S. Hrg. 106-671
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT TO
THE UNITED STATES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION, AND
FEDERAL SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 9, 2000
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs
_______________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
63-638 cc WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee, Chairman
WILLIAM V. ROTH, Jr., Delaware JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
TED STEVENS, Alaska CARL LEVIN, Michigan
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi MAX CLELAND, Georgia
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire
Hannah S. Sistare, Staff Director and Counsel
Joyce A. Rechtschaffen, Minority Staff Director and Counsel
Darla D. Cassell, Administrive Clerk
------
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION, AND FEDERAL SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine CARL LEVIN, Michigan
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania MAX CLELAND, Georgia
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina
Mitchel B. Kugler, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Minority Staff Director
Julie A. Sander, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
------
Opening statements:
Page
Senator Cochran.............................................. 1
Senator Akaka................................................ 2
Senator Thompson............................................. 11
Senator Levin................................................ 14
WITNESSES
Wednesday, February 9, 2000
Robert Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and
Nuclear Programs, National Intelligence Council................ 3
Dr. William Schneider, Jr., Ph.D., Adjunct Fellow, Hudson
Institute...................................................... 31
Joseph Cirincione, Director, Non-Proliferation Project, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace.............................. 32
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Cirincione, Joseph:
Testimony.................................................... 32
Prepared statement with attachments.......................... 71
Schneider, Dr. William Jr.:
Testimony.................................................... 31
Prepared statement with attachments.......................... 54
Walpole, Robert:
Testimony.................................................... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 45
APPENDIX
National Intelligence Council summary report entitled ``Foreign
Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the
United States Through 2015,'' September 1999................... 91
Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat
to the United States, ``Executive Summary,'' Pursuant to Public
Law 201, 104th Congress, July 15, 1998......................... 107
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT TO
THE UNITED STATES
----------
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 2000
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on International Security,
Proliferation, and Federal Services,
of the Committee on Governmental Affairs
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m. in room
SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Thad Cochran,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Cochran, Akaka, Thompson, and Levin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COCHRAN
Senator Cochran. The Subcommittee will please come to
order.
Welcome to our hearing today on the National Intelligence
Estimate of the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States.
Last year Congress passed and the President signed the
National Missile Defense Act, which officially stated the
policy of the United States to be the deployment, as soon as
technologically possible, of a national missile defense system,
effective against a limited ballistic missile attack.
We are now aware that several nations, which may not be
impressed with our overwhelming missile forces, are working
hard to build long-range ballistic missiles.
North Korea is one example. In August 1998, North Korea
launched a three-stage Taepo Dong-1 ballistic missile. This
missile demonstrated that despite the economic difficulties and
isolation of North Korea, it has made impressive progress in
developing a multi-stage ballistic missile capable of flying to
intercontinental ranges.
North Korea appears ready to test an even more capable
Taepo Dong-2; Iran has tested a medium-range ballistic missile
and has begun developing longer-range weapons.
These developments reflect not just a determination by
rogue states to acquire ballistic missiles, but the increasing
availability of the technology required to develop these
weapons. Recent assessments make clear that one factor enabling
rogue states to acquire ballistic missiles is the continuing
flow of missile technology from Russia, China, and North Korea.
Of even greater concern is the fact that traditional
importers of ballistic missile technology are now becoming
suppliers. CIA Director Tenet testified just last week that,
``Iran's existence as a secondary supplier of this technology
to other countries is the trend that worries me the most.''
More suppliers will create greater opportunities for
proliferation in the future.
In September of last year, the Intelligence Community
released a new estimate projecting the likely course of the
threat, the unclassified summary of which is the subject of
today's hearing.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Summary report by the National Intelligence Council entitled
``Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the
United States Through 2015,'' September 1999, appears in the Appendix
on page 91.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Walpole, the Intelligence Community's National
Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs,
oversaw the formulation of the National Intelligence Estimate,
and will be our first witness. Mr. Walpole will be followed by
a panel of two non-governmental witnesses who will provide
their views on the Estimate. Dr. William Schneider, Jr., who is
an Adjunct Fellow at the Hudson Institute, previously served as
Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, and was a
member of the Rumsfeld Commission. And Joseph Cirincione, who
is the Director of the Non-Proliferation Project at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
I would like to emphasize that all discussion in our
hearing today will be confined to the unclassified summary of
the National Intelligence Estimate. Also, during my questions
of the witnesses after they have completed their presentations,
I may refer to the National Intelligence Estimate, or NIE, but
in each case in which I do so, I am referring to the
unclassified summary, even though I may not specifically say
that, and the answers to the questions should include only
information in the unclassified summary of the NIE, or National
Intelligence Estimate.
With that I am happy to yield to my distinguished colleague
and friend from Hawaii, Senator Akaka.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for scheduling this hearing. We know that this is
one of the most important issues facing American policymakers.
Every Congress should begin with a hearing on this subject.
I look forward to hearing the witnesses and so my opening
statement, gentlemen, will be brief.
We all fear the terror that may rain down with little
warning from the skies--missiles launched by rogue nations
carrying nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads. The job of
our first witness, Mr. Walpole, from the NIC, and the job of
all of us in Congress is to understand the threat and not to
let policy be governed by imagined fears.
I hope today's hearing will allow us to understand better
the real terrors that we face. In August 1998, the North
Koreans launched a three-stage missile that blew up shortly
after launch.
We were surprised by that development and the Clinton
Administration has been seeking to halt North Korean missile
exports and production ever since. Next month a senior North
Korean official will be coming to Washington to discuss the
missile moratorium. I would hope the Subcommittee might have
the administration brief us on the results of those talks.
We have begun testing elements of a National Missile
Defense, NMD, to help safeguard us against some of the threats
from rogue nations. We are starting to spend billions of
dollars to guard America against attack by a few missiles.
However, if other nations had lived up to their commitments
under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and had not
provided assistance to North Korea, Iran, and other countries'
missile programs, we wouldn't have to spend this money now.
Some of the states that have complained the loudest about NMD
are also the ones who have provided the most assistance to Iran
and North Korea.
I also think that it is time that we give serious thought
to alternatives to the MTCR. It is an arms control regime that
is not working as it should.
More and more states are also looking to develop space-
launched vehicle programs, including countries like South Korea
and India. Their legitimate desire to be in space will mean
that more and more nations will have the technology to develop
intercontinental ballistic missiles.
I am not certain what the answer is, but I think that we
need to look seriously at finding peaceful outlets for nations
who want to be involved in space exploration and exploitation.
I would encourage my colleague, the Chairman of this
Subcommittee, to hold a hearing on this subject. I think the
private sector and the arms control community would both be
interested in participating.
So let me thank you, Mr. Chairman, again, for scheduling
this hearing and I look forward to the testimony of Mr.
Walpole, Mr. Cirincione, and Dr. Schneider.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Senator.
Mr. Walpole, you may proceed.
TESTIMONY OF ROBERT WALPOLE,\1\ NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
FOR STRATEGIC AND NUCLEAR PROGRAMS, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
COUNCIL
Mr. Walpole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the
Subcommittee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Walpole appears in the Appendix
on page 45.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss
the Intelligence Community's recent National Intelligence
Estimate on the ballistic missile threat, as well as to discuss
the methodologies that we use to devise that Estimate. You have
copies of the unclassified NIE, and following my comments, I
will try to answer questions that you pose without giving any
further assistance to foreign countries that love to hide stuff
from us. They don't need any help and sometimes our answers can
end up helping them. If there are questions that you need
answers to that we can't do unclassified, we could provide an
answer classified for the record.
I support writing unclassified papers for the public from
the Intelligence Community--I have written several myself. They
provide an important insight into the Intelligence Community
and its work. The American public is one of our primary
customers, but generally only their Congressional
representatives get to see what it is that we do, so I
appreciate these opportunities. We need the general populace to
understand how important intelligence work is for our security
and safety. That necessity did not end with the Cold War, in
fact, in some ways it is more important today. Intelligence is
essential for dealing with hostile intentions of some nations,
for combating terrorism, weapons proliferations that you have
discussed, and narcotics trafficking. Significant intelligence
work goes on every day to make our lives safer and more secure.
I would like to summarize my statement and if I could I
would like to submit both the unclassified paper and my written
statement for the record.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Summary report by the National Intelligence Council entitled
``Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the
United States Through 2015,'' September 1999, appears in the Appendix
on page 91.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Cochran. Without objection, they will both be made
a part of the record.
Mr. Walpole. OK, thank you.
Congress has requested that the Intelligence Community do
annual reports on this ballistic missile threat. The first was
in March 1998; we did an update on October 1998, because of the
Taepo Dong launch that you mentioned, and then we did the
September 1999 Estimate. In that case we worked with the
Director of Central Intelligence to do an unclassified version
of the document, and that is what we are meeting on today.
There are three major differences with how we approached
this past year's report and previous reports, and I would like
to walk through those a little bit.
First, we projected to the year 2015; previous reports have
only gone to 2110. In essence what we have done is added 5
years of very important development time frame for these
countries.
The second one--and this is probably the most important
point--we examined when a country could acquire an ICBM as well
as when they were likely to do so; the ``likely'' is our
judgment, when they are likely to do so. Earlier intelligence
reports focused only on what countries would most likely do.
The Rumsfeld report focused only on what a country could do. We
felt that an honest thorough analysis was going to need both,
and I highlight that as probably the most important one. The
day after this Estimate was released, the unclassified version,
I read in the newspaper, a quote from an individual from the
Carnegie Endowment that said that all we had done was looked at
what the countries could do and didn't tell policymakers what
the countries were likely to do. I called the individual and
said, ``We have even got it in italics.'' And he admitted that
he hadn't read it yet. That is kind of irresponsible. This
issue is too important to be dealt with lightly like that. That
is why we went into this saying, ``You know, in order to help
everybody out--policymakers, people on the Hill--we have got to
lay out both what the countries could do--technologically,
economically--and contrast that with what we judge that they
are likely to do.'' You will see some of those differences as I
walk through this.
The third difference is because a country could threaten to
use ballistic missiles against the United States after only one
successful test, we are now using the first successful flight
test as an indicator of initial threat availability. Former
estimates talked about when the system would be deployed.
Countries don't have to deploy these systems in the way that we
were used to during the Cold War--that is a Cold War thinking
idea. We have got to think in terms of, ``What can the
countries do?'' They can erect a missile from a test-launch
stand and use it to strike us. Now it is vulnerable to being
eliminated through other means, that is absolutely true, but
the threat is still there, and that is what we are talking
about, is the threat. They don't need to deploy these systems
in large numbers, they don't need to have robust test programs,
they can deploy after only one successful test and we have seen
that happen. And so that makes it different than the 1995
Estimate, a lot different.
Now, I should note that our projections are based largely
on limited information and engineering judgment. Adding to that
uncertainty is that many countries hide their programs with
secrecy and they use deception. A primary example of deception
in this area is that a country could fly a missile and call it
a space-launch vehicle. And really the only difference between
a missile and a space-launch vehicle is the warhead on the end.
Yes, you have to reprogram the guidance system but that is not
hard for somebody who knows what they are doing in the missile
program.
We also incorporated recommendations of former members of
the Rumsfeld Commission. And we didn't always agree with them
and Bill Schneider could probably tell you some of the areas
where we had disagreements, but we felt, here is a bi-partisan
group that had all the intelligence available that we had.
First, we had them read through various drafts and tell us if
they think we are not addressing some of the questions we ought
to.
Second, we had politico-economic experts get involved and
help us assess what could cause a country like Russia to sell
an ICBM since we judged that they are unlikely to do so right
now.
And third, we had missile contractors come in and help us
design configurations that these countries could do quickly
that would be able to deliver weapons to the United States. So
that instead of being hostage to some of our old thinking about
how the Russians did it or how we've done it, we got some
engineers together and said, ``How could you put this
together?''
Worldwide missile proliferation has continued to evolve
over the last 18 months. The missile capabilities themselves
are advancing, as evidenced by North Korea's Taepo Dong-1
launch. The number of missiles has increased; medium-and short-
range ballistic missile systems already pose a significant
threat to U.S. forces, interests, and allies overseas. We have
seen increased trade and cooperation among countries that have
been recipients of missile technologies in the past. Finally,
some countries continue to work toward longer-range systems,
including ICBMs.
The missile threats that we will see develop over the next
15 years will depend heavily on changing relations with these
foreign countries; political and economic situations, and other
factors that we cannot predict with confidence, but that we
have to project anyway. So we decided that we would project
what the countries could do, what the countries were likely to
do, independent of significant changes. Now if significant
changes occur, then our judgments are going to alter. That is
the value of doing an annual report.
But just to give you an idea of how difficult projecting 15
years out is--15 years ago we and the Soviet Union were
posturing forces opposite each other in Europe during the Cold
War. You wouldn't have projected 15 years ago where we are
today.
Fifteen years ago, Iraq shared common interests with the
United States. You wouldn't have projected that we would have
gone to war and then gone back and bombed them again. You
wouldn't have been accurate with those projections.
Finally, we couldn't tell you whether some of the countries
of major concern will continue to exist 15 years from now, or
whether they will continue to sell missiles and technologies 15
years from now.
That said, we are confronted with missile development
programs that take a long time and we have to give you our
assessments, but we are doing that.
Now recognizing those uncertainties, we project that during
the next 15 years the United States most likely will face ICBM
threats from Russia, China, and North Korea, probably Iran, and
possibly from Iraq.
