S. Hrg. 106-800
IRAN'S BALLISTIC MISSILE AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAMS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION, AND
FEDERAL SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 21, 2000
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
68-305 WASHINGTON : 2000
_______________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee, Chairman
WILLIAM V. ROTH, Jr., Delaware JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
TED STEVENS, Alaska CARL LEVIN, Michigan
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi MAX CLELAND, Georgia
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire
Hannah S. Sistare, Staff Director and Counsel
Joyce A. Rechtschaffen, Minority Staff Director and Counsel
Darla D. Cassell, Chief Clerk
------
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION, AND FEDERAL SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine CARL LEVIN, Michigan
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania MAX CLELAND, Georgia
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina
Mitchel B. Kugler, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Minority Staff Director
Julie A. Sander, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
------
Opening statement:
Page
Senator Cochran.............................................. 1
WITNESSES
Thursday, September 21, 2000
Robert D. Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic
and Nuclear Programs, National Intelligence Council............ 2
A. Norman Schindler, Deputy Director, DCI Nonproliferation Center 10
Dr. Stephen A. Cambone, Director of Research, Institute for
National Strategic Studies of the National Defense University.. 23
Michael Eisenstadt, Senior Fellow, Washington Institute for Near
East Policy.................................................... 32
Alphabical List of Witnesses
Cambone, Dr. Steven A.:
Testimony.................................................... 23
Prepared statement........................................... 27
Eisenstadt, Michael:
Testimony.................................................... 32
Prepared statement........................................... 36
Schindler, A. Norman:
Testimony.................................................... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Walpole, Robert D.:
Testimony.................................................... 2
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Appendix
Announcement of the Voice of The Islamic Republic of Iran Rodeo
1, article from FBIS, dated September 21, 2000, entitled
``Iran: Shahab-3 `Non-Military' Missile `Successfully' Test-
Fired''........................................................ 45
Article from the Washington Times, February 9, 2000, ``N. Korea
Sells Iran Missile Engines,'' by Bill Gertz.................... 45
IRAN'S BALLISTIC MISSILE AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAMS
----------
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 2000
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on International Security,
Proliferation, and Federal Services,
of the Committee on Governmental Affairs
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:38 p.m. in
room SD-342, Senate Dirksen Building, Hon. Thad Cochran,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senator Cochran.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COCHRAN
Senator Cochran. The Subcommittee will please come to
order.
Let me note at the outset that the Senate is in session and
there had been an objection made to committees of the Senate
meeting today during the session of the Senate. I have checked
with the Parliamentarian on the rule and was advised that the
sanction or prohibition relates to legislation that might be
reported out at a meeting of the Committee that occurs during a
session of the Senate, so that any legislation that is reported
at such a meeting would be subject to a point of order if
called up in the Senate.
We have no intention of meeting for the purpose of
reporting out any legislation at today's session. And so, with
the hope that that understanding is correct as a result of my
discussion with the Parliamentarian, we will proceed with the
hearing at which witnesses have agreed to testify on the
subject of Iran's ballistic missile and weapons of mass
destruction programs.
We welcome all of you to today's hearing, and observe that
in 1995, the Intelligence Community assessed that Iran had
neither the motivation nor the technical and economic resources
to build an intercontinental ballistic missile. That assessment
has changed. In the last 5 years, as the Intelligence Community
now recognizes, Iran has made rapid progress in the development
of longer-range ballistic missiles because of assistance from
North Korea, Russia, and China.
Iran is now on the threshold of developing a missile with
intercontinental ranges. One option available to Iran is to
develop missiles similar to North Korea's Taepo Dong-1 or Taepo
Dong-2 using technology North Korea has already transferred to
Iran or may transfer in future sales. According to the
Intelligence Community, a missile could be flight tested within
the next few years. Another option is to develop a long-range
ballistic missile using technology and assistance from Russia
and other countries, which Intelligence Community officials
have testified could be flight tested as early as 2005.
The substantial assistance Iran continues to receive from
foreign missile suppliers is an indication of Iran's interest
in the development of long-range ballistic missiles. This
assistance will continue to accelerate Iran's capabilities,
though as a result of all the assistance it has already
received Iran now has the capability to do much on its own.
Beyond its own efforts to develop and acquire more advanced
ballistic missiles, Iran has also become a supplier of
ballistic missile technology and assistance to other nations.
Unclassified reports from the Intelligence Community have
identified Iran as a supplier of both Scud missile technology
and solid-propellant missile technology to Syria. Press reports
have also linked Iran to other ballistic missile programs,
including Libya's. In testimony to the Senate earlier this
year, Director of Central Intelligence Tenet said, ``Iran's
existence as a secondary supplier of this technology to other
countries is the trend that worries me the most.''
Iran's Minister of Defense announced a few hours ago that a
Shahab-3 ballistic missile has been tested successfully earlier
today.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The copy of the announcement appears in the Appendix on page
45.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iran also continues its aggressive pursuit of nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons.
Our witnesses today will help us examine the extent and
pace of Iran's ballistic missile and weapons of mass
destruction programs, as well as the prospects for, and
consequences of continued proliferation cooperation between
countries like Iran and North Korea.
Our witnesses today are: Robert Walpole, the Intelligence
Community's National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and
Nuclear Programs; A. Norman Schindler, the Deputy Director of
the Director of Central Intelligence's Nonproliferation Center;
Dr. Stephen Cambone, the former Staff Director for the Rumsfeld
Commission; and Michael Eisenstadt, who is a Senior Fellow at
the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Before we begin, I would like to remind all participants
that this hearing is being held at the unclassified level.
Mr. Walpole, we appreciate your attendance. We know you
have prepared a statement for our Subcommittee. We will print
that statement in the record in its entirety and we encourage
you to make whatever summary comments from the statement you
think would be helpful to the Subcommittee. You may proceed.
TESTIMONY OF ROBERT D. WALPOLE, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
FOR STRATEGIC AND NUCLEAR PROGRAMS, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
COUNCIL
Mr. Walpole. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to
appear in an open session to discuss our assessments of Iran's
missile programs and programs for weapons of mass destruction.
Open sessions give the public a brief glimpse at the important
work that we in the Intelligence Community do for national
security. But as you know, much of our knowledge of Iran's
weapons programs is based on extremely sensitive sources and
methods; it must remain classified or left unsaid in an open
session. Thus, many of the details will have to be summarized
here. We can provide additional details in classified briefings
to you or other Senators if they so desire. We hope the
summaries we give today will be of use to this Subcommittee and
to the public.
The worldwide proliferation of ballistic missiles and
weapons of mass destruction continues to evolve. Short- and
medium-range missiles, particularly if armed with weapons of
mass destruction, already pose a significant threat overseas to
U.S. interests, forces, and allies. Moreover, the proliferation
of missile technology and components continues, contributing to
longer-range systems. Development efforts, in many cases fueled
by foreign assistance, have led to new capabilities, as
illustrated by Iran's Shahab-3 launches in 1998 and 2000, and
North Korea's Taepo Dong-1 space launch attempt in August 1998.
Also disturbing, some of the countries that were formerly
recipients of technology have now been disseminating that to
others.
The Intelligence Community continues to project that during
the next 15 years the United States most likely will face ICBM
threats from North Korea, probably from Iran (the focus of
today's hearing), and possibly from Iraq--barring significant
changes in their political orientations. These threats are, of
course, in addition to long-standing threats from Russia and
China.
That said, the threat facing the United States in the year
2015 will depend on our evolving relations with foreign
countries, the political situation and economic issues in those
countries, and numerous other factors that we cannot predict
with confidence. For example, our current relations with Russia
are significantly different than any one would have forecast 15
years ago. Important changes could develop in Iran and in
Iran's external threat environment over the next 15 years. Iran
is in a period of domestic dynamism, with its parliament and
other institutions engaged in a vibrant and potentially
tumultuous debate about change and reform. At the present time
and at least for the next 3 years, we do not believe that
national debate is likely to produce any fundamental change in
Iran's national security policies and programs.
Recognizing the significant uncertainties surrounding
projections 15 years into the future and the potential for
reformers' success in Iran, we have projected Iranian ballistic
missile trends and capabilities into the future largely based
on assessed technical capabilities, and with the general
premise that Iran's relations with the United States and
related threat perceptions will not change significantly enough
to alter Tehran's intentions. As changes occur, of course, our
assessment of the threat will change as well.
The new missile threats from Iran and others are far
different from those in the Cold War. The emerging threats are
going to involve smaller missiles, less accurate, less
reliable, fewer missiles than we have seen in the past. Even
so, the missiles will be threatening. North Korea's space
launch attempt demonstrated, in ways that words alone could
not, that the new long-range missile threat is moving from
hypothetical to real.
Moreover, many of the countries developing longer-range
missiles probably assess that the threat of their use would
complicate American decisionmaking during crises; increase the
cost of a victory and deter the United States from pursuing
certain objectives; and provide independent deterrent and war-
fighting capabilities. They would see the threat of the use
rather than the use of these weapons as providing them
deterrence, coercive diplomacy, and prestige. Some of the
systems would be for political impact; others may be built to
perform specific military missions--facing the United States
with a spectrum of motivations, development timelines, and
hostile capabilities.
The probability that a missile with a weapon of mass
destruction would be used against U.S. forces or interests is
higher today than during most of the Cold War, and will
continue to grow. This is because many more nations now have
them, and we have also seen ballistic missiles used against
U.S. forces during the Gulf War. Although the missiles used
then did not have weapons of mass destruction warheads, Iraq
had weaponized ballistic missile warheads with biological and
chemical weapon agents and they were available for use. Some of
the regimes controlling missiles have weapons of mass
destruction programs and have exhibited the intention to use
those even without missiles. Then we have non-state entities
that are seeking weapons of mass destruction.
In fact, in the coming years, we project that U.S.
territory is probably more likely to be attacked with weapons
of mass destruction from non-missile delivery means than by
missiles, primarily because the non-missile delivery means are
less costly, easier to acquire, more reliable and accurate. But
the missile threat will continue to grow, in part because the
missiles have become important regional weapons in numerous
countries' arsenals, and they provide a level of prestige,
coercive diplomacy, and deterrence that non-missile means do
not.
Iran has very active missile and weapon of mass destruction
development programs, and is seeking foreign missile, chemical,
biological, and nuclear technologies. Iran's ballistic missile
program is one of the largest in the Middle East. Tehran
already has deployed hundreds of short-range ballistic
missiles, covering most of Iraq and many strategic targets in
the Persian Gulf. It will soon deploy the 1,300 kilometer range
Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile, which will allow it to
reach Israel and most of Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
And at this point, let me address this announcement that
you mentioned on the Shahab-3. I would be very careful how much
credibility we apply to public announcements like this. This is
not the first such launch. The announcement said it was the
first launch. This is the third. It says that it was for non-
missile and non-military purposes. We view it as a missile not
a space launch vehicle, it is not designed for that. And then
they say it was successful. We are analyzing the data from the
launch and will be able to tell you more on that. But I would
just say be careful when we get public announcements like this,
when they get two things so clearly wrong, that we are not
swallowed up with the rest of it as well.
Tehran probably has a small number of Shahab-3s available
for use in a conflict, and it has announced that production and
deployment has begun. In fact, it has even displayed three
Shahab-3s along with a mobile launcher and other ground support
equipment. That display even had a range and a payload size on
it, and it is not what I would consider to be a non-military
display.
Iran's public statements suggest that it plans to develop
longer-range delivery systems. Although Tehran stated that the
Shahab-3 is Iran's last military missile, at that point they
stated it, we are concerned that Iran will use future systems
in a military role.
Iran's Defense Minister announced the development of the
Shahab-4, originally calling it a more capable ballistic
missile than the Shahab-3, but later categorizing it as a space
launch vehicle with no military applications.
Tehran also mentioned plans for the Shahab-5, strongly
suggesting that it intends to develop even longer-range systems
in the near future.
Iran has displayed a mock-up satellite and space launch
vehicle, suggesting it plans to develop a vehicle to orbit
Iranian satellites. However, Iran, like any other country,
could convert a space launch vehicle into a missile by
developing a reentry vehicle for it.
Foreign assistance continues to be a problem. Entities in
Russia, North Korea, and China supply the largest amount of
ballistic missile-related goods, technology, and expertise to
Iran.
Let me walk through where we are with the threat. Last
year's threat assessment walked country-by-country. Since we
are looking at a specific country, I am going to walk through
time blocks. I will start with today and then look 5 years out,
and then another 5 years out.
Today, we judge that like many others, Iran views its
regional concerns as a primary factor in tailoring its military
programs. Tehran sees its short- and medium-range missiles not
only as deterrents but also as force-multiplying weapons of
war. On July 15, they conducted the second test of the Shahab-
3, and of course today the third. We assess that Iran's
interest in eventually developing an ICBM and space launch
capability has not changed.
In the 2001 to 2005 timeframe, we believe that Iran is more
likely to develop an intermediate-range ballistic missile based
on Russian technology before developing an ICBM based on that
technology, because of the regional concerns I mentioned
earlier. Iran could test an IRBM, intermediate-range ballistic
missile, before the end of this 5-year period.
Now let me talk a little bit about what we say Iran could
do, and then talk about what they can likely do. We have both
judgments, just like we did in last year's estimate.
Some analysts believe that Iran could test an ICBM or space
launch vehicle patterned after the North Korean Taepo Dong-1 in
the next few years. Such a system would be capable of
delivering biological or chemical payloads to the United
States. Nevertheless, all assess that Iran would be unlikely to
deploy an ICBM version of the Taepo Dong-1. It just does not
serve all of their needs.
Most believe that Iran could develop and test a three-stage
Taepo Dong-2 type ICBM during this same timeframe, possibly
with North Korean assistance. It would be capable of delivering
a nuclear weapon-sized payload to the United States. A few
believe that the hypothetical routes toward an Iranian ICBM are
less plausible than they appeared in our analysis last year and
believe that Iran will not be able to test any ICBM during this
time period. So last year we had agreement on what Iran could
do. Now we have even some disagreement on the could.
Now more on the likelihood judgments. Some believe that
Iran is likely to try to demonstrate a rudimentary ICBM booster
capability as soon as possible, and that a Taepo Dong-type
system, tested as a space launch vehicle, would be the shortest
path to that goal. Others believe that Iran is unlikely to test
any ICBM during this period.
Now let's shift to the next 5 years, 2006 to 2010. Most
believe that Iran will likely test an IRBM--probably based on
Russian assistance--during this period. All assess that Iran
could test an ICBM that could deliver nuclear weapon-sized
payloads to many parts of the United States in the latter half
of the next decade, using Russian technology obtained over the
years.
Some further believe that Iran is likely to test an ICBM
before 2010. Others believe there is no more than an even
chance of an ICBM test before 2010. And a few believe that Iran
is unlikely to test an ICBM before 2010.
So you can see when we start looking at likelihoods, we get
a spectrum of views.
Nevertheless, most agree that Iran is likely to test a
space launch vehicle by 2010. And as I indicated earlier, such
a space launch vehicle could be converted into an ICBM. A few
believe that such a test is still unlikely before 2010.
Now let's look at the 2011 to 2015 time period. Most
believe that Iran is likely to test an ICBM, possibly as a
space launch vehicle, before 2015. Some believe, in fact, that
this is very likely. A few believe that there is less than an
even chance of a test of an Iranian ICBM by 2015.
Sales of ICBMs or space launch vehicles, which have
inherent ICBM capabilities, could increase an Iranian ability
to threaten the United States with a missile strike sooner than
we have laid out here. North Korea has demonstrated a
willingness to sell its missiles and technologies and could
continue doing so, perhaps under the guise of selling space
launch vehicles. We judge that a Russian or Chinese sale of an
ICBM or SLV in the next 15 years is unlikely, although the
consequences of such sales, especially if it were mobile, would
be extremely serious.
Some countries, perhaps including Iran, probably have
devised other means for delivering weapons of mass destruction
to the United States, some cheaper and more reliable than
missiles that we have talked about here. The goal would be to
move the chemical or biological weapons closer to the United
States without needing a missile to do it. Now you could either
build the weapon in the United States and use it in the United
States, or you could bring a ship with a shorter-range system,
like a Scud strapped to the ship, close to the United States
and strike. It would have reduced accuracy, but the reduced
accuracy would be better than some of the ICBMs that we have
even discussed here.
Many of the countries, such as Iran, probably will rely
initially on readily available technologies to develop
penetration aids and countermeasures. And in last year's
report, we listed a whole bunch of countermeasure technologies
that would be readily available, so I will not go into that
list here. But they could develop countermeasures based on
those technologies by the time they flight-test their missiles.
