Statement by:
William E. Ledwith
Chief of International Operations
Drug Enforcement Administration
United States Department of Justice
Before the:
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources
Date:
February 29, 2000
Chairman Mica, Congresswoman Mink and distinguished members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate this opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee today to
discuss the issue of the U.S. and Mexican Counter-narcotics efforts. I
would like first to thank the Subcommittee for its continued support of
the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and overall support of drug law
enforcement. My testimony today will provide you with an objective assessment
of the law enforcement issues surrounding the drug threat posed by international
drug trafficking organizations operating from Mexico. These criminal organizations
based in Mexico pose the greatest challenge to U.S. law enforcement agencies
charged with enforcing narcotics laws. Due to the ever-increasing legitimate
cross-border traffic and commerce between the U.S. and Mexico, several
international organized crime groups have established elaborate smuggling
infrastructures on both sides of the U.S./Mexico border. Furthermore, it
has long been established that in addition to drug trafficking, these international
criminal organizations spawn violence, corruption, and intimidation that
threaten the safety and stability of our cities and towns across America.
The complex and sophisticated international drug trafficking groups
operating out of Mexico are oftentimes vicious, destructive entities, that
operate on a global scale. The four largest drug trafficking organizations
in Mexico --- operating out of Guadalajara, Juarez, Mexicali, Tijuana,
Sonora, and the Gulf region --- under the auspices of Vicente Carrillo-Fuentes,
Armando Valencia-Cornelio, Miguel Caro-Quintero, Ramon and Benjamin Arellano-Felix,
and Osiel Cardenas-Guillen are in many ways, the 1990's versions of the
mob leaders and groups that U.S. law enforcement has fought against since
the beginning of last century. These international organized crime leaders,
however, are far more dangerous, far more influential and have a greater
impact on our day-to-day lives than did their domestic predecessors.
Those international traffickers and their organizations make operational
decisions from places like Sonora, Mexico and other locations outside U.S.
borders, which detrimentally affect the quality of life of our citizens
and directly support drug-related crime in cities and towns across our
country. These groups have reached new levels of sophistication and have
become a threat not only to the United States and Europe, but also to their
own countries. Their power and influence are unprecedented. Unless innovative,
flexible, multi-faceted responses are crafted, these drug trafficking organizations
threaten to grow even more powerful in the years to come.
The Damage to the United States:
In order to understand the extent and nature of the damage caused by
international drug trafficking organizations, it is crucial to look at
how these organizations work, and how they infiltrate and position themselves
in U.S. communities in order to further their goals.
On any given day in the United States, business transactions are being
arranged between the major drug lords headquartered in Mexico and their
surrogates who have established roots within the United States, for the
shipment, storage and distribution of tons of illicit drugs. In the past,
Mexico-based criminal organizations limited their activities to the cultivation
of marijuana and opium poppies for subsequent production of marijuana and
heroin. The organizations were also relied upon by Colombian drug lords
to transport loads of cocaine into the United States, and to pass on this
cocaine to other organizations who distributed the product throughout the
U.S. However, over the past several years, Mexico-based organized crime
syndicates have gained increasing control over many of the aspects of the
cocaine, methamphetamine, heroin and marijuana trades, resulting in increased
threats to the well-being of American citizens as well as government institutions
and the citizens of their own country.
In the recent past, traffickers from Mexico had maintained dominance
in the western part of the United States, and in some Midwest cities. Today,
the Drug Enforcement Administration, along with other law enforcement agencies,
developed evidence leading to indictments demonstrating that associates
of organized crime groups based in Mexico have established themselves on
the East Coast of the United States, thus becoming significant participants
in the nationwide drug trade.
Mexican Traffickers Rise to Prominence:
During 1995 and 1996, intense law enforcement pressure was focused on
the Cali leadership by the brave men and women of the Colombian National
Police. As a result, all of the top trafficking leaders from Cali were
either jailed or killed. During that time frame, U.S. law enforcement agencies
were effectively attacking Colombian cells operating within the United
States. With the Cali leaders imprisoned in Colombia and the successful
attacks by law enforcement on their U.S. cells, traffickers from Mexico
took on greater prominence. A growing alliance between the Colombian traffickers
and the organizations from Mexico worked to benefit both sides. Traffickers
from Mexico had long been involved in smuggling marijuana, heroin, and
cocaine across the U.S.-Mexico border, using established distribution routes
to deliver drugs throughout the United States. The Mexico-based organizations'
emergence as major methamphetamine producers and traffickers also contributed
to making them a major force in international drug trafficking. The Mexican
traffickers, who were previously paid in cash by the Colombian traffickers
for their services, began to routinely receive up to one-half of a shipment
of cocaine as their payment. This led to Mexican traffickers having access
to multi-ton quantities of cocaine and allowed them to expand their markets
and influence in the United States, thereby making them formidable cocaine
traffickers in their own right.