Now, pause here for a moment because one of the things that
is of interest to people is that we contrast this with what we
did in 1995. This is the whole United States; we are not just
talking about the continental United States and leaving Hawaii
and Alaska out. At the same time, least anyone think that I am
trying to take advantage of how close the Aleutian Islands get
to Russia, that I am wanting to use short-range missiles to
strike the United States, we are not doing that. To avoid that
problem, and I will break one of your rules for a moment here,
in the classified version of the NIE, we provide range-payload
curves. Now obviously those curves were going to be classified
so I couldn't put those in the unclassified version. What is
important about that is that anybody can look at that curve and
say, ``Oh, well, this means they could develop this pay-load or
send this payload to this range.'' Now to help the readers of
those curves, we list cities on the curves, so that you can see
where these things could reach. So that people can see that I
am not just talking about Aleutian Islands, here are some of
the cities that are listed on those charts, these are
unclassified: Bangor, Maine; Atlanta, Georgia; Miami, San
Francisco, Seattle, Honolulu, and Anchorage. So we have covered
all of the United States.
Now the Russian threat, while it is going to decrease
substantially, will still be the most robust and lethal.
China's is going to grow, and the other countries that emerge
are going to have small forces, constrain to small payloads, be
less accurate, and less reliable. So the new missile threats
are going to be far different from what we faced during the
Cold War. Even so they threaten, but in different plans.
North Korea's three-stage Taepo Dong-1 heightened
sensitivities and moved earlier projections of the threat from
the hypothetical to the real. If flown on a ballistic
trajectory with an operable third stage, the Taepo Dong-1 could
deliver a small payload to the United States, albeit with
significant inaccuracy.
Second, many countries probably assess that the threat
alone of longer-range missiles complicate U.S. decisionmaking.
Third, the probability that a missile with a weapon of mass
destruction will be used against the United States forces or
interests is higher today than during most of the Cold War, and
that will continue to grow. More nations have used them, and in
fact some have used them against U.S. forces, but not with
weapons of mass destruction. But they have demonstrated a
willingness to use those weapons of mass destruction. Now, we
project that in the coming years, U.S. territories are probably
more likely to be attacked by weapons of mass destruction from
non-missile delivery means, most likely from terrorist or non-
state entities than by missiles primarily because those means
are less costly, more reliable and accurate and they can be
used without attribution.
Nevertheless, the missile threat will continue to grow, in
part because missiles have become important regional weapons in
numerous countries' arsenals, and missiles provide a level of
prestige, coercive diplomacy, and deterrence that non-missile
means do not. Thus, acquiring long-range ballistic missiles
armed with these weapons probably will enable weaker countries
to defer, constrain, and harm the United States. The missiles
need not be deployed in large numbers, they need not be
accurate or reliable. Their strategic value is derived
primarily from the threat of their use, not in the near certain
outcome of such use. Some of these systems are probably
intended for potential terror weapons, others to perform
specific military functions, facing the United States with a
broad spectrum of motivations, development time lines, and
resulting hostile capabilities.
The progress toward achieving these longer-range missiles
has been demonstrated dramatically over the past 18 months. The
Taepo Dong-1 launch and the Taepo Dong-2 flight-test program
has been frozen, but the program itself could still continue to
pace.
Pakistan and Iran flight-tested their 1,300 kilometer
range-missiles. India flight-tested a 2,000 kilometer-range
AGNI II, and China tested its 8,000 kilometer range DF-31
mobile ICBM.
Now against this backdrop, let me walk through the
projections we make in the NIE. And what I would like to do is
array these by time blocks, blocks of 5 years. The Estimate
itself walks through it country by country. I think sometimes
it is helpful to look at it in a little different way.
So where are we today? The proliferation of medium-range
ballistic missiles, driven primarily by North Korean's No Dong
sales has created an immediate, serious, and growing threat to
U.S. forces, interests, and allies, and has significantly
altered the strategic balances in the regions. As alarming as
long-range missile threat is, it should not overshadow the
immediacy, and seriousness of the threat of these shorter-range
systems.
Iran's Shahab-3, for example can reach most of Turkey.
India and Pakistan have growing arsenals postured against
each other.
Alright, now to the long-range missile front. North Korea's
Taepo Dong-1 could be converted into an ICBM that could deliver
small payloads to the United States. Most believe that such a
conversion is unlikely, especially with the much more capable
Taepo Dong-2 that could be ready for testing at any time. The
Taepo Dong-2 in the two-stage configuration could deliver a
several-hundred kilogram payload to Alaska and Hawaii, and a
lighter payload to the western United States.
A three-stage Taepo Dong-2 would be capable to delivering a
several-hundred kilogram payload anywhere in the United States.
Russia currently has about a thousand strategic ballistic
missiles with 4,500 warheads. We judge that an unauthorized or
accidental launch of those missiles is highly unlikely, as long
as current technical and procedural safeguards remain.
China's force of about 20 CSS-4 ICBMs can reach targets in
all of the United States, although Beijing almost certainly
considers its silos to be vulnerable. China began testing, as I
mentioned a moment ago, its first mobilized ICBM last year.
Now let's look at the next 5 years, 2001-2005. North Korea,
Iran, and Iraq could all test ICBMs of varying capabilities,
some capable of delivering several-hundred kilogram payloads to
the United States. Most believe that the Taepo Dong-1 program,
short of flight testing, is continuing, and that North Korea is
likely to test the system as a space-launch vehicle, unless it
continues the freeze. Some believe that Iran is likely to test
some ICBM capabilities in the next few years, most likely as a
Taepo Dong-type space-launch vehicle. All believe that Iraq is
not likely to test an ICBM capable of threatening the United
States, during this time period. So, there is an example of the
``could'' and the ``likely.'' They could do it, but we judge
that they are not likely to do it during that time period.
Russia will maintain as many missiles and warheads as it
can but economics are going to drive those numbers below START
limitations.
We believe that China will test a longer-range mobilized
ICBM in the next several years, as well as the JL-2 submarine
launch ballistic missile. Both of those will be able to target
the United States. China could use that mobilized ICBM RV to
make a multiple-RV payload for its CSS-4. They are also
improving their theater systems, and while I am talking about
long-range I can't just skip this. It is important to note that
in the next several years, China is expected to increase
significantly in the number of short-range ballistic missiles
deployed opposite Taiwan.
Let's turn to the next 5 years, 2005-2010. Again, all three
could test ICBMs, this time all of their ICBMs will be capable
of delivering several hundred kilogram payloads.
North Korean capabilities to test and threaten would likely
remain the same even with the freeze in place. Although non-
flight-testing aspects of the program are likely to continue.
Some believe Iran is likely to test an ICBM that could
threaten the United States before 2010, others believe that
there is no more than even chance of an Iranian test by 2010,
and a few believe less than an even chance before 2010. So you
can see some of the struggles we have in coming down to the
likelihood judgment, there is a lot of difference of view. Many
factors are involved in that. Nevertheless, all believe that
Iran is likely to test a space-launch vehicle by 2010 that
could be converted into an ICBM capable of delivering a
several-hundred-kilogram payload to the United States.
Some believe that if Iraq received foreign assistance that
it would be likely to test an ICBM capable of delivering a
several-hundred-kilogram payload to the United States.
Russia's forces will continue to fall and China will
continue to test its new systems.
Finally the last 5 years. All three again could test more
capable ICBMs. Most believe that Iran is likely to test a U.S.-
threatening ICBM during this time period, one that could
deliver a several-hundred-kilogram payload. A few believe that
is unlikely. Most believe Iraq's first flight test of a U.S.-
threatening ICBM is still unlikely before 2015; some believe it
is likely before 2015, as I said with foreign assistance,
before 2010.
If Russia ratifies START II, its numbers will be
considerably reduced. START II bans MIRVed ICBMs so their
forces would be about half of what they could have without that
ban.
By 2015, China will likely have tens of missiles targeted
against the United States, mostly land- and sea-based mobile
missiles with smaller nuclear warheads, in part influenced by
the U.S. technology gained through espionage.
Foreign assistance continues to have demonstrable effects
on advances around the world. Russia and China's assistance
continues to be of significance. North Korea may expand sales,
and as you noted, Mr. Chairman, we now have second-tier
proliferators, those that used to be recipients, sharing with
others. Sales of ICBMs or space-launch vehicles could further
increase the number of countries or the number of missiles that
countries could have. North Korea continues to demonstrate a
willingness to sell. Projecting the likeliness of a Russian or
Chinese sale is difficult, but we continue to judge it
unlikely. That said, I note that in evaluating the risks
involved, the likelihood of a sale has to be weighed against
the consequences of even one such sale.
Now I know Congress is interested in our ability to provide
warning, which depends highly on our collection capabilities
from country to country. Our warnings about North Korea in the
past, observed as an important case study. Six years ago we
warned that North Korea was trying to acquire an ICBM. In
hindsight, we projected years too soon when North Korea would
start testing these vehicles. We projected pretty accurately
when they would get a system that could reach ICBM range, but
we underestimated the capabilities of the Taepo Dong-1. Now,
the point here is that we can project fairly easily what
countries are considering doing and what they might be doing.
What we can't project with certainty is what the configuration
on the performance is going to be until flight tested. Recall
that we weren't aware of the third stage on the Taepo Dong-1
until after the flight test. Furthermore, countries practice
denial and deception as I mentioned before--masking things, for
example, as a space-launch program.
Nations with a space-launch vehicle could convert it into
an ICBM relatively quickly with little or no chance of
detection before the first flight test. They would have to have
a RV. Now if a country had Russian or Chinese assistance, they
could develop a RV covertly, not flight-tested, and have some
confidence that it would work. If they developed an RV
themselves, and we have been told that there is enough
information in the open to pull this off, they could have a
much less degree of confidence in it but we wouldn't be able to
be confident that it would fail, and that is an important part
of the problem.
Now, several other means of delivering weapons of mass
destruction to the United States have probably been devised,
some more reliable than ICBMs that we have discussed. The goal
of the adversary would be to move the weapon closer to the
United States. These means however, as I noted before, don't
provide the prestige, coercive diplomacy, or deterrence
associated with long-range missiles. They could put the
missiles on a ship and bring them closer to the United States
and we would not be able to provide much warning of such an
event.
Non-missile delivery means are still of significant
concern. They are less expensive than ICBMs; can be covertly
deployed and employed; probably would be more reliable,
accurate, and effective for disseminating biological agents,
for example, and would avoid missile defenses. Foreign non-
state actors, including some terrorists and extremist groups
have used, possessed, or are interested in weapons of mass
destruction. Most of these groups have threatened the United
States or its interests. We cannot count on obtaining warning
of all planned terrorist attacks.
We assess that countries developing ballistic missiles
would also develop various responses to U.S. theater and
national defenses. Russia and China have developed numerous
countermeasures and are probably willing to sell some
technologies. Many countries such as North Korea, Iran, and
Iraq probably would rely initially on readily available
technology--there is a list in the unclassified paper--to
develop penetration aids and countermeasures and they could do
so by the time they flight-test their ICBMs.
Finally, we assess that foreign espionage and other
collection efforts are likely to increase. I led an interagency
team last year to examine China's collection and espionage
efforts against U.S. nuclear information. We have since
assessed that China, Iran, and others probably are targeting
U.S. missile information as well.
That concludes my opening statement and I am prepared to
take questions.
Senator Cochran. Thank you Mr. Walpole.
I am going to ask one question and then yield to the
Chairman of the Full Committee who has joined us, along with
Senator Levin who has also joined us. We welcome you to our
hearing. We will yield to Senator Thompson for questions first.
But let me ask you this: The administration says that North
Korea has agreed to refrain from flight testing its longer-
range ballistic missiles during discussions that are taking
place between our two countries. What effect is that going to
have on the program that is under way to develop long-range
missiles? Is this going to stop the program, or if not will it
impede it in any way?
Mr. Walpole. It is a good thing anytime that you can
constrain a country's program, that is a good thing. But, as I
have indicated in my statement, we don't believe that the
program has ended. We believe that the non-flight testing
aspects of the program are continuing.
Senator Cochran. Senator Thompson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR THOMPSON
Senator Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you for your leadership in this area.
Along those lines, I noticed that it was reported today in
the Washington Times that North Korea sold twelve medium-range
ballistic missile engines to Iran. You may have discussed this
before I got here but they could be used as boosters for long-
range Iranian missiles. The same article reported that in the
Pentagon's Estimate, North Korea was continuing with
preparations for a test of its newest and longest range
missile, the Taepo Dong-2. How do these reports impact your
assessment?
Mr. Walpole. Let me first say that I hate leaks like this.
The sad part is, the more leaks like this that continue, the
harder my job is going to be, and we are not going to be able
to give our Estimates that have any meaning because we won't be
able to collect anything. So, I think that the leak is
abominable.
Second, since it is a leak, I cannot talk about the
intelligence aspects of it. What I can tell you about engines
like that in general, is that those engines are critical. They
are critical to the Taepo Dong program, and they would be
critical to the Shahab-3 program and any extensions of the
Shahab-3 program.
Senator Thompson. We have a hard time even ourselves
getting information on some of these things. I understand your
concern about the leaks, however there is a growing concern
that the American people and perhaps even Congress doesn't
fully comprehend what is going on out there. We continue to
read about underground facilities; nobody seems to know what is
going on in North Korea and stories like this, and at the same
time, the administration is waiving U.S. economic embargo
provisions.
Let me ask you this. This follows up the assessment of the
Rumsfeld Commission. In a broad generalization, in what
material ways do you agree or disagree with the findings of the
Rumsfeld Commission?
