage those who
trade with Iran from easing restrictions on dual use technology that
could be employed to enhance Iran's weapons capabilities.
Despite the appearance of political change in Iran, the Islamic
Republic continues to sponsor international terrorism, remains strongly
opposed to Arab-Israel peace efforts, and engages in efforts to smuggle
and develop weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems that could
reach Israel and Europe. Of particular concern is Russia's cooperation
with Iran in recent years in the development and acquisition of nuclear
and other nonconventional weapons technologies, and Iran's ballistic
missile program.
In furtherance of the subcommittees' efforts, I am enclosing copies
of AJC's June 2000 report entitled ``Iran and Weapons of Mass
Destruction.'' I respectfully request that this report be distributed
to the members of both the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs and the Subcommittee on European Affairs, and that the report,
with this letter, be made a part of the record of the October 5 joint
subcommittee hearing.
Thank you for your consideration of our request and our views on
this important matter.
Sincerely,
Jason F. Isaacson, Director.
Iran and Weapons of Mass Destruction
(By W. Seth Carus)
IN BRIEF
In August 1998--as much as ten years ahead of U.S. intelligence
predictions--Iran tested the Shahab-3, a medium-range ballistic missile
capable of hitting targets in Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Iran
may now possess an arsenal of more than 400 ballistic missiles of
various ranges.
Iran is also pushing the development of nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons of mass destruction deliverable by missile. Although
lacking the infrastructure for an indigenous nuclear weapons program,
Iran could acquire nuclear weapons in a relatively short time by
purchasing fissile materials or even by stealing one or more finished
weapons from the former Soviet Union. Little is known about Iran's
biological weapons program except that Iran has sought to hire
scientists formerly associated with the Soviet program. Experts believe
that Iran now has the most active chemical warfare program in the
developing world.
In the past, the United States has had considerable success in
delaying Iran's arms buildup. Its current policy options include those
designed to further delay Iran's progress by denying it the foreign
technology and technical expertise it requires through various arms
control and export control programs. Another class of options are those
designed to deter Iran's ultimate use of weapons of mass destruction,
including theater missile defenses and consequence management.
______
Iran and Weapons of Mass Destruction
On August 4, 1998, Iran launched the Shahab-3, a seventeen-ton
medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) capable of carrying a 1.2-ton
payload an estimated 1,300 kilometers.\1\ Only eighteen months before,
a senior U.S. intelligence official had told Congress that Iran might
take as long as ten years to acquire a missile with such a long
range.\2\ After the test launch, the U.S. government recognized that
``the Shahab-3 significantly alters the military equation in the Middle
East by giving Tehran the capability to strike targets in Israel, Saudi
Arabia, and most of Turkey.'' \3\ The Shahab-3 became operational in
early 2000.\4\
Iran's development of the Shahab-3 is significant for two reasons.
First, it gives Iran a delivery system capable of striking every
important U.S. ally in the region, including Egypt, Israel, and Turkey.
Second, the system was clearly designed to deliver weapons of mass
destruction. Iran currently has active programs to develop nuclear,
biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons. Although many of these programs
began in the early 1980s, during Iran's long war with Iraq, the pace of
development significantly accelerated in the early 1990s.
Iran's efforts to develop these weapons are having a significant
impact on the strategic environment in the entire Middle East. In
addition to undermining international nonproliferation norms, these
programs pose a direct military threat to U.S. friends and allies in
the region and to U.S. military forces deployed there. Significantly,
the Iranians appear to have accelerated their work on NBC weapons and
associated delivery systems in recent years. Some analysts appear to
believe that Iran would use its NBC weapons and missiles only if the
survival of the regime were in question. Unfortunately, the limited
available evidence calls into question that thesis. Iran's storage of
chemical weapons on Abu Musa, an island in the Persian Gulf off the
coast of Dubai, suggests that Tehran would use such weapons long before
the regime's security was in doubt.\5\
``. . . weapons of mass destruction are a necessary component of
defense and a high priority.''
The development of NBC weapons and associated delivery systems has
significant support in Iran. George Tenet, Director of Central
Intelligence, noted this in testimony to Congress earlier this year:
``[Iran's] reformists and conservatives agree on at least one thing:
weapons of mass destruction are a necessary component of defense and a
high priority.'' \6\
NBC WEAPONS PROGRAMS
Iran's progress in developing NBC capabilities varies considerably
from program to program. Lack of money, difficulties in integrating
complex programs, and constraints imposed by Western technology-
transfer controls have slowed the programs. The chemical weapons
program appears considerably more advanced than the nuclear and
biological programs. Although Iran has made considerable progress in
developing ballistic missiles, it is less clear that it has developed
missile delivery systems for its existing chemical or biological
agents. Nevertheless, unless significant changes occur in Iran, it is
only a matter of time before Iran has an effective arsenal with
deliverable nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons capable of
reaching Israel and other U.S. allies in the region.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Since the early 1980s, U.S. government officials have worried that
the clerical regime in Tehran was bent on acquiring the infrastructure
needed to build a nuclear weapon. These concerns became more acute in
the early 1990s. A 1997 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency report gave
the following assessment of Iran's nuclear activities: ``Although
Iran's rudimentary program has apparently met with limited success so
far, the U.S. believes Iran has not abandoned its efforts to expand its
nuclear infrastructure to support nuclear weapon development.'' \7\ In
early 1999, Director of Central Intelligence Tenet testified that Iran
``seems to be pushing its [nuclear] program forward.'' \8\
Numerous estimates, many unduly pessimistic, have been made
regarding the time required for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. In
1992, one U.S. government agency reportedly calculated that Iran was
eight to ten years from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Press reports in
1995 suggested that some Israeli experts thought that Iran would cross
the nuclear threshold within five years. The most credible estimate was
provided in January 1995 by U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry and
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin, who estimated that Iran would need
seven to fifteen years to acquire a nuclear weapons capability.\9\ That
implied acquisition between 2002 and 2010. In contrast, Gen. Anthony C.