More advanced technologies would take longer.
Let me turn now to Norman Schindler, he is, as you
indicated, Deputy Director of the Nonproliferation Center, to
discuss Iran's programs to develop weapons of mass destruction.
After he goes through his opening remarks, then we would be
prepared to answer questions on the whole thing.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Walpole follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT D. WALPOLE
Mr. Chairman, members of this subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear today in an open session to discuss our
assessments of the Iranian missile and weapons of mass destruction
threat to the United States in coming years. Open sessions give the
public a brief glimpse at the important work the Intelligence Community
performs for the security of our nation. But as you know, much of our
knowledge on Iran's weapons programs is based on extremely sensitive
sources and methods; it must remain classified to aid in our nation's
security. Thus, many details will have to be summarized or left unsaid
in open session. We can provide additional details in classified
briefings to you or other Senators if you so desire. We hope our
summaries today will be of use to the Subcommittee and the public.
The Evolving Missile Threat in the Current Proliferation Environment.
The worldwide proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of
mass destruction continues to evolve. Short- and medium-range ballistic
missiles, particularly if armed with weapons of mass destruction,
already pose a significant threat overseas to U.S. interests, military
forces, and allies. Moreover, the proliferation of missile technology
and components continues, contributing to longer-range systems.
Development efforts, in many cases fueled by foreign assistance, have
led to new capabilities--as illustrated by Iran's Shahab-3 launches in
July 1998 and July 2000 and North Korea's Taepo Dong-1 space launch
attempt in August 1998. Also disturbing, some countries that
traditionally have been recipients of missile technologies have become
exporters.
The Intelligence Community continues to project that during the
next 15 years the United States most likely will face ICBM threats from
North Korea, probably from Iran (the focus of today's hearing), and
possibly from Iraq--barring significant changes in their political
orientations. These threats are, of course, in addition to the long-
standing threats from Russia and China. That said, the threat facing
the United States in the year 2015 will depend on our evolving
relations with foreign countries, the political situation and economic
issues in those countries, and numerous other factors that we cannot
predict with confidence. For example, our current relations with Russia
are significantly different than any one would have forecast 15 years
ago. Important changes could develop in Iran and in Iran's external
threat environment over the next 15 years. Iran is in a period of
domestic dynamism, with its parliament and other institutions engaged
in a vibrant and potentially tumultuous debate about change and reform.
At the present time and for at least the next three years, we do not
believe that national debate is likely to produce any fundamental
change in Iran's national security policies and programs. Recognizing
the significant uncertainties surrounding projections fifteen years
into the future and the potential for reformers' success in Iran, we
have projected Iranian ballistic missile trends and capabilities into
the future largely based on assessed technical capabilities, with a
general premise that Iran's relations with the United States and
related threat perceptions will not change significantly enough to
alter Tehran's intentions. As changes occur, our assessment of the
threat will change as well.
The new missile threats from Iran and others are far different from
the Cold War. The emerging missile threats will involve considerably
fewer missiles with less accuracy, yield, survivability, reliability,
and range-payload capability than the hostile strategic forces we have
faced for decades. Even so, the new systems are threatening. North
Korea's space launch attempt demonstrated--in a way words alone could
not--that the new long-range missile threat is moving from hypothetical
to real. Moreover, many of the countries developing longer-range
missiles probably assess that the threat of their use would complicate
American decision making during crises; increase the cost of a U.S.
victory; potentially deter Washington from pursuing certain objectives;
and provide independent deterrent and war-fighting capabilities. Some
of these countries may believe that testing these systems only as
SLVs--without a reentry vehicle--may achieve deterrence, coercive
diplomacy, and prestige goals without risking the potential negative
political and economic costs of a long-range missile test.
Acquiring long-range ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass
destruction will increase the possibility that weaker countries could
deter, constrain, and harm the United States. The missiles need not be
deployed in large numbers. They need not be highly accurate or
reliable; their strategic value is derived from the threat of their
use, not the near certain outcome of such use. Some may be intended for
political impact; others may be built to perform more specific military
missions--facing the United States with a spectrum of motivations,
development timelines, and hostile capabilities. In many ways, they are
not envisioned at the outset as operational weapons of war, but as
strategic weapons of deterrence and coercive diplomacy.
The probability that a missile with a weapon of mass destruction
would be used against U.S. forces or interests is higher today than
during most of the Cold War, and will continue to grow. More nations
have them, and ballistic missiles were used against U.S. forces during
the Gulf War. Although the missiles used in the Gulf War did not have
WMD warheads, Iraq had weaponized ballistic missile warheads with BW
and CW agents and they were available for use. Some of the regimes
controlling missiles have exhibited a willingness to use weapons of
mass destruction with other delivery means. In addition, some non-state
entities are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and would be willing
to use them without missiles. In fact, we project that in the coming
years, U.S. territory is probably more likely to be attacked with
weapons of mass destruction from non-missile delivery means (most
likely from non-state entities) than by missiles, primarily because
non-missile delivery means are less costly, easier to acquire, and more
reliable and accurate. But the missile threat will continue to grow, in
part because these missiles have become important regional weapons in
numerous countries' arsenals, and they provide a level of prestige,
coercive diplomacy, and deterrence that non-missile means do not.
Iran, Missiles, and WMD.
Iran has very active missile and WMD development programs, and is
seeking foreign missile, nuclear, chemical, and biological
technologies. Iran's ballistic missile program is one of the largest in
the Middle East. Tehran already has deployed hundreds of short-range
(150-500 km) ballistic missiles, covering most of Iraq and many
strategic targets in the Persian Gulf. It will soon deploy the 1,300
km-range Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile, which will allow Iran
to reach Israel and most of Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Tehran probably
has a small number of Shahab-3s available for use in a conflict; it has
announced that production and deployment has begun, and it has publicly
displayed three Shahab-3s along with a mobile launcher and other ground
support equipment.
Iran's public statements suggest that it plans to develop longer-
range delivery systems. Although Tehran stated that the Shahab-3 is
Iran's last military missile, we are concerned that Iran will use
future systems in a military role.
LIran's Defense Minister announced the development of the
Shahab-4, originally calling it a more capable ballistic missile than
the Shahab-3, but later categorizing it as an SLV with no military
applications.
LTehran has also mentioned plans for a Shahab-5, strongly
suggesting that it intends to develop even longer-range ballistic
missiles in the near future.
LIran has displayed a mock-up satellite and SLV,
suggesting it plans to develop a vehicle to orbit Iranian satellites.
However, Iran could convert an SLV into a missile by developing a
reentry vehicle.
Foreign Assistance. Entities in Russia, North Korea, and China
supply the largest amount of ballistic missile-related goods,
technology, and expertise to Iran. Tehran is using this assistance to
develop new ballistic missiles and to achieve its goal of becoming
self-sufficient in the production of existing systems. China provided
complete CSS-8 SRBMs, North Korean equipment and technical assistance
helped Iran establish the capability to produce Scud SRBMs, and Russian
assistance accelerated Iranian missile development.
Iranian Missile Threats to the United States and Its Interests.
Today. We judge that like many others, Iran views its regional
concerns as one of the primary factors in tailoring its programs.
Tehran sees its short- and medium-range missiles not only as deterrents
but also as force-multiplying weapons of war, primarily with
conventional weapons, but with options for delivering biological,
chemical, and eventually nuclear weapons. On 15 July of this year, Iran
conducted a second test of its Shahab-3. We assess that Iran's interest
in eventually developing an ICBM/space launch capability has not
changed.
2001-2005. We believe Iran is more likely to develop an
intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) based on Russian technology
before developing an ICBM using that technology. Iran could test such
an IRBM before the end of this period.
First, what could Iran do during this period. Some analysts believe
that Iran could test an ICBM or SLV patterned after the North Korean
TD-1 SLV in the next few years; such a system would be capable of
delivering BW/CW payloads to the United States. Nevertheless, all
assess that Iran would be unlikely to deploy an ICBM version of the TD-
1.
Most believe that Iran could develop and test a three-stage TD-2-
type ICBM during this period, possibly with North Korean assistance; it
would be capable of delivering a nuclear weapon-sized payload to the
United States. A few believe that the hypothetical routes toward an
Iranian ICBM are less plausible than they appeared in our analysis last
year and believe that Iran will not be able to test any ICBM in the
2001-2005 time frame.
Now to our likelihood assessments. Some believe that Iran is likely
to try to demonstrate a rudimentary ICBM booster capability as soon as
possible; a Taepo Dong-type system--likely tested as an SLV without an
RV impact downrange--would be the shortest path to this goal. Finally,
others believe Iran is unlikely to test any ICBM during this period.
2006-2010. Most believe Iran will likely test an IRBM--probably
based on Russian assistance--during this period.
All assess that Iran could flight test an ICBM that could deliver
nuclear weapon-sized payloads to many parts of the United States in the
latter half of the next decade, using Russian technology obtained over
the years.
Some further believe Iran is likely to test an ICBM--possibly as an
SLV without an RV impact downrange--before 2010; others believe there
is no more than an even chance that Iran will test an ICBM--probably
based on Russian assistance--capable of threatening the United States
by 2010; and a few believe an ICBM test is unlikely in this period.
Nevertheless, most agree that Iran is likely to test an SLV by
2010. Such a vehicle could be converted into an ICBM capable of
delivering a nuclear weapon-sized payload to the United States. A few
believe such a test is unlikely until after 2010.
2011-2015. Most believe Iran is likely to test an ICBM--possibly as
an SLV without an RV impact downrange--before 2015, some believe this
is very likely; a few believe that there is less than an even chance of
an Iranian ICBM test by 2015.
Sales of complete ICBMs or SLVs. Sales of ICBMs or SLVs, which have
inherent ICBM capabilities, could further increase an Iranian ability
to threaten the United States with a missile strike. North Korea has
demonstrated a willingness to sell its missiles and related
technologies and could continue doing so, perhaps under the guise of
selling SLVs. Although we judge that Russia or China are unlikely to
sell an ICBM or SLV in the next 15 years, the consequences of such
sales, especially if mobile systems were involved, would be extremely
serious.
Alternative Threats to the United States. Some countries, perhaps
including Iran, probably have devised other means to deliver weapons of
mass destruction to the United States--some cheaper and more reliable
and accurate than ICBMs that have not completed rigorous testing and
validation programs. The goal would be to move the weapon within
striking distance without a long-range ICBM. These alternative threats
include preparing chemical or biological weapons in the United States
and using them in large population centers; and deploying short- and
medium-range missiles on surface ships--which can be readily done,
especially if the attacking country is not concerned about accuracy.
The reduced accuracy in such a case, however, would be better than that
of some of the ICBMs I mentioned earlier.
Ballistic Missile Defense Countermeasures. Many countries, such as
Iran, probably will rely initially on readily available technologies to
develop penetration aids and countermeasures, including: separating
RVs, radar absorbent material, booster fragmentation, jammers, chaff,
and decoys. These countries could develop some countermeasures by the
time they flight-test their missiles. More advanced technologies could
be available over the longer term. Some of the factors that will
influence a nation's countermeasures include: the effectiveness weighed
against their cost, complexity, reduction in range-payload capability;
foreign assistance; and the ability to conduct realistic tests.
Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs.
Let me turn now to Mr. A. Norman Schindler, Deputy Director of the
DCI's Nonproliferation Center (NPC), which recently published its 721
report related to this issue, to talk about Iran's programs to develop
weapons of mass destruction.
Following his remarks, we will both be available to answer those
questions that we can while still protecting sources and methods. We
would not want this session to inadvertently facilitate Iran's efforts
at hiding its work from us.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Mr. Walpole.
Mr. Schindler, welcome. You may proceed.
TESTIMONY OF A. NORMAN SCHINDLER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DCI
NONPROLIFERATION CENTER
Mr. Schindler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As Mr. Walpole
indicated, I will provide a summary of Iran's WMD programs, the
programs designed to produce the weapons to be delivered by the
missile systems that Mr. Walpole described, as well as by other
delivery means.
The Iranians regard these as extremely sensitive programs
and go to great lengths to hide them from us. As a result, our
knowledge of these programs is based on extremely sensitive
sources and methods. This precludes me, as Mr. Walpole
indicated earlier, from providing many details. But we hope
this summary will nonetheless be useful, and we would be
prepared to elaborate in greater detail on all of these issues
in a classified setting.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin with a few comments on
Iran's nuclear and nuclear weapons program. The Intelligence
Community judges that Iran is actively pursuing the acquisition
of fissile material and the expertise and technology necessary
to form the material into nuclear weapons. As part of this
process, Iran is attempting to develop the capability to
produce both plutonium and highly-enriched uranium.
Iran is seeking nuclear-related equipment, material, and
technical expertise from a variety of foreign sources,
especially in Russia. Tehran claims that it is attempting to
master nuclear technology for civilian research and nuclear
energy programs. However, in that guise it is developing whole
facilities, such as a uranium conversion facility, that could
be used to support the production of fissile material for a
nuclear weapon.
Despite international efforts to curb the flow of critical
technologies and equipment, Tehran continues to seek fissile
material and technology for weapons development and has
established an elaborate system of covert military and civilian
organizations to support its acquisition goals.
Cooperation with foreign suppliers is helping Iran augment
its nuclear technology infrastructure, which in turn will be
useful in supporting nuclear weapons research and development.
The expertise and technology gained, along with the commercial
channels and contacts established, even from cooperation that
appears strictly civilian in nature, could be used to advance
Iran's nuclear weapons effort.
Case in point. Work continues on the construction of a
1,000-megawatt nuclear power reactor at Bushehr that will be
subject to IAEA safeguards. This project will not directly
support a weapons effort, but it affords Iran broad access to
Russia's nuclear industry in the process.
We also have evidence that Russian entities are interacting
with Iranian nuclear research centers on a wide variety of
activities beyond the Bushehr project. Many of these projects
also have direct application to the production of weapons-grade
fissile material.
China pledged in 1997 not to engage in any new nuclear
cooperation with Iran but said it would complete two ongoing
projects. One of those--a small research reactor--has since
been completed, and progress is still being made on a zirconium
production facility that Iran will use to produce cladding for
nuclear fuel. It is our assessment that China is abiding by its
pledge not to engage in new nuclear activity with Iran.
Mr. Chairman, the Intelligence Community continues to
monitor developments in the Iranian nuclear program and nuclear
energy program very carefully. We regularly provide classified
assessments of the progress that Iran is making to the
Administration, to U.S. war-fighters, and to the Congress as a
result of the importance of this issue. However, we are
reluctant to provide additional details in an unclassified
setting as to what timelines we believe exist for the Iranians
to develop a nuclear weapon.
I would like to turn now to Iran's chemical warfare (CW)
program, which is one of the largest in the Third World. Iran
launched its offensive CW program in the early 1980's in
response to Baghdad's use of CW during the Iran-Iraq war. We
believe the program remains active despite Tehran's decision in
1997 to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention. Iran has a
large and growing CW production capacity, and already has
produced a number of CW agents, including nerve, blister,
choking, and blood agents. We believe in addition that it
possesses a significant stockpile of weaponized and bulk agent
and we think that this amounts to actually several thousand
tons.
Tehran's goals for its CW program for the past decade have
been to expand its production capability and stockpile, reach
self-sufficiency by acquiring the means to manufacture chemical
production equipment and precursors, and to diversify its CW
arsenal by producing more sophisticated and lethal agents and
munitions.
Tehran continues to seek production technology, training,
expertise, and chemicals that could be used as precursors from
entities in Russia and China. It also seeks through
intermediaries in other countries equipment and material that
could be used to develop a more advanced and self-sufficient CW
infrastructure.
Thus far, Iran remains dependent on external suppliers for
technology, equipment, and precursors. However, we judge that
Tehran is rapidly approaching self-sufficiency and could become
a supplier of CW-related materials to other nations.
Iran's biological weapons (BW) program also was initiated
in the 1980's during the Iran-Iraq war. The program is in the
late stages of research and development, but we believe Iran
already holds some stocks of BW agents and weapons. Tehran
probably has investigated both toxins and live organisms as BW
agents, and for BW dissemination could use many of the same
delivery systems--such as artillery and aerial bombs--that it
has in its CW inventory.
Iran has the technical infrastructure to support a
significant BW program. It conducts top-notch legitimate
biomedical research at various institute, which we suspect also
provide support to the BW program.
Tehran is expanding its efforts to acquire biotechnical
materials, equipment, and expertise from abroad, primarily from
entities in Russia and Western Europe. Because of the dual-use
nature of the equipment, Iran's ability to produce a number of
both veterinary and human vaccines also gives it the capability
to produce BW agents.
