S. Hrg. 106-580
CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
of the
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
on
CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES
__________
FEBRUARY 2, 2000
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
65-329 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama, Chairman
RICHARD H. BRYAN, Nevada, Vice Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana BOB GRAHAM, Florida
JON KYL, Arizona JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma MAX BAUCUS, Montana
ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado CARL LEVIN, Michigan
CONNIE MACK, Florida
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi, Ex Officio
THOMAS A. DASCHLE, South Dakota, Ex Officio
------
Bill Duhnke, Staff Director
Alfred Cumming, Minority Staff Director
Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Hearing Held in Washington, D.C.: February 2, 2000
Statement of:
Page
Bryan, Hon. Richard H., a U.S. Senator from the State of
Nevada..................................................... 2
Roy, Hon. J. Stapleton, Assistant Secretary of State of
Intelligence and Research.................................. 3
Shelby, Hon. Richard C., a U.S. Senator from the State of
Alabama.................................................... 1
Tenet, Hon. George J., Director of Central Intelligence...... 10
Wilson, Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson, Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency........................................ 21
Testimony of:
Roy, Hon. J. Stapleton, Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research.................................. 47
Tenet, Hon. George J., Director of Central Intelligence...... 30
Wilson, Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson, Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency........................................ 47
HEARING ON THE WORLDWIDE THREAT FOR 2000
----------
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 2000
U.S. Senate,
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in
Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Richard
C. Shelby, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senators Shelby and Bryan.
Chairman Shelby. The Committee will come to order.
This is the Committee's first hearing of the 21st century,
and I want to join with the Committee's new Vice Chairman,
Senator Bryan, in welcoming our witnesses, as well as the
American public, for this annual assessment of the threats
facing our nation.
We have asked our witnesses to focus on those conditions
throughout the world that have fostered, or will foster,
threats and challenges to the security of the United States. We
will be concentrating this morning in an open session, and
again this afternoon in a closed session, on conventional as
well as unconventional threats, including threats posed by the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and high-
technology state-sponsored and nonstate terrorists.
This hearing is intended to form the backdrop not only for
the Committee's annual budget authorization process but also
for a comprehensive review of the capabilities of the
Intelligence Community and the adequacy of the resources being
dedicated to this very important work.
The dynamic change and uncertainty that characterized the
latter part of the nineties will likely continue through the
first decade of the new century because what one of our
witnesses calls the engines of turmoil remain largely in place.
These "engines of turmoil" include significant transitions in
key states and regions throughout the world, the continued
existence of rogue states and terrorist groups, rapid
technological development and proliferation, continuing
international criminal activity, and reactions to a perception
of U.S. political, economic, military and social dominance.
Together, these factors foster a complex, dynamic and
dangerous global security environment that will spawn crises
affecting American interests. If we are to contain, manage and
respond appropriately to these threats, we need to understand
this challenging new security environment in the first year of
the 21st century. And nowhere will these challenges be more
evident than in the asymmetrical threats to our homeland--in
the strategic nuclear missile threats from China and Russia, as
well as rogue states, and in the threats posed to U.S.
interests around the world by large regionally ambitious
military powers.
While this hearing is designed to address critical threats
to our nation's security, another matter has come to the
public's attention and is one that Director Tenet, I believe,
should address in more detail. That matter is the conduct of
Mr. Tenet's predecessor, John Deutch, and the conduct of senior
CIA officials in investigating, failing to investigate, or
possibly impeding the investigation of Mr. Deutch's handling or
mishandling of classified information.
These are matters, I believe, of the utmost importance. The
American people have a keen interest in the performance of
senior officials charged with upholding our laws and policies
with respect to the protection of classified information, the
disclosure of which would constitute a serious and immediate
threat to our national security.
Therefore, I hope that you will take this opportunity to
explain, Mr. Tenet, to the American public today the actions of
your predecessor, the investigations into those actions, the
actions of other CIA officials with respect to this
investigation, and your own actions in this regard.
With that in mind, the Committee is very pleased to welcome
back the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. George Tenet.
We're also pleased to welcome two individuals to their first
public appearance before this Committee--the relatively new
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Vice Admiral
Thomas Wilson, and the new Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research, Ambassador Stapleton Roy.
If there's no objection, we've asked Secretary Roy and
Admiral Wilson to submit their statements for the record, and
it will be so ordered. Director Tenet will then present his
oral testimony, after which I will open the floor for Members'
questions. In the interest of time, I would ask that members
submit any opening statements for the record, other than
Senator Bryan, so that all members will have ample opportunity
to ask questions.
But before calling on you, Director Tenet, let me turn to
my colleague and my new Vice Chairman, Senator Bryan.
Vice Chairman Bryan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
As you have observed, this is my first roll call with you
as the new Vice Chairman of this Committee, and I look forward
to working with you and other colleagues in the Committee in a
bipartisan way in discharging our oversight responsibilities
with respect to the Intelligence Community.
Let me first commend you for the timely manner in which
you're scheduling the Committee's annual worldwide threat
hearing. As we both know, because this is an election year, our
time schedule will be compressed. And so I think it's most
important that we get off as quickly as we can at the beginning
of the year and the timing of this hearing, which was
rescheduled through circumstances beyond your control or my
control, indicates the manner in which we tend to approach this
responsibility.
The annual worldwide threat hearing is one of the
Committee's most important. It's indispensable in helping
members frame the Committee's approach to intelligence issues
in the year ahead. But it's important for another reason.
Because this is an open hearing, the American people themselves
will have an opportunity to assess the seriousness of the
threats that face our country, and reach their own conclusions.
Mr. Chairman, our nation faces numerous threats, albeit
qualitatively different than those that we faced during the
Cold War. Rather than the singularly focused threat of the
former Soviet Union, we now face a host of so-called
transNational issues and threats. As the term implies, these
threats are not confined to specific countries, but rather
cross international borders.
Mr. Chairman, as you and I observed firsthand during our
recent visit to eight African nations, the terrible effects of
one of those transNational threats, in this case terrorism, can
be deadly. In both Kenya and Tanzania, we visited the remains
of our embassies, both of whichwere the object of viciously
destructive terrorist attacks in 1998. Over the last several years,
you, Mr. Chairman, have placed a proper emphasis on the transNational
threats, such as terrorism, weapons proliferation and narcotics, and I
very much look forward to working with you on these and other issues
during the course of the year.
Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence, I'd like to touch on
one more issue, one which you appropriately raised, and I'd
like to associate myself with your comments in terms of the
recent issue that has come to light with respect to DCI John
Deutch's handling of classified information and the misuse of
government computers as reported in the February 1st edition of
the New York Times.
I must say that I find this issue extremely troubling. Not
only are the specifics of the case very disturbing; so, too, is
the manner and timing in which this Committee was notified. I
look forward to hearing any comments that the DCI may have on
this issue today, and I am particularly anxious to see the
results of the accountability panel's inquiry into this matter
as soon as that panel has completed its work.
I would also be very interested in whether or not there
have been any morale problems as a consequence of that, because
one of the obvious concerns raised is whether there is a dual
standard in dealing with a former DCI and other employees of
the agency who might have been guilty of similar activity.
And finally, I would like to applaud the efforts of the CIA
Inspector General, Britt Snider. His investigative report
produced on this matter is both comprehensive and balanced. And
again, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you today
and throughout the rest of the year on issues affecting the
Intelligence Community. Thank you.
Chairman Shelby. Mr. Tenet, you proceed as you wish.
[The prepared statements of Director Tenet, Admiral Wilson,
and Ambassador Roy follow:]
Prepared Statement of J. Stapleton Roy, Assistant Secretary of State
for Intelligence and Research
Chairman Shelby, Senator Bryan, Members of the Committee, I
appreciate this opportunity to present the views of the State
Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) on current and
projected threats to our nation.
Thanks to our military readiness, our intelligence capabilities,
and the effectiveness of our diplomacy, threats to our national
existence from nuclear or large-scale conventional attack remain low.
The threats we face today are less direct and more diffuse. Efforts
by countries to acquire nuclear weapons and ballistic missile
capabilities remain of high concern. International terrorists--Usama
bin Ladin's organization is the most prominent--threaten Americans at
home and around the globe. Narcotraffickers and international criminals
endanger our way of life and corrupt governments and societies
everywhere. Globalization has brought manifold benefits, but it has
created new vulnerabilities. "Soft" threats, such as the spread of
epidemic disease, environmental degradation, or conflict over water
rights, pose new challenges that we are only beginning to understand.
In addition, the United States must pay special attention to the
activities and intentions of states with global reach (Russia and
China) and to countries whose behavior poses actual or potential
threats to American interests. The latter group includes North Korea,
Iran, and Iraq.
the nuclear threat
Only Russia has the unqualified capacity to destroy the United
States. Indeed, for the foreseeable future, Russia's ability to
threaten U.S. territory and overseas interests is greater than all
other potential adversaries combined. China is the only other country
that is not an ally of the United States that currently has the
capacity to strike the U.S. homeland with nuclear weapons. Moreover,
the aggregate nuclear-armed ICBM threat against the United States is
declining dramatically as a result of Russian military choices related
to START I and START II and the significantly reduced size of the
Russian economy.
This situation could change for the worse if Moscow (and
secondarily, Beijing) concluded that the United States was pursuing
interests in fundamental conflict with their own. Such perceptions
could trigger decisions that would significantly increase the
quantitative threat to the United States. Instead of reducing their
nuclear warheads to some 1,500, the Russians could halt their decline
at or above 2,000 warheads. The Chinese could triple their nuclear
deterrent by the end of the decade to more than 100 ICBM warheads by
MIRVing existing ICBMs. Should either (or both) put their strategic
forces on a higher state of alert, their serious early warning
deficiencies would increase the danger of accidental launch.
The growing availability of technical information about nuclear
weapons and the increase in well-financed non-state terrorist
organizations make the prospect of a suitcase or cargo ship bomb a
significant second order concern. The difficulty of acquiring
sufficient fissile materials would be the most important technical
factor limiting the ability of such a group to detonate a nuclear
device in an American city.
North Korea, with its nascent space launch vehicle/ICBM program and
presumed nuclear potential, is preeminent among emerging Third World
nuclear threats. Given the credibility of U.S. retaliatory capabilities
in the face of any nuclear attack on the American homeland, we would
assign the North Korean threat to a tertiary level. A multifaceted
diplomatic effort is under way to eliminate this threat. So far, this
effort has yielded a freeze on activity at declared North Korean
nuclear facilities and a moratorium on further space or missile
launches.
missiles and missile proliferation
Ballistic missiles are a special concern, particularly when
possessed by countries with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons,
because of their ability to strike rapidly and penetrate defense. An
increasing number of countries are developing capabilities to produce
ballistic missiles and/or space launch vehicles; these include
potential adversaries like North Korea and Iran, and regional rivals
like India and Pakistan. These capabilities have been increased by
technology transfers from other countries--principally Russia, China,
North Korea, and advanced European nations. This will allow for
extended range and improved accuracy of older-generation missiles.
Ballistic missiles are unlikely to be used against U.S. territory, but
they are a growing threat to U.S. allies and to U.S. forces deployed
abroad.
the conventional military threat
The threat of a large-scale conventional military attack against
the United States or its allies will remain low for the immediate
future. Since the demise of the Warsaw Pact, there has existed no
hostile military alliance capable of challenging the United States or
NATO, and none is on the horizon.
Regional tensions and potential conflicts threaten U.S. interests
abroad. Progress toward Middle East peace has reduced the chances of
another major war there, but it may have increased the determination of
regional terrorist groups to derail the peace process. Iraq threatens
regional security by confronting coalition forces and retaining weapons
ofmass destruction (WMD) ambitions. Saddam Hussein could precipitate
major crises at any time.
Trends are visible that could increase the conventional military
threats. U.S. military dominance and economic, cultural, and
technological preeminence have sparked resentment by potential rivals
who do not share U.S. values and are concerned that the United States
will use it global leverage in ways inimical to their interests. This
has prompted them to seek ways to constrain Washington. These countries
are not likely to enter formal defensive alliances, but if they
perceive U.S. policies as hostile to their national interests, they may
be increasingly inclined to cooperate militarily, particularly in the
sale of weapons and technologies that might otherwise have been kept
off the market.
technology diffusion
Accelerating technological progress in an increasingly global
economy has facilitated the spread of advanced military technologies
once restricted to a few industrialized nations. Chemical and
biological weapons will pose a growing threat to U.S. interests at home
and abroad, as the means to produce them become more accessible and
affordable. Such weapons are attractive to countries seeking a cheap
deterrent and to terrorist groups looking for means of inflicting mass
casualties. They pose a potential military threat to U.S. forces abroad
and to our homeland.
The critical importance of communications and computer networks to
the military and to almost every sector of the civilian economy has
increased U.S. vulnerability to a hostile disruption of its information
infrastructure. Russia, China, and Cuba have active government IW
programs, and a number of other countries are interested in the
concept.
terrorism, narcotics, and international organized crime
Terrorism.--The United States remains the number one target of
international terrorism. As in previous years, close to one-third of
all incidents worldwide in the first nine months of 1999--about 90--
were directed against Americans. About 60 of these took place in Latin
America and Western Europe, including the murder of three NGO workers
in Columbia.
Increasingly, where attacks occur does not fully reflect the origin
of the threat. The far-flung reach of Usama bin Ladin (UBL) from his
base in Afghanistan is reflected in a continuous flurry of threats by
his organization on almost every continent. Although we cannot
attribute any of last year's anti-U.S. attacks to him, his
transnational network and the devastating example of his 1998 attacks
on our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania make him the primary threat to
U.S. interests at home and abroad. Members of his network and other
like-minded radical Mujahedin are active globally. Bin Ladin funds
training camps and participates in a worldwide terrorist network. But
he is not responsible for every Mujahedin attack. The UBL network is
analogous to a large corporation with UBL as a CEO who provides
guidance, funding, and logistical support. His supporter, like regional
directors or affiliates, are not micromanaged, and may be left to
follow separate agendas.
A number of terrorists, including bin Ladin, have evinced interest
in acquiring weapons of mass destruction. So far, Aum Shinriyko, the
group responsible for the 1995 subway gas attack in Tokyo, is the only
group to use such a weapon on a large scale.
State sponsorship of terrorism has declined but has not
disappeared. Libya last year surrendered two suspects in the Pan Am 103
case for trial. North Korea recently stated that it "would not allow
terrorism or any support to it." Syria completed a first round of
formal peace talks with Israel earlier this month. Cuba no longer
actively supports armed struggle but continues to harbor terrorists.
Iraq also harbors terrorists and may be rebuilding its intelligence
networks to support terrorism. Sudan has been a safe haven and
logistical hub for numerous international terrorist groups; the recent
political shakeup in Khartoum has yet to result in a noticeable
difference. Despite President Khatami's attempts to distance Teheran
from terrorism, Iran continues to support the use of violence to derail
the peace process.
There have been counterterrorism successes over the past year.
Jordanian and Canadian authorities averted possible attacks. The leader
of the PKK, a Kurdish terrorist group, was captured, tried, and
convicted. Jordan expelled the political leadership of the terrorist
group Hamas, and Japan passed laws stringently regulating Aum
Shinriyko. Seven countries signed the international convention on
financing terrorism on the first day it was open for accession.
Narcotics.--The expanding reach of international drug trafficking
organizations poses a significant security threat to the United States,
their primary target. Abroad, criminal drug gangs suborn foreign
officials at all levels, threatening the rule of law.
Despite antinarcotics successes, notably in Bolivia and Peru,
illicit drugs from Latin America constitute the primary drug threat to
the United States. An apparent improvement in Colombian cocaine-
processing efficiency means that traffickers can direct even more of
the drug to U.S. markets. Drugs fund insurgent groups warring against
the Columbian government. Bribery at all levels of officialdom in
Mexico and, to a lesser extent, the Caribbean ensure that drugs reach
their target.
Columbia and Mexico have the largest share of the U.S. heroin
market, but opium poppy cultivation in Asia is increasing, particularly
in Burma and Afghanistan. Indications are that Burma, after two years
of drought reduced opium poppy cultivation, will return to its
traditionally high cultivation level. In Afghanistan, production of
opium and heroin is a major source of revenue for the ruling Taleban
and a political instrument of bin Ladin to "corrupt" the West.
Crime.--At home and abroad, the activities of international
criminals threaten Americans, their businesses, and their financial
institutions. Organized crime has capitalized on economic
liberalization and technological advances to penetrate the world's
financial, banking, and payment systems. It has become increasingly
sophisticated in high-tech computer crime, complex financial fraud, and
theft of intellectual property. The cost to U.S. citizens, businesses,
and government programs is in the billions of dollars.
International criminal gangs trade in materials for WMD, sensitive
American technology, and banned or dangerous substances. They also
traffic in women and children, and in illegal visas and immigration.
Organized crime groups exploit systemic weaknesses in fledgling
democracies and economies in transition.
economic threats
The international economic outlook is more positive than at any
time since the start of the Asian economic crisis in mid-1997. World
economic output is forecast to rise from 2.5 percent last year to 3.0
percent this year. Despite the impressive rebound from the economic
turmoil of 1997-98, significant vulnerabilities in the Asian emerging
economies could affect U.S. economic and strategic interests. The
recovery of confidence in he currencies and financial markets of
Southeast Asia and South Korea remains fragile, and their banking
system are in need of further restructuring. Overall, the danger of a
second Asian financial crisis has substantially diminished. The more
cautious and sophisticated approach of foreign investors, the increase
in transparency of financial information, and the region's dramatic
reduction in reliance on short-term debt have all decreased Asia's
susceptibility to a financial panic triggered by the economic problems
of one country.
Despite export recovery and high and growing foreign exchange
reserves, China is one of Asia's soft spots. Growth this year could
falter under the weight of deflation. China's banks are burdened with
bad debt. Fresh bankruptcies could require urgent capitalization and
fiscal resources already are stretched thin. Chinese policymakers are
concerned about rising unemployment and want to stimulate economic
growth, but they have fewer and fewer options other than painful
economic reform.
Latin America should recover from last year's recession and achieve
3.7% overall growth. Mexico, Brazil, Chile, and Peru have made
difficult policy adjustments that leave them better positioned to
weather external developments. Latin America governments generally
remain publicly committed to fiscal austerity, trade liberalization,
and low inflation. However, income inequality and the failure of
market-oriented policies to dent high poverty levels could decrease
stability in countries where recovery lags.
Economic espionage against the United States is a backhanded
tribute to our economic prowess. In particular industries and for
particular companies, especially in vital high-tech sectors, economic
espionage can threaten profits and fruits of innovation.
threats to human rights, democracy, and humanitarian interventions
The national security of the United States is tied to political
stability, peace, and democratic governance in other regions. When
human rights are systematically abused, when internal conflicts
threaten to spill over into neighboring countries, and when democratic
principles are undermined by coups and/or corruption, like-minded
governments look to the United States to provide leadership, in
conjunction with their own efforts, to address these threats. Most
current complex emergencies are caused by violent ethnic tensions and
religious intolerance, often fueled by malevolent political leaders and
militias, that generate large numbers of displaced persons and atrocity
victims. The US Government has led international efforts to mitigate
such destabilizing humanitarian crises--through providing generous
refugee assistance, supporting international tribunals that prosecute
war criminals, and preventing those security threats from erupting or
re-erupting through support for free and fair elections and for human
rights monitoring.
"soft threats"
The United States faces a broad array of long-term threats to our
national well-being. Some of these take the form of episodic natural
disasters--floods in Venezuela, earthquakes in Turkey and Taiwan. While
the greatest loss of life from natural disasters will continue to be in
crowded poor regions, overseas Americans are often affected, as are
governments with which we work to achieve common goals. Reducing the
suffering inflicted by such crises will depend on improving the use of
early-warning information systems and providing prompt humanitarian
assistance.
Environmental threats range from toxic spills to global climate
change. Environmental contamination can cause severe local problems.
Global warming would result in broader and unpredictable weather
fluctuations, altered agricultural production, and rising sea levels.
Each of these regional problems would affect national economic
production, food exports and imports, and even international relations
as natural resource balances shift within and among countries. A
related threat may come from increasingly resilient bacteria and
viruses, which can take advantage of global linkages, poor sanitation,
and urban congestion to spread quickly across continents.