Zinni, commander, Central Command--and thus responsible for U.S.
military forces in the Middle East--believes that Iran will acquire a
nuclear weapon in the next few years.\10\
The Iranian effort to acquire nuclear weapons has been hampered by
an inadequate technical base. According to the Defense Department:
At this stage, Iran's scientific and technical base remains
insufficient to support major nuclear programs. The Iranians
recognize their dependence on foreign assistance and are
encouraging younger Iranians to study abroad to gain needed
technical assistance.\11\
Although the Iranians have made considerable efforts to enhance
their nuclear infrastructure during the past four years, there is
little public evidence to suggest that they have made more than limited
progress. This implies that they still might require seven to fifteen
years to produce a weapon.
``[Iran] might steal a weapon from the arsenal of the former Soviet
Union.''
Because Iran's program is in its early stages, it is difficult to
predict how Iran will cross the nuclear threshold. Iran could acquire
nuclear weapons in one of several ways. First, it might steal a weapon
from the arsenal of the former Soviet Union. Second, the Iranians could
acquire fissile material, highly enriched uranium or plutonium suitable
for use in making atomic bombs. Finally, Iran could create the
infrastructure needed to produce fissile material on its own.
There have been persistent rumors that Iran has already stolen
weapons, but to date U.S. government officials have denied the
claims.\12\ Iran could steal a weapon clandestinely and provide no
visible indicators to alert the outside world. Accordingly, there is
serious concern that, should Iran steal a weapon, the outside world
would have no knowledge of it until the Iranians decided to make their
possession public.
The acquisition of fissile material from the former Soviet Union
would allow the Iranians to significantly shorten their time-lines to
fielding a crude nuclear weapon quite soon. There is some evidence that
the Iranians were interested in acquiring fissile material from
Kazakhstan in the early 1990s.\13\ One source estimates that it would
take Iran only nine to thirty-six months to produce a fission bomb once
it obtains the necessary fissile material.\14\ This concern is probably
reflected in General Zinni's pessimistic view.
Should Iran have to produce its own fissile material, it will take
considerably longer for Iran to develop a weapon. This process also
will provide early warning, because of the size and complexity of the
associated facilities and the unique signatures of the chemicals used.
There is evidence that Iran has explored the development of
capabilities to produce both highly enriched uranium and plutonium.
Production of these two materials requires considerably different
infrastructures.
Iran's current efforts appear focused on completing the VVER-1000
reactor that the Russians are building at Bushehr. This type of reactor
is considered poorly suited to plutonium production, and Russia has
promised that the reactor will be subject to inspection by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and that spent fuel will be
returned to Russia.\15\ Should Iran decide to break these agreements,
it could extract plutonium from the spent fuel, but only if it also
builds reprocessing facilities. Although the Iranians tried to obtain
such a facility from Russia, there are no reports that it has one at
present. U.S. government officials are concerned that acquisition of
the Russian reactor will provide Iranian scientists with skills needed
for reactor operation and materials handling. The greater concern
remains that Iran will obtain a new reactor better suited to production
of plutonium.
Efforts by Iran to enhance its nuclear infrastructure have been
stymied by effective U.S. government efforts to curtail Iranian
technology acquisitions. In response to U.S. pressure, Iran has taken
the unusual step of allowing the IAEA to conduct relatively intrusive
inspections of its nuclear infrastructure. The IAEA has detected no
violations of Iran's Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) commitments.
Although some experts discount the IAEA conclusions, most believe that
Iran is so early in the process of developing nuclear weapons that it
has little need to hide its activities.\16\
Numerous Iranian efforts to obtain nuclear technology have fallen
apart due to strong U.S. pressure. As Iran broadened its search for
countries willing to supply sensitive nuclear technology, it found door
after door slammed shut. As a result, by the early 1990s Iran was
largely limited to two principal suppliers of nuclear technology: China
and Russia. Some U.S. government experts believe that Iran requires
Chinese or Russian assistance to develop nuclear weapons capabilities.
As a Department of Defense report noted, ``Chinese and Russian supply
policies are key to Iran's success.'' \17\
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
Iran has an offensive biological weapons program that may have
produced small quantities of biological agents. The U.S. Defense
Department believes that the pace of Iranian development efforts
probably accelerated after the 1995 disclosures regarding Iraq's
biological weapons program.\18\ It is unclear from the available
information when U.S. government experts believe that Iran will have a
fully mature biological agent dissemination capability.
There is relatively little public information about Iran's
biological weapons program. During the 1980s, an Iranian scientist made
repeated efforts to acquire different strains of a fungus that produces
mycotoxins from facilities in Canada. Subsequently, it developed that
the same Iranian had attempted to acquire the organisms from the
Central Bureau for Fungus Cultures in the Netherlands.\19\ Mycotoxins
are the poison associated with the allegations that the Soviet Union
used biological agents in Southeast Asia.
``. . . Iran is attempting to hire scientists who worked in the former
Soviet biological weapons program.''
According to a December 1998 New York Times report, Iran is
attempting to hire scientists who worked in the former Soviet
biological weapons program. The Soviet Union had the world's largest
and most sophisticated effort to develop biological weapons. At least
some of these scientists have accepted the Iranian offers, although it
remains unclear how many have done so or what expertise they bring to
bear.\20\
In January 1999, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, which
is associated with the Mujahadeen (an Iraqi-supported group), made a
series of allegations about the Iranian biological weapons program,
charging that Iran has four research centers involved in the production
of biological weapons. The council also alleged that four groups were
involved in Iran's biological weapons program, and that these
organizations were supported by an additional six research centers.