Mr. Walpole. Well, as I indicated in my opening statement,
the Rumsfeld Commission laid out what the countries could do.
So, our ``likely'' judgments, it would be hard to compare or
contrast them with the Commission's report because they didn't
have the ``likely'' judgments. On the ``could'' judgments, they
said a country could do it in 5 years. We have countries doing
it sooner than that, so in that sense we are in line or maybe
even quicker than that, on the ``could'' side of the equation.
Senator Thompson. Well, it seems like every major
assessment seems to bring it closer. Your 1995 assessment, of
course was much less concerned about the imminence of it, I
would say than this. Rumsfeld came a good way and now you are
going a little further in that respect.
Mr. Walpole. Well, the 1995 Estimate only looked at
``likely.'' It didn't look at the ``coulds.'' The problem of
comparing the 1995 Estimate to the Rumsfeld report is that it
was an apples and oranges thing. The 1995----
Senator Thompson. You changed your standard of analysis
somewhat?
Mr. Walpole. Well, we added a standard.
Senator Thompson. Some people, of course, have been
critical of that and they talk about now, ``this could happen,
and that could happen.'' I think absolutely we need the
assessment like you have given us. Clearly it is an inexact
science.
Critics on the other hand say that the Estimate is
overblown because these nations could become friendly, or they
could want to have this nuclear option in their own area or----
Mr. Walpole. That would be great.
Senator Thompson [continuing]. Perhaps it is not as
imminent, or treaties could solve the problem, and all that. So
everybody is dealing, to a certain extent, in kind of a
nebulous area. Most of the critics, I think, are opposed to a
missile defense system and this is necessary for them to get
where they need to get. But, I think in light of the fact that
the Rumsfeld Commission was a unique Commission--I haven't been
up here that long but you had all these people come together,
all different levels of relevant expertise from different
vantage points, not part of any political group and so forth
and all unanimously coming to the same conclusion.
One of those conclusions is that we really have some real
blind spots in terms of being able to tell what is going on and
yet every assessment we get: 1995, Rumsfeld Commission, 2000 is
a greater and greater concern, and of course you acknowledge
from the things that we absolutely know such as the Taepo Dong-
2 shot across Japan that we were surprised. When objective
factors come out it seems like it is always on the side of it
being a little worse perhaps than what we thought.
Mr. Walpole. Yes, we weren't surprised by the test----
Senator Thompson. Third stage.
Mr. Walpole [continuing]. And I sure would have liked to
have been the analyst that said earlier, before that launch,
that they could put a third stage on that vehicle and extend
its range. That would have been neat. That is why we changed
our methodology. We said we have got to think outside the box.
We have got to lay out some of these excursions, what could
happen and then step back and evaluate the likelihood of those
occurring.
Senator Thompson. Well, you are going to be criticized
because you are not absolutely promising things that are going
to occur, but that to me----
Mr. Walpole. I can live with that.
Senator Thompson [continuing]. That is fallacious criticism
and I think you have done exactly the right thing.
Let me ask you in the remaining time that I have about the
sources of some of these problems and that has to do with
foreign assistance.
Our CIA, it seems, comes up every year and says that China
is still the world's greatest proliferators and Russia
apparently is not that far behind. You mentioned China and
Russia with regard to Iran, North Korea, various items--missile
components, technology knowhow, all of that. Could you give us
a fairly concise summary for each of those two countries in
terms of what--unclassified, of course--they are doing with
regard to assistance to the so-called rogue nations?
Mr. Walpole. And that is the problem, I can't give it
unclassified. The best I can say is that----
Senator Thompson. Well, you said some things in your
report.
Mr. Walpole. Yes, and that was pushing it about as far as I
could go. I said both the assistance from Russia and the
assistance from China is significant in the proliferation
realm.
Senator Thompson. And that assistance continues?
Mr. Walpole. Yes.
Senator Thompson. And it has to do--let me see how far I
can go. Does that have to do with both missile components and
missile technology?
Mr. Walpole. It is a mix.
Senator Thompson. All right, I think that is as far as I
will push it.
Mr. Walpole. OK, thanks.
Senator Thompson. Thank you very much.
Senator Cochran. Thank you Senator Thompson.
Senator Akaka, do you want to yield to your senior
colleague? [Laughter.]
Senator Akaka. I am here to stay.
Senator Cochran. I wasn't suggesting that you do so.
Senator Akaka. Thanks.
First, I want to say that you paint a disturbing picture of
more and more countries gaining advanced missile technology. Is
it your sense that as other countries develop and improve their
own ICBM capabilities, they will also develop and improve
counter-measures to missile defense systems? Could you
describe, when you do reply, some of the counter-measures which
countries such as China, Russia, and Iran might take in
response to our national theater missile defense program?
Mr. Walpole. Yes, in the Estimate we laid out what a
country could do on the counter-measure side, we didn't make a
likelihood judgment. The reason we didn't there is that
counter-measures are supposed to be just that, measures to
counter something else. So until an NMD architecture is laid
out, they don't need to commit to one type of counter-measure
or another. So we laid out those counter-measures that they
could draw from initially and I will cover that list here:
Separating re-entry vehicles, spin stabilized RVs, RV
reorientation, radar-absorbing material, booster fragmentation,
low-powered jammers, chafe, simple or balloon decoys. These
were all readily available--that they could have available--our
missile contractors tell us--by the time they flight test their
missiles. So they could draw from those.
Now, how sophisticated any of those measures would be,
would depend upon how much effort they put into it. One of the
reasons we are reporting on it as early as we are is because
you can then have counter-counter-measures and our military
needs to be aware of all of those as well. So this ends up
being an arms race within an arms race, that you have to deal
with.
Senator Akaka. Let me ask another question. If the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was to come into force,
would this constrain the size and design of future Chinese
nuclear weapons? Do you believe that CTBT ratification would
limit weapons development?
Mr. Walpole. When we did the damage assessments on the
China espionage, we did an unclassified key finding for that.
And I was trying to turn to that, I can't find it readily
enough, but I will just try to remember from memory.
We said in that, China's effort is progressing far enough
along that they can do a lot for a number of years with their
nuclear developments. The implication would be that they don't
need to do a lot of testing. So, the impact would be further
down the road than you might think, from your question there.
It would constrain others but some of these other countries may
not be interested in testing a nuclear device. They may be
satisfied in just having one that will work based on the
physics and not worrying about the test.
But anytime you put countermeasures on the front of a
missile, you are reducing the payload capability of that
missile. You are going to exchange payload for countermeasure
and vice versa.
So that in the end, of course it is going to have an
effect, but how much of an effect is going to depend on how
dependent they would be on testing in the near-term and the
long-term.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Chairman, I have other questions but I
will wait.
Senator Cochran. Senator Levin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Walpole, let me add my welcome and my thanks for your
report. It is, as always, enlightening.
The part that is focused on often is the missile threat and
it is important that we understand that threat, where it is
coming from, who supplied the technology--it hasn't just come
from China and Russia?
Mr. Walpole. Oh, if you push back far enough, your
statement will be true.
Senator Levin. In addition to giving us your assessment on
the missile threat from either terrorist groups or rogue
nations, your report also talks about non-missile delivery of
weapons of mass destruction. It seems to me that part of your
report is really quite stunning and I want to spend a few
minutes on that as well because I think the part about the
missile delivery of weapons of mass destruction will get its
proper attention but what may be overlooked, and shouldn't be
overlooked, are the portions of your report that tell us about
the non-missile delivery of weapons of mass destruction. I want
to just read a portion, and ask you to comment on it.
In your testimony you indicate on page 3, ``We project that
in the coming years, U.S. territory is probably more likely to
be attacked with weapons of mass destruction from non-missile
delivery means, most likely from non-state entities, than by
missiles.''
And then you give four reasons why that is true, and on
page 15 of your report you go into some detail about those
reasons: Non-missile means of delivery, which are the more
likely way in which a weapon of mass destruction would be
delivered, include--let me see if I can follow this--
``trucks.'' Is that correct?
Mr. Walpole. Yes.
Senator Levin. ``Ships?''
Mr. Walpole. Yes.
Senator Levin. ``Airplanes?''
Mr. Walpole. Yes.
Senator Levin. Possibly, you indicate, cruise missiles.
Mr. Walpole. Yes.
Senator Levin. All right.
Now, reason one that it is more likely that one of those
non-missile means would be delivering the weapon is that the
non-missile delivery option--you say on page 15--is ``less
expensive than developing and producing ICBMs.'' Is that
correct?
Mr. Walpole. Yes.
Senator Levin. Second, ``Can be covertly developed and
employed.'' Is that correct?
Mr. Walpole. Yes.
Senator Levin. In other words, in your words, ``The source
of the weapon could be masked in an attempt to evade
retaliation.''
Third, you indicate, ``probably would be more reliable than
ICBMs that have not completed rigorous testing and validation
programs.'' Is that correct?
Mr. Walpole. That is correct.
Senator Levin. Fourth, you say ``Probably would be more
accurate than emerging ICBMs over the next 15 years''--that is
your qualifier--but the accuracy comment relates to over the
next 15 years. Is that accurate?
Mr. Walpole. That is correct.
Senator Levin. Next, you say that the non-missile means of
delivery is more probable because--and this is one that I want
to ask you about--``Probably would be more effective for
disseminating biological warfare agents than a ballistic
missile.'' And that is a fifth reason why it is more likely
that a truck, a ship, or a plane would be used for delivery
than a ballistic missile, or at least one of those three would
be the delivery means rather than a ballistic missile.
And I would like to ask you, why would a non-missile
probably be more effective for disseminating biological warfare
agents than a ballistic missile?
Mr. Walpole. If a highly advanced country like us, or
Russia, were to develop a ballistic missile with a biological--
and of course that would violate treaties--but, a biological
dispersion mechanism, we'd be able to pull it off and it would
be very effective. That is because we do rigorous testing, long
flight test programs; we test it every which way.
What we have seen happening here is that these countries
aren't testing a lot, and so our judgment for ``probably would
be more effective'' is that if they are doing something on the
ground, they can do the testing without doing flight-testing.
They can put it in the back of a pickup, they can spread it,
they can test the aerosolization and make sure that it is going
to work. They would have high confidence that the biological
agent either being sprayed or being put in a water supply is
going to work that way, where they wouldn't be so sure the
other way. That is what was really behind that.
Senator Levin. So in your assessment, you give five reasons
why a non-missile means of delivery would probably be more
likely to be used than a missile-means of delivery. And then
your sixth reason, it seems to me, is kind of the bottom line,
is that all of those means of delivery would avoid missile
defenses.
In other words, a missile defense does not defend us
against any of those non-missile-means of delivery. Is that
correct? The truck, the ship, the plane?
Mr. Walpole. That is correct. Certain types of cruise
missiles would probably be captured in some of the instances.
Senator Levin. But except for that, the more likely means
of delivery would not be defended against by a missile defense?
Mr. Walpole. Correct.
Senator Levin. All right.
Now, I don't think there has been enough attention paid to
the entire mix. I think it is important that we see what all
the threats are, the range of threats, including missiles, but
that we also understand the most likely threats, what would
defend against them and where our resources are being placed,
as well as what the impact of those means of delivery are
because that is also important. It is not just that a truck is
more likely than a missile but what would be the impact if it
were a missile, rather than a truck--that also has to be put
into the calculus. But there hasn't been nearly enough
attention paid to that portion of what you are telling us, it
seems to me, as to the missile part of what your report focused
on.
Mr. Walpole. Well, that is why I stated, especially in the
statement with, ``We think that we are more likely to have U.S.
forces and interests struck with a missile with a weapon of
mass destruction, than at most points during the Cold War.''
But, then at the same time I am saying that, to say but as
far as U.S. territories in the coming years, there is other
ways to get us that are probably more likely, at this point.
Senator Levin. I want to go back to the Cold War, because
at some point during the Cold War we still have a Cold War
going on with North Korea, it still is a confrontation, it is
not a----
Mr. Walpole. That is probably an accurate terminology for
it.
Senator Levin. North Korea had missiles, short-range or
medium-range missiles, against which we had no defense for many
years. Is that correct?
In other words, we put in Patriot missiles a few years ago
to defend against North Korean missiles, but until then there
was no defense against those missiles.
Mr. Walpole. That is correct.
Senator Levin. Do you know what that length of time was,
off hand?
Mr. Walpole. I don't know the length.
Senator Levin. But is it fair to say that there was a
period of time before we got the Patriot missiles into South
Korea that there was no missile defense against their medium or
short range missiles?
Mr. Walpole. I think that is accurate.
Senator Levin. Now, during that period of time, North Korea
did not use those missiles, although there was no defense
against them.
What was the assessment of the Intelligence Community
during that period of time, as to the likelihood of the use of
the missiles by North Korea, even though it faced no missile
defense? Can you remember what your assessment was?
Mr. Walpole. I can't. That would be interesting to go back
and look at, and the same would be true of artillery.
Senator Levin. Would you do that for us?
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Walpole, I was asking you a few
questions about North Korea and the fact that during these
discussions they have refrained from flight-testing their
ballistic missiles, and you indicated that this doesn't mean
that they have stopped the development of the long-range
missile program. What kind of activity, specifically, can you
tell us could be conducted, or do you expect would be likely to
be conducted, by North Korea during this period of time when
they are not actually flight-testing their missiles?
