Congressional Record: February 24, 2000 (Senate)
Page S799-S820
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTION
By Mr. SPECTER (for himself, Mr. Torricelli, Mr. Thurmond, Mr.
Biden, Mr. Grassley, Mr. Feingold, Mr. Helms, Mr. Schumer, and
Mr. Sessions):
S. 2089. A bill to amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 to
[[Page S800]]
modify procedures relating to orders for surveillance and searches for
foreign intelligence purposes, and for other purposes; to the Committee
on the Judiciary.
the counterintelligence reform act of 2000
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition to introduce
legislation which would correct procedures under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act. I offer this bill on behalf of Senator
Torricelli, Senator Thurmond, Senator Biden, Senator Grassley, Senator
Feingold, Senator Helms, Senator Schumer, and Senator Sessions.
This is legislation which is designed to correct a very pressing
problem. This bill refines the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to
enable the appropriate investigations of espionage to avoid the very
serious mistakes which were made during the investigation of Dr. Wen Ho
Lee. The references to Dr. Lee's investigation are made only for the
purpose of illustrating the procedural problems which this legislation
is designed to correct. The determination as to whether or not Mr. Wen
Ho Lee is guilty will remain for the court of competent jurisdiction
where he has been indicted.
There was information released into the public domain at Mr. Lee's
bail hearing which underscores the tremendous importance of this
particular case. Dr. Stephen Younger, assistant laboratory director for
nuclear weapons at Los Alamos, testified at Dr. Lee's bail hearing on
December 13, 1999, and said:
These codes and their associated databases and the input
file, combined with someone that knew how to use them, could,
in my opinion, in the wrong hands, change the global
strategic balance.
It is hard to have any item of greater importance than changing the
global strategic balance.
Dr. Younger further testified:
They enable the possessor to design the only objects that
could result in the military defeat of America's conventional
forces. . . They represent the gravest possible security risk
to . . . the supreme national interest.
Again, it is hard to find more forceful language as to the
seriousness of this particular matter than the potential military
defeat of America's conventional forces.
During the course of this investigation, there were very serious time
lapses while the FBI sought to get a warrant on Dr. Lee under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
The FBI made the FISA request in June of 1997. It was refused by the
Department of Justice on August 12, 1997, and then FBI Director Freeh
sent FBI Assistant Director John Lewis to talk personally to Attorney
General Reno. Attorney General Reno then appointed a Department of
Justice subordinate named Daniel Seikaly, who reviewed the matter and
rejected it. Attorney General Reno, as she conceded in testimony
presented to the Judiciary Committee on June 8, 1999, did not follow up
on the matter, leaving this very important request rejected.
The proposed legislation would require that when the Director of the
FBI makes a request for a FISA warrant that the Attorney General
personally must make the decision as to whether the FISA warrant
request should be submitted to the court for action. The legislation
further provides that when the Attorney General declines to submit the
FISA application to the court, the rejection must be in writing. This
would give the FBI Director a roadmap, so to speak, as to what
additional information is necessary to have the warrant request
submitted to the court.
After the Department of Justice declined to submit the FISA warrant
to the court, the FBI investigation of the case was inactive for some
16 months. It took from August of 1997 to December of 1997 for the FBI
Headquarters to send a letter regarding the FISA request to the FBI
Albuquerque Field Office, where it lay dormant until November of 1998.
From the time the FISA application was not forwarded to the court to
the time the FBI office in Albuquerque finally acted, some 16 months
elapsed. These 16 months were very crucial with respect to the
activities of Dr. Lee.
This legislation further provides that when the Attorney General
rejects a FISA application in writing, the Director of the FBI has the
obligation to personally supervise the matter.
The Department of Energy then initiated a polygraph of Dr. Lee, in a
very unusual way, that has since been criticized by the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. The Department of Energy
represented that Dr. Lee passed the polygraph when, in fact, he had
not. The Secretary of Energy even made an announcement on national
television to the effect that Dr. Lee had passed the polygraph when, in
fact, he had not. That threw the FBI off course, thinking that a passed
polygraph exonerated the suspect. This legislation provides that an
agency such as the Department of Energy may not take action on a
polygraph, that these matters are to be left to the FBI, which has the
paramount authority to investigate these matters.