At the same time Tehran continues to develop its BW
capability, it is a party to the Biological Warfare Convention.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say a few words
about Iran's motivations for pursuing its WMD programs.
We assess that Tehran, no matter who is in power, will
continue to develop and expand its WMD and ballistic missile
programs as long as it perceives threats from the U.S. military
forces in the Gulf, a nuclear-armed Israel, and Iraq. In
addition, the deterrence posture or prestige factor associated
with some of these programs are probably viewed by Iranian
leaders as a means to achieve their goals of becoming the
predominant power in the region.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes our prepared statement. We
would be delighted to attempt to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schindler follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF A. NORMAN SCHINDLER
Mr. Chairman, as Mr. Walpole indicated, I will provide a summary of
Iran's WMD programs--the programs designed to produce the weapons to be
delivered by the missile systems Mr. Walpole described, as well as by
other delivery means. The Iranians regard these as extremely sensitive
programs and go to great lengths to hide them from us. As a result, our
knowledge of these programs is based on extremely sensitive sources and
methods. This precludes me from providing many details on the programs
in open session. But I hope this summary will be of use to the
Committee, and we are prepared to provide additional details in
classified briefings.
Nuclear
Mr. Chairman, I'd like to begin with a few comments on Iran's
nuclear and nuclear weapons program. The Intelligence Community judges
that Iran is actively pursuing the acquisition of fissile material and
the expertise and technology necessary to form the material into
nuclear weapons. As part of this process, Iran is attempting to develop
the capability to produce both plutonium and highly-enriched uranium.
Iran is seeking nuclear-related equipment, material, and technical
expertise from a variety of foreign sources, especially in Russia.
Tehran claims that it is attempting to master nuclear technology for
civilian research and nuclear energy programs. However, in that guise
it is developing whole facilities--such as a uranium conversion
facility--that could be used to support the production of fissile
material for a nuclear weapon.
LDespite international efforts to curb the flow of
critical technologies and equipment, Tehran continues to seek fissile
material and technology for weapons development and has established an
elaborate system of covert military and civilian organizations to
support its acquisition goals.
Cooperation with foreign suppliers is helping Iran augment its
nuclear technology infrastructure, which in turn will be useful in
supporting nuclear weapons research and development. The expertise and
technology gained, along with the commercial channels and contacts
established--even from cooperation that appears strictly civilian in
nature--could be used to advance Iran's nuclear weapons effort.
LWork continues on the construction of a 1,000-megawatt
nuclear power reactor at Bushehr that will be subject to International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. This project will not directly
support a weapons effort, but it affords Iran broad access to Russia's
nuclear industry.
LRussian entities are interacting with Iranian nuclear
research centers on a wide variety of activities beyond the Bushehr
project. Many of these projects have direct application to the
production of weapons-grade fissile material.
LChina pledged in 1997 not to engage in any new nuclear
cooperation with Iran but said it would complete two ongoing nuclear
projects, a small research reactor and a zirconium production facility
that Iran will use to produce cladding for reactor fuel. As a party to
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is required to apply
IAEA safeguards to nuclear fuel, but safeguards are not required for
the zirconium plant or its products.
Mr. Chairman, the Intelligence Community continues to monitor
development in the Iranian nuclear and nuclear weapons programs
carefully. We regularly provide classified assessments of the progress
Iran is making to the Administration, U.S. warfighters, and the
Congress. We are reluctant to provide additional details on the Iranian
program--including when Iran might develop a nuclear weapon--in an
unclassified setting.
Chemical
I'd like to turn now to Iran's chemical warfare (CW) program. Iran
launched its offensive CW program in the early 1980's in response to
Baghdad's use of CW during the Iran-Iraq war. We believe the program
remains active despite Tehran's decision to ratify the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC). Iran has a large and growing CW production capacity
and already has produced a number of CW agents, including nerve,
blister, choking, and blood agents. We believe it possesses a stockpile
of at least several hundred metric tons of weaponized and bulk agent.
Tehran's goals for its CW program for the past decade have been to
expand its production capability and stockpile, reach self-sufficiency
by acquiring the means to manufacture chemical production equipment and
precursors, and diversifiy its CW arsenal by producing more
sophisticated and lethal agents and munitions.
LTehran continues to seek production technology, training,
expertise and chemicals that could be used as precursors from entities
in Russia and China. It also seeks through intermediaries in other
countries equipment and material that could be used to develop a more
advanced and self-sufficient CW infrastructure.
LThus far, Iran remains dependent on external suppliers
for technology, equipment, and precursors. However, we judge that
Tehran is rapidly approaching self-sufficiency and could become a
supplier of CW-related materials to other nations.
Biological
Iran's BW program also was initiated in the 1980's during the Iran-
Iraq war. The program is in the late stages of research and
development, but we believe Iran already holds some stocks of BW agents
and weapons. Tehran probably has investigated both toxins and live
organisms as BW agents, and for BW dissemination could use many of the
same delivery systems--such as artillery and aerial bombs--that it has
in its CW inventory.
LIran has the technical infrastructure to support a
significant BW program. It conducts top-notch legitimate biomedical
research at various institutes, which we suspect also provide support
to the BW program.
LTehran is expanding its efforts to acquire biotechnical
materials, equipment, and expertise from abroad--primarily from
entities in Russia and Western Europe. Because of the dual-use nature
of the equipment, Iran's ability to produce a number of both veterinary
and human vaccines also gives it the capability to produce BW agents.
LTehran continues to develop its BW capability despite
being a party to the Biological Warfare Convention (BWC).
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to say a word about Iran's
motivations for pursuing it's WMD programs.
We assess that Tehran--no matter who is in power--will continue to
develop and expand its WMD and ballistic missile programs as long as it
perceives threats from U.S. military forces in the Gulf, a nuclear-
armed Israel, and Iraq. In addition, the deterrence posture or prestige
factor associated with some of these programs are probably viewed by
Iranian leaders as a means to achieve their goals of becoming the
predominant power in the region, asserting Iran's ideological
leadership in the Muslim world, and diminishing Western--particularly
U.S.--influence in the Gulf.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes our prepared statement. Mr. Walpole
and I will attempt to answer the Committee's questions within the
constraints imposed on us by the need to protect sensitive sources and
methods. We would be delighted to present the committee--or committee
Members--with a more detailed assessment of Iran's WMD programs in a
closed setting.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Mr. Schindler, Mr.
Walpole.
Let me ask you first of all about the announcement by
Iran's Minister of Defense about the Shahab-3 test firing that
occurred earlier today, that you commented on earlier. You told
us to be cautious and that there were some errors in this
announcement. One other thing occurs to us, and that is that
there was a lag of about 2 years between the first and second
Shahab-3 test, but a lag of only 2 months between the second
test and today's third test. Is there any significance to the
fact that Iran is decreasing the amount of time between the
tests of its Shahab-3 missile?
Mr. Walpole. I am not sure I would read anything into that.
I have worked with flight-test programs of various countries in
the past and tried to see if I could divine anything from that,
and it is very hard to do, to pin down what is happening.
As we have said in open session before, Iran procured No
Dongs and then sought Russian assistance to modify that into
the Shahab-3, which is a little different approach than
Pakistan used to get the Ghauri, which is also a No Dong. They
did not mind trying to change it, they just decided to change
its name and buy them outright.
And so when they are doing that type of development effort
it really depends on how they want to push each individual
window to get the system to work. So I am not sure that I would
read the difference in time between today's launch and the July
launch as indicating that anything has sped up, because we
could go another 2 years before we see another launch and you
would not have me here saying that they have slowed down just
because there was a delay in it. So I would be careful about
that.
Senator Cochran. There has been some suggestion that
because there have been some so-called moderates elected to
office in Iran that Iran is changing. Does this affect the
weapons of mass destruction and missile programs at all? Who
actually controls these programs?
Mr. Walpole. Well, as Mr. Schindler said toward the end of
his remarks and I said kind of up front in mine, there is the
potential for change. But we do not see this altering the
interest in weapons of mass destruction and the interest in
missile programs to deliver them. The threats are not going to
go away--Iraq is not going to go away, their perception of
Israel is not going to go away, even if relations change with
the United States.
That said, we do factor those types of changes into our
assessments. When you do missile assessments, or almost any WMD
assessment, you have to project many years out. Some of these
missile programs can take a long time to develop. That is why
we force ourselves to project 15 years out, knowing that there
is great uncertainty in what things are going to look like 15
years out. At the same time, we are mandated by Congress to do
an annual assessment of the missile threat. So if we see a
change occur in the government in Iran that would cause us to
alter that judgment, we will let you know about it. But at this
point, we are still holding firm to where we are with the
judgment that probably Iran between now and the next 15 years.
Senator Cochran. A specific question, as a follow up on
that subject, is whether the election of President Khatami has
made any substantial change in the program, and has he made any
statements publicly to your knowledge in support of Iran's
missile program?
Mr. Schindler. I can read a statement that he gave on
August 1, 1998. That is, ``The strategic status of the Islamic
Republic of Iran in the world and in the region, in the Middle
East in particular, demands that we have a strong military
capability.'' It goes on to say that ``defending oneself and
deterring others from committing aggression is the most
important right of every country.''
We really have no indications that his threat perception
really differs from those of other factions at this point or
that there has been any significant change for the better in
any of the key programs.
Mr. Walpole. And with the Shahab-3 launch in July 1998 and
then two in 2000, I think actions speak louder than words on
the missile program.
Senator Cochran. So there has not been any change in the
pace of the Iranian ballistic missile program since his
election?
Mr. Walpole. No.
Senator Cochran. It has not slowed down?
Mr. Walpole. Let me phrase it this way. Any slow down in
the program I do not think we would attribute to political but
rather to technical issues. We are still seeing the program
proceed.
Senator Cochran. Has there been any indication of any
desire on President Khatami's part to stop the missile program
or any of the weapons programs?
Mr. Walpole. Not that I have detected.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Schindler.
Mr. Schindler. Not that I am aware of either.
Senator Cochran. What about the parliament in Iran. We have
heard that there have been some newly elected reformers in the
parliament. Do they have any authority over Iran's ballistic
missile program, and have they exercised any effort, to your
knowledge, to make any changes in those programs?
Mr. Walpole. I am not aware of any efforts exercised to
change the programs. And as I said before, we are seeing the
programs proceed.
Senator Cochran. From your statement, Mr. Walpole, there
appears to be a debate within the Intelligence Community about
when Iran will be capable of testing an ICBM, there are
differences of opinion at least, if not a debate. How difficult
is it for analysts to predict accurately how rapidly a country
can acquire long-range missile capability?
Mr. Walpole. Predicting how long it would take them from
the could perspective, the technical capability perspective, is
a lot easier than what is likely to happen. What we did last
year was brought a bunch of U.S. weapons experts, designers and
so on, together to help us sort out timelines on how quickly a
country could so that we could have some benchmarks to run
through. That was fairly easy once we got that input to look at
the data that we had on Iran and then decide how quickly they
could do certain things.
When we started to overlay the likely judgments--that is,
political factors, do we really think they would push this
program, would they do an IRBM program first, which we all
judged they would anyway, an intermediate-range program first--
then you start to get a whole lot more difference of view,
because it is not just physics, it is not just science, now you
are factoring a lot of other issues together. But we even had
some difference of view surface this year on the could in terms
of how quickly they could do some of these better longer-range
systems.
In intelligence work, you get the data and you try to put
it together to come up with the answer. But we are not getting
revelation intelligence here. There are uncertainties. And
where there are uncertainties, it is open to disagreement. I
view disagreement as healthy. It shows that we are actually
thinking through the issues.
Senator Cochran. Can you make any judgment about the way
foreign assistance appears to have moved the Shahab-3 program
along faster than the Intelligence Community expected. In other
words, do you think it would be prudent for policymakers, those
deciding what steps to take to protect against possible
threats, to plan on Iran having an ICBM capability sooner
rather than later?
Mr. Walpole. Foreign assistance, particularly Russian
assistance, indeed accelerated the Shahab-3 program for Iran.
We have taken that acceleration, if you will, into account in
our judgments for how quickly they could and are likely to be
able to develop an ICBM. So we have already done that in our
assessments.
Senator Cochran. According to your testimony, Iran receives
foreign assistance from a number of sources for its ballistic
missile program. How significant is foreign assistance to
Iran's programs?
Mr. Walpole. I would say that foreign assistance is indeed
significant. We had complete CSS-8s sold from China, we had the
Shahab-3 sold from North Korea, we had Russian assistance in
developing the Shahab-3 and in developing other capabilities.
So the foreign assistance has been critical.
If we were to hypothesize that foreign assistance would
cease right now completely, I still think we would have
concerns with Iran's missile program. I do not think the
program would dry up. It would take them longer to put
together, but they would still be able to get missiles.
Senator Cochran. So foreign assistance would accelerate
Iran's efforts to build long-range ballistic missiles, in your
opinion. Is that correct?
Mr. Walpole. Phrase it foreign assistance will continue to
accelerate it.
Senator Cochran. It will continue to accelerate the
program.
Mr. Walpole. Yes. We factored that in. If you ended foreign
assistance today, you would see some of our timelines shifting
back a little but you would not see them move forward because
of foreign assistance.
Senator Cochran. Could the assistance help Iran build more
technologically advanced missiles than they might otherwise be
able to do?
Mr. Walpole. Yes. In fact, that is why in my statement you
see me talk about missiles patterned after the Taepo Dong
system and then missiles drawing upon Russian assistance. And
the missiles drawing upon Russian assistance are going to be
better.
Senator Cochran. Could this foreign assistance result in
Iran becoming self-sufficient in the design and development or
eventually reduce Iran's need for foreign assistance?
Mr. Walpole. Yes.
Senator Cochran. What is the effect of Iran's relationship
with North Korea on Iran's interest in developing an
intercontinental ballistic missile?
Mr. Walpole. On their interest?
Senator Cochran. Yes, on Iran's interest and their work in
developing an intercontinental ballistic missile.
Mr. Walpole. I think it has been an influence in their
work. I think their interest in developing a ballistic missile
capability is a regional interest, first and foremost. And so I
am not sure North Korea really plays heavily in that, other
than supplying technology that would help them fulfill that
interest.
Senator Cochran. Do you have any evidence that North Korea
would be willing to sell the Taepo Dong-2 or the 3-stage Taepo
Dong-1 to Iran?
Mr. Walpole. I am not sure that is something we would want
to go into in open session. I do not mean to imply that we have
evidence, it is just that evidence of impending transfers is
something that I would rather not go into here. I made the
statement in my opening remarks that North Korea has exhibited
a willingness to share missile technology abroad and might even
try to do that under the guise of space launch vehicles. Let's
just let that be the answer, unless you feel there is more we
can say?
Mr. Schindler. No.
Senator Cochran. Should the United States expect to see any
real technological lag in missile capabilities between the two
countries, Iran and North Korea?
Mr. Walpole. Well, right now, North Korea, although it was
a failed attempt, has tried to put a satellite into orbit, and
Iran is not there. So you have somewhat of a lag. But I would
not read a whole lot into that because I think Iran is getting
some assistance from Russia that in some ways would make them
better able to develop some systems.
Senator Cochran. The unclassified summary of the 1999
National Intelligence Estimate states that a three-stage Taepo
Dong-2 launched from North Korea could deliver a several
hundred kilogram payload anywhere in the United States. What
kind of weapons of mass destruction payload could reach the
United States on a three-stage Taepo Dong-2 launched from Iran,
and how much of the United States could Iran reach?
Mr. Walpole. I have to think of the ranges. North Korea, of
course, is closer to the United States, so the range is not as
far. Iran with a three-stage Taepo Dong-2 would be able to
deliver a several hundred kilogram payload to parts of the
United States. I am not sure it would reach all of the United
States. I do not have the charts that tell me that. But because
of the range differences there, I am not sure that it would.
What we were postulating in that estimate was a third stage
that would not give it any accuracy, in fact it would be a
highly inaccurate system.
Senator Cochran. You indicated that Pakistan seems to have
purchased a missile from North Korea, the No Dong, and Iran has
used that same missile from North Korea, improved it with
Russian assistance, and given it a new name. Iran appears to
have used Russian and Chinese assistance to modify the missile.
Is that what you said, or did you say they just changed the
name?
Mr. Walpole. No. Pakistan basically bought the No Dong and
changed the name. Iran has wanted to modify the missile.
Senator Cochran. OK. And have they used Russian and Chinese
assistance to modify the missile?