Mr. Walpole. Well, there are a lot of aspects of a missile
program that are not flight testing: Any of the production, any
of the ground testing, whether you are doing ground testing of
engines, whether you are doing testing of propellent or fuel
tanks, whether you are doing electronic checkout of various
components, telemetry systems, I mean you can have all of that
kind of activity and not have it be part of the flight-testing.
Senator Cochran. All right, do you expect that it is going
on at this time?
Mr. Walpole. Our judgment is that they are continuing the
program. Now, I was purposely using a generic list to talk
about so I didn't talk specifically about anything we have or
have not seen.
Senator Cochran. How would you characterize the status of
the Taepo Dong-2 program in North Korea?
Mr. Walpole. That the program is still alive.
Senator Cochran. One witness who testified before our
Subcommittee was John Pike, who may be the Federation of
American Scientists, or at least he is one of them, if he is
not all of them. But he said when he was testifying before the
Subcommittee, ``It is quite evident that the Taepo Dong launch
facility was not intended to support, in many respects is
incapable of supporting the extensive test program that would
be needed to fully develop a reliable missile system.''
Do you agree with his conclusion?
Mr. Walpole. Let me rephrase his conclusion and then I
will--``That it certainly wouldn't support a robust United
States or former Soviet flight test program.''
Then I would agree with it.
But where I would disagree with him is, it supported a
nearly-successful space launch. It supported a nearly
successful test of a system that had flown on a ballistic
missile trajectory that could deliver a payload to the United
States. So, we have to get out of this mind set that everybody
has to do it our way.
Senator Cochran. Does North Korea need an extensive test
program to develop its Taepo Dong-2 ballistic missile?
Mr. Walpole. An extensive one, no.
Senator Cochran. Is a long and extensive test program
characteristic of previous North Korean practices?
Mr. Walpole. No.
Senator Cochran. Does North Korea need to flight-test its
Taepo Dong-2 missile before deploying it?
Mr. Walpole. That is an easy answer. The easy answer is no.
Anybody can deploy whatever they want. The question is going to
be, what kind of confidence would they have in a system they
haven't flown?
Senator Cochran. Well, should we conclude from this that
North Korea's level of confidence in its ballistic missiles is
different from the United States?
Mr. Walpole. Oh, I would conclude that. Their confidence is
different, but their need for confidence would probably be
different as well.
Senator Cochran. Why is that? Could you explain why and in
what ways the required confidence levels differ between the
United States and countries like North Korea?
Mr. Walpole. Yes, our missiles were designed to be counter-
force missiles. We were going after silos. If you didn't get
the silo, the missile coming back at you was going to have
multiple nuclear warheads on it, so you wanted to eliminate
that silo and make sure that the missile couldn't be used. That
required highly reliable, highly accurate systems.
If you are doing a counter value, that is going after
populations, it doesn't require that kind of reliability, that
kind of accuracy. Obviously North Korea wouldn't want to have a
dud and say, ``We're going to launch at you'' and then fire
something in that duds.
We'd love it to be a dud.
But there is a big difference in what they are going after,
what they would want to threaten and what we would want to
threaten. Remembering, of course that if North Korea launched,
they would probably view it as one of their last acts.
Senator Cochran. That leads me to this next question which
is that some are suggesting that the capacity to send a long-
range missile to the United States is the reason why some rogue
states may want to possess an effective ballistic missile
system, but the NIE says in many ways that such weapons are not
envisioned at the outset as operational weapons of war but
primarily as strategic weapons of deterrence and coercive
diplomacy.
Is it your view that this is of significant utility, for
rogue states to merely possess intercontinental ballistic
missiles, even if they are not used?
Mr. Walpole. The short answer is yes. I think that they
view it as significant. If nothing else, as a bargaining chip.
And I guess the case that I would make is to look at what North
Korea has been able to accomplish just with having had a failed
space-launch attempt, and an untested Taepo Dong-2.
I think it falls into the category of coercive diplomacy.
So, yes, I think they see this as valuable.
Senator Cochran. The term ``emergency operational
capability'' has been used before in briefings of our
Subcommittee and also in the semi-annual report to Congress on
proliferation. What is meant by the phrase, ``emergency
operational capability,'' and how does it differ from the term
``deployment'' as it is used in connection with ballistic
missile systems?
Mr. Walpole. I didn't like the term, ``emergency
operational capability'' and that is why we used, in our
report, ``initial threat availability.''
``Emergency'' conjures in my mind fire trucks and rescue
squad and stuff.
It is just my bias, but what ``emergency operational
capability'' means is that before deployment, before having a
robust test program where something is fully integrated into
the doctrine and military of a country, they could launch that
for military purposes and have some operational value. I don't
know how ``emergency'' fits into that unless it is because
someone else is attacking you.
That is why we thought it was better characterized by,
``initial threat availability.'' They can threaten to use this
as soon as the thing can fly.
Now how that differs from deployment--and I kind of defined
that a moment ago--fully integrated into the doctrine and the
military forces of the country in question. That is what we
mean by deployment.
Senator Cochran. How many rogue states do you think will be
likely to have that kind of capability by the year 2005?
Mr. Walpole. The initial threat availability?
Senator Cochran. Right. It used to be the ``emergency
operational capability'' but now you call it the ``initial
threat availability.''
Mr. Walpole. Well, you said likely. We are talking
``likely.''
Senator Cochran. Yes, I said likely.
Mr. Walpole. On the ``likely'' side, what the Intelligence
Community obviously has said by 2005, is North Korea. China and
Russia, of course, but not North Korea. Most agencies are
saying unlikely for Iran and unlikely for Iraq.
As you remember, there was an earlier part of my statement
about ``Some believe that Iran could try to test a Taepo Dong-1
copy in the next few years.'' I am one of those some. And so,
to answer your question, I think Iran would fall into that
category.
Senator Cochran. Senator Thompson, do you have any other
questions?
Senator Thompson. Just a few, Mr. Chairman.
On the issue of what is the major threat, the most imminent
threat, clearly we should be preparing for the full range of
threats that this new world is bringing us, but I know last
year the President requested, and I think got, $10 b
[10
deal with terrorist threats with regard to weapons of mass
destruction. So with regard to those truck bombs, it is not
exactly like we are not doing anything.
So I suggest that we compare that with what we are doing in
terms of the other threat, whether it is a little smaller
threat, or a greater threat, or whatever.
I was thinking about, clearly, it is easier in some
respects, I guess, to carry out an act of domestic terrorism.
On the other hand, there are some factors mitigating toward
missiles I would say, but as to an alterative for a rogue
nation, as opposed to terrorism, and one has been touched on
and that has to do with prestige.
Why is North Korea--a country whose people are literally
starving to death--putting the resources that they are into
their missile program, if not for the factors that you have
been talking about, prestige and coercive ability, that
missiles would bring? Is that a correct assessment?
Mr. Walpole. That is a good assessment.
Senator Thompson. Also, what about the regional threat that
missiles will bring? What about our troop vulnerability, and
our allies? I mean, that has nothing to do with domestic
terrorism as far as we are concerned but it certainly would
bring us into the mix, big time. Just as much as if we were
attacked ourselves.
Mr. Walpole. That is here and now.
Senator Thompson. That is here and now? What do you mean by
that?
Mr. Walpole. I mean the medium-range, short-range ballistic
missile threat to our troops and our interests and allies
overseas is already there. That is not waiting for flight-
testing or anything else.
The Shahab-3 can already reach three-fourths of the way
into Turkey. That is NATO.
Senator Thompson. Well, I was going to ask you about Europe
in general. Could you elaborate on that a bit, in terms of
vulnerability of our allies, with regard to this?
Mr. Walpole. Well, it is basically Turkey at this point,
because you would have to get a few-thousand kilometer missile
from Iran, to be able to capture, as I recall looking at the
range the other day, it had to be about 2,500 for Iran to reach
Italy and almost 4,000 to reach France. So you would have to
get some longer range systems to get out there. They are
coming. Those systems are coming down the road.
Senator Thompson. Are we sharing our assessments with our
NATO allies?
Mr. Walpole. Absolutely. I have personally been to the UK
to brief, to France to brief. I have been to Geneva and briefed
the Russians on where we saw this. My deputy has been to
Denmark and in fact, he is meeting with the Danes today to go
over it again. I mean, we have spent time with the allies.
There are so many versions of this NIE out at this point.
We have a secret releaseable NATO version and a secret
releaseable allies version. It has got obviously more
information than the unclassified version to get out to people.
We are trying to get this message out.
Senator Thompson. I don't want to discourage you but some
of us just came back from the conference over in Munich and the
Russian representative said that our concern with nuclear
proliferation was fantasy.
Mr. Walpole. He said that to me too.
Senator Thompson. He has got more work to do.
Mr. Walpole. They said that to me and that is when I coined
the phrase that, I am sorry, it was a General that said that, I
said, sorry General, but the Taepo Dong-1 launch moved us from
hypothetical or fantasy to real. It flew. We know what it can
deliver. It is no longer just a hypothetical issue.
Senator Thompson. After we received a round of criticism, I
responded that I thought it was ironic that the countries that
were complaining so much about our proposed missile defense
system were the main causes of our need for one, that is China
and Russia's proliferation. The Chinese responded that that was
unfounded. So that settled that matter.
Mr. Walpole. They know better than----
Senator Thompson. You mentioned, too, that part of the
Chinese development of their own capabilities will be based
upon U.S. technology and some of that was acquired through
espionage, is that correct?
Mr. Walpole. Yes.
Senator Thompson. How does your assessment comport with the
Cox Report's conclusions along those lines?
Mr. Walpole. In the general sense it comported all right.
The Cox Report used a little different definition of espionage.
We determined that, and I can't say one is right or wrong, but
we determined that if the information was available through
some other means, even though it was classified but had been
available because of a leak or something else, we wouldn't
throw that into the espionage pot. We only called espionage
what we knew couldn't have been attained through any other
means, because then we could have proved that espionage took
place.
The Cox Report said no, if it is classified we are going to
count it as espionage. I can't prove which is right because you
would have to get to the Chinese people that collected it to
sort it out.
Senator Thompson. Even by your definition you concluded
that some of their advancement was based on espionage--
obtaining of our technology.
Mr. Walpole. Yes, we concluded that they did conduct
espionage, influenced their program; their systems would look
more like ours even though they will be different because they
have deficiencies in their own requirements.
Senator Thompson. Thank you very much.
Senator Cochran. Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to hear more about new missile states and the
threat they are to us. I would ask you describe those threats.
For instance, the Iranians as you testified, have been working
on medium range missiles. Do the Iranians now have the ability
to develop, on their own, engines for their medium-range
missiles?
Mr. Walpole. You know that is an interesting question
because unlike Pakistan, who basically got the No Dong and
called it the Ghauri, Iran got the No Dong and wanted to work
with it with Russian assistance. They want to have more hands-
on involvement.
I don't know how to answer the question unclassified, other
than that they have certainly gotten Russian assistance to help
with making that conversion. That said, overnight they could
change their mind and follow the Pakistan round, just buy them
and be done with it.
Senator Akaka. And what have you been alluding to if they
don't have the ability now, do you have an estimate as to when
they might be capable of developing one?
Mr. Walpole. Well, I don't think there is any question that
Iran has the capability of developing engines.
Senator Akaka. Can they do it without----
Mr. Walpole. Yes, I am sorry, I should have answered that
part.
Iran certainly has the ability to develop engines. Whether
they would be able to develop exactly the same as a No Dong
engine or something else and then advance it from that would be
what their program was set up to do.
Senator Akaka. Do you think they can develop it without
outside support?
Mr. Walpole. Oh, they could. It would take them longer but
they could.
Senator Akaka. How would you describe the contributions
made by Russia, China, and North Korea to the Iranian missile
program?
Mr. Walpole. That is what Senator Thompson tried. I have
gone about as far as I can in an open session on that one.
Sorry.
If I start to tell you what we know, then they'll figure
out how we figured it out and we won't pick it up next time.
Senator Akaka. Well, if you can answer this, in your
opinion who has provided the most help to Iran of those
countries?
Mr. Walpole. I don't know that I've ever thought about
counting it up that way because they have both helped in
different ways.
Senator Akaka. Let me ask you about North Korea's missile
program. The North Koreans tested a three-stage missile, Taepo
Dong-1, as you testified, how large a warhead could it carry
over the distance necessary to hit the United States? You
mentioned a ``light warhead,'' and my question on that is what
is a ``light warhead'' and how much damage could it cause?
Mr. Walpole. I can't give the numbers unclassified, but
when I am using terms like light and small, we are talking more
in terms of a biological or a chemical-sized warhead. When I
use the phrase several hundred kilograms that's when I think
you can figure, oh well somebody could make a nuclear weapon at
the several hundred-kilometer range, and that is how we
separated it. So in answer to your question, the Taepo Dong-1
could deliver a small, that is biological or a chemical-sized
warhead to parts of the United States.
Senator Akaka. In your testimony you seemed to indicate
that it is unlikely that the North Koreans would place a weapon
on a three-stage missile and that they would more likely put it
on the Taepo Dong-2. First, why do you draw that conclusion
and, since the Taepo Dong-2 has not been tested, how can you be
certain that it is a much more capable missile, as you say in
your testimony?
Mr. Walpole. Trust us. [Laughter.]
No, we have sufficient intelligence on both missiles to
know that one is a whole lot more capable than the other. I
think you've seen line drawings in the open on the two and the
Taepo Dong-2 is a lot larger missile, in fact, the Taepo Dong-
2's second stage is the first stage of the Taepo Dong-1--just
to give you an idea of how much bigger it is.