Populations in poor regions continue to grow, even as birthrates
decline. This demographic lag ensures that over the next few decades in
many poor countries a growing cohort of young people will be stymied by
the lack of economic opportunities, inadequate health care and schools,
and crowded living conditions. They may be inclined to act violently
against their governments or be swayed by extremists touting anti-
Western nosatrums. The safety of both overseas and domestic Americans
could be harmed by a growing population with dim prospects directing
anger at those perceived to have too much.
countries with global reach
Russia.--Russia's ability to project power beyond its borders and
to challenge U.S. interests directly is much diminished. Russia is
focused on its own internal problems and aware of its weaknesses and
limitations. Nevertheless, Russia remains a nuclear power with the
capability to destroy the United States. It retains the ability to
influence foreign and security policy developments in Europe and, to a
lesser extent, around the globe. Its interests sometimes coincide with
those of the United States and our allies, and sometimes not. Regional
instability in the former Soviet Union, in particular in the Caucasus
or Central Asia, could impinge on U.S. interests, especially if such
instability were to spiral our of control or tempt external
intervention.
The Russian political scene was dramatically altered by the Duma
elections in December and Yeltsin's surprise resignation, but the
consequences for Russia's development as a state remain uncertain.
Vladimir Putin, who at 47 represents a younger generation, is riding a
wave of popularity based, in part, on his vigorous prosecution of the
war in Chechnya. Putin, the odds-on favorite to win the presidency,
almost certainly will be a more engaged and predictable leader. He has
spoken of the need for a democratic, market-oriented approach,
including political pluralism and freedom of speech and of conscience,
that would revitalize the Russian economy. He has called for reform and
pledged to fight crime and corruption. But Putin has a security-
services background, makes no secret of his belief in a strong state
that plays a guiding role in the economy, and is enmeshed in a system
dominated by a narrow stratum of political and financial elites. For
Putin to undertake systematic and thoroughgoing reform, he would have
to move against some of the very people on whom his power depends.
It is too early to predict how recent leadership changes will
affect Russia's foreign and security policies. Both Putin and Foreign
Minister Ivanov have promised broad continuity. Russia's need for
integration into international economic and financial institutions and
access to key markets makes a wholesale return to the ideological
confrontation and policy collisions of the Cold War unlikely. But
Russia will persist in efforts to counter what it perceives as U.S.
dominance by using the diplomatic tools at its disposal.
China.--China's commitment to a multipolar world in which it would
have major global influence means that its interests occasionally lead
to rivalry with the United States, sometimes in concert with Russia or
France. China's increasingly capable military forces and economic base,
and its network of supporters, especially among the developing
countries, will better enable the PRC to forestall or limit unwelcome
U.S. unilateral and allied actions. This also can translate into
opposition to U.S.-led initiatives at the UN.
The most serious potential threat to the United States would be
Chinese military action, possibly in response to a perceived U.S.
challenge to vital PRC interests. Actions that might trigger such a
response include implementation of a robust threat missile defense
system that nullified Chinese deterrence or included Taiwan (directly
or indirectly) and thus increased prospects for indefinite Taiwan
separation or de jure independence. China's refusal to rule out use of
force and determination to forestall further steps toward Taiwan
separateness or explicit independence, and in the long term to achieve
reunification, jeopardizes peace and security in the Taiwan Strait.
Chinese proliferation behavior is a continuing concern,
particularly when it contributes to changes in the balance and
threatens U.S. interests in other geographic regions. China has
assisted the missile and nuclear programs of Pakistan, Iran, and
others. China has made progress in adopting international control norms
in the nuclear area, but Beijing does not accept all elements of the
Missile Technology Control Regime.
The risk of instability within China sparked by social discontent
over unemployment, official corruption or malfeasance, religious
persecution, violation of human rights, lack of democratic choices,
ethnic discrimination, and other factors remains real. Should social
order decline significantly, U.S. economic interests in China (trade
and investments) would suffer, and the expected increased outflow of
Chinese migrants to the region and to the United States would have a
problematic--but not genuinely threatening--impact on U.S. interests.
Should regime failure occur and result in ineffective government in
China, the United States would face serious new uncertainties in East
Asia.
other countries and regions of concern
North Korea.--The DPRK's ability to sustain a conflict has
continued to decrease in the past year. Nevertheless, the North's
military still has the capability to inflict heavy damage and
casualties in the opening phases of a war. The political situation in
the North appears stable, with Kim Jong-Il firmly in charge. There is
evidence that in some areas the economic situation is less dire; rather
than struggling simply to keep its head above water, the regime has
been able to turn its attention to such long-term concerns as restoring
infrastructure. There are signs that the regime is examining a range of
relatively pragmatic, though still seemingly ad hoc, solutions to the
DPRK's economic problems. Diplomatically, the North has begun a broad
push to improve relations with developed countries, which it hopes can
provide economic assistance. Pyongyang continues to refuse to deal
officially with Seoul, but unofficial contacts--in such fields as the
economy, culture, and sports--were carried out on a fairly large scale
last year.
An area of top concern is the North's development of long-range
ballistic missiles and its ongoing efforts to sell missile technology
to countries in the Middle East and South Asia. North Korea last fall
announced it would not launch a satellite or a long-range missile
during high-level U.S.-DPRK talks. But on the question of missile
sales, the North has said only that it would be willing to halt sales
under the right circumstances, a formulation that will require
clarification.
Iran.--In addition to posing a threat in the areas of WMD and
terrorism, Iran is perhaps the only major power in the Middle East
consistently opposed to the Middle EastPeace Process. Deep-seated
hostility to the MEPP within conservative circles of the Tehran regime
plays a major role in the government's apparent willingness to support
terrorist groups and their attacks against Israel or other parties
involved in the process. Although we believe Iranian factions and
leaders are not unanimous in their support for the use of terrorism to
effect political ends, so far this disunity has not resulted in a
discernible change of behavior.
How best to deal with the challenges posed by Iran is a continuing
source of disagreement with other important countries, including some
of our closest allies. Tehran is well aware of these differences and
attempts to exploit them to erode the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions.
Iraq.--Baghdad's denunciation of UNSCR 1284 and continued public
refusal to allow weapons inspections to resume indicates Iraq's
intention to ensure that any future UN inspection presence in Iraq is
weak. Over the past year, Iraq's military has escalated its challenges
to coalition aircraft in the no-fly zones. The regime has looked for
new ways to circumvent UN sanctions, while using proceeds from illegal
smuggling to enhance its military capabilities and enrich Saddam's
family and inner circle. Iraqi media and official rhetoric menacing
Kuwait and other Iraqi neighbors underscore the regime's continued
threat to the region.
Baghdad consistently denounces the MEPP, and appears committed to a
position of stalwart opposition to regional peace. Press reports
indicted that the regime seeks to eliminate opposition figures inside
and outside the country, and to target U.S. facilities such as the
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty offices in Prague. The regime hosts
several Palestinian rejectionist groups and the Mujahedin-e Khalq, a
terrorist organization.
Europe.--Peace and stability in southeastern Europe remain the
paramount "threat" on the continent. The threat from Serbia stems
from the undemocratic nature of the regime. Serbia's autocrat,
Milosevic, still holds the critical levers of power and refuses to meet
legitimate demands for democracy. The possibility of further violence
from the Milosevic regime, directed at Montenegro or elsewhere, is
undiminished. Milosevic poses a continuing challenge to NATO and to the
peace and security of the region.
Kosovar-Serbian recriminations and retaliatory attacks will
continue, and Serbian-Montenegrin tensions will mount as Podgorica and
President Djukanovic seek to carve out an increasingly independent
status. Crime and corruption, homegrown and involving Russian and other
groups, will continue to plague parts of Europe--especially Albania,
Bosnia, and other Balkan areas.
More broadly, West European leaders are concerned over potential
disruption of existing arms control regimes and deterrence strategies
from U.S. development of National Missile Defense and the ascent of
Vladimir Putin in Russia. European economies, though improving, remain
captive to high unemployment, labor unrest, pressures to enlarge the
European Union, and a single currency (the euro) with only a one-year
track record.
South Asia.--The volatile South Asian region could quickly become
embroiled in serious conflict, probably over the disputed state of
Jammu and Kashmir. Last May, India discovered an incursion from
Pakistan into the Kargil sector of Indian Kashmir. In December,
Kashmiri militants hijacked an Indian Airlines aircraft on a flight
from Kathmandu to New Delhi. Tension over Kashmir is endemic in the
Indo-Pakistani relationship and can evolve quickly into a full-blown
crisis threatening a wider, and ultimately much more destructive, war
between India and Pakistan that could result in the use of nuclear
weapons.
Possession of nuclear weapons by these two adversaries will be a
part of the landscape for the foreseeable future. Indeed, such weapons
will become more entrenched in these countries as they develop military
doctrine and command and control procedures for their potential use.
Both India and Pakistan have made it clear that they well continue to
develop their nuclear weapons and missiles capable of delivering them.
We expect to see more ballistic missile tests in the region; there may
be another round of nuclear tests. Pakistan and India might well
themselves become sources of technology for yet other countries bent on
acquiring nuclear and missile capabilities.
Latin America.--A decade into the democracy and market revolution,
the vast majority of Latin Americans have experienced little or no
improvement in living conditions. Recent economic troubles have fueled
unemployment, crime, and poverty, undermining the commitment of many
Latin Americans to free-market economic liberalization. While Latin
Americans are committed in principle to democracy, many question how
successful democracy has been in their own countries because of slow
progress in alleviating wide social inequities and in curbing
corruption. These concerns have raised fears among some observers that
disillusioned Latin Americans will turn to authoritarian governments to
improve their economic situations and reduce crime.
That said, Latin American democracies have proved resilient in the
face of economic crises, and all ideological alternatives to democratic
government remain discredited. Although Ecuador's fragile democratic
institutions are under tremendous pressure because of its ongoing
economic and political crises, recent developments in that country show
that Latin American militaries are fully aware that overt intervention
risks international opprobrium and sanctions, and they will therefore
favor solutions that maintain at least a semblance of constitutional
continuity. Another concern is that legitimately elected leaders could
assume authoritarian powers with popular support. Peruvian President
Fujimori provided a model with his "self-coup" in 1992, and Venezuela
under President Chavez bears careful watching. In none of the other
major countries of Latin America--Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
and Mexico--is democracy threatened in the short or medium term.
In Cuba, an aging Fidel Castro refuses to make concessions toward a
more open political system, and Cuba's overall human rights record
remains the worst in the hemisphere. There is little sign of
significant economic reform. The flow of refugees seeking relief from
repressive conditions continues. With no real provision for
succession--beyond more of the same, with Raul Castro at the helm--the
departure of Fidel could usher in a period of greater instability under
a less charismatic leader, possibly leading to further mass migration
and internal violence.
Africa.--African political and economic crises frequently threaten
U.S. efforts to promote democratization, human rights, the rule of law,
and economic development. Crime and terrorism thrive in some of
Africa's unstable and impoverished nations. Appeals for the United
States to assist humanitarian relief programs and peacekeeping
operations are strong and growing.
In Angola, the government continues to struggle against UNITA.
Renewed fighting, now reaching to the border with Namibia, increasingly
entangles Angola's neighbors in this decades-long civil war.
A peace agreement for the Democratic Republic of the Congo was
signed in Lusaka in August 1999, but implementation has been slow.
Continuing cease-fire violations, the involvement of neighboring
countries, and the injection of arms and other assistance from outside
the region make this conflict potentially the most destabilizing in
Africa.
Further east, Burundi faces heightened ethnic tensions. Nelson
Mandela chairs a peace process, but the high degree of distrust among
the many factions makes his task difficult. Renewed genocide in Burundi
and neighboring Rwanda remains a possibility.
Sudan, after 16 years of civil war that has generated an estimated
4 million internally displaced persons and 360,000 refugees, is
experiencing renewed tensions within its governing political elite. It
remains a haven for terrorists.
Ethiopia and Eritrea continue to rearm and prepare to resume their
conflict over a disputed border. A renewal of this conflict has the
potential to be, by far, the most lethal in Africa.
In West Africa, Sierra Leone struggles to make a peace process work
with UN support. Its neighbors worry that renewed civil war could
adversely affect their stability. The recent coup in Cote d'Ivoire
illustrates the fragility of democracy and the threat inherent in
corruption and the exclusion of regional, tribal, and religious groups
from the political process. Good governance alone might not be enough
to prevent conflict. Current levels of economic expansion may be
insufficient to cope with growing populations and a sharp decline in
foreign assistance. Poorly implemented reforms could unleash such
simmering problems as inter ethnic violence.
In closing, it is worth mentioning that an additional threat to
U.S. interests would be a failure to commit the necessary resources to
address the range of threats noted above. From the perspective of INR,
we cannot defend against these many threats to U.S. interests by force
alone, or by acting alone. We need the help of others. The ability of
the United States to carry out a strong, effective diplomacy on behalf
of its interests is an important part of our national security
strategy. In this respect, shortchanging America's foreign assistance
programs, or America's diplomatic presence overseas (260 missions,
representing 30 federal agencies), would represent a long-term threat
to out national interest. What is unique about this particular threat
is that it is one exclusively within the power of the United States to
address and resolve.
Prepared Statement of George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence
introduction
Mr. Chairman, as we face a new century, we face a new world. A
world where technology, especially information technology, develops and
spreads at lightning speed--and becomes obsolete just as fast. A world
of increasing economic integration, where a US company designs a
product in Des Moines, makes it in Mumbai, and sells it in Sydney. A
world where nation-states remain the most important and powerful
players, but where multinational corporations, nongovernment
organizations, and even individuals can have a dramatic impact.
This new world harbors the residual effects of the Cold War--which
had frozen many traditional ethnic hatreds and conflicts within the
global competition between two superpowers. Over the past 10 years they
began to thaw in Africa, the Caucasus, and the Balkans, and we continue
to see the results today.
It is against this backdrop that I want to describe the realities
of our national security environment in the first year of the 21st
century: where technology has enabled, driven, or magnified the threat
to us; where age-old resentments threaten to spill-over into open
violence; and where a growing perception of our so-called "hegemony"
has become a lightning rod for the disaffected. Moreover, this
environment of rapid change makes us even more vulnerable to sudden
surprise.
transnational issues
Mr. Chairman, bearing these themes in mind, I would like to start
with a survey of those issues that cross national borders. Let me begin
with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Mr. Chairman, on proliferation, the picture that I drew last year
has become even more stark and worrisome. Transfers of enabling
technologies to countries of proliferation concern have not abated.
Many states in the next ten years will find it easier to obtain weapons
of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. Let me underline
three aspects of this important problem:
First, the missile threat to the United States from states
other than Russia or China is steadily emerging. The threat to US
interests and forces overseas is here and now.
Second, the development of missiles and weapons of mass
destruction in South Asia has led to more-advanced systems, and both
sides have begun to establish the doctrine and tactics to use these
weapons.
Third, some countries that we have earlier considered
exclusively as weapons technology importers may step up their roles as
"secondary suppliers," compounding the proliferation problem even
further.
Let's look at the first issue, the growing threat to the United
States. We're all familiar with Russian and Chinese capabilities to
strike at military and civilian targets throughout the United States.
To a large degree, we expect our mutual deterrent and diplomacy to help
protect us from this, as they have for much of the last century.
Over the next 15 years, however, our cities will face ballistic
missile threats from a wider variety of actors--North Korea, probably
Iran, and possibly Iraq. In some cases, this is because of indigenous
technological development, and in other cases, because of direct
foreign assistance. And while the missile arsenals of these countries
will be fewer in number, constrained to smaller payloads, and less
reliable than those of the Russians and Chinese, they will still pose a
lethal and less predictable threat.
North Korea already has tested a space launch vehicle, the Taepo
Dong-1 which it could theoretically convert into an ICBM capable of
delivering a small biological or chemical weapon to the United States
although with significant inaccuracies. Moreover, North Korea has the
ability to test its Taepo Dong-2 this year; this missile may be capable
of delivering a nuclear payload to the United States.
Most analysts believe that Iran, following the North Korean
pattern, could test an ICBM capable of delivering a light payload to
the United States in the next few years.
Given that Iraqi missile development efforts are continuing, we
think that it too could develop an ICBM--especially with foreign
assistance--sometime in the next decade.
These countries calculate that possession of ICBMs would enable
them to complicate and increase the cost of US planning and
intervention, enhance deterrence, build prestige, and improve their
abilities to engage in coercive diplomacy.
As alarming as the long-range missile threat is, it should not
overshadow the immediacy and seriousness of the threat that US forces,
interests, and allies already face overseas from short- and medium-
range missiles. The proliferation of medium-range ballistic missiles
(MRBMs)--driven primarily by North Korean No Dong sales--is
significantly altering strategic balances in the Middle East and Asia.
Mr. Chairman, nowhere has the regional threat been more
dramatically played out than in South Asia. Both Pakistan and India
have intensified their missile and nuclear rivalry. Further nuclear
testing is possible and both states have begun to develop nuclear-use
doctrines and contingency planning. This is a clear sign of maturing
WMD programs. I will discuss South Asia's broader problems later in my
briefing.
Mr. Chairman, another sign that WMD programs are maturing is the
emergence of secondary suppliers of weapons technology.
While Russia, China, and North Korea continue to be the main
suppliers of ballistic missiles and related technology, long-standing
recipients--such as Iran--might become suppliers in their own right as
they develop domestic production capabilities. Other countries that
today import missile-related technology, such as Syria and Iraq, also
may emerge in the next few years as suppliers.
Over the near term, we expect that most of their exports will be of
shorter range ballistic missile-related equipment, components, and
materials. But, as their domestic infrastructures and expertise
develop, they will be able to offer a broader range of technologies
that could include longer-range missiles and related technology.
Iran in the next years may be able to supply not only complete
Scuds, but also Shahab-3s and related technology, and perhaps even
more-advanced technologies if Tehran continues to receive assistance
from Russia, China, and North Korea.
Mr. Chairman, the problem may not be limited to missile sales; we
also remain very concerned that new or nontraditional nuclear suppliers
could emerge from this same pool.
This brings me to a new area of discussion: that more than ever we
risk substantial surprise. This is not for a lack of effort on the part
of the Intelligence Community; it results from significant effort on
the part of proliferators.
There are four main reasons. First and most important,
proliferators are showing greater proficiency in the use of denial and
deception.
Second, the growing availability of dual-use technologies--
including guidance and control equipment, electronic test equipment,
and specialty materials--is making it easier for proliferators to
obtain the materials they need.
The dual-use dilemma is a particularly vexing problem as we seek to
detect and combat biological warfare programs, in part because of the
substantial overlap between BW agents and legitimate vaccines. About a
dozen countries either have offensive BW programs or are pursuing them.
Some want to use them against regional adversaries, but other see them
as a way to counter overwhelming US and Western conventional
superiority.
Third, the potential for surprise is exacerbated by the growing
capacity of countries seeking WMD to import talent that can help them
make dramatic leaps on things like new chemical and biological agents
and delivery systems. In short, they can buy the expertise that confers
the advantage of technologies surprise.
Finally, the accelerating pace of technological progress makes
information and technology easier to obtain and in more advanced forms
that when the weapons were initially developed.
We are making progress against these problems, Mr. Chairman, but I
must tell you that the hill is getting steeper every year.
terrorism
Let me now turn to another threat with worldwide reach--terrorism.
Since July 1998, working with foreign governments worldwide, we
have helped to render more than two dozen terrorists to justice. More
than half were associates of Usama Bin Ladin's Al-Qaida organization.
These renditions have shattered terrorist cells and networks, thwarted
terrorist plans, and in some cases even prevented attacks from
occurring.
Although 1999 did not witness the dramatic terrorist attacks that
punctuated 1998, our profile in the world and thus our attraction as a
terrorist target will not diminish any time soon.
We are learning more about the perpetrators every day, Mr.
Chairman, and I call tell you that they are a diverse lot motivated by
many causes.
Usama Bin Ladin is still foremost among these terrorists, because
of the immediacy and seriousness of the threat he poses. Everything we
have learned recently confirms our conviction that he wants to strike
further blows against America. Despite some well-publicized
disruptions, we believe he could still strike without additional
warning. Indeed, Usama Bin Ladin's organization and other terrorist
groups are placing increased emphasis on developing surrogates to carry
our attacks in an effort to avoid detection. For example, the Egyptian
Islamic Jihad (EIJ) is linked closed by Bin Ladin's organization and
has operatives located around the world--including in Europe, Yemen,
Pakistan, Lebanon, and Afghanistan. And, there is now an intricate web
of alliances among Sunni extremists worldwide, including North
Africans, radical Palestinians, Pakistanis, and Central Asians.