Mr. Walpole. I said Russian assistance.
Mr. Schindler. I think we would want to discuss that in
closed session. We have delivered some briefings recently in
classified sessions where we have discussed that issue in
detail.
Senator Cochran. What is the reason for the difference
between the Iranian and Pakistani approaches?
Mr. Walpole. I could only speculate, but it appears that
Iran wants to develop a basis to be more self-sufficient and
understand the systems themselves, and Pakistan is more
interested in having the systems.
Senator Cochran. Do you expect that Iran would purchase a
complete ballistic missile system from North Korea if they
wanted to field a system quickly? Would they use them as a
resource, if they wanted to field a system quickly, just
purchase the total system from North Korea? Is that unlikely?
Mr. Walpole. If they felt they needed one more quickly than
they could develop one themselves, then they could try to buy
one, absolutely.
Senator Cochran. We have also heard a lot about Russia's
assistance to Iran's programs, not only ballistic missiles, but
weapons of mass destruction programs. The Unclassified Report
to Congress on Proliferation states that Russian assistance to
Iran accelerated the development of the Shahab-3 medium-range
ballistic missile. How did this assistance accelerate the
program?
Mr. Walpole. Now, again, looking at--of course, that is
your report, I will let you comment more on it--but just
looking at the two scenarios that we just discussed briefly,
one is the complete purchase. Obviously, they can buy the No
Dong, label it, and fly it, and then there is no acceleration
there. The acceleration we are talking about is accelerating
Iran's program to get a 1,300 kilometer range missile from what
they would have done had they tried it completely on their own.
So it is not an acceleration compared to a complete sale.
Senator Cochran. Would you expect continued Russian
assistance to help accelerate Iran's longer-range ballistic
missile programs?
Mr. Walpole. I would.
Mr. Schindler. I would, too. I would just add that in terms
of the Russian assistance that we have seen in recent years, it
has been pretty much across the board in terms of providing
training for personnel, assisting them in testing components,
but also provision of some components.
Senator Cochran. In addition to its apparent desire to
develop ICBMs, Iran claims it is developing a space launch
vehicle. The unclassified summary last year states that ``Iran
will probably test a space launch vehicle with ICBM
capabilities within the next few years.'' Would an Iranian
space launch vehicle provide Iran with an initial ICBM threat
availability based on the criteria you used in the National
Intelligence Estimate?
Mr. Walpole. A space launch vehicle and a missile are
essentially the same. The difference is one is intended to put
a payload into orbit, the other is intended to put a payload
into the ground. So what you need is a reentry vehicle, a
vehicle capable of reentering the atmosphere and not burning
up. So that if Iran develops a space launch vehicle, it would
be capable of delivering payloads, if they developed a payload,
to points on the Earth.
Now a Taepo Dong-1 is so range-payload limited that if Iran
had a Taepo Dong-1 space launch vehicle, it would be able to
deliver very, very small payloads to the United States as an
ICBM. That is why I had said in my opening remarks that we
judged they were unlikely to develop that as an ICBM, it just
is too limited. But the capability to deliver a payload with a
space launch vehicle is pretty well inherent.
Senator Cochran. This I think should be directed to you,
Mr. Walpole, but Mr. Schindler can respond as well. We took a
trip in April to Moscow and we had a meeting with the First
Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Ivanov and we asked him about
the assistance to Iran's nuclear weapons program. He said that
there was no Russian assistance to that program. Do you agree
with that? What is your reaction to his comments?
Mr. Walpole. My reaction is I am not surprised. And I will
let Mr. Schindler add to that.
Mr. Schindler. No, the position that many Russian officials
take is that Russian assistance is solely dedicated to civilian
nuclear efforts in Iran. That said, we are concerned by some of
the dealings that some Russian entities have with Iran and the
U.S. Government has been attempting to sensitize Russian
officials to a number of these cases, most recently, one that
was reported in the press just this week with the Yefremov
Institute.
Senator Cochran. I read about that. That is near St.
Petersburg, that institute, and there was a transaction being
planned.
Mr. Schindler. There was some evidence that the Iranians
were attempting to acquire a laser isotope facility that could
be used----
Senator Cochran. And the whole point was that would cost a
lot more than you would spend if you were just developing a
civilian nuclear power program.
Mr. Schindler. It would be much easier----
Senator Cochran. You could get the technology a lot more
efficiently in other ways, other sources, other procedures,
right?
Mr. Schindler. You would buy the low-enriched uranium on
the market.
Senator Cochran. What is your assessment, if you have one,
of when Iran can have a nuclear weapon?
Mr. Schindler. Mr. Chairman, we are very concerned about
the fast pace of the Iranian nuclear program. We would like to
avoid giving estimates in public as to when Iran might have a
nuclear weapon. It depends on a number of variables and these
are all variables we would be very pleased to elaborate on in a
classified setting.
Senator Cochran. On the question of proliferation, where
countries are supplying technology and assistance to Iran, what
effect does this have on the Intelligence Community and its
ability to provide advance warning of Iran's long-range
ballistic missile program or WMD programs?
Mr. Walpole. If it is a complete sale, which I have
indicated before was unlikely, but if a country were to sell
Iran a complete ICBM, a mobile ICBM, we would not be able to
give a lot of warning of that.
Senator Cochran. You would not?
Mr. Walpole. We would not. If we detected the negotiations
for the sale or some indication that that was going on, then
that would be your warning window. But if the sale were such
that what you really detected was the delivery or you detected
them setting it up, that is not a lot of warning. So a complete
sale we have said we would not be able to give a lot of warning
of. If a country is developing an ICBM, if they are doing a
testing program, even with assistance, even if they buy
somebody else's components and try to reverse engineer them and
so on, we can walk through that and give some warning.
If we look at the record of warning, the Intelligence
Community first warned about a North Korean ICBM in 1994. They
did not test the Taepo Dong-1, which failed, until 1998. Now we
were surprised that they put a third stage on the Taepo Dong-1,
so I do not want to try to take credit for warning about what
they would test, because if we were held to the standard that
we would have to warn exactly what configuration was going to
be tested 5 or 10 years from now, I would get it wrong every
time. If you ask me to warn that they are going to work on an
ICBM, I am probably going to be a little better at that.
Now if we look at Iran, your opening statement said
something that kind of surprised me. You said that in 1995 we
judged that they had neither the motivation nor the capability
to develop an ICBM. I have to go back and relook at 95-19, the
famous NIE, but I think what it really was saying was that they
would not have it by 2010 is what that judgment was saying. We
have been following Iran's missile programs for many years. In
the mid-1990's we began to get concerned about longer-range
programs for Iran. Even when 95-19 was written we were looking
at longer-range programs. We did not think they would get it at
the time until after 2010.
So we have been warning about Iran looking at ICBMs for
many years, too. And they still have not tested one. So
warnings are there but it is getting harder to warn what the
systems are going to look like because foreign assistance can
help somebody change what a system will look like. We do not
know to this day, for example, if North Korea got foreign
assistance with the third stage. We know they have the
capability to put one together themselves, it was a very small
third stage, but we do not know the answer to that question.
So there are a lot of unknowns that make this job hard. I
guess what I am saying is we do not want to say that we don't
have the ability to warn, we can still provide a lot of
warnings, but they are not going to be the refined warnings
that some would be looking for.
Senator Cochran. In connection with the chemical warfare
and chemical weapons production capacity, in Mr. Schindler's
testimony, you indicate that Iran has a large and growing
production capacity and already has produced a number of CW
agents. Didn't Iran sign the Chemical Weapons Convention? And
if so, is this not a direct contravention of its Chemical
Weapons Convention obligation?
Mr. Schindler. Mr. Chairman, the Intelligence Community
itself does not make compliance judgments. But nonetheless,
what I have said in my statement is that we assess that they
have a stockpile and a significant production capability which
would appear to be inconsistent with the CWC.
Senator Cochran. Can you speculate as to why Iran would
sign the Convention and then be in obvious violation, or if not
in obvious violation--is it an obvious violation?
Mr. Schindler. Well, Iran may conclude that given the
nature of modern technologies, that it can bury its CW
capability in its industrial infrastructure and it will not be
detected.
Senator Cochran. Can Iran, if they wanted to, circumvent
the Chemical Weapons Convention by acquiring technologies and
materials that are dual use in nature?
Mr. Schindler. It could.
Senator Cochran. What are the implications of this pattern
of activity for its Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations?
Mr. Schindler. For its NPT?
Senator Cochran. Right. Nuclear Non-Proliferation.
Mr. Schindler. What are the implications?
Senator Cochran. If the pattern of activity, is that
transferable to other obligations and other treaties?
Mr. Walpole. Well, we keep a close eye on all of Iran's
activities and all of Iran's commitments relative to that.
Because we see them doing things that are not consistent with
one agreement, of course we are going to keep a close eye on
what they are doing in other areas. Is that what you mean?
Senator Cochran. Right. According to the Unclassified
Report to Congress on Proliferation, Iran has started supplying
other nations with missile technology. In fact, in testimony to
the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Director of the CIA
George Tenet said ``Iran's existence as a secondary supplier of
this technology is the trend that worries me the most.'' Can
you give us any information as to which nation or nations Iran
is now supplying technology to?
Mr. Schindler. We mentioned--I do not think we can do that
in open session.
Senator Cochran. OK. Does the emerging trend of missile
commerce between states like North Korea and Iran concern you
as much as it does Director George Tenet?
Mr. Schindler. Yes.
Mr. Walpole. Yes. That one is easy. Give us more like that.
Senator Cochran. If the U.S. has hardly affected missile
proliferation by countries like Russia and China, how much do
you expect we will be able to affect North Korean or Iranian
missile exports?
Mr. Walpole. I guess I have a little optimism in me. I like
to always hold out the hope that we are going to be able to
affect these countries. Last year's missile estimate said that
we expected North Korea was likely to test the Taepo Dong-2 in
1999, and they did not do it because of some political deals
that we had worked out. So I guess I like to hold hope that
maybe we will be able to work things out with North Korea to
where they would not test the Taepo Dong-2 and they would not
share the technologies with others, and maybe down the road
even do the same with Iran.
Now while I hold out that hope, you can see that my
projections are not driven away from where they are because of
that hope. So it is kind of hard to answer that. I would like
to see nonproliferation efforts succeed in stopping the
programs, but we have to make projections where we see them
falling. Our projections are that they are not going to stop
the programs at this point.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Schindler, anything to add on that
subject from you?
Mr. Schindler. I would just add that I think we would
differentiate between Iran and North Korea in terms of the
potential threat to U.S. interests in terms of them
transferring missiles to other countries at this point in time.
The North Koreans are in an active marketing effort and their
products are more tested, so they are much more active there.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much. You have been a big
help to our understanding of the situation, the nature of the
threat, the development programs that are underway in Iran, the
proliferation activity, transfers to and from the country, to
the extent that these matters could be discussed in an open
session. We do have to make decisions on levels of funding of
programs that are designed to protect against these threats and
to try to help prevent proliferation by the use of the powers
that our government can lawfully bring to bear on those issues.
So you have been a big help to us and it is a very important
undertaking for us to all understand what the facts are and
what is going on.
Mr. Schindler. Thank you.
Mr. Walpole. Thank you. Senator, if I could just add one
more point to the last question and answer on the
nonproliferation front. I keep reminding myself of this as
well. The Condor-2, I do not know if you remember that one,
that was a two-stage system being developed jointly by Iraq,
Egypt, and Argentina. That we log in as a nonproliferation
success. We actually stopped that program. And I am glad we
did, I would not want to see Condor-2s all over the world
today. That is probably part of what is behind my optimism. We
have seen some successes in nonproliferation. We need to
continue to pursue those efforts to try to get them to work.
But at the same time, we have got to make our projections based
on where we think the trends are going.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much. We appreciate it. You
may stand down.
We will have our second panel come forward. We appreciate
very much the cooperation and the presence of Dr. Stephen
Cambone, Director of Research at the Institute for National
Strategic Studies of the National Defense University here in
Washington; and Michael Eisenstadt, who is a Senior Fellow at
the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Thank you both
for being here. We appreciate your presence.
Dr. Cambone, you may proceed.
TESTIMONY OF STEPHEN A. CAMBONE, DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH,
INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES OF THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
Mr. Cambone. Thank you, Senator. It is a pleasure for me to
be here and a honor to appear before the Subcommittee. I do
have a prepared statement that, with your permission, I would
like to submit for the record and to just simply draw a few
summary statements from it in the opening, and then proceed to
questions if you would like.
Let me preface my remarks by saying that what I have to say
are my views alone. I am an employee of the National Defense
University, which is a government agency, and my views are my
own and not theirs and do not represent anyone else at the
University.
My remarks here today are built around what I anticipated
my friend, Bob Walpole, would have to say as a result of having
followed the way in which the NIEs have developed, and
particularly the latest set of comments in which the NIEs and
the reports from the National Intelligence Council have begun
to concentrate on what might be likely to happen, the
motivations and the difficulties of assessing those
motivations, particularly with respect to the Iranian program.
And so I attempted to build my remarks around that issue, with
the view that if we were to take Bob Walpole at his word that
warning has, indeed, been given by the Intelligence Community
on the question of Iran, its ballistic missile programs and its
nuclear weapons programs, then it seems to me it is time to
heed that warning and to react accordingly.
And so, if I may, I would like to briefly outline why I
think we need to take seriously the pace and the direction of
the Iranian program, and then to outline a number of points
where I think we need to begin to prepare to meet the
consequences of Iran's programs.
In my judgment, Iran now has the capability with readily
available foreign assistance to develop and to deploy, with
little testing, ballistic missiles with sufficient range to
reach the United States. In assessing Iran's capability, we
cannot discount the possibility that if it were to accept from
foreign sources a fully developed system, that is a three-stage
Taepo Dong-2 from North Korea, it could go ahead and pose that
threat to us even without testing.
And the reason I make this point, and I know it to be a
controversial one, is, again recalling what Bob Walpole just
told us, the North Koreans were preparing to test the Taepo
Dong-2 in 1999, according to the sources that we have in the
open, and so therefore this is a system that has been
progressing over time. And we need to remind ourselves again
that the Taepo Dong-1 was tested with three stages without ever
having been tested prior to that.
So it is a case where I think we have to begin to lend some
credibility to the proposition that transfers can occur and
deployments made without the kind of testing that we would
expect to see.
Second, there remains some uncertainty whether Iran now
possesses or will soon possess nuclear weapons with which to
arm its ballistic missiles. In my judgment, U.S. policy toward
Iran should take as its point of departure the findings of the
Rumsfeld Commission in 1998. That was that by relying on
foreign sources of fissile material, Iran could acquire nuclear
weapons in 1 to 3 years of a decision that they are essential
to its security. And, moreover, policymakers should assume that
they, policymakers, are unlikely to know when or whether such a
decision has been taken.
And so I do believe that we need to start reviewing
closely, and revise as appropriate our policies in a way that
reflect this new reality. And I believe the reality can be
summarized in this way. That in a future crisis or conflict
involving Iran, the United States will need to honor the
threat--an expression that one used to hear often and which I
think is useful in this case--need to honor the threat Iran
could pose to the interests of the United States.
Now there are those who will argue that I am presenting a
worst case scenario. They will make many arguments why Iran
would not pursue a long-range ballistic missile program, why it
would not pursue an ICBM program, and so forth. But it seems to
me that the motivations and intentions of other countries are
always difficult to assess, and this is especially true in the
case of Iran, a nation with which, frankly, the United States
has had little contact over the last 20 years and that is
governed by a regime that is very different than our own.
That said, U.S. policymakers should suppose nonetheless
that the Iranians are no less capable of understanding the
value of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles than are those
who govern North Korea, who govern Pakistan, who govern India,
and even Iraq. Each of those nations has used its weapons
programs to alter its strategic circumstances in significant
ways, and I have no doubt that the Iranian leadership
understands that it can make use of its ballistic missiles and
nuclear weapon programs to change its strategic circumstances.
In my prepared remarks I have a description of what I think
the changes are that Iran seeks. I will skip over any detail
but mark three points.
First, Iran clearly is looking to deter outside
intervention in its domestic and its national security affairs.
They intend to do that for nations nearby, like Iraq, nations
at intermediate range, like Israel, and nations at longer
range, like the United States.
Second, clearly Iran wishes to establish itself as a
leading power in the Middle East/Southwest Asia region and they
are having some effect in establishing themselves. I think
their ballistic missile and weapons programs have some measure
of credit for the effect that they have had. And that it has
become apparent, that is, the effect they have in establishing
themselves, that I think prompted Secretary Cohen's comment in
April of this past year toward the Gulf States when he was
visiting that they, the Gulf States, should take care in
trusting too much in the proposition that ``Iran wants a
peaceful and stable relationship with them.''