The FBI then conducted another polygraph, but not until February 10,
1999, some 6 weeks after the polygraph he allegedly passed. Even though
Dr. Lee failed this second polygraph, no action was taken to terminate
Dr. Lee until March 8. In the interim, he deleted many of the files
that are in issue. These deletions took place on January 20, February
9, 11, 12, and 17, all to the potential prejudice of the United States.
Dr. Lee did not have a search warrant executed until April 9, which is
a very long lapse before any official action had been taken.
The legislation further provides that when a suspect is left in place
for the purpose of the investigation, the FBI must make this request in
writing and that to that agency. The agency, such as the Department of
Energy, must then formulate a plan within 30 days to structure how that
suspect will be left in place while minimizing the exposure of
classified information to that person.
One of the reasons given by the Department of Justice in declining to
go forward with the FISA application was that Dr. Lee was not
``currently engaged'' in objectionable activities--to use mild words.
This bill changes that requirement to probable cause on the totality of
the circumstances.
That is a brief summary of what this legislation would do. It is the
view of the sponsors of this bill that it is very important for it to
move forward so that on pending espionage investigations we do not have
the lapses that occurred in this very important case.
I am pleased to note that all the members of the Judiciary
Subcommittee have joined in cosponsoring this legislation. I thank my
colleague, Senator Torricelli, for his cooperation. Senator Thurmond,
Senator Grassley, and Senator Sessions have all cosponsored among the
Republican members, as have Senators Feingold and Schumer, in addition
to Senator Torricelli. Senator Biden was consulted specially and is a
cosponsor because he was the author of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act back in 1978. Senator Helms has asked to be added as a
cosponsor, which he has.
The subcommittee has had some substantial difficulty in ``birth''
pains; it has not really been born, to the extent that the subcommittee
has not been funded. We have worked really from our own personal
staffs. We have had three fellows and one detailee. We have completed a
very lengthy detailed report, some 65 pages, which is the product of
extraordinary work by Mr. Doman McArthur of my staff, in collaboration
with Senator Torricelli's staff and the staffs of others. We have gone
through the 65-page report with a fine-tooth comb to be sure that it is
precise, exact, and does not make any disclosures as to any classified
information.
The subcommittee has deferred holding hearings on the Wen Ho Lee
matter, which had been scheduled for December, at the specific request
of Director Freeh. Director Freeh met with Torricelli and myself and
requested that the hearings on Dr. Lee not go forward substantively,
which might cause some problem with the pending prosecution. We do have
hearings scheduled on the legislation for March 7, 8 and 21. I have
already informed FBI Director Freeh of our intentions to proceed with
those hearings, which will be on the substance as to how the act should
be reformed. We have given notice to Director Freeh that we would
appreciate his presence as a witness. He has said he would be glad to
attend.
That is a very brief statement of a very complex matter. It is my
hope we will have the final clearance from the
[[Page S801]]
Department of Justice to be able to file the full 65-page report which
will elaborate upon the brief summary which I have presented.
I am delighted to yield to my very distinguished colleague from New
Jersey, Senator Torricelli, the ranking member of the subcommittee.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey is recognized.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. President, I thank Senator Specter for yielding
time to me. I also thank him for his perseverance and diligence in
working on this issue over the course of the last several months.
I also express particular thanks to Senator Biden who in reviewing
this legislation made very important additions and allowed us to
proceed on a bipartisan basis for what I think is an important and
worthwhile change in the laws dealing with foreign intelligence
surveillance.
The origins of this legislation--part of the Judiciary Committee's
oversight--is the question of how the Department of Justice handled
allegations of Chinese espionage at our most important National
Laboratories.
The focus of this review, of course, had to do with the case of Dr.
Wen Ho Lee, a scientist who was charged in December with 59 counts of
illegally removing secrets from computer information at the Los Alamos
Laboratory. It appears that Dr. Lee was the subject of interest or
investigations for espionage for over 17 years. He was dealing with the
most important weapons secrets possessed by his government critical to
the security of the United States.
It would be difficult for anyone in this Government to explain to the
American people why, despite 17 years of investigation and some reasons
for considerable doubt all during this time, he was permitted to
continue with his job and retain access to highly classified
information.