With the disruption of the Cali syndicate, Mexican groups such as the
Amado Carrillo-Fuentes organization, the Arellano-Felix cartel, the Amezcua-Contreras
brothers, and the Caro-Quintero group, consolidated their power and began
to dominate drug trafficking along the U.S.-Mexico border and in many U.S.
cities. Recent events in Mexico and along the southwest border emphasize
the fact that trafficking groups from Mexico have developed into a significant
force in international organized crime.
Overview of Narcotics Smuggled along the U.S./Mexican Border:
Recent estimates indicate that approximately 55% of the cocaine available
in the United States is transported across the U.S.-Mexico border. Typically,
large cocaine shipments are transported from Colombia, via commercial shipping,
fishing and "Go-fast" boats and off-loaded in Mexico. The cocaine is transported
through Mexico, usually by trucks, where it is warehoused in cities like
Guadalajara, Tijuana or Juarez, that are operating bases for the major
criminal trafficking organizations. The extremely high volume of vehicular
traffic over the U.S./Mexico border allows cocaine loads to be driven across
the border and taken to major distribution centers within the U.S., such
as Los Angeles, New Jersey, Chicago or Phoenix. Surrogates of the major
drug lords wait for instructions, often provided over encrypted communications
devices-- --phones, faxes, pagers or computers---telling them where to
warehouse smaller loads, who to contact for transportation services, and
who to return the eventual profits to. Individuals sent to the United States
from Mexico and often here illegally, have been shown to have contracted
with U.S. trucking establishments to move loads across the country. Once
the loads arrive in an area that is close to the eventual terminal point,
safehouses are established for workers who watch over the cocaine supplies
and arrange for it to be distributed by wholesale dealers within the vicinity.
These distributors have traditionally been Colombian nationals or individuals
from the Dominican Republic, but recently, DEA has come upon evidence that
Mexican trafficking organizations are also directly involved in cocaine
distribution in New York City.
We have not only identified the drug lords themselves, but in most cases,
the key members of their command and control structure. The combined efforts
of the DEA, FBI, DOJ, the U.S. Customs Service and members of state and
local police departments have resulted in the seizure of hundreds of tons
of drugs, hundreds of millions of dollars in drug proceeds and most importantly,
several significant indictments. In fact, some of the leaders of these
organizations---Ramon and Benjamin Arellano-Felix, Jesus Amezcua-Contreras,
Vicente Carrillo-Fuentes----have become familiar names in every major law
enforcement department in the United States. Despite this evidence, along
with the notoriety, these traffickers have continued to evade arrest and
prosecution.
The primary reason they have been able to avoid arrest and continue
their criminal enterprise is their ability to intimidate witnesses and
assassinate and corrupt public officials. Clear examples of this point
may be cited in recent efforts to apprehend members of the Arellano Felix
cartel and the Cardenas Guillen cartel, based in Tijuana and Matamoros,
Mexico, respectively. In Tijuana over the past year, Mexican officials,
with support from the DEA, have unsuccessfully attempted to apprehend key
traffickers working for the Arellano Felix organization. In November 1999,
major Gulf cartel drug trafficker Osiel Cardenas Guillen illegally detained
and assaulted two U.S. drug enforcement agents in Matamoros, Mexico, across
the international border from Brownsville, Texas.
Methamphetamine traffickers, oftentimes associated with major Mexican
organized crime groups, obtain the precursor chemicals necessary for methamphetamine
production from sources in other countries, such as China and India, as
well as from rogue chemical suppliers in the United States. In fact, Mexico-based
transnational criminal organizations have become the most significant distributors
in the U.S. of methamphetamine and its precursor chemicals. Several
bulk ephedrine seizures destined for Mexico have focused attention on the
magnitude of ephedrine acquisition by Mexican organized crime groups. Super
methamphetamine labs, capable of producing hundreds of pounds of methamphetamine
on a weekly basis, are established in Mexico or in California, where the
methamphetamine is provided to traffickers to distribute across the United
States.
These methamphetamine organizations based in Mexico also have well established,
polydrug distribution networks in place throughout our country. The Mexican
trafficking organizations have single-handedly created a new booming demand
for methamphetamine, moving it in mass quantities eastward across the country-far
beyond the traditional West and Southwest markets.