Third, I think Iran is definitely interested in reducing to
a vanishing point the influence the United States has on the
affairs of the region. Iran's rising strength and confidence
has begun to persuade other states in the region that they need
to begin assessing their own relationship with the United
States as well. I think we are in for a fairly rocky period of
time in our relations with countries in that part of the world.
My prepared statement has a bit of history on the Iranian
programs. I will not go through them with you here, except to
come back to remind again of the quotation from the Rumsfeld
Commission's report in 1998 on their nuclear weapons program.
And here let me quote it in full:
``The Commission found that Iran has a nuclear energy and
weapons program which aims to design, develop, and as soon as
possible produce nuclear weapons. The Commission judges that
the only issue as to whether or not Iran may soon have or
already has a nuclear weapon is the amount of fissile material
available to it. If Iran were able to accumulate enough fissile
material from foreign sources, it might be able to develop a
nuclear weapon in only 1 to 3 years.''
Now, of course, this turns on the question of availability
of fissile material. But we know there is an awful lot of
fissile material available in this world. We ourselves, the
United States, have taken highly enriched uranium out of a
former Soviet state. Britain joined with us in another effort
to take it out of a second state. And we know that, despite the
programs that have been undertaken in the context of the Nunn-
Lugar effort to take care of ``loose nukes,'' a recent
Washington Post article underscored how poorly that program is
translating in Russia and how uncertain are the people who work
in those programs in Russia that their future is in any way
secure. And it only gives one cause to worry that transfers of
technology, of information, of people, and maybe perhaps even
of material was taking place whether acknowledged or
unacknowledged by the Russian government.
We know that kind of transfer is not unknown. There are
persistent reports, for example, that China transferred
material to Pakistan. Nor is diversion of material from
civilian programs to clandestine programs unknown, as we find
in Iraq and in North Korea. And then we have the case of South
Africa, where we all, I think, found it interesting that it had
a number of nuclear weapons in their arsenal.
Let me turn then to ``honoring the threat'' and conclude
with six points where I think we ought to begin paying some
attention.
First, it seems to me we have to think about the posture of
U.S. forces. Constant attention is needed to maintain our
capability to undermine the utility to Iran of nuclear weapons
and ballistic missiles. This includes, but is not defined by,
deployment of ballistic missile defenses in the region and to
defend the American homeland as well. It is also the case that
forces deployed by the United States to the region must assure
Iran's neighbors, those that depend on us, that our forces can
perform their assigned missions, including, if necessary,
suppression of ballistic missile attacks.
Second, we have to take a new approach to stemming the
supply of expertise, materials, and technology to Iran. Their
programs are already well advanced, as Bob Walpole told us.
Even if the foreign assistance were to end tomorrow, those
programs would still be a matter of concern. Nonetheless, the
Iranians continue to take in foreign assistance and we have to
find ways different than those we have practiced thus far to
stem that proliferation.
Third, we need to begin worrying about the consequences for
the remainder of the region of Iran's programs. We know that
Iraq continues with its own programs. We know that Pakistan has
one. We know that Saudi Arabia has ballistic missiles that it
may soon need to replace. We know that the Israelis are keeping
a very close eye on what is taking place in Iran. We know that
Turkey is concerned about what is taking place in Iran. And so,
as the Iranian program begins to take shape and become more
apparent, we are going to see a reaction in the region and we
need to be prepared here in the United States to deal with that
consequence.
Fourth, we have to talk with our European friends and
allies. They are the object of a charm offensive from Iran for
Iran to gain legitimacy in the international arena. We clearly
need to make clear to our European friends exactly how serious
we take the Iranian threat and elicit their cooperation and
assistance in dealing with it.
Fifth, it is time for us to do a net assessment of our
interests in the Middle East/Persian Gulf/Southwest Asia
region. Iran's emergence in diplomatic and economic terms
coupled with its advancing military capability, on the
conventional front plus its ballistic missile and nuclear
weapons program, turns it into a true strategic power in the
region and one which we need to take into account in our
policies in the region. I do not think we do that sufficiently
today.
And last, we do have to look at U.S.-Iranian relations.
This is probably the most difficult step for American political
leaders to take. The memories of the 1979 hostage crisis, two
decades of vilification, the toll taken by state-sponsored
terrorism, and the determination with which Iran seeks to
displace the United States in the region make it difficult to
come to this issue without grave reservation. Nonetheless,
there is change going on inside of Iran and it ought to be in
our interest to see that change continue. But we cannot be
misled by what is taking place because what we are likely to
see is an Iran which, while more popular in its government,
will remain Islamic in its foundations. And so while it appears
to be, and may in fact be in the eyes of its own people, a
democratic state, it is one which is very different than our
own with ambitions very different from ours. And so we need to
approach it in a way that we are very careful not to transform
ourselves into a demander of change, being willing to offer
blandishments and rewards to Iran for their behavior, but
rather to approach them from a position where each side is
clear-eyed in its interest and we, for our part, are willing to
sustain our position if in fact we find there is no basis for
friendly agreement.
So let me conclude then. In the last 5 years, we have
clearly witnessed the development of nuclear weapons programs
and ballistic missile programs in Iran that provide it with the
potential to threaten American interests. Iran's programs have
been, and remain, dependent on foreign assistance. But that
fact does not alter the conclusion that Iran could deploy, in a
relatively short time, weapons systems that could threaten the
American homeland.
Over the same period of time, they have been working
assiduously to alter their position in the region and in the
international system. They are looking to establish themselves
as a legitimate state in the international system. This is not
something we should overlook because there is every prospect
now that we will see in the near future what is considered to
be a legitimate state in the international system newly armed
with nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. And whether those
nuclear weapons are acknowledged by Iran, whether they are
admitted by us, or they are kept, as it were, in the basement,
the fact of their programs will change, and have changed, the
Iranian strategic position. And it is one which it is time we
for our part address directly. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cambone follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. STEPHEN A. CAMBONE \1\
I. Introduction
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Dr. Cambone served as Staff Director for the Commission to
Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (Rumsfeld
Commission). He has served on the staff of the Director, Los Alamos
National Laboratory, as Director of Strategic Defense Policy in the
Pentagon and as a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies. He is currently on detail from the National
Defense University to serve as Staff Director for the Commission to
Assess U.S. National Security Space Management and Organization.
The views expressed by the witness are his own and do not
necessarily reflect those of the National Defense University, the
Department of Defense or any other U.S. government department or
agency.
Mr. Chairman, it is an honor for me to appear before the Committee
to discuss the issue of Iran and weapons proliferation.
Iran has benefited from proliferation activity by North Korea,
China and Russia. It has made use of foreign experts, testing,
technology and weapons systems to transform its military posture. The
Congress has been especially concerned with proliferation activity that
has enabled Iran to develop ballistic missiles and, possibly, nuclear
weapons.
In my judgment, Iran now has the capability with readily available
foreign assistance to develop and to deploy, with little testing,
ballistic missiles with sufficient range to reach the United States. In
assessing Iran's capability we cannot discount the possibility that if
it were to accept from foreign sources a fully developed system, e.g.,
a three stage Taepo-Dong 2 from North Korea, rather than components and
technical assistance, it could deploy it without testing.
There remains uncertainty whether Iran now possesses or will soon
possess nuclear weapons with which to arm its ballistic missiles. In my
judgment U.S. policy toward Iran should take as its point of departure
the findings of the Rumsfeld Commission that, by relying on foreign
sources of fissile material, Iran could acquire nuclear weapons in one
to three years of a decision that they are essential to its security.
Moreover, policy makers should assume that they are unlikely to know
when or whether such a decision has been taken.
Consequently, I believe U.S. policy toward Iran needs to be
reviewed closely and revised as appropriate to reflect a new reality.
That reality is that in a future crisis or conflict involving Iran the
U.S. will need to ``honor the threat'' Iran could pose to the interests
of the United States. Put another way, the U.S. needs to begin now to
reassess its policies, strategies and military capabilities as they
apply to the Middle East and Southwest Asia. It needs to do so in light
of the probability that Iran is likely to possess the means to hold the
U.S., its deployed forces and our allies at risk by means of ballistic
missiles armed with nuclear weapons.
There are those who will argue that I am presenting a worst case
scenario. Iran, they will argue, has little to gain and much to lose by
developing a nuclear weapons capability and even more to lose by
coupling it to an ICBM-range missile with which to threaten the United
States. A nuclear weapons program, it is argued, would risk Iran's
standing in the international community, not least because it would
violate Iran's NPT pledge to remain a non-nuclear weapons state. An
ICBM program, it is argued, would gain nothing for Iran because should
it attack the United States--or perhaps only threaten to attack--it
would be the subject of instant and catastrophic retaliation.
The motivations and intentions of other countries are always
difficult to assess. This is especially true in the case of Iran, a
nation with which the U.S. has had little contact in 20 years and that
is governed by a regime very different from our own. That said, U.S.
policy makers should suppose that Iranians are no less capable of
understanding the value of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles than
are those who govern North Korea, India, Pakistan and even Iraq. Each
of those nations has used its weapons programs to alter its strategic
circumstances in significant ways.
Like North Korea, India, Pakistan and Iraq, Iran seeks to change
its strategic circumstances.
First, it seeks to secure itself from outside intervention in its
domestic and national security affairs, what it refers to as
establishing a deterrent capability. This would require an ability to
project a deterrent in the fashion of France during the Cold War--touts
azimuth. Iran has already taken steps to build a deterrent capability
against nearby Iraq, which is its most ambitious competitor for
leadership in the region and a long-term adversary. The deterrent is
intended to affect countries further away that Iran perceives as a
threat, for example, Israel. Israel can pose a countervailing deterrent
to Iran both by frustrating Iranian political objectives in the region
and by its ability to directly threaten Iranian territory. And Iran is
clear in its desire to have a deterrent to American power, which can
affect Iran's regional interests from any distance--near to far--and by
any means--political, economic or military. Second, Iran seeks to
establish itself as a leading power in the region. This requires a mix
of political and economic as well as military strength. Efforts to
establish this position are evident in Iranian diplomacy toward the
Gulf States. The apparent effect of those efforts prompted Secretary
Cohen to warn in April of this year that the Gulf States should take
care in trusting too much in the proposition that ``Iran wants a
peaceful and stable relations [sic] with them.'' Efforts to improve
Iran's economic circumstances can be seen in its program to develop new
oil and gas fields within Iran, its involvement in affairs related to
Caspian Sea oil and pipelines (which has strategic implications as
well) and its own proposals to build a pipeline through Pakistan to
deliver oil to India. Apart from its nuclear and missile programs, Iran
has been rebuilding its military. Though far from complete, the effort
is far enough along that Iran could send a message to neighboring
states by mobilizing two divisions of regular troops (and not
Revolutionary Guards) to signal its opposition to instability emanating
from Afghanistan and by proposing naval maneuvers with Gulf States.
Third, Iran wants to reduce to a vanishing point the influence of
the U.S. on the affairs of the region. Iran's rising strength and
confidence, coupled to their internal domestic pressures, has
contributed to quiet requests to the U.S. from states in the region for
a reduction in the American military footprint. Iran is conducting a
diplomatic and political offensive among states of the European Union.
This has resulted in visits to London, Paris and Berlin for Iran's
leaders. These American allies understand the game Iran seeks to play,
and express their solidarity with the U.S. on such issues as non-
proliferation and human rights. But in the end, Iran undoubtedly hopes
to build a second center of opinion in the West more favorably disposed
to its interests than the U.S. has been or is likely to be.
In my judgment, Iran's nuclear weapon and ballistic missile
programs are essential to achieving these three objectives. As those
programs develop, they could provide a deterrent to interference in
Iranian affairs, a firm foundation for asserting a stabilizing
leadership role in the region and a countervailing power to that of the
United States.
In my view, these programs are essential to Iran's broader
strategic interests. It is dangerous for the U.S. to assess the risks
and benefits of such programs from the vantage point of those who see
no value in and hence no reason for Iran to pursue a nuclear weapon and
ballistic missile program. Once the U.S. grasps the scope of Iranian
interests and the role of its programs in realizing those interests,
the more apparent becomes the need to ``honor the threat'' posed by
Iran to American interests.
II. Iran and Proliferation
A. Ballistic Missiles
Iranian interest in ballistic missile acquisition is traceable to
its war with Iraq in the mid-1980's. Iraq's modified SCUD missiles out-
numbered and out-ranged those of Iran. Iran turned to North Korea to
supply it with ballistic missiles. North Korea obliged, sending Iran
SCUD Bs, 77 of which were fired against targets in Iraq during the
second ``War of the Cities'' in 1988. There was a certain irony in this
transaction. The missiles provided by North Korea had been reverse-
engineered from SCUDs it had obtained from Egypt in the early 1980's.
During the Iran-Iraq war, Egypt was a staunch supporter of Iraq.
Proliferation activity knows no loyalties.
By the early 1990's Iran had turned again to North Korea to acquire
ballistic missiles. (Some analysts believe that Iran was involved in
North Korea's No Dong program from its outset in the late 1980's and
that it provided substantial funding for its development.) By the mid-
1990's Iran had as many as ten No Dongs--either in component form or as
completed missiles--which are evolved from SCUDs and are thought to
provide the building blocks for North Korea's Taepo Dong missiles. Over
the same period Iran had also begun to establish the infrastructure
that would permit it to produce ballistic missiles within the country,
ending its dependence on outside suppliers. By the early to mid-1990's
Iran had also secured considerable technical support from Russia and
China for its SCUD-based program, support that continues to this day.
The result of proliferation activity involving Iran is worth
underscoring. In roughly a decade--from the time it became involved in
North Korea's No Dong program--Iran has arrived at the threshold of
ICBM capability. Recall the judgment of the Rumsfeld Commission in
1998:
Iran now has the technical capability and resources to
demonstrate an ICBM-range ballistic missile, similar to the
[North Korean] TD-2 [itself based on scaled-up SCUD
technology], within five years of a decision to proceed--
whether that decision has already been made or is yet to be
made.
This judgment was acknowledged in the National Intelligence
Council's (NIC) report in September 1999. Much has been made of the
fact that analysts who contributed to this report were unable to agree
on the likely direction and timing of Iran's missile programs, that is,
of Iran's intentions for its programs. This is hardly surprising and
misses the point. It is not surprising because the U.S. has no official
presence--embassy, consulates, trade offices--in the country through
which it could gain first hand knowledge of affairs in Iran. Tight
security limits the availability of people and information that might
shed light on Iranian plans and programs. Through deception and denial
efforts the government and security services work hard to frustrate
intelligence collection by technical means. Under such conditions it is
very difficult to confirm intentions with high confidence.
Readers of the NIC's report who focus on the disagreements about
Iranian intentions miss the underlying point of the report--that Iran's
program is moving along, that all postulated paths lead to a ballistic
missile capability of ICBM range and do so within a reasonably short
period of time. With respect to Iran's actual capability, the NIC
report confirms the Rumsfeld Commission's judgment:
``. . . most analysts believe [Iran] could (emphasis added)
test a three-stage ICBM patterned after the Taepo Dong-1 SLV or
a three-stage Taepo Dong 2-type ICBM, possibly with North
Korean assistance, in the next few years.''
Iran's potential to test a Taepo Dong-like missile in the next few
years is a product of more than a decade of close North Korean-Iranian
cooperation on SCUD-based programs. That cooperation was demonstrated
again in the last year. Press reports suggest that in November 1999
North Korea transferred 12 No Dong engines to Iran. It is reported that
those engines were tested in February 2000. Iran successfully flight-
tested the Shahab 3, which is its version of the No Dong, on July 15,
2000. In fact, in March 2000 the Iranian defense minister suggested the
Shahab 3 was fully operational as of February. In public testimony, the
U.S. NIO for Strategic Programs confirmed the No Dong engine transfer.
He called the engines critical to the Shahab 3 program and ``any
extensions of the Shahab 3 program,'' by which he meant an Iranian
version of the Taepo Dong.
In addition to North Korea, Iran has had assistance from Russia and
China in its SCUD-based programs. There is little reason to believe
that Iran could not procure, or that one of its proliferation partners
would not supply, whatever additional technical support it may still
require to develop, test and deploy an ICBM-range missile. A three-
stage Taepo Dong-2 is said by the intelligence community to have
sufficient range to reach most of the U.S. from North Korea. Such a
missile developed or deployed in Iran would have sufficient range to
reach the northeastern United States.