Much is still to be learned about this case. A criminal case is
proceeding and an investigation. That is for, in some instances, others
to deal with. That does not mean we do not already know some things
that can change the conduct in this Government and the laws under which
we govern ourselves. We have learned through this investigation that
this was all made possible by a series of procedural and investigative
errors that gave Dr. Lee this opportunity to download this highly
classified material to an unsecured computer.
In truth, we do not yet know whether or not, when this unguarded
material was in an unsecured computer, in fact it got to foreign agents
or other interested parties other than people with proper clearance in
the U.S. Government. We do not know. We may never know. But we do know
this after interviewing many witnesses and thousands of documents:
There was a startling, almost unbelievable failure of coordination and
communication between the Department of Justice, the FBI, and the
Department of Energy in dealing with this matter, and only through that
lack of coordination was an allegation of possible espionage able to
lead to 17 years of continued access and the possibility that this
information was compromised.
As early as 1982, the FBI was aware that Dr. Lee was engaged in
suspicious activities. Yet both at that time and in the years that
followed there was no action taken to limit access to classified
material. The Department of Energy detected Dr. Lee transferring an
inordinate number of systems from a secured system to an unsecured
system in 1993 and 1994. Personnel responsible for reporting that
information failed to do so.
In 1997, the FBI had an opportunity to stop Dr. Lee, but they were
stymied by the denial of the Department of Justice of a request
submitted by the FBI for a warrant to further investigate Dr. Lee. It
is this failure that brings us here today.
The evidence supporting a FISA request for their warrant was
overwhelming. It had been building for years. No single piece of
evidence may have been sufficient to warrant a criminal case, but they
were more than sufficient to raise a proper level of suspicion to
support the issuing of a warrant.
Now we know that the request for this warrant, a FISA application,
was never even considered by the Attorney General of the United States.
When the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mr. Freeh,
sent a personal representative to meet with the Attorney General to
express his concern about the warrant application, which he was right
and proper to do, the Attorney General delegated the matter to a
subordinate who was unfamiliar with the matter and who had never
processed a similar request--no experience, no knowledge, no
involvement--and the final disposition of the matter, therefore, was
predictable. The request was denied. The warrant was not issued, and an
opportunity potentially to either apprehend someone committing a
criminal act or to have prevented further damage, if any occurred, was
lost.
Unfortunately, this problem was compounded in that when the FBI was
denied this warrant, in my judgment, the matter should have been
appealed but it was allowed to languish, and then further hampered by
the Department of Energy which conducted a polygraph of Dr. Lee, and
then, incredibly, unbelievably incorrectly concluded that he had passed
the test.
It is a series of compounded errors of procedure and judgment. It is
difficult for the Congress to legislate good judgment for the proper
execution of responsibilities. If we cannot do so, we can at least
design the laws to provide for greater accountability.
That is, indeed, what is being done by my colleagues. Under the
legislation we are now introducing, Senator Specter and I have written
amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to provide that
upon the personal request of the Director of the FBI, the Attorney
General must personally review the FISA requests--no subordinate, no
uninformed associate. This is a matter of national security. The
Attorney General has no greater responsibility than protecting the
secrets of the U.S. Government. This matter belongs on the Attorney
General's desk, and under this legislation that is where it will rest.
There are those who may argue that making the Attorney General
directly responsible will somehow provide an avalanche of work, that
they will not be able to deal with all of these matters. Appropriately,
the legislation has been designed so this provision is triggered only
by the personal request from the Director of the FBI--no subordinate,
no associate, no one else in the Government. So the number of cases
will be extremely limited. But when asked by the Director of the FBI,
one person, and one person in this Government alone, will have direct
responsibility.
Second, the legislation requires that if the Attorney General decides
not to forward a FISA application to the court, that decision must be
communicated in writing to the FBI Director along with specific
recommendations as to what investigative steps should be undertaken to
meet the probable cause requirements. Matters of national security on
this level cannot fall in departmental cracks--not get lost somewhere
between Justice and the FBI. This will ensure that in those cases when
the Attorney General has personally rejected this request the reasons
will be stated, the FBI will be told why and then given a chance to
return having met the appropriate probable cause standard.