However, the reliability of this information is cast into doubt by
obvious inaccuracies, such as calling the chemical agent VX a
biological agent.\21\
Most experts believe that Iran is developing standard biological
weapons agents, such as anthrax and botulinum toxin, although the
National Council of Resistance of Iran also mentions aflatoxin, an
agent of uncertain utility adopted by the Iraqis.\22\ The basis for
these claims is unknown, and given Iranian ties to Russian expertise,
the possibility that Iran might adopt agents weaponized by the former
Soviet program, such as Marburg, smallpox, plague, and tularemia,
cannot be discounted.\23\
The Iranians are trying to reduce the dependence of their
biological weapons program on foreign technology and assistance:
Tehran--driven in part by stringent international export
controls--has set about acquiring the ability to produce
domestically the raw materials and equipment needed to support
indigenous biological agent production.\24\
CHEMICAL WEAPONS
Iran started its chemical weapons program in 1983 to respond to
Iraqi use of chemical agents and produced its first agent the next
year. In 1996, the Defense Department estimated that cumulative
production had reached ``a minimum several hundred tons of blister,
blood, and choking agents.'' \25\ One source claims that the Iranians
might have as much as 2,000 tons of chemical agents, possibly including
nerve agents.\26\ More authoritatively, General Zinni has reported that
Iran ``may have produced several thousands tons of chemical agents to
date.'' \27\ According to Middle East defense analyst Michael
Eisenstadt, ``Iran has the most active chemical warfare program in the
developing world.'' \28\
Iran is also working to enhance the sophistication of its chemical
program. It is trying to develop nerve agents, including VX, the most
advanced agent to enter the inventories of the United States and the
Soviet Union.\29\ The U.S. government has suggested that Iran possesses
stockpiles of chemical-filled artillery shells and bombs.\30\
Persistent reports that Iran may possess chemical warheads for its SCUD
missiles have never been confirmed.\31\
The effectiveness of Iran's existing chemical weapons arsenal is
uncertain. Iran apparently relies heavily on hydrogen cyanide as a
chemical weapon.\32\ While highly toxic, this chemical does not make an
effective chemical agent. Although the Germans claim that they suffered
deaths due to French hydrogen cyanide, the U.S. Army failed in its
efforts during the Second World War to turn it into an effective
weapon.\33\ Even if the Iranians succeeded where others have failed,
and successfully built reliable weapons using hydrogen cyanide, the
chemical is significantly less effective than other chemical agents.
One estimate suggests that twenty tons of hydrogen cyanide are needed
to equal the military effectiveness of one ton of sarin nerve
agent.\34\
Considerable uncertainty surrounds the Iranian chemical weapons
program. The Iranians have signed onto the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC). Under the terms of this treaty, the Iranians will be forced to
eliminate existing stocks of chemical weapons and will be required to
dismantle chemical production facilities. The U.S. Defense Department
has cast doubt on the sincerity of the Iranians in this regard:
Although Iran has signed the CWC, its efforts to establish an
independent chemical production capability and a wide program
to put chemicals into battlefield weapons cast doubt on its
adherence to the agreement.\35\
It believes that Iran ``continues to upgrade and expand its
chemical warfare production infrastructure and munitions arsenal.''
Recent reports that Iraq may be acquiring from Russia a new type of
chemical agent, known as Novichok agents, should raise concerns that
Iran may do the same.\36\ The Soviet Union reportedly developed the
Novichok agents in order to evade the controls imposed by the Chemical
Weapons Convention. Although prohibited by the treaty, these agents are
not specifically mentioned in the annexes to the convention. Russian
scientists estimated that one of the Novichok agents was five to eight
times more lethal than VX, the most dangerous nerve agent that the
United States ever developed.\37\
LONG-RANGE DELIVERY SYSTEMS
Essential to the effectiveness of an NBC weapon is the delivery
system used to transport it to the intended target. The delivery system
must be capable of carrying the weapon's weight, must have sufficient
range to reach the intended target, and must be accurate enough to
allow the weapon to perform effectively. Although many systems can be
used to deliver NBC weapons, special modifications are needed to ensure
that the weapon operates effectively. For tactical applications, field
artillery can be used, and Iran is believed to possess such munitions
for at least its chemical agents. To strike targets at longer ranges,
however, Iran needs to rely on either long-range aircraft, such as its
Soviet-supplied Su-24 strike aircraft, or surface-to-surface ballistic
missiles.
BALLISTIC MISSILES
The Iranians first began to acquire ballistic missiles in the mid-
1980s, when the Libyans reportedly provided them with about thirty
Soviet-built SCUD-C missiles with a range of 300 kilometers. Since
then, Iran has acquired additional missiles from North Korea and China,
and has been provided with assistance for indigenous development of
missiles by China, North Korea, and Russia.
According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies,
Iran currently has more than 400 surface-to-surface missiles, including
about twenty-five CSS-8 launchers with 200 missiles and about ten SCUD
launchers with 210 SCUD-B and SCUD-C missiles.\38\ These missiles have
sufficient range to hit targets in Iraq and the other states bordering
the Persian Gulf. They cannot, however, strike targets very far into
Saudi Arabia, and are unable to reach Israel. In addition, the missiles
are relatively inaccurate. Nevertheless, Iran appears to have
sufficient inventory to allow it to export some to the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (previously called Zaire), according to a
November 1999 press report.\39\
``. . . Iran will soon possess a small arsenal of operational
systems.''
Iran's efforts to develop a regionally significant missile
capability took a long step forward with the test launch of the Shahab-
3. Although the number of Shahab-3 missiles is not known, it is likely
that Iran will soon possess a small arsenal of operational systems. The
United States believes that Russian technology has played a critical
part in the development of the Shahab-3, even though the missile itself
is based on the North Korean No Dong.\40\ In late 1999, a senior U.S.
defense official reported that Iran was experiencing problems with the
missile and has had several unsuccessful tests.\41\ In early 2000 the
Iranians conducted a successful test launch of a Shahab-3, using one of
a dozen North Korean rocket motors supplied to Tehran in 1999.\42\
Iran is also believed to be working on follow-up systems to the
Shahab-3. Reportedly, Iran has a Shahab-4, which appears to be an
intermediate-range ballistic missile, and a Shahab-5, which will be a
10,000-kilometer-range intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). A
December 1999 report states that General Zinni believes that Iran is
likely to test the Shahab-4 in early 2000.\43\
In addition to these missiles, Kenneth Timmerman believes that Iran
is developing a new missile, known as the Kosar. The Kosar is based on
the Soviet SS-5 missile and uses the same RD-216 liquid-fuel rocket
motor. The SS-5 had a range of 4,250 kilometers. This missile may be
the basis for Iran's reported space launch vehicle.\44\ The
relationship between the Kosar and Shahab-4 or Shahab-5 is unclear.