Iran also has the potential to pursue an ICBM-range program by
building off Russian and Chinese assistance to programs other than its
SCUD-based program. That is, Iran could choose to develop an ICBM
different from the North Korean Taepo Dong. The Rumsfeld Commission
reported that Iran ``is reported to have acquired engines or engine
designs for the RD-214 engine, which powered the Soviet SS-4 MRBM and
served as the first stage of the SL-7 space-launch vehicle.'' It also
reported that China ``has carried out extensive transfers to Iran's
solid-fueled ballistic missile program'' and that Iran has ``developed
a solid-fueled rocket infrastructure. . . .'' Other sources report that
Iran has received the RD-216 engine from Russia. It powered the SS-5
IRBM and the SL-8, a space-launch vehicle still employed by Russia. The
step from a space launch vehicle to an ICBM is not very large or
difficult. The assistance of Russia and China in these areas provides
Iran with an alternate approach to ICBM-range missiles.
The Iranians discuss two programs beyond the Shahab 3, referring to
them as the Shahab 4 and Shahab 5. The characteristics of these
programs--that is, whether they are Iranian versions of the Taepo Dong
or single or multiple stage variants on the Soviet-era SS-4 and SS-5 or
something else--are unknown. It is not impossible that the names cover
a number of Iranian programs. But whatever names they may have, the
evidence suggests Iran, like every other ballistic missile power, is
developing missiles of longer and longer range.
B. Nuclear Weapons
There is no doubt that Iran could arm its ballistic missiles with
chemical or biological warheads. Greater uncertainty exists with
respect to nuclear weapons. The Rumsfeld Commission found that Iran:
``. . . has a nuclear energy and weapons program which aims to
design, develop and, as soon as possible, produce nuclear
weapons. The Commission judges that the only issue as to
whether or not Iran may soon have or already has a nuclear
weapon is the amount of fissile material available to it. . . .
If Iran were to accumulate enough fissile material from foreign
sources, it might be able to develop a nuclear weapon in only
one to three years.
The key to Iranian nuclear weapons capability is the acquisition of
weapons-grade uranium or plutonium (depending on the designs Iran may
choose). Recent experience shows that the possibility of procuring
fissile material from abroad cannot be discounted.
The U.S. purchased 600 kg of HEU from Khazakstan. Britain and the
U.S. removed almost 9 pounds of HEU from Georgia. It would be dangerous
to suppose that only the U.S. and the UK could have success in such
transactions. This is especially so given that within eight of the
states of the former Soviet Union there is reported to be some 700 tons
of fissile or near-fissile material located at over 50 sites. To be
sure, the U.S. is working hard to bring that material under protection,
accountability and control. But as highlighted in a recent Washington
Post article, that effort has been fraught with difficulty and delay,
and it cannot be expected to make up for notoriously bad record-keeping
by FSU officials or the disillusionment and poverty of current
officials.
Foreign acquisition of material for weapons is not unknown. There
are persistent reports that China transferred material to Pakistan for
its first weapon. Nor is diversion of material from civilian programs
to clandestine programs unknown, as has been the case with Iraq and
North Korea. Nor are wholly clandestine programs unknown, as the U.S.
learned with respect to the program in South Africa. Hence, the
position of the intelligence community as reported in the press in
January 2000--that it can no longer rule out the possibility that Iran
has acquired nuclear weapons--is not surprising.
In my judgment, the combination of what the U.S. knows of Iran's
programs and activities and past experience should lead policy makers
and Members of Congress to err on the side of caution in the matter of
an Iranian nuclear weapons program. That is, the U.S. needs to take
seriously that the ``absence of evidence is not evidence of absence''--
and to fashion policy on the same basis as urged by the Rumsfeld
Commission with respect to ballistic missiles. That is, Iran could
possess nuclear weapons capability within a reasonably short time of a
decision to acquire it, and that during that time the U.S. might not be
aware that such a decision had been made.
III. Honoring the Threat
In a future crisis or conflict involving Iran, I have argued, the
U.S. will need to ``honor the threat'' posed by an Iran that could
possess the means to hold the United States, its deployed forces and
our allies at risk by means of ballistic missiles armed with nuclear
weapons. To do so, I suggested, requires that the U.S. review its
policies, plans, strategies and forces as they relate to the Middle
East and Southwest Asia. I will conclude with a short list of issues
for examination.
First, the structure and posture of U.S. forces: Constant attention
is needed to maintain the capability to undermine the utility to Iran
of nuclear weapons and missile programs. This includes, but is not
defined by, deployment of ballistic missile defense in the region and
to defend the American homeland as well. It is also the case that
forces deployed by the U.S. to the region must assure Iran's neighbors
that they can perform their assigned missions--including, if necessary,
suppression of ballistic missile attacks. It is likely that this
capability will need to be demonstrated and that regional leaders will
want to be apprised of U.S. thinking about, but not be implicated in,
the planning or execution of those missions. Of greater importance to
those leaders is an assurance that in the event of a crisis or conflict
the security burden will be shared equitably. The U.S. will need to
consider as well whether additional attention is needed to reinforce
the security and raise the deterrent threshold for allies outside of
Iran's immediate neighborhood that are potentially at risk,
particularly Turkey and Israel.
Second, new approaches to stemming the supply of expertise,
materials and technology to Iran: The U.S. might consider altering its
approach toward nations and non-state actors supplying Iran's programs.
Rather than sanction entities within those nations, the U.S. might
consider taking countervailing action. The suppliers to Iran are
contributing to the development of a capability that Iran could use to
threaten important, perhaps one day vital, interests of the U.S.. Those
suppliers need to be put on notice that the U.S. will treat their
actions as a direct threat and act accordingly.
Third, regional proliferation: The Middle East/Southwest Asia
region is already one in which considerable proliferation activity
occurs. Should the Iranian programs continue to progress, it is likely
that other nations will find themselves confronted with the question:
how shall we respond? The U.S. needs to consider how far it can
discourage additional countries from deploying--explicitly or ``in the
basement''--missile and weapons programs--or substantially modernizing
those they do possess. In those cases where countries decided they will
proceed, the U.S. will need to consider how it would respond and the
implications of its response for global arms control regimes.
Fourth, consultation with our European friends and allies: Britain,
France, Germany and Italy, among others, have their own interests in
the Persian Gulf and in repairing their ties with Iran. They need to
understand the seriousness with which the U.S. takes the potential
threat posed by Iran and the measures it is prepared to take to
mitigate that threat. The U.S. should review with them, and seek
cooperation in, a range of diplomatic, economic and military measures
it is prepared to take to undermine the utility of its programs to Iran
and to stem the continuing flow of support to those programs.
Fifth, a net assessment of U.S. interests in the Middle East/
Persian Gulf/Southwest Asia: The U.S. has a number of distinct,
sometimes conflicting objectives in the region. These include: the
peace process, Turkish and Israeli security and defense, stability and
threat reduction in the Gulf, Caspian oil, Pakistani political
stability, moderating political and religious extremism and support for
international terrorism, and Iraqi compliance with UN Security Council
resolutions. Chinese, Russian and EU initiatives are in play
simultaneously. All touch to a greater or lesser extent on Iranian
interests. The U.S. needs to be clear about what its own priorities may
be, where there are opportunities for agreement with Iran, where
misunderstandings can be avoided and what the basic points of real
difference between Iran and the U.S. may be.
Sixth, a fresh look at the future of U.S.-Iranian relations: This
is the most difficult step for American political leaders to take. The
memories of the 1979 hostage crisis, two decades of vilification, the
toll taken by state-sponsored terrorism and the determination with
which Iran seeks to displace the U.S. in the region make it difficult
to come to this issue without grave reservation. Yet, Iran is
undeniably in the throes of important political and social changes. To
be sure, elections do not make for a democratic regime of a kind we
understand in the West. Nor is it likely that a more popular or
moderate Iranian government will be moved any time soon to abandon its
nuclear weapons and missile programs. But the people of Iran are having
an influence on their own government. It is in the United States'
interest to encourage that trend. Public attitudes in Iran might be
affected positively if the U.S. were to take the necessary steps to
undermine the utility to Iran of nuclear weapons and missiles and to
staunch the flow of foreign support to those programs while offering to
engage in reciprocal actions to reduce tensions in the region. At the
same time the U.S. cannot allow itself to be drawn into a relationship
where, as in the case of North Korea, the U.S. becomes the demander.
That will only reward Iran for its behavior, encourage its suppliers,
frustrate U.S. relations with our allies, further destabilize the
region and result in crisis and conflict with Iran.
IV. Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, I will conclude this statement with the following
observation.
In the last five years we have witnessed the development of a
nuclear weapons and ballistic missile program in Iran that now provides
it with the potential to threaten American interests. Iran's program
has been, and remains, dependent on foreign assistance. But that
dependence does not alter the fact that it could deploy, in a
relatively short time, weapons systems that could threaten the American
homeland.
Over the same period of time Iran has been working assiduously to
alter its strategic position in the region. Its nuclear weapons and
missile programs have been complemented by the selective modernization
of its conventional forces. It has made a number of diplomatic
overtures to regional and European powers to establish itself as a
legitimate state in the international system. And, in the last few
years Iran has been struggling to revise its domestic affairs in ways
that, if successfully completed, could bind its large and youthful
population to a more popular Islamic and nationalist system of
government and an economy more prosperous than Iran has enjoyed for
many decades.
As a result of its ongoing military, diplomatic and domestic
transformation, Iran has evolved from a ``state of proliferation
concern.'' It is recognized in the region and increasingly within
international councils as a legitimate state whose national interests
must be taken into account by all other states. It is now time for the
U.S. to address the strategic challenge Iran poses to American
interests in the region and within the international system.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Dr. Cambone.
Mr. Eisenstadt, we will hear from you now. Thank you.
TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL EISENSTADT, SENIOR FELLOW, WASHINGTON
INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
Mr. Eisenstadt. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would
like to thank you for inviting me here today to speak about
this important topic. I will make a few comments based on my
prepared statement which I would like to submit for the record.
I thought I would talk today about policy approaches for
dealing with proliferation in Iran, given that the other
speakers have tended to focus on particular systems and
capabilities. I intend to discuss five policy approaches that
have been used by the United States in the Middle East and
elsewhere for dealing with proliferation, evaluating their
utility and efficacy vis-a-vis Iran so that maybe we can draw
some conclusions as to what works best and what maybe is not
appropriate in dealing with the issue of Iranian proliferation.
These five policy approaches are: (1) altering Iran's
motivations to acquire missiles and WMD; (2) influencing Iran's
proliferation cost/benefit calculus; (3) imposing costs and
delays on its programs; (4) strengthening deterrence; and (5)
mitigating the impact of proliferation by encouraging political
change in Iran. I will evaluate each of these now in turn.
In terms of altering motivations, I would first make two
points. First, Iran's interest in weapons of mass destruction
predates the Islamic Republic. Under the monarchy, under the
Shah, Iran had a nuclear weapons program. After the Islamic
revolution, the Islamic Republic, first in response to Iraqi
chemical weapon use, pursued chemical and biological weapons,
and then reactivated the nuclear weapons program. Whereas the
Shah was motivated mainly by his desire to make Iran a regional
power, the Islamic Republic has been motivated by three
factors: (1) the desire for self-reliance, given the fact that
they have been strategically isolated for the entire time that
the Islamic Republic has existed; (2) to transform Iran into a
regional power; and (3) to strengthen Iran's deterrent
capability.
Now there are two main policy implications implicit in this
assessment. First, Iran's pursuit of weapons of mass
destruction and missiles is not necessarily regime-specific. In
other words, even if the Islamic Republic were to be replaced
by another regime, there is a good chance that they might still
pursue WMD for various reasons. Second, Iran is developing
weapons of mass destruction not just to deal with perceived
threats, that is, for deterrence purposes, but for other
factors as well. This is important because a lot of people tend
to assume that its motivations are strictly defensive, that if
we could deal with its defensive concerns, then the problem can
be dealt with. And usually they put forward the idea of
creating some kind of regional security systems which will then
enable Iran to divest itself eventually of its WMD.
My bottom line is just their security concerns alone are so
complex, I doubt that there is anything we can do to really
modify them. But even if we could deal with them, there are
other factors which will probably continue to motivate Iran in
the direction of proliferation. That is not to say that we
should not try to lay the groundwork for a security framework
in the region, because I think to the degree that would advance
stability in the region, that is good because you might then
avoid conflicts that could lead to the use of WMD. But it is
not a cure for Iranian proliferation.
Second, with regard to influencing the proliferation cost/
benefit calculus of Iran. A number of people again have, I
think, speculated incorrectly that somehow the reformers have
less of a motivation to pursue WMD than the hard-line
conservatives and that they are influenced by a different
calculus.
I think in general I disagree with that. First, from the
little evidence that we have on the subject, Iran's leadership
seems relatively united over the desirability of acquiring
missiles and WMD. I think across the board its leadership sees
the possession of such weapons as a strategic imperative.
However, I think it is possible that there might be
differences within the leadership over the price that Iran
might have to pay for going down the proliferation road. For
instance, if they were to violate their NPT commitments and
develop nuclear weapons or to be caught violating the Chemical
Weapons Convention, then economic sanctions could conceivably
be slapped on the country. And I think the reformers are more
concerned about relations with the West and about getting
foreign investment, and therefore things that are of value to
them can be harmed by Iran's pursuit of WMD. So there might be
differences, whereas the conservatives are less concerned about
Iran's relationship with the West, for instance.
On the other hand, I would just make the point that in
general in the Middle East security concerns trump economic
concerns. So even though I think it is possible that some
reformers might agonize over this dilemma, in the end of the
day I think it is likely that they will go down the route of
putting Iran's security interests over its economic interest.
But nonetheless, I would just say there might be an opening
here for the United States to explore and if given the
opportunity down the road when we do enter into talks with the
Iranians we should explore this. But I am not an optimist about
the prospects of striking a deal even if the reformers were to
consolidate control over most of the levers of government in
Tehran. I am not sure there is a deal to be made there. But,
again, it should be explored. I think more likely Iranians
across the board will believe that they can go down the route
of proliferation and not get caught, and they will be tempted
to do so.
The third course of action is imposing costs and delays.
This is the approach that the U.S. Government to date has
placed the greatest emphasis on. I think we have been fairly
successful in imposing costs and delays on Iran's efforts to
proliferate. In order to accomplish this objective, we have
used various traditional policy instruments such as export
controls, diplomatic demarches of foreign countries, and
economic sanctions. Again, as I said, I think we have been
fairly successful in delaying Iran's proliferation as a result.
You probably cannot stop a determined proliferator, but if
you can delay him, that is something. Some people tend to
dismiss the importance of delay. Granted, I would prefer to
halt rather than delay a program. But delay can have important
benefits in that it buys you time to develop countermeasures to
systems that the adversary is developing, such as missile
defenses and the like.
In addition, it is also potentially a hedge against perhaps
the reversion of Iran to a more aggressive foreign policy in
the future. If this were to happen, delay at least will mean
that they have fewer capabilities in their hand than they would
have had otherwise had their programs not been delayed.
With regard to strengthening deterrence, I would say that
basically deterrence lies at the heart of any effort to deal
with a country of concern, such as Iran, that has already
proliferated. In the case of Iran, I think there is a
widespread perception in some quarters that Iran is an
irrational state or is undeterable either because they are
irrational or because they have a very high pain threshold. I
would disagree with that.
In general, I think experience has shown that although they
do sometimes miscalculate, as all countries do, and I think
there is a greater tendency on Iran's part than other countries
to do so, in general its decisionmakers do act in accordance
with a rational calculus. And while in the early days of the
Revolution they may have had a very high pain threshold, as a
result of the experience in the Iran-Iraq war and the
tremendous damage this did to their country, and as a result of
the death of the Ayatollah Khomeini who probably was the only
person who could have inspired the Iranians to fight 8 years
against Iraq and take the losses they did take, since the end
of the Iran-Iraq war and the death of Khomeini, I think Iran,
in terms of its ability to absorb losses, is much more of a
normal state. I would just point to their very cautious
behavior in 1991 in not really actively intervening in the
South of Iraq during the uprising for fear that they might get
dragged into a quagmire, and their behavior in the crisis with
Afghanistan in 1998 to show that I think they have learned the
lesson of the past and as a result they are a lot more
cautious. The bottom line is we can use traditional tools of
deterrence vis-a-vis Iran in order to mitigate the implications
of proliferation.