Some of these terrorists are actively sponsored by national
governments that harbor great antipathy toward the United States. Iran,
for one, remains the most active state sponsor. Although we have seen
some moderating trends in Iranian domestic policy and even some public
criticism of the security apparatus, the fact remains that the use of
terrorism as a political tool by official Iranian organs has not
changed since President Khatami took office in August 1997.
Mr. Chairman, we remain concerned that terrorist groups worldwide
continue to explore how rapidly evolving and spreading technologies
might enhance the lethality of their operations. Although terrorists
we've preempted still appear to be relying on conventional weapons, we
know that a number of these groups are seeking chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) agents. We are aware of several
instances in which terrorists have contemplated using these materials.
Among them is Bin Ladin, who has shown a strong interest in
chemical weapons. His operatives have trained to conduct attacks with
toxic chemicals or biological toxins.
HAMAS is also pursuing a capability to conduct attacks with toxic
chemicals.
Terrorists also are embracing the opportunities offered by recent
leaps in information technology. To a greater and greater degree,
terrorist groups, including Hizballah, HAMAS, the Abu Nidal
organization, and Bin Ladin's al Qa'ida organization are using
computerized files, e-mail, and encryption to support their operations.
Mr. Chairman, to sum up this part of my briefing, we have had our
share of successes, but I must be frank in saying that this has only
succeeded in buying time against an increasingly dangerous threat. The
difficulty in destroying this threat lies in the fact that our efforts
will not be enough to overcome the fundamental causes of the
phenomenon--poverty, alienation, disaffection, and ethnic hatreds
deeply rooted in history. In the meantime, constant vigilance and
timely intelligence are our best weapons.
narcotics
Mr. Chairman, let me now turn to another threat that reaches across
borders for its victims: narcotics. The problem we face has become
considerably more global in scope and can be summed up like this:
narcotics production is likely to rise dramatically in the next few
years and worldwide trafficking involves more diverse and sophisticated
groups.
On the first point, coca cultivation in Peru and Bolivia has
continued to decline--due largely to successful eradication efforts--
but that will probably be offset to some extent by increases in
Colombian cultivation. More productive coca varieties and more
efficient processing results in production of cocaine more than two and
a half times that previously estimated.
There is some good news in Colombia. Under President Pastrana's
leadershp, Bogota is beginning to improve on its 1999 counterdrug
efforts. In November, Pastrana approved the first extradition of a
Colombian drug trafficker to the United States since passage of a 1997
law.
On the other side of the world, a dramatic increase of opium and
heroin production in Afghanistan is again a cause for concern. This
year, Afghanistan's farmers harvested a crop with the potential to
produce 167 tons of heroin, making Afghanistan the world's largest
producer of opium. Burma, which has a serious drought, dropped to
second place, but will likely rebound quickly when the weather
improves.
Explosive growth in Afghan opium production is being driven by the
shared interests of traditional traffickers and the Taliban. And as
with so many of these cross-national issues, Mr. Chairman, what
concerns me most is the way the threats become intertwined. In this
case, there is ample evidence that Islamic extremists such as Usama Bin
Ladin uses profits from the drug trade to support their terror
campaign.
international organized crime
Mr. Chairman, let me turn now to the related issue of organized
crime. Organized crime has become a serious international security
issue. It not only can victimize individuals, but it also has the
potential to retard or undermine the political and economic development
of entire countries, especially newly independent ones or those moving
from command systems to open societies.
The threat is quite apparent in Russia, where it has become a
powerful and pervasive force. Crime groups there have been aggressive
in gaining access to critical sectors of Russia's economy--including
strategic resources like the oil, coal, and aluminum industries.
Meanwhile, money is moving out of Russia on a large scale. Russian
officials estimate that some $1.5 to $2 billion leaves the country
monthly. Most is not derived from criminal activities but rather is
sent abroad to avoid taxation and the country's economic instability.
Still, Russian officials say that criminal activity may account for
about one-third of the capital flight.
information operations
Finally Mr. Chairman, before I end this chapter on transnational
issues, let me note the especially threatening nature of a relatively
new phenomenon--information warfare. I say especially threatening
because as this century progresses our country's security will depend
more and more on the unimpeded and secure flow of information. Any
foreign adversary that develops the ability to interrupt that flow or
shut it down will have the potential to weaken us dramatically or even
render us helpless.
A surprising number of information warfare-related tools and
"weapons" are available on the open market at relatively little cost.
Indeed, the proliferation of personal computers, and the skills
associated with them, has created millions of potential "information
warriors".
Already, we see a number of countries expressing interest in
information operations and information warfare as a means to counter US
military superiority. Several key states are aggressively working to
develop the IW capabilities and to incorporate these new tools into
their warfighting doctrine.
This is one of the most complex issues I've put on the table. Mr.
Chairman, but, simply put, information warfare has the potential to be
a major force multiplier. And why is this?
It enables a single entity to have a significant and serious
impact.
It is a weapon that "comes ashore" and can effect the daily lives
of Americans across the country.
It gives a force projection capability to those who have never had
it before, and it can be used as an asymmetric response.
It will be a basic capability of modern militaries and intelligence
services around the world in the near future and secondary players not
long thereafter.
All of this amounts to one of the "cutting edge" challenges for
intelligence in the 21st century. We are working on means of
prevention, warning, and detection, but as in so many areas in the
technological age, Mr. Chairman, we are truly in a race with technology
itself.
regional issues
At this point, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to leave the transnational
issues and turn briefly to some of the regions and critical states in
the world.
russia
We begin with Russia. As you know, we are now in the post-Yeltsin
era, and difficult choices loom for the new president Russians will
choose in exactly two months:
He will face three fundamental questions:
First, will he keep Russia moving toward further consolidation of
its new democracy or will growing public sentiment in favor of a strong
hand and a yearning for order tempt him to slow down or even reverse
courseD
Second, will he try to build a consensus on quickening the pace of
economic reform and expanding efforts to intergrate into global
markets--some Russian officials favor this--or will he rely on heavy
state intervention to advance economic goals?
Finally, will Moscow give priority to a cooperative relationship
with the West or will anti-US sentiments continue to grow, leading to a
Russia that is isolated, frustrated, and hostile? This would increase
the risk of anunintended confrontation, which would be particularly
dangerous as Russia increasingly relies on nuclear weapons for its
defense--an emphasis reflected most recently in its new national
security concept.
As these questions indicate, a new Russian President will inherit a
country in which much has been accomplished--but in which much still
needs to be done to fully transform its economy, ensure that democracy
is deeply rooted, and establish a clear future direction for it in the
world outside Russia.
Russian polls indicate that Acting President Putin is the odds on
favorite to win the election--though I must tell you, Mr. Chairman,
that two months can be an eternity in Russia's turbulent political
scene. Putin appears tough and pragmatic, but it is far from clear what
he would do as president. If he can continue to consolidated elite and
popular support, as president he may gain political capital that he
could choose to spend on moving Russia further along the path toward
economic recovery and democratic stability.
Former Premier Primakov is in the best position to challenge Putin,
though he faces a big uphill battle. He would need the backing of other
groups--most importantly the Communists. The Communists, however, have
shown their willingness to deal with Putin's party in a recent
agreement that divided Duma leadership positions between them. Such
tactical alliances are likely to become more prevalent as parties seek
to work out new power relationships in the post-Yeltsin era.
At least two factors will be pivotal in determining Russia's near-
term trajectory:
The conflict in Chechnya: Setbacks in the war could hurt Putin's
presidential prospects unless he can deftly shift blame, while
perceived successes there will help him remain the front runner.
The economy: The devalued ruble, increased world oil prices, and a
favorable trade balance fueled by steeply reduced import levels have
allowed Moscow to actually show some economic growth in the wake of the
August 1998 financial crash. Nonetheless, Russia faces $8 billion in
foreign debt coming due this year. Absent a new I-M-F deal to
reschedule, Moscow would have to redirect recent gains from economic
growth to pay it down, or run the risk of default.
Over the longer term, the new Russian president must be able to
stabilize the political situation sufficiently to address structural
problems in the Russian economy. He must also be willing to take on the
crime and corruption problem--both of which impede foreign investment.
In the foreign policy arena, US-Russian relations will be tested on
a number of fronts. Most immediately, Western criticism of the Chechen
war has heightened Russian suspicions about US and Western activity in
neighboring areas, be it energy pipeline decisions involving the
Caucasus and Central Asia, NATO's continuing role in the Balkans, or
NATO's relations with the Baltic states. Moscow's ties to Iran also
will continue to complicate US-Russian relations, as will Russian
objections to US plans for a National Missile Defense. There are,
nonetheless, some issues that could move things in a more positive
direction.
For example, Putin and others have voiced support for finalizing
the START II agreement and moving toward further arms cuts in START
III.
Similarly, many Russian officials express a desire to more deeply
intergrate Russia into the world economy, be it through continued
cooperation with the G-8 or prospective membership in the WTO.
One of my biggest concerns--regardless of the path that Russia
chooses--remains the security of its nuclear weapons and materials.
Russia's economic difficulties continue to weaken the reliability of
nuclear personnel and Russia's system for securing fissile material. We
have no evidence that weapons are missing in Russia, but we remain
concerned by reports of lax discipline, labor strikes, poor morale, and
criminal activities at nuclear storage facilities.
the caucasus and central asia
Mr. Chairman, earlier I mentioned the war in Chechnya in the
context of Russia's domestic situation. Chechnya also has significance
for the Caucasus and Central Asia, a part of the world that has the
potential to become more volatile as it becomes more important to the
United States.
As you know, the United States has expended great effort to support
pipelines that will bring the Caspian's energy resources to Western
markets. One oil pipeline is expected to pass through both Georgia and
Azerbaijan. Western companies are trying to construct a gas pipeline
under the Caspian Sea from Turkmenistan through Azerbaijan and Georgia
en route to Turkey.
Although many of the leaders in the region through which the
pipelines will flow view the United States as a friend, regime
stability there is fragile.
Most economies are stagnating or growing very slowly, unemployment
is rising, and poverty remains high. This creates opportunities for
criminals, drug runners, and arms proliferators. It also means the
region could become a breeding ground for a new generation of Islamic
extremists, taking advantage of increasing dissatisfaction.
There is not much popular support for Islamic militancy anywhere in
Central Asia or the Caucasus, but as militants are pushed out of
Chechnya, they may seek refuge--and stoke militancy--in the South
Caucasus and Central Asia.
the middle east
Mr. Chairman, let me turn now to another region of the world where
vital US interests are at stake: the strategically important Middle
East. Many positive developments are apparent, most notably the new
potential for progress on peace. But if we step back for a moment, it
is clear that the Middle East is entering a major transition in many
aspects of its political, economic, and security environment.
In addition to the leadership successions that have begun with the
passing of King Hussein of Jordan, the Amir of Bahrain, and King Hassan
of Morocco, there is the challenge of demographics. Many of the
countries of the Middle East still have population growth rates among
the highest in the world, significantly exceeding 3 percent, meaning
that job markets will be severely challenged to create openings for the
large mass of young people entering the labor force each year.
Another challenge is economic restructuring. There is a legacy of
statist economic policies and an inadequate investment climate in most
countries in the Middle East.
As the region falls behind in competitive terms--despite a few
positive steps by some countries--governments will find it hard over
the next 5 to 10 years to maintain levels of state sector employment
and government services that have been key elements of their strategy
for domestic stability.
Finally, there is the information revolution. The rise of regional
newspapers, satellite television, and the Internet are all reducing
governments' control over information flows in the Middle East.
Islamist groups, among others, already are taking advantage of these
technologies to further their agendas.
What all of this means, Mr. Chairman, is that the Middle East--a
region on which we will depend even more for oil a decade from now (40
percent compared to 26 percent today)--is heading into a much less
predictable period that will require even greater agility from the
United States as it seeks to protect its vital interests there.
Iran
Turning now to Iran: Change in Iran is inevitable. Mr. Chairman.
The election of President Khatami reflected the Iranian popular desire
for change. He has used this mandate to put Iran on a path to a more
open society. This path will be volatile at times as the factions
struggle to control the pace and direction of political change.
A key indicator that the battle over change is heating up came last
July when student protests erupted in 18 Iranian cities for several
days. The coming year promises to be just as contentious as Iran elects
a new Majles (Parliament) in February.
Many Iranians particularly the large cohort of restive youth and
students will judge the elections as a test of the regime's willingness
to accommodate the popular demand for reform.
If they witness a rigged election, it could begin to radicalize
what has so far been a peaceful demand for change.
Fair elections would probably yield a pro-reform majority, but
opponents of change still exert heavy control over the candidate
selection process.
Former President Rafsanjani's decision to run for the Majles--
apparently at the urging of the conservatives--highlights the
leadership's desire to bring the two factions back to the center. The
conservatives are supportive of his candidacy, because they believe a
centrist Rafsanjani is a more trustworthy alternative to the reformers.
Even if the elections produce a Majles dominated by Khatami's
supporters, further progress on reform will remain erratic. Supreme
Leader Khamenei and key institutions such as the Revolutionary Guard
Corps and the large parastatal foundations will remain outside the
authority of the Majles and in a position to fight a stubborn rearguard
against political change.
Moreover, even as the Iranians digest the results of the Majles
elections, the factions will begin preliminary maneuvering for the
presidential election scheduled for mid-2001, which is almost certain
to keep the domestic political scene unsettled.
The factional maneuvering probably means that foreign policy
options will still be calculated first to prevent damage to the various
leaders' domestic positions. This will inhibit politically risky
departures from established policy. This means that Iran's foreign
policy next year will still exhibit considerable hostility to US
interests. This is most clearly demonstrated by Tehran's continued
rejection of the Middle East peace process and its efforts to energize
rejectionist Palestinian and Hizballah operations aimed at thwarting a
negotiated Arab-Israeli peace. Iranian perceptions of increasing US
influence in the Caucasus--demonstrated most recently by the signing of
the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline agreement--could similarly motivate Iran to
more aggressively seek to thwart what it regards as a US effort to
encircle it to the north.
Iraq
With regard to Iraq, Saddam faced a difficult start in 1999--
including the most serious Shia unrest since 1991 and significant
economic difficulties.
The Shia unrest was not confined to the south but also affected
some areas of Baghdad itself, presenting Saddam's regime with a major
security problem. On the economic side, to rein in inflation, stabilize
the dinar, and reduce the budget deficit, Saddam was forced to raise
taxes, ease foreign exchange controls, and cut nonwage public spending.
Saddam has, however, shown himself to be politically agile enough
to weather these challenges. He brutally suppressed the Shia uprisings
of last spring and early summer. The regime is still gaining some
revenue from illegal oil sales. Increased access to food and medical
supplies through the oil for food program has improved living
conditions in Baghdad.
A major worry is that Iraqi reconstruction of WMD-capable
facilities damaged during Operation Desert Fox and continued work on
delivery systems shows the priority Saddam continues to attach to
preserving a WMD infrastructure. And Iraq's conventional military
remains one of the largest in the Middle East, even though it is now
less than half the size during the Gulf War.
He can still hurt coalition forces, but his military options are
sharply limited. His continuing challenge to the no-fly-zone
enforcement remains his only sustainable means of engaging US and Uk
forces.
In sum, to the extent that Saddam has had any successes in the last
year, they have been largely tactical. In a strategic sense, he is
still on a downward path. His economic infrastructure continues to
deteriorate, the Kurdish-inhabited northern tier remains outside the
grip of his army, and although many governments are sympathetic to the
plight of the Iraqi people, few if any are willing to call Saddam an
ally.
the balkans
Mr. Chairman, looking briefly at the Balkans--
Signs of positive long-term change are beginning to emerge there as
the influence of the Milosevic regime in the region wanes in the wake
of the Kosovo conflict and a new, more liberal government takes the
reigns of power in Croatia. Political alternatives to the dominant
ethnic parties in Bosnia also are beginning to develop, capitalizing on
the vulnerability ofoldline leaders to charges of corruption and
economic mismanagement. Despite this progress, there is still a long
way to go before the Balkans move beyond the ethnic hatreds and
depressed economies that have produced so much turmoil and tragedy. Of
the many threats to peace and stability in the year ahead, the greatest
remains Slobodan Milosevic--the world's only sitting president indicted
for crimes against humanity.
Milosevic's hold on power has not been seriously shaken in the past
few months. He retains control of the security forces, military
commands, and an effective media machine. His inner circle remains
loyal or at least cowed. The political opposition has not yet developed
a strategy to capitalize on public anger with Milosevic.
Milosevic has two problems that could still force him from power--
the economy and the Montenegrin challenge. The Serbian economy is in a
virtual state of collapse, and Serbia is now the poorest country in
Europe. Inflation and unemployment are rising, and the country is
struggling to repair the damage to its infrastructure from NATO air
strikes. The average wage is only $48 a month and even these salaries
typically are several months in arrears. Basic subsistence is
guaranteed only by unofficial economic activity and the traditional
lifeline between urban dwellers and their relatives on the farms.
Milosevic's captive media are trying--with some success--to blame
these troubles on the air strikes and on international sanctions.
Nonetheless, as time passes, we believe the people will increasingly
hold Milosevic responsible. Moreover, a sudden, unforeseen economic
catastrophe, such as hyperinflation or a breakdown this winter of the
patched-up electric grid, could lead to mass demonstrations that would
pose a real threat.
For its part, Montenegro may be heading toward independence, and
tensions are certainly escalating as Montenegrin President Djukanovic
continues to take steps that break ties to the federal government.
Milosevic wants to crush Djukanovic, because he serves as an important
symbol to the democratic opposition in Serbia and to the Serbian people
that the regime can be successfully challenged. Djukanovic controls the
largest independent media operation in Yugoslavia, which has strongly
criticized the Milosevic regime over the past several years for the
Kosovo conflict, political repression and official corruption. Both
Milosevic and Djukanovic will try to avoid serious confrontation for
now, but a final showdown will be difficult to avoid.
Kosovo
Regarding Kosovo, Mr. Chairman, the international presence has
managed to restore a semblance of peace, but it is brittle. Large-scale
interethnic violence has vanished, but the UN Mission in Kosovo and K-
FOR have been unable to stop daily small-scale attacks, montly by
Kosovar Albanians against ethnic Serbs. This chronic violence has
caused most of the remaining 80,000-100,000 Serbs to congregate in
enclaves in northern and eastern Kosovo, and they are organizing self-
defense forces.
The campaign to disarm the former Kosovo Liberation army has had
success, but both sides continue to cache small arms and other
ordnance. There is even a chance that fighting between Belgrade's
security forces and ethnic Albanians will reignite should Belgrade
continue to harass and intimidate the Albanian minority in southern
Serbia, and should Kosovo Albanian extremists attempt to launch an
insurgency aimed at annexing Southern Serbia into a greater Kosovo.
china
Mr. Chairman, let us now turn to East Asia, where China has entered
the new century as the world's fastest rising power.
The leadership there is continuing its bold, 20-year-old effort to
propel the nation's economy into the modern world, shedding the
constrains of the old Communist central command system. The economy is
the engine by which China seeks world prestige, global economic clout,
and the funding for new military strength, thereby redressing what it
often proclaims as a hundred years of humiliation at the hands of
Western powers. Domestically, it also was the engine that Deng Xiaoping
and his successors calculated would enable the Party to deliver on its
unspoken social contract with the Chinese people: monopoly of political
power in exchange for a strong China with a higher standard of living
for its citizens.
But events conspired last year to tarnish Beijing's achievements,
to remind people that China had not yet arrived as a modern world
power, and to make the leadership generally ill-at-ease:
China put on an impressive display of military might at its 50th
anniversary parade in Beijing, but the leadership today sees a growing
technological gap with the West.
Inside China, the image of domestic tranquillity was tarnished by
last April's appearance of the Falungoing religious sect, whose
audacious, surprise demonstration outside the leadership compound call
into question the Communist Party's ability to offer an ethos that
still attracts the Chinese people.
Even the return of Macau in late December--the fall of another
symbol of a divided China--was overshadowed by the actions of Taiwan
President Lee Teng-hui. Lee declared last July that his island's
relations with the mainland should be conducted under the rubic of
"state to state" rather than "one China".
Lee's statement has China deeply worried that Taiwan's return to
Beijing rule is less likely than before. Chinese leaders act as if they
believe that, at a minimum, a show of force is required if they are to
preserve any hope of reunification.
Because of this, we see high potential for another military flare-
up across the Taiwan Strait this year. The catalyst for these tensions
is the Taiwan election on 18 March, which Beijing will be monitoring
for signs that a new president will retreat from Lee Teng-hui's
statements--or further extend the political distance from
reunification.