Iran may also be testing a sea-based launching capability for its
missiles to allow it to strike targets too distant to be reached by
missiles fired from within its borders. According to one report, in
early 1998 Iran tested a short-range surface-to-surface missile from a
barge located in the Caspian Sea. The report suggests that Iran may
intend to launch missiles from merchant ships, thus allowing it to
strike Israel or the United States with its SCUD-class missiles.\45\
Significantly, the U.S. intelligence community is no longer sure
that it will take Iran a long time to develop an ICBM:
If Iran follows a development time line similar to that
demonstrated with the Shahab-3, which included significant
foreign assistance, it would take Iran many years to develop a
9,000 to 10,000 km range ICBM capable of reaching the United
States. But Iran could significantly shorten the acquisition
time--and warning time--by purchasing key components or entire
systems from potential sellers such as North Korea.\46\
The evolving views of the U.S. intelligence community on the
possibility that Iran could acquire ICBMs are reflected in the
unclassified version of a National Intelligence Estimate released in
September 1999. According to the public testimony of the national
intelligence officer responsible for the report, North Korea is the
most likely country to acquire an ICBM. Significantly, he then
suggested that ``Iran is the next hostile country most capable of
testing an ICBM capable of delivering a weapon to the United States
during the next 15 years.'' Other assessments of Iranian missile
capabilities include the following:
Iran could test an ICBM that could deliver a several-
hundred-kilogram payload to many parts of the United States in
the latter half of the next decade, using Russian technology
and assistance.
Iran could pursue a Taepo Dong-type ICBM and could test a
Taepo Dong-1 or Taepo Dong-2-type ICBM, possibly with North
Korean assistance, in the next few years.
Iran is likely to test an SLV (space launch vehicle) by 2010
that--once developed--could be converted into an ICBM capable
of delivering a several-hundred-kilogram payload to the United
States.
Beyond that, analysts differ on the likely timing of Iran's
first flight test of an ICBM that could threaten the United
States. Assessments include:
likely before 2010 and very likely before 2015 (noting that
an SLV with ICBM capabilities will probably be tested within
the next few years);
no more than an even chance by 2010 and a better than even
chance by 2015;
and less than an even chance by 2015.\47\
As the alternative views suggest, there is little agreement within
the intelligence community about the time required for Iran to acquire
an ICBM capability. Given the high risks of underestimating the threat
from Iran, it is probably prudent to assume that Iran will possess a
missile capable of striking U.S. cities by 2010.
``Iran is the next hostile country most capable of testing an ICBM
capable of delivering a weapon to the United States . . .''
The key problem for the Iranian ballistic missile program is now
the development of warhead designs to permit effective delivery of NBC
weapons. As the Iranians develop longer-range systems, the need for
more sophisticated warheads grows. A warhead suitable for use in a
short-range ballistic missile, such as the SCUD-B, which flies at a
relatively low speed and does not leave the atmosphere, is unlikely to
be useful in a missile with longer ranges that flies at higher
velocities and goes outside the atmosphere.
For biological and chemical weapons, this means developing warheads
intended for cluster munition delivery. The United States and the
Soviet Union are known to have developed chemical and biological
cluster munitions for use in ballistic missiles. Significantly, the
Soviet Union reportedly developed a system for use in delivering
biological agents in intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).\48\
Iranian efforts to develop ballistic missiles have been materially
aided by Russia. This support continues despite numerous efforts by the
United States to convince the Russians to end it. In February 1999,
George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, testified about this
activity:
Especially during the last six months, expertise and materiel
from Russia has continued to assist the Iranian missile effort
in areas ranging from training, to testing, to components. This
assistance is continuing as we speak, and there is no doubt
that it will play a crucial role in Iran's ability to develop
more sophisticated and longer range missiles.\49\
CRUISE MISSILES
The Iranians also have an interest in cruise missiles. Cruise
missiles are unmanned aircraft-like missiles with a self-contained
guidance system. Using modern satellite navigation systems, cruise
missiles can attain accuracies of less than 20 meters. They can carry
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. Some experts believe that
cruise missiles are more effective delivery systems for chemical and
biological agents than ballistic missiles.\50\
Iran is known to possess several remotely piloted vehicles and
antiship cruise missiles. In 1989, the Iranians displayed three
homemade remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs), apparently intended
primarily for reconnaissance purposes. All three were simple propeller-
driven designs that relied on radio control for guidance, much like a
hobbyist's model airplane. Significantly, the Iranians suggested that
the craft could be used as weapons, indicating an interest in land-
attack cruise missiles.\51\
Recently, Iran took a significant step forward in its efforts to
develop cruise missile capabilities. According to the Washington Post,
U.S. intelligence experts believe that Iran can now make the C-802
antiship cruise missile, which is a Chinese system based on the French
Exocet antiship missile.\52\ The C-803 has a range of seventy-five
miles and can carry a payload of 365 pounds. The C-802 is powered by a
version of the French TRI-60 engine manufactured by Microturbo. This
engine is used in a variety of cruise missiles, including the French
Apache, which has a range of up to 800 kilometers, depending on the
version.
``The U.S. government has now spent more than fifteen years trying to
stop Iran's NBC acquisition programs.''