Heroin from Mexico now represents 14% of the heroin seized in the United
States by federal authorities, and it is estimated that 43 metric tons
of opium gum was produced in 1999 in Mexico. A recent study conducted by
the DEA indicates that as much as 29% of the heroin being used in the U.S.
is being smuggled in by the Mexico-based organized crime syndicates. Mexican
black tar heroin is produced in Mexico, and transported over the border
in cars and trucks. Like cocaine and methamphetamine, it is trafficked
by associates of the organized criminal groups in Mexico, and provided
to dealers and users in the Southwest, Northwest, and Midwest areas of
the United States. At one time, it was commonplace for couriers to carry
two pounds or so of heroin into the United States; recently, quantities
of heroin seized from individuals has increased as is evidenced by larger
seizures in a number of towns in Texas. This heroin is extremely potent,
and its use has resulted in a significant number of deaths.
Marijuana from Mexico still dominates the illicit U.S. import market
although U.S. experts estimate Mexico's marijuana production at 3,700 metric
tons (compared with 4,600 in 1998 and 4,800 in 1997). In addition, during
1999, the GOM eradicated some 23,547 hectares of marijuana (down from 24,200
in 1998). Seizures of Mexican marijuana have increased from 102 metric
tons in 1991 to 836.3 metric tons in 1999. Marijuana organizations from
Mexico are very powerful and violent. In some places, traffickers from
Mexico have established growing operations within the United States. In
a recent case in Idaho, DEA , working with other federal, state and local
law enforcement officials, arrested a group of illegal aliens from Zacatecas,
Mexico. A total of 114,000 marijuana plants, weighing almost 20 tons, were
seized. This operation represented the largest marijuana seizure ever in
the state of Idaho.
It is important to note that although many of the transactions relating
to the drug trade take place on U.S. soil, the major organized crime bosses
direct each and every detail of their multi-billion dollar business while
situated in Mexico. They are responsible not only for the business decisions
being made, but ultimately for the devastation that too many American communities
have suffered as a result of the influx of cocaine, methamphetamine, heroin
and marijuana. These powerful and organized syndicates can frustrate the
ability of the Mexican anti-drug police. Their ability to place obstacles
such as corruption and unlimited resources in the path of police can oftentimes
impede investigations. In the past year, none of the major Mexican trafficking
organizations have been dismantled or significantly disrupted by Mexican
authorities.
Law Enforcement Response:
Reporting indicates that the Southwest border (SWB) remains a major
point of entry for approximately 70% of all illicit drugs smuggled into
our country by Mexican trafficking groups. In response to this continued
threat along the border, the DEA has established several initiatives that
facilitate and improve intelligence and information sharing, while identifying
and removing impediments to cooperation. These initiatives employ a multi-pronged
strategy, which utilizes and combines law enforcement operations, intelligence
operations, and provides for law enforcement assistance in order to achieve
success in combating criminal drug trafficking organizations along the
border. The objective of these initiatives are to disrupt and ultimately
dismantle criminal organizations that smuggle illicit drugs into the U.S.
by linking Federal, state and local investigations domestically and mobilizing
multilateral enforcement efforts abroad. Based upon past trends, intelligence,
and recent seizures along the border, the DEA has established the following
priorities for the SWB Field Divisions: (1) cocaine investigations involving
violent organizations; (2) methamphetamine investigations, (3) heroin investigations,
(4) marijuana investigations, (5) money laundering investigations and (6)
diverted/dangerous drug and chemical investigations.
Enforcement Operations/Strategies:
In response to the emergence of these Mexican Drug Trafficking Organization's
(MDTO), it became apparent that a coordinated strategy for law enforcement
counterdrug activities needed to be implemented. In order to combat drug
production and trafficking networks operating along the U.S./Mexican border,
DEA, in concert with other Federal agencies established the Southwest Border
Initiative - an integrated, coordinated law enforcement effort designed
to attack the command and control structure of organized criminal operations
associated with the Mexican Federation. This strategy focuses on intelligence
and enforcement efforts which target drug distribution systems within the
U.S. and directs resources toward the disruption of those principal drug
trafficking organizations operating across the border.
As such, DEA, in cooperation with other Federal, state and local law
enforcement agencies is focusing increased intelligence, technical resources
and investigative expertise on the major MDTO's responsible for smuggling
vast quantities of cocaine, heroin, marijuana and methamphetamine across
the border.