We feel--and I can't go into the intelligence behind it--
but we feel that they basically moved from the Taepo Dong-1 to
the Taepo Dong-2 effort, and that is why our judgment is
unlikely to weaponize the Taepo Dong-1 with the Taepo Dong-2
around the corner.
Now, if you were to ask me the question, ``Well, what if
they were to freeze flight-testing from now on, would they then
be forced to use the Taepo Dong-1?''
Yes, but remember, it failed, so they have a tested, but
not a successful version or an untested version, and they have
no idea how successful it would be, or another missile. And
which one are they going to put their confidence in,
particularly since one would have range to reach further than
the other. We can't get into their minds to sort that out.
Senator Akaka. There might be a possibility, if tested it
might fail.
Mr. Walpole. Yes.
Senator Akaka. Do you have an opinion as to which country,
historically has been the greatest proliferator, I mean which
country has provided the most assistance on missiles to the
greatest number of other states?
Mr. Walpole. A few years ago, that would have been easy; it
would have been Russia. But North Korea has been doing so much
anymore that it is a hard call.
The problem is, do you calculate that based on the amount
of hardware, would you calculate that on the amount of know-
how, or would you calculate that based on the impact it has had
on countries' programs? Now I would rather do it on the latter.
But that is one I haven't calculated. I have a much better idea
of these two, but they could be artificial answers. I think the
impact on the program has got to be the critical answer and I
don't know the answer to that one.
Senator Akaka. Senator Levin asked the question but I want
to ask it again. We have a situation in which a lot of states
have developed short-range missiles for use in war time. There
are a few states that are developing weapons of mass
destruction. Pretty much those same states, if left unchecked,
would probably develop long-range missiles that could hit the
United States. If they do develop these weapons and missiles,
they will probably do so, less for offensive military reasons
and more for diplomatic prestige or deter attack. If these
states wanted to attack the United States, they might more
likely use something like a cruise missile from an offshore
ship or submarine or a ship container in an ICBM to deliver
their weapons. Would you agree with that statement or not?
Mr. Walpole. Well, it is pretty close to what we had said
in the Estimate. The struggle when you start getting down to
``use,'' we have been talking about missile threats, now if we
start to come down to use, it depends a lot on the conditions.
If the country were going to use it because they knew they were
going down and it was just, ``We're going to get back at you
before we go,'' then they don't have time to use one of these
terrorist techniques, then they would launch a missile because
they are going down anyway.
If they were trying to damage the United States without
being attributable, then a missile is not the way they are
going to want to do it because we are going to figure out where
it came from. They would want to use some other means to that
end. So the whole ``use'' question comes down to, it is very
scenario-dependent. And when it starts coming down to U.S.
population at risk, those scenarios need to be looked at
closely.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your response.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In terms of the diplomatic pressure or the prestige or the
intimidation factor, North Korea has had our troops at risk for
decades, have they not, through their medium-range missile?
Mr. Walpole. Artillery?
Senator Levin. And artillery.
Just talking missiles for a moment. Their medium-range----
Mr. Walpole. There are SCUDS, short-range missiles.
Senator Levin. And short-range missiles. Medium and short-
range missiles have had our troops at risk for decades.
Mr. Walpole. Well, not medium for decades; short.
Senator Levin. OK.
Mr. Walpole. I honestly don't remember when the SCUD was
first introduced.
Senator Levin. OK.
Mr. Walpole. But it has been many years.
Senator Levin. It has been a long time that our troops have
been at risk from North Korean missiles.
Mr. Walpole. Yes.
Senator Levin. Our means of defense against those missiles
for a long period of time, was it not, was deterrence, the
threat of retaliation against them if they would use it? Before
we had deployed a Patriot, was that not the only defense we had
against an incoming missile, deterrence and retaliation?
Mr. Walpole. Well, we didn't have a defense but deterrence,
you can argue would have been a play, yes.
Senator Levin. All right.
Did the presence of those missiles achieve any diplomatic
gains for North Korea? In other words, our troops at risk just
the way our population will someday be at risk against the
North Korean weapon of mass destruction, be it a truck bomb or
be it a long-range missile. Our population--well the troops are
part of our population----
Mr. Walpole. They are part of our population but since our
troops--and that is why I threw artillery into the equation--
since we have sent troops over there for decades knowing that
they were at risk to artillery. When the SCUDS were added to
the deck, and you would have to ask the military how they
calculated this, but from my calculation, when the SCUDS were
added, it was just an added threat, we knew we were putting our
troops in harms way anytime they went to North Korea or South
Korea or anywhere near the DMZ. That's a different equation
than our population that didn't join the military and didn't
get sent near the DMZ.
Senator Levin. Not in my book. I don't have the slightest
doubt that if North Korea attacked our troops with artillery or
missiles, that our response would be massive, direct,
immediate. I don't have the slightest doubt, and I hope North
Korea doesn't have the slightest doubt, and I don't think there
would be any difference. I think that would be considered an
attack on us to the same extent as if they were----
Mr. Walpole. Oh, that's true but I thought you were asking
in terms of coercive diplomacy against us. I think when you are
holding a population in our homeland at risk, there is a
different value relative to constraining U.S. options elsewhere
than simply in an area where you are already still a part of
the Cold War, that was the struggle I was having was how to
equate coercive diplomacy in the two scenarios.
Senator Levin. No. Do you believe that North Korea is
likely to deploy or use a ballistic missile that has never been
flight tested?
Mr. Walpole. I know they can. Anybody can deploy----
Senator Levin. My question is likelihood. Are they likely
to?
Mr. Walpole. Deploy starts to seem really unlikely. Use, as
I said, you can start walking down these scenarios, if you've
got it available, you might try it.
Senator Levin. What is the scenario in which the--you are
talking about the suicide scenario?
Mr. Walpole. The scenario where you are losing everything
anyway.
Senator Levin. All right.
Mr. Walpole. Whether it has been flight tested or not, I
mean you can sit there and watch and say, ``Gee, it's too bad
we didn't flight test.''
Senator Levin. Are you talking about the suicide scenario?
Mr. Walpole. Yes, and somebody says, ``Well flight test it,
no.''
Senator Levin. All right.
Mr. Walpole. Put some coordinates in.
Senator Levin. All right. So you are talking about the
suicide scenario.
Mr. Walpole. Yes.
Senator Levin. All right. I got you. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Levin.
The unclassified summary of the NIE states that, ``Iran is
the next most likely country after North Korea to pose a threat
to the United States.''
The report lists several possible dates for when Iran could
first flight-test an ICBM. What is your assessment as the
National Intelligence Officer of when Iran will be capable of
testing an ICBM?
Mr. Walpole. Capable of testing, the Intelligence Community
basically agrees in the next few years. Likely to test, as I
said in an earlier answer, my view falls with the some that say
also sometime in the next few years they'll test one that could
reach the United States.
Senator Cochran. Do you think Iran has made the decision to
build an ICBM?
Mr. Walpole. I do. Yes, but there is not agreement on that.
Senator Cochran. Well, how will we know if Iran has made
such a decision?
Mr. Walpole. Sometimes you just won't know until you either
see the item, or it is flown.
Senator Cochran. What is your level of confidence that we
will know when a decision has been made?
Mr. Walpole. As I said earlier in my testimony, I think we
do a pretty good job of projecting countries efforts and what
they are striving for, but the specific performance and
configuration we have some more difficulty. So, I'd say we are
pretty good at laying our programs of concern.
Senator Cochran. Given the transfer of technology between
North Korea and Iran, should we expect North Korea to transfer
an ICBM such as the three-stage Taepo Dong-1 missile to Iran?
Mr. Walpole. I guess we could see that. I guess I wouldn't
be surprised if I were to see that happen. I think if Iran were
going to do a Taepo Dong-1 type system, that it would probably
try to do it itself.
Senator Cochran. What components does Iran need to build a
three-stage Taepo Dong-1?
Mr. Walpole. Well, a Taepo Dong-1 is basically the No Dong
for the first stage, which they have got the Shahab-3. A SCUD
for the second stage, and then they would need a third stage
and they have got the technology to put one together.
Senator Cochran. Could North Korea also transfer the more
capable Taepo Dong-2 to Iran?
Mr. Walpole. They could.
Senator Cochran. Your report says, and I am going to quote,
``Some countries that have traditionally been recipients of
foreign missile technology are now sharing more among
themselves and are pursuing cooperative missile ventures.''
Do rogue states have technology that would be useful for
them to proliferate to other nations?
Mr. Walpole. Yes.
Senator Cochran. What are the consequences of this trade,
this proliferation?
Mr. Walpole. It makes it harder to have the kind of impact
you want export-control laws to have. Now you are using
countries that didn't care about the export-control laws in the
first place, and now you are trying to convince them, don't
share with others.
It was one thing to convince Russia and China to back off.
It is totally different to tell North Korea and Iran to back
off.
Senator Cochran. Will this trade accelerate the ability of
rogue states to develop or acquire ballistic missiles that
threaten the United States?
Mr. Walpole. I believe it will.
Senator Cochran. What incentives are there for the rogue
states to trade among themselves?
Mr. Walpole. Well, I think there are the financial
incentives; I think there is the prestige incentive; there is
the cooperative adventure incentive, where one country works on
one aspect of the weapons program and another works on another.
Senator Cochran. Will the ballistic missile trade between
rogue states make it more difficult for the Intelligence
Community to monitor and gauge the extent of proliferation?
Mr. Walpole. Yes, because it is just going to be many more
targets to go after.
Senator Cochran. Is it fair to say that missile
proliferation to and among rogue states is not abating?
Mr. Walpole. That is a pretty bold statement.
Proliferation is continuing but we haven't seen the
complete sale of a missile in a number of years. We had the M-
11 from China to Pakistan, we haven't seen that.
We had CSS-2s from China to Saudi Arabia, we haven't seen
that.
So in that sense, we have seen things drop down some, but
we are continuing to see trade.
Senator Cochran. This is the first National Intelligence
Estimate on the ballistic missile threat since 1995. Does this
NIE place greater emphasis on the contribution of foreign
assistance to a country's ballistic missile program than the
1995 NIE did? If so, why?
Mr. Walpole. The 1995 NIE, I think, gave some credit to
MTCR that then didn't come to fruition, it didn't stop things
the way that perhaps the 1995 Estimate thought that it would.
So, yes, foreign assistance is a big player.
Senator Cochran. This assessment of the capabilities of
rogue states greatly contrasts with the assessment presented by
the Intelligence Community in the 1995 NIE. For example, the
1995 NIE stated that Iran would not be able to develop an ICBM
before 2010 because it lacked the economic resources and
technological infrastructure, yet the unclassified summary of
the 1999 NIE states that Iran could flight-test a Taepo Dong
style missile with ICBM ranges in the next few years. These two
Estimates were written only 4 years apart. What has caused such
a dramatic change in the Estimates of when these countries
could develop long-range ballistic missiles?
Mr. Walpole. The 1995 Estimate didn't talk about when the
countries could develop these missiles. If you look at the 1995
Estimate and compare that to the 1999 Estimate, then you are
not going to see as stark a difference, so the ``could''
standard changed that a little bit. Now on top of that, I think
that the idea of a copy-cat Taepo Dong-1 ICBM had not been
contemplated in the 1995 NIE. So there are two differences.
Senator Cochran. A non-proliferation brief released by the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace criticized the NIE
for not taking into account the political factors that could
change the nature of the threat. This brief suggests the threat
from Iran, Iraq, and North Korea could disappear due to future
changes in the political nature of these countries. In the NIE
what assumptions did you make regarding U.S. relations with
those states that are pursuing ballistic missiles?
Mr. Walpole. First off, I take deference with the earlier
comment. We did take into account political and economic
factors. What we say in the unclassified paper is that we did
it independent of significant political or economic change.
That is, we projected what North Korea could do over 15 years,
but if something changes, if there is a unification or
whatever, that could change all of that. We didn't assume a
major change like that in making our projection. And you could
do the same thing with Iran, if Iran all of a sudden became a
friend, and decided, ``Oh, gee we are not going to do this; we
are only going to do a space launch program.'' Well, what we
did was project what they could do technologically,
economically, and given the current political situation in the
country what is expected to extend.
Senator Cochran. Do you think it is likely or realistic to
expect that all of the ballistic missile threats to the United
States will disappear before 2015?
Mr. Walpole. Well, I wish, but I don't think it is likely.
Senator Cochran. Without regard to specific countries, do
you think the United States will face an ICBM threat from rogue
states?
Mr. Walpole. When?
Senator Cochran. By before 2015.
Mr. Walpole. Oh, before 2015? I don't like the term rogue
states, but those are the states, yes.
Senator Cochran. How could we better describe that? What
would be more politically in fashion?
Mr. Walpole. I tried to come up with emerging threats and
so on, but I just decided to say North Korea, Iran, and Iraq.
It takes me a little longer but I can live with it.
Senator Cochran. Well, I was curious just for my own
benefit. I feel bad calling them rogue states, it has serious
outlaw kind of connotations, doesn't it?
Mr. Walpole. It has a lot of connotations that just don't
necessarily apply.
Senator Cochran. Yes.
Mr. Walpole. I just stopped using it.
Senator Cochran. We will try to find another word. Maybe
just naming the countries would be the best thing to do.