Third, the legislation requires that the FBI Director must personally
supervise the implementation of the Attorney General's recommendations
to ensure once again that in the highest levels of the U.S. Government
these unusual but critical cases of national security dealing with
foreign espionage are dealt with not by subordinates, but that this
Congress can hold people for which it has responsibility, oversight,
and votes to confirm--such as the Attorney General and the FBI
Director--directly accountable.
I believe these are appropriate responses to what we have learned to
date out of this investigation. But I conclude by saying both what this
legislation is and what it is not.
This legislation is not an attempt to lower the probable cause
standard for what is required for a warrant and a FISA application.
Probable cause is a standard of law. It should be taken seriously. The
rights of no citizen should be violated by an intrusive or curious
government. The standard remains.
What is being changed here is accountability, not a lessening of
civil
[[Page S802]]
liberties. We simply want to know that the standard which has always
existed of probable cause will be used, that procedures will be
followed, that people will be held accountable, not that the Government
is any more or any less intrusive. The probable cause standard remains
the cornerstone of American liberties to ensure that the Government has
reason and merit as a matter of law to involve itself in the privacy of
our citizens.
I proudly offer this legislation with Senator Specter. I believe it
is a good and appropriate response. I thank the Senator for his
patience in the drafting. I listened to my colleagues, particularly on
this side of the aisle, with relatively modest changes we have
recommended, all of which the Senator has incorporated. I look forward
to the committee and then the Senate enacting this legislation.
Mr. BIDEN. FISA, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978,
is a very vital part of our arsenal to combat terrorism and espionage.
For 20 years, it has enabled the FBI to keep track of major threats to
our security while preserving the constitutional rights of Americans.
Basically, it provides for a sort of super search warrant, allowing the
FBI, under certain unique circumstances, to eavesdrop upon activities,
after showing a probable cause to a Federal judge, without having to
disclose this eavesdropping in ways that they would have to under a
normal warrant for a wiretap or a physical search.
FISA has been very useful to deal with terrorism, and also with
espionage cases.
Senator Specter has undertaken an effort to look into what may or may
not have transpired at our National Laboratories in the celebrated case
of Wen Ho Lee and others. This has been the subject of some very
legitimate discussion, and occasionally some partisan discussion. But
knowing Senator Specter as long as I have, I do not doubt his desire to
look into these cases that have transpired, and the consequences of any
leakage of classified information from any of our National
Laboratories, for the primary purpose of seeing to it that it does not
happen again, if in fact it did happen, as well as to determine what
did happen.
Senator Specter and Senator Torricelli have been looking into these
recent cases, especially, as I said, the case of Wen Ho Lee at Los
Alamos National Laboratory. As a result of that inquiry, Senator
Specter is proposing what I think is a very important series of
sensible amendments to this act we call FISA. I am pleased to cosponsor
this bill, having been an original author of that legislation in 1978,
along with Birch Bayh and others.
The initial bill with which Senator Specter approached me and others
had a few areas where I thought it could be improved. I wish to
publicly thank Senator Specter for agreeing to the changes I suggested
in his proposed legislation.
One of the dilemmas that exists, in the debate about whether the
Attorney General and the Justice Department and/or the FBI were reading
from the same page in the hymnal on how to investigate the Wen Ho Lee
case, is the issue of whether the FBI communicated enough information
to the Attorney General so that, under the reading of the FISA law, the
Attorney General could conclude that there was sufficient reason to get
a search or electronic surveillance court order. There has been a
little bit of disagreement, at a minimum, between the FBI and the
Justice Department as to who said what, when, and what request was made
when. It has led to a serious political controversy. I think it has
also led, as a consequence, on both sides of the aisle, to some
posturing and partisanship about a significant national security issue.
One of Senator Specter's most important ideas in this bill, one which
is going to seem commonsensical to most Americans, is to make it clear
that if something is of such consequence that the Director of the FBI
believes there should be a FISA hearing and authority granted to allow
the FBI to use invasive measures to eavesdrop upon conversations and/or
get records, for example, from computer data and the like, if it is
that important, the FBI Director can, under this new amendment to FISA,
put that request in writing to the Attorney General and the Attorney
General, whoever that may be, then has to personally sign off or not
sign off, so we avoid this debate that is taking place now about
whether second level people or third level people made the right
judgment or wrong judgment, and whether or not there was any
malfeasance.