If these reports are correct, there is little to stand in the way
of an Iranian effort to acquire cruise missiles suitable for delivery
of biological and chemical weapons. A version of the C-802 could have
the range and payload for such weapons if intended for use against a
neighboring state. For longer ranges, the Iranians would have to rely
on a different system. The Iranians could marry the Silkworm platform
to develop a longer-range missile with a large payload, as much as 800
kilometers according to an estimate given by Aaron Karp, an expert on
missile proliferation.\53\
U.S. POLICY OPTIONS
What steps can be taken to halt or constrain Iran's efforts to
develop weapons of mass destruction? The U.S. government has now spent
more than two decades working to stop Iran's NBC acquisition programs.
The good news is that these efforts have achieved many successes, and
as a result the Iranians' capabilities are far less advanced than would
have been the case without the U.S. initiatives. The bad news is that
it is highly unlikely that it will be possible to stop or roll back the
Iranian weapons programs. Thus the United States needs to prepare to
deal with the implications of Iranian possession of NBC weapons and
their associated delivery systems.
This view may seem unduly pessimistic. But the reality, as shown by
the difficulties associated with efforts to eliminate Iraq's NBC
programs, is that it is virtually impossible to terminate such
activities without the active agreement of the proliferating country.
Any country truly committed to acquiring NBC weapons will eventually
obtain them. Nonproliferation efforts, however, are critical for
several reasons, First, such efforts drive up the cost of the programs,
thus inevitably reducing the size of Iran's weapons arsenal. Second,
prevention programs reduce the likely sophistication of the
capabilities, because the Iranians necessarily find it more difficult
to obtain the needed technology from the best sources. Finally,
nonproliferation efforts impose delays, and thus make it less likely
that Iran will have the capabilities that it seeks in time of crisis.
Thus, even only partially successful U.S. policies have yielded
significant benefits. Nor should the United States abandon these
policies once Iran actually begins to acquire NBC weapons. When Iran
acquires the capability to use a particular class of weapons, it will
seek to enhance the sophistication of these weapons and expand the size
of its arsenal. Iran is not satisfied to possess first- and second-
generation chemical agents, such as hydrogen cyanide and mustard gas.
It also wants more effective third-generation chemical agents, such as
VX. Similarly, it is not enough to acquire short-range ballistic
missiles; Iran also wants longer-range systems.
What this suggests, however, is that nonproliferation programs
cannot be the only components of a response to Iran's NBC programs.
Military responses, such as active and passive defenses against NBC
weapons, are also essential to reduce the effectiveness of these
weapons if they are used. These must be coupled with deterrence
policies designed to reduce the willingness of the Iranians to employ
NBC weapons, as well as reassurance policies intended to demonstrate to
U.S. allies and friends in the to their security.
In sum, then, U.S. policy options are of two types: (1) those that
delay Iran's development of weapons of mass destruction through arms
control, Cooperative Threat Reduction, and export controls, and (2)
those that deter Iran's ultimate use of such weapons, including theater
missile defenses, biological and chemical defenses, and consequence
management.
DELAY OPTIONS
A review of Iran's NBC and missile development programs suggests
that the Iranians have two weaknesses that can be exploited as the
United States continues to develop its responses. First, Iran remains
dependent on foreign technology and technical expertise, especially in
program management and systems integration. Second, the Iranians have
limited financial resources, and that prevents them from establishing
massive redundant programs in the way the Iraqis did during the 1980s.
This means that they cannot compensate for delays or increased costs
imposed by U.S. interference simply by throwing more money at the
problem.
Arms Control. The framework for U.S. efforts to constrain Iran is
the nonproliferation regime created over many years through the
negotiation of multilateral arms-control treaties intended to prevent
the proliferation of NBC weapons and related delivery systems. These
agreements provide the structure to accommodate a wide range of
supporting activities essential for the success of nonproliferation
policies.
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is intended to halt the
spread of nuclear weapons by controlling sensitive technologies
associated with nuclear weapons development. The NPT focus has
traditionally been on the nuclear fuel cycle, designed to prevent a
country from building the infrastructure needed to produce fissionable
material. The problem is that there are alternative ways to acquire
fissile material, especially given the disarray in the former Soviet
Union. Thus, even if the IAEA mechanisms are highly effective-a dubious
proposition-Iran still possesses alternative routes to acquire nuclear
weapons.
Two treaties form the basis for arms control in the area of
biological weapons. The 1926 Geneva Protocol prohibits the use of
biological weapons, while the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
prohibits their possession or production. The BWC, however, provides no
inspection or verification system. Some arms-control advocates believe
it possible to create such arrangements in the area of biological
weapons, but there is considerable reason to question the utility of
such a development, since it is doubtful whether even a well designed
verification system would detect an illicit biological weapons program.
Certainly, the experience of the United Nations Special Commission
(UNSCOM) in Iraq gives grounds for skepticism about the prospects for
an effective inspection regime for biological weapons programs. The
main use of the BWC, then, is to provide the international norm that
justifies U.S. concerns over Iran's illegal efforts to develop
biological weapons.
Finally, there is the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). As
previously noted, Iran will have to eliminate its chemical weapons
capabilities in order to come into compliance with the CWC. Iran has
admitted past possession of chemical weapons production facilities but
does not admit to any current possession.\54\ It may try to evade
treaty restrictions and retain chemical weapons and their production
capabilities. The United States must use the international mechanisms
being developed to ensure compliance with the CWC to expose illicit
Iranian activities. With these treaties as a foundation, the United
States can use bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to constrain
Iranian efforts to acquire technology.
``The U.S. government has placed a high premium on the Cooperative
Threat Reduction program to prevent Iran--or any other
country--from acquiring weapons.''
Cooperative Threat Reduction. When the Soviet Union collapsed, U.S.
government officials recognized that there was a high risk that
expertise, technology, and sensitive materials critical to the
development of NBC weapons could assist proliferating countries like
Iran. As a result, the Cooperative Threat Reduction initiative was
launched. Although the program deals with biological and chemical
components, its primary focus has been the security of the nuclear
technology of the states that formerly constituted the Soviet Union.