Finally, I would like to address the issue of mitigating
the impact of proliferation through encouraging political
change. I would agree with what Dr. Cambone said, that we have
to do what we can in order to encourage political change in
Iran as a way of mitigating proliferation as well as for other
general policy reasons. I would say we do have a very limited
ability to influence domestic politics in Iran, though I think
we can shape the political environment in which the domestic
power struggle occurs.
In the case of Iran, the goal of U.S. policy should be to
encourage the evolution of the regime in the direction of
greater openness, freedom, and moderation. Domestic political
change of this kind would hopefully result in the decline of
radicalism abroad and more normal relations between Tehran and
its neighbors, although I have no doubt that still relations
between Iran and its Arab neighbors, between Iran and the
United States will be characterized by tension, and relations
between Iran and Israel will still be characterized by
hostility. But it will be, I think, a better situation, at
least a marginally better situation than the one that we are in
now and that we found ourselves in in past years.
Operationally what this means is supporting the Iranian
people in their struggle for greater freedom while avoiding
tainting particular Iranian personalities or movements with the
potentially fatal U.S. embrace, in promoting contacts between
the American and Iranian peoples, people-to-people contacts,
seeking an official dialogue with Tehran which is the only way
in which the issues dividing the two governments, including
weapons of mass destruction proliferation, can be resolved, and
continuing to highlight the connection between U.S. sanctions
and Iranian policy in the three traditional areas of concern--
terrorism, Iran's support for violent opponents of the Arab-
Israeli conflict, and weapons of mass destruction. Bottom line,
until Iranian policy changes in these three areas, sanctions
that restrict Iran's ability to raise hard currency to fund its
missile and WMD programs should remain in place.
So, by way of concluding, let me just review my main
points.
First, the United States is unlikely to succeed in altering
the range of Iranian motivations for acquiring WMD.
Second, there is probably not much that the United States
can do to alter the proliferation cost/benefit calculus of
Tehran. While there might eventually be a slender chance for a
deal with Tehran wherein Iran agrees to fulfill its arms
control obligations in a verifiable fashion in return for the
easing or lifting of sanctions by Washington, this remains an
untested proposition and I am personally skeptical of the
prospects for such a trade-off.
Third, Washington has had much success in imposing costs
and delays on the WMD programs of Tehran through traditional
arms control instruments and economic sanctions. These should
continue for as long as Iran remains committed to acquiring
WMD. Time gained should be used to develop countermeasures to
emerging threat capabilities and to encouraging political
change in Iran in order to help mitigate the risks of
proliferation.
Fourth, given that missile and WMD proliferation by Iran is
a reality, the United States will have to continue to rely on
deterrence in dealing with this threat while developing the
means to fight in a WMD environment should deterrence fail.
Finally, encouraging political change in Tehran might help
mitigate the problem of WMD proliferation to Iran but it is
unlikely to solve it. Even if Iran's policies in many areas
were to change for the better, from the point of view of the
United States, in the coming years, Tehran's WMD capabilities
are likely to be the greatest long-term obstacle to more normal
relations between the United States and Iran.
I look forward to your questions, sir. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Eisenstadt follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL EISENSTADT \1\
Iran is believed to possess both chemical and biological weapons
and the missiles to deliver them, and it may well be the next nuclear
power in the Middle East. Due to the volatility of Iranian politics,
the clerical regime's involvement in terrorism, ongoing tensions with
some of its neighbors and the U.S., and its continued denial of
Israel's right to exist, halting--or at least hindering--Iran's missile
and WMD programs will be a key U.S. interest in the coming years.
Should these efforts fail, managing the consequences of a proliferated
Iran (perhaps armed with nuclear weapons) will be one of Washington's
most difficult future security challenges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
1828 L St. NW, Suite 1050, Washington, DC 20036. The author can be
reached at . This testimony draws
heavily on previous articles by the author, including: ``Can the United
States Influence the WMD Policies of Iraq and Iran?'' The
Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2000, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 63-76;
``Living with a Nuclear Iran?'' Survival, Autumn 1999, vol. 41. no.3,
pp. 124-148, and; ``Iraq and Iran: Inevitable Proliferators?'' in David
Albright and Robert Kelley (eds.), Proliferation Critical Paths: Trends
and Solutions (forthcoming).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. has a variety of options available to it in dealing with
the general problem of Iranian proliferation: 1) alter Iran's
motivations to acquire missiles and WMD; 2) influence its proliferation
cost/benefit calculus; 3) impose costs and delays on its programs; 4)
strengthen deterrence; and 5) mitigate the impact of proliferation by
encouraging political change in Iran. I this paper, I will assess the
applicability of each of these for the Iranian case and discuss the
implications of this analysis for U.S. policy toward Iran.
Altering Motivations
Iran's interest in WMD predates the Islamic Republic. Under the
monarchy, Iran initiated a nuclear weapons program, as part of the
Shah's drive to make Iran a regional power. The Islamic Republic has
subsequently pursued the acquisition of missiles and WMD as a means to
achieve self-reliance, in light of Iran's relative strategic isolation;
as part of the Islamic Republic's efforts to transform Iran into a
regional power; and to strengthen Iran's deterrent capability against
various perceived threats. There are two conclusions implicit in this
assessment. Iran's pursuit of missiles and WMD is not necessarily
regime-specific; thus, this problem could well be with us even were the
Islamic Republic to be replaced by another regime. Moreover, Iran is
developing missiles and WMD not just to deal with perceived threats,
but for other reasons--related to its drive for self-reliance (a core
value of the Islamic Republic), and its desire to be treated as a
regional power (a motivation shared by the monarchy and the Islamic
Republic). So, even if Iran's security concerns could somehow be
addressed through security assurances from the major powers, or the
creation of a regional security system, such steps would probably not
be sufficient to induce Iran to abandon its missiles and WMD (and
particularly its nuclear program). Although the creation of some sort
of regional security system is inherently desirable as a means of
reducing tensions and enhancing stability in the Middle East, in the
end there might not be much that the U.S. can do to influence the
entire panoply of motivations underpinning Iran's missile and WMD
programs.
Influencing the Proliferation Cost/Benefit Calculus
From the little evidence we have on the subject, Iran's leadership
seems relatively united over the desirability of acquiring missiles and
WMD, seeing the possession of such weapons as a strategic imperative.
However, if the private Iranian policy debate concerning missiles and
WMD parallels public policy debates in Iran on other matters, it is
possible--if not likely--that there are divisions in Iran's leadership
over the importance of the interests that could be jeopardized by a
decision to violate the country's arms control commitments (which could
trigger the imposition of international sanctions). Iran's pragmatic
reformers likely fear the potential impact of violating Iran's arms
control commitments on the country's ties with the outside world (the
West in particular) and the prospects for foreign investment--which is
crucial if Iran is to get its economy on its feet, and avoid future
political unrest. By contrast, conservative hard-liners care less about
Iran's relations with the non-Islamic world. Such differences among
Iran's clerical leadership might provide an opening that the U.S. could
(and should) use to explore the possibility of altering Tehran's
proliferation cost/benefit calculus--though I am not optimistic about
the prospects for success. More likely, I suspect that Tehran's
clerical leadership believes that they will be able to develop nuclear
weapons without getting caught in the act. Here, the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) could be a crucial test case. If Tehran proves able to
circumvent its CWC commitments without paying a price for doing so, it
is even more likely to violate its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) commitments.
Imposing Costs and Delays
While U.S. policy has thus far not succeeded in altering Tehran's
motivations or its proliferation cost/benefit calculus, it has
succeeded in hindering Iran's ability to enhance its existing missile
and WMD capabilities, and acquiring new ones, through various policy
instruments, including export controls, diplomatic demarches, political
arm-twisting, and economic sanctions. Together, such measures have
delayed Iran's proliferation efforts, and constrained the evolution of
its capabilities. Delay is important for several reasons. First, it
buys time for the U.S. and its allies to develop countermeasures to
Iranian capabilities. For instance, American efforts have delayed the
development of Iran's Shehab-3 missile by more than 5 years (providing
the U.S. and its allies with time to improve their theater missile
defense capabilities), and prevented Iran from making much progress
toward establishing a modern, diversified civilian nuclear
infrastructure, that could serve as a springboard toward a clandestine
nuclear program. Delay might also provide a hedge against the
possibility that hard-line conservative clerics could gain control over
all the major centers of power in Tehran in the future and pursue more
aggressive foreign and defense policies. Should such a scenario come to
pass, the conservative hardliners will have fewer means at their
disposal with which to pursue their objectives. Conversely, should the
trend toward greater moderation and openness in Iranian politics
resume, it would be desirable to have forestalled Iran's development of
missiles and WMD until the time that more moderate political elements,
less likely to engage in terrorism or foreign adventures, are more
firmly ensconced in Tehran. Even so, the U.S. could face difficult
challenges in dealing with a reformist leadership should the latter
insist on retaining Iran's missile and WMD capabilities (in the latter
case--in violation of Iran's arms control commitments). If this
assessment is correct, WMD may eventually be the greatest obstacle to
more normal relations between Iran and the U.S.
Strengthening Deterrence
Deterrence lies at the heart of any effort to deal with countries
of concern--such as Iran--that have already proliferated. In the case
of Iran, the main problem in establishing a stable deterrent
relationship is not the putative ``irrationality'' of the regime or its
reputed high threshold for pain. (Iranian leaders have proven to be
quite rational, and while Iran may have had a fairly high tolerance for
pain in the heady early days of the revolution, this has long since
ceased to be the case.) Rather, political factionalism--rooted in
personalities, ideology, and the very structure of the regime--poses
the greatest challenge to a stable deterrent relationship. Persistent
factionalism makes it difficult for the regime to implement policy in a
consistent, predictable manner, and often leads to policy zig-zags, as
different personalities, factions, or branches of the government work
at cross purposes, act to subvert their rivals, or press the government
to take actions inconsistent with its general policy line. And because
this factionalism is rooted in the structure of the Islamic Republic,
this problem will exist as long as the clerical regime retains its
current structure. Nonetheless, the basics of deterrence applies: avoid
ambiguity in defining ``red lines'' whose violation by Iran would
elicit a harsh U.S. response; maintaining a strong and credible forward
military presence in the region, and; know where Tehran draws its own
``red lines'' so as to avoid inadvertent conflict or escalation. And of
course, the U.S. needs to develop missile defenses and the means to
operate in an WMD environment should deterrence fail, while developing
countermeasures to various nontraditional means of delivering WMD that
Iran might employ, such as terrorists, boats, or unmanned aerial
vehicles.
Mitigating the Impact of Proliferation Through Political Change
Since it may not be possible to alter the WMD motivations or cost/
benefit calculus of Iran, or to halt its efforts to augment its missile
and WMD capabilities, and because deterrence is an uncertain
proposition, the U.S. needs to focus on what it can do to encourage
political change in Tehran to mitigate the impact of missile and WMD
proliferation. Though the U.S. has a limited ability to influence
domestic politics in Iran, it can shape the political environment to
influence the outcome of developments there. In Iran, the goal of U.S.
policy should be to encourage the evolution of the regime in the
direction of greater openness and moderation; in practical terms, this
probably means--at least in part--the emergence of a political system
in which clerics play a less prominent role. Domestic political change
of this kind would hopefully result in a decline in radicalism abroad
and more normal relations between Tehran and its neighbors (even if
some tensions persist). Operationally, this means promoting contact
between the American and Iranian peoples; supporting the Iranian people
in their struggle for greater freedom (while avoiding tainting
particular Iranian personalities or movements with a potentially fatal
U.S. embrace); seeking an official dialog with Tehran, which is the
only way in which the issues dividing the two governments--including
WMD proliferation--can be resolved; and continuing to highlight the
connection between U.S. sanctions, and Iranian policy in the three
traditional areas of concern (terrorism, support for violent opponents
to the Arab-Israeli peace process, and the development of WMD). Until
Iranian policy changes, sanctions that restrict Iran's ability to raise
hard currency to fund its missile and WMD programs should remain in
place.
Conclusions
This assessment leads to the following conclusions: First, the U.S.
is unlikely to succeed in altering the range of Iranian motivations for
acquiring WMD; and while conditions are not yet ripe for the creation
of a regional security regime that might help reduce the likelihood of
conflict in a proliferated region, the U.S. should start laying the
foundation for the eventual emergence of such a regional security
framework. Second, there is probably not much that the U.S. can do to
alter the proliferation cost/benefit calculus of Tehran. While there
might be a slender chance for a deal with Tehran--wherein Iran agrees
to fulfill its arms control obligations in a verifiable fashion in
return for the easing or lifting of sanctions by Washington--this
remains an untested proposition. It should, however, be tested when
political conditions are more conducive in the context of future U.S.-
Iran negotiations. Third, Washington has had much success in imposing
costs and delays on the WMD programs of Tehran through traditional arms
control instruments and economic sanctions, and these should continue
for as long as Iran remains committed to acquiring WMD. Time gained
should be used to develop countermeasures to emerging threat
capabilities, and to encouraging political change in Tehran, in order
to help mitigate the risks of proliferation. Fourth, given that missile
and WMD proliferation by Iran is a reality, the U.S. will have to
continue to rely on deterrence in dealing with this threat, while
developing the means to fight in a WMD environment should deterrence
fails. Finally, encouraging political change in Tehran might help
mitigate the problem of WMD proliferation to Iran, but it is unlikely
to solve it. Even if Iran's policies in many areas were to change for
the better (from the point of view of the U.S.), Tehran's WMD
capabilities are likely to be the greatest long-term obstacle to more
normal relations between the U.S. and Iran.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Mr. Eisenstadt.
The question of the weapons programs and missile programs
in Iran brings into focus the effort that we have of developing
countermeasures, for example, the National Missile Defense
program. What is your assessment of the efficacy of the Clinton
Administration's National Missile Defense architecture, the
single-site for the interceptors, given the pace of the
programs in Iran and in North Korea, considering those two,
what is your reaction to that, Dr. Cambone?
Mr. Cambone. In my view, Senator, any deployment of a
ballistic missile defense for the United States has got to be
able to defend us from an attack from either the Asian sector
or from the Middle East/Southwest Asia sector, that is, from
either our West or our East, and it has to have the capacity to
deal with the types of countermeasures that one can assume that
these countries will make an effort to develop. Their success
in developing them will be told when we see them, to be sure,
but nonetheless, we have to be prepared for a set of
countermeasures as well. And so, therefore, a single site in
Alaska is insufficient to meet the kind of warning that I think
we have been given with respect to the program in Iran.
Senator Cochran. How sophisticated do you view the
ballistic missile infrastructure in Iran compared with other
states such as North Korea or Iraq?
Mr. Cambone. I would think it is fair to say that they are
certainly different. The Iraqi infrastructure has been knocked
around a bit both in the Gulf War and subsequently in Desert
Fox. But they are nonetheless still working on much shorter-
range systems that are permitted under the U.N. resolutions and
so forth. The North Korean structure, from what we know of it,
is one that has been designed to turn out what appear to be
increasingly upgraded and extended ranges of what is basic
technology in the Scud class with the added mixture of some
solid rocket motor capabilities, evidenced by the effort to put
the third stage of the Taepo Dong-1 in orbit. The Iranian one,
at least again as far as one knows from the open sources, has
three dimensions to it. One is the Scud-related effort, which
is evidenced by the Shahab-3 program. The second is the
assistance that has come from the Russians in the form of what
is thought to be technology related to Russian SS-4, SS-5 type
missile systems. And then there are also hints that there are
solid rocket motor capabilities that the Iranians are
developing as well. That is why I was intrigued by the report
that the Shahab-3 had both liquid and solid propellant or fuel.
I do not know what that means, you can ask the fellows behind
me, they may know far better than I.
But the point is that the Iranians have a multitude of
options to pursue, which accounts in fact for the multitude of
paths which the Intelligence Community is prepared to lay out
for them to pursue. So on the whole, I think you can deduce
that it is a fairly large infrastructure and one that is
potentially capable of very sophisticated capability.
Senator Cochran. Do you think Iran can become self-
sufficient in the development of long-range ballistic missiles?
Mr. Cambone. Certainly.
Senator Cochran. What impact would continuing foreign
assistance have on their ballistic missile programs?
Mr. Cambone. That foreign assistance has been there in
certain respects from the very beginning. The Iranians had
gotten their original missile systems from the North Koreans,
they did not make them on their own. They have turned to the
North Koreans for assistance initially in developing those
systems on their own and then for supplying additional systems
like the No Dongs. They have turned to the Russians and
apparently to the Chinese for some assistance in their other
programs. So the assistance is embedded in their programs. They
are clearly looking to become independent of that foreign
assistance. I cannot judge, Senator, because I have not got any
information different than what I can find in the press whether
they have crossed the threshold of being self-sustaining on
their Scud-based systems or not. My guess is there is no reason
why they can't be pretty close. They have been at this now for
the better part of a decade and by now I would think they are
pretty close.