Apart from this effort, DEA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) also provide operational planning, intelligence and training to Government
of Mexico (GOM) law enforcement authorities, to strengthen their capacity
to combat these organizations. The Southwest Border strategy targets specific
Mexican trafficking organizations operating across the border and attacks
their command and control infrastructures wherever they operate.
Further, the Special Operations Division (SOD)is a joint national coordinating
and support entity comprised of agents, analysts, and prosecutors from
DOJ, Customs, FBI, DEA and IRS. Its mission is to coordinate and support
regional and national criminal investigations and prosecutions against
trafficking organizations that most threaten the U.S. SOD performs seamlessly
across both investigative agency and district jurisdictional boundaries,
providing field offices with necessary support, assistance, intelligence
analysis and "leads" for investigative action. Within SOD, no distinction
is made among the participating investigative agencies. Where appropriate,
state and local authorities are fully integrated into coordinated operations.
As presently configured, SOD consists of five sections; each of which has
both DEA and FBI personnel assigned. One section targets Colombian Trafficking
Organizations, a second concentrates on cocaine and heroin trafficking
in Europe and Asia, a third targets money laundering organizations and
the remaining two sections are the heart of the Southwest Border Project
and focus their efforts on the principal MDTO's. These two sections target,
among other things, the command and control networks of the identified
MDTO's, and their supporting organizations operating along the Southwest
border. As such, the interagency regional objectives are as follows; (1)
Intelligence collection and analysis, (2) Investigations, (3) Interdiction
and Enforcement and (4) Prosecution and Incarceration. The following operation
delineates the need and significance for such a multi-agency project:
Operation Impunity:
In September 1999, the DEA announced the conclusion of a two-year international
investigation that culminated in the arrest of over 106 individuals linked
to the Amado Carrillo Fuentes (ACF) drug trafficking organization, headquartered
in Cancun, Mexico. This investigation, known as "Operation Impunity", was
a multi-jurisdictional, multi-agency investigation which directly linked
drug trafficking activity in the United States to the highest level of
the Mexican cocaine trade.
This investigation began in January 1998 and was conducted jointly by
the DEA, FBI, USCS, U.S. Attorney's Office, DOJ/Criminal Division and a
host of state and local law enforcement agencies. The investigation encompassed
53 DEA, FBI and USCS case investigations which spans 14 Federal judicial
districts. Since 1998, this investigation has resulted in 36 seizures,
netting 12,434 kilograms of cocaine, a half a kilo of heroin, 4,806 pounds
of marijuana, more than $19 million in U.S. currency, and the arrest of
106 individuals.
The above statistics only tell part of the story. Operation Impunity
demonstrated an unparalleled coordinated and cooperative effort among the
law enforcement community. Overall, this investigation allowed the law
enforcement community to ascertain this organization's method of operation
from the narcotic distribution in Colombia to the transportation through
Mexico to the ultimate distribution networks throughout the U.S. Such success
clearly demonstrates the need for the continuation of long term, multi-agency
investigations.
Cooperative Efforts with the Government of Mexico/Status of Vetted Units:
Subsequent to the arrest of General Gutierrez Rebollo in 1997 and the
establishment of mechanisms within the Mexican law enforcement infrastructure,
such as the Bilateral Task Forces (BTF's) and the Vetted Unit program,
DEA became cautiously optimistic relative to the prospects of the GOM's
commitment to bilateral investigations. The DEA has supported these programs
financially and with other resources in hope that our efforts would result
in a successful attack against the drug lords who are creating so much
havoc throughout communities in the United States. However, continuing
reports of corruption and the rapidly growing power and influence of the
major organized criminal groups in Mexico cause us great concern about
the long-term prospects for success. Perhaps, the arrest of Operation Impunity
target Jaime Aguilar Gastelum and Operation Millennium target Guillermo
Moreno-Rios, by Mexican authorities, is indicative of the GOM's future
commitment to such joint ventures.
However, in the last year the Vetted Units Program in Mexico has not
achieved the potential as originally envisioned by both governments. In
order to presently address this issue, the DEA and the Government of Mexico's
equivalent to the DEA, the Fiscalia Especializada Para la Atencion de Delitos
Contra la Salud (FEADS), have agreed to carefully review the Program and
establish ways to improve its efficiency and effectiveness against mutually
agreed investigative targets. The DEA and FEADS also continue to conduct
joint investigative endeavors throughout Mexico. The joint investigations
are being conducted with the primary investigative component of the FEADS
vetted units --the Bilateral Task Forces (BTF's). However, the DEA has
not worked with the remaining vetted units due to diminished efforts of
the Government of Mexico/PGR to better organize them into a well-engaged
work force.