Although Beijing today still lacks the air and sealift capability
to successfully invade Taiwan.
China has been increasing the size and sophistication of its forces
arrayed along the Strait, most notably by deploying stort-range
ballistic missiles.
China should receive the first of two modern, Russian-built
Sovremennyy destroyers later this month; we expect the ship to join the
East Sea Fleet, which regularly conducts operations near Taiwan.
In the coming year, we expect to see an uncertain Chinese
leadership launching the nation deeper into the uncharted waters of
economic reform while trying to retain tight grip political control.
Thus far, Beijing's approach has largely succeeded. But the question
remains open whether, in the long run, a market economy and an
authoritarian regime can co-exist successfully.
north korea
Looking further east, North Korea's propaganda declares 1999 the
"year of the great turnaround." This is a view not supported by my
analysts, however. Indeed, we see a North Korea continuing to suffer
from serious economic problems, and we see a population, perhaps now
including the elite, that is losing confidence in the regime. Mr.
Chairman, sudden, radical, and possibly dangerous change remains a real
possibility in North Korea, and that change could come at any time.
The North Korean economy is in dire straits. Industrial operations
remain low. The future outlook is clouded by industrial facilities that
are nearly beyond repair after years of underinvestment, spare parts
shortages, and poor maintenance.
This year's harvest is more than 1 million tons short of minimum
grain needs. International food aid has again been critical in meeting
the population's minimum food needs.
Trade is also down. Exports to Japan--the North's most important
market--fell by 17 percent from $111 million to $92 million. Trade with
China--the North's largest source of imports--declined from nearly $200
million to about $160 million, primarily because China delivered less
grain.
Kim Chong-il does not appear to have an effective longterm strategy
for reversing his country's economic fortunes. Kim's inability to meet
the basic needs of his people and his reliance on coercion makes his
regime more brittle because even minor instances of defiance have
greater potential to snowball into wider anti-regime actions.
Instead of real reform, North Korea's strategy is to garner as much
aid as possible from overseas, and the North has reenergized its global
diplomacy to this end. It is negotiating for a high-level visit to
reciprocate Dr. Perry's trip to P'yongyang. It has agreed to diplomatic
talks with Japan for the first time in several years. It has
unprecedented commercial contacts with South Korea, including a tourism
deal with a South Korean firm that will provide almost $1 billion over
six years.
But P'yongyang's maneuvering room will be constrained by Kim's
perception that openness threatens his control and by the
contradictions inherent in his overall strategy--a strategy based on
hinting at concessions on the very weapons programs that he has
increasingly come to depend on for leverage in the international arena.
Squaring these circles will require more diplomatic agility than Kim
has yet to demonstrate in either the domestic or international areas.
east asia
Mr. Chairman, China and North Korea do not exist in a vacuum. They
influence the policies of other states--including how those states
relate to us. Nowhere is this more true than in East Asia. Let me talk
about two trends there that I believe will affect US interests over the
next several years.
The first is the growing concern in the region about China and
North Korea. Leaders in Southeast Asia have long worried about Chinese
interference in their internal affairs, but the concerns of these
governments and publics also now focus on China's growing economic and
military power and the potential influence it will provide Beijing.
Concerns about North Korea are more varied and localized. Japan fears
North Korea's expanding missile capabilities, while South Korea--along
with the historical threat of a North Korean invasion--worries that the
collapse of the regime in the North will create humanitarian, economic,
and military challenges for the South.
These concerns create several dynamics. For one thing, they fuel
incentives to expand and modernize defense forces. Japan's interest in
building its own satellite imaging system, for example, is a direct
result of its concern about North Korea. Vietnam's recent acquisition
of Su-27 aircraft from Russia reflect concerns about China's future
military might. And Seoul's attempts to modernize its air force and
navy reflect the fact that it is looking beyond North Korea toward
potential future threats.
In addition, these concerns reinforce the long-standing desire
among almost all the states of the region for the US to remain engaged
militarily. In short, regional leaders--and most publics--continue to
see the US presence as key to East Asian stability, although I must
tell you, Mr. Chairman, that some leaders in the region have doubts
about our staying power there.
The second trend worth noting for you is the continuing pressure in
East Asia for more open and accountable political systems. Over the
last 15 years, that pressure brought political change to the
Philippines, Thailand, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and most recently
Indonesia. Others, including Malaysia and China, are certain to face
similar pressure for change in the years ahead as the spread of
information technology limits the ability of authoritarian leaders to
control the public's exposure to democracy and to constrain opponents
from organizing. These pressures, of course, create the potential for
political instability, particularly if they are resisted by incumbent
leaders.
indonesia
Mr. Chairman, I've mentioned Indonesia a couple of times earlier,
so let me take a moment to say a few words about it. Indonesia is in
the midst of a difficult transition to democracy that will have a
powerful bearing on the country's future direction and perhaps even on
its cohesion as a nation. President Wahid is grappling with a variety
of long-standing, intractable issues including communal violence,
separatist sentiments, and an economy in distress. At the same time, he
is trying to forge a new role for the Indonesian military--which
includes tighter civilian control and the gradual withdrawal of the
armed forces from the domestic political arena--and create an open,
consensual decisionmaking process in a country accustomed to 30-years
of one-man rule.
Since his selection to the presidency last October, Wahid has
implemented a variety of initiatives designed to set the country on the
path to democracy. A popularly elected president who preaches religious
and political tolerance, Wahid has succeeded in forming a viable
coalition government drawn fromdisparate elements. He is actively
supporting a national investigation into alleged human rights abuses by
the Indonesian military in East Timor, and a once muzzled national
press is flourishing. He also is taking steps to improve Jakarta's
bilateral relations with a number of countries and restore Indonesia's
regional prominence, which suffered in the wake of the Asian financial
crisis in 1997 and the domestic political uncertainty that surrounded
the fall of President Soeharto in 1998.
Addressing demands from restive provinces to redefine their
relationship with Jakarta is Wahid's most immediate challenge. Several
leaders in the region remain concerned that Jakarta's loss of East
Timor--coupled with growing separatist tensions and communal violence
across the archipelago--could result in the Balkanization of the
country over the next several years. The challenges are myriad: in the
west, pressure is mounting from Acehnese separatists who have resisted
Jakarta's control since the 1950s and began an insurgency in 1976. To
the east in Irian Jaya--recently renamed Papua--there is local
resentment of Jakarta's exploitation of the province's natural
resources, but the insurgent movement is weak. The nearby Malukus have
been wracked by communal violence for the past year; this is Christian-
Muslim violence with an ethnic overlay that may not only be difficult
to pacify, but could ignite sectarian violence elsewhere in the
archipelago, testing the country's long commitment to religious
tolerance. Indonesia's ASEAN partners particularly fear the refugee and
humanitarian crisis that would accompany such worst-case scenarios.
india-pakistan
Whatever suspicions and fissures exist among states in East Asia,
they pale in comparison to the deep-seated rivalry between India and
Pakistan. Mr. Chairman, last spring, the two countries narrowly averted
a full-scale war in Kashmir, which could have escalated to the nuclear
level.
The military balance can be summarized easily: India enjoys
advantages over Pakistan in most areas of conventional defense
preparedness, including a decisive advantage in fighter aircraft,
almost twice as many men under arms, and a much larger economy.
Recent changes in government in both countries add tensions to the
picture. The October coup in Pakistan that brought to power Gen.
Musharraf--who served as Army chief during the Kargil conflict with
India last summer--has reinforced New Delhi's inclination not to reopen
the bilateral dialogue anytime soon.
Pakistanis are equally suspicious of India's newly elected
coalition government in which Hindu nationalists hold significant sway.
Clearly, the dispute over Kashmir remains as intractable as ever.
We are particularly concerned that heavy fighting is continuing
through the winter, unlike in the past, and probably will increase
significantly in the spring.
New Delhi may opt to crack down hard on Kashmiri militants
operating on the Indian side of the Line of Control or even order
military strikes against militant training camps inside Pakistani-held
Kashmir.
Thus, we must head into the new year, Mr. Chairman, with continuing
deep concerns about the antagonisms that persist in South Asia and
their potential to fuel a wider and more dangerous conflict on the
subcontinent.
africa
Mr. Chairman, South Asia presents a discouraging picture but it
hardly compares to sub-Saharan Africa, which has been largely bypassed
by globalization and the accelerating spread of technology. The region
has little connectivity to the rest of the world--with just 16
telephone lines per 1,000 people--and its battered infrastructure, the
population's limited access to education, and widespread health
problems such as AIDS and malaria have deterred many foreign investors.
One indicator of Sub-Saharan Africa's marginalization is its
infinitesimal share of world trade in goods and services, which slipped
from 2.8 percent in the early 1980s to just 1.5 percent in recent
years.
As Africa's already small role in the international economy has
faded, instability has intensified. Humanitarian crisis is constant.
Since 1995, violent internal unrest has wracked 15 of the region's 48
countries, and 19 Sub-Saharan governments have deployed military
forces--as peacekeepers, protectors of beleaguered regimes, or outright
invaders--to other African states.
Instability fosters conditions potentially leading to genocide and
other massive human rights abuses. In the Great Lakes region, Congo
(K)'s beleaguered government periodically targets Tutsis as suspected
saboteurs, while the civil war in Burundi could with little warning
degenerate into another round of wholesale ethnic killings. In Sierra
Leone, the rebels who used widespread mutilations of civilians as a
conscious tactic of intimidation are poised to break a tenuous cease-
fire and resume a campaign of terror.
Finally, endemic violence and instability increase the danger that
criminal and insurgent groups will zero in on individual US citizens as
soft targets.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, this has been a long briefing, and I'd like to get to
your specific questions on these and other subjects. Before doing so, I
would just sum it up this way: the fact that we are arguably the
world's most powerful nation does not bestow invulnerability; in fact,
it may make us a larger target for those who don't share our interests,
values, or beliefs. We must take care to be on guard, watching our
every step, and looking far ahead. Let me assure you that our
Intelligence Community is well prepared to do that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Now, I'd welcome any questions from you
and your colleagues.
Prepared Statement of Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson, Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency
executive summary
The dynamic change and uncertainty that characterized the 1990s
will likely continue through 2015 because the basic engines of turmoil
remain largely in place. These include: Significant transitions
underway in key states and regions such as Russia, China, North Korea,
the Middle East, and Europe; the continued existence of rogue states,
groups, and individuals who do not share our vision of the future;
rapid technology development and proliferation; declining global
defense spending; pressures resulting from uneven demographic and
economic developments; evolving international and regional security
structures, institutions, and concepts, including the growing influence
of NGOs; reactions to the perception of western political, economic,
military and social dominance; continuing international criminal
activity, particularly the narcotics trade; ethnic, cultural, and
religious conflict, and increased numbers of people in need.
These factors create the conditions in which threats and challenges
emerge, and define the context in which US strategy, interests, and
forces operate. Collectively, they foster a complex, dynamic, and
dangerous global security environment that will continue to spur
numerous crises, hotspots, and issues affecting US interests.
Containing, managing, and responding to these will be a constant
challenge.
Beyond this general global turmoil, three specific developments are
likely to present more direct long-term military challenges to US
policy and interest:
The asymmetric threat.--Most adversaries recognize our general
military superiority and want to avoid engaging the US military on our
terms, choosing instead to pursue a wide variety of initiatives
designed to circumvent or minimize our strengths and exploit perceived
weaknesses. Asymmetric approaches will become the dominant
characteristic of most future threats to our homeland and a defining
challenge for US strategy, operations, and force development.
Strategic nuclear missile threats.--We will continue to face
strategic nuclear threats--from Russia and China, and eventually from
North Korea and other `rogue' states. While the total number of
warheads targeted against us will be much lower than during the Cold
War, the mix of threat nations, force structures, capabilities, and
employment doctrines will complicate the strategic threat picture.
Large regional military threats.--Several potential regional
adversaries will maintain large military forces featuring a mix of Cold
War and post-Cold War technologies and concepts. Under the right
conditions, these regional militaries could present a significant
challenge.
the global security environment
To paraphrase the ancient Chinese curse ". . . we are living in
very interesting times." More than a decade has passed since the end
of the Cold War, yet we seem no closer to the emergence of a new,
stable international order. Rather, the complex mix of political,
economic, military, and social factors that have undermined stability
during much of the 1990s remain at play. The most important of these
include:
Significant continuing uncertainties, especially regarding the
future of Russia, China, Europe, the Middle East, and the Korean
peninsula. Developments in each of these key states and regions will go
a long way towards defining the future security environment. But it
would be difficult to be highly confident in predicting outcomes.
Rogue states, groups, and individuals (e.g. Iran and North Korea,
numerous terrorist and international criminal groups, Usama Bin Ladin,
etc.) who do not share our vision of the future and are willing to
engage in violence to improve their position and undermine order. Many
of these adversaries view the United States as the primary source of
their troubles, and will continue to target our policies, facilities,
interests, and personnel.
Rapid technology development and proliferation--particularly in the
areas of information processing, biotechnology, communications,
nanotechnology, and weapons. Technology will continue to have a
staggering impact on the way people live, think, work, and fight. Some
aspects of our general military-technological advantage are likely to
erode. Some technological surprises will undoubtedly occur.
Declining global defense spending. The 50% real reduction in global
defense spending during the past decade is having multiple impacts.
First, both adversaries and allies have not kept pace with the US
military (despite our own spending reductions). This has spurred foes
toward asymmetric options, widened the gap between US and allied
forces, reduced the number of allied redundant systems, and increased
the demand on unique US force capabilities. Additional, longer-term
impacts--on global defense technology development and proliferation,
and on US-allied defense industrial consolidation, cooperation, and
technological competitiveness--are likely.
Pressures resulting from unfavorable demographic developments. By
2020, developing world population will increase some 25%. Meanwhile,
some 20-30 million of the world's poorest people move into urban areas
each year. These trends will continue to stress the resources,
infrastructure, and leadership of states throughout Africa, Asia, and
Latin America.
Growing disparities in global wealth and resource distribution. One
quarter of the world's population (the developed world) controls nearly
80% of today's wealth and consumes the great majority of the world's
resources. The numbers will get worse (from the developing world's
perspective) during the next 15 years, exacerbating north-south and
inter-regional tensions.
Evolving global security structures, organizations, and
institutions. The changing structure, role, adaptability, and influence
of familiar Cold Warentities--the UN, NATO, the nation state, etc.--and
the increasing presence and impact of NGOs, brings greater uncertainty
to the way policy is made and implemented in the post Cold War era.
Reaction to "western dominance." Many individuals, groups, and
states fear the global expansion and perceived dominance of western
(and especially US) values, ideals, culture, and institutions. Efforts
to resist, halt, or undo this trend will spur anti-US sentiments and
behavior.
International drug cultivation, production, transport, and use will
remain a major source of instability, both within drug producing,
transit, and target countries, and between trafficking and consumer
nations. The connection between drug cartels, corruption, and
antigovernment activities (terrorism and insurgency) will increase as
the narcotics trade provides an important funding source for criminal
and antigovernment groups. States with weak democratic traditions and
poor economic performance and prospects will be particularly
susceptible. Counternarcotic activities will become more complex and
difficult as new areas of cultivation and transit emerge and
traffickers exploit advances in technology, communications,
transportation, and finance.
Ethnic, religious, and cultural divisions will remain a motivation
for and source of conflict in much of the world. As the situation in
Kosovo demonstrates, ethnic-based conflict is often brutal and
intractable.
Increasing numbers of people in need. A combination of factors--
many of those listed above, plus inadequate infrastructure and health
facilities, resource shortages, natural disasters, epidemics, and
insufficient local, regional, and global response capabilities--have
combined to increase the numbers of people requiring international
humanitarian assistance. According to UN assessments, some 35-40
million people worldwide needed aid each year during the 1990s,
compared to slightly more than 20 million in 1985. Likewise, the
number, size, cost, and duration of UN and other "peace operations"
have risen significantly since the late 1980s.
These factors create the conditions in which threats and challenges
emerge, and define the context in which US strategy, interests, and
forces operate. Collectively, they foster a complex, dynamic, and
dangerous global security environment. A review of just a few of last
year's headlines--Iraq's continued combativeness, prolonged ethnic
tensions in the Balkans and Indonesia, Russia's ongoing offensive in
Chechnya, North Korea's intransigence, continued hostility between
India and Pakistan, Colombia's insurgency, and tribal and internecine
disputes throughout many parts of Africa--underscores the point.
Moreover, no power, condition, or circumstance is likely to emerge
during the next 15 years capable of transcending this general
instability and imposing a new global order. Accordingly, we can expect
the global dynamic will continue to spur numerous crises, hotspots, and
issues that will directly affect US policy and interests. Containing,
managing, and responding to these will be a constant challenge.
Against this backdrop of general global turmoil, I'd like to focus
on three specific developments that present more direct long term
military challenges to US policy and interests:
The asymmetric threat.--Most adversaries recognized our general
military superiority and want to avoid engaging the US military on our
terms, choosing instead to pursue a wide variety of initiatives
designed to circumvent or minimize our strengths and exploit perceived
weaknesses. Asymmetric approaches will become the dominant
characteristic of most future threats to our homeland and a defining
challenge for US strategy, operations, and force development.
Strategic nuclear missile threats.--We will continue to face
strategic nuclear threats--from Russia and China, and eventually from
North Korea and other "rogue" states. While the total number of
warheads targeted against us will be much lower than during the Cold
War, the mix of threat nations, force structures, capabilities, and
employment doctrines will complicate the strategic threat picture.
Large regional military threats.--Several potential regional
adversaries will maintain large military forces featuring a mix of Col
War and post-Cold War technologies and concepts. Under the right
conditions, these regional militaries could present a significant
challenge.
the growing asymmetric threat
Most of the rest of the world believes the United States will
remain the dominant global power during the next 15 years. Foreign
assessments generally point to the following US strengths: our economy
weathered the recent global financial crisis in excellent shape and is
uniquely positioned to capitalize on the coming "high-tech boom;" we
are among the world's leaders in the development and use of the most
important technologies (but civilian and military); we have the world's
best university system and the most fluid and effective capital
markets; we spend nearly half of what the advanced industrial world
spends on all types of research and development each year; we retain
strong alliances with key nations; and we enjoy unrivaled "soft
power"--the global appeal of American ideas, institutions, leadership
and culture.
Perhaps even more striking, however, is how potential adversaries
think about our military advantage. The superiority of US military
concepts, technology, and capabilities has been a key theme in foreign
military assessments since Operation Desert Storm. Moreover, many
foreign military leaders and writing express concern that our
conventional warfighting lead will grow, given our doctrinal and
resource commitment to achieving the operational capabilities
envisioned in Jointed Vision 2010.
Adversary anticipation of continued US military superiority is the
genesis of the asymmetric challenge. Potential US opponents (from
druglords and terrorists to criminal gangs, insurgents,and the civilian
and military leadership of opposing states) do not want to engage the
US military on its terms. The are more likely to pursue their
objectives while avoiding a US military confrontation, and/or to
develop asymmetric means (operational and technological) to reduce US
military superiority, render it irrelevant, or exploit our perceived
weaknesses. Asymmetric approaches are imperative for US adversaries and
are likely to be a dominant component of most future threats.
The asymmetric problem is extremely complex because adversaries,
objectives, targets, and means of attack can vary widely from situation
to situation. Moreover, some developments--such as WMD and missile
proliferation, counter-space capabilities, denial and deception
operations, etc.--could have both symmetric and asymmetric
applications, depending on the context. Recognizing these potential
ambiguities, and understanding that many different approaches are
possible, I am most concerned about the following "asymmetric"
trends, developments, and capabilities.
Threats to Critical Infrastructure.--Many adversaries believe the
best way to avoid, deter, or offset US military superiority is to
develop a capability to threaten the US homeland. In addition to the
strategic nuclear threats discussed below, our national infrastructure
is vulnerable to disruptions by physical and computer attack. The
interdependent nature of the infrastructure creates even more of a
vulnerability. Foreign states have the greatest potential capability to
attack our infrastructure because they possess the intelligence assets
to assess and analyze infrastructure vulnerabilities, and the range of
weapons--conventional munitions, WMD, and information operations
tools--to take advantage of vulnerabilities.