The U.S. government has placed a high premium on the Cooperative
Threat Reduction program to prevent Iran--or any other country--from
acquiring weapons. Whether these efforts will be sufficient to prevent
future thefts, given Russia's growing economic and political turmoil,
remains to be seen.
Export Controls. Iranian efforts to develop NBC weapons and
delivery systems depend heavily on foreign assistance. Iran's nuclear
weapons program appears to rely on China and Russia, its chemical
weapons program on China, its biological weapons program on Russia, and
its missile program on a combination of Russian, Chinese, and North
Korean support. The salience of external support is evident in a U.S.
Defense Department statement about Iran's chemical weapons program:
China is an important supplier of technologies and equipment
for Iran's chemical warfare program. Therefore, Chinese supply
policies will be key to whether Tehran attains its long-term
goal of independent production for these weapons.\55\
``. . . eliminating foreign support for Iran's weapons program would
slow development, reduce sophistication, and increase cost.''
This suggests that eliminating foreign support for Iran's weapons
programs would slow development, reduce sophistication, and increase
costs.
The Clinton administration has pressured China, Russia, and North
Korea to end state-supported activities and to curtail illicit exports.
The track record, however, is extremely uneven. North Korea, which
clearly views missile sales as a source of badly needed foreign
exchange, has made it quite clear that it will continue the practice.
Similarly, there are severe doubts about the willingness of China and
Russia to stop all but the most flagrant exports.
Two problems make it impossible to rely on export controls to halt
transfers of technology. First, despite considerable pressure from
Congress, the administration has not been willing to impose significant
costs on China or Russia for their ongoing efforts to support Iran's
weapons programs. For a variety of reasons, the administration has
determined that pushing too hard on these issues would harm efforts to
develop closer ties with China and Russia. Although this view may be
justified by the broader context of U.S. strategic interests, it does
nothing to keep Iran from developing NBC weapons.
Second, even countries that support U.S. nonproliferation
objectives are often more willing to trade with Iran than the United
States believes appropriate. This is a clear lesson of the French
willingness to sell Microturbo engines to Iran, ostensibly as power
generators, even though the equipment might be helping Iran develop an
indigenous production capability for cruise missiles. While some U.S.
officials believe that the engine parts supplied by France assisted
Iran in its efforts to produce cruise missile engines, the French were
unwilling to be persuaded by the U.S. evidence. If it is difficult to
reach agreement with a NATO partner, the prospects of reaching
agreement with countries that have radically different views of their
national interests are even less likely.
Trade Restrictions. In particular, the U.S. Congress has sought to
exploit Iran's need for investments. A focal point of this effort was
the 1996 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA). In May 1998, the
administration, however, agreed to waive sanctions for oil and gas
investments in Iran, effectively gutting the act. Secretary of State
Madeline Albright justified this action in the following way:
Among other factors, I considered the significant, enhanced
cooperation we have achieved with the European Union and Russia
in accomplishing ILSA's primary objective of inhibiting Iran's
ability to develop weapons of mass destruction and support of
terrorism.\56\
The European countries in particular objected to IILSA due to the
insistence on imposing sanctions on entities outside the legal
jurisdiction of the United States. Moreover, the Europeans prefer a
policy of engagement toward Tehran, rather than one that focuses on
sanctions.
As a practical matter, ILSA had only a limited impact on Iran. In
general, the Iranians have been hindered more by unfriendly investment
policies than by U.S. sanctions legislation. Indeed, a study by the
Economist Intelligence Unit ranked Iran 59 of 60 countries reviewed for
their attractiveness to foreign investors.\57\
DETERRENCE OPTIONS
The Department of Defense's Counterproliferation Initiative was
started in the early days of the Clinton administration because
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin strongly believed that nonproliferation
efforts might fail, and, as a result, the U.S. military might be forced
to fight an adversary armed with NBC weapons. As originally conceived,
the Counterproliferation Initiative focused on having a balanced
military response to allow the United States to defeat an NBC-armed
adversary.
Theater Missile Defenses. Active defenses are a critical element of
efforts to defeat NBC weapons. Because the most likely delivery systems
for these weapons are ballistic and cruise missiles, the U.S. military
needs robust theater missile defense systems. The importance of the
missile defenses was highlighted during the 1991 Gulf War, when the
mere presence of Patriot missile batteries helped nullify the strategic
advantage that the Iraqis gained from their missile attacks against
Israel and Saudi Arabia. Although there is little evidence that the
Patriots successfully intercepted many missiles, they provided enormous
political benefits. This demonstrates the importance of having even
partially effective missile defense systems.
As a result of its experience in the Gulf War, Israel increased its
commitment to missile defenses and to the Arrow missile program. The
first three Arrow batteries became operational in March 2000.
Unfortunately for Israel, Iranian missiles pose an even tougher
challenge than the Iraqi missiles. The farther a ballistic missile
flies, the higher its speed is on reentry and the harder it is for a
missile defense system to hit it. Similarly, Israel appears interested
in developing a so-called Boost Phase Intercept weapon, which is
designed to destroy a ballistic missile just after launch or a launcher
immediately after it has fired such a missile. The Israeli program
appears to rely on remotely piloted vehicles, which would have to be
flown into Iranian territory, a daunting technical challenge. The
United States needs to work with Israel to ensure that the latter has
the range of capabilities needed to defend against Iranian missiles.
Biological and Chemical Defenses. After the Gulf War, the U.S.
Defense Department determined that the U.S. military lacked adequate
biological and chemical defenses. Since then, there has been a serious
effort to enhance the quantity and quality of such defenses. This
includes equipment designed to detect chemical and biological agents,
protective garments and gas masks that put barriers between soldiers
and the toxic materials, and decontaminating agents to eliminate
hazardous substances.
Israel is the only country in the region that has a significant
capability in these matters. In addition, it is one of the few
countries anywhere in the world that provides such protection for its
civilian population. Israel, then, is probably better prepared as a
nation to deal with this threat than virtually any other country,
including the United States.