However, the investigative achievements by the BTF and the SIU as related
to cases against the major drug trafficking organizations are minimal.
The inability of these units to fully employ the provisions of the Organized
Crime Law to properly investigate these major organizations has been equally
disappointing. Further complicating investigative efforts, the Mexico City-based
SIU was compromised in February 1999 by a Mexican news exposé describing
the operations of that unit, to include its location, activities and investigative
targets. Because of this setback, the SIU has been largely shut down, and
throughout 1999 to present, the GOM has failed to revive the unit and is
still in the process of searching for a new site to relocate the SIU. In
addition, throughout 1999 police personnel from the Mexico City SIU were
separated into smaller groups and often deployed to various regions throughout
Mexico in order to work other investigations, such as the search for Mexico
fugitive and former Governor of the State of Quintana Roo Mario Villanueva-Madrid.
In addition, vetted unit personnel of the Organized Crime Unit (OCU),
of which the SIU is a part, have been investigating a drug smuggling network
of the Carrillo-Fuentes organization in Cancun, headed by Alcides Ramon-Magana.
During the course of this investigation, DEA has shared three principal
witnesses with the OCU who have provided information regarding this organization
. The information gleaned from these witnesses has contributed to the seizure
of real estate in Quintana Roo and the arrest of several defendants in
this case, including mid-level drug trafficker and money-launderer Carlos
Colin-Padilla. In addition, the GOM issued arrest warrants for a total
of 44 individuals associated with Ramon-Magana including an arrest warrant
issued on April 5, 1999, against former Governor Villanueva Madrid on 28
counts of drug related offenses.
The governments of Mexico and the United States will continue to conduct
cooperative and bilateral investigations. Just this month, based upon information
provided by the DEA to the GOM, two such operations were conducted, resulting
in the seizure of a cocaine laboratory and a methamphetamine laboratory
in Mexico. Ultimately, DEA believes that the vetting process is our best
chance at ensuring integrity with our counterparts. As mentioned in previous
testimony today with respect to the ongoing bilateral Vetted Units Program
survey, DEA will remain actively engaged with our GOM counterparts relative
to this process. DEA will also encourage the GOM to fully staff and support
the BTF's and the SIU's with FEADS personnel that have already been vetted
and to supply the resources that these operations require.
Corruption Issues:
Although the Mexican government is attempting to address the issue of
corruption, it continues to be a serious problem in Mexican law enforcement
institutions. The Federal Preventive Police (FPP) was created in early
1999 in response to the existing corruption in the police ranks, but recently
reported that several FPP agents were under investigation for corrupt activities.
In December 1999 the Government of Mexico/PGR reported that between April
1997 through 1999 more than 1,400 of the 3,500 federal police officers
had been fired for corruption and that 357 of the officers had been prosecuted.
Additionally, the National Public Safety System established a national
police registry to prevent corrupt police officials from being rehired
by another law enforcement entity. However, the PGR has not fully implemented
these programs to deal with corruption. For example, in 1999, the former
Director of Investigations for the PGR's SIU and OCU, Cuauhtemoc Herrera
Suastegui, was reassigned to a high-level position within the PGR despite
failing a USG-administered polygraph examination in 1998. Additionally,
there are indications that he provided assistance to the Carrillo-Fuentes
drug trafficking organization. Although several FEADS vetted "floater"
units have had several successes during 1999, the Vetted Unit Program failed
to adhere to internal security principles involving the polygraph process,
which may lead to potential compromises and corruption. The Mexican military
also has experienced narco-related corruption within its ranks.
As of July 1999, an amendment to the Judicial Organic law mandated that
PGR officers, prosecutors, police agents, experts, and pilots assigned
to narcotics eradication duties are required to undergo an evaluation process,
to include background checks and polygraphs.
Judicial efforts to stop corruption are underway. On January 11, 2000,
a Mexican Federal judge issued an arrest warrant for the magistrate who
wrongly freed Adan Amezcua-Contreras, a major methamphetamine trafficker.
On February 3, 2000, the Mexican Federal Supreme Court ruled that the suspended
Morelos Governor, Jorge Carrillo-Olea, could be brought to trial for protecting
drug trafficking and kidnapping activities. Olea, a retired general and
former Director of Mexico's civilian intelligence agency (CISN) and former
anti-drug Commissioner for the Attorney General's Office (PGR), was ordered
by the Federal Supreme Court to be placed under house arrest by the PGR.
