ANA MARIA SALAZAR

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
DRUG ENFORCEMENT POLICY AND SUPPORT

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY,
AND HUMAN RESOURCES

February 15, 2000

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD

I am pleased to have the opportunity to testify before this
Subcommittee to discuss the Department of Defense's perspective on the
growing Colombian drug threat as well as our integrated programs
designed to assist the Government of Colombia in its efforts to
address this scourge.

As you are aware, drug abuse is an undeniable threat to our national
security that is measured in thousands of lives lost and costing our
country billions of dollars annually. Reducing the supply of drugs on
our streets is an integral component of our National Drug Control
Strategy and the Department of Defense (DoD) plays a key supporting
role in creating the opportunity for law enforcement agencies, both
our own and those of foreign nations, to interdict the flow of drugs
into our country. DoD is committed to this counter-drug mission. The
programs I will outline today were developed in conjunction with U.S.
Southern Command, our interagency partners and the Government of
Colombia, and form the core of a sound, responsive, and timely
assistance package that will significantly enhance Colombia's ability
to conduct effective counter-drug operations.

Over the past two years, Colombia -- specifically the area east of the
Andes -- has become the center of the cocaine trade, largely as a
result of successful interdiction and eradication efforts in Peru and
Bolivia. The remoteness of eastern Colombia and the lack of government
control in large areas of this region has precluded Colombian
interdiction operations to the point that the expansion of
coca-growing areas, especially in the Putumayo Department, has
progressed virtually unchecked. Most of the world's coca is now grown
in Colombia and over 80 percent of the cocaine consumed in the U.S. is
manufactured in Colombia. The United States, the nation with the
greatest cocaine demand, currently consumes over 200 metric tons
annually from the Andean region.

Source-Zone Programs

To disrupt illegal cocaine cultivation and production throughout the
source zone, DoD, working with host nations and our interagency
partners, has developed and selectively implemented a threat-based,
intelligence-driven, counter-drug interdiction strategy which has
focused on air, riverine/coastal, and ground programs. DoD has worked
closely with source-zone nations to improve their organic air
interdiction capability by funding upgrades to their aircraft that
conduct counter-drug missions. To support the detection and monitoring
(D&M) of airborne traffickers, the Department has fielded Relocatable
Over-the-Horizon Radars (ROTHR), and deployed ground-based radars
along with airborne tracker aircraft equipped with air-to-air radars.

Our counter-drug riverine and littoral efforts have provided equipment
and training support to source-zone nations, thereby facilitating
effective operations along the vast river networks of the Amazon
Basin, a major supply route for precursor production chemicals.
Finally, DoD's ground interdiction assistance has concentrated on
training selected military units, consisting of human rights-vetted
personnel, in the light infantry tactics they require to support law
enforcement interdiction and eradication operations. These source-zone
programs have been enhanced through the development of intelligence
and command-and-control networks. These efforts, in conjunction with
law enforcement and eradication programs, have proven to be successful
in both Peru and Bolivia; however, the conditions necessary to
implement a coordinated response throughout the Colombian cultivation
and cocaine-production regions have not been met -- until now.

Plan Colombia

Colombian President Andres Pastrana has developed a comprehensive and
integrated approach to address Colombia's current problems. This plan,
known as "Plan Colombia," would strengthen the Colombian economy and
democracy while fighting narcotics trafficking. Further, this plan
demonstrates that Colombia is moving forward aggressively, exercising
its political will to address, and ultimately solve, domestic problems
that have persisted for decades. The U.S. has a vital material
interest in the success of this plan. We must now step forward with
the Government of Colombia by enhancing our current strategy, based on
proven source-zone interdiction programs. This effort is responsive to
Plan Colombia and consistent with current U.S. policy.

Colombian Supplemental Source-Zone Enhancements

The proposed fiscal year 2000 supplemental request will provide the
resources necessary to promote essential facets of the Department's
assistance to Colombian interdiction efforts. We feel that the
supplemental is a balanced and executable plan -- not without
challenges, which I will address later -- that is necessary to attack
the strategically vulnerable aerial cocaine transportation network
while expanding ground interdiction and eradication operations into
the densest coca-cultivation areas of the Putumayo region. Let me
outline for you how this supplemental funding would enhance each of
our baseline counter-drug programs in Colombia in support of our
overall source-zone strategy.

Air Interdiction

Colombia requires aircraft that can track drug traffickers engaged in
aerial smuggling. The supplemental will fund the installation of
air-to-air radars in two Colombian aircraft. These radars will provide
the Colombian Air Force with the organic ability to conduct terminal
aerial intercepts of drug smugglers. Aerial intercepts are intricate
operations and require adequate ground-based coordination. Therefore,
the supplemental will also fund the upgrade of the Colombian Air Force
radar command and control center as well, as additional ground-based
radars to assist in detecting and sorting aircraft operating in
eastern Colombia. Critical to this air interdiction effort are
supplemental initiatives, under State Department authority, that will
upgrade Colombian Air Force counter-drug aircraft for the air
intercept mission. The supplemental also requests funding for U.S.
Customs Service airborne early warning aircraft upgrades to ensure
that these crucial platforms will continue to be available for the
source-zone interdiction mission.