The NIE states that nations like North Korea and Iran would
develop countermeasures and penetration aids by the time they
flight-test their long-range ballistic missiles. Are the
countermeasure you listed as sophisticated as we would expect
to see in a Russian ballistic missile?
Mr. Walpole. No.
Senator Cochran. If countermeasures were present, would
they be rudimentary at first and then become more sophisticated
over time or would these nations be able to deploy the more
sophisticated countermeasures and penetration aids from the
start?
Mr. Walpole. Now, you are talking in terms of a different
spectrum. Rudimentary has a lot of connotations too. They'll be
able to deploy what is available out there in technology today,
which I think is a little better than rudimentary and certainly
not as sophisticated as what we, the Russians or the Chinese
have.
Senator Cochran. The NIE does not say that these nations
will deploy these countermeasures and penetration aids on their
ballistic missiles. Do you think they are likely to deploy
these systems?
Mr. Walpole. That was the discussion that we had earlier in
terms of their countermeasures, so it is hard to put ``likely''
to all of that.
Senator Cochran. In testimony last week, the Director of
Central Intelligence said, ``Iran's emergence as a secondary
supplier of this technology''--missile technology--``to other
countries is the trend that worries me the most.''
I used that in my opening statement and quoted it. Why is
that threat so worrisome in your opinion?
Mr. Walpole. As I said a bit ago, now you are getting the
ones that we don't have as much influence over. It was one
thing with our western allies, then with Russia and China, now
we are moving to a group that we even have less influence over
to try to get them not to share or leak.
Senator Cochran. In addition to Iran's ballistic missile
force, I am concerned about Iran's development of nuclear
weapons. Recent press reports claim that the CIA cannot rule
out the possibility that Iran has the ability to build nuclear
weapons. Does Iran have the ability to build nuclear weapons?
Mr. Walpole. There is another example of a leak that I
would just as soon have not had occur. Iran has had a nuclear
weapons program for some time, and I guess, I will make one
other comment. There is a lot of information available in the
open on how to put together a nuclear device. Let's just leave
my unclassified answer there.
Senator Cochran. When was the last time you conducted an
NIE on Iran's nuclear weapons program?
Mr. Walpole. Several years ago.
Senator Cochran. Are you working on a new or updated NIE
based on this new information?
Mr. Walpole. We are, actually we have been for a little
while, but when we end up with leaks like have had occurred it
makes it harder to pursue.
Senator Cochran. Senator Thompson, do you have any other
questions?
Senator Thompson. No, no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you very much.
One observation, perhaps. In listening to you it reminds me
of the policy decisions that the Congress is going to have to
address, in addition to questions of missile defense. It seems
to me that three things are going on:
One, continuing accelerating threat.
Two, continuing aid and comfort by Russia and China.
And third, our continuing to embrace and assist Russia and
China without imposing any cost to them whatsoever for what
they are doing.
We are spending hundreds of millions of dollars in Russia
now to help protect the nuclear stockpile and their scientists
and so forth. We don't want to shoot ourselves in the foot by
cutting that off. On the other hand, do we know where that
money is really going?
Most people, especially those of us who are free traders,
we have got to consider the WTO and normal trade relations with
China now. We call them our strategic partners while they
continue; and we continue to catch them, and they continue to
deny or deny and promise that they won't do it again, sign a
new piece of paper.
That M-11 missile situation--the administration says we
only can see the missile canisters in Pakistan. We are not sure
that missiles are in the canisters and the hoops the
administration has jumped through in order to keep from
applying sanctions that our law requires.
So, it is a very complex situation--our relationship with
Russia and China right now. But how in the world can we justify
continuing down the road that we are going with them as much as
we want normal relations with them in every respect, while they
continue to arm people who are direct threats to this country?
Those are the things that we have got on our plate.
Senator Cochran. Thank you.
Senator Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Senator Levin, any other questions?
Senator Levin. Just a couple more.
On page 10 of your report you indicate that there is a
difference among analysts as to the likely timing of Iran's
first flight test.
Mr. Walpole. Yes.
Senator Levin. You have got some analysts who are saying it
is likely before 2010 and very likely before 2015. You have
another group saying, no more than an even chance by 2010 and a
better than even chance by 2015. And a third group says less
than an even chance by 2015. I think you fall in the first
group, personally, do you?
Mr. Walpole. I do.
Senator Levin. Which is the dominant or the majority view
among the analysts because those are three different
assessments?
Mr. Walpole. There isn't a dominant. At least the first two
have most analysts in it, and to be fair, all three are
defensible, justifiable positions.
The first one, the one that I am, in looking at what Iran
could do, and in fact with that--now we've been surprised by
third stages, we've been surprised by people deploying things
after only a few flight-tests--so, we will take what they could
do and add a few years for problems and that is what we are
going to put down.
The second group said, wait a minute, this is still rocket
science. Surprises or not, this is rocket science. It isn't all
that easy so the problems are going to be more than you think
they are going to be, so they added a little bit more.
The third group said, on top of being rocket science and
real hard, there are a lot of political factors that could just
dissuade them from going down this path.
Now given what I have said about projecting 15 years and
being wrong, I can't tell you which one of those is right. I
have chosen one because I think it is the most likely but they
are all three defensible positions.
Senator Levin. And when you talk about would do, could do,
you are always talking here about development and deployment.
You are not talking about likelihoods of use. In all cases you
are not saying that----
Mr. Walpole. There is element in flight-tests.
Senator Levin. In flight testing, in all cases you are not
saying that there is a likelihood of use by any of these
countries, is that correct?
Mr. Walpole. No.
Senator Levin. And finally would you give us a list of
countries that have assisted in the technical support and
provision of technical information or of things to the missile
program of any of these three countries, I will call them rogue
states, I don't mind, including any of our allies that have
provided technology, technical assistance, or pieces or parts?
Would you give us that for the record?
It is not just China or Russia. We have got allies who have
supported technology transfer of information which has assisted
in the development of missile programs on the part of countries
that we are worried about. So we ought to see a much more
complete list than just China and Russia, although they have
obviously been involved. So would you give us that list of
countries?
Mr. Walpole. You want that classified?
Senator Levin. Either way.
Mr. Walpole. Either way, OK.
Senator Levin. Thanks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Levin.
Mr. Walpole, thank you so much for being here today and
presenting the unclassified summary for us to discuss. We
appreciate your cooperation and assistance to our Subcommittee
very much. Thank you.
We now have a panel of two witnesses, Dr. William
Schneider, Jr., of the Hudson Institute, and Joseph Cirincione,
of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, to discuss
the assessment of the ballistic missile threat.
We have copies of statements that have been furnished to
the Subcommittee by both witnesses which we appreciate very
much and we will print them in the record of our hearing in
full, and encourage you to make whatever summary comments you
think would be helpful to our understanding of your views on
this assessment of the National Intelligence Estimate.
Dr. Schneider, you may proceed.
TESTIMONY OF DR. WILLIAM SCHNEIDER, JR.,\1\ Ph.D., ADJUNCT
FELLOW, HUDSON INSTITUTE
Dr. Schneider. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate the privilege to appear before this Subcommittee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Dr. Schneider with attachments appear
in the Appendix on page 54.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I will truncate my remarks and as you suggest, submit the
copy of my remarks for the record.
I would like to emphasize a couple of points. First, I
think the NIE as published is an excellent document and adds
materially to our understanding of the phenomenon of the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of
delivery. Second, I think the most enduring contribution of
this NIE has been the reflection the Intelligence Community has
undertaken about the methodology by which they assess the
evidence that they have acquired and the fact that the
Intelligence Community has done such a thorough review, I
think, will benefit many other areas of national security
concern to the United States, and not merely the question of
foreign missiles.
Much of my information about this subject has been derived
from my service on the Rumsfeld Commission, and the conclusions
that were obtained during that deliberation and the findings
associated with it, I believe, still obtain and I have included
a copy of the Executive Summary of that report if the
Subcommittee cares to publish it I will submit it.\2\
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\2\ The Executive Summary of the Rumsfeld Commission Report appears
in the Appendix on page 107.
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Finally, just a few brief observations on some of the
points in the Commission's Report.
First, on the question of motivation for the acquisition of
weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Given
the character of the effort that has been undertaken by North
Korea and Iran in particular, while both countries are friendly
to the use of terrorism and have done rather spectacular things
through the use of terrorist techniques, I believe the scale of
the effort that has been undertaken suggests that these are
intended for coercive purposes for purposes of advancing their
agenda as part of keeping the United States and other parties
from intervening in the regions of concern.
One other factor that I believe is stimulating the trend
towards the development of proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction that may not stop with Iran and North Korea is the
enormous gains that the United States is making in advanced
conventional weapons. These gains have the point where the
traditional conventional military power is rapidly moving
toward obsolescence and this is pushing a lot of the poorer
countries such as North Korea and Iran towards weapons of mass
destruction. They have always used the ballistic missiles
because SCUDS have been available for many years; they were
developed by the Soviet Union based on German V-2 rocket
technology, but the idea of moving to ranges where they can
directly threaten the homeland of the nations that might
intervene in regional disputes in which they have an interest
tips the scales in favor of a sustained interest in pursuing
long-range missiles and weapons of mass destruction.
Finally, on the question of foreign assistance, it is a
question that deserves a good deal of understanding and study
simply because the problem has changed radically since the
liberalization of access to advanced technology since the end
of the Cold War.
One of the most prominent sources of information on nuclear
weapon design comes from the United States because of the vast
amount of material that has been declassified in recent years.
Some of it is available on the websites of various
organizations and it does provide material assistance on the
design, manufacture, support, and deployment of weapons of mass
destruction.
This new NIE is a valuable contribution to our
understanding of the scope and maturity of the missile threat.
In the past 2 days we have seen press reports or leaks that
suggest that there is still a substantial amount of energy left
in the proliferation problem. The situation now, is that the
Executive Branch and the Congress need to move decisively to
find a way of devaluing the investment that is now being made
in weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, so
that we can contain this curse and try and diminish the
likelihood that these weapons will be used.
Thank you.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much for your statement.
Mr. Cirincione.
TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH CIRINCIONE,\1\ DIRECTOR, NON-PROLIFERATION
PROJECT, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
Mr. Cirincione. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I greatly
appreciate the hard work that you, the other Members of the
Subcommittee, and the staff have done in tracking and
documenting the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the
single greatest national security threat that we face today.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Cirincione with attachments
appear in the Appendix on page 71.
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It is an honor to be here and testify before you. I
appreciate the hard work that Mr. Walpole and others have put
into this assessment and I strongly agree with many parts of
his assessment, particularly his often overlooked remarks that
are in here that Senator Levin referred to, that they project
in the coming years that U.S. territories probably are more
likely to be attacked by a weapon of mass destruction from a
non-missile delivery system than from a missile, a very
important finding, one that most experts share.
He also emphasizes in the report that the Russian threat,
though significantly reduced, will continue to be the most
robust and lethal, considerably more than China's and orders of
magnitude more than the potential posed by the other states
that are mentioned in this report.
Unfortunately, the report doesn't spend too much time on
either the ballistic missile threat from Russia or China, and
that is one of several methodological flaws that I think
reduces the value of this assessment for policy makers.
If I could just briefly summarize knowing that my testimony
will be entered into the record, I will just briefly summarize
my comments on the methodological shortcomings of this report.
I believe the 1999 unclassified NIE portrays known missile
programs in several developing countries as more immediate
threats than previous assessments have in the past. While there
have been several significant tests of medium-range ballistic
missiles over the past 2 years, this new assessment is more the
function of a lowered evaluative criteria than of major changes
in long-range missile capabilities. The change from the
previously established Intelligence Agency criteria should be
more clearly established in this report, so policy makers can
understand why this assessment is different from all other
assessments. In particular, the three assessments that I am
talking about is the one that Mr. Walpole alluded to, they
changed the criteria from when a country was likely to deploy a
system to when it could first test its system. This represents
a time change of about 5 years.
In addition they changed the targets set. All previous
assessments looked at attacks on the 48 continental States.
This now looks at all 50 States and all territories of those 50
States. That represents a geographical shift of about 5,000
kilometers, that is the difference from Seattle, for example,
to the tip of the Aleutian Island chain.
Finally, and most important, is the adoption of the
``could'' standard. This, I think, is the deepest
methodological flaw in the report because it makes the report
very mushy. It is very hard to find here what analysts really
believe is likely to happen. So, when Senator Levin, for
example, is asking, ``Is it likely that Iran will have an ICBM
within the next 5 or 10 years? '', what you get is a range of
opinions. There is no coherent Intelligence Community
assessment. Everybody agrees that anything is possible,
certainly in the next 10 years Iran could have an ICBM; many
things could occur in the next 5 years, but what is most
likely, what is most probable? Previous assessments have tried
to have that predictive value, I think it is a shame that that
predictive value has been obfuscated, obfuscated in this
report.
Finally, sir, let me suggest that there are several other
things one might consider here. The assessments of these
projected changes take place independent of significant
political and economic changes. That results, I believe, in the
overestimation of potential ballistic missile threats from
Iraq, Iran, and North Korea and underestimates the dangers from
existing arsenals. They assume that Russia and China will
maintain status quo paths. If in fact, the international non-
proliferation regime collapses, if the international security
regime is fundamentally altered by poor relations between the
United States and Russia, poor relations between the United
States and China, we could be facing a much more dangerous
threat from those existing arsenals than we are likely to
encounter from the potential arsenals of these three small
states.