The most immediate and serious infrastructure threat, however, is
from insiders, terrorists, criminals, and other small groups or
individuals carrying out well-coordinated strikes against selected
critical nodes. While conventional munition attacks are most likely
now, over time our adversaries will develop an increased capacity, and
perhaps intent, to employ WMD. They are also likely to increase their
capabilities for computer intrusion. Commercial off-the-shelf products
and services present new security challenges and concerns, providing
opportunities to develop software functions allowing unauthorized
access, theft and manipulation of data, and denial of service.
Information Operations.--Information operations can involve many
components including electronic warfare, psychological operations,
physical attack, denial deception, computer network attack, and the use
of more exotic technologies such as directed energy weapons or
electromagnetic pulse weapons. Adversaries recognize our civilian and
military reliance on advanced information technologies and systems, and
understand that information superiority provides the US unique
capability advantages. Many also assess that the real center of gravity
for US military actions in US public opinion. Accordingly, numerous
potential foes are pursuing information operations capabilities as
relatively low cost means to undermine support of US actions, attack
key US capabilities, and counter US military superiority.
The information operations threat continues to spread worldwide,
with more mature technologies and more sophisticated tools being
developed continuously. However, the level of threat varies widely from
adversary to adversary. Most opponents currently lack the foresight or
the capability to fully integrate all information operations tools into
a comprehensive attack. Many with limited resources will seek to
develop only computer network attack options--relying on modest
training, computer hardware and software purchases, and/or the use of
"hired" criminal hackers. At present, most nations probably have
programs to protect their own information systems, and some--
particularly Russia and China--have offensive information operations
capabilities. Today, we are more likely to face information operations
carried out by terrorists, insurgents, cults, criminals, hackers, and
insider individuals spurred by a range of motivations.
Terrorism.--Terrorism remains a very significant asymmetric threat
to our interests at home and abroad. The terrorist threat to the US
will grow as disgruntled groups and individuals focus on America as the
source of their trouble. Most anti-US terrorism will be regional and
based on perceived racial, ethnic or religious grievances. Terrorism
will tend to occur in urban centers, often capitals. The US military is
vulnerable due to its overseas presence and status as a symbol of US
power, interests, and influence. However, in many cases, increased
security at US military and diplomatic facilities will drive terrorists
to attack "softer" targets such as private citizens or commercial
interests.
Terrorism will be a serious threat to Americans especially in most
Middle Eastern countries, North Africa, parts of Sub-Saharan Africa,
Turkey, Greece, the Balkans, Peru, and Colombia. The characteristics of
the most effective terrorist organizations--highly compartmented
operations planning, good cover and security, extreme suspicion of
outsiders, and ruthlessness--make them very hard intelligence targets.
Middle East-based terrorist groups will remain the most important
threat. State sponsors (primarily Iran) and individuals with the
financial means (such as Usama bin Ladin) will continue to provide much
of the economic and technological support needed by terrorists. The
potential for terrorist WMD use will increase over time, with chemical,
biological, and radiological agents the most likely choice.
WMD and Missile Proliferation.--Many potential adversaries believe
they can preclude US force options and offset US conventional military
superiority by developing WMD and missiles. Others are motivated more
by regional threat perceptions. In either case, the pressure to acquire
WMD and missiles is high, and, unfortunately, the post Cold War
environment is more amenable to proliferation activities. New alliances
have formed, providing pooled resources for developing these
capabilities, while technological advances and global economic
conditions have made it easier to transfer materiel and expertise. The
basic sciences necessary to produce these weapons are widely
understood. Most of the technology is readily available, and the raw
materials are common. All told, the prospects for limiting
proliferation are slim, and the global WMD threat to US-allied
territory, interests, forces, and facilities will increase
significantly.
Several rogue states will likely acquire nuclear weapons during the
next decade or so, and some existing nuclear states will undoubtedly
increase their inventories. As these trends unfold, the prospects for
limited nuclear weapons use in a regional conflict will rise. So too
will the potential for a terrorist or some other sub-national group to
acquire and use a weapon.
Chemical and biological weapons are generally easier to develop,
hide, and deploy than nuclear weapons and will be readily available to
those with the will and resources to attain them. I expect these
weapons to be widely proliferated, and they could well be used in a
regional conflict over the next 15 years. I am also concerned that sub-
national groups or individuals will use chemical or biological agents
in a terrorist or insurgent operation. Such an event could occur in the
United States or against US-allied forces and facilities overseas. The
planning for such "smaller-scale" incidents would be extremely
difficult to detect, and consequently, to deter or warn against.
Theater-range ballistic and cruise missile proliferation is another
growing challenge. I expect the numbers of ballistic missiles with
ranges between 500 and 3,000 kilometers to increase significantly
during the next 15 years and to become more accurate and destructive.
Likewise, the potential for widespread proliferation of land attack
cruise missiles is high. While the types of missiles most likely to be
proliferated will be a generation or two behind the global state of the
art, states that acquire them will have new or enhanced capabilities
for delivering WMD or conventional payloads inter-regionally against
fixed targets. Major air and sea ports, logistics bases and facilities,
troop concentrations, and fixed communications nodes will be
increasingly at risk.
The Foreign Intelligence Threat.--Adversaries hoping to employ
asymmetric approaches against the United States desire detailed
intelligence on US decision-making, operational concepts, capabilities,
shortcomings, and vulnerabilities. Consequently, we continue to face
extensive intelligence threats from a large number of foreign nations
and sub-national entities including terrorists, international criminal
organizations, foreign commercial enterprises, and other disgruntled
groups and individuals. These intelligence efforts are generally
targeted against our national security policy-making apparatus, our
national infrastructure, our military plans, personnel, and
capabilities, and our critical technologies. While foreign states--
particularly Russia and China--present the biggest intelligence threat,
all our adversaries are likely to exploit technological advances to
expand their collection activities. Moreover, the open nature of our
society, and increasing ease with which money, technology, information,
and people move around the globe in the modern era, make effective
counterintelligence and security that much more complex and difficult
to achieve.
Cover, Concealment, Camouflage, Denial and Deception (C3D2).--Many
potential adversaries--nations, groups, and individuals--are
undertaking more and increasingly sophisticated C3D2 activities against
the United States. These operations are generally designed to hide key
activities, facilities, and capabilities (e.g. mobilization or attack
preparations, WMD programs, advanced weapons systems developments,
treaty noncompliance, etc.) from US intelligence, to manipulate US
perceptions and assessments of those programs, and to protect key
capabilities from US precision strike platforms. Foreign knowledge of
US intelligence and military operations capabilities is essential to
effective C3D2. Advances in satellite warning capabilities, the growing
availability of camouflage, concealment, deception, and obscurant
materials, advanced technology for an experience with building
undergound facilities, and the growing use of fiber optics and
encryption, will increase the C3D2 challenge.
Counter-Space Capabilities.--The US reliance on (and advantages in)
the use of space platforms is well known by our potential adversaries.
Many are attempting to reduce this advantage by developing capabilities
to threaten US space assets, in particular through denial and
deception, signal jamming, and ground segment attack. By 2015, future
adversaries will be able to employ a wide variety of means to disrupt,
degrade, or defeat portions of the US space support system. A number of
countries are interested in or experimenting with a variety of
technologies that could be used to develop counter-space capabilities.
These efforts could result in improved systems for space object
tracking, electronic warfare or jamming, and directed energy weapons.
the strategic nuclear threat
Russia.--Russian strategic forces are in flux. During the 1990s,
force levels were reduced significantly, and additional reductions are
certain during the next 15 year. But the precise size and shape of
Moscow's future strategic deterrent will depend on several "unknown"
factors, including: future resource levels, arms control
considerations, threat perceptions, Russia's ability to maintain aging
force elements, and the success of strategic force modernization
programs. Despite this general uncertainty, I can foresee virtually on
circumstance, short of state failure, in which Russia will not maintain
a strong strategic nuclear capability, with many hundreds of warheads
and relatively modern delivery platforms capable of striking the United
States. I say this because even during the past decade, with severe
economic constraints and other pressing priorities, Moscow mustered the
political will and resources to maintain key aspects of its strategic
forces capability, fund several new strategic weapons programs, and
upgrade portions of its strategic infrastructure. Moreover, strategic
forces continue to receive priority today--in terms of manpower,
training, and other resources.
In addition to the changes in strategic force composition, Moscow's
thinking about the role, utility, and employment of nuclear forces is
in flux. The 1999 Draft Russian Military Doctrine provides some
insights. In includes a nuclear weapons use formulation similar to that
described in the 1993 doctrinal document, but widens the theoretical
threshold for Russian employment of nuclear weapons during a
conventional conflict if the situation becomes "critical" to national
security. Russia's strategic force posture and strategy will continue
to evolve, reflecting the uncertain political and economic situation,
changing Russian perceptions of the international security environment
and strategic threats, and the increased dependence on strategic forces
as the "backbone" of Russian military power. This uncertainty in
Russian strategic thinking is troubling.
China.--China's strategic nuclear force is small and dated at
present, but Bejing's top military priority is to strengthen and
modernize its strategic nuclear deterrent. Several new strategic
missile systems are under development, along with upgrade programs for
existing missiles, and for associated command, control, communications
and other related strategic force capabilities. In early August 1999,
China conducted the first test flight of its DF-31 ICBM. It will be
deployed on a road-mobile launcher and will have the range to target
portions of North America. While the pace and extent of China's
strategic modernization clearly indicates deterrent rather than "first
strike" intentions, the number, reliability, survivability, and
accuracy of Chinese strategic missiles capable of hitting the United
States will increase significantly during the next two decades.
Rogue Strategic Forces.--Russia and China are the only potential
threat states capable today of targeting the United States with
intercontinental ballistic missiles. However, I am increasingly
concerned that more radical hostile nation--particularly North Korea
and Iran--will develop that capability over the next several years. The
growing availability of missile technology, components, and expertise,
intense political pressure to acquire longer-range ballistic missiles,
the willingness of some states to take shortcuts and accept more risk
in their missile development programs, and our sometimes limited
ability to reliably track these protected programs, are all cause for
concern. Moreover, we must assume that any state capable of developing
or acquiring missiles with intercontinental range will likely be able
to arm those missiles with weapons of mass destruction.
Whether this broader threat emerges sooner or later, during the
next 15 years, the strategic nuclear environment will become more
diverse and complex. This has significant implications for US strategic
force planning, doctrine, deterrence, and testing.
large regional militaries
Joint Vision 2010 is the conceptual template for US force
development. It envisions a 21st Century "information age" US
military that leverages high quality, highly-trained personnel,
advanced technology, and the development of four key operational
concepts--dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional
protection, and focused logistics--to achieve dominance across the
range of military operations. The United States, and to a lesser extent
our closest allies, are moving steadily toward the capabilities
embodied in this vision.
In contrast, most other large militaries will continue to field
primarily "industrial age" forces--generally mass and firepower
oriented, employing large armored and infantry formations, late-
generation Cold War (vice 21st Century) technologies, and centralized,
hierarchical command-and-control structures. Over the next 15 years,
many regional states will seek to augment these forces with selected
highend capabilities, including: WMD and missiles, advanced C4I
systems, satellite reconnaissance, precision strike systems, global
positioning, advanced air defense systems, and advanced anti-surface
ship capabilities. It is likely that in any large regional conflict
beyond 2010, US forces will face adversaries who combine the mass and
firepower of a late-20th century force with some more-advanced systems
and concepts.
On paper, such forces would be hard pressed to match our dominant
maneuver, power projection, and precision engagement capabilities. Most
would prefer not to engage in traditional conventional warfare with the
US. But in an actual combat situation, the precise threat these forces
pose will depend on the degree to which they have absorbed and can
apply key technologies, have overcome deficiencies in training,
leadership, doctrine, and logistics, and on the specific operational-
tactical environment. Under the right conditions, their quantitative
capability, combined with situational advantages--e.g. initiative,
limited objective, short lines of communication, familiar terrain, time
to deploy and prepare combat positions, and the skillful use of
asymmetric approaches--will present significant challenges to US
mission success. China and Russia at the high end, followed by North
Korea, Iran, and Iraq, are all examples of militaries that could field
large forces with a mix of current and advanced capabilities.
China.--Bejing is modernizing and improving the People's Liberation
Army (PLA) at a steady pace, consistent with the country's overall
emphasis on general economic and infrastructure development. During the
past year, the PLA has fielded several new ballistic missiles, agreed
to purchase Su-30 FLANKER aircraft from Russia (delivery within 2
years), and taken delivery of the fourth Russian KILO submarine and
additional indigenous submarines. Just this month, the PLA received the
first two SOVREMENNYY destroyers from Russia, and could field its first
airborne early warning aircraft within the next year or so.
Beyond modernization, the PLA has revised its training program to
improve pilot proficiency, improve its capabilities for engaging
stealth aircraft, cruise missiles, and helicopter gunships, and improve
its ability to defend against precision strikes, electronic jamming,
and all forms of reconnaissance. In addition, logistics are being
centralized and modernized across the force. The PLA is also upgrading
C4I links to its forces with satellite dishes, fiber optic, and video
links
As a result of these and other developments, China's capability for
regional military operations will improve significantly. By 2010 or so,
some of China's best units will have achieved a reasonably high level
of proficiency at maneuver warfare (though they will probably not fully
master large, complex joint service operations until closer to 2020).
Moreover, by 2015 Chinese forces will be much better equipped,
possessing more than a thousand theater-range missiles, hundreds of
fourth?
Second, will he try to build a consensus on quickening th
tanks and artillery, a handful of advanced diesel and third generation
nuclear submarines, and some 20 or so new surface combatants. China is
also likely to field an integrated air defense system and modern
command-and-control systems at the strategic and operational levels.
The Taiwan issue will remain a major potential flashpoint,
particularly over the near term. As tensions between China and Taiwan
remain high, there is an increased risk of small scale military
"incidents"--intimidating exercises, heightened force readiness in
border regions, accidents involving opposition air or naval forces in
close proximity, etc. It is doubtful, however, unless Taipei moved more
directly toward independence, that China would attempt a larger scale
military operation to attack Taiwan outright. Beijing recognizes the
risk inherent in such a move and, at least for the near term, probably
has questions about is military ability to succeed. Nevertheless, by
2015, China's conventional force modernization will provide an
increasingly credible military threat against Taiwan (though probably
not the large amphibious capability necessary for invasion).
Russia.--Moscow will remain focused on internal political,
economic, and social imperatives for at least the next decade.
Meanwhile, Russia's Armed Forces continue in crisis. The military
leadership remains capable of exercising effective control, but there
is increased potential for collapse in military discipline,
particularly in the event of a large-scale internal crisis. The Defense
Ministry and General Staff are attempting to cope with broad-based
discontent while struggling to implement much-needed reforms.
Compensation, housing, and other shortfalls continue to undermine
morale. Under these conditions--chronic underfunding and neglect--there
is little chance that Moscow's conventional forces will improve
significantly during the next decade.
Beyond that timeframe, the size, characteristics, and capabilities
of Russia's conventional forces could vary widely, depending on the
outcome of numerous unsettled issues. Among the most important of these
are the size of Russia's defense budget, Russian threat perceptions,
the achievement of national consensus on a blueprint for military
reform, and Moscow's success at restoring the "intangible" components
of military effectiveness (leadership, readiness, morale, sustainment,
etc.). Two alternatives seem most likely:
If the Russian military experiences continued underfunding,
indecision, and leadership indifference, it will remain chronically
weak, and present about the same (or even a reduced) level of threat to
US interests in 2015 as it does today. This alternative becomes more
likely the longer Russia's economic problems persist, defense budgets
decline or remain relatively stagnant, there is no consensus on the
direction for defense reform, and the national leadership continues to
neglect the needs of the military.
If economic recovery and political stability come sooner rather
than later, and the military receives stable, consistent leadership and
resources, Russia could begin rebuilding an effective military toward
the end of this decade, and field a smaller, but more modern and
capable force in the 2015 timeframe. This improved force would be large
and potent by regional standards, equipped with thousands of later-
generation Cold War systems, and hundreds of more advanced systems
built after 2005.
North Korea.--North Korea will remain a challenging dilemma: a
"failing" state with rising internal pressures and limited
conventional military capability, but posing an increasing regional and
global threat by virtue of its expanding WMD and long-range missiles.
As the pressure builds on the economy, society, and military, there is
increased potential for internal collapse, instability, and leadership
change.
North Korea's capability to successfully conduct complex, multi-
echelon, large-scale operations to reunify the Korean peninsula
declined in the 1990s. This was, in large measure, the result of severe
resource constraints, including widespread food and energy shortages.
Still, Pyongyang has managed to maintain a huge military force
numbering over one million personnel. I am most concerned about
Pyongyang's very large, forward-deployed forces, and its extensive
"asymmetric" capabilities--WMD and missiles, underground facilities,
and special operations forces. These capabilities, combined with the
time, distance, terrain, and other theater characteristics, make a
Korean war scenario very challenging. War on the peninsula would be
very violent and destructive, and could occur with little warning.
North Korea's resource difficulties will continue with limited
policy changes insufficient to allow a major economic recovery.
Nevertheless, Pyongyang will continue to place a high premium on
military power (as a source of leverage in international and bilateral
fora), and will strive, with some limited success, to slow the erosion
of its conventional military forces and to continue to expand its
asymmetric capabilities.
Iran.--Iran's armed forces are embarked on an uneven, yet
deliberate, military buildup designed to ensure the security of the
cleric-led regime, increase its influence in the Middle East and
Central Asia, deter Iraq or any other regional aggressor, and limit US
regional influence. Iran's leaders seek to dominate the Gulf area, and,
at present, we have major concerns over how Teheran may act to
undermine agreements between Israel and Syria, Lebanon, and the
Palestinians. Iran's conventional land and air forces have significant
limitations with regard to mobility, logistics infrastructure, and
modern weapons systems. Rivalry and mistrust between Revolutionary
Guards, the regime's main internal security arm, and the regular armed
forces is serious and hampers effective operations among the nearly
half million in the uniformed services. Iran has compensated for these
weaknesses by developing (or pursuing) numerous asymmetric
capabilities, to include subversion and terrorism, the deployment of
air, air defense, missile, mine warfare, and naval capabilities to
interdict maritime access in and around the Strait of Hormuz, and the
acquisition of WMD and longer range missiles to deter the US and to
intimidate Iran's neighbors.
Iran has a relatively large ballistic missile force, and is likely
assembling SCUD SSMs in the country. Last June, in response to the
assassination of a high-ranking Iranian army general, Iran used SSMs to
attack anti-regime Iranians encamped about 100 kilometers inside Iraq.
Teheran intends to develop longer range SSMs capable of striking the
entire Arabian Peninsula and Israel.
Iran's navy is the most capable in the region and, even with the
presence of Western forces, can probably stem the flow of oil from the
Gulf for brief periods employing KILO submarines, missile patrol boats,
and numerous naval mines, some of which may be modern and
sophisticated. Aided by China, Iran has developed a potent anti-ship
cruise missile capability to threaten sea traffic from shore, ship, and
aircraft platforms.
Although Iran's force modernization efforts will proceed gradually,
during the next 15 years it will likely acquire a full range of WMD
capabilities, field substantial numbers of ballistic and cruise
missiles--including some with intercontinental range--increase its
inventory of modern aircraft, expand its armored forces, and continue
to improve its anti-surface ship capability. Iran's effectiveness in
generating and employing this increased military potential against an
advanced adversary will depend in large part on "intangibles"--
command and control, training, maintenance, reconnaissance and
intelligence, leadership, and situational conditions and circumstances.
Iraq.--Years of UN sanctions and embargoes as well as US and
Coalition military actions have significantly degraded Iraq's military
capabilities. Overall manpower and material resource shortages, a
problematic logistics system, and a relative inability to execute
combined arms doctrine have adversely affected Iraqi military
capabilities. These shortcomings are aggravated by intensive regime
security requirements.
Nevertheless, Iraq's ground forces continue to be one of the most
formidable within the region. They are able to protect the regime
effectively, deploy rapidly, and threaten Iraq's neighbors absent any
external constraints. Iraq's air and air defense forces retain only a
marginal capability to protect Iraqi air space and project air power
outside Iraq's borders. Although the threat to Coalition Forces is
minimal, continued Iraqi confrontational actions underscore the
regime's determination to stay the course. Iraq has probably been able
to retain a residual level of WMD and missile capabilities. The lack of
intrusive inspection and disarmament mechanisms permits Baghdad to
enhance these capabilities. Lessons learned from survivability remain
the regime's watchwords.
Absent decisive regime change, Iraq will continue to pose complex
political and military challenges to Coalition interests well into the
future. Baghdad's attempts to upgrade its military capabilities will be
hampered as long as effective UN sanctions remain in place.