Consequence Management. As a result of the Clinton administration's
concern that U.S. cities may be increasingly vulnerable to biological
and chemical terrorism, the United States is devoting considerable
resources to programs for mitigating the consequences of biological and
chemical weapons attacks on urban areas. This means developing response
capabilities to deal with casualties and to clean up contaminated
areas. The significant expenditure of resources on this is providing
the United States a unique expertise in the complexities of dealing
with the consequences of biological and chemical use against civilians.
Israel already has considerable capability to conduct consequence
management, and the techniques being developed in the United States
will enhance its capacity to respond. Unfortunately, other U.S. allies
in the region lack Israel's capabilities. The United States needs to
work with them to ensure that they are not left vulnerable to
biological and chemical weapons attack.
CONCLUSION
The United States probably cannot stop Iran from acquiring NBC
weapons, so long as the Iranians remain willing to pay the political
and economic costs of pursuing such programs. But there is a great deal
the United States can do to constrain Iranian capabilities so as to
reduce the risks they pose to the U.S. military forces operating in the
region and to U.S. friends and allies there. Three administrations have
pursued policies aimed at preventing the Iranians from acquiring NBC
weapons and missile delivery systems. Although they have not prevented
Iran from making dangerous progress, the Iranians would be considerably
more powerful today if it had not been for those efforts. These
policies have slowed the Iranian programs, increased their financial
cost, and limited the size and sophistication of Iranian capabilities.
``. . . even rudimentary Iranian capabilities pose a danger to U.S.
friends and allies in the region.''
However, even rudimentary Iranian capabilities pose a danger to
U.S. friends and allies in the region. This means that the United
States must actively assist those countries develop responses to the
threat posed by NBC weapons. What is needed will vary from one country
to another. Israel is unique because it has the capacity to develop
effective responses to Iran's weapons, even as its sensitivity to even
limited casualties makes it highly vulnerable. The United States needs
to continue its collaboration with Israel in missile defenses, and
extend that effort to the arena of consequence management. Other
countries, especially the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states,
lack Israel's robust defense and deterrence capacities, and so the
United States may have to provide more direct assistance. Where
appropriate, the United States needs to ensure the availability of
missile defenses, either by selling missile defense systems or
deploying U.S.-manned systems. Moreover, the United States needs to
work with the GCC countries to enhance their consequence management
capabilities.
Finally, the United States must continue to pursue a strategy that
combines multilateral, bilateral, and unilateral activities. The United
States cannot deal with this problem by itself, and needs the support
of governments around the world. At the same time, the United States
cannot allow its policies to be influenced by those in the
international community who believe that consensus is more important
than results. The United States must be prepared to go it alone when
necessary to protect its national interests, even in the face of
criticism from others.
NOTES
\1\ Tehran IRNA in English, 1722 GMT Aug. 4, 1998, Foreign
Broadcast Information Service (FBIS).
\2\ Statement by Acting Director of Central Intelligence George J.
Tenet before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, hearing on
Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,
Feb. 5, 1997, as found at http://www.cia.gov. He stated: ``in less than
10 years Iran probably will have longer range missiles that will enable
it to target most of Saudi Arabia and Israel.''
\3\ Robert D. Walpole, national intelligence officer for strategic
and nuclear programs, ``North Korea's Taepo Dong Launch and Some
Implications on the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States,''
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Dec. 8, 1998, as found
at http://www.cia.gov.
\4\ Steve Rodan, ``Iran Completes Shihab-3 Development,'' Ha'aretz,
Mar. 12, 2000, as carried by FBIS's on-line data base.
\5\ Ralph Perry, ``Iran rejects chemical weapons charge,'' United
Press International, Mar. 23, 1995.
\6\ Statement of Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet,
as prepared for delivery before the Senate Armed Services Committee
hearing on Current and Projected National Security Threats, Feb. 2,
1999, as found at http://www.cia.gov.
\7\ Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Adherence to and
Compliance with Arms Control, 1997, as found at http://www.acda.gov.
\8\ Statement of George J. Tenet, Feb. 2, 1999.
\9\ New York Times, Jan. 10, 1995, p. A1O.
\10\ Aviation Week & Space Technology, Dec. 13, 1999, p. 33.
\11\ Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and
Response (Washington), April. 1996, p. 14.
\12\ Michael Eisenstadt, Iranian Military Power: Capabilities and
Intentions (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, 1996), p. 24, and Anthony H. Cordesman and Ahmed S. Hashim,
Iran: Dilemmas of Dual Containment (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press,
1997), p. 306.
\13\ Eisenstadt, Iranian Military Power, p. 16.
\14\ Cordesman and Hashim, Iran, p. 306.
\15\ Ibid., pp. 299-301, and Eisenstadt, Iranian Military Power,
pp. 19-21.
\16\ Cordesman and Hashim, Iran, pp. 299-301.
\17\ Proliferation: Threat and Response, November 1997, p. 25.
\18\ Ibid., p. 27.
\19\ Don Sutton, ``Harmful Fungi Requested by Iranian, Scientist
Says,'' Globe and Mail (Toronto), Aug. 14, 1989, p. A1, as cited in Ron
Purver, Chemical and Biological Terrorism: The Threat According to the
Open Literature, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, June 1995, p.
35.
\20\ Judith Miller and William J. Broad, ``Bio-Weapons in Mind,
Iranians Lure Needy Ex-Soviet Scientists,'' New York Times, Dec. 8,
1998, pp. A1, A12.
\21\ ``Iran Accused of Bio-Weapons Program'' Associated Press, Jan.
26, 1999; ``Iranian Opposition Alleges Huge Bio-Warfhre Program in
Tehran,'' Agence France Presse, Jan. 26, 1998.
\22\ Arnold Beichman, ``Arsenal of Germs in Iran?'' Washington
Times, Jan. 26, 1999, p. 17.