So this is a very practical solution. If this legislation had been in
place 3 years ago, 5 years ago, there would be no doubt as to what
happened. Had the FBI said this is critical and this is national
security, the Attorney General personally would have had to say yes or
no. That is where the record is unclear in the Wen Ho Lee case. This
bill would eliminate such doubt in future similar cases if and when
they arise, and they surely will arise.
Section 2 of this bill permits the judge to consider the past
activities of the target of an investigation--that is, the person upon
whom they want to eavesdrop and/or whose records they want to secretly
examine. So, for example, the Attorney General would be able to say, in
a closed FISA hearing: Your Honor, not only do we think this is
justified because of some current activity, but we can show you
evidence that in 1991 they were engaged in this suspicious activity, in
1993 they were engaged in that, in 1995 they were engaged in this,
therefore lending greater credibility to the argument that a FISA court
order should be issued by the judge.
Again, in this Wen Ho Lee case, and other cases that Senator Specter
has examined, there has been discussion of the fact that sometimes
these folks had been under investigation before. Would that not lend
greater weight to the need for this FISA request to be granted? So we
clear that up in this legislation, rather than only allowing the
target's current activity to be brought up.
Section 3 of this proposal requires the FISA court to be told if the
target of a proposed search or surveillance has a relationship with a
Federal law enforcement or intelligence agency. This came up in this
case as well. The case is being investigated. It turns out at some
point one of the persons in the past had been also a source for the
FBI. The FBI had gone to this person and said: Will you be a source for
us, looking into the possibility of some illegal activity? Then that
very person becomes the target, and that very person is never able to
tell, nor does the FBI or the CIA say: By the way, Your Honor, we were
working with them. That is why they went ahead and did the following.
Up to now, when the Federal Government has asked for a FISA court
judge to give this surveillance authority, it has not been required to
say: By the way, Your Honor, this person in the past had worked with us
as a source, as a person cooperating with us.
This is a new and useful protection for Americans, because the
conduct that might seem suspicious could be a result of what the law
enforcement agency had actually asked them to do. It seems only fair to
the target to be able to have that information known to the judge.
This is typical of the Senator from Pennsylvania, that he looks out
for individual rights as well as the interests of law enforcement.
There are several other interesting provisions in this bill,
including some to improve relations between the FBI and other agencies,
and I am sure there will be further refinements in this bill when it is
considered by the Judiciary Committee. The important thing is that
Senator Specter is working, I think effectively and in a bipartisan
manner, to ensure that his inquiry into the Wen Ho Lee case leads to
useful changes and not just to partisan recriminations. I compliment
him on that, because the purpose of oversight is not only to find out
who struck John but, in the national interest, to find the best way to
prevent something such as this from happening again. So I compliment
him and again thank him for acceding to the more than several changes I
asked for in this legislation.
I think the amendments to existing law that this bill will enact are
good amendments. I think America will be well served, and I would argue
that the individual rights of Americans will be in no greater jeopardy
after this passes than they ever were. They are protected; they will
continue to be protected; and some of these changes will
[[Page S803]]
even help to further protect the rights of individual Americans.
I yield the floor.
106th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 2089
To amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to modify procedures relating to orders for surveillance and searches for foreign intelligence purposes, and for other purposes.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
February 24, 2000
Mr. SPECTER (for himself, Mr. TORRICELLI, Mr. THURMOND, Mr. BIDEN, Mr. GRASSLEY, Mr. FEINGOLD, Mr. HELMS, Mr. SCHUMER, and Mr. SESSIONS) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
A BILL
To amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to modify procedures relating to orders for surveillance and searches for foreign intelligence purposes, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the `Counterintelligence Reform Act of 2000'.
SEC. 2. CIRCUMSTANCES ESTABLISHING PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ISSUANCE OF ORDERS FOR ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE UNDER FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978.