Reconstitution of strategic air defense assets, WMD, and ballistic
missile capabilities remain Baghdad's highest priorities. Expansionand
modernization of ground and air forces are secondary objectives. Over
the longer term, assuming Iraq's leadership continues to place a high
premium on military power, is able to "get around the sanctions
regime" sooner rather than later, and the price of oil is stable,
Baghdad could, by 2015, acquire a large inventory of WMD, obtain
hundreds of theater ballistic and cruise missiles, expand its inventory
of modern aircraft, and double its fleet of armored vehicles. While
this force would be large and potent by regional standards, its
prospects for success against a western opponent would depend
ultimately on how successful Baghdad was in overcoming chronic
weaknesses in military leadership, reconnaissance and intelligence,
morale, readiness, logistics, and training.
other issues of concern
There are two other nearer term issues--the situation in the
Balkans and the continuing rivalry between India and Pakistan--that
deserve comment based on their potential impact on US security
interests.
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.--During 1999, there was great
upheaval within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Despite
remaining nominally part of the FRY, Kosovo was lost to Serb control
during the summer. The year ended with increased tensions between the
last two constituent republics of the FRY, Serbia and Montenegro.
President Djukanovic of Montenegro, a long-time political rival of
Milosevic, has moved to redefine relations between the two republics.
His program calls for virtual political, economic, and foreign and
defense policy independence of Montenegro. Predictably, Serbian
President Milosevic resists these efforts. Though the Yugoslav Army
maintains a garrison in Montenegro that could easily defeat the small
Montenegrin paramilitary forces, neither side appears ready to force
the issue at this time.
Despite defeat by NATO and the loss of Kosovo, FRY President
Milosevic does not appear in imminent danger of losing his political
control. This is probably attributable to the near total lack of unity
among the various political opposition parties within Serbia. There is
currently no reason to believe that Milosevic will not serve his entire
term of office, which expires in the summer of 2001.
Kosovo.--Since entering Kosovo, NATO forces have overseen the
withdrawal of Serb forces and the demobilization and disarmament of the
UCK. KFOR is in control of the province, but ethnic violence continues,
most directed at remaining Serbs by vengeful Kosovar Albanians. There
is no direct military threat to KFOR, but there is always the
possibility that KFOR troops could be caught in ethnic fighting. The
FRY military has reorganized following the loss of Kosovo, but is
concentrating on force and facility reconstitution and does not appear
able or willing to attempt a re-entry into Kosovo.
Bosnia.--International peacekeeping forces in Bosnia continue to
operate in a complex inter-ethnic environment that poses significant
challenges to the establishment of a stable and enduring peace. Deep
mutual distrust among Bosnia's ethnic factions and the legacy of war
has created an impetus toward de facto partition of Bosnia. All three
of the Bosnian factions have resisted full implementation of the Dayton
Accords at one time or another. Each ethnic group will only cooperate
as long as its perceived, long-term interests are not forfeited or
marginalized. Although the civilian aspects of Dayton are lagging in
their implementation, progress has been made. We believe the Bosnian
factions will continue to generally comply with the military aspects of
the Dayton Accords and SFOR directives, and will not engage in
widespread violence, so long as peacekeeping forces remain credible.
Pervasive international engagement--both political and economic--will
be necessary to prevent a permanent division of Bosnia along ethnic
lines.
SFOR is the dominant military force in Bosnia, and the direct
military threat facing it remains low. SFOR monitors all factional
armies, permitting the entities to train only with SFOR approval, and
keeping all equipment in cantonment sites. None of the factions will
risk taking any kind of overt military action against SFOR. The
Federation Army is receiving assistance from the Train and Equip
Program, which is moving the military balance in its favor. However,
the Federation Army continues to be hampered by the unwillingness of
the Muslims and Croats to effectively integrate. The Bosnian Serb Army,
which no longer enjoys an overwhelming superiority in heavy weapons,
poses very little threat to SFOR as it is hampered by its own internal
problems such as insufficient funds for training, equipment
modernization, maintenance, and personnel.
Participating in refugee resettlement, freedom of movement, and
other civil implementation issues may expose SFOR personnel to
increased risk. The international community proclaimed 1999 as a year
of refugee returns, and it began to focus on moving people back to
areas where they are ethnically in the minority. An increase of 40% was
realized in minority returns in 1999, but this is a slow and uncertain
process that is marked by occasional incidents of local violence.
India and Pakistan.--The tense rivalry between India and Pakistan
remains an important security concern. Both nations continue to invest
heavily in defense and the procurement of military equipment. At
present, each side possesses sufficient material to assemble a limited
number of nuclear weapons, has short-range ballistic missiles, and
maintains large standing forces in close proximity across a tense line
of control. With each viewing their security relationship in zero-sum
terms, we remain concerned about the potential, particularly over the
near term, for one of their military clashes to escalate into a wider
conflict.
The dispute between India and Pakistan concerning the status of the
state of Jammu and Kashmir is the most likely trigger for war between
the two countries. The state was the site of major fighting in 1947,
1965 and 1971; and again witnessed heavy military action in 1999. With
Islamabad and Delhi's respective positions on Kashmir firmly
entrenched, meaningful progress on the issue is unlikely in the near
term.
conclusion
The dynamic change and uncertainty that characterized the 1990s
will likely continue through 2015 because the basic engines of turmoil
remain largely in place. The volatile mix of global political,
economic, social, technological, and military conditions will continue
to bring great stress to the international order. While no Soviet-like
military competitor will emerge during this timeframe, the combined
impact of numerous local, regional, and transnational challenges
presents a formidable obstacle to our strategic vision.
Most adversaries will attempt to avoid directly confronting the
United States military on our terms, choosing instead to pursue a
variety of asymmetric means that undermine our power, leadership, and
influence. Strategic nuclear threats will endure through this
timeframe, but the mix of adversary strategic doctrines and
capabilities will complicate deterrence planning. China, Russia, North
Korea, Iran, and Iraq will maintain relatively large and well-equipped
militaries, which could pose a significant challenge under the right
operational conditions.
TESTIMONY OF HON. GEORGE TENET, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE ACCOMPANIED BY VICE ADMIRAL THOMAS WILSON,
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; AND AMBASSADOR STAPLETON
ROY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
Director Tenet. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with the Committee
our assessment of the threats facing the United States. But
before so doing, I want to make some brief comments about
recent news articles concerning a highly sensitive classified
report by the CIA's Inspector General.
The report, which was provided to the Committee in August
of 1999, was critical of an internal investigation of former
Director John Deutch's mishandling of classified information.
You and Senator Kerrey have communicated directly with me
about your insistence that classified material be properly
handled and that you will defend any employee of the
Intelligence Community who brings instances of mishandling to
your attention. You've also asked me to provide you with the
results of the accountability determination when it is
completed, and I will certainly do so.
The Inspector General's report was thorough and its
conclusions and recommendations were sound. The IG report did
not conclude that anyone intentionally impeded the security
investigation relating to DCI Deutch. Had the Inspector General
any evidence to that effect, he would have been obliged to
refer the matter to the Department of Justice. He did not do
so.
At the conclusion of the Inspector General's investigation
last August, when all of the relevant facts were available to
me, I made the decision to suspend the security clearances of
my predecessor, John Deutch. My action and his response were
made public at that time.
As the IG report documents, the internal investigation took
too long to complete. The process certainly was not perfect,
Mr. Chairman, and I fully accept that finding. Yet, once the
facts were put forward by the Inspector General, I did take
decisive action.
That said, let me discuss the matters which continue to
concern me and you--threats to our national security. Mr.
Chairman, as we face a new century, we face a new world--a
world where technology, especially information technology,
develops and spreads at lightning speed and becomes obsolete
just as fast; a world of increasing economic integration, where
a U.S. company designs a product in Des Moines, makes it in
Bombay and sells it in Sydney; a world where nation-states
remain the most important and powerful players, but where
multinational corporations, nongovernment organizations, and
even individuals can have a dramatic impact.
This new world harbors the residual effects of the Cold
War, which had frozen many traditional ethnic hatreds and
conflicts within the global competition between the two
superpowers. Over the past ten years, they began to thaw in
Africa, the Caucasus and the Balkans, and we continue to see
the results today. It is against this backdrop that I want to
describe the realities of our national security environment in
the first year of the 21st century, where technology has
enabled, driven, or magnified the threat to us; where age-old
resentments threaten to spill over into open violence, and
where growing perception of our so-called hegemony has become a
lightening rod for the disaffected. Moreover, this environment
of rapid change makes us even more vulnerable to sudden
surprise.
Mr. Chairman, let me first talk to you about the
proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction. The picture
that I drew last year has become even more stark and worrisome.
Transfers of enabling technologies to countries of
proliferation concern have not abated. Many states in the next
ten years will find it easier to obtain weapons of mass
destruction and the means to deliver them.
Let me underline three aspects of this important problem.
First, the missile threat to the United States from states
other than Russia or China, is steadily emerging. The threat to
U.S. interests and forces overseas is here and now.
Second, the development of missiles and weapons of mass
destruction in South Asia has led to more advanced systems, and
both sides have begun to establish the doctrine and tactics to
use these weapons.
Third, some countries we have earlier considered
exclusively as weapons technology importers may step up their
roles as secondary suppliers, compounding the proliferation
problem even further. We are all familiar with Russian and
Chinese capabilities to strike at military and civilian targets
throughout the United States. To a large degree, we expect our
mutual deterrent and diplomacy to help protect us from this as,
they have for much of the last century.
Over the next 15 years, however, our cities will face
ballistic missile threats from a wider variety of actors--North
Korea, probably Iran, and possibly Iraq. In some cases, this is
because of indigenous technological development, and in other
cases because of direct foreign assistance. And while the
missile arsenals of these countries will be fewer in number,
constrained to smaller payloads and less reliable than those of
the Russians and Chinese, they will still pose a lethal and
less predictable threat.
North Korea already has tested a space launch vehicle, the
Taepo Dong I, which it could theoretically convert into an ICBM
capable of delivering a small biological or chemical weapon to
the United States, although with significant inaccuracies.
Moreover, North Korea has the ability to test its Taepo Dong II
this year. This missile may be capable of delivering a nuclear
payload to the United States.
Most analysts believe that Iran, following the North Korean
pattern, could test an ICBM capable of delivering a light
payload to the United States in the next few years. Given that
Iraq missile developments are continuing, we think that it,
too, could develop an ICBM, especially with foreign assistance,
sometime in the next decade. These countries calculate that the
possession of ICBMs would enable them to complicate and
increase the cost of U.S. planning and intervention, enhance
deterrence, build prestige and improve their abilities to
engage in coercive diplomacy.
As alarming as the long-range missile threat is, it should
not overshadow the immediacy and seriousness of the threats
that U.S. forces, interests and allies already face overseas
from short and medium-range missiles. The proliferation of
medium-range ballistic missiles, driven primarily by the North
Korean No Dong sales, is significantly altering strategic
balances in the Middle East and Asia. Nowhere has the regional
threat been more dramatically played out than in South Asia.
Both Pakistan and India have intensified their missile and
nuclear rivalry. Further nuclear testing is possible, and both
states have begun to develop nuclear-use doctrines and
contingency planning. This is a clear sign of maturing WMD
programs.
Another sign that WMD programs are maturing is the
emergence of secondary suppliers of weapons technology. While
Russia, China and North Korea continue to be the main suppliers
of ballistic missiles and related technology, longstanding
recipients, such as Iran, might become suppliers in their own
right as they develop domestic production capabilities. Other
countries that today import missile-related technology, such as
Syria and Iraq, also may emerge in the next few years as
suppliers.
Over the near term, we expect that most of their exports
will be of shorter-range ballistic missiles-related equipment,
components and technologies. But as their domestic
infrastructures and expertise develop, they will be able to
offer a broader range of technologies thatcould include longer-
range missiles and related technology. Iran, in the next few years, may
be able to supply not only complete SCUDs, but also Shahab-3s and
related technology, and perhaps even more advanced technologies, if
Tehran continues to achieve assistance from Russia, China and North
Korea.
Mr. Chairman, the problem may not be limited to missile
sales. We also remain very concerned that new or non-
traditional nuclear suppliers could emerge from this same pool.
This brings me to a new area of discussion that more than ever
we risk substantial surprise. This is not for a lack of effort
on the part of the Intelligence Community; it results from
significant effort on the part of proliferators.
There are four main reasons: denial and deception; the
growing availability of dual-use technology; the potential for
surprise is exacerbated, thirdly, by growing capacity of these
countries seeking WMD to import talent that can help them make
dramatic leaps on things like new chemical and biological
agents; finally, the accelerating pace of technological
progress makes information and technology easier to obtain in
more advanced forms than when the weapons were initially
developed.
We are making progress on these problems, Mr. Chairman, but
I must tell you the hill is getting steeper every year.
With regard to terrorism, since July of 1998, working with
foreign governments worldwide, we have helped to render more
than two dozen terrorists to justice. More than half were
associates of Usama Bin Ladin's organization. These renditions
have shattered terrorist cells and networks, thwarted terrorist
plans, and in some cases even prevented attacks from occurring.
Although 1999 did not witness the dramatic terrorist attacks
that punctuated 1998, our profile in the world--thus our
attraction as a terrorist target--will not diminish any time
soon.
We are learning more about our perpetrators every day. Bin
Ladin is still foremost among these terrorists because of the
immediacy and seriousness of the threat he poses. Everything
that we have learned recently confirms our conviction that he
wants to strike further blows against the United States.
Despite some well-publicized disruptions, we still believe he
could strike without additional warning. Indeed, Bin Ladin's
organization and other terrorist groups are placing increased
emphasis on developing surrogates to carry out attacks, in an
effort to avoid detection.
For example, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad is linked closely
to Bin Ladin's organization and his operatives located around
the world, including in Europe, Yemen, Pakistan, Lebanon, and
Afghanistan. And now, Mr. Chairman, there is an intricate web
of alliances among Sunni extremists worldwide, including North
Africans, radical Palestinians, Pakistanis, and Central Asians.
Some of these terrorists are actively sponsored by national
governments that harbor great antipathy for the United States.
Iran, for one, remains the most active state sponsor.
Although we have seen some moderating trends in Iranian
domestic policy and even some public criticism of the security
apparatus, the fact remains that the use of terrorism as a
political tool by official Iranian organs has not changed since
President Khatami took office in August of 1997.
Mr. Chairman, let me move on to narcotics. The problem we
face has become considerably more global in scope and can be
summed up like this: Narcotics production is likely to rise
dramatically in the next few years, and worldwide trafficking
involves more diverse and sophisticated groups. On the first
point, coca cultivation in Peru and Bolivia has continued to
decline, due largely to successful eradication efforts. But
that will probably be offset to some extent by increases in
Colombian cultivation. More productive coca varieties and more
efficient processing results in production of cocaine more than
two and a half times that previously estimated.
There is some good news in Colombia. Under President
Pastrana's leadership, Bogota is beginning to improve on its
1999 efforts. In November, Pastrana approved the first
extradition of a Colombian drug trafficker to the United States
since the passage of legislation in 1997.
On the other side of the world, a dramatic increase in
opium and heroin production in Afghanistan is again a cause for
concern. This year Afghanistan's farmers harvested a crop with
the potential to produce 167 tons of heroin, making Afghanistan
the world's largest producer of opium. Burma, which has had a
serious drought, dropped to second place but will likely
rebound quickly when the weather improves.
Explosive growth in Afghan opium production is being driven
by the shared interests of traditional traffickers and the
Taliban. And, as with so many of these cross-national issues,
Mr. Chairman, what concerns me most is the way the threats
become intertwined. In this case, there is ample evidence that
Islamic extremists, such as Usama Bin Ladin, uses profits from
the drug trade to support their campaign of terrorism.
Mr. Chairman, my statement goes on to talk about
information operations and organized crime, but let me move to
regional issues in the interest of time. First, let me start
with Russia. As you know, we are now in the post-Yeltsin era,
and difficult choices loom for the new president Russians will
choose in exactly two months. He will face three fundamental
questions: First, will he keep Russia moving toward the
consolidation of its new democracy, or will growing public
sentiment in favor of a strong hand and a yearning for order
tempt to slow him down or even reverse course?
Second, will he try to build a consensus on quickening the
pace of economic reform and expanding efforts to integrate into
global markets--some Russian officials favor this--or will he
rely on heavy state intervention to advance economic goals?
Finally, will Moscow give priority to a cooperative
relationship with the West, or will anti-U.S. sentiments
continue to grow, leading to a Russia that is isolated,
frustrated or hostile? This would increase the risk of
unintended confrontation, which would be particularly dangerous
as Russia increasingly relies on nuclear weapons for its
defense, an emphasis reflected most recently in its new
National Security Concept.
As these questions indicate, the new Russian president will
inherit a country in which much has been accomplished but in
which much still needs to be done to transform its economy,
ensure that its democracy is deeply rooted, and establish a
clear future direction for it in the world outside of Russia.
Russian polls indicate that Acting President Putin is the odds-
on favorite to win the election, though I must tell you, Mr.
Chairman, that two months can be an eternity in Russia's
turbulent political scene. Putin appears tough and pragmatic,
but it is far from clear what he would do as president. If he
can continue to consolidate a lead in popular support, as
president he may be able to gain political capital that he
could choose to spend on moving Russia further along the path
of economic recovery and democratic stability.
Former Premier Primakov is in the best position to
challenge Putin, though he faces an uphill battle. He would
need the backing of other groups, most importantly the
communists. The communists, however, have shown their
willingness to deal with Putin's party in a recent agreement
that divided the Duma leadership positions between them. Such
tactical alliances are likely to become more prevalent as
parties seek to work out new power relationships in the post-
Yeltsin era.
At least two factors will be pivotal in determining
Russia's near-term trajectory. First, the conflict in Chechnya.
Setbacks in the war could hurt Putin's presidential prospects
unless he can deftly shift blame, while perceived successes
there will help him remain the front runner. The economy. The
devalued ruble, increased world oil prices and favorable trade
balance, fueled by steeply reduced import levels, have allowed
Russia to actually show some economic growth in the wake ofthe
August '98 financial crash. Nonetheless, Russia faces an $8 billion in
foreign debt coming due this year. Absent a new IMF deal to reschedule,
Moscow would have to redirect recent gains for economic growth to pay
it down or run the risk of default.
Over the longer term, the new Russian president must be
able to stabilize the political situation sufficiently to
address structural problems in the Russian economy. He must
also be willing to take on the crime and corruption problem,
both of which impede foreign investment.
In the foreign policy arena, U.S.-Russian relations will be
tested on a number of fronts. Most immediately, Western
criticism of the Chechen war has heightened Russian suspicions
about U.S. and Western activity in neighboring areas, be it
energy supply decisions involving the Caucasus in Central Asia,
NATO's continuing role in the Balkans, or NATO's relations with
Baltic states. Moscow's ties to Iran will also continue to
complicate U.S.-Russian relations, as will Russian objections
to U.S. plans for national missile defense.
There are, nonetheless, some issues that could improve
things and move them in a more positive direction. Putin and
others have voiced support for finalizing the START II
agreement and moving toward further arms cuts on START III.
Similarly, many other Russian officials express a desire to
more deeply integrate Russia into the world economy, be it
through continued cooperation with the G-8, or prospective
membership in the WTO.
One of my biggest concerns, regardless of the path that
Russia chooses, remains the security of its nuclear weapons and
materials. Russia's economic difficulties continue to weaken
the reliability of nuclear personnel and Russia's system for
security fissile material. We have no evidence that weapons are
missing in Russia, but we remain concerned about reports of lax
discipline, labor strikes, poor morale and criminal activities
at nuclear storage facilities.
Mr. Chairman, let me move on to Iran. Change in Iran is
inevitable. The election of President Khatami reflected the
Iranian popular desire for change. He has used this mandate to
put Iran on a path towards a more open society. This path will
be volatile at times, as the factions struggle to control the
pace and direction of political change. The key indicator that
the battle over change is heating up came last July, when
student protests erupted in 18 Iranian cities for several days.
The coming year promises to be just as contentious, as Iran
elects a new parliament in February.
Many Iranians, particularly the large cohort of restive
youth and students, will judge the elections as a test of the
regime's willingness to accommodate the popular demand for
reform. If they witness a rigged election, it could begin to
radicalize what has so far been a peaceful demand for change.
Fair elections would probably yield a pro-reform majority, but
opponents of change still exert heavy control over the
candidate selection process.