And by focusing on developments in a small number of
missile programs in these developing states, the NIE neglects a
dramatic decline in global ballistic missile totals. That is,
it simply isn't true that globally the ballistic missile threat
is increasing. When you look at the global ballistic missile
situation, I have tried to detail this on page 10 of my report,
there has been over the last 15 years, a significant decrease
in many important criteria of the ballistic missile threat. For
example, the numbers of ICBMs in the world have been cut almost
in half in the past 15 years. The number of intermediate-range
ballistic missiles in the world have been all but eliminated--a
99 percent decrease in the last 15 years. The short-range
ballistic missile programs are largely consisting of short-
range SCUDS, that is 1950's technology which is aging and
declining in military utility.
Even the number of nations with ballistic missile programs
has decreased over the last 15 years. There are eight countries
we were worried about primarily 8 years ago; there are only
seven now. They are different countries and they are poorer,
less technologically advanced than the countries we were
worried about 15 years ago.
And finally, most importantly, the level of damage that
could occur to the United States as a result of ballistic
missiles is vastly decreased from what it was 15 years ago when
we were worried about global thermonuclear war. We were worried
about an attack that would destroy the Nation. There are still
significant threats, we should be worried about a possible
ballistic missile attack on the United States over the next 15
years, but it would be one of terrible but still limited damage
to what occurred over the past 15 years.
So, I think if we look at the global context of this, we
can see that the threat from ballistic missiles is serious,
deserves our urgent consideration, but is much less dramatic
than is sometimes portrayed by advocates of deploying a
national ballistic missile system and I will end by urging the
Congress to conduct a review, an outside review of this
assessment to see whether in fact there are methodological
flaws that I have identified and whether they could be
corrected, and to consider an objective assessment of the
technologies that exist for ballistic missile defense to filter
out political agendas, contractor influences, and other
considerations from this critical national security decision to
see whether in fact the technology exists to provide an
effective defense for the United States against ballistic
missile attack.
Thank you, sir.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much. We appreciate both of
your attendance at today's hearing and your participation in
and assistance to our understanding of your views on this, the
Estimate, and an assessment of the National Intelligence
Estimate.
There seems to be still, a disconnect between what Mr.
Walpole said was the goal of this 1999 Estimate as compared
with the 1995 one and that is not only to suggest what is
likely or expected to happen in the future years, but what
could happen in the future years. And that he put in italics
the fact that they were also going to include what their
expectation was for the future, what would be likely to happen.
And now we hear Mr. Cirincione repeating the same criticism
saying that this Estimate includes only what is possible, what
could happen in the future. So there seems to be the continued
disconnect between what the NIE says it says, and what Mr.
Cirincione says it says.
Beyond that, I guess my question is, what are your views,
each member of this panel, about the effect of vulnerability of
the United States in the absence of a missile defense system?
What is the effect of the vulnerability of the United States at
this time on the likelihood that foreign nations like North
Korea, Iran, and Iraq would develop long-range missile systems
to threaten the United States? Would it be more likely that
they would develop these systems if we had a national missile
defense system or less likely?
Dr. Schneider, would you go first?
Dr. Schneider. My view of the vulnerability is a factor
that stimulates the development of the various means of
delivering weapons of mass destruction. The one area for which
we have no defense at this stage is defenses against ballistic
missile attack. We do have some defenses against cruise missile
attack and we have a $10 billion counter terrorism budget, so
in terms of where the effort gets allocated by those who seek
to impose a threat to the United States for purposes of
coercive diplomacy, they are likely to follow the path of least
resistance, which is to date in ballistic missiles.
I suspect if we deploy a national missile defense that they
will try and shift efforts to some of the other areas where we
already have undertaken some defensive effort such as cruise
missiles or the terrorist delivery of WMD.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Cirincione.
Mr. Cirincione. Yes sir, I don't believe that this
``could'' issue, by the way is a disconnect; it is in the body
of the assessment itself. It notes that some of the analysts
involved in the assessment objected to the adoption of this
standard. It is the standard that was introduced by the
Rumsfeld Commission and one that I think is detrimental to good
predictive analysis.
Particularly on the question that you ask, however, I
believe that countries will continue to pursue ballistic
missile programs independent of whether the United States
attempts to build a ballistic missile shield or not. Remember
we had a ballistic missile shield for some time. It didn't seem
to affect ballistic missile programs at that time.
Senator Cochran. Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Cirincione, you mentioned in your
testimony where you disagree with the Rumsfeld Commission
report. Are there conclusions which you agree with?
Mr. Cirincione. Well, there are lots of words in the
Rumsfeld Commission report, I am sure I could find some that I
agree with. But the basic thrust, you see, is that they
concluded--and this is what made the headlines--that a country
could field a ballistic missile that could strike the United
States with little or no warning, that is tomorrow we could
wake up and find that Argentina had a missile that could attack
the United States. I just believe that isn't true. It is
fundamentally untrue and has resulted in a certain hysteria
about the ballistic missile threat. So fundamentally and at its
core, I disagree with the Commission's assessment.
Senator Akaka. How would you like to see the Intelligence
Community address developing threats in the future? Is there a
need for a new alternative such as Team B approach which would
look at other factors affecting likely threats?
Mr. Cirincione. Well, this current assessment is the result
of exactly a Team B approach so I wouldn't recommend that
approach. We have this 1999 assessment because Congress
strongly disagreed with the 1995 National Intelligence
Estimate, and so it convened a special panel, the Gates Panel,
headed up by the former Director of the CIA, and that panel
reviewed the 1995 assessment and in 1996, found out that it
completely agreed with the assessment. Former Director Gates
testified here in the Senate in December 1996, agreeing with
the 1995 assessment, and thought the case was even stronger
than had been presented publicly. Certain Members of Congress
didn't like that finding so they convened another review. This
was the Rumsfeld Commission which finally gave them the answer
that many Members wanted, which is that the ballistic missile
threat was more robust than had been found by the Intelligence
Community. The National Intelligence Community has responded by
basically adopting the Rumsfeld Commission standards and
finally presenting to the Congress an assessment that they
agree with.
Senator Akaka. Dr. Schneider, before the House Armed
Services Committee on October 13, 1999, one of your colleagues
on the Rumsfeld Commission, Dr. William Graham, criticized the
NIE for placing, ``Too much weight on the intentions without
trying to evaluate how they might change.'' He said, ``It is
particularly important to be cautious of Intelligence Community
Estimates that on the one hand focus on capacities and then on
the other state that they do not consider major changes in a
government policy.''
Would you agree with this statement?
Dr. Schneider. It is difficult when making a 15-year
assessment to manage, as Mr. Walpole suggested, the vagaries of
international politics and how that might affect it. So I am
sympathetic with the point of view that suggests that somehow
this, while a very important factor, is difficult to
incorporate. That being said, I do think that the Intelligence
Community has got the right balance in the way they have come
to assess this. The issue of the methodology about how it is
assessed was one of the more detailed efforts of the Rumsfeld
Commission. Three of our members are particularly well
identified with a position that is skeptical of ballistic
missile defenses and have a powerful advocacy position with
respect to arms control. Dr. Richard Garwin, for example, now
Secretary Albright's advisor on Arms Control and Counter-
Proliferation.
General Lee Butler has advocated abandoning nuclear weapons
entirely; Dr. Barry Bleckman is a well known arms control
expert. All of these specialists look very carefully at the
methodology about the most constructive way to get a grip on
the threat. They shared the perspective that is reflected in
the Rumsfeld Commission Report. I believe that the approach in
the Rumsfeld Commission Report is a good way to do it.
Senator Akaka. In your testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on April 20, 1999, you stated that, ``The
use of surface ship launch missiles may be especially
attractive to Iran in attacking the weapons of mass
destruction.''
How useful would an NMD be against such an attack?
Dr. Schneider. Well, it would depend on the range of the
missile used from a shipboard attack. If they used a short-
range missile with less than 2,000 nautical mile range, the
National Missile Defense System is constrained from being
effective at those ranges under the terms of the AVM treaty so
it would not have any effect on those. You would have to depend
on a theater type system such as THAAD or a Patriot PAC-3 as a
way of engaging missiles that were delivered that had a shorter
range than could not be engaged by the National Missile Defense
System.
Senator Akaka. The administration has talks underway with
the North Koreans to restrain their missile exports and
development. If the administration is successful, how do you
think the progress should affect our National Missile Defense
Program?
Dr. Schneider. First, North Korea is not the only country
that poses a potential threat to the United States so that if
the negotiations are successful and relations improve with
North Korea that it should be addressed as a bilateral matter
rather than a question of worldwide policy. However, if the
news story in the Washington Times today about the shipment of
No Dong engines to Iran turns out to be correct, then I think
the effectiveness of the efforts with North Korea are clearly
in doubt.
Senator Akaka. My last question, Mr. Chairman.
What if we were to convince the Iranians to suspend their
ICBM program, how should that affect our NMD program?
Dr. Schneider. Again, the question of missile defense is
most recently driven by developments in Iran and North Korea,
however those are not the only countries that are getting this
technology and those that do have it such as for example,
Pakistan has expressed readiness to export their missiles to
other countries so the missile threat is not resolved solely by
improved bilateral relations with either Iran or North Korea.
Our vulnerability to ballistic missiles needs to be addressed
in the same way we deal with other security vulnerabilities
though our defense establishment.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Akaka. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me ask both of you whether you agree with the statement
of Mr. Walpole and the finding of the National Intelligence
Council relative to non-missile delivery means and the
statement is this, ``We project that in the coming years U.S.
territories are probably more likely to be attacked with
weapons of mass destruction from non-missile delivery means
(most likely from non-state entities) than by missiles,
primarily because non-missile delivery means are less costly
and more reliable and accurate. They can also be used without
attribution.''
I am wondering Mr. Cirincione, do you agree with that?
Mr. Cirincione. Yes, sir I do, I strongly agree with that.
Senator Levin. Dr. Schneider, do you agree with that?
Dr. Schneider. Yes, I do because there are three hundred
crank calls a week on anthrax scares, so yes, if you score them
that way. But I think if you disaggregated the number into
state actors, that is if you are considering only states as
players that would manipulate or actually engage in the use of
weapons of mass destruction, then I think missile delivery is
probably a more likely scenario in the short-term. This would
be so unless the phenomenon I described earlier, where missile
defenses were deployed, proliferators would try and follow the
path of least resistance and use ballistic missiles.
Senator Levin. So that in terms of states, you do not agree
with that finding?
Mr. Cirincione. Correct.
Senator Levin. So, you both disagree with parts of this
Intelligence Estimate.
Dr. Schneider, would you agree that the Rumsfeld panel made
no finding relative to the deployment of missile defenses?
Dr. Schneider. No, it was not in our charter.
Senator Levin. That has really been so misunderstood. I am
looking at an editorial in a highly respected newspaper, the
Washington Post, it says the following: A well respected
Congressional advisory panel in 1998, urged the deployment.
That is not accurate?
Dr. Schneider. That is not correct.
Senator Levin. And I think it is really important that
those of you who were on the panel continue to do what was done
when the panel report was presented, which is to indicate that
on that issue whether or not deployment of a national missile
defense system should occur, that the panel itself took no
position--even though they found that the North Korean threat
was closer than had previously been expected.
Dr. Schneider. That is correct and I had proposed to the
Chairman, that I include the Executive Summary of the Rumsfeld
Commission Report in my testimony. I think this will make that
clear.\1\
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\1\ The Executive Summary of the Rumsfeld Commission Report appears
in the Appendix on page 107.
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Senator Levin. I think it is very important that everybody
on that panel, whatever side of the deployment issue that they
are on, make it clear that the panel did not address the issue,
and reached no conclusion on the issue relative to deployment
of missile defenses. There is some misunderstanding about what
the panel found and what they didn't find and that
misunderstanding can have an effect on the debate. So, thank
you for that clarification.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Senator Levin.
Let me ask both of you this question. The NIE says
acquiring long-range ballistic missiles armed with WMD will
enable weaker countries to do three things that they otherwise
might not be able to do: Deter, constrain, and harm the United
States.
Do you think there is utility for rogue states to merely
possess ICBMs, even if they are not used, Mr. Cirincione?
Mr. Cirincione. Actually, sir, I disagree specifically with
that statement. I think this confuses weapons of mass
destruction with delivery vehicles. That is a nation, and I do
believe that it is more likely that a nation state that wanted
to threaten the United States with a weapon of mass destruction
would do so, not with a missile but by finding another delivery
means. So a nation that had secreted a nuclear weapon in
Washington or Fairbanks and said that it was there and would
detonate it unless so-and-so, would be just as able to deter,
constrain, and harm the United States as a country that claimed
to have a nuclear warhead on top of a ballistic missile. So, I
don't believe the possession of ballistic missiles is a unique
capability to deter, constrain, or harm.
Senator Cochran. Dr. Schneider.
Dr. Schneider. I believe that a long-range missile delivery
is a much more persuasive way of dealing with it than the
notion of an attempted terrorist delivery. We had a recent
example over the Christmas holiday and immediately thereafter
of a terrorist group that was trying to infiltrate the United
States through a very clever scheme involving multiple points
of entry. They were apprehended by law enforcement
organizations and the case is now being investigated.
The probability of detection of terrorist organizations is
one of the successful results of the $10 billion counter
terrorism program we have in the Federal budget. The risks that
would be taken by a state in trying to sneak a WMD device into
the United States where culpability could be ascertained, is
extremely high.
On the other hand, the manipulation of WMD and long range
missile threat could be very powerful and I call your attention
to a colloquy that took place between Secretary Rumsfeld and
Senator John Kerry in a testimony before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence on the Rumsfeld Commission Report.