\23\ For a discussion of the former Soviet program, see Ken Alibek,
Biohazard (New York: Random House, 1999).
\24\ Statement by Special Assistant to the DCI for Nonproliferation
John A. Lander on the Worldwide Biological Warfare Threat to the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence as prepared for delivery on
Mar. 3, 1999, as found at http:/www.cia.gov
\25\ Proliferation: Threat and Response, April 1996, p. 15.
\26\ Andrew Rathmell, ``Chemical Weapons in the Middle East--
Lessons from Iraq,'' Jane's Intelligence Review, December
1995.Eisenstadt, Iranian Military Power, p. 26, suggests that Iran can
produce several hundred tons of agent per year.
\27\ Statement of Gen. Anthony C. Zinni, commander in chief, U.S.
Central Command, before the House Armed Services Committee, Mar. 11,
1999, as found at http://www.house.gov/hasc/
\28\ Eisenstadt, Iranian Military Power, p. 26.
\29\ Proliferation: Threat and Response, November 1997, p. 27.
\30\ Ibid.
\31\ Cordesman and Hashim, Iran, p. 292, and Eisenstadt, Iranian
Military Power, p. 26.
\32\ Proliferation: Threat and Response, April 1996, p. 15.
\33\ For the First World War experience with hydrogen cyanide, see
L. F. Haber, The Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare in the First World
War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), and Augustin Prentiss, Chemicals
in War: A Treatise on Chemical Warfare (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, 1937), pp. 171-174. World War II research is discussed in
Stanford Moore and Marshall Gates, ``Hydrogen Cyanide and Cyanogen
Chloride,// pp. 7-16, in Division 9, National Defense Research
Committee, Office of Scientific Research and Development, Chemical
Warfare Agents and Related Chemical Problems, parts I-II (Washington,
D.C., 1946).
\34\ Proliferation: Threat and Response, November 1997, p. 27.
\35\ Proliferation: Threat and Response, April 1996, p. 16.
\36\ Richard Z. Chesnoff with Douglas Pasternak, ``Mystery at a
Pesticide Plant,'' US News and World Report, Oct. 25, 1999.
\37\ Judith Miller, ``U.S. and Uzbeks Agree on Chemical Arms Plant
Cleanup,'' New York Times, May 25, 1999, and Jonathan Tucker,
``Converting Former Soviet Chemical Plants,'' Nonproliferation Review,
Fall 1999, pp. 78-89. Tucker's article provides considerable detail on
the program to develop the Novichok agents.
\38\ International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military
Balance, 1998/99 (London: Oxford University Press for the International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998), p. 127.
\39\ ``DRC Receives Iranian `Scud' Missiles,'' Jane's Defence
Weekly, Dec. 1, 1999, and Bill Gertz, ``Iran Sold Scud Missiles to
Congolese,'' Washington Times, Nov. 22, 1999.
\40\ Statement for the Record to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile
Threat to the United States Through 2015 by Robert D. Walpole, National
Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, Sept. 16,
1999, as found at http://www.cia.gov
\41\ Aviation Week & Space Technology, Dec. 13, 1999, p. 33.
\42\ Bill Gertz, ``N. Korea Sells Iran Missile Engines,''
Washington Times, Feb. 9, 2000, p. 1.
\43\ Aviation Week & Space Technology, Dec. 13, 1999, p. 33.
\44\ ``Iran Preparing Bigger Missile Launch,'' Reuters, July 15,
1999. This report is based largely on the testimony of Kenneth R.
Timmerman, president, Middle East Data Project, Inc., before the
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Hearing on H.R. 1883, Iran
Nonproliferation Act of 1999, July 13, 1999, as found at http.//
www.house.gov/science/
\45\ Kenneth Timmerman, ``Trumped by Iran's New Missile,''
Washington Times, May 5, 1999.
\46\ Statement of George J. Tenet, Feb. 2, 1999.
\47\ Statement of Robert D. Walpole, Sept. 16, 1999.
\48\ Alibek, Biohazthd, pp. 5-8.
\49\ Statement of George J. Tenet, Feb. 2, 1999.
\50\ This discussion of cruise missile technologies is based on W.
Seth Carus, Cruise Missile Proliferation in the 1990s (Westport, Conn.:
Praeger, 1992).
\51\ Dan Boyle and Robert Salvy, ``Iranian RPVs,'' International
Defense Review, June 1989, p. 857.
\52\ John Mintz, ``Tracking Arms: A Study in Smoke,'' Washington
Post, Apr. 3, 1999, pp. A3-A4.
\53\ Aaron Karp, ``Lessons of Iranian Missile Programs for U.S.
Nonproliferation Policy,'' Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1998,
p. 20, discusses the possibilities of Iran's developing cruise missile
systems.
\54\ ``News Chronology,'' CBW Conventions Bulletin, Issue No. 46,
December 1999, p. 25, includes Iran in a list of nine countries
(``China, France, India, Iran, Japan, Russia, the UK, the USA, and one
other'') admitted to possession of chemical weapons (U.S., Russia,
India, and ``one other''--the one other is presumably the same one in
the previous list). On 17 November 1998, the Director General of the
Iranian Foreign Ministry admitted that Iran possessed chemical weapons
at the end of the Iran-Iraq war, but said, ``Following the
establishment of cease fire, the decision to develop chemical weapons
capabilities was reversed and the process was terminated.'' See ``News
Chronology,'' CBW Conventions Bulletin, Issue No. 43, February 1999, p.
20.
\55\ Proliferation: Threat and Response, November 1997, p. 27.
\56\ Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Statement on ``Iran
and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA): Decision in the South Pars Case,''
London, United Kingdom, May 18, 1998, as released by the Office of the
Spokesman U.S. Department of State, as found on the Department of State
web site, http://www.state.gov.
\57\ Keith Weissman, ``Iran Falling to Attract Foreign
Investment,'' Near East Report, July 12, 1999, as found at http://www.
aipac.org