Former President Rafsanjani's decision to run for the
Majlis, apparently at the urging of conservatives, highlights
the leadership's desire to bring the two factions back to the
center. The conservatives are supportive of his candidacy
because they believe a centrist Rafsanjani is a more
trustworthy alternative to the reformers. Even if elections
produce a Majlis dominated by Khatami supporters, further
progress on reform will remain erratic. Supreme Leader Khamenei
and key institutions such as the Revolutionary Guard Corps and
the large parastatal foundations will remain outside the
authority of the Majlis and in a position to fight a stubborn,
rear-guard action against political change.
Moreover, even as the Iranians digest the results of the
Majlis elections, the factions will begin preliminary
maneuvering for the presidential election scheduled for mid-
2001, which is almost certain to keep the domestic political
scene unsettled. The factional maneuvering probably means that
foreign policy options will still be calculated first to
prevent damage to the various leaders' domestic positions. This
will inhibit politically risky departures from established
policy. This means that Iran's foreign policy next year will
still exhibit considerable hostility to U.S. interests. This is
most clearly demonstrated by Tehran's continued rejection of
the Middle East peace process and its efforts to energize
rejectionist Palestinian and Hizbollah operations aimed at
thwarting a negotiated Arab-Israeli peace.
Iranian perceptions of increasing U.S. influence in the
Caucasus, demonstrated most recently by the signing of the
Baku-Ceyhan pipeline agreement, could similarly motivate Iran
to more aggressively seek to thwart what it regards as a U.S.
effort to encircle it from the north.
Mr. Chairman, let me move to the Balkans, an important
area. Signs of positive long-term change are beginning to
emerge there as the influence of the Milosevic regime in the
region wanes in the wake of the Kosovo conflict, and a new,
more liberal government takes the reins of power in Croatia.
Political alternatives to the dominate ethnic parties in Bosnia
are also beginning to develop, capitalizing on the
vulnerability of old-line leaders to charges of corruption and
economic mismanagement.
Despite this progress, there is still a long way to go
before the Balkans move beyond the ethnic hatreds and depressed
economies that have produced so much turmoil and tragedy. Of
the many threats to peace and stability in the year ahead, the
greatest remains Slobodan Milosevic, the world's only sitting
president indicted for crimes against humanity. Milosevic's
hold on power has not been seriously shaken in the past few
months. He retains control of the security forces, military
commands, and an effective media machine. His inner circle
remains loyal or at least cowed. The political opposition has
not yet developed a strategy to capitalize on public anger with
Milosevic.
Milosevic has two problems that could still force him from
power--the economy and the Montenegrin challenge. The Serbian
economy is in a virtual state of collapse, and Serbia is now
the poorest country in Europe. Inflation and unemployment are
rising, and the country is struggling to repair the damage to
its infrastructure from NATO airstrikes. The average wage is
only $48 a month, and even these salaries typically are several
months in arrears. Basic subsistence is guaranteed only by
unofficial economic activity and the traditional lifeline
between urban dwellers and their relatives on the farms.
Milosevic's captive media are trying, with some success, to
blame these troubles on the air strikes and on international
sanctions.
Nonetheless, as time passes, our analysts believe that the
people will increasingly hold Milosevic responsible. Moreover,
a sudden unforeseen economic catastrophe, such as
hyperinflation or a breakdown this winter of the patched-up
electric grid, could lead to mass demonstrations that would
pose a real threat.
For its part, Montenegro may be heading toward
independence, and tensions are certainly escalating as
Montenegrin President Djukanovic continues to take steps to
break ties with the federal government. Milosevic wants to
crush Djukanovic because he serves as an important symbol to
the democratic opposition in Serbia and to the Serbian people
that the regime can be successfully challenged. Djukanovic
controls the largest independent media operation in Yugoslavia,
which has strongly criticized the Milosevic regime over the
past several years for the Kosovo conflict, political
repression, and official corruption. Both Milosevic and
Djukanovic will try to avoid serious confrontation for now, but
a final showdown will be difficult to avoid.
Regarding Kosovo, the international presence has managed to
restore a semblance of peace, but it is brittle. Large-scale
inter-ethnic violence has vanished, but the U.N. Mission in
Kosovo and KFOR have been unable to stop daily small-scale
attacks, mostly by Kosovar Albanians against ethnic Serbs. This
chronic violence has caused most of the remaining 80,000 to
100,000 Serbs to congregate in enclaves innorthern and eastern
Kosovo, and they are organizing self-defense forces.
The campaign to disarm the former Kosovo Liberation Army
has had success, but both sides continue to cache small arms
and other ordnance. There's even a chance that fighting between
Belgrade security forces and ethnic Albanians will reignite,
should Belgrade continue to harass and intimidate the Albanian
minority in southern Serbia, and should Kosovo Albanian
extremists attempt to launch an insurgency aimed at annexing
southern Serbia into a greater Kosovo.
Let me now turn to China, Mr. Chairman. The leadership
there is continuing its bold 20-year-old effort to propel the
nation's economy into the modern world, shedding the
constraints of the old communist central command system. The
economy is the engine by which China seeks world prestige,
global economic clout and the funding for new military
strength, thereby redressing what it often proclaims as 100
years of humiliation at the hands of Western powers.
Domestically, it was the engine that Deng Xiaoping and his
successors calculated would enable the party to deliver on its
unspoken social contract with the Chinese people--monopoly of
political power in exchange for a strong China with a higher
standard of living for its citizens.
But events conspired last year to tarnish Beijing's
achievements, to remind people that China had not yet arrived
as a modern world power, and to make the leadership generally
ill at ease. China put on an impressive display of military
might at its 50th anniversary parade in Beijing, but the
leadership today sees a growing technological gap with the
West.
Inside China, the image of domestic tranquility was
tarnished by last April's appearance of the Falun Gong
religious sect, whose audacious surprise demonstration outside
the leadership compound called into question the Community
Party's ability to offer an ethos that still attracts the
Chinese people.
Even the return of Macao in late December, the fall of
another symbol of a divided China, was overshadowed by the
actions of Taiwan President Lee Teng-Hui. Lee declared last
July that his island's relations with the mainland should be
conducted under the rubric of state-to-state rather than one-
China. Lee's statement has China deeply worried that Taiwan's
return to Beijing is less likely than before. Chinese leaders
act as if they believe at a minimum a show of force is required
if they are to preserve any hope of reunification.
Because of this, we see a high potential for yet another
military flare-up across the Taiwan Strait this year. The
catalyst for these tensions is the Taiwan election on the 18th
of March, which Beijing will be monitoring for signs that a new
president will retreat from Lee's statements or further extend
the political distance from reunification. Although Beijing
today still lacks the air and sealift capability to invade
Taiwan, China has been increasing the size and sophistication
of its forces arrayed along the strait, most notably by
deploying short-range ballistic missiles. China should receive
the first two Russian-built destroyers later this month. And we
expect the ships to join the East Sea Fleet, which regularly
conducts operations near Taiwan.
In the coming year, we expect to see an uncertain Chinese
leadership launching the nation deeper into the uncharted
waters of economic reform, while trying to retain a tight grip
on political control. But the question remains open, Mr.
Chairman, whether in the long run a market economy and an
authoritarian regime can coalesce equally.
Mr. Chairman, I want to talk about two more subjects, North
Korea, and India and Pakistan, and we'll reserve the rest.
North Korea's propaganda declares 1999 the year of the great
turnaround. This is not a view supported by my analysts.
Indeed, we see a North Korea continuing to suffer from serious
economic problems, and we see a population, perhaps now
including the elite, that is losing confidence in the regime.
Mr. Chairman, sudden radical and possibly dangerous change
remains a real possibility in North Korea, and that change
could come at any time.
The North Korean economy is in dire straits. Industrial
operations remain low. The future outlook is clouded by
industrial facilities that are nearly beyond repair after years
of underinvestment, spare-parts shortages and poor maintenance.
This year's harvest is more than one million tons short of the
minimum grain needs. International food aid has again been
critical in meeting the population's minimum food needs. Trade
is also down. Exports to Japan, the North's most important
market, fell by 17 percent. Trade with China, the North's
largest source of imports, declined to $160 million, primarily
because China delivered less grain.
Kim Jong Il does not appear to have an effective long-term
strategy for reversing his country's economic fortunes. His
inability to meet the basic needs of his people and reliance on
coercion makes his regime more brittle because even minor
instances of defiance have greater potential to snowball into
wider anti-regime actions. Instead of real reform, North Korean
strategy is to garner as much aid as possible from overseas,
and the North has reenergized its global diplomacy to this end.
It has agreed to diplomatic talks with Japan for the first
time in several years. It has unprecedented commercial contacts
with South Korea, including a tourism deal with a South Korean
firm that will provide almost a billion dollars. But
Pyongyang's maneuvering room will be constrained by Kim's
perception that openness threatens his control and by
contradictions inherent in his overall strategy, a strategy
based on hinting at concessions on the very weapons program
that he has increasingly come to depend on for leverage in the
international arena. Squaring these circles will require more
diplomatic agility than Kim has yet to demonstrate in either
domestic or international arenas.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me talk about India and
Pakistan. Last spring the two countries narrowly averted a
full-scale war in Kashmir, which could have escalated to the
nuclear level. The military balance can be summarized easily.
India enjoys advantages over Pakistan in most areas of
conventional defense preparedness, including a decisive
advantage in fighter aircraft, almost twice as many men under
arms, and a much larger economy.
Recent changes in the government of both countries add
tensions to the picture. The October coup in Pakistan that
brought General Musharraf to power, who served as the army
chief during the Kargil conflict with India last summer, has
reinforced New Delhi's inclination not to reopen the bilateral
dialogue anytime soon. Pakistanis are equally suspicious of
India's newly elected coalition government, in which Hindu
nationalists hold significant sway.
Clearly, the dispute over Kashmir remains as intractable as
ever. We are particularly concerned that heavy fighting is
continuing through the winter, unlike in the past, and probably
will increase significantly in the spring. New Delhi may opt to
crack down hard on Kashmiri militants operating on the Indian
side of the line of control, or even order military strikes
against militant training camps inside Pakistan-held Kashmir.
Thus, Mr. Chairman, we must head into this new year with
continuing deep concerns about the antagonisms that persist in
South Asia and their potential to fuel a wider and more
dangerous conflict on the subcontinent.
Mr. Chairman, I know this has been a long briefing, and we
skipped over many subjects, and we want to get to your
questions. But before so doing, I would sum it up this way: The
fact that we are arguably the world's most powerful nation does
not bestow invulnerability. In fact, it may make us a larger
target for those who don't share our interests, our values, and
our beliefs. We must take care to be on guard, watching our
every step and looking far ahead. Let me assure you that our
Intelligence Community is well prepared to do just that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator Bryan.
Chairman Shelby. Director Tenet, it's been reported that
former Director Deutch placed highly classified materials on
his unclassified home computer, a computer that was connected
to the Internet, but that, as far as can be determined, no
outsider gained access to this material. That's what we've been
told.
Director Tenet. Yes, sir.
Chairman Shelby. Can you assure us that the classified
files in Mr. Deutch's unclassified computer were not accessed
from outside?
Director Tenet. Mr. Chairman, we cannot assure you of that
fact. All I can say is we came to a judgment that said we
cannot exclude that possibility. We have no evidence to suggest
that that has occurred. But, I cannot give you assurances.
Chairman Shelby. You can't reassure us?
Director Tenet. No, sir, I can't give you a definitive
statement to say it absolutely didn't happen.
Chairman Shelby. When evaluating the scope of information
potentially compromised by Mr. Deutch to the material disclosed
by Mr. Ames or Pollard, how would you rate it? In other words,
was it sensitive, more sensitive or less sensitive?
Director Tenet. Well, Mr. Chairman, we have to make a
distinction between espionage cases where people were intending
to harm the United States----
Chairman Shelby. I know that.
Director Tenet [continuing]. And documents that you found
on someone's computer who was working at home. I don't think
there is any way.
Chairman Shelby. But, we are talking about materials,
classified materials.
Director Tenet. I understand that.
Chairman Shelby. Okay.
Director Tenet. In both the case of Ames and in the case of
Pollard, we can document the fact that a foreign power had
direct access to significant material, including human assets.
In this case, we can't tell you that any damage has occurred.
We don't exclude the possibility; I can't tell you it has or
has not occurred. So I don't think that that's a fair
comparison.
Chairman Shelby. You can't confirm it and you can't deny
it, right?
Director Tenet. You can't, sir, but I can't put the Deutch
case in the same context as Pollard or Ames. I don't think
that's fair.
Vice Chairman Bryan. Mr. Chairman, I don't think you got an
answer to your question. I don't think the Chairman was
impugning motives here. He was asking as to the material
itself.
Chairman Shelby. The material, the sensitivity of the
material.
Director Tenet. As you know, in the report--and I don't
want to go into it specifically in open session--there was
enormously sensitive material on this computer, at the highest
levels of classification.
Chairman Shelby. Highest levels of classified information
were transferred from--to an unclassified----
Director Tenet. Sir, the distinction again--and I think we
should let the Inspector General walk you through all this--but
there is a distinction between the transfer and his sitting
down at a computer and writing. He basically created all these
documents, rather than transferring files, which is a
distinction; there is a difference there.
Chairman Shelby. But it was, as you just said, very
sensitive material.
Director Tenet. Yes, sir.
Chairman Shelby. Was Mr. Deutch ever asked to take a
polygraph examination concerning the information he took to his
home while Director of CIA?
Director Tenet. Mr. Chairman, I'd preferred that you ask
the Inspector General and the investigators how they conducted
their investigation, rather than me getting into how they did
their business.
Chairman Shelby. Senator Bryan brought this up earlier and
I believe this is about right. It took the CIA almost a year
and a half to notify the Intelligence Committees after the
material was discovered on Dr. Deutch's computers. Why did it
take so long to notify this Committee and why did it take so
long to notify the Department of Justice?
Director Tenet. Well, sir, I don't have--there is no excuse
for that. That should have been done promptly. Certainly by the
spring of 1997, when internal reviews had been completed by the
Office of Personnel Security, we should have come to you. But
my view is, is that when you have a case involving the
Director, the notification should have been prompt. And there
is no excuse for that. And we should not have assumed that it
happened, and it should have happened.
Chairman Shelby. Director Tenet, why wasn't the FBI brought
into the investigation of this early on?
Director Tenet. Well, Mr. Chairman, remember--and the IG
again should come talk to you about all these facts.
Chairman Shelby. He's going to. He's going to come.
Director Tenet. One of the things that he and our internal
accountability board is looking at right now is that
originally, in fact, a referral was not made to the Department
of Justice. There was a legal judgment made not to refer the
case. Well, we have to get underneath that.
As you know, subsequently, when we get to the 1998 time
period, the IG did make a referral, the Justice Department did
decline to prosecute, so that the Justice Department did have
an opportunity to play in this case at a later date.
Chairman Shelby. If you were faced with a similar set of
facts today, involving anyone at Langley, at the CIA, an
employee, how would you react?
Director Tenet. Certainly, Senator, I think I would have
taken the same ultimate disciplinary action, which has to be
the same for everybody. In fact, the action we took against the
Director was unprecedented in its scope, because we believe
that everybody has to be treated equally, whether at the top of
the chain or the bottom of the chain, so that the men and women
who work for us understand that there are not two standards.
Everybody has a right to due process, and process is
provided to everybody, but in essence that would be my answer.
Obviously, there are lessons learned in how we did this, and
we're looking at all those things as well.
Chairman Shelby. Senator Bryan.
Vice Chairman Bryan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just pursue the Chairman's questions for just a
moment. I understand the state of the record. It's clear there
is no evidence--repeat, no evidence--that Mr. Deutch
transferred any information to unauthorized personnel. And that
is a distinction between the Aldrich and the Pollard matter, as
you've made clear. Nevertheless, you have characterized the
information that was on the unclassified computer as highly
sensitive. And I take it that we can get into that in more
detail in a closed hearing.
Director Tenet. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Bryan. I take it that this is not just
something that people ought not to know about, but this is
serious stuff. Is that a fair generalization?
Director Tenet. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Bryan. Very serious stuff. And so, I guess my
follow-up questions are twofold. Have you done a damage
assessment?
Director Tenet. Well, sir, we've certainly, I think we--no,
not in a formal way. We have basically fulfilled all the
obligations the Inspector General--or are in the process of
fulfilling all the obligations the Inspector General imposed on
us.
In a formal sense, no, I have not done it a damage
assessment in terms of what the possibility would be.
Vice Chairman Bryan. I ask that question in the context
that, as I understand it, because this information was on an
unclassified computer, for purposes of our
counterintelligence----
Director Tenet. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Bryan [continuing]. We have to assume that
that information may have been compromised.
Director Tenet. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Bryan. If that is the case, then it seems to
me that a damage assessment would be appropriate. And, the
follow-on question to that, it seems to me, is what actions
have been taken in response to that assessment. That is to say,
are we changing, making any different responses because of the
assumption that we have to make that this information----
Director Tenet. Yes, sir. Well, I'd like to--first,
Senator, I think it's valid and legitimate to go do a damage
assessment. In closed session, I'd like to walk you through--we
can talk about some of the documents and you'll see--you'll get
a full sense of the issue I think in closed session.
Vice Chairman Bryan. Let me ask you about the
accountability review. Where are we on that? When can we expect
to get that?
Director Tenet. The Executive Director has completed that
review as of yesterday, and he will forward it through the
Deputy Director and then on to me. So I hope that we will
provide that to you very quickly.
Vice Chairman Bryan. And can you give us the scope of the
review? Obviously it should include yourself, as well as
others, and does it do that?
Director Tenet. Yes, sir. It goes through the entire chain
of command, looks at everybody who touched this, looks at their
actions, looks at their judgments and will cover everybody.
Vice Chairman Bryan. And let me just say, the Chairman
raised the question--I mean, the delay, which you've
acknowledged is inexcusable, what actions are going to be taken
prospectively? The Committee is entitled to receive this
information----
Director Tenet. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Bryan [continuing]. As part of its oversight.
You would not deny that. What steps are being taken so that if
something like this happens prospectively that the Committee
gets an earlier notification?
Director Tenet. Sir, you know that there is a notification
process and policy in place that gives you everything, almost
as soon as I get it. That's the standard. We need to move.
There is no upside in not bringing you this information.
Everybody understands that.
Chairman Shelby. What happened in this case?
Director Tenet. That's another issue in terms of the
accountability. I mean, there are multiple nodes that had a
responsibility to move this information and they understood
that, and that's something that we're dealing with.
Vice Chairman Bryan. And let me say as the new Vice
Chairman, not only is the notification important, but the
manner in which we are notified is important. To be presented
with some information in the talking points during the course
of a hearing is really not the kind of notification I think the
Committee's entitled to. You've acknowledged and we all
understand that this compromise is serious. It strikes me that
when we have that kind of compromise that there needs to be a
process by which the Chairman or the Vice Chairman and the
staff directors are requested to have a meeting with you or
your authorized representatives to say, "Look, here's the
situation." And I would hope that we would have that
commitment from you.
Director Tenet. In fact, Senator, that's what we do today.
Even on the most sensitive issues, you're provided written,
detailed notifications. There are briefings. I think there's a
process here that's working extremely well. It didn't work in
this case as well as it needed to, but we have a process in
place that we pay a lot of attention to, and I think the
record's a good one.
Vice Chairman Bryan. I think the other question that's
raised publicly is the treatment in the Deutch case, with
reference to referral to the Department of Justice for possible
action. The delay there seems to me to have been excessive. My
understanding is that it is regarded as a very serious offense
when information is mishandled--classified information such as
this.
In hindsight, shouldn't that have been referred to the DOJ
earlier for whatever determination they want to make?
Director Tenet. Sir, the Inspector General feels so. But
there was a legal judgment made. I'm not a lawyer, but I
understand that there was a debate within the office of the
General Counsel about what the right way to proceed here was.
There was a decision not to make the referral. That's something
that we're looking at in our own accountability chain to
understand why this decision was made that way.
There was a subsequent decision to refer by the General
Counsel and Justice declined a prosecution. So, we're looking
at all that.
The IG will have a view on that, and we will in terms of
our accountability process as well.
Vice Chairman Bryan. But in hindsight, wouldn't it have
been better to do so?
Director Tenet. Well, of course. In hindsight, of course.