(a) PAST ACTIVITIES- Section 105 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) as subsections (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (h), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsection (b):
`(b) In determining whether or not probable cause exists for purposes of an order under subsection (a)(3), a judge may consider past activities of the target, as well as facts and circumstances relating to current or future activities of the target.'.
(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT- Subsection (d) of that section, as redesignated by subsection (a)(1) of this section, is amended by striking `subsection (b)(1)' and inserting `subsection (c)(1)'.
SEC. 3. ORDERS FOR ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE UNDER FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978.
(a) DESCRIPTION OF INTELLIGENCE OR LAW-ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES OF CERTAIN TARGETS- Section 104 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804) is amended--
(A) by redesignating paragraphs (8), (9), (10), and (11) as paragraphs (9), (10), (11), and (12), respectively; and
(B) by inserting after paragraph (7) the following new paragraph (8):
`(8) in the case of an application covering a target described in section 101(b)(2), a detailed description of--
`(A) any current relationship between the target and any Federal intelligence, intelligence-related, or law enforcement activity; and
`(B) any prior relationship between the target and any Federal intelligence, intelligence-related, or law enforcement activity that is relevant to a determination of probable cause under section 105;'; and
(2) in subsection (b), by striking `(8), and (11)' and inserting `(9), and (12)'.
(b) ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS REGARDING CERTAIN APPLICATIONS- That section is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
`(e)(1)(A) Upon written request of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, or the Director of Central Intelligence, the Attorney General shall personally review under subsection (a) an application under that subsection for a target described in section 101(b)(2).
`(B) An official referred to in subparagraph (A) may not delegate the authority to make a request referred to in that subparagraph.
`(2)(A) If as a result of a request under paragraph (1) the Attorney General determines not to approve an application under the second sentence of subsection (a) for purposes of making the application under this section, the Attorney General shall provide written notice of the determination to the official making the request for the review of the application under that paragraph. The Attorney General may not delegate the responsibility set forth in the preceding sentence.
`(B) Notice with respect to an application under subparagraph (A) shall set forth the modifications, if any, of the application that are necessary in order for the Attorney General to approve the application under the second sentence of subsection (a) for purposes of making the application under this section.
`(C) Upon review of any modifications of an application set forth under subparagraph (B), the official notified of the modifications under this paragraph shall modify the application if such official determines that such modification is warranted. Such official shall supervise the making of any modification under this subparagraph. Such official may not delegate the responsibility set forth in the preceding sentence.'.
SEC. 4. ORDERS FOR PHYSICAL SEARCHES UNDER FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978.
(a) DESCRIPTION OF INTELLIGENCE OR LAW-ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES OF CERTAIN TARGETS- Subsection (a) of section 303 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1823) is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (8) and (9) as paragraphs (9) and (10), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (7) the following new paragraph (8):
`(8) in the case of an application covering a target described in section 101(b)(2), a detailed description of--
`(A) any current relationship between the target and any Federal intelligence, intelligence-related, or law enforcement activity; and
`(B) any prior relationship between the target and any Federal intelligence, intelligence-related, or law enforcement activity that is relevant to a determination of probable cause under section 304;'.
(b) ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS REGARDING CERTAIN APPLICATIONS- That section is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
`(d)(1)(A) Upon written request of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, or the Director of Central Intelligence, the Attorney General shall personally review under subsection (a) an application under that subsection for a target described in section 101(b)(2).
`(B) An official referred to in subparagraph (A) may not delegate the authority to make a request referred to in that subparagraph.
`(2)(A) If as a result of a request under paragraph (1) the Attorney General determines not to approve an application under the second sentence of subsection (a) for purposes of making the application under this section, the Attorney General shall provide written notice of the determination to the official making the request for the review of the application under that paragraph. The Attorney General may not delegate the responsibility set forth in the preceding sentence.
`(B) Notice with respect to an application under subparagraph (A) shall set forth the modifications, if any, of the application that are necessary in order for the Attorney General to approve the application under the second sentence of subsection (a) for purposes of making the application under this section.
`(C) Upon review of any modifications of an application set forth under subparagraph (B), the official notified of the modifications under this paragraph shall modify the application if such official determines that such modification is warranted. Such official shall supervise the making of any modification under this subparagraph. Such official may not delegate the responsibility set forth in the preceding sentence.'.