Secretary Rumsfeld has the rare perspective of being both the
White House Chief of Staff and a Secretary of Defense. He went
through a very interesting thought process that is derived from
that experience about the impact that an Iraqi possession of
long-range ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction
might have had on the White House in 1991 if they were
contemplating intervention in a Gulf region security crisis. I
can't reproduce the colloquies as effectively as I would like,
but it was a very compelling one suggesting that the possession
of this could have a very powerful impact on opportunities for
coercive diplomacy in these kinds of scenarios.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Cirincione, though the NIE discusses
the value of ICBMs to rogue states, some have suggested that
ICBMs are actually of little value for rogue states. Do you
agree with that?
Mr. Cirincione. Oh no, I think they are of some value. If I
was a rogue state I would like to have an ICBM. The trouble is
that it is not easy to do. If it was easy, everybody would do
it. It is technoloillion to
deal with terrorist threats with
and demanding technology to master, so I expect it is going to
take a very long time before any other country has an ICBM
capable of delivering a nuclear warhead on the United States.
Senator Cochran. Dr. Schneider, what do nations like North
Korea, Iran, and Iraq gain by developing missiles like ICBMs or
longer-range missiles?
Dr. Schneider. Take the case, first of North Korea, I think
they gain several things, one is they are the largest U.S. aid
recipient in Asia, which is a testimony to their management
skills in the manipulation of their WMD program and ballistic
missiles. But also they have been able to equalize their status
with South Korea despite the fact that South Korea is a much
richer state, it is a democratic state, it is a state which
whom we have had good relations, largely as a consequence of
the WMD and missile threat they are able to manipulate.
I think this is replicated in Iran as well. Their ability
to deploy weapons of mass destruction and deliver them at great
ranges with ballistic missiles has made them the most powerful
and influential state in the Gulf region. In the security arena
it has obliged the United States to revisit its policies
concerning how it would deploy forces in the future in a Gulf
region security crisis. As a result there are powerful
incentives for them to go down this path. Since North Korea and
Iran are moving incrementally to an ICBM capability, it is
clear that they wish to have this ace-in-the-hole of an ability
to threaten the territory of the United States.
Senator Cochran. Dr. Schneider, you brought to our
attention the fact that we have this $10 billion effort
underway to deal with threats such as terrorist attacks on the
United States, but some claim that we are paying too much
attention and spending too much money on ballistic missile
threats and defending against them. Do you think we are paying
too much attention to the ballistic missile threat over the
other threats?
Dr. Schneider. No, I think it is important to look at these
threats posed by weapons of mass destruction in a holistic way;
there are several ways in which they can be delivered.
Terrorism is one means, cruise missiles and manned aircraft are
another means. Ballistic missiles are yet another means. We
need to be able to engage all of these. I strongly support the
effort that the President has proposed for this $10 billion
counter terrorist effort. I think we will probably need to do
more in the way of cruise missile defense, especially national
cruise missile defense in the future and I think the Congress
initiated such a program just last year. But, ballistic missile
defense is the area where for a variety of reasons, we have not
engaged and as a result, the path of least resistance has been
taken by those for whom it is important to maintain a threat
against the United States. I think the effort that we make to
invest in a national missile defense program--and this is a
personal view, not the view of the Rumsfeld Commission--would
contribute to devaluing the investment in ballistic missiles.
It would do so by making it worth less simply because ballistic
missiles are much less likely to have the desired effect either
in terms of coercive diplomacy or in actual use.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Cirincione, in a recent Los Angeles
Times article you criticized NIE as being less useful to policy
makers because it avoided the issue of whether threats might
actually disappear. In this article you said that under some
scenarios, North Korea may collapse before the fielding of a
national missile defense system. Do you believe that all of the
threats described in this NIE will probably disappear before
the fielding of a national defense system?
Mr. Cirincione. It depends when you think we are going to
field this system. Well, sir I base that comment on testimony
given to the Congress by the Director of the DIA, General
Patrick Hughes, who testified that North Korea was probably
terminal. This was 2 years ago and I think many analysts
believe that it is probable that North Korea is going to
collapse in the short term, that is, over the next 5 to 10
years. And I think that is just as important a ``could''
possibility that should be considered as a possibility that
North Korea could, or Iran could, field an ICBM. And that is
why it is so urgent when you make these kinds of assessments,
to the greatest extent possible, to bring in the political,
economic, and diplomatic factors, so that you have a net
assessment.
We do that all the time, we don't worry about Japan for
example, in this assessment because we judge that even though
Japan could develop an ICBM, they are unlikely to do that. That
actually could change dramatically if the situation in Asia
spiraled out of control; if relations with China deteriorated;
if India fielded large numbers of ballistic missiles, Japan may
decide that they actually should deploy a ballistic missile,
that they should become a nuclear nation. That is the kind of
political variable that is very important for the intelligence
agencies to bring into their assessments and that is lacking
here, and I would hope that the Congress would help encourage
the intelligence agencies, to the greatest extent possible, to
integrate their assessment so they really give Congress the
kind of predictive tool that they need. That was the basis of
my statement to the Los Angeles Times.
Senator Cochran. Dr. William Perry, who as you know is our
former Secretary of Defense and is now serving as the
Coordinator for U.S.-North Korea Policy, said in his review of
U.S. policy, that the United States needs to deal with the
North Korean Government as it is because, ``there is no
evidence that change is imminent.''
So my follow up is, should the United States deal with
North Korea's long-range missile programs as if no change is
imminent? Is he right or is he wrong?
Mr. Cirincione. Well, frankly, I believe he is wrong. I
think all indications are that change is fairly imminent, that
is 5 to 10 years in North Korea. I do not believe that that
regime can survive.
Senator Cochran. Dr. Schneider, looking at the August 1998
Taepo Dong-1 launch by North Korea, what technologies for
developing ICBMs did North Korea demonstrate by that launch?
Dr. Schneider. The most important feature was the ability
to have successful stage separation. That is, when the first
stage of the missile carried aloft the second stage it was able
to separate the two stages without damaging the other stage or
otherwise inhibiting its ability to perform permitting the
third stage also separated successfully. This is the core
capability necessary to develop an ICBM. Ultimately if you can
put a payload in orbit, you have an ICBM capability.
Senator Cochran. But we have seen a clear pattern in rogue
state programs where they begin their programs with SCUD-type
technology. Do we need to be concerned about, not only North
Korea, but other countries leveraging this SCUD technology to
develop longer-range ballistic missiles?
Dr. Schneider. Yes I think it is a source of concern for a
number of reasons.
One, is that it is a highly mature technology. Several
thousand launches have been undertaken using this technology.
This contributes to a need for less testing because of the
maturity of the technology.
Second, the technology is very cheap to manufacture and
hence North Korea is able to have as one of its core
competencies the ability to cheaply manufacture liquid fuel
technology based on relatively simple evolutions of the
underlying SCUD technology.
I believe it is a source for concern because it does create
a direct path to an ICBM.
Senator Cochran. Let me ask both of you about the NIE
assessment of the likelihood of an unauthorized or accidental
launch of ballistic missiles from Russia or China. It describes
this as highly unlikely.
Mr. Cirincione, do you agree with the NIE on that point?
Mr. Cirincione. I don't believe it is highly unlikely. I do
believe it is unlikely, but I also agree with the 1995 NIE,
which cautioned when it made a similar prediction, ``We are
less confident about the future in view of the fluid political
situation in both countries, Russia and China. If there were
severe political crisis in either country, control of the
nuclear command structure could become less certain, increasing
the possibility of an authorized launch.''
I think the political situation in both of those nations
remains very fluid. I am deeply pessimistic about the future of
Russia which is why I tried to stress in my testimony that much
more of our attention has to be focused on the here and now; on
the five thousand nuclear warheads that sit atop ballistic
missiles in Russia. That is the ballistic missile threat we
really should be worried about and I am afraid that situation
is going to become less stable in the next 5 to 10 years,
increasing the probability not just of an accidental launch,
but the possibility for fragmentation of Russia where we see
new nuclear-armed nations emerging and the possibility of
transfer or sale of those assets to third parties. That is the
real danger. That is the real threat that we would face from a
third Nation getting a ballistic missile, they would simply buy
it.
Senator Cochran. Dr. Schneider.
Dr. Schneider. There was an important caveat in the NIE
that suggested that unauthorized launch was highly unlikely if
existing procedural safeguards remained in place. The Russians
have inherited the command and control system of the former
Soviet Union and I am persuaded that that is a good system.
However, if there is deterioration in the state control of the
assets, that is the nuclear weapon delivery systems, and it
causes a breakdown in the procedural safeguards then, of course
it would be possible for an accidental or an unauthorized
launch to take place.
Similarly a source of concern is the degradation in the
effectiveness of the warning systems where they may mistake a
phenomenon that they see for a launch and try to respond. We
have some concerns about an incident 5 years ago and I think
those concerns remain.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Cirincione, in your opening statement
which we put in the record in full, you characterize the
Rumsfeld Commission's conclusions as hysterical. What do you
mean by that?
Mr. Cirincione. Well, sir, my exact phrase was ``somewhat
hysterical.''
Senator Cochran. Oh, I am sorry.
Mr. Cirincione. That is quite all right.
I believe that it is somewhat hysterical to assert that the
United States could have little or no warning of a new ICBM in
the world. I simply don't believe that is true. I think that is
an extreme view that we could wake up tomorrow--and I heard
Members of Congress take to the floor and say things like this
after the Rumsfeld Commission Report--that we could wake up
tomorrow and find that Libya had deployed an ICBM. I simply
don't think our Intelligence capabilities are that poor. I
don't think building an ICBM is that easy. I don't believe
missiles pop in and out of existence like virtual particles.
There is a trail; there is a way to ascertain this. I think we
have a very good grasp on who has what kind of missile program.
I don't think we are in for those kinds of gigantic surprises
that Vanuatu suddenly fields an ICBM, even though by
consistently applying the ``could'' standard of the Rumsfeld
Commission that is a ``could'' possibility.
Senator Cochran. Dr. Schneider, do you agree with the
conclusions of the Rumsfeld Commission, that they were somewhat
hysterical or---- [Laughter.]
Dr. Schneider. No, I think they were very restrained and
offered with the sobriety that the subject requires.
I think part of the confusion is to equate a threat to the
United States with an ICBM capability. There are a number of
ways, including some mentioned in the NIE, in which a ballistic
missile can be delivered to the United States without it being
an ICBM. One example is a launch from a surface ship. This
technology is not at all new. The Germans demonstrated it
during World War II. The Russians have frequently launched
ballistic missiles from surface ships. We launched a Polaris
missile from a merchant ship in the early 1960's. This is not
rocket science. This is navigation and as a consequence, the
possibility that a ballistic missile threat could be posed to
the United States without warning is a very real one. A SCUD
missile on a transporter erector launcher (TEL) which is
similar to an off-road logging vehicle, can be put in the hold
of a merchant ship and the merchant ship sail the first 9,500
km. of the voyage needed to get to the United States. The last
500 or so are managed by the short-range ballistic missile
launched from the ship.
The usual problems that have been referred to in the past
of command, control, and navigation. These have largely been
dispensed with because of the availability of high-quality
commercial communications such as INMARSAT and modern
commercial navigation such as that available from the global
positioning system (GPS). So this is practical; it has been
widely demonstrated, and it should be counted as a part of the
portfolio of ballistic missile threats that can threaten the
United States.
Mr. Cirincione. But sir, if you are going to have a
merchant ship, why bother with a ballistic missile? Why don't
you continue sailing those last hundred miles into the harbor
and detonate the device then? That is way before Customs is
going to be able to get you. You don't need the ballistic
missile to make that kind of threat.
Dr. Schneider. I guess you blow yourself up. That is the
answer.
Mr. Cirincione. Well, we have a lot of evidence that people
are willing to do that.
Dr. Schneider. Yes, but there probably would be a low
volunteer rate for that duty. [Laughter.]
Mr. Cirincione. Some nations have a very high volunteer
rate for exactly those kinds of things.
Senator Cochran. Let me ask both of you this question. How
much warning time, for example, do you think the Intelligence
Community would be able to provide if Iran decided to develop
an ICBM like the three-stage Taepo Dong-1? Dr. Schneider.
Dr. Schneider. Well, it could be done by the weekend if the
missiles were put on a 747 and flown to Iran where they would
just set them up. We had a circumstance in the 1980's when
China delivered the CSS-2 missiles to Saudi Arabia. We didn't
know about it until after the transaction was implemented, so
it is quite possible that we could be surprised because there
are a number of ways in which an adversary-state can acquire
ballistic missiles other than going to engineering school and
starting to mine the aluminum and steel out of the ground. It
is possible to simply buy these things off the shelf.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Cirincione.
Mr. Cirincione. If they tried to build it themselves--
years. If they smuggled it in piece by piece and assembled it--
very little warning time.
Senator Cochran. Well, I think this has been a very helpful
hearing. I appreciate very much your both being here to help us
understand this National Intelligence Estimate and Mr.
Walpole's participation in the hearing and his presentation of
the unclassified summary for our review, and the participation
of Senators. I think this has been an excellent afternoon,
interesting and informative as well. So thank you very, very
much.
Dr. Schneider. It was an honor to be here.
Senator Cochran. This concludes our hearing. We stand in
recess.
[Whereupon, at 4:34 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned,
to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]
A P P E N D I X
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