Vice Chairman Bryan. I mean, because the thrust of what the
article in the newspaper yesterday seems to suggest, in using
the language of impeding, is that the process was deliberately
slowed so that the time period for referral to independent
counsel was allowed to expire. I'm not making that assertion,
Mr. Tenet. I want to be clear.
Nevertheless, the actions, or the inactions, do give some
arguable credibility to that position. Could you respond to
that?
Director Tenet. Sir, the thing that worries me is of course
there was no impeding. There was no intentional effort. The IG
didn't find that. If he had, we would have had another Justice
Department issue. The perception has been created that that's
what happened. I think it was erroneously portrayed in the news
piece.
The fact is that this didn't work as quickly as it should
have worked. We know that now, and we make no excuses. We were
in a period of great transition. We were dealing with a former
Director. People were trying to do their best job. At the end
of the day, we now know that we all could have done this
better. The entire system could have performed better.
We take a lot of pride in policing ourselves. You know,
some people say, "Can the CIA police itself?" Well, we take a
lot of pride in our own internal accountability and our
professional responsibility and conducting ourselves honorably
and ensuring that this Committee and the American people
believe that.
Anything that detracts from that is not good for me and not
good for my people.
Vice Chairman Bryan. And I think the final observation that
I would have is certainly the appearance is of a dual standard.
That is to say that the former DCI, an individual who we all
know--we respect his talents and abilities and his
co-generation aircraft, thousands of "late Cold War equivalen
that had this been someone who was on a lower level in the
hierarchy, that different treatment would be given.
I think that's damaging to morale within the agency itself
because everybody ought to be held to the same standard of
accountability.
Director Tenet. Well.
Vice Chairman Bryan. Do you agree with that?
Director Tenet. In terms of process, everybody has a right
to due process and I never want to be in a situation where my
employees at the lower ranks feel that the people higher up get
any benefits or privileges.
I will say this. There have been analogous cases to
Director Deutch's case where we did not take the kind of action
we took against this Director. I believe stronger action was
required, because as the leader of the organization, you're
required to act and behave on the basis of higher standards.
So when we look at punishment, I think that the statement
to everybody ultimately is, we took decisive, tough action
against the former leader of the organization. And that has an
impact as well in the positive, I believe.
Vice Chairman Bryan. So I take it that your view would be
that within the agency the perception is that the treatment of
Mr. Deutch was comparable that others who might have been
guilty of similar classified violations would have received.
Director Tenet. Well, sir, I don't want to speak for them.
I can't--you know, I didn't take a poll after the action to
find out what the constituencies felt, but here's the message I
want to leave to the men and women that I lead: There is one
standard. People up and down the chain of command will get
disciplined. This process--we will ensure that a process is
fair, not just for people at the top but people at the bottom,
and everybody gets the same treatment.
And that's the message I want to leave them with. There are
no distinctions between the top and the bottom, and we run a
fair and honest institution when it comes to disciplining men
and women.
Vice Chairman Bryan. So your own perspective would be that
you have treated others, or the agency has treated others in
situations similar to Mr. Deutch, in a comparable fashion?
Director Tenet. Yes, sir, although I do feel in his case we
went the extra mile because of his leadership position.
Vice Chairman Bryan. Mr. Chairman, I thank you. Thank you
very much, Mr. Tenet.
Chairman Shelby. Director Tenet, is it troubling to you, as
it is to me, that--we know Mr. Deutch, Dr. Deutch we call him.
And we know that he's done a lot, served this nation in the
defense over at the Pentagon and in the CIA and all this. He
has an exemplary career. But isn't it troubling to you that
someone at the CIA--especially a Director--but anybody that
would use unclassified computer to do all these things, not
inadvertently, not once, but continuously, to a great extent.
Isn't that troubling? You wouldn't do that, would you?
Director Tenet. Mr. Chairman----
Chairman Shelby. Sir, would you do that?
Director Tenet. Well, my computer literacy is so low that I
probably couldn't do it. [Laughter.]
But in any event----
Chairman Shelby. Now I didn't ask you, could you.
Director Tenet. Let me say something serious to you. I
wouldn't do it, Mr. Chairman. And obviously, there's no
education in the second kick of a mule and everybody's gotten
the picture here. But, let me say this to you: You know, I took
a stern action against John. He's obviously my predecessor and
my friend. He was sloppy in what he did. He worked around the
clock. He didn't think about what he was doing.
Nevertheless, as Director, I believe he should have known
better. And I think, you know, in some way you have a salutary
impact here because everybody understands. We talk about
computer security, we talk about electronic means of getting
into our databases. Now it's shown that this is an important
issue that we're all paying attention to.
And, you know, one man's mistake is another man's
stupidity. Of course, it's troubling that we're in this
situation. It's a tough situation for all of us to be in and we
took a tough action for it.
Chairman Shelby. Was he polygraphed regarding any of this?
Do you know?
Director Tenet. I don't, and I'd prefer that you'd talk to
the investigators and the folks who----
Chairman Shelby. We will. You don't know and you're not
going to say.
Director Tenet. Let's talk about that later, if we could,
sir.
Chairman Shelby. Do you know if he has ever failed a
polygraph test?
Director Tenet. I don't know that.
Chairman Shelby. You don't. We'll get into it a little
later, in the closed session.
Director Tenet. Okay.
Chairman Shelby. To go back to the counterintelligence
threat, the recent discovery of a Russian listening device
inside the State Department and reports of PRC espionage
against the Department of Energy's nuclear labs have served all
of us as stark reminders of the continued counterintelligence
threat to the U.S. government facilities and personnel.
The Intelligence Community is currently reviewing, as you
well know, its counterintelligence postures for the 21st
century in an exercise dubbed CI-21. The Intelligence Committee
will be holding closed hearings on CI-21, as well as on the
State Department bug. But I think it's important here today to
take the opportunity, while we're in open session, to outline
the extent of this problem for the American people who have
heard about it.
Director Tenet, which countries are most aggressively
engaged in collection of intelligence against the United
States? What are their primary targets--political and
diplomatic intelligence, military plans and defense and
technology, economic and industrial secrets? And to what extent
have the traditional threats changed?
Director Tenet. Well, Mr. Chairman, let me----
Chairman Shelby. You can talk about some of it here.
Director Tenet. Yes. Let me say this. There are a lot of
countries involved in espionage against the United States--
traditional enemies, some friends.
Chairman Shelby. Sure.
Director Tenet. Different motivations. Why do they do it?
One, they want to penetrate the United States government. Two,
they want to get access to your trade secrets and your economic
well-being. They want to access technology. They want to access
what our private sector does for a living. What we're trying to
do in CI-21, Louis Freeh and I are trying to design a system
that basically allows us to understand what the most important
threats are, and then allocate people and resources to work
against these threats not just within the government, but also
to engage the private sector in a way that it's never been
engaged before, in creating something so that, Mr. Chairman,
we're not talking to you about counterintelligence when we have
a case. When we have a case, it's too late; it means that
something's already happened.
Chairman Shelby. Something bad, generally.
Director Tenet. Something bad is generally happening. So
the only good news here is there is an arrest, followed by the
bad news of a damage investigation. And what we would like to
do is use the resources in the intelligence and law enforcement
communities proactively, engage analysis and use analytical
tools in a way we haven't done before, and create something
that's new.
Now, Louis and I are going to brief this. He needs to brief
the Attorney General, I'm going to brief the National Security
Adviser. I think the President has a keen interest in this. And
then we will come forward and give you this new plan that we
plan to undertake.
Chairman Shelby. Sure. I think it's very important, and the
timeliness couldn't be better.
Director Tenet. Yes, sir.
Chairman Shelby. Admiral Wilson, do you have any comments
on this threat?
Admiral Wilson. Well, I certainly agree with the threat.
And the world of information superiority being so important,
protecting your own is too often undervalued compared to
acquiring others'. So we would support aggressive moves in
counterintelligence improvements.
Chairman Shelby. Ambassador Roy, I know you are new on this
job. You have served this country with distinction in your
ambassadorial post. But over in State, where you are dealing
with intelligence and security there, isn't it troubling to
you, the bug and the penetration somewhat, that was in the
paper recently, about the State Department, out of Russia--
probably not shocking?
Ambassador Roy. It is troubling to me. My experience has
been that maintaining the alertness and the procedures that you
need is difficult, because of the human factor, over time. And
to protect secrets properly, you have to maintain the highest
standards over time. In that sense, I think that the recent
cases have been useful because they have provided the
additional impetus for all of us to tighten our procedures.
That's what the State Department has been doing; I am
confident that's what other members of the Intelligence
Community have been doing. In the case of the State Department,
I think the damage assessments are under way, and the probable
damage is limited.
Chairman Shelby. Admiral Wilson, what's your assessment of
the performance of the Russian military recently, particularly
the army in their current operation in Chechnya?
Admiral Wilson. Well, first of all, the Chechen situation
will not be solved by military actions alone. It's been going
on for centuries, and it won't be solved by military action.
The Russians do show a good ability to move forces to the
region; however, they have taken a high percentage of their
ready forces to do so. And, therefore, it impedes Russian
military modernization to any extent that they could accomplish
that in the economic environment that exists there.
They have used some of the same brute-force tactics that
did not work well earlier in the nineties, in 1996
specifically--of heavy bombardment of the city and then
followed up with infantry and internal security forces, which
are ill-prepared to conduct urban warfare, which is difficult
for any military to conduct.
So the Russian military is not well-prepared for the
situation that they were thrust into. It's a difficult
situation for any military. They are taking losses, as are the
Chechens. And it will not solve the problem, which will be
around for a long time at the current pace.
Chairman Shelby. Okay.
Senator Bryan?
Vice Chairman Bryan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Tenet, returning to you for a moment, I am sympathetic
with the position that you find yourself in, that when you do
achieve success in breaking up terrorist cells or activity,
it's not something that you can proclaim. Your failures are on
the front page of the morning newspaper and the lead stories on
television across the country. And I think it's fair to
acknowledge that there have been, as you made oblique reference
to in your presentation, that there have been successes that
you've briefed the Committee on, and we applaud those efforts
and commend them.
Nevertheless, it appears to me that we may be just chipping
around on the edge. My question: Is there a broader, more
systemic approach that we ought to be undertaking? And if we
are doing that, to the extent that you can do so in an open
session, would you care to respond to that?
Director Tenet. Let me handle this in the open, but then
I'd like to talk about it in closed session at greater length.
There is-- I don't want you to think that there is not a
systematic effort to look at a worldwide terrorist
infrastructure and think about how you disrupt or make it more
difficult for them to operate. Indeed, what we learned over the
course of the five or six weeks leading up to the New Year
celebrations, on the basis of all the actions we took, we
learned that there's an infrastructure out there that is
perhaps bigger than we anticipated.
And we essentially have undertaken to systematically
develop a strategic plan to attack this infrastructure. And I
don't want to say more than that. But we look at this not just
from an event perspective. I come and tell you two dozen
renditions. That's tactical in nature. There is a strategic
outlook about how to do this, not just by ourselves, but in
concert with our allies.
Of course, in terms of the bigger picture, at the end of
the day you've got to go back, and we won't go through what I
said about the Middle East, but you've got to go back and look
at the economics and demographics of the region of the world
that basically is going to spawn, unless some changes are made,
large numbers of unemployed men to whom bin Ladin's message
resonates, and people like him.
So there are big systemic issues about economic
opportunity. Chechnya is another example, for example. I mean,
Afghanistan was the calling card in the seventies and eighties;
Chechnya will become the calling card of this millennium in
terms of where do terrorists go and train and act. So these
conflicts, while we talk about them from the concept of the
Chechens and the Russians, also turn into spawning grounds of
the next generation of people who try their skills.
Now, that all involves a very intricate strategy that we
need to think about. So, it's not just what the law enforcement
and Intelligence Community does. It's how we look at a world
and regions of the world where we can strategically use
relationships that undermine the terrorists' ability to
operate.
Vice Chairman Bryan. So you're really suggesting to us that
the Russian-Chechnyan conflict is, from our point of view, a
potential source of a new generation of terrorists who will
learn their craft----
Director Tenet. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Bryan [continuing]. And that long after that
conflict may subside--assuming that it does, at least in its
present form--there may be some spin-off implications for us
that can be very troubling.
Director Tenet. I think that you should expect that the
opportunity the terrorists will take to inject themselves in
this, for Muslim reasons and reasons to aid the Chechens, many
of whom are not terrorists, will create a cascading effect of
people proving their mettle on a battleground that they will
then come back and test against us in other places, yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Bryan. Changing the focus a little bit, Mr.
Tenet, one of my first calls as the new Vice Chairman dealt
with a fairly significant information systems breakdown. I want
to speak somewhat obliquely here. My question is, what are we
doing to prevent a recurrence of that? Are there other aspects
in the Intelligence Community, not precisely of this same
nature, that are in jeopardy of a breakdown or a failure of
this magnitude? And thirdly, what, if anything, do you need
from us in the Congress to address any of those concerns?
Director Tenet. First, let me say that Mike Hayden has it
totally under control. We did have a problem for a series of
days. He did undertake the work-arounds. He did all the right
things. He is in the middle of a lessons-learned. He believes
there was no intelligence loss, that we've retrieved all that
collection and processed it all. And we are now looking at an
after-action with him.
The point I would make is we need to find out what
happened. The point I would make is that we have an
infrastructure that is functioning at near or overcapacity
constantly, and we need to ensure that we're making the right
investments and that our leadership is looking at these things
as carefully as they need to. And I think that we are.
And I think the men and women out there did a great job in
getting us back up and running without missing a beat. And it
was something that had us all concerned, but handled very well
by General Hayden and the folks at NSA.
Vice Chairman Bryan. I hope that you will follow up on this
and give us a report. You're making a critical judgment in
terms of personnel and the way it was handled, but to have
something of that magnitude occur for that length of time, had
the situation globally been more----
Director Tenet. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Bryan. [continuing]. Volatile it would have
been extremely dangerous in terms of the lack of information
that we were able to gather. And so I would hope that you would
report back to us, once the after-action report is completed,
what, if anything, we need to do to help you.
Director Tenet. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Bryan. This is not in a critical vein, but to
help you in that.
Director Tenet. Right. We will do that.
Vice Chairman Bryan. Admiral Wilson, if I might just ask
you a question about the situation in Colombia, what is the
status with the guerrilla action there and the government? The
DCI made reference to the situation in Colombia, but I don't
really have a sense. It's been a few years since I've been
there and flew into the part of the country where a lot of the
coca is being processed and some of the plants are grown. Give
us your assessment. Are we winning? Are we losing? Are we
holding our own? It looks like more and more of that country
seems to have been taken over, in a de facto sense, at least,
by the guerrilla movements, even though the government itself
tends to be more cooperative in terms of extraditions and other
kinds of activity.
Admiral Wilson. Senator, I think that the government of
Colombia, and specifically their security force, is enormously
challenged in dealing with the insurgent threat in rural
Colombia, which, of course, is fueled by narcotics and other
criminal activity. They're trying hard and have made some
improvements, but are still challenged by mobility and
flexibility and command-and-control and intelligence shortfalls
against a difficult adversary.
The rebels, the insurgents, have used the demilitarized
zones disproportionately to their advantage in the field of
military activity, and so they continue to be a challenge for
Colombian security forces. The Colombian Army, while it appears
able to protect large cities and the urban environment, is not
able to control the countryside where the insurgents operate.
So, I think I would say that while they are certainly not
winning, they're trying very hard to hold their own in a very
difficult situation, even as the President tries to put
together a political process that will reach some type of peace
agreement in the future with the insurgents.
Vice Chairman Bryan. Were you all involved, and if so, what
role did you play in providing the intelligence data needed for
the supplemental appropriation request for Colombia? Were you
involved in that process from the intelligence point of view,
in terms of what was needed?
Admiral Wilson. We did provide intelligence associated with
that. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Bryan. And specifically, I mean, some areas
that you felt ought to be included in terms of the request.
Admiral Wilson: Yes.
Vice Chairman Bryan. You were?
Admiral Wilson: We did, as a community, participate in the
exercise.
Vice Chairman Bryan. I appreciate that. Let me yield back
to the Chairman.
Chairman Shelby. Thank you, Senator Bryan.
Director Tenet, we all realize we're going into a closed
hearing later this afternoon and we'll be able to get into just
about everything there. But could you assess here today, to
some extent, what's the status of Iran's nuclear weapons
program?
Director Tenet. Well, we should talk about this behind
closed doors.
Chairman Shelby. Okay. Could you say here that Russia, the
PRC and other people, other suppliers have given assistance to
their nuclear program?
Director Tenet. Let me outline all of that for you behind
closed doors.
Chairman Shelby. Okay. What about North Korea? Do you
believe that North Korea is continuing to work on its nuclear
weapons program and related activities, or can you say here, or
you'd rather get into that in a closed session too?
Director Tenet. Sounds good to me, Mr. Chairman.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Shelby. Okay, that's what you'd rather do.
Senator Bryan, do you have any other questions?
Vice Chairman Bryan. Well, we wouldn't want to neglect
Ambassador Roy. Let me ask you, one of the perennial questions
that comes up every year is the degree of cooperation we get
with Mexico, whether we ought to recertify them for compliance.
Give us your take. I mean, I must say that I don't see a lot of
encouraging news there. Maybe we haven't focused on some of the
areas that may give some cause for hope. But your analysis
there, Mr. Ambassador, if I may.
Ambassador Roy. We think we're making progress in
addressing a very difficult and complex issue. As you know, it
was our success in attacking the narcotics routes through the
Caribbean that resulted in the diversion of those routes to
Mexico, and Mexico is now the principal route through which
cocaine from South America enters the U.S. market.
We have worked with the Mexican government. They have set
up special police forces. They are using new technology at
border points to try to interdict actions. They have passed new
laws which are designed to improve their ability to get rid of
corrupt security officials. They have focused at senior
government levels on the problem of dealing with corruption at
the highest levels of the government that are related to the
narcotraffic. This has affected governors in Mexico.
So that on balance, we feel that we are working in the
right direction with the Mexican government and are getting a
positive spirit of cooperation from them.
Vice Chairman Bryan. Well, I hope so. I was in Mexico a few
years ago, and they cited operations where we have very
carefully screened everybody, and they had passed all of the
litmus tests, and this was something that gave us great cause
for hope.
I understand now that we have determined that we are going
to abandon that particular effort because the corruption has
been so pervasive. It would appear to be 180 degrees from where
we were a few years ago. I don't minimize the difficulty of the
problem; I think its tremendous. But I mean--progress--I don't
think that the American public, Mr. Ambassador, sees great
results there.
You know, the amount of narcotics that comes into the
United States, I think, in no way has been abated. I am not
suggesting we ought not to try to interdict that. And you are
quite right; the supply route has changed, based upon some of
the successes previously elsewhere in the Caribbean.
Ambassador Roy. Senator, our assessments of the issues you
have just addressed are objective. When we see increases in the
narcotics entering the United States, we say so. But at the
same time, it would be our judgment that the problem would be
much worse if we had not been able to accomplish the progress
in working with the Mexican government in addressing these
types of problems that you refer you that we have made.
But it is a constant, and indeed a growing, problem. As you
know, our assessments of the amount of cocaine produced in
South America have risen recently. So I would agree with your
assessment that this is a growing threat to our well-being.
It's not one that we can say we are winning the war against.
Vice Chairman Bryan. The last question: To what extent has
Mexico's evolving pluralistic political structure, where they
do have opposition parties who not only can challenge but
actually can prevail to what extent is that a factor either
that helps or impedes this effort of trying to get greater
cooperation from Mexico and to ferret out those elements that
are part of this pervasive corruption that makes it so
difficult for us? Is that a positive factor, a negative factor;
I mean, politically, how does that play in Mexico? And what
role do the two parties take, the same or different, with
respect to this issue of cooperation with the U.S.?
Ambassador Roy. It's a mixed picture. We welcome progress
toward democratization. But our experience in other countries--
I have personal experience of my own in this respect--is that
the process of democratization brings new problems, even as it
enables the countries to solve old problems. And I think in the
case of Mexico a more open political system there is not going
to be an unmixed blessing in terms of the efficiency of our
antinarcotics operations. But I think it's an area where we can
make progress as long as we understand the problem and devote
the necessary attention and resources, which I think we are
doing.
Vice Chairman Bryan. Gentlemen, thank you very much. I know
we're going to get into more of these questions in closed
session. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Chairman Shelby. Thank you.
We'll conclude this hearing. Thank you all--Admiral Wilson,
Director Tenet, Ambassador Roy. The Committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