SEC. 5. DISCLOSURE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT PURPOSES OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED UNDER FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978.
(a) REGULATIONS RELATING TO DISCLOSURE- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall prescribe in regulations the following:
(1) The circumstances under which information acquired pursuant to title I of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) shall be disclosed for law enforcement purposes under section 106(b) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 1806(b)).
(2) The circumstances under which information acquired pursuant to title III of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1821 et seq.) shall be disclosed for law enforcement purposes under section 305(c) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 1825(c)).
(3) The circumstances under which information acquired pursuant to title IV of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1841 et seq.) shall be disclosed for law enforcement purposes under section 405(b) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 1845(b)).
(b) SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS- The Attorney General shall submit to the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and House of Representatives the regulations prescribed by the Attorney General under subsection (a).
SEC. 6. COORDINATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WITH THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.
(a) TREATMENT OF CERTAIN SUBJECTS OF INVESTIGATION- Subsection (c) of section 811 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (50 U.S.C. 402a) is amended--
(1) in paragraphs (1) and (2), by striking `paragraph (3)' and inserting `paragraph (5)';
(2) by redesignating paragraphs (3), (4), (5), and (6) as paragraphs (5), (6), (7), and (9), respectively;
(3) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new paragraph (3):
`(3)(A) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall notify in writing the head of the department or agency concerned of a finding by the Federal Bureau of Investigation that the subject of an investigation under paragraph (1) should be left in place for investigative purposes.
`(B) Not later than 30 days after receiving written notification under subparagraph (A), the head of the department or agency so notified shall submit to the Director a plan to minimize the unauthorized disclosure of classified information by the subject concerned.
`(C) A plan under this paragraph may be modified if the Director and the head of the department or agency concerned jointly determine that the modification is warranted. A modification under this subparagraph may include a decision that the subject of an investigation no longer be left in place for investigative purposes.
`(D) A disagreement regarding an element of a plan under subparagraph (A), including a proposed modification of the plan under subparagraph (C), shall be resolved by the Board.'; and
(4) in paragraph (5), as so redesignated, by striking `paragraph (1) or (2)' and inserting `paragraph (1), (2), or (3)'.
(b) TIMELY PROVISION OF INFORMATION AND CONSULTATION ON ESPIONAGE INVESTIGATIONS- Paragraph (2) of that subsection is further amended--
(1) by inserting `in a timely manner' after `through appropriate channels'; and
(2) by inserting `in a timely manner' after `are consulted'.
(c) INTERFERENCE WITH FULL FIELD ESPIONAGE INVESTIGATIONS- That subsection is further amended by inserting after paragraph (3), as amended by subsection (a) of this section, the following new paragraph (4):
`(4)(A) The Federal Bureau of Investigation shall notify appropriate officials within the executive branch, including the head of the department or agency concerned, of the commencement of a full field espionage investigation with respect to an employee within the executive branch.
`(B)(i) A department or agency may not conduct a polygraph examination, interrogate, or otherwise take any action that is likely to alert an employee covered by a notice under subparagraph (A) of an investigation described in that subparagraph without prior coordination with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
`(ii) Any examination, interrogation, or other action taken under clause (i) shall be taken in consultation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.'.
(d) COORDINATION OF INFORMATION ON ESPIONAGE INVESTIGATIONS- That subsection is further amended by inserting after paragraph (7), as redesignated by subsection (a)(2) of this section, the following new paragraph (8):
`(8) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall be responsible for coordinating all information relating to espionage investigations, including information on any prior or current relationship between the subjects of such investigations and any Federal intelligence or intelligence-related activity, within the intelligence community and within and among Federal law enforcement agencies.'.
(e) REQUESTS FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE- That section is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection (d):
`(d) REQUESTS FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE- The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Director of the National Security Agency shall establish procedures to ensure the timely evaluation and determinations regarding requests from the Federal Bureau of Investigation for technical assistance in counterintelligence activities covered by this section.'.
SEC. 7. SEVERABILITY.
If any provision of this Act (including an amendment made by this Act), or the application thereof, to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this Act (including the amendments made by this Act), and the application thereof, to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.