Senator Cochran. What do you see the political changes
bringing to Iran's weapons programs? Are these changes
occurring, more democratization, so-called, of the political
system? Can we expect any change to flow from that to the
military and the weapons programs, the ballistic missile
programs?
Mr. Cambone. No, I do not think so. The statements that
have been made by public leaders in Iran indicate that they are
squarely behind those programs irrespective of whether they sit
on either side of the political fence.
Senator Cochran. Earlier this year there was a press
article which reported that North Korea had transferred missile
engines to Iran for the Shahab-3 program.\1\ This appears to be
different from Iran's usual missile development process which
has been described as a hands-on process. Do you have any views
as to why Iran would purchase these engines if they could have
produced them on their own?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The article from the Washington Times appears in the Appendix
on page 45.
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Mr. Cambone. One can go through a lot of reasons. It may be
that they have a short-term need for an engine and had
airframes in which to put them and wished to be able to test
something different than they have in development on their own.
Some will argue undoubtedly that they are having trouble with
their own programs and that this is an indication that the
effort to become self-sustaining and so forth is in trouble.
That is certainly a hypothesis.
My own observation is that it is more worrisome to see them
having done this, actually, because if it is possible for them
to--if, indeed, what they did was take engines they purchased
and then in a fairly short order put them in an airframe and
launched them, it suggests that they can get other engines of
bigger and longer-range missiles and put them in airframes and
launch them. So depending on how you look at this problem, I
think that there is in fact a dark side to it and one that we
need to be conscious of.
Mr. Eisenstadt. If I could, Mr. Chairman, just add
something on this.
Senator Cochran. Yes, Mr. Eisenstadt.
Mr. Eisenstadt. Thank you, sir. I would just add that one
of the two main bottlenecks in the Iraqi program in the late
1980's in their efforts to develop an indigenous Scud knock-off
was with the turbo pumps, which is an engine component. And as
far as we know, at least as of about Desert Storm, they never
succeeded in mastering that. As for Iran, some people have
speculated that when the Shahab-3 was first test launched in
1998 the engine may have blown up and that may have been the
cause of its destruction. So it is possible that they may not
have mastered all the engine components and therefore that is
why they still had to rely, at least as of last year, on the
North Koreans for the engines. But who knows where they are
right now.
Senator Cochran. There have been some discussions, as we
all know, between the United States and North Korea trying to
work out arrangements for a new energy program there and a
transfer of energy resources so they will not have to have a
nuclear reactor-based energy program, and opening up trade to
make changes in the relationship. Has this led, in your view,
and I will ask both of you, to any change in the relationship
between North Korea and other states like Iran and their
willingness to continue to sell WMD components or technology or
missile systems? Have you seen any change, or is there any
reason to believe they will not continue to do what they have
done in the past?
Mr. Cambone. Senator, I think you pointed to the evidence
that at least the North Koreans are prepared to transfer
engines, despite the fact that, as last I looked, the talks
were still ongoing. So I do not know why we should expect that
the North Koreans will end those programs. And I am not sure we
would know at this point, for example, how much inventory there
is, how much they have already transferred elsewhere. We know
what we can see; we don't know what we don't know. And they
have been a very active proliferant, haven't they? So there may
be many more things they have already done that will come to
light at a subsequent time.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Eisenstadt.
Mr. Eisenstadt. I just would second what Dr. Cambone said.
I would also just add this apropos to a point that you asked
earlier about Iran becoming a secondary supplier. It is quite
possible you have, going back to North Korea, a flow of
information as well as technology. The Iranians were involved
at a very early stage in the No Dong program in terms of
funding it, and it is quite possible that now as part of the
pay-off they might be providing the North Koreans with some of
the technology they are getting from the Russians in order to
help the North Koreans improve their original product. I am
simply speculating here, but I think this is just another angle
that we should look at.
Senator Cochran. Can you comment about the amount of time
the United States would have in terms of warning about Iran's
possession of an ICBM?
Mr. Cambone. Senator, I think we have been warned. So my
answer to that is the time is up.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Eisenstadt.
Mr. Eisenstadt. I second that.
Senator Cochran. The most recent unclassified report on
proliferation says that Russian firms faced economic pressures
to circumvent export controls and did so in some cases, and
that they failed in some cases regarding Iran to enforce its
export controls. Are Russian entities continuing to transfer
ballistic missile technology to Iran despite the changes in
Russian export control laws?
Mr. Cambone. I cannot answer that with any certainty,
Senator. I read the press along with you and it appears that
the relationship continues, the reports from the DCI and others
suggest that the transfers continue.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Eisenstadt.
Mr. Eisenstadt. All I would add to that is that we had the
story that appeared just a couple of days ago about the laser
isotope enrichment facility. And as of a few days ago the
Russians have told us that the sale is not going to go through.
So I think this indicates that until now this has been
continuing.
The only thing I would point out in addition to this, one
cannot help conclude when looking at accounts in the Russian
press that this is not simply people freelancing, that there is
a certain degree of culpability by various government agencies
or collusion by various government agencies in this in terms of
facilitating the transfer of technology and information. That
being the case, I would assume that these things would continue
even if there are temporarily steps taken to deal with certain
high priority cases that have become politically difficult or
problematic.
Senator Cochran. You wrote an article, Mr. Eisenstadt, for
Survival Magazine suggesting that because Iraq's chemical and
biological weapons did not succeed in deterring the United
States from involvement in the Gulf War, that Iran may believe
that in a confrontation with Washington only a nuclear
capability could enable it to avert defeat. Is that something
you think we should consider likely, that Iran is going to
develop that nuclear capability so it will be able to avert
defeat?
Mr. Eisenstadt. I think that is one, and perhaps one of the
more important, motivations on their part in pursuing nuclear
weapons. But I think there is a whole cluster of motives here,
as I said before, and this is only one. And even if we could
deal with, address Iran's concerns on this issue, there are so
many other motivations out there which I think are beyond our
ability to influence that I think they would still continue to
go down this road.
Senator Cochran. I was at a conference recently on U.S.-
Russia relations and one of the participants, one of the
scholars suggested that the experience of Russia in Chechnya
might very well have some spill-over effects into other
countries where there might be sympathies with the local
Chechen population that has been hard-pressed by the Russian
military, and we have all read of atrocities, there have been
atrocities I guess on both sides. Nonetheless, that is a very
mean situation over there, and the question would be whether or
not attention could be focused on Russia now from Islamic
states or neighboring states or states in sympathy with the
Chechen insurgents to the extent that Russia might have
difficulties with Iran and others. Do you see this as a problem
and changing the relationships in the Middle East?
Mr. Eisenstadt. Thus far, Iran in its policy towards both
Chechnya as well as Central Asia, the Newly Independent States
in Central Asia, has generally subordinated ideology, its
commitment to Islamic solidarity, to its state interests. And
its state interests are preserving its relationship with Russia
which from their point of view is, at least as far as we can
tell, a strategic relationship. It may not be seen as a
strategic relationship in Moscow, I do not know. I do not know
whether this is simply a cash-earning enterprise or a way to
cause problems for the United States or whether there is a
strategic design here. But for the Iranians I think it is a
strategic relationship. And from their point of view they have
deferred to Russian interests throughout Central Asia and
Chechnya. In fact, they have been almost completely silent
throughout the war in Chechnya for that reason. So this has not
yet become a problem in the relationship. And even though the
two countries have differences with regard to the division of
the resources of the Caspian Sea, they have not let this get in
the way of the overall relationship because each has other
equities that are at stake here that are important to them.
Senator Cochran. Dr. Cambone, you mentioned that Russia
continues to provide Iran with assistance that could aid their
nuclear weapons development programs. What do you think is the
potential impact of this assistance to Iran's nuclear weapons
programs?
Mr. Cambone. Well, Senator, I will say again that the
finding or the judgment of the Rumsfeld Commission in 1998, in
my view, stands. That with access to fissile material Iran
could acquire, develop, possess a nuclear weapon in 1 to 3
years of a decision to do so, and that undoubtedly the
assistance that they have gotten from others has aided in that
endeavor. But I cannot help but note that others bear
culpability for the availability of the kind of information
that a country like Iran makes use of. And if it is true, as
someone testifying in a case in Albuquerque suggested, that
much of the material that was said to have been downloaded from
secure computers at Los Alamos is available in the open
literature, then we have a severe problem on our hands.
Senator Cochran. There is a good deal of concern around the
world about the escalating oil prices. A lot of the oil that is
produced comes from countries that we are talking about--Iraq,
Iran, others in the Middle East, and Near East. What are the
implications of the increases in oil prices on Iran's ability
to acquire ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction
technology, Mr. Eisenstadt?
Mr. Eisenstadt. To the degree that a lot of what they are
getting, just about all of what they are getting is due to
smuggling or what are on the face of them illegal transactions,
money is basically the lubricant for all of these kinds of
activities. The more money they have, the more they will be
able to engage in these kind of smuggling operations. And not
only that, up till recently they have had to focus their
efforts. Because of a lack of resources they have had to
prioritize their defense spending. Defense spending in absolute
terms has been relatively small. And in relative terms, given a
state the size of Iran, their defense spending has been
relatively limited. As a result, they have had to focus on
specific narrow capabilities whereas their preference would
have been to have modernized their military across the board.
Now I think there is a chance they might have greater
opportunity to broaden their modernization efforts and to
intensify their efforts to modernize their military
capabilities in more areas than they have been able to until
now.
Senator Cochran. Dr. Cambone, do you have any comments or
observations, any suggestions for changes in U.S. energy policy
as a matter of national security interests?
Mr. Cambone. [Laughing.] Well, Senator, I----
Senator Cochran. Or is that too political?
Mr. Cambone. Well, no, it just may be energy policy as such
is well beyond my ken. But it clearly is the case that the
increase in oil prices has been of assistance not only to Iran,
but to the Russians, to the Saudis, and not least of which to
the Iraqis. But I would like to focus though on the point that
the Iranians have uncovered new oil and gas deposits. They are
working very hard to establish a supplier relationship with
India. They are working hard to protect their equities in the
Caspian Sea. They clearly understand that there is money to be
made here. But not only is there money to be made, there is
entre into the international system as a supplier of energy.
And that is an important position for them to occupy in their
effort to legitimize themselves in the international community.
And so the sort of longer-range point I think would be not
whether they can manage to keep oil prices high, my guess is
those prices will come down over time as pressures are put on
all of the OPEC members. More important is their establishment
as a supplier in the system, which in turn then gives them that
much more leverage on the politics in the region and with
respect to Western Europe and Japan. And that, I think, is an
important development in Iran's strategic evolution that we
need to take into account.
Senator Cochran. Very interesting and helpful comments from
both of you. Your statements are appreciated. We appreciate
your spending the time and making the effort to develop the
presentations that we have asked for. We think this will be
very helpful to our better understanding of the situation in
that part of the world and the proliferation issues that we
face and the development of WMD programs in Iran particularly.
We appreciate your being here. Thank you very much.
Our hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned,
to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]
A P P E N D I X
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ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE VOICE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN RODEO 1
September 21, 2000
iran: shahab-3 `non-military' missile `succesfully' test-fired
The first Shahb-3 missile, using liquid and solid fuel, was
successfully test-fired on the first day of the Holy Defence
Week. Announcing the news, the minister of defence and armed
forces logistics said: The missile was built and tested for the
purpose of gaining the necessary technology in order to enter
the design and production stage of satellite guidance systems
[Persian: samane-haye ranesh-e mahvareh].
Vice-Admiral Shamkhani added: The Shahab-3 missile has no
military use and only for achieving the preliminary stages of
new non-military operations.
__________
ARTICLE FROM THE WASHINGTON TIMES, FEBRUARY 9, 2000
n. korea sells iran missile engines
by bill gertz, the washington times
North Korea recently sold Iran a dozen medium-range ballistic
missile engines, indicating the Pyongyang government has not curbed its
transfers of missile know-how and equipment.
According to a Pentagon intelligence report, North Korea supplied
the 12 engines to an Iranian government agency involved in missile
production in November.
The engines arrived in Iran on Nov. 21 after they were spotted
being loaded aboard an Iran Air Boeing 747 cargo jet that left Sunan
International Airfield, about 12 miles north of the North Korean
capital of Pyongyang, said U.S. officials familiar with the classified
report.
U.S. intelligence officials said the missile engines are the same
as those used in Nodong medium-range missiles, which have a range of
about 620 miles.
The Iranians used Nodong engines in the first stage of the new
Shahab-3 missile that was flight tested for the first time in July
1998. That missile has an estimated range of up to 930 miles.
Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon declined to comment on the
transfer citing a policy of not discussing intelligence matters.
The general issue of weapons proliferation, however, is ``of great
concern to us'' and officials have been trying to talk to the North
Koreans about their missile trade.
``We obviously worry about proliferation by anybody and North Korea
is one of those that we are particularly worried about,'' he said.
The missile engine transfer comes amid continuing diplomacy by the
Clinton administration aimed at trying to halt North Korea's missile
proliferation. Two rounds of U.S.-North Korean talks in Berlin made
little progress on the issue, officials said.
The intelligence on the missile engine transfer also coincides with
other recent Pentagon reports showing that China is continuing to sell
missile technology to North Korea despite promises from Chinese leaders
to halt the exchanges.
The Pentagon also reported in November that North Korea was
continuing with preparations for a test of its newest and longest-range
missile, the Taepo Dong 2.
The communist North Korean government announced a moratorium on
missile tests during talks with U.S. officials. However, Pyongyang
recently threatened to resume the missile tests after the Pentagon
conducted its national missile defense test.
Iran also is working on a longer-range version known as Shahab-4
with an estimated range of up to 1,240 miles. That missile could use
two booster stages equipped with the Nodong engines, or a single Nodong
engine on top of a more powerful Russian-design motor, according to
U.S. officials.
The missile transfer has raised new questions about a recent
decision by the Clinton administration to waive U.S. economic embargo
provisions against Iran and allow Boeing Co. to sell engine parts to
Iran for its fleet of 747 passenger jets.
State Department officials have said the export license for the 747
engine parts was approved in November--shortly before the engine sale--
with restrictions limiting the repairs to passenger versions of Iran
Air 747s and not its fleet of 747 cargo jets. The license was approved
by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott.
Some within the administration opposed the Boeing parts sale
because of fears the Iranians will use the jets for missile transfers.
One U.S. national security official said he doubts the controls will
prevent the Boeing parts from being diverted for military use.
The installation work on the Iranian jetliners will be carried out
by technicians from the German airline Lufthansa without U.S. personnel
watching, the official said. Also, there is nothing to prevent the
Iranians from using the upgraded passenger jets as cargo planes in the
future, the official said.
``It would be very easy to rip the seats out and use them to ferry
missiles and parts,'' the official said.
Henry Sokolski, a Pentagon arms proliferation specialist during the
Bush administration, said the North Korean engine sale also raises
questions of Chinese government complicity in the engine deal.
The Iranian airliner probably had to fly over or through China, a
course that would have required approval by Beijing, he said.
China several years ago denied overflight rights to an aircraft
shipment of weapons from Kazakhstan to the Middle East after the U.S.
government asked Beijing to block the flight, according to U.S.
intelligence officials.
On the parts waiver to Boeing, Mr. Sokolski said: ``This is the
same kind of hairsplitting that has gotten previous administrations in
trouble with exports to Iran and Iraq.''
``Dealing with high technology to Iran is bad business,'' Mr.
Sokolski said. ``It can come back to bite you. Undoubtedly, if you
engage in this practice there will be more of these kind of transfers
in the future.''
The CIA in the past has identified Russia and China as major
suppliers to Iran's missile program, which includes developing a long-
range Shahab-5 that will be able to reach the United States.
The engine sale is new evidence that North Korea also has become a
major supplier for Tehran's missile effort.
The CIA's annual report to Congress on the spread of missiles and
nuclear, chemical and biological arms stated that during the first half
of 1999 ``entities in Russia and China continued to supply a
considerable amount and a wide variety of ballistic missile-related
goods and technology to Iran.''
Officials said the report did not include the intelligence from
November on the engine transfer from North Korea.
``Exports of ballistic missiles and related technology are one of
the North's major sources of hard currency,'' the CIA said, noting that
North Korea has exported missile-related goods to the Middle East and
Africa last year.
A CIA spokesman declined to comment, and a State Department
official had no immediate comment.