The PGR, however, has yet to take him into custody. This is the first time
the Federal Supreme Court ruled to refer a Governor or Executive Branch
official to trial.
Perhaps the most alarming incident involving Mexican officials occurred
on November 9, 1999, when a DEA Special Agent, along with a FBI Special
Agent debriefed a Confidential Source in Matamoros, Mexico. During the
course of this debriefing the Special Agents and Confidential Source were
surrounded and physically threatened by documented Mexican trafficker Osiel
Cardenas-Guillen and approximately 15 associates. Each of these associates,
one brandishing a gold-plated automatic assault weapon, were either municipal
or state police officers. Furthermore, despite monitoring the entire incident
over the DEA Special Agent's cellular telephone, whom had called to request
assistance, the Tamaulipas State Judicial Police Commander took no action.
Due only to their resourcefulness and ability to diffuse this potentially
fatal encounter, were the agents and the confidential source able to survive
unscathed. Among other issues, this incident highlights the vulnerability
of DEA and FBI Special Agents working in Mexico.
Status of Extraditions:
The principal leaders of major drug trafficking organizations fear the
threat of extradition to the United States more than any other law enforcement
or judicial tool. Extradition of significant traffickers ensures that those
responsible for the command and control of illicit activities, including
drug smuggling and money laundering, will be held totally accountable for
their actions and serve a prison sentence commensurate with their crimes.
No major drug traffickers were extradited to the United States in 1999.
The Mexican Government did extradite 10 fugitives on narcotics related
or money laundering offenses in 1999 -- eight U.S. citizens and two Mexican
citizens. One Mexican citizen, a drug trafficker, was sought on drug charges
after escaping from a U. S. prison while serving a sentence on drug related
crimes. The other Mexican citizen, who killed a United States Border patrol
agent, was sought on murder and marijuana smuggling charges.
In September 1998, the Government of Mexico arrested U.S. Citizen and
DEA fugitive Randall Jeffrey Spradling in Guadalajara which, given Spradling's
strong ties to both Mexican and Colombian drug traffickers, was an important
event. He is fighting extradition to the United States.
In the past twelve months, some Mexican Courts have denied extradition
of significant drug traffickers, such as Jaime Ladino-Avila, to the U.S.
due to a variety of reasons, such as outstanding Supreme Court decisions
holding life imprisonment unconstitutional in Mexico. At the end of 1999,
there were 40 persons in Mexican custody and subject to extradition proceedings
based on U.S. provisional arrest warrants and extradition requests. However,
DEA has not observed any positive developments with respect to the extradition
of significant drug traffickers in the last year.
Conclusion: The Road Ahead:
The United States' long experience with confronting and dismantling
organized criminal activity has necessitated the development of an aggressive,
cohesive and coordinated strategy to identify, target, arrest and incapacitate
the leadership of these organizations . DEA=s role in addressing the drug
problem is to continue to attack the leadership of these international
criminal organizations. With a strategy consisting of mounting attacks
on the organizational command and control of major Mexican trafficking
syndicates that operate along the U.S./Mexico border, the DEA is able to
attack the ability of these organizations to conduct business and impede
their efforts to import drugs into the U.S.
The effectiveness of national and bilateral efforts against drug organizations
will depend largely on demonstrable progress in disrupting and dismantling
these transnational narco-trafficking organizations. This includes apprehending,
prosecuting and convicting major drug traffickers, as well as exercising
extradition laws against those defendants facing federal drug trafficking
charges in the United States, and exposing and prosecuting individuals
and businesses involved in providing critical support networks such as
front companies, security , transportation and the like.
Therefore, it is imperative for law enforcement to continue to facilitate
the flow of information and intelligence while identifying and removing
impediments to cooperation. In this vein, it is vital for the DEA, along
with other USG agencies, to continue to support the GOM in the field of
counternarcotics operations. In turn, DEA encourages and expects the GOM
to provide adequate investigative manpower, ongoing integrity testing,
financial resources, equipment and reciprocal drug intelligence in support
of bilateral drug law enforcement, which should significantly improve both
governments' ability to counter and eliminate transnational drug trafficking
organizations.
However, the true sign of success regarding anti-drug efforts in Mexico
is best recognized with tangible results from concerted law enforcement
efforts, i.e. the arrest and successful prosecution of significant leaders
of these major drug cartels in Mexico and; where applicable, their extraditions
to the United States to face federal drug trafficking charges. We are not
yet there.