Basing airborne D&M aircraft, as well as aerial intelligence
collection platforms, close to the historical airborne smuggling
routes is of the utmost importance to the successful implementation of
the integrated strategy in Colombia. For this reason, funding for the
forward operating location (FOL) at Manta, Ecuador, is included in the
supplemental. General Wilhelm will expound on the operational
requirements; however, I want to ensure that you understand that the
Department views the completion of the site upgrades to the Manta FOL
as a critical component of the overall source-zone effort.

Ground Interdiction

The supplemental funding focuses extensive resources on improving
Colombia's counter-drug ground interdiction programs. The Department
has completed training of a counter-drug battalion that is now
operational in the Putumayo region. The supplemental will support the
training and equipping of two additional counter-drug battalions that
will be operational by the end of this calendar year. Funding, if
appropriated, will also be used to develop a suitable counter-drug
brigade headquarters to oversee the operation of the three
counter-drug battalions.

The Colombian National Police (CNP) will be conducting counter-drug
interdiction and eradication missions in remote regions of the country
where the coca-growing fields are located. Therefore, the counter-drug
battalions will require adequate airlift to move troops to support the
CNP. The required helicopter lift is provided for under State
Department authority; however, DoD will use proposed supplemental
funding to establish the necessary Colombian Army aviation support
infrastructure. Enhanced counter-drug intelligence collection efforts
are also required to develop and plan counter-drug operations.
Consequently, the supplemental will provide sufficient funding in this
area to further enhance the intelligence programs that already serve
as a foundation for our source-zone strategy.

All these programs that I just outlined build on our current strategy
-- no change in DoD policy is required to execute the programs funded
by this supplemental. There is nothing new here for DoD. However,
there will be challenges to confront in the course of our efforts to
attack the center of the cocaine industry in eastern Colombia. It will
not be easy, but it is worth the effort. Let me share with you my
concerns.

DoD Concerns

Colombian Military Organization

First, the Colombian military, by their own admission, is not
optimally structured and organized to execute sustained counter-drug
operations. They are heavy on "tail" and short on "tooth." They need
to better coordinate operations between the services and with the CNP.
The military has limitations based on resources, training practices,
lack of joint planning and operations. The restructuring of the
military is essential if Colombia is to have continuing operational
success against the drug threat. The Colombian military needs help and
we plan to use a small portion of supplemental funding towards this
end.

Human Rights

I am also concerned, as are many others in Congress, about human
rights. The practices and procedures that the U.S. government has put
in place, often at the behest of concerned members of Congress, and
the example set by the small number of our troops training Colombian
forces, has had an impact, as have President Pastrana's reforms. This
is a success story. While we must remain vigilant, and there is
undoubtedly room for improvement, I am concerned that if extensive
conditional clauses are included in the supplemental appropriations
language, we could inhibit or mitigate the overall effectiveness of
U.S. assistance to Colombian. We need to work together, Congress and
the Administration, to address this concern. I am also alarmed by the
reported dramatic increase in human rights violations attributed to
both the paramilitaries and insurgents -- this is symptomatic of
Colombia's crisis in general and, as I see it, a call for action. The
Colombian government needs the resources and training to address this
problem, and the supplemental represents a significant contribution on
the part of the U.S.

Counter-drug vs. Counter-insurgency

Lastly, let me address the "targets" of this supplemental package, and
our source-zone strategy as a whole. The targets are the
narco-traffickers, those individuals and organizations that are
involved in the cultivation of coca and the subsequent production and
transportation of cocaine to the U.S. The Colombian military will use
the equipment and training that is provided by this supplemental
request, in conjunction with the assistance that has already been
delivered, to secure perimeters around CNP objectives -- coca fields
and cocaine labs -- so that the CNP can safely conduct interdiction
and eradication operations. Only those armed elements that forcibly
inhibit or confront these joint military and CNP operations will be
engaged, be they narco-traffickers, insurgent organizations, or
paramilitaries.

I know that many are concerned that this aid package represents a step
"over the line," an encroachment into the realm of counter-insurgency
in the name of counter-drug. It is not. The Department has not, and
will not, cross that line. While I do not have the time to elaborate
on all of the restrictions, constraints, and reviews that are involved
in the approval of the deployment of U.S. military personnel on
counter-drug missions, in Colombia and elsewhere, it suffices to say
that it is comprehensive. I personally look not only at who is
deploying and what they are doing, but at the specific locations to
which they are going. Furthermore, each and every deployment order
states, in no uncertain terms, that DoD personnel are not to accompany
host nation personnel on operational missions. This will not change.
As I have said, this supplemental does not require a change in U.S.
policy. Is there risk to U.S. personnel providing counter-drug
support? Yes, there is. Is the risk increased as a result of the
programs being enhanced by the supplemental? The answer is no.

The Department of Defense enthusiastically supports this supplemental.
U.S. Southern Command and my office participated extensively in its
formulation. It integrates fully our source-zone strategy, affording
the opportunity to enhance those counter-drug programs that have
proven successful in Peru and Bolivia. President Pastrana has asked
for international support to address an internal problem that has
international dimensions -- fueled in part by our country's demand for
cocaine. It is time to move forward and, I hope, with congressional
support, that we can do so soon.